ISI-History and Discussions

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 12 Aug 2008 06:59

This post from mainstream ties ISI, Great Game and everything else! And its written in 1995.

Mainstream, Vol XLVI No 30
India’s Stake in Afghanistan

Wednesday 16 July 2008, by From NC’s Writings

In the last two years, there has been non-stop coverage in the media and in the diplomatic circles about Bosnia, but very little about the happenings in Afghanistan. From the angle of ethnic conflict, both represent a dimension which needs to be fully grasped while from the strategic point of view, Afghanistan’s historical importance is unmatched.

For a century-and-a-half, Afghanistan has been the battleground of rival Great Powers, so much so that the moves and the counter-moves between Russia and Britain had come to be known as the Great Game. Diplomatic, political and military moves on the part of London and St Petersburg converged, to a considerable extent, upon Afghanistan. And both these great powers of the time had designs to capture Afghanistan, at least so manage that the country did not come under its rival. The British made three military attempts to capture Afghanistan, but failed as they could not overcome the fierce spirit of autonomy on the part of the major tribes which refused to permit any power to dominate over their country. For both, Afghanistan was the key area. Whoever conquered Afghanistan, the road to Delhi would be open. And on the other side, from Kabul to Tashkent and beyond, into the heart of the Czarist Empire would have been open.

When the Czarist Empire fell in 1917 and the Bolsheviks under Lenin captured power, the importance of Afghanistan did not diminish. The British, as the leading imperial power at the time, played the foremost role in the protracted war of intervention waged by the Western powers together against the new Soviet state as part of the crusade against Communism. Operations, both open and sub rosa, against the arrival of the Bolshevik power into Central Asia was conducted mainly from Delhi, at that time and key regional base of Britain’s imperial exploits raging all the way from Suez to Shanghai. Well-known figures in the Political Department of the Raj in Delhi like Sir Francis Younghusband, Col. Bailey and Sir Olaf Caroe all worked from their base in India. For Afghanistan, particularly active was Sir Olaf Caroe, as his interventions were directed against Central Asia where he stirred up the regional tribal leaders and mullahs against the new regime in Moscow. It may be worth recalling that one of Caroe’s trusted lieutenants was Iskander Mirza, who later on overthrow the democratic regime in Pakistan in the late fifties and established the military dictatorship. Incidentally, Caroe dedicated his book on Pathans to Iskander Mirza.

At the end of World War II, when the British had to quit the subcontinent and the independent states of India and Pakistan were formed, the Great Game took a new turn. The British openly admitted their inability to lead the Great Game against the Soviet Union. In the international sphere, London openly became the subservient junior partner of Washington. Sir Olaf Caroe personally went to Washington and handed over his entire dossier on Central Asia to the US authorities, as by the terms of the Cold War, the leadership role of the anti-Soviet coalition passed on to the USA.

It was in this changed context that the importance of Pakistan became crucial in the geo-strategic map of the US. President Eisenhower offered the Mutual Security Pact to Pakistan in 1954—a landmark for which Nehru accused the USA for bringing the Cold War to this part of the world. Followed Pakistan’s participation in CENTO and SEATO. The military alliances of the USA had their domestic impact. Within two years of the 1954 military accord with the US, Pakistan witnessed the end of its First Republic and the military takeover, first under Iskander Mirza, followed by General Ayub Khan.

It is important to note here that more than any alliance on the civilian side, the link-up between the Pentagon and the CIA on one side and the Pakistan military junta on the other became an abiding feature of this relationship. And for its external operations, the responsibility was mainly placed on the so-called Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan which has throughout been working as an extended arm of the Pentagon and the CIA, an arrangement which has by no means ceased with the end of the Cold War or been affected by the vagaries of the US-Pak relations on the political front.

Pakistan’s importance in the US geo-strategic map was enhanced with the worsening crisis in Afghanistan. After three years of hide-and-seek within the political spectrum of Afghanistan, the two superpowers came out openly for the capture of the country itself. The Soviet military intervention into Afghanistan in December 1979 immediately touched off the US counter-move. Brezezinski as the head of President Carter’s National Security outfit rushed to Pakistan and went up to the Afghan border and instantly decided on a massive supply of arms and financial aid to Pakistan on the plea of building up resistance to the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. The Afghan mujahideen groups were stationed in Pakistan, and the ISI took charge of training and directing the armed Afghan guerillas with the full backing of the USA. It was in this period during General Ziaul Haq’s presidency that the ISI as the extended arm of Washington was really consolidated as a parallel autonomous establishment to the Pakistan Government.

