India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008

[RajeshA]

Summary of the Nuclear Deal Conundrum from US Perspective

India nuclear deal in political snafu

[Arun_S]

Nuclear Power short-lists 4 suppliers for reactors[quote]Westinghouse Electric Company (AP1000 series of reactors), GE-Hitachi (ABWR reactor series) , Areva (1,000 MW European pressurised reactors) and the Russia’s atomic energy agency Rosatom (VVER 1,000 reactors) are among the frontrunners for new projects planned across the country.

State-owned Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL) – the monopoly nuclear power generator – has tentatively short-listed these four major reactor manufacturers based on “suitability” of technical parameters for placement of orders that will form the first phase of the Centre’s plan to build 40,000 MW of nuclear capacity by 2020, Government sources indicated.

Once nuclear trade commences, NPCIL hopes to set up “Nuclear Parks” or reactor clusters, for which four coastal sites have been identified across Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal.

These “parks” are being envisaged with a capacity of housing up to eight reactors of 1,000 MW each at a single location. The orders would initially be placed for around two reactors of 1,000 MW at each of the locations, following which more reactors could be added .

[/size]

It seems that "import-LWR" lobby in India has gained the upper hand in decision-making. Note that the Canadian designs that have proven successful not only in India but also elsewhere, have not even been mentioned in the shortlist. What are the unsuitable technical parameters for placement of orders, in the Canadian designs?

Looks like Canada will have only itself to blame and may regret its decision to find comfort in staying within the shadow of US's nuclear diktats.[/quote]
Canada does not have LWR reactor technology.

CANDU is heavy water based and uses natural-Uramium fuel.

LWR(Light Water Reactor) does not need the expensive heavy water, but because light water (I.e. natural/ordinary water) has higher neutron absorbtion cross-section, thus to sustain criticality it needs enrichment level that is few times higher than natural Uranium. Typically uses 3-4% enriched U fuel. Fuel change on these reactor requires shutting down the reactor (unlike CANDU that can be refuelled while in operation), thus any attempt to use LWR for low burning of fuel rod (to genrate Pu for nuclear weapons) leaves a tell tale sign of shutdown (E.g. steam from the cooling tower).

[RajeshA]

Nuke-free New Zealand concerned over N-deal

[svinayak]

Summary of the Nuclear Deal Conundrum from US Perspective

India nuclear deal in political snafu

The Bipartisan Security Group — a coalition of 23 arms control, environmental, medical and religious groups that oppose exemptions for India — is appealing to Germany, which now leads the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to reject what it calls an “ill-conceived proposal.”

[RajeshA]

Q&A: Thorium Reactor Designer Ratan Kumar Sinha

[RajeshA]

India to brief NSG troika today by Siddharth Varadarajan: Hindu

Troika is South Africa, Germany, Hungary

[RajeshA]

For nuclear club, it’s decision time on India by Siddharth Varadarajan: Hindu

[RajeshA]

A summary of the various fence sitters

NZ PM hits a defiant note by Ramesh Ramachandran: Howrah.org

As mentioned previously, New Zealand is going to be a big pain in the a$$. Austria, Ireland would give vocal support. Sweden, Netherlands, Norway would also have a few things to say.

It will be about time, Dr. Manmohan Singh picked up his telephone and called up a few heads of state. If Sweden, Norway and Netherlands can be somehow convinced, and Ireland is quietened down, then there will be little New Zealand and Austria would be able to do.

The most they can then do, is to ask for a new meeting, which Germany could hold on Sept 2 in Berlin. NZ and Austria may however wish for a meeting at the end of September.

[svinayak]

A summary of the various fence sitters

NZ PM hits a defiant note by Ramesh Ramachandran: Howrah.org

As mentioned previously, New Zealand is going to be a big pain in the a$$. Austria, Ireland would give vocal support. Sweden, Netherlands, Norway would also have a few things to say.

It will be about time, Dr. Manmohan Singh picked up his telephone and called up a few heads of state. If Sweden, Norway and Netherlands can be somehow convinced, and Ireland is quietened down, then there will be little New Zealand and Austria would be able to do.

The most they can then do, is to ask for a new meeting, which Germany could hold on Sept 2 in Berlin. NZ and Austria may however wish for a meeting at the end of September.

