Geopolitical thread

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renukb
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A superpower by default?
By Sasha Uzunov - posted Monday, 13 October 2008 Sign Up for free e-mail updates!

Australia’s Prime Minister Kevin Rudd recently warned about an arms race in the Asia pacific region with China the country to watch. But he may have missed out on one key player “bigger” than China: Russia.

http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=8007
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Another secret outs!
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world ... 63271.html

Johannes Paulus-1,was stabbed by a Catholic priest!

Pope John Paul 'was stabbed by priest'

Reuters
Thursday, 16 October 2008


The late Pope John Paul II was wounded by a knife-wielding priest in 1982, a year after he was shot in St. Peter's Square, but the injury was kept secret, his former aide says in a documentary.

Cardinal Stanislaw Dziwisz also discloses on film that when John Paul, then 84, was unable to pronounce words several days before his death in 2005, he told his aides in a whisper that, "If I can't speak any more, it's time for me to go." He died days later on April 2, 2005.

Dziwisz, now cardinal of Krakow, Poland, was private secretary and aide to John Paul for nearly 40 years, including his 27-year papacy.

Testimony, narrated by British actor Michael York, is a film version of a memoir Dziwisz published last year, with some additions.

Its Vatican premiere is tonight in the presence of Pope Benedict.

On May 12, 1982, John Paul was visiting the shrine city of Fatima in Portugal to give thanks for surviving a first assassination attempt a year earlier on May 13, 1981, when he was shot in St. Peter's Square by Turkish gunman Mehmet Ali Agca.

A crazed ultra-conservative Spanish priest, Juan Fernandez Krohn, lunged at John Paul with a dagger, but was knocked to the ground by police and arrested. That the knife actually reached John Paul and cut him was not known until now.

"I can now reveal that the Holy Father was wounded. When we got back to the room (in the sanctuary complex), there was blood," Dziwisz says on film. John Paul continued his trip but kept the wound secret. Krohn served several years in prison before Portugal expelled the Spaniard.
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

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bloomberg:

Putin - efficient as usual!
----

Putin May Use Credit Crisis to Finish Reining in Oligarchs

By Torrey Clark and Henry Meyer

Oct. 17 (Bloomberg) -- Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000 vowing to destroy Russia's oligarchs ``as a class.'' Within two years, he'd driven two into exile and imprisoned another.

Now, he may use the global markets meltdown to finish the job.

The $50 billion that the prime minister and President Dmitry Medvedev have pledged to lend cash-strapped companies will extend state control over business leaders. Billionaires seeking bailouts -- including Oleg Deripaska, Russia's richest man, and Mikhail Fridman -- will have to give authorities veto power over their companies' financing decisions.

``This will give the state more leverage over the country's biggest companies and main industries,'' said Chris Weafer, chief strategist at UralSib Financial Corp. ``In 2008, there is only one real oligarch: the state.''

All this marks a reversal from a decade ago, when oligarchs bankrolled Boris Yeltsin's almost-insolvent government. As recently as April, Russia's 100 wealthiest citizens had a combined fortune equivalent to about a third of the economy, Forbes magazine estimated.

The nation's 25 wealthiest businessmen have seen their worth shrink by $230 billion, or 62 percent, according to Bloomberg calculations. And Putin controls the strings on the biggest remaining purse -- $531 billion in government reserves, which he is doling out through state-run Vnesheconombank, or VEB, where he presides as chairman of the supervisory board.
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Strengthening A Strategic Partnership
http://www.aina.org/news/20081014185032.htm

More than 100 years ago, decades before Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations theory, an Indian nationalist named Bipin Chandra Pal predicted the world would eventually split into two camps. On one side of this strategic divide, the prescient patriot saw forming a Hindu, Jewish and Christian alliance confronted by a Chinese-Muslim axis on the other.

The United States took a big step last Friday in turning this prophecy into reality when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed a groundbreaking nuclear deal in a ceremony in the State Department's Benjamin Franklin Room after three years of negotiations. Called the 123 Agreement after a section in the in the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, the pact will allow India to buy vital nuclear fuel and technology from American and other foreign companies. Besides strengthening America's growing strategic relationship with the emerging South Asian power, observers say the pact will be regarded in later years as one of the President George Bush's greatest foreign policy achievements.

"This legislation will strengthen our global non-proliferation efforts, protect the environment, create jobs, and assist India in meeting its growing needs in a responsible manner," said Bush, who was instrumental in the deal's success. The 123 Agreement was approved in the United States Senate by 86-13 vote this month only minutes before passing the $700 billion financial rescue bill. As a result, it received little media attention, although the measure will probably cement the American-Indian strategic alliance.

Previously, the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) had banned nuclear fuel and technology sales to India because the country had refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) in 1968 and had exploded a nuclear weapon in 1974. India, however, believed the NNPT was discriminatory, since it allowed only France, England, the United States, the Soviet Union and China to possess nuclear weapons.

Finally recognizing that India is a nuclear power and that the clock cannot be turned back, the NSG waived the sanctions in September, paving the way for the 123 Agreement. The lifting of the ban was also seen as a reward for India's responsible behaviour over the years regarding its nuclear program. Unlike Pakistan, India did not share its nuclear secrets with rogue regimes and regards the ban's abolition as the end of the NSG nations' unjustified "technology apartheid" against the Hindu-majority nation.

The 123 Agreement is a win-win proposition. The Indian economy has grown almost nine percent annually the last five years but energy demands have not kept pace. Power shortages are so bad that even the country's capital, New Delhi, experiences brownouts. So besides India's business groups, ordinary people would also benefit from an improved energy supply.

India currently has 22 nuclear reactors that produce about three percent of the country's electricity needs. Most of these, however, are running well below capacity because India could not buy nuclear fuel, due to NSG sanctions, on the international market. But as soon as the ban was lifted, France, the second-biggest nuclear fuel producer in the world after the United States, was able to negotiate a nuclear fuel contract.

The United States will probably be the foreign country to benefit most commercially from the $100 to $150 billion India is expected to spend on nuclear infrastructure over the next fifteen years. In order to help India achieve its goal of increasing its nuclear-generated electricity supply to seven percent, one American company, Westinghouse Electric, according to the Wall Street Journal, is planning to build eight nuclear reactors in India for about $40 billion.

Other benefits the 123 Agreement provides include a lessening of India's dependence on foreign oil and a boost for its well-known environmental problems. Nuclear energy is more environmentally friendly than coal or oil burning power plants and thus will help fight both pollution and global warming.

Because of this new closeness in the Indian-American strategic relationship, the United States is also expected to have the inside track on the $30 billion in weapons purchases India plans to make over the next four years, as it distances itself from Russia, its current chief armaments supplier (Israel is India's second main source of foreign weaponry). India recently bought its first American warship and agreed to purchase six transport aircraft for one billion dollars.

But a main reason for President Bush's aggressive pursuit of Agreement 123 is that a strong Indian economy is seen as essential in building up India as a counterweight to China, the other Asian giant. A reliable supply of nuclear energy would help substantially in achieving this goal of strengthening India and making her a more valuable strategic ally.

Not without reason, both the United States and India regard China as their biggest military competitor in this century. China's current massive military modernization program and the projection of its navy into the Pacific and Indian Oceans have caused some concern. India also directly faces the Chinese military along a four thousand kilometer northern border.

Critics of the 123 Agreement say India might use the new technology it receives to test another nuclear weapon, citing the fact that under the pact's provisions only Indian civilian nuclear reactors will come under international inspection and not its eight military ones. But India has been warned against this. In such an eventuality, the deal would be immediately cancelled and sanctions imposed once more, a risk the technology- and energy-starved country is unlikely to take.

India, a country of 1.1 billion people, should become one of the world's great powers in this century but energy shortages were hindering its great potential. And while some among India's 130 million Muslims may not like their government's new closeness with America, they should regard it positively. After all, it is America and the West helping their country to achieve prosperity and not the other side of the divide.

By Stephen Brown
FrontPageMagazine.com
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A "Third Neighbor" Strategy for Asia Print Mail
By Michael Auslin
Posted: Monday, October 6, 2008


http://www.aei.org/publications/filter. ... detail.asp
Conclusion

No one should expect a third neighbor strategy to become America's dominant policy in Asia. It will not, and indeed it should not, supplant long-standing U.S. alliances, nor will it prevent Washington from attempting to pursue better relations with China or building multilateral approaches to problems when and where appropriate. However, the third neighbor approach can allow for more flexible interaction with a number of key states in Asia that are worried about their long-term viability. America can offer them comfortable geographical distance, an economic outlet, and security expertise that responds to their own needs.

For some, like Mongolia, the U.S. approach can be explicit; for others, such as ASEAN, it should be more nuanced. Yet each third neighbor partner will soon recognize the benefits of closer relations with America and will not feel that such help is contingent on its being forced to line up against any other nation. Moreover, as this strategy is directed largely toward liberal or liberalizing states, a natural community of values is likely to form among them over time as they deepen their relations with the United States. Each will understand that the real threats to their independence or wealth come from illiberal regimes, and those concerned about the size of other democracies in their region can slowly be brought into a more beneficial relationship with those liberal states through their closer ties to America. This, it should be stressed, is not forcing smaller states into some sort of U.S. grand plan for hegemony in Asia but rather helping sympathetic states protect their own interests and strengthen their own liberal tendencies.

Rebuilding U.S. influence, trustworthiness, and operations in Asia will take time and will not be without expense. However, melding U.S. interests with those of smaller partners can be a powerful agent for pursuing stability and strengthening liberalism in the most dynamic region on earth.
Michael Auslin is a resident scholar at AEI.
AEI research assistant Jennifer Gregg worked with Mr. Auslin to produce this Asian Outlook.
As the United States loses ground in Asia, the struggle for influence is heating up, with small states caught between authoritarian and democratic nations alike. The pressure being put on these small states provides a rare opportunity for the United States to play the role of an honest broker, working to reduce tensions and promote liberalism. By adopting a new "third neighbor" strategy, the next U.S. president could begin to rebuild America's position in Asia, interacting more effectively with emerging democracies, engaging older allies more fully, and helping friends pursue regional stability more successfully.

Despite U.S. government assertions to the contrary, American influence in Asia has eroded over the past half-decade. Blows to America's public image, combined with a narrow focus on political mechanisms such as the six-party talks over North Korea and a seeming unwillingness to champion liberal values, have rendered U.S. policy reactive and uninspired. Some celebrate this "realistic" approach to regional affairs, largely because it avoids annoying or confronting the People's Republic of China, but the effect has been to make America a status quo power, one that simply reacts to initiatives from countries like China or responds to crises such as those provoked by Russia. As a result, the United States is running ever harder but failing even to stay in place.

The next U.S. president will face revived geopolitical tensions and rising authoritarian powers throughout the world. One of the main areas of contention is Eurasia, where many of those authoritarian powers--including China, Russia, and Iran--are actively attempting to expand their influence and power. At the same time, Asia's large democratic states, such as India and Japan, are also seeking to bolster their standing and influence. Asia has become a zone of central geopolitical importance--the economic engine of the world, rich in natural resources--where some of the world's most powerful states are forging alliances, selling weapons, extracting concessions, and viewing competitors with growing distrust.

