Bharat Rakshak

A handy summary of discussion points on china.

Video: MUNK DEBATE ON CHINA

On June 17th, 2011, the Aurea Foundation held the seventh semi-annual Munk Debate in Toronto. The participants debated the question "Does the 21st century belong to China?" Historian and author Niall Fergusson and David Daokui Li from Tsinghua University's School of Economics and Management in Beijing argued for the resolution. Henry Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977, and Fareed Zakaria, CNN Host and Editor-at-Large of TIME Magazine, spoke against the resolution.

Henry Kissinger speaks for the first time here in public.

The latest spat in the South China Sea, in a first, involves China and India. An Indian naval ship, INS Airavat, transited through the sea claimed by China as its “territorial waters”. It had left a Vietnamese port after a spot of maritime diplomacy. While at sea, it is reported to have received a radio transmission asking it to explain its presence. The Chinese maintain that they have no record of this incident. Vietnam insists that it has no information. The story broke in the Indian press over a week after the incident. It serves as a useful entry point into discussing the India-China strategic equation, with India’s relationship with the US serving as backdrop.

India’s presence in the South China Sea dates to 2000 and is part of its strategy of engaging with East Asia and South East Asia. The hawks have it that the strategy must be pursued with a vengeance so as to counter what they perceive as China’s encirclement of India. The moderates prefer to view the incident in perspective, concentrating on engaging China and the region rather than prematurely ruffling feathers.

In the background is the most fundamental geopolitical change underway over the past two decades, that of a rising China. The relative decline of the US, of more recent vintage, has led to fears of a vacuum emerging. India has in tandem enhanced its profile in the region, a move some see as a balance to China. Indeed, Hillary Clinton, during her recent five-day visit to India for a “strategic dialogue”, said, “As India takes on a larger role throughout the Asia Pacific, it does have increasing responsibilities…In all of these areas, India’s leadership will help to shape positively the future of the Asia Pacific. That’s why the United States supports India’s Look East policy, and we encourage India not just to look east, but to engage East and act East as well…”

The debate between the hawks and moderates is essentially about the extent of proximity to US and corresponding distance from China. It is played out at two levels: the strategic and operational.

At the strategic level, the two positions are in a democratic contest within the national security system. The chairperson of India’s National Security Advisory Board, K. Shankar Bajpai, a tier for recommendatory input from professionals and thinkers in the National Security Council system, in a recent trenchant criticism bemoaned, “That…our wider priorities currently include…the changing power equations to our East (of which the global consequences of China’s ascension is a vital, but separate issue), and several interests in the Indian Ocean. In which of these are we intellectually, much less militarily, equipped to do anything?”

His argument, representative of the more assertive position, is that India’s strategic frontiers stretch from Suez to Shanghai, an expansion from the earlier stretch from Aden to Singapore. Answering the question he poses himself, “How to develop influence within our strategic frontiers?”, his counsel is: “the one option we still shy away from is America”, the reasoning being, “until we are able to do more on our own, we must develop partnerships, or at least ad-hoc collaborations…”

The National Security Advisor, Shivshankar Menon, on the other hand, has a more nuanced take. To him the issue most likely to affect India’s future ability to transform itself is the rise of China. His argument is that, “India’s interest is clearly in an inclusive world order, with China as one of its cooperative members…. But this will require much better communication between India and China and no misunderstanding of each other’s actions and motives.”

At the operational level, the attack by India’s strategic community on what they see as Delhi’s desultory policies is intense. A representative opinion, voiced by a military funded think tank, has it that, “The first requirement is to upgrade India’s military strategy of dissuasion against China…. Genuine deterrence can come only from the ability to take the fight deep into the adversary’s territory through the launching of major offensive operations.” The recommendation is therefore for offensive and firepower capabilities.

India’s NSA, no doubt already having deliberated over such demands, has it in response that, “Our goal must be defense, not offense, unless offense is necessary for deterrence or to protect India’s ability to continue its own transformation. We must develop the means to defend ourselves.” It is no wonder then that the defense ministry has reportedly returned a Rs. 1200 billion (approximately US$25-30 billion) plan to refurbish the military for a face-off with China, for reconsideration.

Summing up, the two views are at odds on two counts. Hawks would prefer taking on China more assertively and in partnership with the US. The moderates, who currently control policy, prefer engagement with China and, in respect of the US relationship, as the NSA put it, India “will continue to walk her own path in the world.”

There is a third view, less visible these days largely on account of the Left parties having been eclipsed in the last polls. It is that the discussion is subject to the limitations of international relations theories that see the world as anarchic and balancing as the only recourse. Instead, in this perspective, Asian values need revisiting to bring about a regime of tolerance and non-violence. Reliance on western perspectives of how nation-states behave in a power-reliant world makes for a tension-filled future. The interest of the US is in seeing a self-perpetuation of suspicion in order that its relevance extends indefinitely. Working towards a pan-Asian identity and interaction can serve as an antidote.