The Catholic movement has two primary tentacles in the Asian theater. One coordinated from Phillipinies, aiming at the evangelization of Vietnam, Korea, China, Japan etc. The other, of relevance to India, is based in Australia and New Zealand. Here, with active collaboration from the Protestants, they stage and coordinate the evangelization of Indonesia (involving in the separation of East Timor, and the slaughter of Indians in Fiji, amongst other things). Much of the evangelical movement in India (e.g. the missionary schools), are directed by the Catholic establishment in New Zealand. Australia provides a good cover for this

[RajeshA]

The Catholic movement has two primary tentacles in the Asian theater. One coordinated from Phillipinies, aiming at the evangelization of Vietnam, Korea, China, Japan etc. The other, of relevance to India, is based in Australia and New Zealand. Here, with active collaboration from the Protestants, they stage and coordinate the evangelization of Indonesia (involving in the separation of East Timor, and the slaughter of Indians in Fiji, amongst other things). Much of the evangelical movement in India (e.g. the missionary schools), are directed by the Catholic establishment in New Zealand. Australia provides a good cover for this

Even if it was a Catholic conspiracy, doesn't Sonia Gandhi's Catholic credentials count for anything?

I understand your suspicions Acharya ji. I myself do not really buy much into Da Vinci Code theories. However Austria and Ireland, the other outposts of opposition are indeed strongly Catholic countries.

[putnanja]

India, US lobby hard as first red flags are waved in NSG

India, US lobby hard as first red flags are waved in NSG
Pranab Dhal SamanthaPosted online: Wednesday, August 20, 2008 at 0146 hrs Print

Meeting Tomorrow Non-proliferation group pushes for stricter terms on testing, enrichment;
Shyam Saran, Foreign Secy reach Vienna today

NEW DELHI, AUGUST 19: While India and US went into a diplomatic overdrive 48 hours ahead of the crucial NSG meeting to consider an exemption for India from its guidelines, the opposition within the grouping has crystallised its demands around three basic issues: provision for periodic review, conditions on future testing and transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies.

It’s learnt that there are “strong undercurrents” within the 45-member grouping to address this in the form of extra conditions to the draft exemption note circulated by the US. While no formal move has been made, top sources indicated that attempts will be made when the group meets on Thursday.

On the positive side, France has put its weight behind India and issued demarches to all members asking them to allow the exemption for India to pass by consensus. Top Indian diplomats PM’s Special Envoy Shyam Saran and Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon, along with DAE officials, are expected to be in Vienna tomorrow.

They will meet the NSG troika Germany, South Africa and Hungary ahead of the special NSG meet, said sources.

Given the informal nature of the grouping, much of the conversation is still unofficial although clear signals are being sent by countries with a strong non-proliferation agenda that the draft needs to be further “tightened”. This, however, would run the risk of tampering with a draft currently acceptable to India and any addition could prompt a fresh review in New Delhi.

The three areas that strong NPT proponents want adequately addressed are:

• An elaborate provision for a periodic review that India is abiding by all its commitments made under the exemption. India has resisted such reviews as it makes the waiver look conditional and open to periodic reconsideration.

• Draw India into some commitment on future testing. Though individual countries can go by their own laws in case India were to test, some countries are keen that the NSG acts on this together. Currently, the draft mentions India’s unilateral moratorium and a commitment to work towards Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty.

• Introduce provision on transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. The current draft only states that India will not make such transfers but does not qualify the transfer of such technologies to India. Again, India would prefer individual countries to go by their domestic laws on the issue while NPT proponents would want the group to collectively address the issue.

While Ireland, Switzerland, Norway, Austria and New Zealand are in the forefront of raising objections to the exemption being sought for India, frenetic diplomacy is underway within Europe to get more countries to weigh on the US that itself has a strong non-proliferation lobby.

The French diplomatic muscle within Europe may be formidable but sources point out that other key countries like Germany and the Netherlands, too, are under pressure to achieve an “acceptable compromise”.

Germany, which is the current NSG chair, will have to play a significant role. Similarly, many of these countries have stakes in their bilateral relationship with India. Switzerland, for instance, is working hard to firm up a free trade agreement with India.

