India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008

[Gerard]

To avoid the adverse economic impact of reactor shutdowns, India decides to temporarily feed these reactors domestic uranium. However, it does not wish this domestic uranium to get trapped in the safeguarded category as a result

(a) Do Indian enrichment plants have the capability to fabricate LWR fuel in the quantities needed to replace the foreign fuel?
(b) There will be safeguarded FBRs in the future (where all the imported spent fuel will end up). Why not put the additional spent domestic fuel there?
(c) If, after a nuclear weapon test that wrecked the non-proliferation agenda, the UN had to pass a non-binding resolution, why, in say a few decades time, would it try to pass a chapter 7 resolution on India? Over some fuel? Will Indian military and economic power be so weak in a decade or two that it need tremble so?

[SSridhar]

Does India sign onto anything with NSG at all? Is it some form of agreement between India and NSG accepting any conditions for the sake of nuclear commerce?

No, India doesn't sign anything with the NSG. The Draft being talked about is an 'Amendment' to NSG Guidelines to allow individual NSG members to trade nuclear materials and dual-use items with India. These countries, in turn, may have individual agreements with India.

However in the end, these conditions and restrictions does pit certain countries in the NSG against the others.

True. That's why countries like Austria & NZ whose nuclear commerce is a pittance can afford to take a moral high-ground, out of tune with reality, while those countries with potential for significant nuclear commerce will take a more realistic stand taking into account India's consistent stand, its laws, its achievements scientifically, industrially & technologically, its indigenous programmes, and its overall approach to nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. They cannot let these insignificant members rob them of a legal commercial opportunity of huge proportions. The DAE's repeated highlighting of 40 GWe is a good attemp to remind what the biggies will miss out, if NSG fails to pass the amenment in its current form.

[Gerard]

The NSG makes decisions by consensus. Since however it is not a body created by treaty, what prevents the US from breaking a deadlock by calling for a majority vote?

[Rkam]

http://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php ... ian_envoy/
Relations More than Nuclear: Indian Envoy
While David Emerson says voting to lift nuclear trade restrictions will reap rewards, Rajamani Laskhmi Narayan downplayed the possibility of potential payoffs.
By Michelle Collins
Although Canadian politicians and business leaders say supporting India's bid to trade nuclear fuel and technology is critical for boosting commercial ties with the growing nation, Indian High Commissioner Rajamani Lakshmi Narayan is downplaying such notions.

In an interview Monday, Mr. Narayan said the relationship between Canada and India is one which is multifaceted and on the "up and up," but that it is not one that is based on only one issue.

"I don't think one should look at this as a make or break issue," Mr. Narayan said.

"As we look at the future we can be very optimistic our trade will increase. So I'm not saying that we expect a downturn and so forth, but certainly this would add to the level of confidence and trust in India."

Two weeks ago, Canada was among the 35 countries on the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency that supported a nuclear-inspection plan for India. The plan will see India open 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors to IAEA inspection.

In return, on Aug. 21, 45 countries, including Canada, will convene at the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Vienna to vote on whether to exempt India from nuclear trade restrictions. If successful, India would be the exception to a 1968 treaty that allowed for five nations to have nuclear-weapons programs—the U.S., Russia, China, Britain and France—while restricting all other nations from developing weapons through trade in nuclear technology and supplies.

India has faced restrictions since 1974 when it used Canadian reactor technology to make and test its first atomic bomb, which triggered the creation of the NSG and tainted Canada-India relations.

Despite this, it is expected Canada will support the exemption, and Foreign Affairs Minister David Emerson is standing by the claim that this will be good for opening up bilateral relations.

On Friday, Mr. Emerson wrote a letter to the Toronto Star in response to an editorial that ran on Aug. 6 and which criticized the government's position. In the letter, Mr. Emerson said India shares Canada's values of freedom, human rights and the rule of law.

He said that this is part of the government's efforts to make up for lost time and called it a "re-engagement of India."

"It is truly a shame that Canada's relations with a like-minded country have been frozen for decades. While the rest of Canada's allies began to re-engage India in 2000, we have lagged behind," Mr. Emerson wrote.

He also said that bringing India under the IAEA umbrella "strengthens the non-proliferation regime by bringing additional nuclear facilities under international monitoring."

Similarly, Ryan Touhey, a junior fellow at the Canadian International Council in Waterloo, Ont., recently wrote a report advocating that Canada's support is key to shaking off "the burden of history" that has limited relations between Canada and India.

"Arguably, one of the most significant measures Ottawa can take in showing India that it means business is re-examining the nuclear relationship," the report states, adding that supporting the lifting of trade restrictions "will be a bold measure."