How the debate turns out in India between the two mainstream and one marginalized position may prove consequential to the future strategic movement in Asia. Future crises, for which the current ‘crisis that isn’t’ serves as a precursor, can be expected to lend energy to the debate.

This chapter discusses the responses of countries in South Asia to the rise of India and China.

Main argument :

For Pakistan, the rise of India is a strategic nightmare, while the rise of China is an opportunity to curb India’s advancement and reduce dependence on the United States. Afghanistan sees its ties with India and China, as well
as with the U.S., as vehicles for blunting interference by its immediate neighbors, especially Pakistan. Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka generally accept India’s primacy in their region. Bangladesh and Nepal see their ties with China as a way of increasing their freedom of action against India; Sri Lanka sees both India and China as means to emphasize its independence from Western donors.

Policy implications :

• India’s South Asian neighbors look on India and China with one eye on relations with the U.S. Most of these countries are seeking either to balance a hostile relationship or to hedge against excessive dependency on the U.S. or India.

• India is still the major player in South Asia, and is becoming more active in East Asia.

• China’s security profile and economic heft in South Asia have risen dramatically in the past decade. India’s economic growth will determine whether New Delhi maintains its influence in its own neighborhood.

• The Indian Ocean is the arena where the India-China rivalry will play out. U.S. strategic goals align well with India’s, and U.S. interests would be well served by treating the Indian Ocean as a single policy space.

• The smaller South Asian countries, especially Sri Lanka, will play a greater role in the dynamics of the Indian Ocean region than traditional U.S. policy would indicate

A number of younger diplomats have begun to search for the soul of the foreign service, to give its members a sense of belonging and pride, observes former ambassador T P Sreenivasan.

Every service or institution has a foundation day, which becomes an annual event every year. The day is invariably celebrated with varying degrees of enthusiasm, depending on the mood of the leadership or its loyalty to the originator or to the set of events that founded the institution.

But the Indian Foreign Service, which was created by Independent India without a model from the colonial era, rarely celebrated an IFS Day, though old hands recall an odd cocktail party or a tea get-together hosted by the foreign secretary in certain years. Till recently, many IFS officers did not even know which day was celebrated as the IFS Day.

The absence of regular IFS Day celebrations had more to it than meets the eye. It was not simply a matter of forgetfulness or apathy to needless ceremonies and unnecessary expenditure.

The ministry of external affairs and individual officers entertain even inside the country, accustomed as they are to the representational grant as an instrument of winning friends and influencing people.

More fundamentally, the IFS has been the least cohesive of services, because of the very nature of its composition and deployment.

The majority of missions are 'one man and a dog' missions and very few missions have more than a handful of IFS officers working together. In the past, it was not essential for officers to serve at headquarters, where officers have an opportunity to get to know each other.

But even at headquarters, the officers tend to meet only those in their divisions or their bosses, as there is no time for interaction outside their own sphere of work. Constant travel and demands from foreign missions leave them with little time to get to know their colleagues.

These factors turn IFS officers into single palm trees on islands known only to their families and close friends. They may serve in the IFS for nearly forty years and still never set their eyes on some of their colleagues. They merely become names on the seniority list or bylines on papers and notes that get circulated.

The unique deployment pattern of the IFS makes its members insensitive to the needs and aspirations of their colleagues and gives them a sense that they must fend for themselves by fair or foul means, depending upon their sense of propriety and innate character. They tend to help themselves without concern for others as they rarely see for themselves the frustrations they may have imposed on their colleagues by advancing their own careers, to the detriment of others.

Many of them have no qualms about utilising a chance opportunity of getting to know their political bosses to get a prize posting even beyond established norms. In the IFS, promotions are a science while postings are an art and, therefore, juniors in lower grades can do better than their seniors by securing plum postings.

The IFS has begun to look like a service without a soul, though it has a strong mind and a heart to serve its national purpose.

Things have begun to change in the IFS, but not because of imaginative initiatives of the leadership or even the rather moribund IFS Association, which has to research its annals to find instances of heroic action like when a foreign secretary was fired unfairly or when a subsidiary service began to do better than the senior service.

A number of younger recruits have begun to search for the soul of the service, to give it cohesion and to give the members a sense of belonging and pride.

The IFS Day celebrations on October 9, 2011 and a decision to mark the day every year are part of an 'IFS spring'.

The information revolution and the advent of social media played a part in the awakening. Unlike many senior people, who got their e-mails printed and dictated replies to their private secretaries even in the initial years of the 21st century, the young men and women who joined the service in recent years realised the potential of the new technology and began to put it to use to bring the service together.

It began with the establishment of a Google group to exchange ideas, to share strategic and literary creations or simply to circulate notable writings outside the circle. It soon developed into a lively, frank, creative and useful forum as more and more members, young and old, signed up.