This apart, sources pointed out that China has still not revealed its hand. It is known that China had in the past attempted to push a proposal for criteria-based exemption for non-NPT countries. The argument was to give exemption to any of the countries that meets these criteria. But with that proposal not making much headway, both India and US will keenly watch the way Beijing responds at the NSG meet.

[kshirin]

Looks like hatchet job on Sri Kumar.

KP Nayar was famous for those. Siddharth Varadarajan has explained well the strategy behind the current tactics.

[putnanja]

The exception called India

The exception called India
G. BalachandranPosted online: Wednesday, August 20, 2008 at 0009 hrs Print

Pragmatically, this is the NSG’s biggest chance to engage non-members and address non-proliferation

G. Balachandran


In a few days the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) will hold a meeting to consider the draft of the US proposal on civil nuclear trade with India. This step is probably more complex than the other two successful steps on the way: the US-India 123 agreement and the India-specific IAEA safeguards agreement. The former required direct negotiation between two countries and in the latter, the IAEA’s aim was quite specific and bounded — to devise a system to safeguard supplied materials from being diverted for nuclear explosion purposes. Moreover, although in case of IAEA the final draft was approved by consensus, if there had been some opposition and voting had taken place, it would have required only a majority to carry through the agreement.

The NSG decision is qualitatively different in a number of respects. India is not a member of the NSG and has no voting rights there. And in the NSG, since decisions are taken by consensus, there is a requirement that no member oppose the draft, even though all may not agree fully with all elements of the text. NSG members are already being pressured by various opponents of the deal, both internal and external, to either reject the draft or amend it with significant changes which will render its operation untenable.

It is necessary, therefore, to recall the past India/NSG interactions and the NSG’s objectives. Although it was formally established in response to the first nuclear test by India in 1974, after its rejuvenation in 1992, it has been intensively involved in efforts to contain proliferation. The first substantive amendment to its ‘guidelines for transfers of trigger list items’ was made in 1993 when fullscope safeguards requirements were introduced as a precondition for nuclear transfers. This effectively barred India from any fresh nuclear commerce with NSG members. It is this 1993 amendment that the new text seeks to modify.

While considering the draft text, NSG participating countries should consider the following. Even before 9/11 there was global concern about both nuclear proliferation and the entry of non-state actors in the global nuclear proliferation stage. It is very unlikely that the number of countries that have the additional protocol in force with IAEA will increase substantially in the coming years.

The NSG will find it difficult to amend its guidelines for nuclear transfer to include the additional protocol as a requirement for such transfers. In spite of repeated attempts during the past decade the NSG has found it difficult to adopt such an amendment because of resistance to such a move by many of the participating countries. In the absence of an additional protocol, it will be difficult for IAEA safeguards mechanism to keep track of all global transfers of dual use items from suppliers to recipients.

It would, therefore, be prudent if NSG was to initiate actions now to engage non-NSG members that have developed nuclear capability and possess all round nuclear technology and have sound nuclear industrial base and are potential suppliers in future. Currently, India is one of the few countries that fit these requirements. Actually it is the only such country.

India is not a signatory to the NPT, does not have fullscope safeguards and has a large number of nuclear facilities that are indigenous in design and development including fast breeder reactors. It is not required, therefore, to place any of these facilities under any IAEA safeguards. Nor is it required to report exports of any dual use items to any country, member or non-member of NPT. It would, therefore, be in NSG’s interests to actively involve India in both the NSG and global efforts to contain nuclear proliferation India’s nuclear weapon state status is an undeniable fact. It is equally undeniable that there is very little that NSG members, individually or collectively, can do to persuade India to give up its strategic nuclear program in the absence of global nuclear disarmament. So while considering the draft amendment the current NSG participating countries should ask themselves the following questions: Do they think or believe that nuclear proliferation would be a serious subject in the coming years? Do they believe that cooperation from India, the only country outside of both NSG and NPT regime today that operates full nuclear cycle activities would assist or help them in their non-proliferation goals or that it would not have any impact?

Now it is recognised that the primary factor in the minds of some NSG members is the Indian reluctance to commit formally to a no-test promise. The simple fact is that the CTBT is not in force with two nuclear weapon states not having ratified it — including one with whom India had some military conflicts in the past.

