Afghanistan News & Discussion

[SSridhar]

Abdullah asks India to ‘stay the course’ - Dinakar Peri, The Hindu

Amid discomfort in India over the rapprochement by the new government in Afghanistan with Pakistan, Kabul on Saturday expressed “surprise” at the level of apprehension in India in this regard and reassured New Delhi, asking it India to “stay the course.”

Speaking at the Vivekananda International Foundation, Abdullah Abdullah, Chief Executive (CE) of Afghanistan, expressed “surprise” and said: “We expect India to stay the course and be sure that nothing will shake the foundations of friendly relations of the two countries.” Dr. Abdullah stated that the two countries were bound by common objectives for a stable Afghanistan and thanked India for its constant support.

On the upcoming visit of Mr. Ashraf Ghani to India, Dr. Abdullah said, “the different facets of the Strategic Framework agreement with India would be reactivated” during the visit.

China’s role

Former President Hamid Karzai had initiated China’s role in talks with the Taliban to “encourage Pakistan to cooperate in achieving peace in Afghanistan,” the CE said.

[pankajs]

http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-as ... tly-747268
India asks UN to Act Against Security Threat Urgently

United Nations: Asserting that terror groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) cannot remain active in Afghanistan without "systematic state support" from "beyond" its borders, India has asked the UN Security Council to act against this security threat with a sense of urgency.

Reiterating its commitment to "stay the course" in Afghanistan, India told the UN Security Council that the main source of instability in the war-torn nation is terrorism and not ethnic rivalries.

Expressing concern over the security situation inside Afghanistan, India has cited UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's latest report which said the number of security incidents in Afghanistan was the second highest in 2014 after 2011 when Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was neutralised.

The Secretary General's report "substantiates our view that it is terrorism, and not tribal differences or ethnic rivalries, which is the main source of insecurity and instability in Afghanistan," India's Ambassador to the UN Asoke Mukerji said at the Security Council debate on United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) yesterday.
.................
"It is obvious that their activity cannot be sustained without systematic state support from beyond Afghanistan's borders," Mr Mukerji said adding that reports indicate these groups are mutating into more virulent forms, in a region already impacted by terrorism.

"The Council must act against this threat with a sense of urgency," Mr Mukerji said.

He said it is a critical decade of transformation for Afghanistan and reiterated India's commitment to "stay the course" in the war-ravaged country.

"India is proud to call itself Afghanistan's first strategic partner. We share the Afghan people's vision of a strong, independent, united and prosperous state...India stands ready to do all that is possible within our capacities and our means, to work with the Afghan Government and its people, to realise this great vision," he said.

Mr Mukerji informed the 15-nation Council that India, Afghanistan and Iran are examining how the existing port of Chabahar in Iran can be developed to help Afghanistan connect with the outside world.
...............
The Security Council extended UNAMA's mandate till March 17, 2016.

Unanimously adopting the resolution, the Council underscored the importance of sustainable democratic development in that country with all national institutions acting within their defined competence.

Condemning all attacks targeting civilians, Afghan and international forces, the Council expressed strong concern over the recruitment and use of civilians by the Taliban and other violent and extremist groups.

[Prem]

Obama likely to announce keeping US troops in Afghanistan

WASHINGTON: President Barack Obama is likely to make an announcement about keeping US troops in Afghanistan in a joint news conference with his Afghan counterpart later this week, says a senior White House official.Jeff Eggers, Special Assistant to the US President for Afghanistan and Pakistan, told a news briefing in Washington that the presence of the self-styled Islamic State militants in the Pak-Afghan region would influence the US decision to keep or withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan.He said he expected that President Obama would have something to say about that in his press conference at the end of President Ghani’s visit to the White House on TuesdayiPresident Ashraf arrived in Washington on Sunday with his country’s chief executive Abdullah Abdullah on their first official visit to the United States. President Obama will meet his Afghan counterpart on Tuesday at the White House after the two sides sort out “seemingly intractable issues”, The Washington Post reported.Top on the agenda for the Camp David meeting is the Afghan president’s request for revising the schedule for the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan.The United States, which once had more than 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, currently has only 10,000 troops in that country. President Obama plans to further reduce that number to 5,500 by the end of this year but PresidentGhani has urged him to stop the planned withdrawal.Mr Eggers said that Presidents Obama and Ghani had already held a number of discussions on this issue and the Afghans would present an assessment of their security needs at Camp David. Mr Eggers said that Gen. John F. Campbell, the commander of US forces in Afghanistan, had also developed some recommendations to “maintain appropriate counter-terrorism capabilities” of his troops

[CRamS]

Guys, nothing much in this that we don't know, but good to see a former ambassador telling the truth about TSP in a US govt mouthpiece rag (when it comes to foreign policy and protecting TSP munna that is)

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/23/opini ... ement.html

[Philip]

http://rt.com/op-edge/243213-afghanista ... bama-visit

Afghanistan: No end for Obama’s endgame
Sergey Strokan is a journalist, essayist and a poet.
Published time: March 23, 2015 12:35

Afghan president Ashraf Ghani.(Reuters / Omar Sobhani)

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's visit to the US has sparked a new debate on the future of Afghanistan which for centuries played a special role, remaining unconquered by superpowers repulsing offensives with old British rifles and Kalashnikov’s.

With America the last superpower to launch its own “Afghan project” more than 13 years ago under President George W. Bush, all eyes are focused on his successor, President Obama. The core question is whether Americans should entirely leave the country after last year's pullout of the main contingent of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force or stay, and if so, in what numbers and with what mission yet to be accomplished.

Weeks before President Ghani's visit which began Sunday, the Obama administration unveiled its new big Afghan surprise. First, it was Defense Secretary Ashton Carter who hinted that Washington might slow the pace of withdrawal for the remaining 10,600 American troops.The statement made by the Pentagon chief during a visit to Kabul was shortly followed by a leak from an administration official that President Obama is planning to abandon his initial plans to cut the number of US forces in Afghanistan to 5,500 by the end of this year and wants to keep more troops in the country, including into the 2016 fighting season. It is expected that the details of the new security deal will be sealed during Ghani’s visit, which will be watched with keen interest all over the world.

Afghan leadership duo visit US to secure troops, aid

While President Bush launched the military intervention in Afghanistan to disrupt the al-Qaeda network and destroy the Taliban regime, Obama has built his presidency on the promise of scaling down and then suspending military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. So, is Obama backtracking on his initial decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, and if so, why? Finally, is the time even right for the Americans to pull out?

In a thought-provoking article, “Leave Afghanistan To The Afghans: Obama Administration Should Speed Military Withdrawal”, in the Forbes magazine independent expert and contributor Doug Bandow argues that the very idea of slowing down the withdrawal contradicts basic American interests and will only result in more meaningless human and material losses.

“America has been at war in Afghanistan for more than 13 years, as long as the Civil War, Spanish-American War, World Wars I and II, and Korean War combined. U.S. troop levels peaked at 140,000 in 2010. More than 2200 Americans died in a conflict reflecting little more than purposeless inertia,” writes Doug Bandow, adding that in recent years, Washington and its allies were building a large government bureaucracy and security force in Kabul “on a potential foundation of sand.”

So why can't the Americans withdraw once and for all, leaving the fate of Afghanistan in the hands of its people? Well, the idea to leave Afghanistan to the Afghans sounds naïve, to say the least. The American operation in Afghanistan has led to quite a paradoxical result: while the initial idea was to build a democratic and prosperous Afghanistan which would presumably enjoy full political sovereignty, today as never before the fate of Afghanistan lies more in the hands of external forces – regional powers and superpowers - than in the hands of the Afghans themselves. Whether one likes it or not, it will remain a state with very limited sovereignty and potential for independent actions.

Let us have a closer look at this point. The first external force which would increasingly shape up the security environment and political situation in Afghanistan after the presumed US withdrawal would be neighboring Pakistan. It is an open secret that large swatches of Pakistan’s territory are not controlled by the government in Islamabad, but rather by various groups of Islamic militants.Pakistan is joined to Afghanistan by the Pashtun tribal belt where the law of Pakistan has no sway.