Despite such claims this will improve the bilateral relations, Mr. Narayan said the discussions are taking place mostly within multilateral settings and that there have been few discussions about the issue directly with Canada. He said there have been no deals worked out for Canada to receive something in exchange for its support at the NSG. At the same time, however, he refused to comment on whether Canada withholding support would harm relations.

Last week, India's national security adviser, M.K. Narayanan, was in Ottawa to meet with government ministers, including Mr. Emerson, Public Safety Minister Stockwell Day and Natural Resources Minister Gary Lunn. The high commissioner said the talks centred on the "multilateral issue."

"I don't want to talk about private conversations, but I would say we are happy with the Canadian vote, and happy for the [foreign] minister's statement as well," Mr. Narayan said.

He said Canada should support India's bid because without nuclear technology, the country will not be able to meet the large energy demands of its high-growth economy.

"We are really left with the nuclear option, and currently we are producing around three per cent of our power with the nuclear option," Mr. Narayan said. "We need access to clean and sustainable energy with a low carbon footprint, and basically, with the price of oil being where it is, fossil fuels I think would be difficult. Our needs are huge, and we can't make up for it through conventional sources...so it's quite important for us."

Mr. Narayan also said Canada and India "have a long history of co-operation in this area" as Canada was the first country to provide reactor technology to India back in the 1950s and so they are familiar with the CANDU reactors.

He avoided the fact that this history is also an uncomfortable one as India used that Canadian technology to make an atomic bomb.

Critics of Canada's voting in favour of NSG lifting restrictions say that granting India an exemption will set a dangerous precedent and make dealing with other nations, such as Iran, more difficult.

On Aug. 15, about 2,000 civil society groups from around the world will send letters to the governments of each of the 45 members of the NSG in an effort to convince them that granting India an exemption will lead to dire consequences.

[Rkam]

http://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php ... /13/kapur/

Put the Past Behind and Move Towards India
By Ashok Kapur
When India tested its nuclear devices in 1974 and declared its nuclear weapons status, there was widespread criticism of India's actions. But now most international players take India seriously and seek strong strategic and economic ties with it.

The new approach on the nuclear question is innovative and realistic. It recognizes that India will not sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, its nuclear weaponry is important for its national security and the time is ripe to make India a part of the non-proliferation mainstream and a strategic and an economic partner.

The nuclear sanctions against India established after 1974 hurt India's nuclear power reactors program, but they did not impede its nuclear weapons work.

The new approach, crafted by the United States and India three years ago, is a nuanced and balanced work to bring together three elements: to build strategic relationships with India, recognizing that it has a clear record of non-proliferation—unlike some NPT parties—and that India is a stabilizing and a moderating element in world politics; to bring India's civilian nuclear program (14 of 22 reactors) under international safeguards; and to ensure reliable nuclear supplies to meet India's growing energy needs and to use nuclear energy's benefits for the environment.

A balance between these elements is seen as the basis of a win-win situation for the strategic practitioners, the commercial class, and the non-proliferators. There are no free lunches for any party in the fabric of agreements and deliberations that led to the U.S.-India agreement and the action in the multilateral fora.

The new approach to India shows that diplomacy is a craft, and how countries shape their relations depends on how the question is framed and how it is answered. A practitioner can be a builder or a spoiler.

The India/IAEA safeguards agreement, which was recently approved by the IAEA board with Canada's support, is a part of the complex U.S.-India negotiations. The consensus was achieved because the U.S. and India asked the board members to indicate what kind of relationship they want with India. Will it be an open-minded shift toward bilateral and international co-operation with India that is for mutual benefit? Or is it to continue sanctions and a freeze in links?

By their actions, the board members signalled a move towards the first option, but clearly more work is needed to advance the agenda for constructive changes in this direction.

The new approach was formed in a bilateral U.S.-India framework, but it has value for many countries with an interest in nuclear commerce, non-proliferation and India.

The present set of arrangements, which requires NSG and U.S. Congressional approvals, stems from the Bush-Singh declaration of July 2005, but this was preceded by other preliminary steps.

In 2003, the Vajpayee government and the U.S. formulated the "Next Step in Strategic Partnership", and then the U.S. made a significant shift in its policy in high-tech areas. Earlier U.S. policy was based on a "presumed denial of dual-use technology" to India; following the acceptance of the Indo-U.S. High Technology agreement, the new approach was to "presume approval."

It is amazing how creative bureaucrats can be when the political direction is to move forward. These constructive experiences were steps to the present India/IAEA safeguards agreement and the 123 agreement (2007) that gained bipartisan support in Washington.