Neither can India formally declare a moratorium of fissile material production for strategic purposes with China deliberately and consciously having decided not to announce such a moratorium. On the other hand India having voluntarily forsaken nuclear tests for a long time and voluntarily declaring a moratorium on testing has very little incentive to test any more unless compelled by supreme national security interests, which primarily means a nuclear test by one of its neighbouring nuclear weapon states.

India for its part realises the abhorrence many NSG members have about nuclear tests and their reluctance to commit themselves permanently to even civil nuclear cooperation with countries that conduct nuclear tests. Under the circumstances, the present draft does the following. It ensures that no transferred nuclear material or facilities will be diverted by India for any nuclear explosive related activities. It commits India to an additional protocol with reporting requirements of its exports of nuclear material and related dual use items and technologies. It places many of its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under safeguards now and promises to place even many more in the future. It permits such countries as those might be reluctant to engage in civil nuclear trade with India if India were to conduct a test, to act according to those wishes.

Such a draft affords the best option for NSG, and the global community, to prepare for the coming campaign against nuclear proliferation, and the campaign for global disarmament. It would be a pity if NSG participating countries were now to deny themselves and the international community such an opportunity.

The writer is visting fellow at IDSA and National Maritime Foundation

[RajeshA]

Hurdles in NSG draft down to just 3 by Indrani Bagchi: TOI

India is pushing very hard for lifting of the bar on ENR technology, but here it has no supporters, not even the US, which has the most stringent laws on this in the world, and would not like to be pushing this openly in violation of its domestic laws.

Question to the experts: Can India accept an NSG Waiver, which does not allow India access to Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology (ENR)?

[Gerard]

It would be difficult to sell a deal where India is prohibited from exporting ENR while at the same time denied the option to import ENR.
How can India be part of a regime that itself targets India?

No ENR is fine, if India is then free to export and work with others in developing the technology. Would the NSG be comfortable with ENR being shared?

Either the camel must be inside the tent pissing out or outside the tent pissing in.

[SSridhar]

I am really amused by this urge to ban transfer of technologies on reprocessing & production of heavy water. India has been doing both of them indigenously for a long time now. Many countries, including the US, buy heavy water from us. What are they talking about ?

[NRao]

What are they talking about ?

Based on a conversation with a scitech at Hanford, ENR is not a universal tech. Since each vendor has their own reactor design, each of their waste differs. So, ENR differs from "vendor to vendor".

Thus the FR have pretty much a "single" design (for all practical purposes I am told), so their ENR is most advanced - since they had to deal with a known quantity over a long period of time. Next come the Japanese I am told. The Russians and Americans are the worst because they not only have multiple designs (from way long back) they also have tons and tons of waste from strategic programs. For some waste both have no ENR at all!!

I was informed by this person and another at Argonne Labs for a variety of reasons no one in the West is familiar with Indian ENR techs except that it is PUREX. But, what is the composition of the waste Indian reactors produce and therefore what is the ENR is unknown.

So, in short, ENR should come with the reactor - or the waste has to go back to the vendor's country (which is not acceptable, since India wants the reprocessed material for the next stage)

[svinayak]

The Catholic movement has two primary tentacles in the Asian theater. One coordinated from Phillipinies, aiming at the evangelization of Vietnam, Korea, China, Japan etc. The other, of relevance to India, is based in Australia and New Zealand. Here, with active collaboration from the Protestants, they stage and coordinate the evangelization of Indonesia (involving in the separation of East Timor, and the slaughter of Indians in Fiji, amongst other things). Much of the evangelical movement in India (e.g. the missionary schools), are directed by the Catholic establishment in New Zealand. Australia provides a good cover for this

Even if it was a Catholic conspiracy, doesn't Sonia Gandhi's Catholic credentials count for anything?

I understand your suspicions Acharya ji. I myself do not really buy much into Da Vinci Code theories. However Austria and Ireland, the other outposts of opposition are indeed strongly Catholic countries.

It is not about one person and long term about India as a whole - a non Christian, pagan country according to them.
Those countries look at nuke power as moral power which only Catholic/Christians are allowed to subscribe. Rest of the world is not fit for proscribing morality for ever.

[NRao]

SSridhar,

One more thing. This person also said that the lesser the number of vendors the better for India. Because of the waste issue. With each diff type of waste the headaches add up. Not worth it.

