Indian Foreign Policy

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NRao
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by NRao »

Realism of the second year

Consensus may be an oversold virtue, but it could help Narendra Modi beat the last-mile crunch in achieving foreign policy objectives

Hours before he left for India this month, U.S. Defence Secretary Ashton Carter gave an upbeat account of his upcoming trip at the Council on Foreign Relations, in New York. A slew of agreements were in the works, Mr. Carter said, and while he didn’t name the logistical support agreement (LSA, now called Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement or LEMOA), that was obviously expected to be signed. “We will also conclude several important agreements, including one on commercial shipping information exchange, which will make many new things possible in the future,” he added.

Significantly, neither the LEMOA nor the commercial shipping agreements were actually concluded or signed during the visit that saw the Defence Secretary in India for three days, his second such visit in a year. Officials have variously blamed the fine print, the timing, the unease over the U.S.’s F-16 sales to Pakistan, and the visits (being planned then) by the Defence Minister and the National Security Adviser to China as reasons for putting off the signing, but none of them fully explains the failure to clinch an agreement that the U.S. considers one of the “foundational agreements”, expected to ease the two countries’ militaries into a tighter embrace. The expectation is the signing may happen in the next few weeks or possibly in months, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi is understood to be considering another visit to Washington to bid farewell to U.S. President Barack Obama, but the moment has been missed.

Caution as new watchword

The LEMOA story is significant, not because of any perceived impact on India-U.S. ties, but because it fits into a pattern that seems to have defined foreign policy moves in Mr. Modi’s second year in office. If in the first year, he was brimming with confidence, the second year has seen more caution, and while several big announcements were made and Mr. Modi kept up his frenetic pace of travel, fewer agreements that were negotiated were actually signed or concluded. “It’s the curse of the last mile,” explained a diplomat, who described the disappointment during the Carter visit.

Consider Mr. Modi’s last visit abroad that began with a stop in Brussels. The visit to Brussels for the EU-India summit had been in the works for more than a year, aimed at restarting negotiations on a free trade agreement, formally called the Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) that had been stalled for four years. More hinges on this than good trade relations — concluding it would signify an end to the four-year logjam between India and Italy over the marines’ issue, and is also key to India’s aspirations this year to join the missile control and nuclear regimes, not to mention its goal of a UN Security Council permanent seat.

In private meetings, as well at a press conference addressed by the EU ambassador in January 2015, it was clear that the purpose of the Prime Minister’s visit would be to announce the restart of talks with his European counterparts. Eventually, officials said that despite talks going into extra time ahead of the visit, neither side was able to say “I do” when Mr. Modi arrived, primarily because of differences on guarantees and data protection.

When he went on to Washington, another deal expected to be announced choked at the last minute: for six nuclear reactors to be built by Westinghouse. Like the BTIA, this is about much more than the deal; it would be the first evidence that the India-U.S. nuclear deal announced by Mr. Modi and Mr. Obama in January 2015 was actually “done”. Since January last year, legal teams have travelled back and forth between Delhi and Washington, trying to iron out the last wrinkle over the issue of liability, but proof of their agreement will only come with the announcement of the first commercial deal, that is, with Westinghouse.

Visiting Delhi in January this year, Westinghouse CEO Daniel Roderick said in an interview to Reuters that a “commercially significant announcement” would be made when Mr. Modi came to Washington for the nuclear summit in April, but acknowledged that the liability issue was a sticking point. The visit came and went without any announcement. In another interview on the eve of the Prime Minister’s visit, Mr. Roderick said he now hoped for something “in June”, perhaps in time for when reports indicate Mr. Modi will go again to Washington.

Delays beyond agreed deadlines

With Australia, the delay on the free trade agreement — the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) as it is known — is equally significant, despite a “hard deadline” of December 2015 set by Mr. Modi and former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott for its completion. This week, Commerce Minister Nirmala Sitharaman said the two sides were “probably getting nearer to a conclusion”, but again no firm sign of it being done years after it was started and months past its deadline date.

And then there is the cliffhanger of the Rafale deal that has kept Indian and French officials on tenterhooks for more than a year now. When Mr. Modi made the unusual move (rare for a Prime Minister to do) of announcing during a state visit to France that India would buy 36 fighter aircraft in a government-to-government “off the rack” agreement, it was meant to signal decisive action that would cut through bureaucratic hurdles in order to procure much-needed military hardware. The year since has proven anything but decisive. Negotiations on offsets had to be rescued by a personal call between Mr. Modi and François Hollande last year, but despite inviting the French President to the Republic Day parade, no breakthrough was announced on the pricing issue, and only a memorandum of understanding could be signed. In January, Mr. Hollande said the deal would be announced in a matter of days, but a deal has not been announced three months later, although reports indicate it is in its “final stages”.

This list is by no means exhaustive, and it doesn’t even include the list of agreements signed that have not yet gotten off the ground. Clearly, there is no harm in prolonging negotiations for any of the deals listed above or others that are in the works. It cannot also be anyone’s case that bilateral relations hinge on deals alone, or that India alone bears the responsibility of their success or failure. What matters is the quality of the relations and not the ink expended on agreements. But if there is a pattern in all these, it is necessary to investigate why so many agreements that had been envisaged and anticipated in Mr. Modi’s first year in office are not clearing the final hurdles of negotiation in the second.

Pushback to personalised diplomacy

One of the obvious reasons is an over-dependence on summit-style diplomacy. With all his flair and forceful manner, there are limits to what the Prime Minister can achieve in one-to-one talks. At best, Mr. Modi and his counterpart can push through a particular logjam, as he did with Mr. Obama on the nuclear deal, but the fine print will still have to be vetted by negotiators. The spate of visits abroad, while excellent for the record books, dilutes the already stretched Ministry of External Affairs’ capacity for preparation and follow-ups. It is to Mr. Modi’s credit that he seems to recognise this and is slowing down that pace heading into the third year of his term. Many of the radical shifts he proposes — on alliances with the U.S., shifting his emphasis from bilateral diplomacy to commercial- and security-driven diplomacy, as well as bypassing red tape on defence and other procurement processes — are also now facing a bureaucratic pushback, and Mr. Modi may have decided to weave a path through them internally rather than externally in the year to come.