Canada has been slow in moving towards the mainstream approach to India, in part because of the presence of bureaucratic spoilers (known as NPT ayatollahs).

Despite fierce opposition by anti-India NGOs and a handful of officials, ministers in the Harper government and the prime minister himself recognized that India was of growing economic and strategic importance, Indo-Canadians were a dynamic force in Canada's economic and political life, and governments and economic sectors in the U.S., Europe, Russia, Japan, Australia, Brazil, South Africa and Chile, among others, had moved to develop their partnerships with Indian counterparts.

Prime Minister Harper and his ministers deserve praise for Canada's support of the India/IAEA agreement; it signals a desire to move forward to strengthen political and bilateral relations with India.

The Harper government move is significant if it is followed up by a similar move in the NSG meetings in August-September. It encourages Canadian diplomacy and Canadian businesses to prepare for the 21st century in Asia-Pacific, and to balance non-proliferation with other pressing interests. It sets a basis to expand political and economic relations with a vibrant economy and to diversify Canada's international interests. Settlement of the nuclear question is the key to the India door for Canada.

It is interesting that the India/IAEA safeguards agreement was approved in a building with drawings about the Mahabharata and Ramayana—ancient Indian scriptures that portray life as a fight between good and evil. But in the world of practical affairs, the diplomat must learn to deal with realities and opportunities, to control what can be managed and to avoid the uncontrollable element, and to accept that the practical world is more gray than white or black.

Ashok Kapur is a distinguished professor emeritus at the University of Waterloo and a senior fellow at the Canada India Foundation. He is the author of Pokhran and Beyond.

[email protected]

[Rkam]

Getting a Non-Proliferation Payoff from India
By Ernie Regehr
When mainstream candidates for the U.S. presidency begin inserting calls for a world free of nuclear weapons into their stump speeches, you know nuclear disarmament is finally making it as a topic for polite company.

But it is traditional disarmament champions like Canada and New Zealand who will be most severely tested when the United States puts India on the agenda of the Aug. 21 meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

India is looking for unfettered access to the global civilian nuclear market, despite its nuclear weapons program and refusal to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The United States is looking for a new strategic ally. And the chosen path to their respective destinations runs directly through a core nuclear non-proliferation principle—namely that civilian nuclear co-operation is to be confined to states that adhere to full-scope safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

It is this fundamental rule that has guided, at least until now, the regulatory efforts of the 45 states of the NSG, including Canada, to prevent the spread of nuclear material and technology beyond legitimate civilian users.

In 1995, it became a global norm when the 189 States in the NPT adopted and expanded the same principle in a decision that said "acceptance of the Agency's full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons" is "a necessary precondition" for civilian nuclear co-operation.

But on Aug. 21, the NSG will consider a U.S. proposal to exempt India from that rule. President George Bush has even portrayed the exemption as a means of "bringing India into the international non-proliferation mainstream."

While others wonder how exempting India from a central non-proliferation principle will bring it into the non-proliferation mainstream, the pressure on them, including Canada, to go along with this selective fiddling with non-proliferation standards will not be easily resisted.

To be sure, India promises to place more of its civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards, but only some, and those of India's own choosing. India also promises to continue its moratorium on nuclear testing, but while still claiming what it calls its sovereign right to test. Neither the bilateral agreement between the U.S. and India nor the proposed NSG action calls for the exemption to be terminated if India conducts another test. Indeed, the exemption as proposed would permit India to stockpile nuclear fuel explicitly to make it immune to any future nuclear sanctions that could and should follow an Indian test.

And perhaps most notably, the proposal is to permit civilian nuclear co-operation with India without any demand that it end its production of fissile material for weapons purposes. The NSG exemption would actually facilitate the accelerated production of bomb ingredients and thereby open the door to violations of Article I of the NPT, which requires that states not in any way "assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons."

If Canada, for example, were to take advantage of the exemption and start selling uranium to India for its civilian programs, it would, contrary to Article I, be assisting India in the manufacture of nuclear weapons inasmuch as more of India's domestic uranium would then become available to its military program, and thus for accelerated warhead production.

India's growing arsenal would obviously not go unnoticed in Pakistan or China, risking a new south and north Asian nuclear arms race. And if foundational rules can be set aside in the interests of building new strategic alliances, it will not take China long to think about strengthening its strategic alliance with Pakistan, indeed the two have already been speculating on that very thing.

Exempting India from the basic full-scope safeguards rule would clearly serve particular interests, but the non-proliferation regime is not among them.