US to delay Afghanistan withdrawal, leave more troops – report

It is obvious that if the Americans complete their withdrawal, it will embolden Islamic militants in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, giving new steam to radical Islamic movements not only in these two countries, but also in the rest of Central Asia and even China, with the potential to create a major threat for the nearby former Soviet republics.

The other crucial factor which will hardly allow the Americans to risk leaving Afghanistan to the Afghans is the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq with its idea of global Islamic revolution. With the emergence of ISIS, the Middle East has turned into a testing ground for a destabilization model that will be exported to other regions. The Syrian or Iraqi “model of destabilization” can be effectively applied in Afghanistan, with external forces playing a key role.

This is not exactly a remote scenario, as independent sources point out that ISIS ranks in Syria already contain jihadists from Afghanistan. What we can thus see will be a connecting of the Syrian, Iraqi, Yemeni, and Afghan dots into a single arch of instability ranging from the Middle East to Central and South Asia.

And this is not the whole list of all the grave security risks related to Afghanistan. If the Taliban is allowed to overthrow the President Ghani regime, it can then attempt to destabilize the government in Islamabad, which is still a key American security partner in the region despite all the odds. So, the “Somalia-ization” of the region, which now looks like a product of someone’s wild imagination, can soon become a reality.

All in all, it looks like there is no speedy end for President Obama’s endgame in Afghanistan. Launching his global campaign on this sun-soaked muddy terrain, President Bush thought he was acting as a responsible global leader. Subsequently, global responsibility requires President Obama to stay there for more time. The price of the operation in Afghanistan for the US has already exceeded $673 billion, but if they allow Afghanistan to turn into another springboard for global jihad, then there will obviously be an even larger cost that can't be measured in dollars and cents.

[Tuvaluan]

If the GOTUS actually wants Afghanisthan to not be a springboard for pakistani terrorists, then the question is why they sidelined India and an anti-pakistan Karzai to replace him with a pakistani-friendly Ghani by manipulating the Pakistani elections (drawing them into two phases and allowing ample time to plant their stooge) and to remove any pro-India govt. from emerging. Effing duplicitous scum just like their paki friends.

[svinayak]

If the GOTUS actually wants Afghanisthan to not be a springboard for pakistani terrorists, then the question is why they sidelined India and an anti-pakistan Karzai to replace him with a pakistani-friendly Ghani by manipulating the Pakistani elections (drawing them into two phases and allowing ample time to plant their stooge) and to remove any pro-India govt. from emerging. Effing duplicitous scum just like their paki friends.

Geo political control also is achieved by having unstable countries in the region.

AfPak region being unstable has dual purpose for the Atlantic powers.
It keeps Russia, middle east, India(Kashmir) and China under long term threat of terrorism
AfPak region will take decades to play out completely.
The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War by Robert D. Kaplan

Broken Window theory states that US mil deployment prevents war.
For example - US to delay Afghanistan withdrawal, leave more troops – report

“America has been at war in Afghanistan for more than 13 years, as long as the Civil War, Spanish-American War, World Wars I and II, and Korean War combined. U.S. troop levels peaked at 140,000 in 2010. More than 2200 Americans died in a conflict reflecting little more than purposeless inertia,” writes Doug Bandow, adding that in recent years, Washington and its allies were building a large government bureaucracy and security force in Kabul “on a potential foundation of sand.”

The main purpose of large GOTUS troops in AfPak when the actual threat is only Al QUaida is to prevent Pak from attacking India and parts of AfPak to achieve its internal goals for jihad groups.

There is no visible GOTUS policy yet which tries to mold the AfPak region for a future end state.

[Tuvaluan]

Geo political control also is achieved by having unstable countries in the region.

svinayak, absolutely. There is no other explanation for the US funding and propping up the terrorist mofos in the Pakistani Army. The real question then is why the strategic geniuses in New Delhi literally begged the US to stay behind in Afghanisthan and still continue to do so -- WTF goes on in the heads of these people in New Delhi is beyond me. The Indian Govt. basically does not want to arm the Afghans overtly because they are risk averse and afraid the weapons will leak to the pakis who can then use it against India, and instead they beg the US to stay behind and wreck afghanisthan, and all this after spend millions of $s on Afghanisthan's reconstruction at the tax payer's expense.

[Prem]

http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... b8.twitter

Afghan President Ghani to visit India on April 27
The visit is expected to push Modi's vision of strengthening SAARC

The newly-elected President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, will be on his maiden visit to India in the week starting April 27. During the visit, both sides are expected to take up bilateral matters ranging from a pending arms deal to India's involvement in the development of the war-torn country.Ghani and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi are expected to hold their bilateral meeting on April 27. This will be followed by several other meetings by Ghani with Indian officials, businesses and think-tanks on April 28.Afghanistan has been pushing for an arms deal with India under the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) for the past two years. The agreement was signed in 2011. Afghanistan under its former president Hamid Karzai had made several attempts to procure military weaponry under the pact such as fighter jets, missiles and field guns.Under the SPA, India had been only supplying non-lethal defence equipment such as communication devices and transport equipment. However, the Modi-led government is reportedly keen to have the arms deal go through with Afghanistan.
However, the situation has somewhat turned ironical now with the new government there making several indications that it wants to now have the deal with Pakistan, leaving India high and dry.
Ever since coming to power in September last year, Ghani has been cozying up with Pakistan. There were reports that he had rejected the arms deal with India and might ink a similar deal with Pakistan instead."It is imperative for the Indian government now to get a clarity whether or not the offer is still there on the table. India should make sure it is there. The arms deal would form a good basis for strengthening our bilateral ties. India should also raise counter-terrorism issues during this visit and what reformation has taken place of the Afghan security forces," said Sameer Patil, associate national security fellow, Gateway House, a Mumbai-based foreign policy think tank.

India has also been concerned with the recent announcements made by the Islamic State (IS) that it has opened one of its 'branches' in Afghanistan. The Indian government might raise this issue also with Afghanistan about how it sees the situation in West Asia and the eventual rise of IS and its impact in South Asia.India is also keen to resume the talks for having the $7.6-billion TAPI (Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) natural gas pipeline project with Afghanistan. Several Indian companies are also involved in developing the mining industry there.India and Afghanistan also has a Preferential Trade Agreement providing substantial tariff concession to a number of their products.The visit is expected to push Modi's vision of strengthening the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).On 14th April, Afghan first lady Rula Ghani had met India's external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj in Delhi. Last month, Afghan chief executive Abdullah Abdullah was in Delhi. Prior to this, Swaraj and foreign secretary S Jaishankar had travelled to Kabul to meet the new leadership there.

[vijaykarthik]

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... jin%2e1a6z

Clash of terrorists: ISIL vs. Taliban in Afghanistan

[A_Gupta]

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 007217.cms

Notwithstanding India's push to use Iran as a corridor to connect Central Asia, Russia and beyond in the backdrop of nuclear detente between Tehran and world powers, Delhi and Kabul could sign a pact next week that will not only allow access to Afghanistan but also to Central Asian nation of Tajikistan which share longstanding strategic ties with South Asia's biggest country.

The pact that could be agreed during Afghan President Ashraf Ghani's visit to Delhi on April 27-28 would also send a message to Pakistan that has been obstructing road connectivity among all South Asian countries by refusing to sign SAARC Motor Vehicles Agreement at Kathmandu Summit last November.

The proposed Indo-Afghan motor vehicles pact would, however, remain a non-starter in the absence of either SAARC motor vehicles pact or Pakistan allowing India transit rights to Afghanistan ..

[Philip]

India is to deliver 3 little Cheetal helos to the Afghans after years of dithering.While Pak and China cement their road and rail silk route to Gwadar through Tibet ,and by way of a bonus,attempt to control Afghanistan too,India seems to be still sitting on the fence.For years the Afghans have been asking us for arms,etc.but we have been spurning their pleas like timid mice,while pretending to be a major global power! Unless India put sits money where its mouth is,we will see yet another Afghan debacle,when a new Paki/ISI/Taliban attempts to take over the country.