It is equally clear that despite the large electoral mandate he received in 2014, Mr. Modi will need to reach out to his political opposition on foreign policy as he approaches his mid-term. Many of his predecessors, from Narasimha Rao to Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, who had lesser majorities, have tackled the Opposition by consulting them on major foreign policy decisions, and even assigning members of the Opposition to major diplomatic roles. In contrast, given the lack of such consultation, every decision taken by Mr. Modi has been followed by open challenges and scathing public criticism from the Opposition. Consensus is, no doubt, an oversold virtue, but it could cushion Mr. Modi’s way when it comes to the last-mile crunch he faces today.
Philip
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by Philip »

It is equally clear that despite the large electoral mandate he received in 2014, Mr. Modi will need to reach out to his political opposition on foreign policy as he approaches his mid-term. Many of his predecessors, from Narasimha Rao to Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, who had lesser majorities, have tackled the Opposition by consulting them on major foreign policy decisions, and even assigning members of the Opposition to major diplomatic roles. In contrast, given the lack of such consultation, every decision taken by Mr. Modi has been followed by open challenges and scathing public criticism from the Opposition. Consensus is, no doubt, an oversold virtue, but it could cushion Mr. Modi’s way when it comes to the last-mile crunch he faces today.
Well put.India has for the most part had little controversies on foreign policy despite changes in govt. In the Week mag,both AKA and the Congress' "foot and mouth artist" who lost them millions of votes,one Mani Aioo...oops! Mani S. Aiyer, have warned Mr. M about getting too close in an embrace with Uncle Sam,LEMOA being the spark for the warnings. The Nehruvian approach ,non-alignment ruled sway even after the debacle of '62.Independence,tilting neither to east or west,though the west typified ait as being pro-Soviet as we were not in their camp,taking a Cold War "with us or against us" approach. NAM ,with India one of the 3 key nations that guided it along with Yugoslavia and Egypt,was an important global club as it attracted a large number of former colonies which were tasting independence after centuries. NAM's pressure saw the racist white supremacist regime of S.Africa bite the dust.The NAM approach is still valid today,though in some reduce measure as it has watered down with the collapse of the USSR and the polar shitfs that have taken place since then.

However, the reigniting of CW embers as we've seen in the UKR,the colour revolutions gone sour,and the ME and Islamic Crescent ablaze with proxy wars, are once again diving the principal global powers the US and Russia.They have new bedfellows and fellow travellers though today.China is closer to Russia than before,thanks to the US trying to corral China through a motley posse of Asia-Pacific lilliputs,with Japan,SoKo and the ANZACs being the principal entities.Into this motley posse,like the gung-ho gold-fevered townsfolk of Hadleyburg in that classic western "McKenna's Gold",Marshal McUncle wishes to press-gang the "Injuns".The genuine article this time,not native-Americans.His aim is to pin a Deputy's badge onto the waistcoat of Mr.Modi,the "storekeeper of India" to strengthen the posse and claim the gold of Cathay,but then as John Colorado aka Omar Sharif would tell you,"it's a long way to Canyon del Oro" or vanquishing the dragon of Cathay for that matter!
Philip
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by Philip »

MEA does an about turn over the Uighar dissident's visa the moment the Chinese frowned! great b*lls displayed by our MEA babus. We send out a huge naval "task force" to the Gulf to show off our muscles,but our Delhi MEA "task farce" makes up for the naval bombast! No wonder they want us to take shelter behind Uncle Sam's tailcoat. :rotfl:
Viv S
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by Viv S »

Philip wrote:However, the reigniting of CW embers as we've seen in the UKR,the colour revolutions gone sour,and the ME and Islamic Crescent ablaze with proxy wars, are once again diving the principal global powers the US and Russia.
Talk about wishful thinking...

There are two 'principal global powers'. Russia unfortunately is not one of them.
member_23370
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by member_23370 »

You are ignorant if you think pipsqueak like china can ever do what Russia did in syria or patrol the american coasts like Russian subs.
ShauryaT
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by ShauryaT »

Bheeshma wrote:You are ignorant if you think pipsqueak like china can ever do what Russia did in syria or patrol the american coasts like Russian subs.
No, now he will come back with 6,000 data points on the disparity of power between US and Russia and show you there is no comparison. The funny thing is, these folks would have said the same in the 2nd world war too but no one could imagine the costs Russia was willing to pay to get its way. The point is power is not just a factor of assets in hand or economic power, it is also a question of will and costs one is willing to bear.

Can only request Viv S to dwell on all these factors to come to a composite view. The Vietnam war was another example. I mean simply hats off to these people as opposed to what the US did there. We should create a South East Asia Economic Corridor (SEAEC) over land from Kolkata to Hanoi, passing through BD, Tripura, Mizoram, Myanmar, Thailand and Laos. Laos maybe at a point of no return but where is the India led SE Asia road plan?
habal
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by habal »

Viv S wrote:
Philip wrote:However, the reigniting of CW embers as we've seen in the UKR,the colour revolutions gone sour,and the ME and Islamic Crescent ablaze with proxy wars, are once again diving the principal global powers the US and Russia.
Talk about wishful thinking...

There are two 'principal global powers'. Russia unfortunately is not one of them.
Only 3 countries have depth of manufacturing and MIC to take on each other combination of each other.

Those are China, Russia and the creepy USA.

the 2 countries who can do most things but not all of them are

Germany & India. Only a quantum leap in their MIC can bring them to league of the above 3 but still they will lack the scale and tremendous breadth of geography that the first 3 have.

But right now China is a missing player, it does not intervene anywhere, it has serious crisis of confidence. Only Russia counts in standing up to USA and allies (which is EU and entire west).

Even in early days, the southern Chinese were too 'let's play by rules' kind of folks, it was the northern Chinese including the Manchus, Mongols, Kipchaks, Juechi who always led the show when it came to territorial ambition and expansion. But current PLA and Politburo is stuffed with studious southern types.
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by Viv S »

Bheeshma wrote:You are ignorant if you think pipsqueak like china can ever do what Russia did in syria or patrol the american coasts like Russian subs.
Do what in Syria? Bomb and strafe a bunch of half trained fanatics with no air defences whatsoever? No they won't. Then again, its not their port and their dictator who's under threat, so why should they?