Even so, opponents of the exemption and proponents of disarmament face an uncomfortable reality—the status quo with regard to India, Israel, and Pakistan, the three states with nuclear weapons that are outside the NPT, is also weakening the non-proliferation regime. The prohibition on civilian nuclear co-operation has not prevented India (or Israel or Pakistan) from steadily building nuclear weapons. Simply continuing current policy is not going to induce any of them to give up their now significant arsenals.

So that raises the legitimate question of a compromise. Could the exemption for India be sufficiently conditioned—that is, linked to concrete non-proliferation commitments—to actually produce a non-proliferation benefit?

The question has certainly been explored, and the disarmament community generally points to at least three such conditions. If India is to be exempted from the full-scope safeguards rule while retaining its existing nuclear arsenal, it should at least be required to: a) commit to an end to testing and to seal that commitment with the signing and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); b) commit to a verifiable moratorium on producing fissile materials for weapons purposes, pending the negotiation and entry into force of a fissile materials treaty; and c) declare that it fully accepts the disarmament obligations of Article VI of the NPT and the related decisions of NPT Review Conferences.

In the short run, the domestic politics of India would lead it to reject such a compromise, but the offer of an exemption to the full-scope safeguards rule with these conditions attached would confirm key disarmament objectives and preserve the principle that the trade in civilian nuclear materials and technology can never be allowed to even indirectly aid a weapons program. That would be a non-proliferation payoff for Canada and other traditional disarmament champions to pursue at the NSG.

It would also show India a genuine path toward the non-proliferation mainstream and the common global effort toward the increasingly respectable goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

Ernie Regehr is co-founder of Project Ploughshares, adjunct associate professor in peace studies at Conrad Grebel University College, and fellow of the Centre for International Governance Innovation.

http://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php ... 13/regehr/

[SSridhar]

Getting a Non-Proliferation Payoff from India
By Ernie Regehr

It is boiling down to who will blink first. For India, I do not think it can go low any further than what it has put up with since 1974. Things can only get better from this point onwards. OTOH, what do these non-proliferation Ayatollahs gain if India walks away ?

[Sanatanan]

The DAE's repeated highlighting of 40 GWe is a good attemp to remind what the biggies will miss out, if NSG fails to pass the amenment in its current form.

As per an earlier post in these threads, Dr M. R Srinivasan had indicated that there is a gentleman's agreement between India the US, that after the NSG waiver and subsequent approval by the US Congress, the 123 Agreement will indeed be consumated

Taking both the above, is there a possibility for a scenario as below?

After signing the 123, citing the great and immediate urgency (in November - December 2008) to bridge the projected energy gap in the year 2050, at the same time highlighting the existence of the current managed mismatch in availability of Nat U for PHWRs, and the need to operationalise the agreement before the end of the Bush Presidency, orders may be placed on NSG suppliers (and governmental agencies if / where applicable); even advance payments may be made against these orders. Assuming they have not already been completed in the background over the last two and a half years or more, bid evaluation, price negotiations, accident liability issues etc. etc may all come later, at a more leisurely pace and at more advantageous times.

Only after this might the next general elections be called. The next government, in case it happens to be non-UPA and wants to cancel / not proceed with these international contracts, cannot do so without attracting severe financial penalties, "loss of face" etc. India might thus be helped to observe and maintain the moratorium as well as the IAEA inspection regime in its own reactors, in perpetuity.

[RajeshA]

Getting a Non-Proliferation Payoff from India
By Ernie Regehr

It is boiling down to who will blink first. For India, I do not think it can go low any further than what it has put up with since 1974. Things can only get better from this point onwards. OTOH, what do these non-proliferation Ayatollahs gain if India walks away ?

The NPT process was launched by Frank Aiken, Irish Minister for External Affairs, in 1958, and it was opened for signature on 1st July, 1968. No wonder the Irish would protect their legacy jealously and not allow any dilution.

There are general elections to Austria's National Council on 28th September, 2008, and the Green Party could very well hold the balance in the next Council and could decide whether Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPOe) or Austrian People's Party (OeVP) forms the next Govt.

In New Zealand, elections are slated for sometime before 15th November, 2008. At the moment Helen Clark, who is herself a non-proliferation hawk, and perhaps was key to the legislation which bars ships carrying nuclear weapons on board to dock in New Zealand, is the PM of a minority Labour Party Govt, dependent on the crucial outside support of the Greens. I think, if one thinks about the UPA-Left Committee, and the smileless face of PM Dr. Manmohan Singh, one gets the picture. This will be the 4th term to which Helen Clark would like to be elected to and she might not wish to take any chances.

In Switzerland the Federal Govt. may be inclined to support the Indian Nuclear Deal, however the Cantons who have the real power are not obliging. Some Swiss Parliamentarians are touring India at the moment. Could be Nuclear Deal PR Exercise.