Caught in the middle are smaller nations increasingly worried about the plans of their larger neighbors. Officials in many of these countries, particularly the newly democratic ones, recognize that the U.S. presence in Asia protects their independence, and many are willing to strengthen ties with America as a means of creating policy options and developing their political, economic, or security systems. For its part, Washington should welcome deeper ties with these smaller states as a means of promoting democracy and liberalization throughout the Asia-Pacific region. This is a new way that Washington can seek to repair its position and bolster its influence. By taking advantage of what seems to be America's greatest handicap in Asia, its distance, the United States can play the role of disinterested outsider, offering to be a "third neighbor" to various nations--even ones that are already allies--that fear China and Russia or perhaps even India and Japan. If carefully nurtured and creatively expanded, this balancing strategy can eventually evolve into a natural and coherent community of interests among liberal states in the Asia Pacific and even play a role in the various multilateral organizations now blooming in the region. The result will be a freer, more prosperous Asia in which smaller nations play an important role in securing regional stability.

Alliance System Limitations

For more than fifty years, U.S. strategy in Asia has been centered on a so-called hub-and-spoke model, whereby a select few key allies have entered into bilateral defense relationships with Washington. For them and others, America's presence has helped ensure stability for decades. The U.S. treaty system has absorbed the bulk of Washington's resources and planning in the Pacific since the 1950s. America's closest allies--Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia--have formal mutual defense treaties with the United States, and the United States continues to provide security commitments to Thailand under the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization agreement, despite its dissolution in 1977.

For these key allies, as for other nations in the Asia Pacific, America's long-standing commitment to maintaining regional stability has been central to their development and well-being. In addition to basing nearly one hundred thousand troops in Asia for most of the post-World War II period, America has continuously patrolled crucial sea lanes, provided development assistance, built up counterinsurgency capabilities, delivered humanitarian relief, and promoted free trade and democracy. Under this aegis, East Asia has become the most dynamic area of the globe, accounting for almost a quarter of global economic output with a combined GDP of over $9 trillion.[1] Deep poverty (defined by the United Nations as living on less than one dollar per day) was halved in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and China between 1990 and 2003,[2] while China, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand all doubled their GDPs between 1990 and 2005.[3] At the same time, democratic movements spread gradually throughout the region, taking firm hold in South Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia and weathering protracted challenges in countries such as Thailand and the Philippines.

Even so, Washington's role was not without controversy, especially in a Cold War context that appeared to force Asian nations to choose between the United States and the Soviet Union (or, earlier, the Sino-Soviet alliance). Some nations, such as India and Indonesia, saw greater utility in not choosing sides and founded the Non-Aligned Movement in 1955, which still has 118 member nations, some democratic, many others authoritarian. America's abandonment of Saigon in 1975 showed the dangers of relying too closely on Washington, thus reinforcing the reluctance of many Southeast Asian states to seek closer ties with the United States.

A Missed Chance

The end of the Cold War provided a rare opportunity for the United States to move beyond the largely bilateral structure of its Asian alliance system and forge a more encompassing community of democratic and liberal-leaning states. Once the threat of Soviet-sponsored insurgencies had ended and Moscow's ballistic missile submarines started rusting in Vladivostok's harbor, Washington could have taken advantage of democratic trends in South Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan to link stable and emerging democracies, promote multilateral free trade pacts, and begin discussions on regional security issues. A deft public diplomacy program also would have trumpeted the rise of democracy and woven a compelling narrative of Asia's future that envisioned greater freedom for all in the region.

Instead, during the 1990s, the United States elevated economic relations to the forefront and paid little attention to potentially transformative political movements, including multilateral organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). More alarmingly, the Clinton administration imagined a "strategic partnership" with China as the cornerstone of its Asia policy. This supposed partnership was to be with a regime that less than a decade before had massacred its own citizens at Tiananmen Square and that was assiduously building up its ballistic missile forces, in part by stealing U.S. technology and nuclear secrets.[4] Longstanding allies like Japan became increasingly worried about U.S. strategy and Washington's apparent willingness to overlook adverse security trends in favor of economic gain.

This mismatch of strategic priorities continues today, as does the absence of an overall Asia strategy. Washington has yet to come up with a coherent China policy, and with regard to Beijing, America's economic interests seem to run counter to its security commitments. Despite U.S. intentions, any moves designed to hedge China's potentially threatening power are seen by Asian states (including U.S. allies) not merely as containment but potentially as requiring them to choose sides as they did in the Cold War. Most are unwilling to do so, since their own economic ties to China are now irreversible, and their concern about antagonizing Beijing or losing market access constrains their support for America's seemingly conflicted strategy. As a result, Washington has floundered for a sensible approach, trying to "shape" China and get it to accept a role as a "responsible stakeholder," to use former deputy secretary of state Robert Zoellick's formulation.[5]

New Realism and the Return of Geopolitics

Pundits and policymakers seem split between those still believing in the possibility of a grand, multilateral "architecture" in Asia that will resolve problems and create a new era of cooperation and those who see the return of a machtpolitik era of aggressive competition among a handful of potential hegemons. Neither position is an entirely accurate assessment of regional trends. Current cooperation can mask preparation for future conflict, while more confrontational policies today may actually reduce the likelihood of miscalculation and crisis later on. Yet, in the long run, Washington is limited in how much it can directly influence the choices the most powerful Asian powers make or the policies they pursue. Their leaders will decide their interests regardless of what Washington or other nations want.

Washington has yet to come up with a coherent China policy, and with regard to Beijing, America's economic interests seem to run counter to its security commitments.

That this is clear in the security sphere is proven by China's ongoing military modernization. Despite no imminent external or domestic threats and a long-established policy in Washington--and particularly the U.S. Navy--to promote warmer ties, Beijing has increased its military budget by double digits every year for more than a decade.[6] It has pursued advanced weapons systems, including fourth-generation fighters, kinetic space kill capabilities, and new ballistic missile submarines. It has laid underwater listening nets and built a recently discovered submarine base in its far southern waters, near Asia's most crucial trade routes. It is becoming increasingly adept at cyber-warfare. And, even though the People's Liberation Army ground forces remain cumbersome and outdated, its asymmetric capabilities are worrying defense planners around the region.

But China, for all its growth, is not the only state of concern to many nations in Asia. More so than in other regions, geography continues to play a preponderant role in Asian politics and security. As much as China is feared, it is Russia, flush with petrodollars, that nations are beginning to worry about more. Moscow's invasion of Georgia this summer was a stark reminder of the Kremlin's willingness to use force to achieve strategic objectives, and the ineffective, faltering Western responses did nothing to allay the concerns of U.S. allies. The fact that a small, newly democratized nation could be invaded and partitioned by Russia without a coherent Western response will not be lost on other democratizing states, whether in Asia, Europe, or the Caucasus. And in Asia especially, the sheer size of authoritarian China and Russia creates a unique situation akin to nineteenth-century great power competition in its inherent threat to smaller states.

Beyond this, the two key democracies in Asia--India and Japan--worry some of their neighbors due simply to their enormous size and strength. For some, memories of World War II bedevil better relations with Japan and cause concern over the prospect of Japanese military development, even though such development is largely aimed at current threats like North Korea. India's historically tense relations with China and its development of nuclear weapons may raise fears of a Sino-Indian conflict spilling over into the Indian Ocean, particularly as China's navy expands its influence via Burmese and Pakistani seaports. Finally, the strength of the Indian and Japanese economies provides enormous benefits to nations throughout Asia but also causes smaller nations to become dependent on those markets and to be affected by the rising domestic inequality engendered by trade relations.

These regional concerns offer the United States a unique opportunity to shift its tactics with certain states, repackage its strategy, and achieve its longstanding goals of maintaining regional leadership and promoting democracy. Much like Herbert Hoover's "Good Neighbor Policy," which was later seized upon by Franklin Roosevelt, a program of reducing distrust through expanded political and economic relations can, in this case, be tied explicitly to addressing regional pressures and threats. The key partners for the United States in this policy are the democratic and liberalizing states in the Asia Pacific that share common values with it already or are developing their civil societies to take advantage of the economic and social benefits brought by greater freedom.

There will be questions about whether such a strategy could actually be seen as neutral. U.S. policymakers should not forget, however, that the natural distrust between Russia and China will likely ensure tension and increased competition between them in Asia at some point. The specter of two heavyweights facing off or pressuring their smaller neighbors is more than enough to offset vague concerns that Washington is seeking allies in order to confront either Beijing or Moscow. Similarly, adroitly addressing concerns about democratic India or Japan will bolster the United States' disinterested status, largely by its serving as an honest broker on issues that affect economic or security relations between Washington and other actors involved. Such brokering should be explicitly promoted as a norm for solving regional problems, thus undercutting the moral standing of states that threaten or use force over contested issues. There are enough threats, worries, and pressing problems in Asia to more than offset a cynical reaction to this new American policy.

Implementing the Third Neighbor Strategy

America's third neighbor strategy will work only by taking into account the particular condition of several mostly liberal nations whose larger neighbors make them uncomfortable and offering to assist them with their respective concerns. For some, this will entail stressing the United States' ability to help them provide for their security; for others, serving as an economic lifeline; and for yet more, serving as a neutral political supporter and arbiter.

In general, the United States should employ a similar set of programs and approaches, linking security assistance to open trade relationships and buttressing both with enhanced civil society engagement, from grass-roots gatherings to parliamentary and intellectual exchanges. The emphasis and short-term needs of each country will determine the particular mix employed. The long-term goal of a third neighbor strategy is to develop a comprehensive relationship with each partner, with the commitment to do so deriving from the ally's strategic importance and overall place in a comprehensive Asia strategy. This moves beyond recent U.S. attempts, such as the Asia Pacific Democracy Partnership, by pursuing multilateral results through bilateral progress.

This will, of course, require a significant commitment of American resources, from diplomatic to military. Above all, the next president must make a political commitment to this strategy and direct senior officials to integrate it into Asian strategy. Overall strategic direction and supervision of the third neighbor strategy should be kept in the White House at the National Security Council (NSC), which should also pick the target nations after consultation with leading government departments. During the crucial agenda-setting stage, area experts should be employed fully and work in concert with functional specialists, such as security advisers and economic planners. The NSC's senior director for Asia and the strategic planning director should work together to set overall policy, with implementation oversight resting at the Asia desk.

Country-specific goals, timelines, appropriation and allocation of resources, and appropriate work flow should originate in an interagency process combining working groups from the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. While cumbersome and bureaucratic, an interagency approach is the only feasible way to engage U.S. government stakeholders responsible for the target countries. On-the-ground implementation of the specific set of policies should be coordinated by the U.S. mission in each country, with a dedicated civilian foreign service officer or military foreign area officer assigned for that specific purpose.

The Third Neighbor Strategy in Action: Case Studies

Once all these pieces come together in Washington, where are the most appropriate testing grounds for a third neighbor approach? Clearly, states that feel pressed by overweening neighbors and desire a closer relationship with the United States to provide some breathing room should come first. Second, to the best of its ability, the United States should partner with democratic states or those with liberal leanings, no matter how imperfect their systems. For those that are not democracies, the third neighbor strategy must aim explicitly at liberalization. Third, the United States should aim at countries with strategic importance due to their geographic positions, raw materials, or current political policies that are having a positive effect on Asia. Given limited resources, U.S. policymakers will have to come up with some type of matrix to determine which nations best fit the bill, but even at this hypothetical stage, certain states seem naturally suited to this new strategy.