As for their ('pipsqueak'-like) willingness to use force, ask Taiwan (which outstrips Ukraine on every metric of hard power) how confident it feels about the prospect of declaring independence.
Viv S
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by Viv S »

ShauryaT wrote:No, now he will come back with 6,000 data points on the disparity of power between US and Russia and show you there is no comparison.
Of course there's no comparison there, save for their nuclear arsenals. But the more relevant comparison i.e. between China & Russia is far more skewed than what Russian nationalists would like to believe.

Save for a specific few technologies where Russians have a legacy advantage (submarines, gas turbines), China outmatches Russia on every other measure of national power. A simple function of its economic strength ($11 Tr v $1.3 Tr, GDP 2015) carried forward to its defence budgets ($200 bn v $50 bn) coupled with huge advantage in manpower (1350 bn vs 140 mil) and an equally nationalist foreign policy. (And as a result of the ruble collapse, its got a higher nominal per capita GDP as well.)
The funny thing is, these folks would have said the same in the 2nd world war too but no one could imagine the costs Russia was willing to pay to get its way. The point is power is not just a factor of assets in hand or economic power, it is also a question of will and costs one is willing to bear.

Can only request Viv S to dwell on all these factors to come to a composite view. The Vietnam war was another example. I mean simply hats off to these people as opposed to what the US did there.
On the issue of will, its worth noting that fifteen years before the Vietnam war, long before China rose as a superpower in the making, the PLA fought a coalition led by a superpower to a standstill on foreign soil (unlike the Soviets who were fighting a peer on home ground in 1940-41), in a war of national interest (as opposed to 'national survival'). And given what the PRC is evolving into; its not going to fight a (third world) 'People's War' in the future either. They're preparing to fight an 'Information Age' war and aiming to win.
Viv S
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by Viv S »

habal wrote:Only 3 countries have depth of manufacturing and MIC to take on each other combination of each other.
Only one of the three has at the ability to independently project a substantial degree of military power. For now. Within ten years that'll be two countries. There isn't going to be a third. Not for another ten years (when you can add India to that).

As for economic power projection, China's already well on its way to catching up with and overtaking the US (and in some respects has already done so).
But right now China is a missing player, it does not intervene anywhere, it has serious crisis of confidence. Only Russia counts in standing up to USA and allies (which is EU and entire west).

Intervening for intervention's sake doesn't help achieve China's strategic interests. And unlike certain segments of the Russian intelligentsia, they aren't obsessed with the idea of opposing and bringing down the 'decadent' and 'immoral' West. They have what the Soviets/Russians never did - an economy that (despite all its transitory problems) has the potential to continue growing, upending a century of US economic primacy. Everything else will follow.
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by ShauryaT »

Viv S wrote: On the issue of will, its worth noting that fifteen years before the Vietnam war, long before China rose as a superpower in the making, the PLA fought a coalition led by a superpower to a standstill on foreign soil (unlike the Soviets who were fighting a peer on home ground in 1940-41), in a war of national interest (as opposed to 'national survival'). And given what the PRC is evolving into; its not going to fight a (third world) 'People's War' in the future either. They're preparing to fight an 'Information Age' war and aiming to win.
On that, please do note, it was with the help of the BIA that Asia and Africa were conquered and defended. In an earlier era, even major PRC cities was captured by the BIA. I do not know, why the great achievements, valor and sacrifices of the BIA are not sung with glory. It is a reminder of what we are capable of and we should proudly incorporate that history as part of our military valor - separating it from its political dimensions. The point is do not underestimate the will of the Indian people. EMALS or not, we know how to fight and defend what we must. Let us stop shitting in our pants on the past two decades of achievements of China and be confident of what we are capable of.
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by NRao »

I think the bigger mistake that Modi made, of FP issues, is that displaced veterans within his own party. A good part of his back peddling I think is due to the lack of experience in his circle.
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by ShauryaT »

NRao wrote:I think the bigger mistake that Modi made, of FP issues, is that displaced veterans within his own party. A good part of his back peddling I think is due to the lack of experience in his circle.
I agree and this should be viewed from a non-partisan lens. This lack of confidence is affecting not just FP but ALL policy, but that is OT. It is as if you almost need two separate teams, one to govern and the other to win elections. The trick is in being able to undertake administrative reforms. So, in the FP area, challenge the IFS babucracy with an infusion of outside talent that a political leader can bring in as ambassadors, advisers, etc and they may or may not leave with a change in power. An infusion of talent from the outside to shake things up is needed or else babus will be babus and politicians will be politicians. When these advisers political bosses loose power the normal thing would be for these political appointees to also by and large loose their positions and let a fresh set of folks come in with the new power. Let babus be babus and push paper and act as a check on some rash decisions of the political appointees but the only way to get in some dynamism is to take some risk. The current structure has NO scope for any risk taking.
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by member_29350 »

I see deliberate vacillation by the FS cadre on India's projection policy. Right from Sujatha Singh who had to be ejected out for trying to outguess the PM and set a different agenda. A lot more dismissals are needed for people to actually work, design and project a sensible policy that showcases India's identity and mores
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

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ShauryaT wrote:On that, please do note, it was with the help of the BIA that Asia and Africa were conquered and defended. In an earlier era, even major PRC cities was captured by the BIA. I do not know, why the great achievements, valor and sacrifices of the BIA are not sung with glory.
Yes the British Empire was held together with Indian boots. Still doesn't change the fact that Asia & Africa predominantly consisted of pre-industrial societies (with the notable exception of Meiji-era Japan). To quote one Capt. Edmund Blackadder - "the kind of people we liked to fight were two feet tall and armed with grass".
It is a reminder of what we are capable of and we should proudly incorporate that history as part of our military valor - separating it from its political dimensions. The point is do not underestimate the will of the Indian people. EMALS or not, we know how to fight and defend what we must. Let us stop shitting in our pants on the past two decades of achievements of China and be confident of what we are capable of.
That's all fine as a rallying cry to keep the spirits up. Meanwhile I don't blame the MoD & MEA for scheming and plotting to ensure that those actually doing the fighting, face odds that are as low as possible, and that they aren't forced to hemorrhage good men to keep the flag flying and national morale steady, even though they're ready and willing to do so. (The victory at Stalingrad, for example, may be glorious to those who remember it and read about it, but I doubt glory was the last thing going through the minds of the ones who made it happen, by dying in the mud by the thousands.)
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