Russia it looks like has provided ENR. Is it true?

[amit]

It is not about one person and long term about India as a whole - a non Christian, pagan country according to them.
Those countries look at nuke power as moral power which only Catholic/Christians are allowed to subscribe. Rest of the world is not fit for proscribing morality for ever.

Acharya ji,

Where does Japan, China and to a certain extent Israel fit into this worldview?

[Gerard]

Russia has allowed the spent fuel to be reprocessed at the existing reprocessing plants in India.

As regards enrichment however...

By 2020 Russia will have to create a network of international uranium enrichment centers

a network of such centers would ensure nondiscriminatory access for non-nuclear states to low-enriched fuel for nuclear power plants with all nonproliferation requirements observed

We have seen how zealous Russia is regarding control over natural gas. It seems to want the same wrt the Uranium supply. It is unlikely to encourage competitors...

[amit]

On what basis do you guys state that? The Hyde Act is not up for a vote!! It is the 123.

Besides, Andy Grotto did not get the memo from the US Amby to India? He clearly stated that both teh Hyde Act and the 123 stand, which is why the NSG does not have to place additional conditions - when there are these, why place more? All the concerns of all the NSG members - per him - are answered in the Hyde Act/123/IAEA.

There is no time to undo the Hyde Act in this US Congress as far as I can see - there are enough problems for just the 123 to pass, how can they take up both the 123 and then the Hyde Act?

Besides that FR and RU have both agreed not to deal with India until the US Congress passes the 123 and BOTH have subscribed to GNEP already!!!

On the flip side, even if RU + FR get $100 billion, the US will get access to the greater share of the Indian middle class - a few Trillion dollar market. What does Russia OR France have to compare to the US or Japan when it comes to selling consumer products? Also, on the "strategic" front, what has Russia done outside of selling arms - France to a much lesser extent. The US is getting a ton done on that front.

All said and done, the US seems to be in a better position as we post?

Hi N,

Consider a scenario, where the NSG Waiver does not have hard-coded conditions of no nuclear testing. In this case:

There are two constraints, which US Business and US Nuclear Industry could face in a post NSG Waiver-Phase.
1) The Freedom to do business with India like other countries. (123 Agreement)
2) A level playing field as other countries like France and Russia in the Indian Nuclear Market. (Hyde Act)

Once the NSG Waiver is there, there will be tremendous pressure on Congress to pass 123 Agreement, which then allows US Nuclear Industry to do business with India.

For US to be on a level playing field with France and Russia, either the NSG Waiver also needs to have a condition of "No nuclear testing, otherwise NSG countries will be required to terminate their bilateral agreements with India" just as in the Hyde Act. Only then would France and Russia have the same constraints as USA. Hyde Act is not directly applicable to Russia and France. Or if NSG does not have such a provision, and thereby Russia and France do not insist on such conditions in their bilateral agreements with India, then USA is at a disadvantage. To level the field, Congress would have to soften up the Hyde Act somewhat.

If NSG insists on the hard-coded condition, then India will probably walk out of the deal, and there is no deal.

As far as access to Indian market is concerned, Kamal Nath has his own ideas and I like his methods.

NRao ji,

I see Rajesh has given a reply to you.

I broadly agree with what he's written and would just like to add that it's not going to be as if the US Congress will meet to formally change the Hyde Act.

IMO an Act is only useful as long it is implemented in both letter and spirit. When the potential $100 billion is dangled in front of companies which are desperate for new orders, I don't think the Hyde's NPA spirit is going to have a very strong influence.

France and Russia agreeing to wait for the US to get it's act together is not an open ended agreement IMO. The French and Russians love the $$$$ sign as much as the Americans.

One final point, what makes you so confident in believing that the US will get access to the billions likely to be spent by the Indian middle class while at the same time it blocks/puts restrictions on Nuclear supply?

I think if the deal is settled to India's satisfaction, there's a good chance that India is going to spend the $$$ on its MCRA on US planes - not that I think they are best on offer - because at the end of the day which plane we go for will be a political decision, again in my IMHO.

And that would be just the start of potential inducements.

If the US Congress uses Hyde as a deal breaker then I am sure the US can say bye to the billions of business.