Mongolia. Possessed of abundant natural resources, including Asia's largest copper mine and enormous uranium deposits, Mongolia is also a stable, if emerging, democracy, lauded by President Bush on his 2005 visit. Charges of illicit deals benefiting the governing--formerly Communist--party and fears of ballot fraud that led to riots in the capital city of Ulan Bator after parliamentary elections earlier this spring provide some indications of the obstacles facing this infant democracy. Mongolia sits uneasily between Russia and China and is actively searching for help from the United States to maintain its economic and strategic independence. Over the past year, Russia has moved aggressively to make Mongolia an economic satellite. Raising oil prices through blackmail and seeking exclusive concessions have allowed Russia to carve out a significant role in Mongolia's economy.[7] But predominance goes to China, whose economic influence over Ulan Bator continues to grow as it has sought to build up its Central Asian presence.

Washington can naturally play the role of third neighbor to Mongolia, expanding trade and security relations (Mongolia has already dispatched forces to Iraq) in a bid to deny strategic control to either Moscow or Beijing. Equally important, in light of the riots after this year's parliamentary elections, America should commit public diplomacy resources, as well as economic and security incentives, to persuade Mongolians not to retreat from the liberal path they have been following for two decades. Promoting a free trade agreement between the United States and Mongolia would provide alternative markets and sources of investment for the Mongolians and would send a strong message about Washington's interests in the heart of Eurasia.

South Korea. The Republic of Korea is another state ripe for a third neighbor strategy. America's half-century alliance with Seoul remains strong, but Koreans themselves are worried about being caught between a rising China and a resurgent Japan, or potentially between a Sino-North Korean alliance and a Japanese response. By acknowledging these concerns, America can argue that the way to avoid being overwhelmed by either is to increase South Korea's regional presence and activities, from humanitarian assistance to security partnerships. This achieves U.S. goals of upgrading South Korea's capabilities while decreasing its sense of isolation, and it fits perfectly with President Lee Myung-bak's desire to build a "global Korea."[8]

As a central part of this strategy, Washington must push Seoul to modernize its defensive capabilities so that it is hardened against any potential regional threat. Once this leads to a heightened South Korean confidence level, the United States must then support closer Japanese-South Korean relations as a way to allay fears rooted more in their historical experience than in current reality. Here, the third neighbor strategy will be employed to move beyond existing divisions between democratic states. Developing closer Tokyo-Seoul ties thus will be a test of whether the third neighbor strategy can move beyond simply playing large states off one another. Reworking a triangular relationship--in this case, South Korea, China, and Japan--by reducing tensions between the two democratic societies can lead to a more flexible U.S. approach to regional problems that does not always have to take into account frayed relations between natural partners.

ASEAN. The regional bloc may also benefit from a third neighbor strategy. ASEAN has driven many of the more innovative multilateral developments in Asia, including the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit (EAS). Yet ASEAN is riven by a struggle between Japan and China (both members of the organization's Plus Three forum) for influence, and it also worries about the long-term economic and military rivalry between India and China.

The United States is not currently involved in most ASEAN initiatives, including the EAS. The United States should increase its participation with ASEAN, increasing military ties with its liberal states and pursuing a free trade agreement, thereby offering a neutral partner for the organization to turn to as it seeks to shape regional relations. Areas of specific and common concern between ASEAN and the United States include maritime security, in which the growth of the Chinese navy is causing concern over the freedom of sea lines of communication and in which the Indian Navy may grow to counter that trend. America's help should be offered in response to specific concerns of ASEAN's leaders and publicly crafted so as to help ASEAN fulfill specific goals that bring about greater stability. By employing diplomacy in this way, Washington will be seen as promoting the organization's interests--not its own.

To be sure, engaging ASEAN as a collective is more difficult than working with a single nation. Furthermore, ongoing human rights problems, such as the continuing oppression of the Burmese by the ruling military junta, make it impossible for the United States to deal with all ASEAN states. Yet, from America's old ally in the Philippines to newly democratizing Indonesia and geopolitically crucial Singapore, Washington needs to address these growing countries' fears about being played as pawns by the larger, unified powers of the region. Many of these countries have quietly been reaching out to the U.S. military, for example, sharing information and looking for signs that Washington is paying attention to their concerns. As America applies a third neighbor strategy to ASEAN, certain states will become more natural partners, and Washington should be flexible enough to then begin dealing with them on their own terms while continuing to push for free trade and joint security initiatives with the whole group.

Conclusion

No one should expect a third neighbor strategy to become America's dominant policy in Asia. It will not, and indeed it should not, supplant long-standing U.S. alliances, nor will it prevent Washington from attempting to pursue better relations with China or building multilateral approaches to problems when and where appropriate. However, the third neighbor approach can allow for more flexible interaction with a number of key states in Asia that are worried about their long-term viability. America can offer them comfortable geographical distance, an economic outlet, and security expertise that responds to their own needs.

For some, like Mongolia, the U.S. approach can be explicit; for others, such as ASEAN, it should be more nuanced. Yet each third neighbor partner will soon recognize the benefits of closer relations with America and will not feel that such help is contingent on its being forced to line up against any other nation. Moreover, as this strategy is directed largely toward liberal or liberalizing states, a natural community of values is likely to form among them over time as they deepen their relations with the United States. Each will understand that the real threats to their independence or wealth come from illiberal regimes, and those concerned about the size of other democracies in their region can slowly be brought into a more beneficial relationship with those liberal states through their closer ties to America. This, it should be stressed, is not forcing smaller states into some sort of U.S. grand plan for hegemony in Asia but rather helping sympathetic states protect their own interests and strengthen their own liberal tendencies.

Rebuilding U.S. influence, trustworthiness, and operations in Asia will take time and will not be without expense. However, melding U.S. interests with those of smaller partners can be a powerful agent for pursuing stability and strengthening liberalism in the most dynamic region on earth.


Michael Auslin is a resident scholar at AEI.

AEI research assistant Jennifer Gregg worked with Mr. Auslin to produce this Asian Outlook.
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Nuclear weapons could rule again as China rises further
September 25, 2008
http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fSect ... Id=4627729
By Etienne Swanepoel

During the Cold War the central geopolitical strategic debate concerned nuclear weapons. Today this is no longer the case. Global concerns now focus on climate change, demographics, the twin US deficit, the future role of China and the like.

The current global financial crisis has dominated the list of global top-of-mind issues. Global decision makers would be foolish if this were not the case. The current crisis is undoubtedly the most serious to face Western hegemony since the end of the Cold War.

Fortunately for Western powers the financial crisis has not conflated with more serious geopolitical equivalents, such as the Cuban missile crisis or the Berlin airlift crisis of 1948.

During the Cold War strategic debates relating to nuclear weapons, arguably the highest level of geopolitical strategic debate, were developed in a geopolitical environment populated by two principal contestants, the US and the former Soviet Union. Following the Cold War, this contest has passed.

Nuclear weapons are the ultimate weapons. It follows that if geopolitical contestants such as China and a resurgent Russia continue their ascent, the importance of nuclear weapons as instruments of geopolitical power will once again come to the fore.

The key difference between any future nuclear equilibrium and the one that prevailed during the Cold War is that the level of complexity has increased beyond the original two contestants - the US and the Soviet Union.

The number of geopolitical actors with credible nuclear posture probably now amounts to at least five. As the commonality of interests between the US, Britain and France, notwithstanding the independent Gaullist tendencies of the last, outweighs their differences, they probably count as one nuclear actor.

From a leadership perspective the key concern to the US as the natural leader of this bloc is the cultural diversity now prevalent in the EU. There is also the prevalent risk of independent action on the part of France.

Pakistan and India are two further independent nuclear powers. Here the principal concern is whether Pakistan might succumb to perceived radicalism aimed against the US.

Though neither country, properly speaking, amounts to a geopolitical nuclear power, those with seats at the nuclear table reluctantly recognise their geopolitical importance. This is principally due to their antagonism to each other, the sheer population mass of India, and their proximity to China and Russia.

The next actor is Russia, which, at an economic level, makes skilful use of its status as an oil and gas power. Likewise, it makes skilful use of its status as a nuclear power at a grand geopolitical level. A surge of Russian nationalism in the recent past makes it difficult to model its future behaviour at the grand strategic level. It may see itself as a swing vote in future geopolitical standoffs between the US and China.

It is inevitable that China's geopolitical posture will increase substantially in the medium term. The world is now on a geopolitical fault line, economic power is shifting from West to East. The switch, which has arguably already started, will take place over the next decade or two. It is a period of great geopolitical uncertainty and the geopolitical environment is likely to be even more dynamic than is now the case.

The key change in Chinese posture is likely to be at the nuclear level. Experience since the deployment of nuclear weapons broadly shows that in the superpower ballpark nuclear power must be sufficient to deter a first strike. This is generally achieved when there is demonstrable proof that a nuclear power has second-strike capability. Though China is a continental power, it may decide to project any revised posture in the form of a blue-water navy capable of operating in the western hemisphere to demonstrate the required second-strike capability.

There are two market issues. First, do markets correctly price geopolitical risk? The answer is probably no. During the recent financial crisis the yield on 10-year US treasuries has fallen. At the same time, the difference in yields between interbank and US government loans has risen. It reached a historic high of 490 basis points last Thursday. Both these trends indicate extreme bearishness in the markets. Since the announcement of the US government's $700 billion (R5.7 trillion) financial sector rescue package, both trends seem to be reversing. This indicates that markets are anticipating normality.

Since the start of the financial crisis there has been no perceptible change in the geopolitical environment. In the absence of repricing of geopolitical risks, the correlation between market risk and these trends is to be expected. Therefore, none of the recent market volatility is geopolitically related and the market stance towards geopolitical risk remains the same.

Market critics say that markets are relatively efficient at calculating financial risks but, as in the period before World War 1, are not good at calculating geopolitical risk.

The second, and perhaps more immediate, geopolitical risk is another spectacular 9/11-type attack. The current financial crisis provides the incentive. Conflating a financial crisis with a geopolitical crisis is likely to harm Western hegemony under US leadership substantially.

Etienne Swanepoel is a partner at Webber Wentzel. The views expressed in this column are his own
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Subject: RAND Study Suggests U.S. Loses War With China
The Lizard King 10/17/2008 6:33:45 AM

http://www.strategypage.com/militaryfor ... 03539.aspx

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i= ... =ASI&s=AIR

TAIPEI - A new RAND study suggests U.S. air power in the Pacific would be inadequate to thwart a Chinese attack on Taiwan in 2020. The study, entitled "Air Combat Past, Present and Future," by John Stillion and Scott Perdue, says China's anti-access arms and strategy could deny the U.S. the "ability to operate efficiently from nearby bases or seas."

According to the study, U.S. aircraft carriers and air bases would be threatened by Chinese development of anti-ship ballistic missiles, the fielding of diesel and nuclear submarines equipped with torpedoes and SS-N-22 and SS-N-27 anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), fighters and bombers carrying ASCMs and HARMs, and new ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

The report states that 34 missiles with submunition warheads could cover all parking ramps at Kadena Air Force Base, Okinawa.

An "attack like this could damage, destroy or strand 75 percent of aircraft based at Kadena," it says.

In contrast, many Chinese air bases are harder than Kadena, with some "super-hard underground hangers."

To make matters worse, Kadena is the only U.S. air base within 500 nautical miles of the Taiwan Strait, whereas China has 27.

U.S. air bases in South Korea are more than 750 miles distant, and those in Japan are more than 885 miles away. Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, is 1,500 miles away. The result is that sortie rates will be low, with a "huge tanker demand."