From the veterans in their nineties to the youngest recruits, everyone found a level ground to speak out, differ and even agree. From nuclear strategy to table manners, from policy directions to directions to settle back in India after living abroad, there was no topic untouched or unembellished.

It did not take long to move from discussions to formulation of ideas and setting up of data banks. How many in the IFS had written books?� No one had a complete list, not to speak of a complete collection. How did the IFS Association originate and why is it stagnant? No one could answer.

Does the IFS have a foundation day, and if so, why is it not celebrated? Do the members get an identity card, and if not, why not? These questions and many others came up and we began to find answers. Nothing frivolous, indecent or undiplomatic came up. A group of young moderators remained vigilant against the least invasion of privacy or breach of secrecy without being accused of censorship.

In future, promotions and posting policies may come up. Right to information will be raised. More transparency may be imposed on the administration. Blue eyed boys and girls may become a rarity. Merit may be recognised and self confidence may increase.

The IFS may find its soul. India may become less of a reluctant superpower. The possibilities are endless.

"You have shown us the way," said Shyam Saran to the young diplomats, "creating a modern networking platform which has brought us all together, from all corners of the world, first as digital identities and now in flesh and blood."

The IFS spring may well have been an offshoot of the advent of public diplomacy. A ministry, which had prohibited the use of official computers for social media and witnessed a minister falling victim to the temptations of Twitter, today not only has multiple Web sites but also Facebook and Twitter accounts to project its policy.

This liberation led to the extension of social media to the needs of the service and its members. A paperless web of information now envelops the service and encourages greater interaction and action.

Like blogging turned hackers into commentators and literary geniuses, the New Media has turned retired bureaucrats, who were destined to baby sit their grandchildren in high-rise buildings in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada [ Images ] and Australia [ Images ], into writers, thinkers and even poets. Making a contribution to the collective wisdom of the IFS is a compulsive instinct for the oldest and the youngest.

Technology alone cannot explain the difference that the young officers are making to the service. They are imaginative, ambitious and motivated. Instead of accepting the status quo, they are seeking a change for the better. They are lighting candles instead of cursing the darkness.

A poignant moment came when the dangers to diplomats in these days of international terrorism was dramatically displayed by Malathi Rao.

She is the young widow of V Venkateswara Rao, a diplomat who lost his life in Kabul. But she spoke not in sorrow, but with pride of the IFS, which stood by her in her hour of tragedy.

In contrast, in an earlier era, young widows had complained bitterly that the service had left them high and dry. IFS has had its share of casualties in untimely deaths and grievous injuries, which have remained uncompensated and unacknowledged.

Those affected nurse their injuries in body and spirit, taking them in their stride. "We recall those who have paid a price, some with their lives, some with serious injuries. Should not gate number 4 have a list of names on display," asks Leela K Ponappa.

The IFS spring, alas, is still in its dawn and it is yet to infect sections of the old and the young. The attendance at the IFS Day event could have been better, particularly of retired officers who were in town. Veterans like Pammi Sahay, Shyam Saran and Shivshankar Menon came and spoke in praise of the initiative and the initiators. Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai was away in Sri Lanka [ Images ].

But with better planning and certainty of an event on every October 9, attendance may be better in the future years. The administration and the association may well be less reluctant to lend a helping hand. The IFS spring must infect the seniors even if their stakes in the service diminish over the years.

The book makes a timely appearance now that both India's economy and diplomacy are reaching what Rostow called the “take-off” stage. “The year 1991 was a significant turning point in Indian politics, economic orientation, and foreign policy. It coincided with the collapse of the post-Second World War world order….”

India's policies became more pragmatic and its pronouncements less doctrine. “The manner in which India's international relations evolved assisted India in creating higher levels of economic growth and earning greater global influence. However, India still grapples with a number of important security and political challenges at home, in its region, and globally. On the domestic front, while the opening up of the political space to new social groups has deepened democracy in India, it has also led to severe political fragmentation and often creates obstacles to effective policymaking. India's region is fraught with security threats arising out of unstable, often weak states such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Afghanistan, a near-neighbour in which India is much invested. Further afield, India could serve as a pivot in a new triangle (much promoted by geo-strategic commentators) involving the USA, China and India. Beyond the sphere of enjoyable geostrategic speculation, India has in recent times benefited from cooperation with the USA, while it grapples with perennial potential security threats emanating from China. India's regional and global security concerns are reflected in its policies relevant to military modernisation, maritime security, and nuclear policy. But domestic security concerns overwhelmingly predominate.” They are just the ones which remain unaddressed not least because of a volatile public opinion shaped by unscrupulous politicians and a self-righteous, ignorant media, bar a few honourable exceptions.