Then there is the lovely country of Norway, with about 60,000 or so Pakistanis living there. Norwegians do not have qualms about hunting whales, but become very moralistic about everything else under the sun. I believe some Norwegian politicians might look at those Pakis as a vote bank, and would like to play it safe.

Netherlands has had a history of blundering on the wrong side of it. They are burdened by guilty consciences because of Slavery, Srebrenicza massacre, A.Q. Khan's stealing their centrifuge technology, etc, but they keep on hoping that if they remain moralistic and try to do good in the world, somehow God will forgive them their sins.

[NRao]

RajeshA,

Thanks for that post.

Not a knock on you. However, I have to wonder what have ALL these yahoos being doing when countries have been proliferating.

I suspect India will have to proliferate for them to keep quite. Following the rules is not their goal. Signing and therefore promosing to follow the rules is their goal.

[Prem]

From Indian point of view ,In 2 decades or so NSG, UNO etc international organisations will become irrlevant. All it require is 10 Trillion $ economy and India will be able to say NO to any one with full length of forearm.

How many such three letter treaties has Japan been able to say no to in spite of having the second largest economy for at least two decades now? How many stealth aircrafts or BM or BMD has it been able to build in spite of all their technology prowress?

The size of the economy needs a backing of military, political and soft power to change things to your satisfaction in this world.

Sharya, we do have military strength and we wont stop adding to it. Japan has this too and the day they want to say good bye to good munna behaviour no country can do nothing about them. The one mjaor difference we will have with Japan will be the size of our internal economy / consumption thus having gretaer freedom of action than Nippons..

[Ananth]

Folks, I have not been in loop since the IAEA agreement. Has the additional protocol draft made public? If so pointers to it would be greatly appreciated. Thanks.

[svinayak]

However, I have to wonder what have ALL these yahoos being doing when countries have been proliferating.

India is the only legal oriented country when it comes to foriegn relations. Other countries dont follow them. This is the real world.

[Gerard]

NZ ponders stance on nuclear deal

[RajeshA]

NZ ponders stance on nuclear deal

Program of Non-Proliferation Activist States (NPAS Group):
New Zealand, Austria, Sweden, Ireland, Netherlands

* Whether conditions could be built into an exemption that meant the agreement would cease to exist if there were a testing of nuclear weaponry - as was already the case in the US legislation on the deal, the Hyde Act.

* Whether India would sign up to the "Additional Protocol" of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which gave greater powers of inspection for India's nuclear facilities.

* Questions of how to prevent transfer of sensitive technology such as enrichment and re-processing.

* Questions of confidence and transparency-building measures in any exemption.

* A question of what would happen if the safeguards agreement that India had entered into with the International Atomic Energy Agency were to be terminated.

Interesting, Interesting!

[Pulikeshi]

NZ ponders stance on nuclear deal

Mr Goff rejected a suggestion that New Zealand's hopes for free trade agreements with both the US and India would be harmed if it did not back a waiver.


What incentives do these small countries (driven by ideology) have in supporting the waiver in a clean and unconditional manner?

[Pulikeshi]

However, I have to wonder what have ALL these yahoos being doing when countries have been proliferating.

India is the only legal oriented country when it comes to foriegn relations. Other countries dont follow them. This is the real world.

Not just foreign relations, but internally as well. Our "seculars" follow Constitutional Dharma (in the legal sense) onlee!

[Gerard]

Ayatollah Kimball is foaming at the mouth....

http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3274

The Arms Control Association has obtained a copy of the U.S. proposal to exempt India from existing nuclear trade restrictions maintained by the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

[Gerard]

Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India
[Text of Draft U.S. Proposal to NSG, August 2008]

1. At the _____ plenary meeting on ______ the Participating Governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed that they:

a. desire to contribute to an effective non-proliferation regime and the widest possible implementation of the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

b. seek to limit the further spread of nuclear weapons

c. wish to pursue mechanisms to affect positively the non-proliferation commitments and actions of those outside the traditional nuclear non-proliferation regime

d. seek to promote fundamental principles of safeguards and export control for nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes

e. recognize the world's need for clean and reliable sources of energy for sustained growth and prosperity

2. In this respect, Participating Governments have taken note of steps that India has taken voluntarily as a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime and they welcome India's efforts with respect to the following non-proliferation commitments and actions:

a. Deciding to separate its civilian nuclear facilities in a phased manner and file a declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency

b. Conducting negotiations with the IAEA and obtaining approval of its Board of Governors regarding a Safeguards Agreement for application of safeguards to civilian nuclear facilities that is in accordance with IAEA standards, principles and practices (including Board of Governors document GOV/1621)

c. Committing to sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to India's civil nuclear facilities

d. Refraining from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technology to states that do not already possess these

e. Having adopted a national export control system capable of effectively controlling transfers of multilaterally controlled nuclear and nuclear related material, equipment, and technology.