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ShauryaT wrote:On that, please do note, it was with the help of the BIA that Asia and Africa were conquered and defended. In an earlier era, even major PRC cities was captured by the BIA. I do not know, why the great achievements, valor and sacrifices of the BIA are not sung with glory. It is a reminder of what we are capable of and we should proudly incorporate that history as part of our military valor - separating it from its political dimensions. The point is do not underestimate the will of the Indian people. EMALS or not, we know how to fight and defend what we must. Let us stop shitting in our pants on the past two decades of achievements of China and be confident of what we are capable of.
I think you ought to stop making absurd arguments. The UK was the predominant industrial and economic power at that time and had a peerless navy. That allowed them to project power using the BIA. If just bodies and valour was enough, India wouldn't have be colonized in the first place. The idiocy of comparing Vietnam's experience against the US and China is just mind boggling. The point is to prevent a war from breaking out in the first place, anchored by one's own economic, industrial and military power, or an alliance to shore up against a superior enemy. Fighting the enemy to a standstill on one's own soil is not a great win. It's barely managing to survive.
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

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KrishnaK: Completely opposed to an alliance (your words) with the US. Willing to pay the price and bear the risk to maintain our space of maneuver and retain our freedom of action in our chosen region of interest and ensure that Bharat remains an "independent" pole of power and works towards the objective of a great power, in its own right that can protect its geo-political interests. I bring these arguments as I do not know, what some of you are thinking. Either a few shiny toys will enable us to resist China or are you folks in fact delusional and the US indeed will put her blood, sweat and money to fight for Indian interests or worse that Indians do not know how to fight and hence need to be colonized (allied).

At the end of the day, it was bodies and valor that was enough to send the British Empire packing home. The BIA was as much responsible for our freedom as the freedom movement. My angst is our babus and many of us forget the former part too easily and keep these facts out of the public conscious and school history. We have looked upon the achievements of our men with a sense of shame for being a colonial army. As for your point that it was the Navy that enabled the army, How can I argue against the accomplishment of the RIN? It was the glory and valor of the sailors to claim, including the great mutiny that played a critical role to establish our freedom.

Mahindra Singh Sairila's works are instructive here on how FDR followed up regularly with Churchill to ensure Indian war preparations were as per plan, as it was critical to the war effort. Without the support of Indian men, the British were nothing and as soon as this support was deemed unreliable, they were left to nothing and lost their empire. Some new works that shed light into that history, which we should all read.
I think the key point is that the British lost the empire not just because they were weakened by the war, but because they lost the Indian Army’s support by the end of it, which was their instrument of control. That’s what the impact of the INA mutiny was, to show that the British could raise this massive Army, but that it could turn on them too. People like Churchill had even questioned the expansion of the Indian Army and said: “Someday it is going to shoot us in the back”.
British lost empire as they lost our Army’s support
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by Philip »

Sorry Viv,it was Uncle Sam who ran away in Syria not Russia! :rotfl:

http://www.deccanchronicle.com/opinion/ ... flops.html

Modi’s diplomatic flip-flops
Published Apr 27, 2016, 5:51 am ISTUpdated Apr 27, 2016, 5:51 am IST

Mr Isa would take the affront to China too far.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi (Photo: PTI)

The foreign policy of any nation is both continuity and innovation within established boundaries of national political consensus. Politicians during electioneering often make bold or even aggressive statements, but as a rule power has a moderating influence and drives them towards the mainstream consensus. Sometimes there are exceptions. For instance, the Bharatiya Janata Party government of Atal Behari Vajpayee came to power with its election manifesto describing nuclear weapons as a factor of national security. No one paid any attention as this was seen as election rhetoric, but within months of being in office, the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998 took everyone by surprise.

The Modi government similarly assumed power advocating a more muscular approach to dealing with recalcitrant neighbours, i.e. principally Pakistan and China. Unfortunately, the Modi government’s experiment with new, coercive doctrines has been erratic and without ensuring that pressure on target nations is calibrated to be neither beyond Indian capabilities nor delinked from universal values, which separate India from China or its protégés.

The reality of China being an all-weather friend of Pakistan has become increasingly apparent as China has chosen to more openly back Pakistan. India too has lifted its engagement with the US, Japan and Australia to a higher plane, treating the Indo-Pacific region as a seamless theatre for diplomatic, economic and military partnerships. The first signs were a more visible Chinese presence in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, followed by the announcement of the $45 billion China-Pakistan economic corridor. The vetoing of a listing of the leaders of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) by the United Nations Security Council counter-terrorism committee was China directly poking India in the eye despite its own serious problems with terrorism in Xinjiang.

The Indian option was to either, as foreign secretary S. Jaishankar said at the inauguration of Carnegie foundation India, treat this in a UN context and not let it poison the rest of the relationship or to draw a red line and expect China to address it unless it wanted to impact the bilateral relations in other areas. A third alternative was to start paying China in the same coin after weighing the consequences as China tends to pursue its national security goals with dogged firmness.

The controversy that erupted on Monday over the grant and then cancellation of visa to prominent Uyghur leader Dolkun Isa, head of the World Uyghur Congress (WUC), for attending the Interethnic/Interfaith Leadership Conference organised by US-based “Initiatives for China” at Dharamsala, raises serious questions. Mr Isa has expressed his disappointment. The government’s explanation that he has an Interpol Red Corner notice, which debars him from entering India, seemed unconvincing.

Although India denied a visa to Uyghur leader Rebiya Kadeer in 2009, as Mr Isa pointed out, India had even as early as 1949 admitted Uyghur leaders fleeing persecution in China. Such conferences need approval of the ministry of external affairs and ministry of home affairs, for which applications are required months in advance, complete with list of invitees. The location and theme was obviously aimed at sending a signal to China. The identity of the sponsors also raises questions about their real masters. Maybe the government felt

Mr Isa would take the affront to China too far. The issue that arises is not that visa was denied but that it was withdrawn after grant, making it appear that India buckled under Chinese pressure.
It is possible the e-tourist visa was mistakenly given and once its ramifications were clear was withdrawn. However, India should have simply announced that no one can come on a tourist visa to attend a conference, so Mr Isa was being asked to apply correctly. Naturally there was little time to process a fresh visa and the issue would have faded away.