Comments on Afghanistan bear quotation in extenso. “Aside from similar nations such as Bhutan and the Maldives, perhaps the one country in the region where India's involvement has not played against it – to the Pakistani establishment's distress – is Afghanistan. Indians tend to see Delhi's policy as altruistic, in the words of a recent editorial: ‘Delhi's partnership with Kabul has thrived because Delhi has neither geographic access to Afghanistan nor a political agenda of its own. What India wants is a moderate and stable Afghanistan that is in harmony with its neighbours.'

The work covers the whole gamut of India's relations with the U.S., Russia, the European Union, Japan, the Gulf States, Iran and South-east Asia, besides the neighbours. “India's policy was appreciated with much more moderate enthusiasm by the West, which, with overweening superiority, and the assumption that any democracy worthy of the concept should align on it, indulged quite frequently in bullying tactics towards Delhi (while also assisting it economically, particularly with food aid). The Western, particularly U.S., tactics viewed with hindsight today were distasteful, and, in any event, proved consistently counter productive in compelling India's compliance.

“Russia was eventually able to acquire India as an ally, virtually by default, through a more relaxed projection towards India of its ideological posture, through patience with Indian rhetorical flourishes, and a realist appreciation that India mattered in the balance of power in Asia. Indian needling of the West, particularly of the USA, the fruit of its anti-imperialist sentiment, and the high-minded nature of much Indian speech-making at the U.N. and elsewhere, was congruent with its eventual alliance with Moscow, but the latter was unable to assist India much with several of its pressing needs.” This is a fair assessment of the policies.

So is this one on India's conduct of its foreign policy, its diplomacy. “Indians are mostly brilliant, hard-working, loquacious, fluent, and creative. They generally cleave to engagement with others, and this works wonders at the bilateral level, where the parameters of national interests are perhaps most clearly defined on both sides. In bilateral diplomacy, India has made many friends. Multilaterally, however, while generating for itself a reputation as a country that always needs to be contended with, India has achieved less to date, with its financial diplomacy an honourable exception. The perceived need to outflank all potential or actual rivals and impress all comers sometimes leads Indian practitioners to monopolise attention through rhetorical brilliance and to spend as much time on impressing the gallery as on tending effectively to Indian interests.


Its author's appraisals are balanced and sound. “At the strategic level, India is not yet a particularly significant player beyond its own neighbourhood. International experts view only the Indian navy as having developed both a strategy and the political support and resources to implement it in expanding India's global reach…. Time and history are on India's side as it struggles to recover from several centuries of foreign domination and its consequences. Its re-emergence, particularly if it manages its significant domestic challenges with success, will be one of the major shifts of the twenty-first century. It will have been hard won, and should gladden both students of history and of foreign affairs the world over. Twenty or thirty years from now, the tentative, contingent nature of many of my judgments today may well seem over-cautious. I certainly hope so.”

Over 40 years ago, Dorothy Woodman, another friend of India, wrote: “India today seems to be the victim of three traumas: Kashmir, the Aksai Chin, poverty. To try to resolve the first two by vast military expenditure can only direct her funds and energies from the struggle against poverty…. To settle for the present stalemate is to condone a militarily active frontier across Asia” ( Himalayan Frontiers, page 321). The situation in 2011 is not much more promising than it was in 1969.

After the humiliating defeat in the border war with China in October-November 1962, the overwhelming prestige and authority of Jawaharlal Nehru inevitably declined. After all, he was the sole architect as well as implementer of Indian foreign policy since the dawn of Independence, and it was the stark failure of his China policy that had traumatised the nation.

Long before the Chinese troops had come rolling down the Himalayan slopes in both the northeast and the northwest, and indeed, since the Chinese intruders first drew blood at Kongka-la three years earlier, large sections of the opposition had been criticising him vehemently for refusing to fight the Chinese and seeking a peaceful settlement of the border issue instead. There were many on the Congress benches who silently shared the sentiment. Came the day when Atal Bihari Vajpayee, then of the Jan Sangh, the forerunner of the BJP, went so far as to taunt the prime minister rather cruelly. “Wars between nations”, he said directly addressing Nehru, “take place for three reasons: Zar (wealth or cash), zewar (ornaments) and zameen (land). Land you’ve given away. What more will you give”?


Without any loss of temper, Nehru explained at some length why the policy of peaceful settlement of disputes was in the best interest of the country. However, “if this House thinks that the way our government has carried out this work in not satisfactory, it is open to this House to choose more competent men...”.

When the full-blown Chinese attack began and overran everything in its way, Nehru did admit that he and the country had been “out of touch with the reality in the modern world” and “living in an artificial atmosphere of our own our own creation”. This was as close as he could come to confessing that the fundamental flaw in his China policy was his conviction that there would be border skirmishes and patrol-level clashes but the Chinese would do “nothing big”.