One of the first signs of the end of the Cold War could be seen in Afghanistan when the Russian troops pulled out in 1989. Then came the real test of the ISI. A smooth take-over by a mujahideen coalition did not follow. To cut the story short, the situation became precarious as diverse contending tribal coalitions ranged against one another. The American dream of a subservient Afghanistan acting as its intelligence-cum-intervention station against the turbulence in Central Asia with the collapse of the USSR has not materialised, nor can Afghanistan today be regarded as a convenient base for US operations against Iran, which is today Washington’s Number One target in the Gulf region.

The ISI calculations that its trusted forces under Hekmatyar would be able to capture power in Kabul ended up in a fiasco. So, a new regrouping of ISI-led forces has taken place under the brand name of Taliban. It is the ISI-directed Taliban which has been carrying on a full-scale war against the mujahideen leader Rabbani’s government in Kabul. Even if Rabbani’s forces fall, the Taliban can hardly take over the entire Afghanistan, as the forces in the North and the West would not permit a regime which depended on Pakistan.

It is the present phase of the Afghan war, which directly brings out the commonality of interests between India and Afghanistan. It is now widely acknowledged in India and abroad that the armed secessionism in Kashmir is being directed by the ISI, more than any other elements in Pakistan. And it is the same ISI which is directing the Taliban operation against the government in Kabul. If the ISI wins in Afghanistan, it will have more effective political control within Pakistan and its military intervention in the Kashmir Valley will be stepped up. Therefore, whenever New Delhi raises the question of armed terrorism from across the border into Kashmir, it has to remind itself and the world that the very same force—the ISI—is conducting military intervention in Afghanistan. This linkage between Kashmir and Afghanistan needs to be stressed by our government and political parties whenever they talk about foreign intervention into Kashmir. And who backs the common bandit force, the ISI?

Since the ISI admittedly owes its origin and survival most decisively to the patronage it enjoys from the Pentagon and the CIA, it would be short-sighted not to face the reality; it is imperative that the real face of the ISI is shown up as the common enemy of Afghanistan, Kashmir and the democratic forces within Pakistan.

(Mainstream, October 28, 1995)

arun · Post by **arun** » 12 Aug 2008 12:16

X post.

A.Q. Khan's wife, Hendrina Khan in her own words.

Alleges the ISI and later the ISI and SPD were fully in the know about Pakistan proliferating nuclear weapon related technology to third countries:

08/11/2008 05:23 PM

'STABBED IN THE BACK'

Hendrina Khan on the Pakistani Government's Role ………

Spiegel Online

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 12 Aug 2008 15:20

ramana wrote:This post from mainstream ties ISI, Great Game and everything else! And its written in 1995.

For Afghanistan, particularly active was Sir Olaf Caroe, as his interventions were directed against Central Asia where he stirred up the regional tribal leaders and mullahs against the new regime in Moscow.

Olaf Caroe similarly instigated the tribes against Nehru and India in 1947.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 14 Aug 2008 01:38

From the Pioneer, 14 August 2008

CIA stumped by ISI

D Suba Chandran

The CIA suspects that the ISI is withholding information about the Taliban. Worse, the ISI is believed to be providing information about impending attacks to America's enemies in Afghanistan. Yesterday's friends have turned into foes

Since July 2008, numerous statements, meetings and actions highlight the growing divide between the CIA and the ISI. Why the discord suddenly? What can the United States do about this? Will the US succeed in forcing the ISI to deliver and coordinate with the CIA to achieve American objectives in the war on terrorism?

The following four events underline the growing discord between the CIA and the ISI. First, in July 2008, Mr Stephen Kappes, Deputy Director of the CIA, visited Pakistan and met the Prime Minister, President, Chief of Army Staff and the DG of the ISI. The primary objective of this visit was to confront the Pakistani leadership with evidence of continuing linkages between the ISI and the Taliban, especially the group led by Jalaluddin Haqqani (ISI is believed to have worked through the Haqqani group to carry out the attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul).

Second, during his July trip to Washington, Pakistan's Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, besides the US President, also met the CIA director. Apparently, both the CIA chief and the President were harsh on the ISI's links with the Taliban. Third, just before him leaving for the US, Mr Gilani issued a notification, announcing that the ISI and IB henceforth would function under the Interior Ministry. Clearly, the notification, though short-lived, was to please the Americans.

Fourth, perhaps for the first time, the US openly supported India's claim - that the ISI has been aiding the Taliban in Afghanistan against the Indian presence. The US even announced that it has proof of the ISI's role in the Indian embassy bombing in Kabul.