f. Harmonizing its export control lists with those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and committing to adherence to NSG guidelines

g. Continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and declaring its readiness to work with others towards conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

3. In view of the above, Participating Governments have adopted the following policy on civilian nuclear cooperation with the IAEA-safeguarded Indian civilian nuclear program

a. Notwithstanding paragraphs 4(a), 4(b) and 4(c) of Infcirc/254 (Rev. 9) Part 1, Participating Governments may transfer trigger list items and/or related technology to India for peaceful purposes and for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear facilities provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions of Part 1.

b. Notwithstanding paragraph 4(b) of the Part 2 guidelines, Participating Governments may transfer nuclear-related dual use equipment, etc. for peaceful purposes for use in civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions of Part 2.

c. Participating Governments shall maintain contact and consult through regular channels on matters connected with the implementation of the Guidelines, taking into account relevant international commitments and bilateral agreements with India.

4. In order to facilitate the efforts of non-member adherents to Infcirc/254 Parts 1 and 2 to remain current in their implementation of the Guidelines, the NSG Chair is requested to review proposed amendments to the Guidelines with all non-member adherents on a non-discriminatory basis and solicit such comments on the amendments as a non-member adherent may wish to make. Participation of India in the decisions regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their implementation by India.

5. The NSG Point of Contact is requested to submit this statement to the IAEA DG with a request that it be circulated to all Member States.

[Gerard]

http://verificationthoughts.googlepages ... 080801.pdf

INTERVENTION BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL IN THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS ON AGENDA ITEM 1 (“Nuclear verification: the conclusion of safeguards agreements and of additional protocols”) Application of Safeguards in India - Mohamed ElBaradei Director General

[RajeshA]

What incentives do these small countries (driven by ideology) have in supporting the waiver in a clean and unconditional manner?

One needs to remember these are rich spoilt countries living in a moralistic Kantian World.

These countries want that the bigger countries with commercial interests hanging on the outcome of some decision, build a marble staircase with a red carpet for them to come down from their high moral grounds, which is the work of diplomats specializing in H&D Issues.

Or one needs to give these some other target than oneself, some target which is bigger and juicier and is begging for a moral treatment.

Or one can try and shatter the Kantian world of these countries. Usually when their citizens get kidnapped by the FARC, or Somali Pirates, etc. they get a wake-up call. Then they are also most grateful to the rescuers.

Or one can get Greenpeace or some other Global Warming NGO to start a campaign against one's own country criticizing the country for its very huge carbon footprint. The more vociferous the criticism, the easier it would be to sell the amendment for a waiver.

Or one can simply buy off some very influential lobbies in these countries. These countries have fewer people, and there are a handful of opinion-makers in the country. For that one has to make one's hands dirty at the provincial level and do lobby work.

Or one can send a fox amongst the hen. Perhaps getting one favorable country, or preferably two, to join the gang against you, which can manipulate the opponents over time to dilute their opposition.


There are a few possibilities as you see, but again these countries do not have much to lose.

[Prem]

http://seekingalpha.com/article/90531-f ... on-uranium

The situation in uranium is reminiscent of the world’s skyrocketing demand for oil. In a classic supply-and-demand imbalance, eventually someone is going to pay the price. With uranium - as with oil - there plain and simple just isn’t enough to go around.

"We are at the beginning stages of a massive bidding war in uranium," said Sol Palha, a noted uranium investor and analyst.

Nuclear energy is rapidly gaining acceptance as a clean, reliable alternative to burning coal. In a bid to combat global warming and keep up with soaring demand for electricity, countries are rushing to build nuclear power plants. Currently, there are 440 nuclear reactors in operation that generate about 16% of the world’s electricity.

Another 25 are under construction, 38 are on order and 115 are proposed. Also, there are 284 research reactors and 220 nuclear-powered ships and submarines patrolling the oceans - key facts that nevertheless often slip by most industry analysts.

Refined uranium [known in the industry as U308] is what makes nuclear fuel. And the proliferation of new commercial nuclear power plants has the price of the radioactive metal soaring.

Now here’s the thing: All told, those reactors soak up about 77,000 tons of refined uranium every year. Yet, in 2006, only about 50,000 tons of uranium were mined. That has forced some countries to run reactors at only 50% to 60% capacity, while others - such as India - have actually been forced to periodically take reactors off line because they lack the fuel to keep running them.