Of course all this is with the disclaimer(s) JMHT etc

[NRao]

I agree with his post too. Just that modifications to the Hyde Act are way in the future. I think the earliest challenge will be ENR around 2012-15. Modifications will come after that, IMHO.

By then, IF Indian eco grows decently .......... I for one expect, fully expect NWS status.

[amit]

Hurdles in NSG draft down to just 3 by Indrani Bagchi: TOI

India and the US are pushing Germany to incorporate the "concerns" of NSG members or "conditions" in the chairman's statement, which makes it non-binding, but reflects the sentiments of the group. However, that is not decided yet. For instance, the "testing" clause will not fly at all. India says it has put a voluntary moratorium on testing but would not want it to be "multilateralised".

If Indrani has got this correct, then does this mean that India's own reading of 2g clause is that it's not being "multilateralised" as is being feared here? Or has 2g been eliminated from the draft that we've seen?

Also,

For the past few weeks, India, US and France have been flooding the inboxes of NSG members with diplomatic demarches, burning up phone lines and visiting NSG leaders even on vacation to push the India case. Russia, sources said, has been more muted, promising to work on its smaller neighbours.

The Russian Bear seems to playing its cards close to its chest. Just gives more credence to Gerard's last post.

[amit]

By then, IF Indian eco grows decently .......... I for one expect, fully expect NWS status.

Exactly, that's why I've always been arguing that the economic implications - that is what this deal would mean to us economically (overall in terms of business sentiments and not just in the narrow terms of nuclear power generation) - is just as important as the military implications.

A multi trillion dollar economy has its own momentum which takes care of geopolitical influence, military influence as well as diplomatic influence.

If the world's second or third biggest economy with the world's first or second biggest population and potentially the most dynamic technology innovation centre in the world is not a part of NWS high table, then what meaning does that table have?

[svinayak]

http://www.hindu.com/2008/08/20/stories ... 531200.htm

For nuclear club, it’s decision time on India
Siddharth Varadarajan

Proposal to bend rules brings angst, and the opportunity of business for some
India to add an additional 40 GWe of capacity through reactor imports
Australia, Japan and Germany expected to quietly back Indian plea

Set up under conditions of the greatest secrecy in London in April 1975 in order to deal with the consequences of India’s ’peaceful’ nuclear explosion at Pokhran in 1974, the seven founding members decided not to advertise the birth of their club. Three of them — France, West Germany and Japan — were not even members of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, though Bonn and Tokyo would deposit their instruments of ratification soon thereafter. One of them, the erstwhile Soviet Union, did not want developing countries to think it was ganging up with the West against them. The United States, Britain and Canada also preferred to be circumspect. Conscious of the fact that the rest of the world — including their closest allies — would see the cartel in a negative light, the seven decided that no minutes would be kept of their historic first meeting.

Predictably, when word of the secret meeting leaked out in the New York Times six weeks later, many European chanceries were enraged. The Netherlands, which saw itself as a pioneer of enrichment technology (as did an obscure Pakistani scientist named A.Q. Khan) petitioned for membership since it would be affected by the club’s decisions to restrict sensitive technologies. In 1976, it was admitted along with seven other countries from west and east Europe. According to an account by a former Swiss nuclear official, Alec Baer, Switzerland’s Claude Zangger — who headed a multilateral export control committee named after himself —“complained bitterly [but diplomatically] about not having been invited to the NSG discussions.” So the next year, Berne was also made a member of the club. After this initial burst of activity, however, the ‘London Club’ went into hibernation for 15 years and did not meet again in plenary until 1992.

Throughout this period, the group’s export rules did not prohibit nuclear sales to India despite the country refusing to place all its nuclear facilities under international safeguards. However, meeting in Warsaw that year after the end of the Cold War and the first Gulf War, the NSG adopted ‘full scope safeguards’ as a condition of supply for nuclear sales to any country. And that is when New Delhi found the door for nuclear imports — reactors, components and fuel — slammed in its face. Eighteen years after Pokhran-I, India had become off limits for nuclear commerce.

[SSridhar]

One more thing. This person also said that the lesser the number of vendors the better for India. Because of the waste issue. With each diff type of waste the headaches add up. Not worth it.

Russia it looks like has provided ENR. Is it true?