The authors suggest China's CETC Y-27 radar, which is similar to Russia's Nebo SVU VHF Digital AESA, could counter U.S. stealth fighter technology. China is likely to outfit its fighters with improved radars and by "2020 even very stealthy targets likely [would be] detectable by Flanker radars at 25+ nm." China is also likely to procure the new Su-35BM fighter by 2020, which will challenge the F-35 and possibly the F-22.

The authors also question the reliability of U.S. beyond-visual-range weapons, such as the AIM-120 AMRAAM. U.S. fighters have recorded only 10 AIM-120 kills, none against targets equipped with the kinds of countermeasures carried by Chinese Su-27s and Su-30s. Of the 10, six were beyond-visual-range kills, and it required 13 missiles to get them.

If a conflict breaks out between China and the U.S. over Taiwan, the authors say it is difficult to "predict who will have had the last move in the measure-countermeasure game."

Overall, the authors say, "China could enjoy a 3:1 edge in fighters if we can fly from Kadena - about 10:1 if forced to operate from Andersen. Overcoming these odds requires qualitative superiority of 9:1 or 100:1" - a differential that is "extremely difficult to achieve" against a like power.

If beyond-visual-range missiles work, stealth technology is not countered and air bases are not destroyed, U.S. forces have a chance, but "history suggests there is a limit of about 3:1 where quality can no longer compensate for superior enemy numbers."

A 24-aircraft Su-27/30 regiment can carry around 300 air-to-air missiles (AAMs), whereas 24 F-22s can carry only 192 AAMs and 24 F-35s only 96 AAMs.

Though current numbers assume the F-22 could shoot down 48 Chinese Flankers when "outnumbered 12:1 without loss," these numbers do not take into account a less-than-perfect U.S. beyond-visual-range performance, partial or complete destruction of U.S. air bases and aircraft carriers, possible deployment of a new Chinese stealth fighter around 2020 or 2025, and the possible use of Chinese "robo-fighters" to deplete U.S. "fighters' missile loadout prior to mass attack."

The authors write that Chinese counter stealth, anti-access, countermissile technologies are proliferating and the U.S. military needs "a plan that accounts for this."
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Soviet Subs In The Sunset
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsub/ ... 81016.aspx

October 16, 2008: Russia's nuclear submarine fleet is fading away. The navy budget, despite recent increases, is not large enough to build new ships to replace the current Cold War era fleet that is falling apart. This is not much noticed. The rapid decline of Russia's nuclear submarine fleet got some attention only because Russia needed international help to safely decommission over a hundred obsolete or worn out nuclear subs. This effort has been going on for over eight years.

But there hasn't been enough money available to build replacements. Currently, Russia only has 14 SSBN (nuclear ballistic missile sub) boats in service, and not all of them have a full load of missiles. Some lack full crews, or have key systems in need of repair. Russia has only 14 modern Akula SSNs (nuclear attack subs) in service. These began building in the late 1980s and are roughly comparable to the American Los Angeles class. All of the earlier Russian SSNs are trash, and most have been decommissioned. There are also eight SSGN (nuclear subs carrying cruise missiles) and 20 diesel electric boats. There is a new class of SSGNs under construction, but progress, and promised funding increases, have been slow.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, most of the ship building money has gone into new nuclear subs. Six Akulas have been completed in that time, but the first of a new generation of SSBNs, the Borei class was delayed by technical problems, a new ballistic missile that wouldn't work, and lack of money. The first Borei class boat, after many delays, is finally ready for service, and ended up costing over two billion dollars.

The Russian admirals made their big mistake in the early 1990s, when the dismantling of the Soviet Union left the second largest fleet in the world with only a fraction of its Cold War budget. Rather than immediately retire ninety percent of those ships, Russia tried to keep many of them operational. This consumed most of the navy budget, and didn't work. There were too many ships, not enough sailors and not enough money for maintenance or training at sea. The mighty Soviet fleet is mostly scrap now, or rusting hulks tied up at crumbling, out-of-the way naval bases.

While Western nuclear subs can last for about thirty years, Russian models rarely get past twenty. That means two new SSN or SSGN has to be put into service each year to maintain a force of forty boats. Unless the sub construction budget get billions more dollars a year, that is not going to happen. Right now, the priority is on producing a new class of SSBNs (11 more Boreis) are planned or under construction. These are critical, because they carry SLBM (Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles) that provide a critical (they are much harder to destroy in a first strike than land based missiles) portion of the nuclear deterrent. The rest of the Russian armed forces, like most of the navy, is in sad shape, and unable to resist a major invasion. Only the ICBMs and SLBMs guarantee the safety of the state. So the way things are going now, in a decade or two, Russia will end up with a force consisting of a dozen SSNs and a dozen SSBNs.
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Renukb, Add to those the issue of financial meltdown of the West and one realizes that there will be bigger weapons deployed than our dealmakers envisoned. IOW more reliance on nukes. I wouldnt bes surprised if small fish start showing bigger teeth than displayed earlier by way of the tests prior to CTBT run-up.
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No need to overestimate Russian military might
http://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op_ed/30208

No revival of Russia’s military might occurred in Georgia and there was hardly any hope for Russia to create a modern and effective army by 2020.

Although it is never wise to underestimate a potential adversary, it is equally unwise to overestimate his strength. After the Iron Curtain came down and Westerners had the opportunity to closely observe the conditions of the Soviet Union, they admitted that they had greatly overestimated the U.S.S.R.’s state of development.

Throughout its history, Russian military capability had often been exaggerated, as its government sought to gain diplomatic advantage through inflated public perceptions. Even today, the bellicose statements from the Kremlin mask the severe shortfalls of its military capability.

There is little doubt that – in terms of sheer numbers – Russia’s conventional military strength is several times that of Ukraine. But numbers can be misleading. Poor training, weak morale and poor quality and availability of supplies and armaments can easily transform a seemingly formidable military into a “hollow force.” On paper it may look impressive, but operationally it can suffer defeats as embarrassing as Stalin’s disastrous war against the Finns or Russia’s defeat at the hands of the fledgling Japanese military in 1905.

Russia’s attack on Georgia in August is illustrative of the serious problems it faces in bringing its operational capability in line with its “superpower” pretensions. Russia’s 58th Army invaded tiny Georgia with 500 tanks and an equal number of combat vehicles. However, prior to the attack, the Russian army secretly transferred its top-of-the-line T-80 and T-90 battle tanks and BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles from its Moscow and Western military districts to the Caucasus, thereby hoping to hide the obsolete and dilapidated state of its equipment. Despite the pre-planning and the “show” pieces Russia put on display, observers commented on the numerous stranded tanks and generally unimpressive “ragtag” performance of the Russian military.

Participants in an April conference in Washington on Russian military reform unanimously acknowledged that “there was no revival of Russia’s military might to be observed, and there was hardly any hope for Russia to create a modern and effective army by 2020.” Russia’s armed forces remain beset by manpower and morale problems, aging equipment, graft and unfulfilled promises. Although Putin has increased the defense budget to a level five times greater than when he became president, it is still only 7 percent of U.S. spending. With the decline in the price of oil, it is doubtful that Russia will be able to continue its planned expansion and to afford the $200 billion needed for modernization.

According to a 2005 Defense Ministry report, 60 percent of Russian missiles have exceeded their service life and half require major repairs. Just 30 percent of the country’s fighter planes are combat-ready. John Pike, director of a Virginia-based military research group, noted that Russia suffers from endemic draft avoidance and that 9 out of 10 of eligible draftees escape service: “If you’ve got 90 percent draft evasion, those who show up are just too stupid to evade it.’’ Imagine the kind of military you can make out of that.

An article in an Estonian newspaper in 2007 quoted a Russian officer as saying that “we lack armaments, and the weapons we do have don’t work…..only about 15-20 percent of Russia’s military hardware meets Western quality standards.’’ Then, with the obvious intent of dramatizing the state of decline of the Russian military, the officer went on to say “if Estonia attacked us tomorrow, its soldiers might well reach Moscow.” It was interesting, however, to read a rebuttal of this last point by the military observer for “Komsomolskaya Pravda,” who went on to analyze the manpower and logistics of the Estonian army and reassure the reader that “one Russian division would suffice to defeat it.”

Even the much-favored strategic arm of the Russian military is increasingly obsolete. Of the 500 ground-based ICBMs in Russia’s strategic arsenal, 400 are old and need to be replaced. Of the 12 nuclear-powered submarines, 2 are ready to be scrapped. Of the 79 strategic bombers, many are 30 years old. Even the much ballyhooed “new strategic bomber patrols” that Putin ordered to be resumed in August, are done mostly by aging Tu-95 “Bear” bombers that have turbo-prop rather than jet engines, carry no nuclear weapons, and are limited to about one flight a week by budget and equipment constraints.

Can Russia reverse the decline in its military capability? Not according to Stanislav Belkovsky of Russia’s Institute for National Strategy. According to him, “it’s impossible to reverse these trends in current policy.” He explained that the steady decline of the Russian military-industrial complex would make it impossible to increase weapon production without huge investments.

These numbers and observations, however, give little cause for comfort. Although – with the exception of the airborne divisions, the air assault brigades, and a few tank and motor-rifle divisions – Russia has relatively few competent, deployable formations, Ukraine’s military is in no better shape. Both Russian and Ukrainian military forces are largely “hollow.” Both countries produce a great deal of military hardware for export, but relatively little of the new equipment is sold to their own armed forces. Most of the weapons used by Ukraine’s military are inherited from the Soviet armed forces.

In 2007, the Ukrainian state-owned arms exporters generated $1 billion in revenue (more than half of the total annual budget of Ukraine’s defense ministry) placing Ukraine in the top 10 worldwide exporters. Yet the Ukrainian army’s 800 tanks are modernized versions of tanks produced in 1964 and its planes were manufactured 25-35 years ago.

Although Ukrainian law requires that the defense ministry be financed with 3 percent of the gross domestic product, no government has even approached the 2 percent level. Its 2008 funding has been 1 percent of GDP while Russia has earmarked 7 percent and NATO requires 2 percent. The 2009 budget, although nearly doubling, is still less than 1 percent of GDP.

Predictably, such a budget does not allow much for training, and soldiers are engaged in such activities as picking potatoes to feed themselves. Conscripts get marksmanship training only several times during their 10-month compulsory service. Ukrainian officers and enlisted personnel are notoriously underpaid and cared for. A lieutenant’s wage is $422 per month and a serviceman is allocated only $7-8 per day for food. “Contract” volunteers earn $175 per month – a fifth of what a Kyiv taxi driver takes home. Poor morale, poor training, outdated equipment, and loss of skilled personnel have placed Ukraine’s independence at risk.

The “good news” is that Ukraine – in defense of its borders – does not need to match Russia’s military strength. Russia has a huge land mass to protect and will never leave its Chinese, Caucasus, or Western borders unguarded. A country with pretensions of “superpower” status must field and finance a force larger than it needs for its own defense. Ukraine, on the other hand, needs a military force only large enough to ensure that the cost of foreign aggression will be too high a price for the aggressor to bear. It does not need a larger military force … only one that is well-trained, adequately paid, and equipped with the latest technology, supplies, and equipment.

In short, Ukrainian politicians must decide whether they want to have a real military force capable of protecting Ukraine (with or without NATO), or simply pay lip service to national security. Russia’s military may be as hollow as Ukraine’s. And Ukraine need not (currently) be intimidated by threats, but the day will come when that may change. It is time for Ukraine to begin the long but critical process of upgrading its military capability. A good beginning is the allocation of the 3 percent of GDP that has been promised but never delivered.