This, according to Nehru’s critics, was because of his naivety, but that is far from, being the case. Dangerously wrong he certainly was, but naïve he wasn’t even though the republic’s then-president and his friend, S. Radhkrishnan, accused his government of “credulity and negligence”. Evidence to the contrary is compelling. As early 1954, briefing a goodwill delegation to China, Nehru had told them that India’s problems with China would be all along the “spine of Asia”. Two eminent editors, Frank Moraes and M. Chalapathi Rao, who were members of the delegation, put this in the public domain.

More importantly, in March 1958, on the night G. Parthasarthi was to leave for Beijing to take over as ambassador, Nehru advised him not to believe whatever the foreign office might have told him about the state of India-China relations. Then he gave him what was unquestionably the most forthright appraisal of the Chinese whom, he added, he “didn’t trust one bit”. “They are arrogant, deceitful, hegemonist, and a thoroughly unreliable lot. We just cannot trust them at all. They are totally inimical to us...” Nehru also told the ambassador-designate to be “extremely vigilant” in Beijing and not “fall for any blandishment the Chinese might offer. It is all deceit”. He then gave GP the rather unusual directive to send all his dispatches from China “marked only to me”.

In view of this the question is: why then did he err so grievously? Clearly, he was not a victim of naivety but had fallen between two stools: his knowledge that China was trouble all the way, and his belief that India was “too big a prize” and therefore neither China nor any other country could invade it without risking a wider war. It didn’t occur to him that China could launch a short, calibrated punitive strike. According to the British historian of the Himalayan frontiers, Dorothy Woodman, another reason for Nehru’s misreading of the situation was “an element of deceit” in all of Zhou Enlai’s negotiations with him.

Against this backdrop, the surprise is not that Nehru’s towering stature slipped but that the slippage was so limited and so short-lived. Soon enough, he had recovered his enviable hold on the Indian masses. Several historians have testified that no other leader in any country could have survived politically under similar circumstances. But in post-1962 India, according to Steven A. Hoffmann, an American analyst of the India-China crisis, Nehru remained “in command of the Indian political system and the national decision-making process... as always during the time of his prime ministership, he remained a legitimising symbol and, to many, the embodiment of the nation. The war with China had curtailed his role as an international statesman and champion of peace, but he had become the focal point of national and international sympathy”.

Almost immediately, Nehru buckled down to the onerous task of revitalising both the Congress and his administration. He was more active now than before the war. By August 1963, he had had two remarkable achievements to his credit. Through what is known as the Kamaraj Plan (named after the chief minister of Madras (now Tamil Nadu), K. Kamaraj) he cleared the way for Lal Bahadur Shastri’s succession to him, eliminating Morarji Desai. And he defeated, spectacularly, the first and only no-confidence motion against his government.

However, at no time is the Indian scene uni-dimensional or free from complexities. Around the same time, Nehru’s party badly lost three key parliamentary byelections in quick succession. These brought or brought back into the Lok Sabha three of his inveterate and eloquent critics — Acharya Kripalani, Minoo Masani and Ram Manohar Lohia. The victors and the opposition in general were jubilant.

C. Rajagopalachari, better known as Rajaji, a one-time close associate of Nehru turned bitter critic, immediately declared that the mandate the prime minister had won in February 1962 had been exhausted, and therefore he must resign and hold fresh elections. Other opposition leaders joined the chorus. Nehru hit back equally hard. He denounced them as “inept, irresponsible, lately becoming positively indecent”, and said that they were “reviving memories of fascism and Nazism”. Masani commented bitingly, if also helplessly: “Defeat seems to have gone to his head”.

The writer is a Delhi-based political commentator

Jayanth Jacob, Hindustan Times
New Delhi, November 06, 2011

This could just add to the great game in the Indian Ocean. As it did with Bangladesh last September, leading with an umbrella pact for promoting cooperation across many sectors, India is set to unleash a charm offensive on Maldives during the Prime Minister’s visit.

The move comes at a
time when Chinese efforts to increase its presence in Maldives, an Indian Ocean archipelago located on crucial international shipping lane with vital strategic importance, is on an upswing.

Stepping up interactions and reconnaissance efforts, and greater cooperation in counter-terrorism will enhance defence and security ties between the two countries.

Furthering defence ties will be under the rubric of stepping up maritime security and enhanced efforts to deal with the threat of piracy that Maldives is facing of late. Singh, who is in Maldives to attend the SAARC summit from November 9 to 12, will have a bilateral meeting with the President of Maldives.http://www.hindustantimes.com/Images/HT ... tro09a.jpg

With an Indian PM visiting Maldives for a bilateral after nine years, New Delhi wants it to be a unique affair and a game changer — in sync with the changing aspirations of a democratic Maldives under its dynamic president, Mohamed Nasheed, sources told HT.

The umbrella pact will be the larger framework agreement that will broadly spell out the basis for stronger partnership in many spheres between the countries in the coming years, a government official said.