Clearly, the Americans are unhappy with the ISI; the CIA has done its homework and has briefed the political establishment on what is happening at the ground level in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Otherwise, the US establishment would not have come down this heavily on Pakistan, especially against the ISI. Where are the differences? Why should the CIA have problems today with the ISI, its erstwhile partner in the 1980s when they worked in tandem to overthrow the Russians?

The main issue between the CIA and the ISI today is the continuing support by the latter to the Taliban. Unlike the 1980s, today the primary objectives of the CIA and the ISI are totally different. In the 1980s, both wanted to throw the Russians out and establish a friendly Government. The ISI considered the mujahideen as the best choice; the CIA supported that idea and funneled enormous funds and arms, but through the ISI. When the Russians left Afghanistan, the CIA also packed its bags, whereas the ISI continued its links with the mujahideen in the early-1990s, and then later with the Taliban since the late-1990s.

When the CIA came back to Afghanistan after 9/11, the actors had changed along with their objectives and perceptions of the US, but their links with the ISI continued. The new actors are no more the mujahideen, darlings of the CIA; they are the Taliban and Al Qaeda, who perceive the US as the 'great satan' and the CIA as its archangel. To be fair to the ISI, the CIA expected the former to start afresh in Afghanistan, breaking all links with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, without understanding what had happened between 1989 and 2001.

This is where the second problem arose between the ISI and the CIA - in terms of current and future objectives in Afghanistan, especially who should be in Kabul. The ISI (and to a large extent the political and military establishment in) prefer a 'friendly' regime in Kabul. After all, Afghanistan is a part of Pakistan's 'strategic depth'.

The ISI does not see Mr Hamid Karzai and his Government as 'friendly'. The ISI also believes that Americans will not remain in Afghanistan for long; once Osama bin Laden is neutralised, the CIA will leave Afghanistan, as it did in yjr 1990s. Hence, the ISI is pursuing its long-terms interests and using the Taliban to destabilise and overthrow the Karzai's regime . This strategy is in direct conflict with the US objective.

The US wants to establish a moderate regime under Mr Karzai and wipe out the Taliban and Al Qaeda. This is where the CIA is at the receiving end, in terms of not being able to provide accurate intelligence in terms of Taliban/Al Qaeda targets.

On the other hand, the Taliban and Al Qaeda seem to know about American moves and counter-moves. And the CIA suspects the ISI for this on three counts: First, the ISI is withholding information about the Taliban and its strategy; second, the ISI is providing information to the Taliban of impending American attacks; and, third, the ISI is providing safe havens to the Taliban.

What can the CIA do now? The present strategy seems to be two-fold. First, directly confronting the political and military leadership with evidence and pressurising the ISI to work along with the CIA. The high-level visit, selective leaks to the media and the periodic statements are a part of this strategy. Unfortunately, this is not working, as the ISI's interests in Afghanistan outweigh American interests and pressure. The second strategy is to pressurise the political establishment to bring the ISI under civilian control. Mr Gilani's aborted attempt to bring the ISI under the Interior Ministry is a part of this. Given the civil-military intelligence relations in Pakistan, this strategy is totally foolish.

Does this mean there is no other alternative? There is, but neither the CIA nor the White House is interested. It demands an arduous process of providing sufficient space to the democratic movement in Pakistan to run its course and become a full democracy, with strong institutions. Unfortunately, neither the White House nor the CIA has that much patience. As in the 1980s, the US is in a hurry. The ISI, however, has all the time.

-- The writer is Deputy Director at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.

Great timing- Aug14th!

A strong defeat will also do the job of reformation.

Avinash R · Post by **Avinash R** » 19 Aug 2008 17:36

atleast one person knowns who is behind the jehadism and attacks it, unlike the jholawalla crying intelligence failure after every terror attack.
Rajnath demands diplomatic initiative against Pak, ISI

Bangalore, Aug 19

BJP President Rajnath Singh today alleged that the confidence building measures (CBM) initiated by India with Pakistan have not brought any benefits as terror-related activities continue to rise, Addressing a press conference here, he demanded that the UPA government 'shift gear' to initiate 'aggressive' diplomatic action against Pakistan and its intelligence agency ISI to achieve the desired results.

The ISI and other anti-India forces had been actively involved in carrying out terrorist attacks on Indian soil, he charged, adding, the UPA government had failed to fight against these divisive forces.

Mr Singh, who was in the city to attend the Special Executive Meeting of the Karnataka BJP unit, also alleged that the UPA had failed to provide protection to life and properties of the common people in the country.