George Woloshyn, a native of Kupnovychi, Ukraine, is an American citizen living in Linden, Virginia
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Nuclear Weapons For No One
Kelly Wall

Issue date: 10/16/08 Section

Nuclear weapons have long been an issue in the global community. Five countries (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China) have nuclear weapons under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India, Pakistan and North Korea have not signed the treaty, nor has Israel.

But now, North Korea has been taken off of the U.S. State Department's state sponsors of terrorism list. Through a series of six-party talks, North Korea has agreed to several provisions and is getting energy for stopping its nuclear production.

North Korea will, of course, have to submit to inspections and really stop their nuclear production to receive the energy aid.

At the same time, the U.S. has signed a nuclear agreement with India. Is India going to dismantle its projects for aid? No. This agreement will provide opportunities for American companies to share and sell equipment and technology to nuclear power plants in India.

Does this make any sense to anyone? We sanction and punish and try to negotiate with one country to get them to stop nuclear power production. Then we turn around and make a trade deal with another country, a country that is not under the NPT? And we got international support for both? I can't be the only one who sees something wrong here.

North Korea has stated several times that it wants nuclear power, not nuclear weapons. But as they were sponsors of terrorism up until just a few days ago, the country can't have nuclear production facilities.

However, India, which has nuclear bombs already, can most definitely benefit from the new technologies, and probably not just in terms of enhancing their power and energy structures.

In my opinion, no one should have nuclear weapons. It is sad to think that countries feel they need bombs that can destroy the Earth just to feel safe. It's also just a little bit ridiculous. Do we really need the capabilities to blow each other up completely?

Also, I feel it's just a little bit unfair the way it seems to work in our society. North Korea and India are both members of the United Nations. Neither has signed the NPT and both have nuclear capabilities. But the difference is in their traditions, who they supported in wars and whom they stand behind now. And of course, the Korean War isn't helping matters.

But who are we to say that one country can have something with our blessing and another has to halt production to get energy aid. That seems a little bit like a bribe to me, an enticement to cooperation.

Now I'm not saying that North Korea, or any country for that matter, should have nuclear weapons. However, how can the United States tell people not to develop nuclear power or weapons when we have stockpiles ourselves? Our stockpiles are some of the largest in the world, considering how many we stockpiled during the Arms Race with Russia during the Cold War. I don't think it is right that the United States is asking people to destroy and dismantle their programs while we still have weapons stockpiled somewhere.

No country should have nuclear weapons. If our leaders feel so unsafe that they need to stockpile nuclear weapons and technologies, how can we feel safe?
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

Post by Philip »

Why are there no Indian names?I'm sure that a few would put these worthies to shame!

http://timesbusiness.typepad.com/money_ ... -10-w.html

October 16, 2008
The world's 10 wealthiest politicians

If you have been sickened by media mentions of Lord Mandelson's £2.4 million townhouse and £1 million European Union pay-off, consider that his wealth is nothing compared to the fortunes of really wealthy politicians. Even Arnold Schwarzenegger's hundreds of millions do not make our list...

1 Suleiman Kerimov - $17.5 billion

The far-right Russian senator from Dagestan struck it rich as a stakeholder in Gazprom, Russia's gas export company, and Sberbank, Eastern Europe's largest bank. Kerimov, 42, made news in 2006 when he was seriously injured after losing control of his Ferrari on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice. His passenger, Playboy covergirl Tina Kandelaki, suffered minor injuries

2 Michael Bloomberg - $11.5 billion

The 66-year-old independent mayor of New York City made his billions from sales of stockmarket-tracking systems and later the Bloomberg newswire and related services after he was fired from Salomon Brothers, the investment bank, with a $10 million severance package in 1981. He has donated more than $1.4 billion to good causes and draws $1 a year for his work as mayor

3 Serge Dassault - $9.9 billion

The French aviation mogul is a member of Nicolas Sarkozy's UMP party, a senator, and mayor of Corbeil-Essonnes in Paris. He inherited Groupe Dassault from his father Marcel, who was deported to Buchenwald concentration camp in 1944 for his refusal to collaborate with the Nazis. In 1998, Dassault Jr. was given a two-year suspended sentence for corruption in the Agusta scandal

4 Silvio Berlusconi - $9.4 billion

Italy's larger-than-life prime minister (pictured, above) is weathering the crunch well - reportedly purchasing a 30-room neo-classical villa on Lake Maggiore and doubling the size of his Villa San Martino outside Milan. The super-magnate, who owns much of the country's media and AC Milan football club, laid the foundations of his fortune as a property developer during the late 1960s

5 Aburizal Bakri - $9.2 billion

The chief welfare minister of Indonesia inherited control of the vast Bakrie Group from his father, a partisan of Suharto. He ran into controversy in 2006 when drilling by a Bakrie-controlled oil and gas outfit allegedly triggered a mudslide which displaced thousands. He has been branded the "national avatar of government by conflict of interest" in the Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus

6 Rinat Akhmetov - $7.3 billion

A member of parliament for Ukraine's opposition, Rinat Akhmetov is also his country's wealthiest tycoon, with a massive coal and steel empire. Last year he founded the Foundation for Effective Governance to support economic development in Ukraine, counting Shimon Peres, the Nobel Laureate, and Hernando de Soto, the Peruvian economist, among speakers at its launch

7 Andrei Molchanov - $4 billion

The 37-year-old construction baron is a member of Russia's upper house and the adopted son of Yury Molchanov, deputy governor of St Petersburg - himself a former university colleague of Vladimir Putin. In 2005, Molchanov Jr.'s company LSR Group controversially demolished a fine 18th century barracks in St Petersburg, after it was quietly de-listed by the city authorities

8 Gleb Fetisov - $3.9 billion

The third Russian senator on our list built his fortune trading commodities in the vast Alfa Group and remains a stakeholder in Altimo, Alfa's telcoms holding company. The latter is set for "aggressive" expansion in developing markets in Asia, such as Iran and Afghanistan. Holding a doctorate in economics from Moscow State University, Fetisov maintains a low media profile

9 Kostyantin Zhevago - $3.4 billion

A member of Ukraine's parliament and aide to prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, the 34-year-old oligarch began his career as finance director of the bank Finance & Credit at 19. He has since acquired a control of the latter's holding company and plans to take the bank public by 2010. Last week, Zhevago was forced to sell 20 per cent of his mining venture Ferrexpo to clear a loan from JP Morgan

10 Saad Hariri - $3.3 billion

The son and political heir of assassinated Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri leads the Future Movement parliamentary majority in Beirut and heads Saudi Oger, the family's Riyadh-based construction, banking and telecoms empire. The graduate of Georgetown University in Washington DC lives amid ultra-tight security and is said to enjoy Cuban cigars and scuba diving

EXTRA: Three super-rich politicians who don't make the list...

Arnold Schwarzenegger - $200 million-plus

Hank Paulson - $700 million-plus

John Kerry - $230 million-plus

More from Money Central:

Wealth figures from The World's Billionaires, Forbes, 2008
Comments
I guess these are the legitimate rich politicians. why not a list of the corrupt ones too like the Bhutto and Gandhi families in S. Asia and the African politicians

Posted by: rhmayo | 17 Oct 2008 10:36:00

Excuse me while I go throw up.....

Posted by: Andy | 17 Oct 2008 23:17:03

Why is Bush not on this list? The Bush family must be worth billions.
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

Post by renukb »

Why is Bush not on this list? The Bush family must be worth billions
Both Dick Cheney and Bush should have been there...!
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Post by renukb »

Do our rulers know enough to avoid a 1930s replay?
Events are moving with lightning speed as the global credit freeze evolves into something awfully like a classic trade-depression.

Our leaders know little more than we do, so we have to look out for our own families and our country.

Some solutions:

1. Stop buying crap and dangerous products from China.
2. Buy from British companies and Shops. Not foreign owned ones. At least that way your money stays in the UK.
3. I notice that many 'branded' household / food products sold in supermarkets are now made outside the UK. Their equivilent 'own-label' products are often made in UK. So buy those. By doing so you are helping British companies and British employees.

It has never been fashionable to be think this way, but we are now in survival mode people.
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

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http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world ... 66934.html
The unholy legacy of Pius XII

The man who presided over the Vatican during the war stands accused of turning a blind eye to the Holocaust. And his reputation is still a source of division between Catholics and Jews. Peter Popham reports from Rome

Monday, 20 October 2008

The "Pius Wars" that have long raged over the Vatican's desire to declare Pope Pius XII a saint flared up again over the weekend when the Jesuit priest in charge of the canonisation process declared that Pope Benedict XVI could not visit Israel until a disputed panel in Jerusalem's Holocaust museum, which refers disparagingly to Pius, is removed.

Pius XII, the austere, bespectacled Vatican diplomat who reigned from 1939 to 1958, has long been regarded by conservative Catholics as one of the greatest of modern popes. His claim to sainthood was opened by Pope Paul VI, "with the same sort of urgency and certainty", the Vatican journalist Robert Mickens said yesterday, "as when John Paul II opened the case for Mother Teresa".

But the Pius XII depicted in the Yad Vashem Holocaust Museum is a very different figure. Included among the "Unjust", those responsible directly or indirectly for the Holocaust, he is castigated on a large panel in the museum for his failure "to leave his palace, with crucifix high, to witness one day of pogrom". "When reports of the massacre of the Jews reached the Vatican," it goes on, "he did not react with written or verbal protests. In 1942, he did not associate himself with the condemnation of the killing of the Jews issued by the Allies. When they were deported from Rome to Auschwitz, Pius XII did not intervene."

"As long as that panel remains in the museum," Father Peter Gumpel said, "Benedict XVI cannot go to Israel because it would be a scandal for Catholics. The Catholic Church is doing everything possible to have good relations with Israel, but friendly relations can only be built if there is reciprocity."

A spokesman for the Israeli foreign ministry skirted the museum issue in his reply. "If Benedict XVI would like to visit Israel he would be a welcome and beloved guest," said Yossi Levy. "Pope Ratzinger has already been officially invited and whether he accepts or not depends entirely on his will."

But Sergio Itzhak Minervi, a former Israeli ambassador to Brussels and a historian, commented: "No moral entity, and least of all Yad Vashem, can treat these historical questions as if they were in a market, as Father Gumpel would wish: 'unless you cancel those phrases I don't come'. Let us be serious. History has need of proof, of documents, which the church would be well to show to the world."

At the crux of the dispute, as the museum caption states, is the failure of Pope Pius to make a protest of any kind, either verbally or in writing, as millions of Jews all over Europe were taken to the gas chambers. By the end of 1942, he had received reports of the ongoing murder of Jews from at least nine different countries where the Holocaust was under way, including Poland, Slovakia and Croatia. The British envoy to the Holy See, Sir D'Arcy Osborne, practically a prisoner inside the Vatican after the Nazi occupation of Rome, wrote in his diary late in 1942: "The more I think of it, the more I am revolted by Hitler's massacre of the Jewish race on the one hand, and, on the other, the Vatican's almost exclusive preoccupation with the ... possibilities of the bombardment of Rome."

By the following year, the Holocaust had arrived under the Pope's nose: in October 1943, more than 1,000 Roman Jews had been rounded up and were being processed for extermination in a military school a few hundred yards from the Pope's window. The Pope was personally warned by an Italian princess, Enza Pignatelli, who had managed to force a way into his study, about the imminent assault on the city's ancient Jewish community. "You must act immediately," she had told him. "The Germans are arresting the Jews and taking them away. Only you can stop them." He told her: "I will do all I can."