Though this is old,little has changed since then.
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/09/06 ... tral-asia/

India’s ailing strategic policy in Central Asia
6 September 2013

Author: Micha’el Tanchum, Shalem College

New Delhi’s poor manoeuvring has left it without a robust strategic policy in Central Asia, a region critical for India’s energy, trade and security needs. This lack of direction raises doubts about India’s capacity to maintain strategic partnerships across the region, and whether its strategic planning can match its world power aspirations. If India is to reverse the lacklustre performance of its ‘Connect Central Asia Policy’, it needs to offset its strategic setbacks in Tajikistan, particularly now that India has lost its use of Tajikistan’s Ayni airbase.

As India’s closest Central Asian neighbour, the distance between Tajikistan’s capital, Dushanbe, and New Delhi and is approximately the same distance between New Delhi and Mumbai. More significantly, Tajikistan’s southeastern border is less than 30 kilometres from Pakistani-administered Kashmir across Afghanistan’s Wakhan corridor. India’s only foreign airbase is located in Tajikistan, at Farkhor on the Tajik–Afghan border. Following Pakistan’s ban of Indian overflights, India started operating the Farkhor base in May 2002, with Russian acquiescence, to support Indian relief and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. India’s involvement at Farkhor began with its operation of a military hospital that treated Northern Alliance fighters. But after the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom drove the Taliban from power and led to the establishment of NATO’s ISAF presence in Afghanistan, India closed the hospital. This move alone indicates a lack of sound strategic planning given India recently established a new India–Tajik Friendship Hospital in southern Tajikistan to bolster its standing with Dushanbe — yet India’s lack of broader operations at the Farkhor base also raises doubt.

Without firm evidence of any Indian combat squadrons at Farkhor, the airbase does not provide India with an alternative attack route against Pakistan or the ability to affect militant operations in Kashmir. The base’s main function is to transport India’s relief and reconstruction supplies into Afghanistan. India airlifts resources to Tajikistan’s Ayni airforce base located about 15 kilometres from Dushanbe and then transports material approximately 150 kilometres to Farkhor, where it is then trucked to Afghanistan. Thus, the Ayni airbase has been the key to India’s strategic footprint in Tajikistan, and its loss represents a grave strategic setback.

The Ayni airbase, originally used by the Soviets during the 1980s, was abandoned after their withdrawal from Afghanistan. India contributed technical assistance and US$70 million to renovate the airbase between 2003 and 2010. India’s Border Roads Organisation (BRO), directed by India’s Army Corps of Engineers, extended the main runway, built a control tower and constructed three hangars capable of housing squadrons of MiG-29 bombers used by the Indian Air Force. In September 2010, Tajik Defence Ministry spokesman Faridun Muhammadaliev also confirmed to the press that the Ayni airbase had state-of-the-art navigational and defence technology and a runway extended to 3,200 metres to accommodate all types of aircraft.

Nonetheless, the airbase remains unused. There are no reports of Indian combat aircraft having ever been stationed at the base. Tajikistan’s small air force does not need it. Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division (MRD), Moscow’s largest military contingent abroad, is stationed in Dushanbe and two other Tajik cities. Moscow is also intent on preventing other foreign nations from using the base. Although the BRO began the Ayni renovations in 2004, New Delhi seems never to have developed a coherent vision of how to use the base or leverage its position with the Tajik government. Dushanbe may have simply used New Delhi to force a better deal from Moscow for Russian use of Ayni and the bases housing the 201st MRD.

In December 2010, Tajikistan announced that Russia was the only country under consideration to use the Ayni airbase in future. The two countries are now negotiating the details of their future military cooperation and, most likely, Russian support for Tajik president Emomali Rahmon’s November 2013 re-election bid. India, on the other hand, has been effectively closed out of Ayni. While the Times of India reported in April 2013 that India maintains over 100 personnel at the Ayni base, there is no corroborating evidence for the newspaper’s portrayal of the facility ‘as a kind of “military outpost”’ for India.

Despite the decade-long opportunity provided by the United States’ regional presence for New Delhi to develop an expanded role in Central Asia, India does not project any significant military or economic power in the region. And although India and Tajikistan share security concerns about Islamist militancy, there is no meaningful security cooperation between the two countries. The Indian armed forces have not participated in counter-terrorism military exercises in Tajikistan like the Chinese PLA and Russian military did in June 2012.

With NATO’s 2014 Afghanistan withdrawal, China and Pakistan are well placed to prevent India from projecting any hard power in Central Asia. Unless India can act as a strategic partner in an Indo–American ‘New Silk Road’ framework, it will watch from the sidelines as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation constructs its own New Silk Road.

Micha’el Tanchum is a Fellow at the Department of Middle East and Islamic Studies, Shalem College, Jerusalem, and at the Asia and Middle East Units, Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Hebrew University. Dr Tanchum also teaches in the Department of East Asian Studies, Tel Aviv University.

[pankajs]

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 010595.cms
Taliban announces plans to ramp up annual spring attacks in Afghanistan

The Afghan Taliban announced the start of its annual spring offensive on Wednesday, warning it would ramp up attacks on foreign embassies and government officials as well as military targets.

"If the foreign occupiers really want to relieve themselves from this nuisance of fighting, they should immediately withdraw," the Taliban said in a statement.

[Falijee]

Afghanistan: Taliban to Begin Offensive

Comment: Confirmation of Taliban spring offensive from another source

[Tuvaluan]

Unless India can act as a strategic partner in an Indo–American ‘New Silk Road’ framework, it will watch from the sidelines as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation constructs its own New Silk Road.

So how exactly will an American partnership help as long as the Americans continue to push that PoK is pakistani territory to be handled by pakistan? What BS is this author selling here? I don't get it.

[Cain Marko]

India HAS to take a more active stance in Afghanistan; if not anything, at least sell them the weapons - Philip has presented a good idea about getting rid of the T-72 tanks. Ideal and probably simplistic scenario:

US and NATO foot the bill
Iran and Rus provide supplies/routes
India maintains a strategic and strong force in Kabul (all in the name of training and support of Afghan Army).
India trains and arms Northern Alliance types who hate the taliban and will probably cause havoc in the NWFP too.

TSP and Talib force effectively moves away from Kashmir
India gets a backdoor into

There was some talk of Indian boots on the ground in Afghanistan during Bush years or early Obama years - nothing has come of it. The previous GOI was obviously spineless, time for the current administration to recharge this relationship, but the chances are not so good, not with Karzai gone.

The way I see it, this is the last chance for India to clip TSP and keep China out of it. Otherwise it is going to be at the receiving end from TSP shenanigans for as long as TSP lasts (or as long as the US and Cheen keep it propped up).

[Falijee]

Ashraf Ghani: America’s New Subedar?

[Tuvaluan]

If India is to put soldiers in Afghanisthan, US has to get out of the way. Else those US mofos will just turn around and assist the pakis and start pretending that all the bloodletting in Pakistan is a result of India-Pakistan animosity. This s**t was already tried by William Dalrymple and Brookings scumbags when the US proclaimed it was getting out of Aghanisthan a couple of years ago.

India is already training Afghan police and military in India and helping in building capacity of Afghans to take care of their own territory -- and weapons are fungible, and there is nothing to say that weapons handed to the Afghans won't land up in the hands of the pakjihadis operating in PoK and in Pakistan. We all know the pakis would love that kind of outcome.

So, if India is going to send anyone to Afghanisthan it should be after US and NATO mofos have taken their sorry asses back to their own countries.

[member_23692]

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinio ... 58020.html

The short answer is, "YES".

This guy Ashraf P Ghani is a disaster for India. Did no one see it coming in the Indian babudom, intelligence agencies, armed forces or experts ? Or there simply was no wherewithal of any kind available with the Indian government to do anything ? Really ? So, we just kept watching the train wreck happen and did nothing ?

[SSridhar]

I am posting below two contrasting articles.

Reduced to just a toehold in Afghanistan - PHUNCHOK STOBDAN, Business Line

Many in India feel rebuffed by the way new Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai has ignored India and instead given more priority to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China and Iran, where he went visiting for crucial talks.

The shift may have been for tactical reasons, but the snub has a symbolic significance that New Delhi cannot discount.

India’s mistakes

As things stand today, President Ghani has already rescinded a request for weapon supplies by India suggesting he can get arms from anywhere. New Delhi had firmed up with Russia to supply small arms, field mortar and air support platforms to the Afghan army.