India will help Maldives set up a police training academy. Cooperation in climate change, financial aid including extending a fresh credit line to Maldives are also on the cards. There will be initiative in the health sector too.

With its strategic location, China has been of late making overtures to increase its footprints in Maldives. Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) became the highest-ranking official ever to visit Maldives when he visited the country in May.

The Indian private sector, too, has invested close to $1 billion in Maldives.

These guys are a product of the times. No more then that.

India allegedly has a military doctrine called 'Cold Start', which means that in the event of any future conflict with Pakistan, New Delhi will avoid a full-blown war and go for a low-intensity offensive. This term also appropriately describes the status of the Indo-Pak dialogue after the Mumbai terror attack because it failed to warm up after a cold start. In such a scenario, Pakistan's decision to confer the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status on India adds some warmth to the relations.

While trade and liberal visa regimes improve bilateral relations, overcoming coagulated distrust between the two will take more than just these efforts. If trade was responsible for friendship then China would be friends with Japan and the US. But that's not the case. What then can be the gamechangers in Indo-Pak relations?

The Chao Phraya Dialogue, a track-two initiative named after the river that passes through Bangkok, recently brought nearly three dozen representatives (diplomats, academicians, journalists) from the two countries to discuss this issue and it threw up some interesting ideas.

Perceptions play an important role in international relations, but in Indo-Pak relations, perceptions play an overwhelming part. Both countries have an understanding of the other's understanding of it — and behave accordingly. Its distance from the reality can be twice over — because it's always a perception about a perception. How this self-aggravating cycle can be broken is a conceptual challenge in Indo-Pak relations.

The formation of Pakistan (based on the two-nation theory) makes hostility with India the core of its existence, according to an influential view in India. A dominant Pakistani view presents the same set of historical facts to argue that India will never tolerate the existence of Pakistan. Assuming that both are right from their respective perspectives, one still has to think of ways to overcome it.

After the collapse of the Sharm el-Sheikh initiative and the chill that followed, India resumed talks primarily because not talking to Pakistan had diminishing returns. Moreover, India was optimistic that Pakistan would indeed take some action against the conspirators of the attack. The inability — or unwillingness — of Pakistan to deliver on this has weakened the peace process that India now carries on with ritualistic impassiveness.

The frantic efforts to stabilise Afghanistan have inserted yet another variable in the complex regional matrix. Pakistan expects a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, after the US exit. It sees India's interventions in Afghanistan more as encircling and weakening Pakistan rather than stabilising the troubled zone. For the record, Kashmir remains Pakistan's first item vis-à-vis India, but the suspicions are about Afghanistan. India's position on Kashmir is a known, while that in Afghanistan is an unknown known. Given Pakistan's fears about its further disintegration that it suspects India supports and uncertainties about Afghanistan, the western border is closer to Pakistan's strategic calculations. Hence, Pakistan holds the Haqqani Network that is hostile to India, close.

Given the preeminence that terror and Afghanistan have on Indo-Pak relations, the gamechangers too must evolve around these.

A discernible Pakistani action against terrorists who target India from its soil will do wonders. Haggling over the technical issues in the cases related to the Mumbai attack will not take it forward; it must demonstrate an attitude. Acting on terror can turn around bilateral relations as the recent radical shift in India-Bangladesh ties shows. The trust created by Bangladeshi action against groups that targeted India catapulted relations to a different level.

On the other hand, India's explanations about its intent in Afghanistan are not sufficient to reassure Pakistan. While India does understand — and perhaps overemphasises — Pakistan's existentialist fears, isn't there anything it can do to mitigate it? Engaging Pakistan on India's activities in Afghanistan can be a beginning. Two suggestions emerged specifically on this issue: first, India and Pakistan must hold a meeting specifically on Afghanistan; and second, India must help to bring the Northern Alliance and Pakistan closer so that the latter is assured of the possibility of working with them also in the future.

Getting beyond the Cold Start will take courage on India's part and a realisation in Pakistan that the war on terror is also its problem — and not India's and the US's alone.

Looks like the guy checked out his mind in heady Track Two engagement.

Anyway who funds these track two shindigs?

Not true. These guys were specially chosen by the UPSC system and in case a jingo got in the interview process eliminated them. Most of those selected before 1963 were interviewed by JLN. So particular mindset were chosen. The idea is to create a corps of diplomutts that will toe the JLN line about syncretic India that was Bharat and to pooh pooh any idea of a resurgent India in order to avoid Western fears. Invariably when a new country emerged it was resurgent and expansionist. So JLN ensured that a neutered image of India and Indian mind frame wrapped in his aura that is difficult to shatter.