On 18 October, the day the 1,000 Jews were dispatched to Auschwitz in cattle cars, Osborne was received by the Pope. Pius remarked that "until now the Germans have always behaved correctly," respecting Vatican neutrality, but he hoped they would put more police on the streets.

Supporters of Pius claim that his silence was necessary: to protest would have exposed the church and Catholics across Europe to Nazi attack and made the Pope himself vulnerable. Thousands of Jews, they point out, were hidden and protected by individual priests and nuns. They also insist that Pius's canonisation is a purely internal matter for the Church. "For Benedict and other conservatives in the Church," says Mr Mickens, "Pius XII has for a long time been an iconic figure, a figure of reason and stability. They also like the fact that he was a staunch anti-Communist. They say that, if he had spoken out against the Nazis, he would have put even more lives in jeopardy."

But Robert Katz, author of several narrative histories of Rome during the Nazi occupation, said: "They argue that a lot of worse things would have happened if he had spoken. But what worse could have happened than did happen?"

He went on: "It's true that he did what he could to protect the Vatican, and it's true that there were many individual acts by Catholics to save Jews. But these were not ordered by the Vatican. If they made him a saint he would become a role model for Catholics worldwide. His deeds would be singled out for imitation and veneration; virtue would be found in a passivity that was sometimes indistinguishable from complicity before the acts of perpetrators of crimes against humanity."

The new row over Pius emerges exactly 50 years after his death. "His supporters are extremely frustrated," said Mr Mickens. "They were hoping that his canonisation would have happened by that anniversary." Instead even Pope Benedict, one of Pius's ardent admirers, is now calling for a truce. The issue of the museum caption was "important but not decisive," said his spokesman, Father Federico Lombardi. And regarding Pius's canonisation, the Pope "maintains that a period of deeper study and reflection is opportune."
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

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NATO reaches into the Indian Ocean
The NATO deployment has already had some curious fallout. In an interesting coincidence, on October 16, just as the NATO force was reaching the Persian Gulf, an Indian Defense Ministry spokesman announced in New Delhi, "The [Indian] government today approved deployment of an Indian naval warship in the Gulf of Aden to patrol the normal route followed by Indian-flagged ships during passage between Salalah in Oman and Aden in Yemen. "The patrolling is commencing immediately."

The timing seems deliberate. Media reports indicated that the government had been working on this decision for several months. Like NATO, Delhi also acted fast when the time came, and an Indian ship has already set sail. Delhi initially briefed the media that the deployment came in the wake of an incident of Somali pirates hijacking a Japanese-owned merchant vessel on August 15, which had 18 Indians on board. But later, it backtracked and gave a broader connotation, saying, "However, the current decision to patrol African waters is not directly related [to the incident in August]."

The Indian statement said, "The presence of an Indian navy warship in this area will be significant as the Gulf of Aden is a major strategic choke point in the Indian Ocean region and provides access to the Suez Canal through which a sizeable portion of India's trade flows."

Indian officials said the warship would work in cooperation with the Western navies deployed in the region and would be supplemented with a larger force if need and that it would be well equipped. But Delhi obfuscated the fact that the Western deployment will be under the NATO flag and any cooperation with the Western navies will involve the Western alliance. Given the traditional Indian policy to steer clear of military blocs, Delhi is understandably sensitive.

Clearly, the Indian warship will eventually have to work in tandem with the NATO naval force. This will be the first time that the Indian armed forces will be working shoulder-to-shoulder with NATO forces in actual operations in territorial or international waters.

The operations hold the potential to shift India's ties with NATO to a qualitatively new level. The US has been encouraging India to forge ties with NATO as well as play a bigger role in maritime security affairs. The two countries have a bilateral protocol relating to cooperation in maritime security, which was signed in 2006. It says at the outset, "Consistent with their global strategic partnership and the new framework for their defense relationship, India and the United States committed themselves to comprehensive cooperation in ensuring a secure maritime domain. In doing so, they pledged to work together, and with other regional partners as necessary."

The Indian Navy command has been raring to go in the direction of close partnership with the US Navy in undertaking security responsibilities far beyond its territorial waters. The two navies have instituted an annual large-scale annual exercise in the Indian Ocean - the Malabar exercises. This year's exercises are currently under way along India's western coast.
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China's silent dominance in Russia
http://www.upiasia.com/Politics/2008/10 ... ssia/4198/
By 2015, it is estimated that up to 20 million Chinese will reside in Russia, more than half of whom will be in the unpopulated reaches of Siberia. What the Japanese failed to achieve in the last century may now be accomplished by the Chinese – which is, to take effective control of Siberia away from Moscow. Already, well-funded "indigenous" organizations sprouting in the territories are calling for the rollback of Moscow's control, while much of the real estate and many businesses on the Sino-Russian border are in Chinese hands, even on the Russian side.

Some Russian analysts have been calling for migration from India as a counter to the Chinese influx, but pro-China elements in the Russian administration have thus far managed to prevent such a policy from being implemented. Although Moscow has a long way to go before the density of Chinese agents of influence there reaches the saturation levels of Taipei and Washington, the number of officials and academics who toe the Beijing line is increasing every year. The China lobby is today by far the most powerful in Russia, dwarfing the once-muscular U.S. lobby.
However, change may be ahead. Several Russian analysts are concerned at the way in which their country has become subservient to the geopolitical needs of China – often being used as a battering ram against the West, while China plays the good cop – and are once again turning to India. In turn, New Delhi has come to accept that a revival of the once-close partnership between Russia and India is key to ensuring that the country is not smothered by China.

The coming visit by year-end of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev is expected to rekindle an alliance that was once the closest that either New Delhi or Moscow had with another country. Should such an outcome take place, there may be a pause and possibly a rollback of the People’s Republic of China’s overwhelming dominance in Russia.
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Beijing pays little heed to rhetoric in U.S.
Sees stable ties after election

Chris O'Brien
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/200 ... ric-in-us/

BEIJING | The U.S. presidential race traditionally has been a time for tough talk on China, and a period of unease for the Chinese leadership as it waits to see whether words become actions.

On the campaign trail in 1980, Ronald Reagan called for re-establishing an "official governmental relationship" with Taiwan just a year after the U.S. had switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing from Taipei.

Candidate Bill Clinton promised in 1992 to put human rights before trade when dealing with the "butchers of Beijing." George W. Bush took office in 2001 after pledging to treat China as a "strategic competitor."

This time around, the China issue has taken a back seat. That reflects both the stable nature of U.S.-China relations and the country's growing role in the world economy, a feeling reinforced by the current financial crisis.

"The Chinese are quite confident that the U.S. need for cooperation with China will remain strong, and probably increase," no matter who is the next president, said Bonnie Glaser, of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In a clear sign of Beijing's importance, the Bush administration has invited China to attend a summit of 20 nations in Washington on Nov. 15 to discuss the financial crisis.

In addition, Beijing this week is hosting a summit of 16 Asian countries and the 27-member European Union.

"It's very simple," European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso told reporters here Thursday. "We sink together or we swim together."

China's low profile in the campaign between Barack Obama and John McCain reflects the stability of relations, which have been curving upward since 2001, said Wu Xinbo, deputy director for the Center of American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai.

"The relationship is stable and quite cooperative in many ways," Mr. Wu said. "It's not perfect ... but compared with the start of the Bush administration, relations have progressed beyond expectations."
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U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Russia, China for Supplies to Iran
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= ... E&refer=us


By Greg Walters

Oct. 24 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. government imposed sanctions on Russian, Chinese and Venezuelan companies for supplying what it said were materials used in making weapons of mass destruction to Iran, North Korea and Syria.

Companies including Russian state arms exporter Rosoboronexport and the China Shipbuilding & Offshore International Corp. were barred from entering into contracts with the U.S. government, according to a document posted on the Web site of the U.S. Federal Register and dated yesterday.

``A determination has been made that 13 foreign persons have engaged in activities that warrant the imposition of measures pursuant to Section 3 of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act,'' the U.S. government said in the statement.

Sanctions against Rosoboronexport violate international law and will impact relations between Russia and the U.S., Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in remarks broadcast by state television.

To contact the reporter on this story: Greg Walters in Moscow gwalters1@bloomberg.net



Russia says U.S. sanctions will hit ties
Fri 24 Oct 2008, 10:07 GMT

http://africa.reuters.com/wire/news/usnLO490356.html

Adds Russian comments, changes dateline to MOSCOW)

By Guy Faulconbridge

MOSCOW, Oct 24 (Reuters) - Russia accused Washington on Friday of breaking international law and undermining cooperation on Iran's nuclear programme after it imposed sanctions on companies accused of passing sensitive technology to Tehran.

The U.S. State Department said on an official website it had imposed sanctions on firms in China and Russia for alleged sales of sensitive technology that could help Iran, North Korea and Syria develop weapons of mass destruction or missile systems.

"These new sanctions were introduced without any international legal foundation whatsoever," Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said.

"We will take this into account in our affairs, in our relations with the United States," he was quoted as saying by Interfax news agency.

He also said the U.S. move would undermine Russian cooperation over Iran's nuclear programme, which Washington suspects is aimed at making a nuclear bomb.

"If it seemed to someone in Washington that in this way the USA can make Russia more compliant in accepting American ways of resolving the Iranian nuclear problem, then they are mistaken," Lavrov said.


Tehran says its nuclear programme is for civilian purposes only. Russia has given limited backing to U.N. sanctions against Iran over its nuclear programme, but says there is no evidence Iran is seeking nuclear weapons.

A document published on the U.S. Federal Register http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/ (page 63226) said the sanctions would be effective from Oct 23.

It was first reported by Russian news agencies. A State Department spokesman was not immediately available for comment.

Under the sanctions, which usually last two years, no U.S. government agency may enter into any agreement with the organisations named.

Sanctions were imposed on 13 organisations, including China Xinshidai Company, China Shipbuilding and Offshore International Corporation, Huazhong CNC as well as Russian state arms exporter Rosoboronexport and the Venezuelan Military Industries Company.

The United States imposed sanctions in 2006 on Rosoboronexport, now a unit of Russian industrial group Russian Technologies, provoking sharp criticism from Moscow.

Russian Technologies is headed by Sergei Chemezov, a close ally of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Russian Technologies also has stakes in AvtoVAZ, Russia's top carmaker, and VSMPO-Avisma, the world's largest titanium producer.

A spokesman for Rosoboronexport said on Russian television the State Department's measures were "a case of unscrupulous competition," by the United States and that the firm worked in line with all international agreements on arms control. (Additional reporting by Todd Eastham) (Reporting by Guy Faulconbridge, editing by Myra MacDonald)
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http://mnweekly.ru/business/20081024/55352603.html

Big Gas Troika
> print version
We are sitting on the edge of a new world order these days. The possibility, which for several years has been a subject of fears, gossip and speculation, is finally becoming reality. The world's three largest natural gas nations - Russia, Iran and Qatar - which together control 60 percent of global gas reserves, agreed to strengthen cooperation. Meanwhile, Tehran said there was consensus to set up an OPEC-style group.