Expressing doubt over the 'tall claims' made by National Security Advisor M K Narayanan that the intelligence agencies had unearthed over 800 'sleeper modules' across the country, Mr Singh demanded the Prime Minister to clarify on the matter.

He also pointed out that former Deputy National Security Advisor Satish Chandra had questioned the authenticity of the 'claims' made by Mr Narayanan.

''It is a very sensitive and serious matter and the Prime Minister should intervene and clarify the status on the unearthing of 'sleeper modules,'' he demanded.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 23 Aug 2008 04:01

News report form Pioneer, 23 August 2008

ISI provides round-the-clock security to Dawood: Mumbai blasts accused

TN Raghunatha | Mumbai

Throwing light on the much-discussed nexus between Dawood Ibrahim and Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), 1993 Mumbai serial blasts accused Karimullah Khan Osan Khan has revealed that ISI provides round-the-clock security to the underworld don, who lives in a posh bungalow in Clifton area of Karachi.

A day after he was arrested for his active role in the landing of explosives used in the 1993 Mumbai blasts, Karimullah made many revelations about Dawood and his other aides based in Karachi, during his interrogation by the city crime branch sleuths.

"Dawood lives a secure life in Karachi, with the ISI taking care of all his personal security needs. Retired Army personnel guard bungalow," a senior crime branch official said on Friday, quoting the revelations made by Karimullah.

After prolonged interrogation, the city police handed over Karimullah to the Special Task Force of the CBI, which produced him before Special Judge UD Mulla, who remanded the 1993 blasts accused to the custody of the apex investigating agency till August 29.

According to sources, Karimullah also told his interrogators in the city crime branch that high-profile people, including the Army and intelligence officials, frequently visited Dawood's Clifton locality bungalow, which is located on a sprawling two-acre plot.

Karimullah revealed that Dawood hardly stepped out of his high-security bungalow. He told in his interrogations that he could not get to meet Dawood often while he was in Karachi and that he had worked as a telephone operator for Dawood's younger brother Anees Ibrahim till 2006. "Anees does not live with Dawood, but has his own residence in Clifton area. Dawood's other brothers Noora, Humayun and Mustaqeen stay in Defence Colony area," said Karimullah in his interrogation.

Among other revelations that Karimullah made about Dawood was that the underworld had invested heavily in the Karachi stock market and that had a stronghold over that city's economy. Over the period, Dawood had built a few supermarkets and helped his brothers acquire vast chunks of property.

"On the other hand, Anees runs fake currency racket and is into the smuggling of narcotics," Karimullah told his interrogators. In another revelation, Karimullah said there was no truth in reports that Dawood brothers and Chhota Shakeel had fallen out. "They are very much together," he said. Of Tiger Memon, Karimullah said that the 1993 Mumbai serial blasts absconding mastermind was now a leading builder in Pakistan. "Like Dawood, Tiger Memon also lives in Karachi," he told his interrogators.

Very interesting.

So ISI provides security to gangsters and criminals.

arun · Post by **arun** » 04 Sep 2008 08:45

From Dawn :

September 04, 2008 Thursday Ramazan 3, 1429

ISI behind abduction of Japanese worker, alleges Afghanistan

KABUL, Sept 3: Afghan intelligence claimed on Wednesday it had arrested a Pakistan national who said he was paid by his country’s spy agency to help abduct a Japanese aid worker who was later shot dead.

Kazuya Ito, 31, was abducted on August 26 in eastern Nangarhar province, about 50km from the Pakistan border. His body was found a day later.

The arrested man was named as Adil Shah and had been studying at a madressah in the NWFP, the National Directorate for Security said in a statement.

He said he was enlisted by ISI and had been working with three Afghans.

“Adil Shah has confessed during the investigation that the abduction and killing of the Japanese engineer was planned and implemented by Pakistan’s ISI and for that a large amount of money was given to the members of the group,” the statement said.

The Taliban had claimed responsibility for kidnapping Ito, who had been working in Afghanistan for five years.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 04 Sep 2008 22:53

Nitesh wrote:http://timesnow.tv/NewsDtls.aspx?NewsID=15261

Blackwill: ISI using Taliban to hold on Indian positions

9/4/2008 7:18:40 PM

Warning that terrorists were widening their net in Pakistan, former US Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill today (September 4) said the ISI was using the Taliban to continue its hold on "strategic" positions in India.

Describing Pakistan's future as bleak over the next five years, he said, "the civilian leadership in the country has little interest in governing the country and was more interested in out manoeuvring each other".

"The terrorists are widening their net and Pakistan's ISI was continuing to use the Taliban to hold on to strategic Indian positions as well as Afghanistan," he said at a conference on Indo-US relations.