[RajeshA]

Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India
d. Refraining from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technology to states that do not already possess these

Does such a commitment from India mean indirectly that Non-Proliferation Activist States would not be insisting that India not be allowed to import enrichment and reprocessing technology, as such trade is allowed amongst those, who already possess this technology. If so, then smart way of doing this.

g. Continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and declaring its readiness to work with others towards conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

One the one-hand nuclear testing is being brought into the text itself, even though India would be opposed to such inclusion. On the other hand it is being said, that such a moratorium is unilateral, and hereby not a subject of negotiation with other parties.
Concluding FMCT is just prescriptive and uncertain, so it does not matter, especially as it has less of an emotional appeal to India's Opposition.

b. Notwithstanding paragraph 4(b) of the Part 2 guidelines, Participating Governments may transfer nuclear-related dual use equipment, etc. for peaceful purposes for use in civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions of Part 2.

What happens to all the dual-use items, which are for use in other fields from medicine to meteorology?

[ShauryaT]

Ramana: The Neer Dosa is almost melting in my mouth.

g. Continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and declaring its readiness to work with others towards conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

[enqyoob]

When does the NSG meet?

[pradeepe]

I think Aug 21st

[Sanatanan]

Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India
[Text of Draft U.S. Proposal to NSG, August 2008]

. . .

4. In order to facilitate the efforts of non-member adherents to Infcirc/254 Parts 1 and 2 to remain current in their implementation of the Guidelines, the NSG Chair is requested to review proposed amendments to the Guidelines with all non-member adherents on a non-discriminatory basis and solicit such comments on the amendments as a non-member adherent may wish to make. Participation of India in the decisions regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their implementation by India.

. . .

As I understand it, Infcirc 254 Parts 1 and 2 deal with 'Dual-use list' 'Trigger List' containing list of items not to be exported to countries that do not have full scope safeguards. NSG counties follow these guidelines.

My doubt is which countries are "non-member adherents to Infcirc/254 Parts 1 and 2" (I presume here membership refers to being a member of the NSG)

[RajeshA]

As I understand it, Infcirc 254 Parts 1 and 2 deal with 'Dual-use list' 'Trigger List' containing list of items not to be exported to countries that do not have full scope safeguards. NSG counties follow these guidelines.

My doubt is which countries are "non-member adherents to Infcirc/254 Parts 1 and 2" (I presume here membership refers to being a member of the NSG)

Correct
non-member => Not a member of NSG
adherent => Still willing or requiring to have national laws which are in sync with NSG's Export Guidelines (as would be the case with India shortly)

[RajeshA]

I have a question for the experts:

As per India-IAEA Safeguards Agreement: In case the fuel supply to a safeguarded nuclear reactor is interrupted, then India may take 'corrective measures'. Can India feed the nuclear reactor with domestic nuclear fuel, and upon its processing take it out of the safeguarded category and use it in the strategic facitilities?

Does the axiom still hold: Perpetual Safeguards in lieu for Perpetual Fuel Supply?

[RajeshA]

When does the NSG meet?

August 21-22 in Vienna, Austria.
September 2 in Berlin, Germany.

[RajeshA]

Some Pakistani heartburn at India's Nuclear Deal.

Abject surrender by Tariq Fatemi: Yawn

[NRao]

I have a question for the experts:

As per India-IAEA Safeguards Agreement: In case the fuel supply to a safeguarded nuclear reactor is interrupted, then India may take 'corrective measures'. Can India feed the nuclear reactor with domestic nuclear fuel, and upon its processing take it out of the safeguarded category and use it in the strategic facitilities?

Does the axiom still hold: Perpetual Safeguards in lieu for Perpetual Fuel Supply?

(No expert.)

From Indian PoV the intent is Indian control over events - both civilian and strategic. (After all the ultimate goal is to be accepted as a NWS, which is another story.) The civilian (fuel supply) depends on what India does on the strategic side, which inturn depends on external events. I think (or at least hope) tha NPAs are aware of this rather simple logic.

Now, given the dual interpret-ability of these "agreements", who knows what will/can happen in the future. Like I said, India will need a very strong leader to protect Indian interests in the future - that is a given.

[Avinash R]

Indian suppliers ready for more players in nuclear industry

New Delhi, Aug 13 : India's energy equipment manufacturers are ready to supply to a burgeoning nuclear power industry once the India-US nuclear deal is approved, a senior industry leader said here Wednesday.

“Only the approvals are required, but we have the capacity to be the major suppliers (for equipment)," said P.V. Kannan, managing director of Micromax Systems, which supplies control and instrumentation equipment for power plants.