Russia's gas export monopoly Gaz­prom said it had agreed with Iran and Qatar to form a "big gas troika" and that it should become a permanent body complete with forums. Gazprom chairman Alexei Miller did not refer to OPEC in his speech. This was done by Iran's Oil Minister Gholamhossein Nozari, who said after the meeting with his colleagues: "There is a demand to form this gas OPEC and there is a consensus to set up a gas OPEC." Gazprom, which is the world's largest natural gas exporter, has been trying to downplay the potential "danger" that the European countries in particular may perceive in this arrangement. "Surely this gathering of gas exporting countries is to give assurances over gas supply to the world," Alexei Miller said, adding: "We have a common vision of the goals of the forum and the need to transform it into a permanent organization as quickly as possible to serve the goals of stable and reliable energy supplies in the world." This did not prevent Miller from adding: "We share the opinion that oil price fluctuations don't put in question the fundamental thesis stating that the era of cheap hydrocarbons has come to an end."

There has already been some reaction to the announcement from the European Commission and the European press. Europe currently imports almost half of its gas supplies from Russia with another sizable chunk coming from Algeria, which also has special relations with Gaz­prom. And while European observers discount Nozari's announcement of a gas OPEC, because they don't believe in production quotas of the sort used by OPEC, they are fearful of another thing - Russia, Iran and Qatar exchanging information about prices, production schedules and investment plans. The European Commission has already announced that it will oppose the creation of any structure that will restrict competition. "The European Commission feels that energy supplies have to be sold in a free market," said its spokesman, Ferran Tarradellas Espuny.

The most interesting question, of course, is qui prodest? Who profits more from this arrangement? Iran, whose current energy infrastructure is so bad that it is forced to import natural gas from Turkmenistan? Iran has been the driving force behind the gas OPEC move, working relentlessly to convince the others. Or is it Russia that will have a chance to somehow control its eager colleagues who are looking for their share of the European market? Russia has been very cautious about putting its name on anything that may once again raise suspicions of unfair play on its part, but it has finally given in, which means the deal sounded lucrative enough to risk the western resentment. Qatar is mostly along for the ride in this case, just by virtue of its largely untapped reserves. The talk of "no more cheap gas" aside, it seems to me that Russia may have been forced to put its name on the list in the spirit of: "If you can't beat them, join them". The move to establish organization of gas producers is more about trying to preserve Russia's share of the European market than about trying to really squeeze hard on the clients. Whether or not Europe wants Russia to have such share of its market is a different issue, but it may be that it's too late to think of that now. The European politicians missed their chance to push Russia out by becoming friendly with Iran and by investing in this country's gas producing infrastructure. This could produce the desired results in the period of several years. But while the Europeans sought to avoid confrontations with the U.S., which views Iran as a part of the "axis of evil," Russia befriended Teheran, even though this friendship is at times uncomfortable. The gas troika is all about reaping the benefits of this friendship - and keeping the cash flow from gas exports alive and well. Tough for the Europeans, but it's a dog-eat-dog world out there. ■

By Marina Pustilnik
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What Georgians say about Russia
The Realist Resurgence
http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?opti ... Itemid=132
Russia is weaker than it looks, which is why NATO's soft-power strategy can still prevail.
Christopher Dickey, John Barry and Owen Matthews
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http://www.upiasia.com/Security/2008/10 ... mies/3728/

China’s prime potential enemies
By Andrei Chang
Column: Military Might


Hong Kong, China —
China’s military preparedness and strategic deployment of weaponry take into consideration a whole range of potential enemies, an analysis of internal People’s Liberation Army documents has revealed.

In order of importance – that is, the likelihood of actual military engagement – those enemies are Taiwan, the United States and Japan (as potential defenders of Taiwan), India, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, Russia and NATO.

Chinese military journals consistently criticize the United States for seeking to isolate and contain China. The PLA’s indignation and frustration over this perceived U.S. interference is a reflection of its ambition to become a global hegemon, or at least a regional one.

As evidence of U.S. hostility, the military journals cite Washington’s sales of arms to Taiwan, its military alliance with Japan, its support of NATO’s eastward expansion, the stationing of a permanent force in Afghanistan, the expansion of its nuclear arsenal and its influence in restricting European arms sales to China. The journals claim that these U.S. actions all pose a direct or indirect threat to China’s national security.

As for Japan, despite warmer political relations between the two countries in recent months, there are two prickly issues that will not be easily resolved. One is the territorial fight over the Diaoyutai Islands – which Japan calls the Senkakus – and the other is the dispute over the exact location of the border in the East China Sea, in the midst of rich oil and gas reserves that both sides claim.

For now the two sides are working together to develop these resources, but the lack of a legally defined border makes the situation unpredictable. Also, China remains highly wary of any Japanese steps to strengthen its military.

On the Indian front, mistrust between the two countries has become more heated. New Delhi is wary of China’s increased deployment of ballistic missiles aimed at India, the activities of the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean, and China’s intentions with regard to territorial disputes.

On the other hand, China is also keeping an eye on India’s active development of its Flame III intermediate-range ballistic missile, the activities of the Indian navy in the South China Sea, and India’s constantly changing attitude with regard to border disputes.


Differences between China and Vietnam focus on disputed maritime territories. At the same time, China is watching closely Vietnam’s rapprochement to India and the United States.

As for ASEAN countries, they too have disputes with China over territories at sea. China thinks it will eventually recapture the Nansha Islands – better known as the Spratlys – located between Vietnam and the Philippines and claimed by both, as well as by China. The area is a rich fishing ground and may also contain oil and gas. There may one day be a struggle over ownership of these islands.

In the midst of these disputes, since the mid-1990s Chinese military strategists have focused on one key issue – the economic, political and national security benefits of expanding the military and centralizing all forces to “solve the Taiwan issue.” Their position was that after Taiwan was reunited with the mainland, there would be additional economic benefits and national security gains resulting from the military build-up.

One argument held that the South China Sea disputes could be easily resolved when the time was right. Toward that end, there was a need to develop major maritime combat platforms, including an aircraft carrier.

As far as Russia is concerned, China is concerned about the resurgence of extreme nationalism within Russia, which could lead to territorial demands on China.

China is also constantly worried about NATO’s eastward expansion. The existence of NATO forces in neighboring countries would undermine its border security.

Against this background of regional tensions, improved relations across the Taiwan Strait are not reason enough for the PLA to relax its level of preparedness. All of the issues outlined above have frequently been discussed in numerous military and diplomatic documents over the past 10 years.

China’s development and deployment of military equipment corresponds to all the conflict scenarios it foresees. First, priority attention has been placed on the development of combat equipment related to the air force, navy and landing operations, all of which are directed at Taiwan.

Second, in response to possible intervention by U.S. forces, China has actively developed and deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, anti-satellite weapons, space warfare capabilities, and ballistic-missile and attack submarines.

Third, to cope with frontlines in Vietnam and India, China has developed mountain warfare armored vehicles and medium- and short-range ballistic missiles. An upgraded IRBM is now deployed in Yunnan province, which borders Vietnam.

Fourth, in the direction of Japan, the PLA has deployed DF-3A IRBMs in coastal Shandong province and reinforced the combat capabilities of its No.19 Division based in that region.

Fifth, with an eye to Southeast Asia and India, a large submarine base has been established on Hainan Island and electronic surveillance stations set up on the Xisha Islands in the South China Sea at China’s southern tip.

Sixth, in response to the presence of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, China has sped up the deployment of HQ-9 long-range ground-to-air missiles in major metropolitan centers and strengthened its No. 6 Fighter Division in the Lanzhou Military Region of central China. In the direction of Russia, China is now actively developing and upgrading new main battle tanks and armored vehicles.

Given the need to cover all the scenarios described above, it is likely that China’s military spending will continue to rise, with the 2009 military budget reflecting at least a 10 percent increase over this year.

Some equipment intended for combat operations against Taiwan will be replaced, and there will be some adjustments in the deployment of this equipment. The pressure to maintain a vigilant “military deterrence” against Taiwan is expected to continue.

It is worth noting, however, that with the warming of cross-strait relations and the balance of military power in the Taiwan Strait already tilted in China’s favor, the PLA will likely focus its military build-up in other directions, particularly in the upgrading of long-range military projection capability.

Close attention should be paid to China’s building of a new aircraft carrier fleet, its development and deployment of more ICBMs, SSBNs, new bombers and new-generation fighters. The Chinese military industry will also take this opportunity to put greater effort and expenditure into upgrading and expanding its research for the development of new weapons systems.

--

(Andrei Chang is editor-in-chief of Kanwa Defense Review Monthly, registered in Toronto, Canada.)
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No plans to attack Poland, says Russia

http://www.polskieradio.pl/thenews/fore ... /?id=94008

Created: 20.10.2008 16:23
Russia’s deputy prime minister, Sergei Ivanov, tells a BBC TV programme tonight that Moscow has no plans to attack Poland or any other country in the region.

“We are not going to start a war or attack any country. Right now, in fact, Russia isn’t fighting any war at all. If you analyse how many wars the United States and Britain are fighting, it’s quite different,” he tells the Panorama programme.

“In a few years a new military threat will be very close to our borders. But that doesn’t mean, of course, that we are planning a nuclear attack on the Czech Republic or Poland. That’s total rubbish.”

He was responding to questioning about a Russian general’s comments that Warsaw and Prague are “now targets ”after both capitals finalised, earlier this year, a deal to house the US anti-missile system.”

Ivanov did state that “there would be a reaction” to the placing of the missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Russia announced at the weekend that it will be boosting its nuclear deterrent by building its own anti-missile system.

"We plan to start serial production of warships, primarily nuclear-powered submarines carrying cruise missiles and multifunctional submarines, We will develop an aerospace defence system, as well," said Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev. (pg)
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Russia blasts off back to the future

Published Date: 26 October 2008
By Thom Shanker
AS THEY tracked Russian military manoeuvres last week, the US government's Kremlin-watchers might have been forgiven for wondering if they were seeing recycled newsreels.


http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/wo ... 4630357.jp

There was no specified enemy, but the Russian forces appeared to be enacting a nationwide effort to quell unrest along Russia's southern border – and to repulse a US-led attack by Nato forces, according to experts in Moscow and Washington.

In a grim finale, commanders launched three intercontinental ballistic missiles, the type that can carry multiple nuclear warheads. It was a clear signal of the drastic endgame the Kremlin might consider should its conventional forces not hold. One of the missiles flew more than 7,100 miles, allowing Russian officials to claim they had set a distance record.

If these images of Russian power projection appeared drawn from the dark decades of Dr Strangelove, the response from Washington was anything but. Defence secretary Robert Gates and admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, provided the same sanguine reply, echoed down through the ranks of government analysts who have spent years reading Russian military journals and scrutinising classified satellite photographs.

The Russian military fell to Third World standards from neglect and budget cuts in the turbulent years when Boris Yeltsin was president, they say. The new Kremlin leadership is working to create a force that can actually defend the nation's interests.

The military has embarked upon a programme to buy modern weapons, improve training and healthcare for troops, trim a bloated officer corps and create the first professional class of sergeant-level, small-unit leaders since the Second World War.


That is not to say that the US will stop judging Russian behaviour in light of what it considers a clumsy, ill-advised invasion of the former Soviet republic of Georgia.

Yet policymakers also say the Kremlin's efforts at military modernisation should not prevent co-operation on mutual concerns, including countering terrorism and halting nuclear proliferation.

Even a high-profile speech last month by President Dmitry Medvedev, ordering a military modernisation programme and the largest increases in defence spending since the death of the old USSR, was viewed in Washington as short on substance and designed more for a domestic political agenda.