NRao, India has always maintained that it could reprocess the Tarapur High Level Waste (fuel initially by the US and then others) as well as the Kudankulam HLW. In fact, the Indian contention has always been that the US should either take back the HLW at Tarapur or let India process it. How does it square up with 'each vendor, his own ENR" ?

Yes, it appears that Russia has allowed India to reprocess.

[ramana]

amit, My reading is India doesn't like 2g. Thats what Ms Bagchi is reporting.

[amit]

amit, My reading is India doesn't like 2g. Thats what Ms Bagchi is reporting.

Ramana ji,

You could very well be right - in fact I hope you are right.

I have a feeling it will boil down to who will blink first. For all you know the US may be using the righteous to test how far India is willing to bend backwards.

Me thinks it was good that at a very early stage AK has explicitly set out the red lines.

[ramana]

Yeah When I said that folks jumped on me!

[amit]

Yeah When I said that folks jumped on me!

That also means that India is playing hard ball. It is not as if it has rolled over and is allowing the US to dictate terms.

One point. The NSG draft has to always be a US written document - India does not have jurisdiction nor willingness to write the draft.

What India can do and is obviously doing is telling the US what is acceptable and not acceptable - hence the draft we were discussing was already after a few revisions and even that doesn't look like the final product.

If that's the case what's the need to cry wolf and worry that the negotiating team is selling us short at this stage?

IMHO, I think that's what a lot of folks were/are trying to say.

At the end of the day everyone on BRF wants India to win, otherwise it does not justify the amount of time we all invest here. Sometimes it's useful to remember that, IMHO.

[ramana]

amit, Its not about crying wolf. Its about making the opinions felt for those who need to know.

[amit]

Its about making the opinions felt for those who need to know.

In that case I'm happy that it seemed to have worked, if we go by what Indrani has to write.

[RajeshA]

If Indrani has got this correct, then does this mean that India's own reading of 2g clause is that it's not being "multilateralised" as is being feared here? Or has 2g been eliminated from the draft that we've seen?

amit, My reading is India doesn't like 2g. Thats what Ms Bagchi is reporting.

India has often repeated, they expect the NSG to accept the draft of the waiver as it is. => That itself means, that India is fine with 2g.

India has also said, that they do not want to multilateralise India's voluntary unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. => That means, they do not consider 2g to be multilateralising the moratorium.

IMHO,
That is because our negotiators see 2g as a favorable condition for initiation of waiver and NOT as a necessary condition for continuation of waiver.

[awagaman]

Good article:
The exception called India by G. Bhalachandran, Indian Express.
http://www.indianexpress.com/story/350837._.html

Interview with strategic affairs editor of Hindu, Siddharth Varadarajan by the Heinrich Boell foundation website http://www.boell-india.org/which belongs to the Greens Party of Germany. It has been conducted with the upcoming NSG meeting in mind.
http://www.boell-india.org/download_en/ ... -final.pdf

Worth reading it in full.

[sraj]

It would be difficult to sell a deal where India is prohibited from exporting ENR while at the same time denied the option to import ENR.
How can India be part of a regime that itself targets India?

No ENR is fine, if India is then free to export and work with others in developing the technology. Would the NSG be comfortable with ENR being shared?

Either the camel must be inside the tent pissing out or outside the tent pissing in.

Well, Gerard, this is exactly what J18+Hyde mandate for India in the case of MTCR (i.e. India has to respect MTCR rules for missile exports, but is itself barred from getting anything prohibited by MTCR!).

If the 'international community' thinks it has already gotten away with imposing this kind of restriction on India with respect to MTCR, what stops them from attempting to do the same with respect to ENR?

[awagaman]

Do not go by today's story of Bagchi in TOI.
Anyone else notice it is identical to the story run by Samanta in Express?

The source is the same.
And he is unkil.

Think: All the Indian officials in the know are at the NSG -- Shiv Shankar Menon, Shyam Saran, Kakodkar.

But unkil is spinning away in Delhi. To get Indians used to the idea that
(a) their is massive opposition in NSG, which there is not
(b) Nasty suggestions are being foisted on India by these other guys, and not unkil

Caveat emptor!

[Gerard]

International community split over U.S.-India nuclear deal

[ShyamSP]

Do not go by today's story of Bagchi in TOI.
Anyone else notice it is identical to the story run by Samanta in Express?