The relations with Pakistan also betray a similar flip-flop that gives an impression of lack of a well thought-out strategy to counter the old conundrum of how to dissuade Pakistan from using terror as an instrument of state policy, which it attempts to use to coerce India to resolve disputes on terms acceptable to Pakistani military, while engaging the civilian government. Mr Modi’s dramatic stopover in Lahore, followed soon by the terror attack at the Pathankot airbase and Pakistani unwillingness to allow, as India did, an Indian investigation team to go to Pakistan leave the relations adrift.

The name of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s family in the Panama Papers and his sudden departure for the UK for medical treatment had rumours swirling of another military coup. Mr Sharif having returned to Pakistan leads to the following surmise: Mr Sharif has been weakened politically, if not fatally; also the Army appears to be not yet ready to directly assume charge of the nation, preferring back-seat driving.

In this context, the visit of Pakistan’s foreign secretary, albeit for a conference on Afghanistan, leaves the possibility of a meeting with his Indian counterpart. Pakistan wants India to operate this second track simultaneously to discuss resolution of disputes instead of, as India insists, having the national security advisers of two countries resolving first the outstanding terror issues, particularly 26/11 and now Pathankot. Pakistan meanwhile has been able to complicate the matter by arresting a former Indian naval officer, perhaps by kidnapping him from Iran where he ran a business, for allegedly abetting terror in Balochistan. Moral equivalence is thus attempted to be created with India. Is this Pakistan’s riposte to the Doval doctrine of an eye for an eye?

Clearly the “muscular” national security approach of the Modi government has run into trouble. Meanwhile, the smaller neighbours also test Indian resolve. The President of Maldives breezes into Delhi, signs agreements but goes back and seeks the return of former President Mohamed Nasheed from medical treatment abroad, indicating either that India has withdrawn from Maldivian domestic debate or they are signalling defiance. Henry Kissinger said hope is not a policy. Nor it appears can be muscle flexing which is fitful and not anchored in principles like human rights and democracy and laced with realpolitik.

PS:The manner in which the Maldives is taking us for a sweet ride has to be met with real muscle.India does not need to display a fraction of its full capability here to bring the Maldivians to heel.But do we have the will?
This is where the Modi regime differs from the ABV regime at least upto now in comparison.ABV walked the talk with the P-2 N-tests and rode through the US sanction regime.The visiting Maldivian pres should've had the riot act read out to him and b*lls squeezed hard.Unfiortunately,we have wimps,wets and waiters masquerading as diplomats in the MEA.
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by member_28442 »

Philip wrote: PS:The manner in which the Maldives is taking us for a sweet ride has to be met with real muscle.India does not need to display a fraction of its full capability here to bring the Maldivians to heel.But do we have the will?[/b] This is where the Modi regime differs from the ABV regime at least upto now in comparison.ABV walked the talk with the P-2 N-tests and rode through the US sanction regime.The visiting Maldivian pres should've had the riot act read out to him and b*lls squeezed hard.Unfiortunately,we have wimps,wets and waiters masquerading as diplomats in the MEA.
i have a question
do the diplomats in MEA have their own foreign policy agenda when the head of another state visits?
or is everything decided by the minister and the PMO ?
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by NRao »

^^^^^

Good question.

It is called the Deep State. PMO, etc have some say, but the DS , being continuous and with old tentacles, prevail more often then not.
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by Austin »

China, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan share Russia’s approaches to security — Russia FM
BEIJING, April 28. /TASS/. Ideas in the security sphere advanced by China, India, Indonesia and Kazakhstan are similar to Russia’s, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on Thursday at a ministerial meeting of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA).

"Efficient answer to the challenges and threats in the region can be found in open inclusive multilateral mechanisms of security, in common ‘rules of the game,’" he said.

In his words, they should be based on the principles of equality and indivisibility of security, respect to norms of international law, peace settlement of disputes, non-use of force or a threat of force, denial of any actions aiming at overthrowing legitimate governments.

"These Russian approaches are shared by the majority of responsible participants in international communication," Lavrov noted. "Similar ideas are advanced by China, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan. Other countries also have their ideas."

"It is necessary to ensure their synergy so that the regional architecture of security could really reckon with the interests of all countries and be adequate to the present-day realities," the Russian top diplomat said. "We call on all to join this work that has already started within the East Asia Summit."
member_28442
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by member_28442 »

NRao wrote:^^^^^

Good question.

It is called the Deep State. PMO, etc have some say, but the DS , being continuous and with old tentacles, prevail more often then not.
then why not just transfer/retire these DS actors. after a few of them are halalled the rest will relax
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by chetak »

SSharma wrote:
NRao wrote:^^^^^

Good question.

It is called the Deep State. PMO, etc have some say, but the DS , being continuous and with old tentacles, prevail more often then not.
then why not just transfer/retire these DS actors. after a few of them are halalled the rest will relax
If the Min has a strong personality and prevails, the baboo(n)s will not come out of the shadows. If not, who cares what the baboo(n)s do??
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by ShauryaT »

Has India outsourced foreign policy to American think tanks?
IN 2013, Brookings Institution, a prestigious American think tank, opened its New Delhi chapter, promising to disseminate ‘recommendations for Indian policymakers’. Three years later, its Washington twin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, set up shop in the country, hoping to develop ‘fresh policy ideas and direct[ly] [engage] and collaborat[e] with decision makers in [Indian] government, business, and civil society’. It is reasonable to surmise that the policy advice proffered by these two organisations will, at a minimum, be in tune with the US interests and geopolitics.

In fact, at an event on 6 April, Sunil Mittal, owner of Bharti Airtel, a big donor and chairman of the board of trustees of Carnegie India, removed any doubts on this score. “We have put out our flag here,” he declared, without a trace of irony in a speech that to some seemed studded with many other cringe-worthy gems, such as his plea to numerous Indian moneybags in the audience to show more “generosity in moving our agenda forward”—meaning, presumably, the Carnegie (cum-Brookings)-qua-US government policy agenda in this country.

Carnegie and Brookings have established a presence financed by Indians, to influence the Indian Government and engender domestic policies that resonate with the United States’ regional and international posture. It is a business model last implemented when the famed Jagat Seths of Murshidabad subsidised the East India Company’s operations.