hese are times when Indian foreign policy keeps meandering. It ducks and then it resurfaces, it stands still lost in thoughts and then it dashes forward - only to go subterranean - and the next thing you know, it reemerges and begins dashing backward.
No coherent foreign policy vision seems to exist at the top, conceptual thinking seems to have dried out. Paucity of brain power? Difficult to say - because, Delhi doesn’t lack the ‘apparatus’ or the mandarins to push the files or the resources.
Anyway, in these times of pedestrian thinking, any flash of originality immediately catches the mind’s eye. Amidst the recantation of India’s China policy by Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai in his Wednesday’s address at the National Defence College, I found a nugget of incredible originality. ‘Eureka!’ I am tempted to call it the ‘Mathai Doctrine’. No matter whether it has been his ingenuity or the result of collective brain power in the PMO, Mathai did articulate the doctrine and so it rightfully belongs to him.
Mathai said: “The rapid strides in economic and military capabilities of China and the manner in which China exercises its power is being followed carefully not only by us but by other neighbours in East Asia, ASEAN and beyond.” I surmise this is not an off-the-cuff remark, since Mathai always reads out from briefs even during his rare press briefings.
The doctrine is at once a brain teaser and a provocation to the intellect. It is intriguing that India is taking up a collective ‘grievance’ about China just as a Special Representatives meeting with China is due. Can it be that there has been a secret mandate given to PM Manmohan Singh by the ASEAN to represent their interests and concerns vis-a-vis China when the Chinese SR arrives in Delhi? Or, can it be that India is suo moto insisting that it articulates the collective voice of the southeast Asian and far eastern countries of the Asian continent regarding China’s rise?
Either way, there is novelty here. Even Jawaharlal Nehru was not given such a sweeping mandate as the voice of Asia. Certainly, Nehru wasn’t immodest, either, despite his stature as a Colossus on the world stage to arrogate to himself the prerogative to voice third countries’ collective opinions regarding China.
Or, can it be that PM Manmohan Singh had a nasty showdown with his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao at Bali last week and Mathai is gradually letting us into that dark secret? Beijing gives the contrary impression that Manmohan Singh and Wen hit it off well in Bali and took quite an exciting excursion exploring the potentials of ‘win-win’ situations in the two countries’ bilateral relationship. Was it all bluff? Maybe, Mathai knows something we don’t know.
What is absolutely clear, though, is that the ‘Mathai Doctrine’ poses challenging questions. India should be consistent. If this is a new foreign-policy doctrine, India shouldn’t hesitate to speak about the US or France, too. There are dozens of countries in the world which throughly disapprove of the ‘manner’ in which the US and France have ‘exercised their power’ in the most recent period since last December when a street hawker in Tunis took his life in sheer despair and all hell broke loose in the Middle East and North Africa.
In fact, it is reprehensible that US is threatening Iran (India’s ‘civilisational’ partner) and indulging in covert operations to destabilise that country and this is happening right in front of our eyes at India’s very doorstep. So much is happening in our extended neighbourhood and yet India is speechless.
India’s foreign policy is not one-dimesional. It is not just about China. It is also about a multipolar world; it is also about the centrality of international law and the UN Charter in the conduct of inter-state relations; it is also about settlement of differences through dialogue and negotiations and not through bloody violence; it is also about justice and fairplay and equitable relationship in the world order; it is also about an international system that rejects unilaterlist interventions in sovereign countries.
We would do well to keep in mind the perennially green maxim in life - ‘Do what you’d like to be done by’. Our mandarins should take time out, sit alone, lock up the door and switch off the telephone and ask one straightforward question: How would India’s neighbours view its ‘rapid strides in economic and military capabilities’ and what dark fears they could be harbouring about the ‘manner in which India exercises its power’ or about the intentions behind India’s massive militarization programme. They do ‘follow carefully’ India’s moves.
But then, it doesn’t matter to India a wee bit what others think about it. Suffice to say, there should be a limit to hubris - especially at a time when the Indian rupee is nosediving, the economy is visibly slowing down, chronic poverty is rising, foreign investors are calling back their money, repayment burden looms ahead and an indecisive leadership presides over all this.

Shyam Saran / December 31, 2011, 0:54 IST

The world in 2012 will provide many opportunities for India’s foreign policy. But a fractious polity could slow the country’s responses

If 2011 was the Year of the Unexpected, 2012 will almost certainly be the Year of Uncertainty. 2011 had begun on an optimistic note for India. The country seemed to have emerged from the global financial and economic crisis with its growth prospects largely intact. Its international stock was high. Towards the end of 2010, Delhi played host, in serial order, to leaders of each of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. India began its two-year term as a non-permanent member of the Council by winning a record 187 out of 192 votes. There were positive trends in the country’s relations with its South Asian neighbours, including Pakistan. And Sino-Indian relations remained stable, though testy at times. But within 12 months, the India story has soured. Self-confidence and optimism have given way to a mood of pervasive anxiety and apprehension.