Now that the US promised to support 352,000 Afghan personnel until 2017, the relevance of Indian assistance gets less important. But, to cover it up, India is expected to hand over three multi-role Cheetah helicopters while Ghani is in town.

Many would suspect that Ghani might review the gamut of India’s economic commitments for his country; including the Chabahar Port linking project, iron-ore blocks and steel plant in Hajigak. Also what holds for the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) with Afghanistan now, with Kabul looking for military support from Islamabad?

Is India’s Afghan policy in crisis? Firstly, it appears India’s somewhat impulsive efforts have not cut much ice. A Pakistani analyst wryly wrote “India trains Afghan forces but does not arm them… does not build houses — so morally weak army join the Taliban insurgents.” Interesting observation, but India’s concern here was to respect Pakistani sensitivity.

Secondly, was the wisdom of committing $2 billion was driven by some woolly ideas of winning goodwill among Afghans or was it based on sound strategic assessment? India genuinely may have desired to help Afghanistan.

But it clearly hasn’t worked that way, because politics does not necessarily work on logic. Politics is also not about showing benevolence, magnanimity and display of riches. Clearly, some short-term objectives and assessment may have dictated India’s Afghan policy. Thirdly, why did India go alone without joining hands with other partners? In contrast, the Iranians, Russians and Chinese thinking proved smarter.

Sadly, there are no visible strategic gains for the resources spent by India. It seems the money has gone down the drain. For now, let us consider that we have earned some good puniya (merit) in Afghanistan and hope that it will help India in our future destiny.

All likely scenarios are visible, including Pakistan gaining a leeway to thwart Indian plans. In the current context, even the Russians seem lending support to Pakistani efforts. Clearly, India needs to reassess its Afghan strategy.

Reassess strategy

In April 1992, when the pro-Pakistan Mujahideen group took control of Kabul, it appeared for a while that India would have no friends left in Afghanistan. By 1992-end, the ISI lost control and Kabul once again looked at New Delhi as a window to the world outside. Pakistan then sought to spread widespread propaganda about Indian pilots, engineers and personnel helping the Rabbani-Masood regime.

The ISI then created the Taliban in mid-1994, to get rid of the Rabbani-Masood-Dostum regime and to counter the India-Iran-Turkmenistan railway connectivity plan and push for a Unocal–Saudi Delta gas pipeline project.

With the Taliban coming to power, India departed away from its traditional practice of recognising any regime that controlled Kabul. The key reason apart from its obscurantist doctrine and display of bigotry was that the militia was specifically created, nurtured, fostered and anchored by Pakistani ISI to serve its agenda. To be fair, the Taliban showed no particular antagonistic overture towards India.

India vowed to get the Taliban’s opponents back to power, but the much-proclaimed Gujral Doctrine for better relations with Pakistan inevitably poured cold water on that plan. In fact, in May 1997, when Mazar-i-Sharif fell to the militia, India signalled to deal with whosoever was in control in Kabul. The BJP then in the opposition criticised the government for being indecisive in supporting the Northern Alliance.

India’s concerns today in Afghanistan are linked to terrorism rather than inter-ethnic differences. New Delhi’s current fears are tied to Lashkar-e-Tayyaba’s networks in Kunar and Nooristan. The policy option of joining hands with Iran is still on the table.

This, however, would be once again a folly. India should continue to play the game not by using the financial incentives but deploying its skilful political manoeuvring power. Clearly, the US will play a key role, but for an enduring transformation in Afghanistan is not possible unless two major Asian powers, India and China, find a common strategic understanding.

Many fear that the greatest beneficiaries of Afghan stability, apart from the Afghan people, are going to be India and China. But Pakistan may scuttle that prospect. Indian and Chinese interests historically converged in Afghanistan, and if they make a calibrated move for working together in Afghanistan, the outcome could be more harmonising than conflicting.

The author is a former Ambassador and a strategic thinker

[SSridhar]

Stability tops agenda as India readies to host Afghan President - Stanly Johny, Business Line

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s much-awaited visit to India from Monday is expected to broaden economic and security cooperation between the two countries even as New Delhi remains wary of China’s growing influence in the war-ravaged nation.

Ghani, who became the President last year in bitterly contested elections, is visiting India during April 27-28.

A host of issues ranging from regional stability, reconstruction of Afghanistan and bilateral security cooperation are likely to top the agenda when Ghani meets Prime Minister Modi on the first day of his trip, say experts.

“Ghani is likely to emphasise the need for India’s sustained assistance and engagement in the development of his country’s social and economic sectors. It would be interesting to see how the President would seek to connect himself and his government with the Indian establishment,” says Vishal Chandra, Associate Fellow focussed on Afghanistan at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, a New Delhi-based think tank.

Constancy & stability

New Delhi has maintained close ties with post-Taliban Afghanistan.

India is the fifth largest bilateral donor in Afghanistan after the US, the UK, Japan and Germany (with commitments totalling $2 billion).

“The main driver of Indian policy is a desire for constancy in Afghanistan for the regional stability of South Asia,” says Sukanya Natarajan, a Research Associate with Centre for Policy Research (CPR).

Both countries had signed a partnership agreement in 2011 that calls for India “assisting, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity-building programmes for Afghan national security forces.”

Natarajan, who coordinates a project on South Asia at the New Delhi-based CPR, says it’s time for expanding the scope of this partnership.

The countries “are expected to explore a new defence mechanism to increase capacity building for Afghan armed forces during Ghani’s visit.”

She also believes both Prime Minister Modi and President Ghani would reach a motor vehicle agreement, which would be a step forward in South Asian nations’ pursuit for “greater regional connectivity”.

The agreement, originally proposed at the SAARC level, aims to ensure free movement of commercial vehicles across South Asia.

It was expected to be reached at the last SAARC summit in November 2014 in Kathmandu, but was shelved following resistance from Pakistan.

India would seek to send out a message to Pakistan by entering a bilateral motor vehicle agreement with Afghanistan, adds Natarajan.

However, all is not rosy about Indo-Afghan cooperation.

The China clouds

The summit is happening after the Afghan government recently rejected an Indian offer for arms. Besides, Ghani is perceived to be following a different foreign policy from his predecessor, Hamid Karzai.

Under Ghani, Afghanistan is pursuing a peace deal with the Taliban, improved ties with Pakistan and greater cooperation with China. {To be fair to Ghani, it must be said that even Karzai was doing the same thing. That was the reason for the arrest of Abdul Ghani Baradar by a joint operation of CIA & ISI. I am sure that the High Peace Council's Chairman and ex-President Rabbani was assassinated by the ISI because he had established contacts with the Taliban behind the ISI's back.}

Recently, Afghanistan, Pakistan and China had held a “trilateral dialogue” in which Beijing announced plans to provide grants worth $300 million over the next three years to Kabul.

It’s also to be noted that President Ghani is visiting India after travelling to China, Pakistan, US and Iran.

Should India be worried about Ghani’s multi-directional foreign policy? Aryaman Bhatnagar, Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, doesn’t think so.

“Afghanistan’s improving ties with Pakistan and China might be a matter of concern for the Indian government. But at this point of time, there’s nothing to suggest that it’s at the expense of India.”

What’s more important is the constructive role India is playing in the country.

“In the past 13-14 years, India has played a more constructive role in Afghanistan than Pakistan. Though New Delhi could not translate its developmental activities into political capital, it has demonstrated that it’s capable of playing a constructive role in Afghanistan. Ghani, being a realist, must know that India is a force Kabul can’t ignore,” he adds.

From Afghanistan’s point of view, improving ties with China and Pakistan is a natural course of action.

“China has the capacity to invest in Afghanistan. And relations with Pakistan are also important considering the country’s close ties with Taliban and the Haqqani network,” he adds, explaining the rationale of Ghani’s foreign policy.
Regional stability

What India should do? “It should continue commitment to Afghan reconstruction and express support for Kabul’s ongoing diplomatic initiatives, while emphasising the need to preserve the democratic spirit of the Afghan Constitution,” adds IDSA’s Chandra, who’s written a book on Afghanistan: The Unfinished War in Afghanistan: 2001-2014.

Agrees Natarajan: “Democracy and development are the key instruments to ensure that Afghanistan becomes a source of regional stability of South Asia.”