It marks an astonishing turn in Indian foreign policy that until the last years of the 20th century had made good by leveraging the country’s autonomous heft and independent standing in the world—keeping all big powers at bay while getting close to this or that major country on a contingency basis to advance specific strategic interests from time to time, and by scrupulously preserving its broad policy latitude and freedom of action. But Shivshankar Menon, a star in the Brookings India firmament, during his time as India’s Foreign Secretary and National Security Adviser in the Manmohan Singh dispensation, scoffed at Indian policies to ‘balance’ regional and international power as “oh so 19th century” and now foresees no detrimental outcomes from buying into US security schemes. That such sentiments are mainstream today is attributable to the institutionalisation in the late 1990s of the collaborationist school of national security policy thinking propagated by the late K Subrahmanyam, the ‘go to’ strategist for the Indian Government.

In a nutshell, Subrahmanyam’s idea was that in a world dominated by the US, it made economic, technological and military sense to foster a strategic partnership with it to help propel the Indian economy forward and enable the country to technologically and militarily compete with China, and, by acting as a ‘responsible’ country with ‘reasonable’ policies, become a stakeholder in a system of durable peace in Asia overseen by Washington DC. The policies of AB Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh, and Narendra Modi have hewed to the Subrahmanyam script. They have made capital purchases ($10 billion worth of transport planes, for example, with $25 billion worth of nuclear reactors in the pipeline), courted US trade and investments, enhanced military cooperation, and even compromised India’s nuclear security (by acquiescing in a testing moratorium cemented by the Indo-US nuclear deal and restricting India to a small nuclear arsenal for ‘minimum deterrence’). It may be recalled that Subrahmanyam and his acolytes campaigned for India’s signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1995-96, which would have left India stranded short of even basic low-yield fission weapons.

Subrahmanyam’s prescriptions found eager takers because toadying up to the West is in India’s genes. The retention, post- 1947, of the colonial-era civil services, administrative structure and armed forces wedded to British norms and values has perpetuated policies in the Western mould, notwithstanding the ‘socialism’ professed by its rulers. Moreover, the English-medium education system has had its effect. This is another colonial legacy that today mass produces software specialists, engineers, doctors and financial managers itching to service the post- industrial economies of the US, UK, Canada and Australia. Indian policies to keep this ‘brain bank’ solvent have helped firm up domestic support for US-friendly policies among the middle-class and other aspiring sections of the Indian society, complete with an annual song-and-dance celebration of our ‘pravasis’ staged by the Ministry of External Affairs which loops back into jam-packed NRI receptions for Prime Minister Modi on his jaunts to Western cities.

The outsourcing of India’s foreign policy begs the question: Does the Indian Government have a sense of India? India, in the minds of the new lot of Indian rulers, is thus increasingly only a cultural expression, not a national territorial entity whose interests have to be vigorously protected, pursued and advanced by any and all means. In their reckoning, the nation and national interest are fungible concepts and the policies meant to serve them can be entirely elastic. So, C Raja Mohan, director of the local Carnegie unit, argues for India’s becoming a part of the ‘political West’ and for its joining China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, deeming these moves as “pragmatic economics and muscular geopolitics”. But cutting deals at every step reflects a susceptibility to pressure and an infirm will, compounding the confusion at the heart of Indian foreign and military policies. When aggregated, the effects of such moves can quickly hollow out the nation.

Central to giving legitimacy to the role of American think tanks in shaping Indian foreign policy is Ashley Tellis. As a senior Carnegie associate in Washington and heavyweight policy wonk, he finessed the Nuclear Deal with the US through Indian corridors. Tellis enjoys unprecedented access to the highest in the land, and rarely misses an opportunity to push US objectives in the guise of serving India’s interests. He, for instance, contends in a recent monograph that India’s best bet is to ally with the US and Japan because it will ‘never be capable of holding its own against… China or defining the international system to its advantage in the face of possible opposition’, and, that even Modi’s more modest goal of making India ‘a leading power’ will require it to lean on the US.

This is a self-serving thesis for the obvious reason that India has not discriminately built up its strategic capabilities or exercised its hard power options to make life difficult for China, nor reacted in kind to China’s elbows in the face. Beijing has had a free pass. Merely mentioning a transfer of nuclear missiles to Vietnam and the Philippines, or activation of the Tibet and Uyghur ‘cards’, is to hint at the sort of trouble India can create for China as payback for its nuclear missile arming of Pakistan and supporting insurgencies in the Indian northeast.

Consumed with pleasing Washington and fearful of displeasing Beijing, Indian governments—including Modi’s— have settled into a comfortable niche they have carved out of a small-minded, narrow-visioned Indian state that can be relied upon not to be disruptive, create trouble, or undermine regional and global orders that victimise it. Such weak-willed and weak-kneed regimes will, however, seek ‘narratives’ from Carnegie and Brookings that would justify their risk-averse, talk-much-do-little policies that hitch the country to the US bandwagon. This last, Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar said at the Carnegie do, constitutes “a contemporary agenda [that goes] beyond the debates of a less confident era”. India, he averred, must “leverage the dominant, collaborate with the convergent, and manage the competition”.

Subrahmanyam had observed that, “With the Americans, you purchase not just weapons but a security relationship… [We should] build it into [our] calculations.” Jaishankar didn’t explain how Modi’s forging a military alliance with the US by signing the ‘foundational agreements’ that Washington desires, such as the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement, and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement, which will tar India’s reputation in the Third World, limit India’s room for manoeuvre, alienate Moscow, hobble sensitive strategic projects involving Russian technical expertise, and comprehensively ground the country’s fighting capabilities featuring Russian hardware, even as America offers us armaments of 1970s vintage—F-16/F-18 combat aircraft, will ‘leverage the dominant’ and serve the national interest.

The LSA, for example, is unnecessary because it only formalises an existing arrangement whereby US ships and aircraft are refuelled and replenished on a barter basis to avoid negotiating the complex accounting systems in each other’s country and handling cash. The LSA will end up re-hyphenating India with Pakistan, as Islamabad is on the LSA grid and to get reimbursement for sustaining and servicing US troops in Afghanistan, has to jump through procedural hoops and face US Congressional scrutiny. Does Modi favour exposing the Indian military to this kind of public humiliation in another country? Apologists for the accords claim they will extend the operational reach of the Indian navy and air force. But why would New Delhi opt for such a short-term salve when the long term solution of developing distant bases (in the Agalégas in Mauritius, in northern Mozambique, Seychelles, et al) is available for the asking?