Medvedev declared that, by 2020, Russia would construct new types of warships and an unspecified air and space defence system. Military spending, he said, will leap 26% next year, bringing it to 1.3 trillion rubles (about £30bn), its highest level since the collapse of the Soviet Union – but still a fraction of US military spending.

American experts were unimpressed. "Russia is prone to make fairly grandiose announcements about its military," said a defence department official. "These programmes have long been in the works. They are not new plans."

Even so, analysts of Russian military affairs acknowledge that a military renaissance would allow the Moscow leadership to increase political pressure on former Soviet republics, as well as former Warsaw Pact allies that embraced Nato after the collapse of communism.

"What the Russian leadership has discovered is proof of an old maxim: that a foreign policy without a credible military is no foreign policy," said Dale Herspring, a scholar on Russian military affairs at Kansas State University.

Some of the steps undertaken to wrench the Russian military out of mediocrity resemble changes in the American military over several decades.

Russia plans for its ground forces to move to a system designed for the deployment of brigades, rather than bulkier division or corps headquarters – nearly copying the US army's approach.

The Russian military also plans to offer pay and housing incentives to attract noncommissioned officers – the valuable class of sergeants – to make a long-term career of military service. The plan would shift Russia further from reliance on one-year conscripts, who are not in uniform long enough to master even basic skills.

The Russian general staff will be trimmed to 900 from the current 1,100. But in an acknowledgment that the general officer corps can slow the pace of change throughout the military, most of those reductions will occur through retirement.

The Kremlin knows that its military bureaucracy is riddled with corruption. Experts in Washington say that audits ordered after Vladimir Putin took over from Yeltsin in 2000 found that 40% of the budget for some weapons programmes and salaries was lost to theft and waste. The new defence minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, was a surprise choice, given that he had no military background but was an expert in finance and taxes. As he moved to clean house across the military-industrial complex, the reason for his selection became clear.

Analysts of Kremlin affairs note that a central risk to Russian military reform might not be foreign armies but the current economic collapse, which has seen a plummeting of oil prices, robbing Russia of profits earmarked for upgrading the armed forces. An irony is emerging. One central cause of the Soviet collapse was that the USSR's centrally planned, calcified economy simply could not support the Kremlin's superpower military ambitions. If oil prices continue to drop, Medvedev and Putin may be faced with the same economic limits on their military plans.
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Russia faces possible future threats in Asia
From UPI.com

MOSCOW, Oct. 22 (UPI) -- The Russian navy has 14 strategic missile submarines, including six Project 667-BDRM submarines with 92 R-29RM Sineva (NATO designation SSN-24) submarine-launched ballistic missiles and two Project 667-BDR submarines operated by the Northern Fleet. The Pacific Fleet has four more Project 667-BDR submarines.

The six Project 667-BDR submarines carry 81 R-29R Skif (NATO designation SSN-23) submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The Russian air force has 15 Tupolev Tu-160 (NATO designation Blackjack) and 64 Tupolev Tu-95MS (NATO designation Bear) strategic bombers carrying 884 nuclear-tipped X-55 cruise missiles -- ALCMs.

However, ballistic and cruise missiles cannot be used against such adventurist and aggressive governments as the incumbent Georgian leadership. Reinforced general-purpose and rapid-deployment brigades are the most effective option for repelling conventional invasions and fighting insurgents and international terrorist units.

Russia also faces other threats, including those posed by al-Qaida and the Taliban movement. U.S., NATO and Afghan units continue to fight them more or less effectively. But the Taliban could move to the north, if they seize power in Kabul and Islamabad, as was almost the case at the beginning of the century.

In this scenario, operational rapid-deployment brigades of the Central Asian states, members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization now holding regular exercises, could effectively repel their aggression with the help of other brigades that would be transferred to the region.

Military analysts are also worried about the long-term strategy on the Russian-Chinese border.

Moscow and Beijing have settled disagreements that could lead to conflict. The two countries have no current territorial claims against each other and are not divided by ideology. They have signed the relevant bilateral documents and maintain partner-like, friendly and almost allied relations.

Although current relations are good, nobody knows what could happen in the next 20 to 30 years after younger and more unpredictable Chinese leaders, not concerned with a cordial bilateral relationship, take over.

Under this concern, Russia would have to deploy strategic nuclear weapons and large military formations in order to counter a hypothetical Chinese threat. Military analysts do not like plans to disband divisions and armies because it would be very hard to reinstate them in case of crisis and because Russia could suffer grievously if attacked.

Moscow should assess all possible consequences and find ways of coping with future problems.

Analysts say Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov's reforms were not approved by the Russian Security Council, the State Duma or the Federation Council -- the lower and upper houses of the Russian parliament -- and that there was no prior discussion involving the military and the public at large.

Although Serdyukov claims that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev supports the reforms, such crucial decisions should not be adopted at the departmental level. Defense ministers come and go, but the future of long-term army reform should not depend on their whims.

--

(Nikita Petrov is a Russian military commentator. This article is reprinted by permission of RIA Novosti. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.)

--

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
ramana
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

Post by ramana »

What did the Greeks do? Or is India getting into the intra Church fights?
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

Post by Rye »

Greece is part of EU, isn't it? Maybe that has something to do with it.
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

Post by svinayak »

Suspicions mar US-China relations


The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been spoken about in great detail during the US election campaign so far. But it seems military threats from other sources are still of great concern to US voters.

A recent survey conducted by the Financial Times found that China was the country that most Americans perceived as a potential military threat.

In the first of a special series on ties between the US and China, Tony Cheng traveled to the US state of Hawaii to examine relations between these two military giants.

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/ameri ... 68738.html
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

Post by Johann »

Ramana,

Both the Greeks and the Macedonians are Orthodox.

Rye,

The EU tends to defer to the Greeks on the Macedonian business, but it isnt exactly an external EU priority. India' decision will be taken by the Greeks as a defeat. I have no idea why India chose to make the change.
ramana
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

Post by ramana »

Thanks Johann. I thought the Macedonians are different. Wonder why India did this? What is th US position on Macedonia?

The logic not recognizing Macedonia by India was two fold: The use of a province (Greek province) name as a state name(Macedonia break away region of Yugoslavia/Serbia) could lead to centrifugal movements and lead to similar moves elsewhere (J&K). And then there is the sympathy/support for Greeks due to Archibishop Makarios of Cyprus.
So either J&K has settled down or there is some unknown alignment going on or Greece has done something to upset the applecart.
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

Post by Johann »

Ramana,

In doing this India is following the lead of every member of the P-5 with the exception of France.

In situations where it has no direct stake the GoI seems to follow the lead of other major powers.

I dont think its a dig at the Greeks - after all both the US and Russia have very close relationship with the Greeks and yet differ with them on the Macedonian thing.

p.s. The Macedonians are Orthodox Slavs, but they do have a significant (largely Muslim) Albanian minority
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

Post by renukb »

Three Steps to Stop Putin . . . Before It Is Too Late
http://www.aei.org/publications/filter. ... detail.asp
Western opposition to Russia's recent aggressive behavior should not rest on a desire to "punish" Russia, but on the critical need to brace Moscow before its behavior becomes even more unacceptable.
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

Post by svinayak »

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/world ... ussia.html

Russia Seeks to Trade Oil for Loans From China
renukb
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

Post by renukb »

As the US public is dimly aware, things are not going very well in Afghanistan.

The most recent United Nation situation map for Afghanistan issued September 3 paints a grim picture: there are large swaths of the country where things are getting worse. This includes the entire area surrounding Kandahar on the Pakistan border in the south, as well as areas on the Pakistan-Tajikistan border in the northeast and other areas on the Turkmenistan border to the northwest.

Despite the deterioration of security in the Afghan countryside - illustrated by the recent massacre of 24 bus passengers by the Taliban on a major highway in Helmand province - a Taliban reconquest of Afghanistan is unlikely. (See Death stalks the highway to hell, Asia Times Online, October 24, 2008)


More ....here.........
Page 1 of 3
'We're not going to win this war'
By China Hand


http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JJ30Df02.html
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

Post by renukb »

Choose your enemy: Moscow or Teheran
By AMNON RUBINSTEIN


http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite? ... 2FShowFull


Whoever is elected US president next month will have to take a vital decision on how to deal with two clear and present crises: an imminent-nuclear Iran and an ebullient, post-Georgia Russia. The two issues are clearly interconnected: Russia under Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev will not allow - and will even thwart - effective UN sanctions against Iran until differences with a US-led alliance are remedied and the past East-West understanding is restored. That this interdependence affects the future of Israel and the entire Middle-East is also manifestly clear.

Simply put, the next president of the United States will have to decide whether to jeopardize the isolation of the Iranian regime or somehow placate the Russians by, among other things, mothballing the idea of expanding NATO to include Ukraine and Georgia. This is the old realpolitik dilemma: choosing between two unpalatable alternatives and opting for the lesser of two evils.

Which is the lesser evil? A buoyant power- and influence-craving Russia, waving its big fossil-fuel stick, is an unpleasant sight which many observers thought would not arise from its communist grave. However, a rejuvenated, cocky Russia does not pose an existential threat to the West. No one seriously suggests that if Ukraine is not included in NATO, Russia will invade it. The "near-abroad" region is seen by Russian hawks as part of their natural sphere of influence - but not as part of a renewed Moscow-controlled empire.

Russia may be difficult to handle, but it is not by all accounts, the ogre of the Cold War era.

ON THE other hand, a nuclear Iran will severely endanger the stability of the Middle East, encouraging non-Shi'ite states to follow suit, whereby the entire Middle East - that volatile half-crazed part of the globe - would go nuclear.

A nuclear Iran - with its old-new unambiguous imperialistic aspirations - may unhinge the Trans-Caucasus half-Moslem new republics born out of the former Soviet Union. It could also have a negative impact - to put it mildly - on the substantial Muslim communities in Western Europe, seeking to incite them against their Crusader "oppressors" - i.e. their host states.

In short, Iran, unlike Russia, poses a real threat to the peace, stability and welfare of many countries and to the very existence of the State of Israel. Moreover, the future prosperity and democracy of independent Ukraine and Georgia can be enhanced even without their incorporation into NATO, through membership in the European Union and through development of trade and cultural relations, as demonstrated recently in the EU-Ukraine summit in Kiev.

No such alternative exists with regard to fundamentalist, fanatic and reclusive Iran. It is clear that the Iranian regime cannot be placated by favorable trade policies and economic incentives.

Of the two crises, it is clear which poses a greater threat to the interests of the United States and the West. The message is plain: Russia is wrong about NATO. NATO is indeed a defensive pact among nations, which by international law and moral conventions Ukraine and Georgia have every right to join. But given the constraints of reality, the next American president would be well advised to give up this legitimate initiative in order to seek the crucially vital entente with Russia, without which a nuclear, imperialistic Iran will almost certainly materialize in short order.

The writer is a professor of law at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, a former minister of education and MK, as well as the recipient of the 2006 Israel Prize in Law.
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

Post by Dilbu »

Falling oil production 'is greater threat to Britain than terrorism'
This excuse of economic situation being bigger threat than terrorism will do a lot of rounds in US and EU capitals now on. The population had been brainwashed to think there is no threat more than terrorism since a few years through media control. Now to justify the cut in military expenses and may be even backing off from WOT, they have to ram this excuse in to the minds of the people. Economics is such a bytch.
ramana
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Re: Geopolitical thread - 15

Post by ramana »

Indian elite should rethink the current equations of power and start looking at the emergence of other players than the traditional West.
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