[SSridhar]

Changed variables, same equation - Rakesh Sood, The Hindu

The Afghanistan President, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, will be in India this week, beginning today, on his first official visit here. There has been speculation about the fact that he is visiting New Delhi after having made, ever since assuming office in late September 2014, two visits in the region, namely to China (October 2014) and also to Pakistan (November 2014), and then to the United Kingdom (December 2014), Saudi Arabia (March 2015), and the United States (March 2015). Therefore, this delay sends out its own message about a reprioritisation in Afghanistan’s foreign policy calculus about relations with India. It marks a sharp contrast to the kind of warmth that his predecessor, Hamid Karzai, displayed towards India and the comfort levels that he enjoyed with the Indian leadership, cutting across party lines.

Afghanistan’s first Strategic Partnership Agreement was signed with India in 2011 and was supported across the board in the Afghan Parliament at the time of ratification. While Dr. Ghani is no stranger to India, this time around he will be under scrutiny for what he says about how he visualises India-Afghanistan relations and, equally, what questions he chooses to sidestep. He will do well to keep in mind that he is engaging with a new Indian leadership which has adopted a more robust and active foreign policy posture and displayed no anxiety about the fact that he waited for six months before visiting New Delhi.

Trajectory of violence

Incidentally, Mr. Karzai also had his share of ups and downs with India. In the early years, he tried hard to build relations with Pakistan, confident that the U.S. would back him in this effort but became disillusioned when he discovered that it had no stomach for reining Pakistan in, even after realising that the growing Taliban insurgency had its roots across the border {This will certainly happen with Ghani also. The trouble is that if institutional memories are sidelined either because of pressure from the US or because of a brainwave by the new President, it puts the game back to square one and it has to start all over again thus wasting precious time, lives, money and efforts.} . The first Presidential election in Afghanistan in 2004 passed off peacefully because U.S. President George Bush had virtually read out the riot act to General Pervez Musharraf, ensuring Pakistan’s cooperation in controlling the border. But after October 2005, when the parliamentary elections were over, it was as if a tap had been turned on with the number of suicide attacks and improvised explosive device (IED) blasts skyrocketing. Between 2001 and October 2005, there had been four suicide attacks in Afghanistan; the figure jumped to 15 during the last quarter of 2005. As Gen. Musharraf candidly acknowledged in an interview a couple of months ago, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was supporting the Taliban in its efforts to destabilise Mr. Karzai’s government. Such was Gen. Musharraf’s paranoia about India’s role in Afghanistan {It is the institutional paranoia in Pakistan deliberately created to sustain its strategic culture and goal of destroying India} that he once told Mr. Karzai during an official meeting that India was running more than 25 consulates in Afghanistan! Gen. Musharraf, and subsequently former Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, would demand evidence from Afghanistan every time Mr. Karzai complained about the activities of the Quetta and Peshawar shuras or the Haqqani group (led by Sirajuddin Haqqani); a charade that only ended after Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad in 2011.

Internal pressures

As violence levels rose in Afghanistan, so did Western casualties. Gradually, the nature of the Pakistan Army’s double game became apparent, but by this time, Western countries had lost the appetite for their Afghan engagement and were seeking an exit. Mr. Karzai foresaw this as early as 2007. He also realised that this would leave Afghanistan at the mercy of the ISI’s manipulations and concluded that he had to engage the Taliban in a peace process. Initially, the U.S. was opposed to the idea but Mr. Karzai went ahead with the setting up of the High Peace Council in 2010. He persuaded former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani to chair it. The Council did not achieve much and the following year, Rabbani was killed in a Taliban suicide attack{That is the general feeling, but it may be wrong. IMHO, it was a joint operation by the ISI & Haqqani network}. Mr. Karzai wanted to control the peace process, and through the Council tried to wean away some of the Taliban commanders, but the ISI stranglehold proved to be too strong. Eventually, when the U.S. put its weight behind opening the Taliban office in Doha, Qatar, to promote reconciliation, it came to the same conclusion and the process has remained stillborn.

Unlike his predecessor, Dr. Ghani is more of a technocrat rather than a politician. As Finance Minister during President Karzai’s first term, Dr. Ghani conceptualised the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), a local community-led development programme. Incidentally, this highly successful scheme was ably implemented by Mohammad Hanif Atmar who is now Dr. Ghani’s National Security Adviser. Unlike Mr. Karzai who could spend hours interacting closely with tribal leaders, Dr. Ghani is more at home with policy wonks, graphs and power point displays and hardly tolerates dissent. Second, he is a man in a hurry. He knows that his election was a contested one. His legitimacy rests on the tenuous compromise of a National Unity Government, backed by the U.S.’s heavy diplomatic lifting, with presidential candidate Dr. Abdullah Abdullah reluctantly accepting the newly created post of a Chief Executive Officer. On September 21, 2014, the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan had merely announced the end of the election process and declared Dr. Ghani the President but voting results were withheld with no mention being made about the internationally monitored comprehensive audit of all the ballots. Power sharing between the President and the CEO has not happened leading to strains within the political system and delaying cabinet formation and crucial administrative appointments. This is why both leaders undertook a joint visit to the U.S. last month. Dr. Ghani also realises that the U.S. is headed for elections in 2016 and while he was able to persuade U.S. President Barack Obama to maintain the current U.S. troop presence of nearly 10,000 till end-2016, there is uncertainty about the U.S. and Western role and commitment, post-2016.

Dr. Ghani is under pressure to conclude a peace process with the Taliban and get some investment into the Afghan economy so that economic growth, which has declined from nine per cent annually, during the last decade, to two per cent is resumed. He is all too aware of Pakistan’s ability to play the role of “spoiler” and has tried hard to start on a clean slate with Pakistan {But, Pakistan is least bothered about Afghanistan. For it, Afghanistan is another piece in its jigsaw puzzle in taking a potshot at India.}. To demonstrate his goodwill, he made it a point to call on Gen. Raheel Sharif at the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, in 2014, in a notable departure from protocol. In December last year, Latif Mehsud, a senior Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander, who was held in Bagram, Afghanistan, was handed over to the Pakistani authorities. TTP infiltration across the Durand Line has been blocked by strengthening Afghan Army deployments in provinces like Kunar and Nuristan. Also, for the first time, six Afghan cadets are training at the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul. But, so far, there is little to show for it. The Taliban has launched the spring offensive by declaring its ‘Operation Azm’. A deadly suicide attack in Jalalabad, Pakistan, claimed more than 30 civilian lives on April 18. On April 10, an Afghan Army outpost in Badakhshan was overrun by militants who beheaded eight soldiers. The brutality has led to speculation about whether these incidents might be the handiwork of the Islamic State (IS) making forays into the Afghan theatre or by yet another militant group incubated in the AfPak nursery under a different name.

Looking to China

In addition to wooing the Pakistan Army, Dr. Ghani is also trying to get China to invest in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Given the uncertainty about sustained Western financial support, if the Chinese can be tempted to invest as part of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, it could even generate pressure on the ISI to enable a meaningful peace process with the Taliban to move forward. The announcements made during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Pakistan, in April, about projects worth $46 billion being launched around the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, coupled with Gen. Sharif’s statement that a dedicated division could be raised to ensure security for the Chinese-aided projects would have sounded encouraging to Dr. Ghani.

Engaging with India

India need not feel unduly concerned about Dr. Ghani testing his Pakistan-China project. This does not diminish the wealth of goodwill built up over the past decade with all sections of the Afghan community covering countrywide economic cooperation projects, infrastructure, health, nutrition, institution building, human resource development and industry. This cooperation should be expanded provided security is managed. Dr. Ghani’s desire not to purchase military hardware from India is not a rebuff, for India’s capabilities to provide lethal military hardware are extremely limited. Instead, we should urge Dr. Ghani to use his influence to open up transit through Pakistan for India-Afghan trade so that Afghan farmers can rediscover their traditional markets for fruit and dry fruits. Today, the Afghan Pakistan Transit and Trade Agreement (APTTA) is seen as a barrier because of delays at the borders, restrictions on vehicles, and Afghan trucks having to return empty as they are barred from picking up Indian goods! At the same time, India needs to accelerate the expansion of the Chabahar port on the Iranian coast which provides an alternative route to Afghanistan and Central Asia.{This is really the issue. We have been working on it for a decade now! Of course, there was the US embargo et al but things must be accelerated now}

Even as Dr. Ghani clears the air about his agenda, India should wish him well, for as a proud Pashtun, and as a proud Afghan, he understands that India is a strategic partner because we share the same vision — of a stable, united, independent and democratic Afghanistan where all its ethnic groups live and prosper together.