Modi’s approval of these agreements— to satisfy President Barack Obama, perhaps—may be traced to his palpable fascination with the US. He is planning his fourth visit to Washington soon. It is in keeping with the impetuous decisions he makes (such as committing the country to buy 36 Rafale fighter aircraft in Paris, initially disavowing India’s claim on the Kohinoor diamond, among others) as friendly gestures to his Western hosts.

Outsourcing of India’s foreign policy in small and big ways begs the larger question: Does the Indian Government have a sense of India, its role in the region and the world, of the nation’s inherent capacity to shape its own future, and to mobilise resources for it? The answer is iffy. Why else would one see India running in place for the last six decades and still expect it to get somewhere? When a country doesn’t know what it wants and how to get it, it will latch on to imported solutions. A facilitative factor is the Indian Government’s naiveté and gullibility when dealing with Western countries, resulting in its swallowing nonsensical promises such as Washington’s to help India become ‘a major power’. Related to it is the civilisational failing of mistaking tactics for strategy. It is the same old story all over again. Incapable of seeing beyond their immediate pecuniary profit, the Seths lent money to Robert Clive at Plassey, and, other repercussions apart, funded their own decline.

(Bharat Karnad is the author most recently of Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet). The author’s views do not reflect Open’s)
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by KrishnaK »

ShauryaT wrote:
IN 2013, Brookings Institution, a prestigious American think tank, opened its New Delhi chapter, promising to disseminate ‘recommendations for Indian policymakers’. Three years later, its Washington twin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, set up shop in the country, hoping to develop ‘fresh policy ideas and direct[ly] [engage] and collaborat[e] with decision makers in [Indian] government, business, and civil society’. It is reasonable to surmise that the policy advice proffered by these two organisations will, at a minimum, be in tune with the US interests and geopolitics.

In fact, at an event on 6 April, Sunil Mittal, owner of Bharti Airtel, a big donor and chairman of the board of trustees of Carnegie India, removed any doubts on this score. “We have put out our flag here,” he declared, without a trace of irony in a speech that to some seemed studded with many other cringe-worthy gems, such as his plea to numerous Indian moneybags in the audience to show more “generosity in moving our agenda forward”—meaning, presumably, the Carnegie (cum-Brookings)-qua-US government policy agenda in this country.
Using the order established by another power to grow one's one business interests has happened before. The US grew economically under the noses of the British empire from whom it achieved independence and then managed to take over without endangering its own independence.
Carnegie and Brookings have established a presence financed by Indians, to influence the Indian Government and engender domestic policies that resonate with the United States’ regional and international posture. It is a business model last implemented when the famed Jagat Seths of Murshidabad subsidised the East India Company’s operations.
There is no comparison between the India when the East India company operated and the current incarnation The difference is the establishment of a modern state which has demonstrated the ability to manage all the functions of the state including the most important one - transition of power. India has held 16 union elections which are considered free and fair by pretty much everyone in the world. Paranoid dramabaazi.
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by ShauryaT »

KrishnaK: Why not say more clearly. You want India to ally with the US and the US being the larger power, it is OK for India to compromise with its geo-political interests. This way you do not have to draw non-sensical and wrong inferences from things like EIC, battle of plassey, US-UK history, which from your posts, you do not seem have read except in its cursory ways to know fully what is implied by them. Give real examples of the same, Japan, S. Korea, UK, Germany, these are nations, very successful in their own respect and "allied" with the United States. I wish someone actually does make these arguments openly and clearly instead of trying to be sly about being allied with the US. Based on its facts and merits, it can be a powerful argument and also serve Indian interests from a certain lens. Just be open about it.
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by KrishnaK »

ShauryaT wrote: KrishnaK: Why not say more clearly. You want India to ally with the US and the US being the larger power, it is OK for India to compromise with its geo-political interests.
My argument isn't about what either of us want. Allying with anyone is going to involve compromises on either side. If the advantages are large enough to offset, it will happen automatically. I personally think it will happen no matter what anyone says. India cannot afford to have a clear understanding on where the US stands on all sorts of issues. Wanting to put that down on paper is the next step from there. Even the defence agreement we have with them could hardly have been envisaged a few decades ago.
This way you do not have to draw non-sensical and wrong inferences from things like EIC, battle of plassey, US-UK history, which from your posts, you do not seem have read except in its cursory ways to know fully what is implied by them.
Lol.. I'm not interested in getting into an argument over my understanding. You're free to indulge in your conspiracy theories and I'll feel equally free to call them out. Battle of Plassey :rotfl:
Give real examples of the same, Japan, S. Korea, UK, Germany, these are nations, very successful in their own respect and "allied" with the United States. I wish someone actually does make these arguments openly and clearly instead of trying to be sly about being allied with the US. Based on its facts and merits, it can be a powerful argument and also serve Indian interests from a certain lens. Just be open about it.
I'm not being sly about anything. I'm stating very clearly and openly that comparing the of India of 1700s with the India of today is absurd and ridiculous. BTW I'm saying that without implying any mischief on your part :).
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by Arjun »

It is reasonable to surmise that the policy advice proffered by these two organisations will, at a minimum, be in tune with the US interests and geopolitics.
If these individuals Sunil Bhartee Mittle and other Indian businessmen are financing organizations that promote US or non-Indian interests in India - that IS most definitely a highly serious allegation. This will not go down well with the Indian public and NOR should it.

On the other hand if the agenda is one based on promotion of trade principles - such as 'free enterprise' or globalization, then Mittal should come out and openly make that case in his defense. It would then be incumbent on parliament or Indian public opinion to monitor whether Brookings policy prescriptions are indeed consistent and oriented towards promoting a particular value irrespective of whether they are pro-or anti- US national interest.
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by Kashi »

KrishnaK wrote: India cannot afford to have a clear understanding on where the US stands on all sorts of issues.
Say what? :-?
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by JE Menon »

Those things work both ways...think tanks and the like. Apart from being a fund sink.
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by Philip »

In general,the GOI should take a stand that NO foreign NGOs which have a secuurity/defence/!strategic agenda should ever be allowed to set up shop in India.This is as good as asking a foreign intel agency,CIA,FSB,MI-6 whoever,to set up shop in India freely and openly.We have taken such a strong view of firang NGOs (KKNPPagitation,IB reports) trying to destabilize our civil N-programme, how on earth are we allowing such oufits to operate openly in India? One might as well request that india be added on as another star on the Stars and Stripes! :rotfl:
member_29350
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by member_29350 »

SSharma wrote:
NRao wrote:^^^^^

Good question.