The worsening global economic environment in 2011 played its part in this changed scenario. An increasingly globalised Indian economy picked up negative cues from a faltering US economy and a worsening debt crisis in the euro zone. But it was domestic economic mismanagement and governance failures that compounded the adverse external situation. India finds itself shunned by domestic and foreign investors alike, who doubt whether its currently dysfunctional polity is capable of raising India’s game to the standards of the big league. With the global economy decelerating, if not slipping into recession next year, India will face even greater political and economic challenges.

Dealing with a rapidly transforming international landscape with a weak hand will be problematic enough. But the year gone by has unleashed powerful but unexpected forces, which require well-considered policy responses. The eruption of the Arab Spring in North Africa and the Gulf began with a strong populist and democratic impulse, which democratic India could not but welcome. However, it is now apparent that the movement runs the risk of being overlaid with more ancient and enduring sectarian, tribal and ethnic divides, further complicated by external intervention. The eventual denouement of these complex political dynamics is not at all clear.

India will need to be far more engaged with this strategic part of the world because its interests are so patently obvious. Six million Indians are living and working in countries already roiled by political turbulence, while others confront similar prospects. Evacuating even a fraction of this number would be a logistical and financial nightmare. Seventy per cent of India’s oil comes from this region, with Saudi Arabia and Iran being the main sources of supply. Any disruption of these supplies would deal a debilitating blow to an already vulnerable Indian economy.

We are also witnessing a much sharper Shia-Sunni divide emerge in this neighbourhood. This will have domestic consequences. After Iran, it is India that has the largest Shia population.

India will need to draw up contingency plans to deal with a possible worsening of turmoil in this region. It must diversify energy supplies away from traditional sources. To forestall conflict, growing sectarianism and likely prolonged instability, which benefit no one, India should leverage its presence in the UN Security Council, its membership of both IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India And China), and its good relations with both the West and Iran.

On May 2, 2011, US Special Forces killed Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden, who was in hiding in the Pakistani town of Abbottabad — undoubtedly under the protection of Pakistani army and intelligence. This has triggered a rapid deterioration in US-Pakistan relations. The killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in Mohmand by a US-Afghan raiding party last month, and Pakistan’s angry response, probably marks the end of even the pretence of alliance between them. China may well respond by increasing its political, economic and military support to Pakistan, but would be unable to replace the US in its role as Pakistan’s chief benefactor.

Pakistani may be more amenable to improving relations with India to keep its eastern flank tranquil. Even if this opening is tactical, India should leverage it to promote cross-border linkages, confidence-building measures and dialogue on Afghanistan, even while keeping up insistent pressure on the terrorism issue. A decline in Pakistani meddling creates an opportunity to pursue peace and reconciliation in Kashmir.

India should also be ready to respond to developments in Pakistan where open confrontation between the Pakistan Peoples Party-led government and the Pakistan army will almost certainly lead to a fluid political situation in the country, with the possibility of another military takeover.

In managing its subcontinental neighbourhood, India must ensure that the Teesta controversy does not reverse the recent real gains in Indo-Bangladesh relations. In Sri Lanka a careful balancing is necessary between upholding the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil community and consolidating the overall bilateral partnership. The recent positive trends in Nepal must be encouraged through engagement with all competing political forces. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh should visit Nepal and Sri Lanka in 2012.

The world had to deal with a much more assertive and self-confident China in the year gone by. India, too, felt the consequences of this, both on its borders as well as in the larger Indo-Pacific theatre. The US has played upon the apprehensions over Chinese behaviour to “pivot” itself into Asia, strengthening existing alliances and also establishing security arrangements with new partners including Vietnam. Hillary Clinton’s recent dramatic visit to Myanmar brought with it the prospect of diminishing China’s dominance there.

How China and the US handle the leadership transition in North Korea will also be critical. The Korean Peninsula is the only region where the interests of China, Japan, South Korea, the US and Russia intersect. If North Korea descends into instability, the risks of military confrontation will rise.

The broad-based but loosely structured countervailing arrangements emerging in the Asia-Pacific region, including but at the same time constraining China, are to India’s advantage. For now, China is on the back foot. With a sensitive leadership transition looming large in 2012, China may continue to adopt a cautious approach in its external relations. China’s posture towards India has always been sensitive to shifts in regional and global balance of power. The more options India has, the more amenable China will be to meeting Indian concerns. The coming year could be a good time to give Sino-Indian relations a positive direction.

The year 2012 will indeed be a world in uncertain and often dangerous transition, but there are opportunities, too, for India to leverage. But for that, India needs a more focused government and a less fractious polity.

A FOREIGN AND STRATEGIC POLICY FOR INDIA IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY

Sunil Khilnani Rajiv Kumar Pratap Bhanu Mehta
Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Prakash Menon Nandan Nilekani Srinath Raghavan
Shyam Saran Siddharth Varadarajan

"Don't make concessions to Pakistan. Enough of Gandhigiri now. You are seriously accepting being slapped again and again in the face,"