(Rakesh Sood is a former diplomat who has served as Ambassador to Afghanistan.)

[SSridhar]

Afghanistan and the Region - P.Stobadan, IDSA

In its 16 March 2015 Resolution 2210 (2015) extending the mandate of United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), the UN Security Council drew an optimistic scenario for the country. From all angles, Afghanistan is a transformed place: a robust unity government; stronger security force; better living standards; higher GDP growth; better schools for children and greater presence of women in the workforce. It further noted that Afghanistan is free of al-Qaeda training camps, the Taliban is subdued, and there is an improved atmosphere in its ties with Pakistan.

Not every observer is, however, convinced that Afghanistan is stable. The Unity Government, created to end the crisis set off by widespread election fraud, remains inherently divided and fragile. Power sharing among coalition groups remains hung up due to delay and differences. Ashraf Ghani is facing accusations of centralizing power, which he justifies as necessary for fighting corruption and better governance. Critics say the Chief Executive’s role remains ill-defined and they suspect that Abdullah Abdullah will be eventually sidelined. Already, the First Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum is feeling marginalized. He was distraught and believed to have broken down during a recent meeting of the National Security Council.

Moreover, Afghanistan’s corrupt elite remains divided on a host of issues ranging from tackling terror, the Taliban and the economic agenda. The country is already facing a budget deficit. The external assistance needed to run the economy and ensure security is likely to gradually dry up. And not all are convinced that regional players are unlikely to resume their proxy war any time soon. No one can also wish away the fact that Afghanistan is tied to geopolitical issues relating to Pakistan-India, Iran-Saudi Arabia, and China-US-Russia. Given all this, the expectation is that Afghanistan may either fail or at best muddle through by struggling to survive as a divided country ruled by regional and tribal warlords and fiefdoms, and posing a significant security concern for the region and the world.

Clearly, if the current regime is able to maintain a robust strategic partnership with the United States, the prospects of regional powers upsetting the internal situation of Afghanistan through proxy groups would be minimized. At the same time, Kabul would also be able to play a balancing role in terms of cooperating with Pakistan across the Durand Line, protecting the interests of India, Iran, China, Russia and the Central Asian Republics - all in line with the interests and supervision of America.

So how will the regional powers respond to the evolving situation in Afghanistan? To be sure, none would like to see the reversal of the current situation; instead every country would wish that the Unity Government builds on the achievements of the past decade. They would also want the Afghan security forces to retain professionalism to deal with internal threats. Nevertheless, the perspectives and policy nuances of each regional player differ significantly.

Clearly, no one is visualizing Pakistani activism in Afghanistan that would cause a further deterioration in the situation in Afghanistan. The discourse is actually shaping itself more in favour of a plausible collective Russia-India-China effort. Such a regional consensus is feasible under the Russia-India-China or SCO frameworks. But the Americans and Europeans are unlikely to encourage such an alternative. Notwithstanding that, the main problem impeding the prospect relates to differing regional concerns and interests of the three countries – a principal reason why, despite their display of well-meaning intentions and quiet diplomacy, a definite idea in this regard is yet to take a concrete shape. To get a clear idea, it is important to analyze the current policy approaches of the regional countries towards Afghanistan.

Pakistan

To be sure, Pakistan’s importance for Afghanistan is indisputable. But Islamabad has so far failed in every Afghan mission it has undertaken and has instead ended up worsening its own internal security situation primarily in FATA. Pakistan initially propped up Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his network, but the Benazir government later abandoned this old protégé in favour of the Taliban in October 1994, of course with American consent. Washington’s great confidence in Pakistani assessments of Afghan developments created the real mess. It had to pay the prize in the form of 9/11 and all its attendant consequences.

Having successfully pushed the Taliban to Kabul on 27 September 1996, Pakistan tried many stunts to gain full diplomatic legitimacy for the Taliban. Its initiatives –Murshed’s plan for a regional conference, setting of a “political commission,” “Ulema Commission,” “five-nation” conference, “shuttle-diplomacy,” and many others – all essentially designed as exercises to exclude India from the peace process, did not cut much ice. All other countries looked askance at Pakistan’s diplomacy and questioned its neutrality especially given its attempts to scuttle several UN sponsored peace initiatives such as the “six-plus-two” meetings aimed at fostering reconciliation among the warring Afghan factions.

Pakistan now claims to have made a “strategic shift” in its approach towards Afghanistan in the wake of the October 2014 Peshawar school attack. The leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan have now shared a vision for realizing common security and economic interests. They are committed to targeting terrorist groups hiding across their border “without distinction.” Islamabad wishes to enlarge the scope of cooperation beyond trade, terror and border management to include a “full range” of military-to-military ties including the training of Afghan infantry brigades. Pakistan sees the Taliban testing the Afghan National Security Forces, even as it also sees “encouraging” signs for a peace negotiation with the Taliban and expects others to support the process. What Islamabad wants from the international community is “strategic patience” to achieve this goal.1. Clearly, it has been pushing for greater Chinese involvement to offset India’s economic engagement in Afghanistan, especially in the context of regional cooperation and promoting trans-regional energy and connectivity projects.

However, controlling the Pakistani strategic dream in Afghanistan may not be easy. And this time around, Islamabad may also face other competitors especially from China and Iran, both of which are inclined to develop greater economic and strategic stakes in Afghanistan. The fear of India interfering in Afghanistan will continue to haunt Islamabad. Even if Islamabad manages to turn a new page in its relations with Kabul, the tribal dynamics (terrorist hideouts, border violations) along the Durand Line will not disappear soon. One also has to watch for duplicitous moves by Pakistan, which has clearly been running with the American hare and hunting with the Taliban hounds.

China

Until now an onlooker on the Afghan scene, China’s likely role in Afghanistan is increasingly gaining importance. Even though the activities of the Taliban in the past spilled over in to Xinjiang, Beijing remained supportive of the position adopted by its close ally Pakistan. But at the same time it remained careful so as not to cause any suspicion among the Russians and other regional countries about its position. Until recently, China did not see the containment of fundamentalism as its priority and believed that its close military ties with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran will assuage the problems. In fact, China viewed Afghanistan as another venue where India can be kept pre-occupied through Pakistan. However, at the height of the Taliban rule, China had made a subtle change in its position on Kashmir: it no longer directly supported the Pakistani position.

In the changed context, China’s role in stabilizing Afghanistan is viewed as critical. China needs to stabilize Afghanistan to fortify its own strategic interests as well as counter the threat of extremism in Xinjiang. Akio Kawato, a former Japanese Ambassador to Central Asia, recently pointed out that “Afghanistan is not alien for China.....it was a vital part of the Silk Road and was a conduit to India from where China imported Buddhism.” He further noted that the Taliban, more ‘civilized’ now than in 2001, may induce China’s strong involvement in Afghan affairs.

It appears that Ashraf Ghani initially prodded China, perhaps on Pakistani insistence, to play a major strategic role in Afghanistan. Pakistani leaders reportedly told their Afghan counterparts to part ways with the US and instead hold China’s hand. Beijing was perhaps hesitant, except to play diplomacy and contribute through investment, economic and trade cooperation. In fact, China hosted the Heart of Asia conference, institutionalized the China-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral dialogue, and played host to a two-member delegation from the Taliban in November 2014.

Not just Pakistan, even Iran, Russia and India would welcome China's greater engagement in Afghanistan. However, the Chinese themselves admit their inadequate understanding of tribalism and lack of experience with combating a Taliban-type ideological insurgency. China’s own experience in handling Uighur separatism is not a success story. Clearly, Beijing will continue to rely on Pakistan and other Islamic countries to deal with the Afghan chaos.