"BHEL (Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd) is already supplying to NPCIL (Nuclear Power Corp India Ltd), but when the field opens up, there are enough suppliers in Trichy (Tamil Nadu) to cater to their needs," he said.

Kannan, chairman of an industry exhibition on energy equipment and fabrication - Energex-2008 - to be held at Trichy next month, said officials from NPCIL visited the exhibition last year and were expected to visit this year too.

Trichy has become a hub of manufacturing units of energy equipments. In fact, most of the fabrication of windmill towers is taking place in factories dotted around the city. “More and more power companies that are coming into India are looking at Trichy for sourcing (equipment),” he said.

Energex 2008, to be held Sept 26-27, will have over 80 exhibitions from India as well as from China, the UK and the US.

Besides, there will be a one-day conference, focusing on “Advanced Technologies in Power Generation” with a theme of “Power to Power the World”, he added.

[Gerard]

Can India feed the nuclear reactor with domestic nuclear fuel, and upon its processing take it out of the safeguarded category and use it in the strategic facitilities?

India doesn't have the enrichment capacity to fuel Tarapur, far less a bunch of 1000MWe LWRs.

Why would India want high burnup LWR spent fuel for strategic purposes? Additional dedicated military Pu production reactors would be needed to ramp up the fissile stockpile before any FMCT comes into effect. The domestic Uranium is enough for the largest possible arsenal India could ever want.

[Rishirishi]

A question for the experts here.

Can India stock, 10 years of uranium supply, for each of the reactor that it purchases. What will be the cost of this, compared to the total cost.

I have seen that the cost is arround $200 pr kg. 1000 tonnes would cost or 200 million dollars. If the cost of the nuclear plant is 2 billion dollars, only 10% of the total cost would be the Uranium store.

Am I missing out

[ShauryaT]

Does the axiom still hold: Perpetual Safeguards in lieu for Perpetual Fuel Supply?

It is not the IAEA that is in the fuel supply business. As far as the IAEA is concerned, it has ensured that, once a facility is declared "civilian", IAEA will apply safeguards on it, until such time that no further nuclear activity is taking place and even then IAEA and GoI have to jointly determine (meaning IAEA veto), over what facility can go out of safeguards. How the preamble is interpreted by India is not their concern, as long as the operating provisions are clear. And clear they are.

So, as far as the IAEA is concened, it has ensured perpetual safeguards on civilian facilities, without those words being explicitly said. As far as the IAEA is concerned, these faclities will be safeguarded using the standard NNWS type of safeguards, with an additional protocol that ALL NNWS only sign.

[ShauryaT]

Can India stock, 10 years of uranium supply, for each of the reactor that it purchases. What will be the cost of this, compared to the total cost.

I have seen that the cost is arround $200 pr kg. 1000 tonnes would cost or 200 million dollars. If the cost of the nuclear plant is 2 billion dollars, only 10% of the total cost would be the Uranium store.

Am I missing out

Remember the Obama amendment. Fuel supply only for, what is needed for safe operating conditions - not a reserve to ride out sanctions. However, when there are sanctions, we will have other issues too. So, a 10 year fuel reserve is possible, if not economically optimal or feasible, especially through non poodles of USA.

[Johann]

NZ ponders stance on nuclear deal

Mr Goff rejected a suggestion that New Zealand's hopes for free trade agreements with both the US and India would be harmed if it did not back a waiver.


What incentives do these small countries (driven by ideology) have in supporting the waiver in a clean and unconditional manner?

NZ was willing to risk terminating its security relationship with the US by banning USN warships back in the 1980s when many of them had tactical nukes on board.

These kinds of countries want a radically different global security architecture, one that doesnt rely on deterrence through hard power, but instead through norm based approaches. They think its possible. In India I suppose that sort of thinking would be called Gandhian.

[RajeshA]

Thank you Gerard,

I think, I will have to do some background study before I can fully comprehend, what you said.

Thanks ShauryaT for your response.

I gather, that in case of a disruption of foreign uranium, India will use either the uranium fuel reserve, and if that is exhausted, one would feed civilian nuclear reactors with domestic fuel, and once that takes place, the domestic fuel would then move to the civilian fuel cycle, and the concerned nuclear reactor remains under permanent safeguards.

[Gerard]

with an additional protocol that ALL NNWS only sign.

There is the additional protocol , which NNWS may optionally sign.
Then there is an additional protocol, which may have different provisions.
India is not signing the additional protocol, it is signing its own an additional protocol

The US has signed an additional protocol.

The US version of the additional protocol contains what is known as a ‘national security exclusion clause’, which permits the US to restrict IAEA inspections in respect to activities of ‘direct national security significance to the United States or to locations or information associated with such activities’.