The source is the same.
And he is unkil.

Think: All the Indian officials in the know are at the NSG -- Shiv Shankar Menon, Shyam Saran, Kakodkar.

But unkil is spinning away in Delhi. To get Indians used to the idea that
(a) their is massive opposition in NSG, which there is not
(b) Nasty suggestions are being foisted on India by these other guys, and not unkil

Caveat emptor!

India showed how it is facing internal opposition to the deal. Now Unkil is showing how it is facing the international opposition to the deal.
India is like Telugu expression "Intilo puli Vidhilo pilli" (Tiger in the house, cat in the street). Until it reverses its power projection, even small rats on the street will have their day.

[RajeshA]

Eyes on NSG prize, India prepares for big day by Siddharth Varadarajan: Hindu

Indian officials told The Hindu the picture that was emerging on the eve of the NSG’s plenary consultation was one of quiet support for the proposal.

Though some NSG states continue to have reservations about the implications of the exception for the non-proliferation regime, Indian officials said they did not detect any strong undercurrent of opposition, or the crystallisation of dissidence around the demand for specific changes.

U.S. officials feel NSG decision may take two sessions by Siddharth Varadarajan: Hindu

Underselling waiver?

Indeed, the American pessimism about the exemption being a one-shot affair is forcing India to ask itself whether the United States, the deal’s chief architect, is now underselling the waiver.

“We know the U.S. has been extensively consulting with a number of NSG members and probably has a sheet of paper with a bunch of conditions that it will say the others want,” said an Indian official. Some of those conditions may not necessarily be palatable to Washington, especially if they make U.S. executive authority subservient to NSG rules. “The U.S. likes to have its own rules and grant waiver authority to the President. So it will not want the NSG to adopt something which will make it mandatory for the U.S. to act in a particular way if something happens [between India and another supplier].” But in other areas where U.S. policy is clear-cut and there is no scope for any domestic carve-out, Washington will not want the NSG to adopt rules which might place its own firms at a disadvantage. “I think for them, the big fear is enrichment and reprocessing equipment,” said the official. “They have decided they will never give it to India. But if tomorrow the Russians or French throw in some ENR equipment as a sweetener for a reactor contract which U.S. suppliers won’t be able to do, they fear others will have a commercial advantage.”

Indian officials say that while the country is self-sufficient in ENR technology it would be unfair to deny equipment and components for the dedicated reprocessing plant the U.S. wants India to build in order to be able to reprocess American-origin spent fuel.

NSG support yes, but no uranium: Australia by Anil Sasi: Hindu Business Line

N-deal: Crucial NSG meet today: Business Standard

Convincing them is the key by Pramit Pal Chaudhuri: HT

So the US urged India to consider, as one consequence of the nuclear deal, a bilateral partnership in breeder technology. The US would contribute its own breeder knowhow, expertise in thorium fuel fabrication and, of course, its superior ENR. But this was too much, too fast, for a wary DAE that said ‘later perhaps’. Nuclear expert Anupam Srivastava of the University of Georgia says India was too cautious. “Right now India can live with ENR equipment. If its nuclear programme matures, in ten years it will want ENR technology,” he says.

The US left a loophole on ENR sales in the Hyde Act in the hope that India might one day revisit the idea. Section 104 Part 4 allows the transfer and export of ENR “equipment, components or materials” to India in case of “a bilateral or multinational program to develop a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle”.

The NSG hurdle: DNA India

India to hold special briefing for all NSG members: IANS

Meanwhile, Austria's Green Party, the third largest political party after the socialists and conservatives, has decided to stage a demonstration outside Japan's permanent mission to the IAEA, where the NSG will meet on Thursday.

"We will hold banners saying, 'Have the courage to say no to the India-US nuclear deal'. We will make anti nuclear speeches and demand that the NSG say no to the nuclear ambitions of India and the US," Ulrike Lunacek, Green Party spokesperson, said.

Wrote the Austrian Greens, incl. Ulrike Lunacek a letter a few days back. Doesn't seem to have helped. . She recently wrote Foreign Minister Plassnik can and should not allow the whipping through of the US-Indian Nuclear Deal in IAEA and NSG. Maybe militant Le$bians don't really like Bush, and India has to pay.