Afghanistan is not terribly an important priority for China and it will not undermine US efforts because the situation there is linked to China’s domestic situation in Xinjiang. It is also linked to the great-power equation and balance of interest in the Asia Pacific – Taiwan, Japan and elsewhere. Therefore, although US-China interests are not greatly aligned in Afghanistan, China has avoided playing a zero-sum game and has instead sought harmony with US interests. This approach is likely to continue.

For now, Beijing is pushing for an inclusive national reconciliation, as it understands the complexity of the challenges involved in Afghanistan. China’s interests are clearly focused on Afghanistan’s untapped raw material reserves: copper, iron ore, gold, oil, gas, massive veins of rare earth elements including critical lithium (estimated at $1 trillion dollar worth) which are eminently suited for its own needs. Surely, it would seek investment opportunities but without assuming security responsibilities. China would still like the Americans to ensure the security of Afghanistan and want countries like Turkey and India to build Afghan infrastructure. All China wishes to do is connect resource rich Afghanistan to its own industrial towns. Billions of dollars have already been spent in mining and Chinese visitors to Kabul are invariably seeking mining privileges. Several road, railway, pipeline projects are underway to link Western China to Afghanistan through Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

The current ‘civilized’ Taliban appear to be bargaining with China for recognition but it is also important to note that Afghans in general have shown aversion to non-Muslim outsiders extracting underground riches. Surely, they have no particular liking for the Chinese, for they represent an alien culture and thus a danger to Islam. China’s excessive investments could invoke powerful resource nationalism among Afghans in the longer term. The same argument was, in fact, made about Chinese investment in Central Asia as well. But just like they benefited from the Soviet fall and Russian decline, to be sure, the Chinese hope to gain in Afghanistan too.

Russia

Russia’s position on Afghanistan is a restrained one: avoid direct intervention and stay the course of neutrality. There were moments when Moscow adopted an ambivalent position – with one section advocating a hard line and the other cautioning against a repeat of past mistakes. However, it is continuing with a hands-off position realizing that Central Asia now separated Russia from Afghanistan. Instead, the Afghan issue is being linked to Russia’s own Central Asia policy. By expressing unwillingness to bear the burden of facing the Afghan challenge alone, Moscow has made itself indispensable for the Central Asian countries. Russia considers Central Asia as the first line of defence against any threat emanating from Afghanistan. It has strengthened its military position in the region directly or through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

India’s good friend Russia is unlikely to get drawn back into Afghanistan. Russia had in fact changed its position in 1997 soon after the Taliban captured Kabul. Since then, Russia has pursued the diplomatic option of engaging with the Taliban and accommodating Pakistan. The visit by the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Viktor Osuralyuk, to Islamabad in June 1997 and Pakistani Foreign Minister Gohar Ayub Khan’s visit to Moscow a month later changed the context. At that time, India, of course, had expressed anxiety over the uneasy developments in the context of Russia’s links with the Taliban.

In recent years, Russia’s ties with Pakistan have increased manifold. Moscow hopes that Pakistan will dissuade the Taliban, if they come to power, from interfering in areas of Russian influence. Moscow has in fact been praising the Pakistan military’s anti-terror fighting capabilities and has sought cooperation. This increased Russian confidence about Pakistan could form a strong alternative diplomatic backdrop for any future Russian engagement with Kabul. Clearly, Moscow has resumed engagement with all sections of the Afghan elite and has even revived some of the Soviet era economic projects including a decision to spend $20 million for restoring its old cultural centre in Kabul.

Curiously, Ashraf Ghani, during his recent visit to Washington, cited the role of other powers in Afghanistan’s development but he conspicuously skipped any mention of Russia. Nevertheless, Russia remains concerned about the geographical spread of ISIS activities and desires joint action. The Russian complaint is that NATO has been un-cooperative with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for battling the threat of drug trafficking. So far, Russia’s concerns have been heavily focused on the impact of Afghanistan on Central Asia, especially the threat of extremism and drug trafficking. Today, it is more concerned about renewed American geopolitical ambitions in Afghanistan and Central Asia in the context of the Ukraine crisis. Moscow might be trying to assess that possibility, but for now Russian policy would be based on the principle drawn from the Great Game precept of “not striving for victory but avoiding defeat.” This line is likely to persist unless Russia’s core interests are threatened.

Iran

Iran has deep interests in Afghanistan. From the Iranian perspective, one of the important aspects of the Afghan imbroglio is that the conflict there is being used as a means to isolate and contain Iran in the region at all costs. Tehran always felt besieged by a hostile America and its proxies in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s capture of Herat in 1997 was the most important counter-measure by Pakistan and US/Saudi oil companies to push a gas pipeline project across Afghanistan. Tehran is maintaining a cautious approach in the new circumstances unfolding now. The Iranian Foreign Minister visited Kabul in January 2015 to discuss bilateral strategic cooperation, including on issues relating to security. Iran’s concerns are tied to protecting the interest of the Hazaras as well as combating cross-border terrorism and drug trafficking. Iran prefers a regional approach to include other neighbours such as China, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to address Afghanistan’s problems. For the time being, Tehran is preoccupied with the nuclear talks. A possible thaw in US-Iran relations will have a significant impact on the Afghan situation.

Conclusion

Uncertainty continues to prevail on the Afghan front. In fact, one is not sure what might happen in Afghanistan during the course of the next year. Logically speaking, answers to all of Afghan problems can easily be found within the regional context of India, Russia, China and Iran and their involvement in the economic and political process of stabilization. But the Afghan leadership is not likely to uphold the regional choice now.

One must also be clear that problems in the Af-Pak are linked to the interests of Saudi Arabia. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are sectarian allies of Saudi Arabia. Besides, both have shown a tremendous capacity and willingness to participate in the geopolitics of major powers like the United States. Pakistan has amply showed its willingness to compromise on its sovereignty. It has acted as a mercenary state, bending over backwards to comply with the desires of its masters. As for Afghanistan, one can do no better than cite what Aftab Kazi, a Senior Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC, had noted: “Afghanistan politics has been destabilized so very much that the country needs a Genghis Khan like leader to destroy the old in order to create a new political order in Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Even such a reordering will take at least a century.”

Afghan history is about Pushtun tribalism. The Taliban is also about Pushtun brutality. The Taliban’s brutality vis-à-vis any foreign invasion will not end, nor would their differences with the northerners – Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. The Russians, British-Indians, Soviets, and Pakistanis have burnt their fingers in Afghanistan. The last to add graveyards in Afghanistan include the Americans, the Europeans and an assortment of al Qaeda elements drawn from various Arab countries. Now, the ISIS wants to recreate Khorasan in Afghanistan – let them also try. In fact, the UNSC recently concluded that ISIS gaining a foothold in Afghanistan is not so much a function of its intrinsic capacities, but its potential to offer an “alternative” flagpole to which otherwise isolated insurgent splinter groups could rally.2. More than that, Afghanistan will remain home for a host of insurgent groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighting against Pakistan, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) against China, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) against Central Asia and the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) against India. These groups will keep the interests of regional countries drawn to Afghanistan.

[SSridhar]

Major Taliban attack in Afghanistan’s Kunduz forces President Ghani delay India visit - Reuters, ToI

Heavy fighting between Afghan security forces and Taliban insurgents that killed more than 30 combatants threatened a major northern city on Monday, officials said.

The battle on the outskirts of Kunduz city, part of a stepped-up wave of attacks after the departure of most foreign troops, led President Ashraf Ghani to delay his departure on a state visit to India by several hours.

Officials said hundreds of Taliban insurgents had attacked police and army checkposts in the province of Kunduz, the militants' last stronghold before US coalition forces drove them from power in 2001.

Now they threaten to overrun parts of the provincial capital, after fighting that killed eight Afghan security forces and at least two dozen Taliban, a spokesman for the provincial governor said.

"The threat level is very high, but with new reinforcements, our security forces have gained morale and god willing, we will win the fight," said Abdul Waseh Basel, the spokesman.

The insurgents have overrun seven army and police checkposts in central Kunduz and two districts, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said in an email statement.

Presidential spokesman Ajmal Obidy said Ghani left for India late on Monday afternoon. He had delayed his departure for New Delhi to meet Nato's Gen John Campbell at the presidential palace to discuss the Kunduz fighting, the general said.

Battles were raging about 6km (4 miles) south of Kunduz city, officials said. Insurgents also broke into the city itself, in the southern district of Gul Tepa, Basel told Reuters.