It is called the Deep State. PMO, etc have some say, but the DS , being continuous and with old tentacles, prevail more often then not.
then why not just transfer/retire these DS actors. after a few of them are halalled the rest will relax
That's what happened to Sujatha Singh, told to take a hike and marched out when she opposed what the PM wanted to do

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 048436.cms
NRao
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by NRao »

SSharma wrote:
NRao wrote:^^^^^

Good question.

It is called the Deep State. PMO, etc have some say, but the DS , being continuous and with old tentacles, prevail more often then not.
then why not just transfer/retire these DS actors. after a few of them are halalled the rest will relax
Well ............................

A couple of points here.

1) Deep states exist everywhere. Even in villages in India. They are either business, political or other interests. Until now, since it was very difficult to identify such entities, it was called a "Deep State". The solution lies in gaming a situation. NOT easy, but doable, if there is a will. A "deep state" exists everywhere, in the US deep state for "motels" are .................................................................................. NRIs - "Patels". There was a time in Chicago, the "deep state" for street side vendors were Indians. You could not get anything done without their blessing.

2) Such interests are very well established. Take an Indian village, interests have been vested for eons. And, that is the problem. You cannot really hallal someone here and there. Their kids will get to you. And, there are a ton of these kids - all over the world.

So, how do you overcome them - game and some luck. Not impossible.

BTW, did you hear about the American who was dealing with Indians in the def sector - about 6-8 years ago? He said he would rather wait until the next gen came along. :) And, that, to a certain extent, is what is happening. Anyone below 45 years of age is being wooed (Karnad should know better). Conversely, anyone above taht age is given a lot of drinks and sent home.






FUN times. That is how the world works.

I think India has a HUGE potential, provided Indians play the game. Stop this nonsense of "IOR" and "non-alignment" and just play the game. R Co seems to be doing so. not the best rep for India IMVVVVVVHO, but it is what it is. Hated to see Tata sell assets in UK for a $1.
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by arun »

In the end the BJP led Government of our Prime Minister Narendra Modi has shown some cojones and supported the legitimate aspirations of freedom for Peoples Republic of China occupied Xinjiang not to mention the Maoist oppressed people of the PRC as well.

India allows Uyghur, 8 Chinese dissidents to attend Dharamsala meeting
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by arshyam »

So what's this game we are supposed to be playing? Younger generation here, asking with genuine curiosity...
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by SSridhar »

SSharma wrote:i have a question
do the diplomats in MEA have their own foreign policy agenda when the head of another state visits?
or is everything decided by the minister and the PMO ?
In our country, the foreign policy has *always* been the preserve of the Prime Minister. The precedent was set by Nehru and has been faithfully followed ever since. The Foreign Minister simply follows the diktats of the PMO. Foreign policies of most nations are strategically unchanging, even with change of governments. India is no exception either.
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by Cosmo_R »

"NEW DELHI: India has quietly dumped its most controversial "red line" with Pakistan. Two years after imposing a policy whereby Pakistani officials meeting Hurriyat leaders was a distinct "no-no", India has officially walked back from this position, as it has become increasingly untenable. "

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 069159.cms

This is getting to be much like the zig zag nonsense of the UPA. I wish they would make up their mind if they have one.

For sure you can't blame this on SSM. I wonder who the replacement twit is.
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by SSridhar »

Govt says it’s okay with Hurriyat talking to Pak - Indrani Bagchi, ToI

I hope there is a method in the madness, but, increasingly, it looks to me like GoI is losing control and it looks to me more like the Brownian movements witnessed in the brief Janata Party rule after Emergency. I hope I am wrong, but am not confident of that.
India has quietly dumped its most controversial "red line" with Pakistan. Two years after imposing a policy whereby Pakistani officials meeting Hurriyat leaders was a distinct "no-no", India has officially walked back from this position, as it has become increasingly untenable.

In a written answer to Parliament last week, minister of state for external affairs VK Singh had stated, "Since the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of the Union of India and these so-called Kashmiri 'leaders' are Indian citizens, there is no bar on their meetings with representatives of any country in India."

He, however, clarified that there could be no role for any third party in the India-Pakistan dialogue process. "India has consistently maintained that there is no role for a third party in the bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan as per the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration. India's displeasure at Pakistan's attempts to interfere in India's internal affairs has been repeatedly conveyed to Pakistan," he added.

In August 2014, the Modi government imposed a new pre-condition to talks with Pakistan, cancelling foreign secretary talks on the argument that the Pakistani high commissioner had met Hurriyat leaders before the official talks. That added a new, belligerent dimension to the bilateral dynamic.

Since the Agra summit in 2001, Pakistani leaders and senior officials have been meeting Hurriyat leaders regularly without the government throwing a fit. Nobody liked it in the government, but they left it at that. In August 2015, when India and Pakistan were battling about the terms of reference for a meeting between NSAs after the Ufa understanding, it was once again the threat of a meeting with the Hurriyat that derailed the talks at the last minute. Trying to defend a silly position, the government went to the extent of locking up Hurriyat leaders to stop them from coming to Delhi.

In the process, the Modi government was roundly criticised for bringing into the limelight a group like the Hurriyat. The NSA dialogue crash-landed without anybody being a winner.

But a thaw was discernible after the Bangkok meetings between NSAs, which has started a new channel of quiet communication on security and terrorism between Ajit Doval and his Pakistani counterpart Nasir Khan Janjua. Clearly, the government was beginning to see how difficult it would be to impose such a ban without physically locking up Hurriyat leaders and appearing unreasonable.

The Pakistan Day celebrations this year saw a full complement of Hurriyat leaders in attendance, while the high commissioner, Abdul Basit, has even met Asiya Andrabi of Duktaran-e-Millat in April, without attracting criticism from the government.
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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Post by Philip »

Who have traditionally been the most persuasive to have the Hurriyat in the p*ss talks,not just the Pakis,but the Yanquis! This has no doubt been the advice form the Yanquis who love to have leaders who are on their payroll. It looks like our foreign policy is yet again in danger of being outsourced,thansk to the Yanqui think-tank entities being allowed to set up shop in India.
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