Afghan security forces used artillery in defence.

"The sound of heavy weapons fired by Afghan forces can be heard in the city," said Kunduz police spokesman Sayed Sarwar Hussaini.

Taliban aided by foreign militants have this month launched major attacks in another northern province, Badakhshan, and on Monday fired on a government delegation meeting armed forces there.

Insurgent rockets and gunfire narrowly missed the group, led by Ahmad Zia Massoud, head of Ghani's governance commission, a close aide said. The delegation quickly withdrew by helicopter

[Paul]

It is a warning shot across Ghani's bow. Telling him not to get too smart and blabber in front of Doval

[Tuvaluan]

Yes, surely no coincidence that the paki-taliban mount such an offensive on the day Ghani is to leave for India.

[devesh]

It looks like the more pessimistic past predictions are coming true. India is the lowliest of all fools in this game. Pakis are motivated by their fanatical intent to destroy India. PRC is motivated to show India its place & has the muscle to do it. What does India have? Neither the clear ideological recognition that Islam is a problem nor the ability to back up so called "soft power" with military equipment to allies and ourselves.

To me the great lesson is this: "centrist" powers like India which lack both ideological decisiveness & tactical intent will be left with nothing. Delusions of "soft power" are just that...delusions.

[devesh]

It is comical that our "analysts" are making absurd characterizations of Ghani. Wtf is a "technocrat" going to do in a country like Afghanistan? That's an entirely irrelevant guess (?) which has nothing to do with Ghani's motivations. In all likelihood, Ghani has calculated probably accurately that India has neither the intent nor the capability to stop the Jihadi sweep especially with Chinese support to Jihadis. So he's shoring up the bases that need to be shored up: US, PRC, UK, Pak, SA.

Make no mistake, Ghani is not where he is today by being naive. He knows very well that in a Jihadi society like Afghanistan, only strength is respected. As long as we don't realize this basic nature of totalitarian societies and the psychology of people living in those societies, we will continue to make blind blunders.

[member_23692]

It is comical that our "analysts" are making absurd characterizations of Ghani. Wtf is a "technocrat" going to do in a country like Afghanistan? That's an entirely irrelevant guess (?) which has nothing to do with Ghani's motivations. In all likelihood, Ghani has calculated probably accurately that India has neither the intent nor the capability to stop the Jihadi sweep especially with Chinese support to Jihadis. So he's shoring up the bases that need to be shored up: US, PRC, UK, Pak, SA.

Could not agree more !

Make no mistake, Ghani is not where he is today by being naive. He knows very well that in a Jihadi society like Afghanistan, only strength is respected. As long as we don't realize this basic nature of totalitarian societies and the psychology of people living in those societies, we will continue to make blind blunders.

Again, very astute observations. Could not agree more !

Yes, Ghani is not where he is today by being naive or even being a technocrat. He is here by stealing an election with Pak and US support. Thugs steal, technocrats dont !

[pankajs]

EconomicTimes ‏@EconomicTimes 1h1 hour ago

Sushma Swaraj calls on Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani ahead of delegation level talks



So the Afghanistan President did arrive in Delhi as per schedule or am I missing something?

[pankajs]

Ok ... Yes he is in India ... here is the confirmation

PIB India ‏@PIB_India 1h1 hour ago

Afghanistan President Md. Ashraf Ghani being welcomed by President & PM at Ceremonial Reception in Rashtrapati Bhavan

[pankajs]

PIB India ‏@PIB_India 3m3 minutes ago

PM Shri @narendramodi with Afghanistan President, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani at Hyderabad House, New Delhi

[RajeshA]

It looks like the more pessimistic past predictions are coming true. India is the lowliest of all fools in this game. Pakis are motivated by their fanatical intent to destroy India. PRC is motivated to show India its place & has the muscle to do it. What does India have? Neither the clear ideological recognition that Islam is a problem nor the ability to back up so called "soft power" with military equipment to allies and ourselves.

To me the great lesson is this: "centrist" powers like India which lack both ideological decisiveness & tactical intent will be left with nothing. Delusions of "soft power" are just that...delusions.

Bharat's new Avatar is not even one year old and the exorcism of the secular demon living in Bharat's body called India, is even now not fully complete. Too early to judge Bharatiya India as "centrist power" or anything else other than a young child with immense potential!

"Soft Power" is a force multiplier, but some "hard power" as force must be available for multiplication.

[pankajs]

Devesh saar is right in that India neither has the fanatical intent nor the military might to project power should stay out of Afghanistan. If that is foolishness I welcome such foolishness.

He is again on the money on Ghani who has to look after himself and his fief and dance as per the players who have the ability to project power into Afghanistan. Again, nothing wrong with that. If that makes us less relevant than Bakis, cheenis, amreekis, ruusies and iranis so be it.

*Soft power* has its use but lets not go out on a limb just based on this one weak factor. Lets steer clear of too deep an involvement in Afghanistan.

[Vipul]

Abhadrakumar's piece in Rediff to make himself relevant for lectures/talk shows/conference jamborees abroad.

What a certified Ass H*le, In all matters relating to Afghanistan he wants India to be pacifist and playing second fiddle to the Paki's, let them set all agenda's related to Afghanistan and let their puppet Ghani order us around. He wants US to exit Afghanistan so that SCO ( his Chinese Masters can be the new King Makers).
This ignoromus was in our foreign office at one time (He served thrice in the Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan Division in the Ministry of External Affairs, including as the Head of the Division in 1992-95). Hope Ajit Doval reads this article and orders a complete purge of his remaining chelas in the MEA.

[RajeshA]

If Afghanistan wants the "world" to have a stake in its future or stability, it has to offer something to the "world" that the "world" desperately wants!

Please see "Treachery, Faith and the Great River" episode of Deep Space Nine!

The "Great Material Continuum" delivers all that one needs!

[SSridhar]

Modi, Ghani talk trade, terror - Suhasini Haidar, The Hindu

India is keen to be included in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement and it will welcome Afghan trucks on the Wagah-Attari border with Pakistan, said Prime Minister Narendra Modi {This is not going to happen, unless for some reason China wants it} as he addressed a joint press gathering along with visiting Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani.

Mr. Ghani, who is making his first state visit to India, said he hoped to increase regional cooperation where “the energy of Central Asia will flow to South Asia, where pipelines, fibre optics, railways, and connectivity, air, ground and virtual will connect us.” Neither side signed any agreement but announced that they would clear a motor vehicles agreement {This will also not happen because Pakistan stands in the way just as it is in APTTA} soon, as well as expedite the development of the trade route from Afghanistan to India via Iran’s Chabahar port, which would allow both countries to circumvent objections from Pakistan.

Mr. Modi told Mr. Ghani that India shared Afghanistan’s pain over persisting terrorism and was “deeply grateful” to the Afghan security forces for protecting Indians in Afghanistan “as they would their own.” Mr. Ghani said “we must have a unified approach, we must be united both in the region and globally to contain this terror.”

So, on the whole, a very tepid state visit which achieved nothing. Afghanistan simply wants to keep the India-Afghan relationship in simmer at this point of time.

[Agnimitra]

^^ His decision to increase the number of ANA forces sent to Pak military academies for training indicates a vision of a much deeper level of engagement.

Whatever the end game turns out to be, PRC re-shaping of this area over the next 10-15 years will successfully forge a stable interstate relationship (trade, infrastructure and security) and build a greater Khorasan that Taliban tactics alone could not.

[SSridhar]

A shift in Afghanistan’s stand on terror - Suhasini Haidar, The Hindu

Mr. Ghani’s words indicate a shift in Afghanistan’s position on countering terror, from charging Pakistan with complicity in attacks by the Taliban, to a more cooperative approach with that country. In another shift from President Hamid Karzai’s stand, he referred to the IS rather than the Taliban and LeT as the next big challenge for the country.

After talks, Mr. Ghani made an unusual reference to Rabindranath Tagore’s story Kabuliwala , saying it had built a “brand image” for Afghanistan in India that no amount of money could have paid for in advertising.

[sum]

^^ So, going by the lack of signed agreements and general statements from Afg side, we have pretty much lost all the investment pumped into that country over these years?