Blackwill said there should be talks between India and the United States on how to deal with Pakistan. "There is no single issue which fundamentally affects the two countries as this", he added. Observing that NATO was not winning the war in Iraq, he said, "India should be a major partner of the United States in Afghanistan".

On the rise of China, Blackwill said, "containment is not an option" adding that the United States was in itself not in a position to control China. Commenting on the US position on Iran, he said Washington should realise India's "civilisational ties" with Iran and listen to New Delhi on dealing with Tehran. "Both American attack on Iran and Tehran acquiring a nuclear arsenal would have terrible consequences," he said.

(With inputs from PTI)

sum · Post by **sum** » 07 Sep 2008 16:00

Blackwill: ISI using Taliban to hold on Indian positions

A most intriguing and "hiding more than it reveals" statement!!!!

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 11 Sep 2008 02:42

My view...

The origins of the Taliban, the Pashtun Civil war and the Pakiban are all tied to the role and mission of the ISI. The three phenomenons are unexplainable without understanding the ISI.
The ISI was formed in 1948 after Partition. There was no such organization in the British Indian Army. As such it is difficult for Indians to comprehend what it is? In British India intelligence was civil/police function. Military intelligence that existed as such was more for battlefield knowledge of opposition forces. The ISI was setup by Major General Cawthorn, a former British Indian Army officer who opted for Pakistan at the time of Partition. Prior to that Lt. Gen Cawthorn was the Director General of Intelligence for the British Indian Army and the Allied forces during World War II. The published accounts state that he formed the ISI with MI5 and MI6 as role models but staffed with military personnel. We don’t have accounts of Lt. Gen Cawthorn’s WWII experience.
Lt Gen Cawthorn later headed the Australian SIS after reverting back to his native country. Prior to that, he was High Commissioner to Pakistan and later Canada. In addition during the war he was in the Olaf Caroe’s Viceroy Study Group (VSG), which studied the future of the Great Game - the British –Russian struggle to control Central Asia. One can’t discount the possibility that Lt Gen Cawthorn was nurturing his creation even when he was the Australian High Commissioner and it was part of outcome of the VSG studies.

Later the ISI was tasked to its current charter by Field Marshal Ayub Khan with defending Pakistan. Its role expanded with Zia’s coup to be all encompassing the security of Pakistan state. It developed ties and linkages to the CIA during the Afghan war and channeled the US support to the mujahedeen. It was this role that allowed it to develop covert armies of irregulars who later were molded into the Taliban. After 9/11, these armies of irregulars were sheltered in the FATA region and morphed into the Pakiban also known as Tehreek –e- Pakistan (TEP). The ISI also developed other irregular armies in Pakistan: Lashkar –e- Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e- Mohammad (JEM) for terrorist acts on India. They also developed links with radicalized elements of the SIMI in India. The question then is the TSP state is fighting the Pakiban and other radicals then who is it fighting and what is its effectiveness?

The Pashtun Civil War is a result of the channeling of Pashtun nationalist aspirations which were thwarted in 1947 by the merger into the newly formed state of Pakistan. The nationalist desire was subsumed till the formation of the Taliban after the Afghan War ended. The corralling of the Taliban forces in the FATA region allowed the Pashtun nationalist aspirations to take on Islamist fervor to achieve their goals by creating a state within a state inside Pakistan as first step.

India is unable to fathom the ISI as it does not fit the profile of a standard intelligence agency for it was not created to be one but an operations directorate like SOE. The question of who really tasks it is not clear. The day to day tasks are possibly from the military chain of command but its strategic perceptions and tasking seem to be more part of the Great Gamesque mode of thinking.
...
More as I thin things over.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 11 Sep 2008 06:31

ramana wrote:Its role expanded with Zia’s coup to be all encompassing the security of Pakistan state. It developed ties and linkages to the CIA during the Afghan war and channeled the US support to the mujahedeen. It was this role that allowed it to develop covert armies of irregulars who later were molded into the Taliban.

Two things, Ramana.

The role certainly expanded during Zia's time. ISI became all-too powerful only during this time because Zia insisted with the Americans that it would be only the ISI that will handle the arms, ammunitions and cash distributions to the mujahideen. This made the ISI very rich and also helped them favour the groups that were amenable to them, like Hekmatyar, Haqqani etc. There was no stopping the ISI after that. Of course, the relationships forged then, have continued to flourish.

IMO, the Taliban was an independent phenomenon that happened because of the internecine war among the warlords and the mujahideen after the Geneva accord and Soviet withdrawal as there was no more a common enemy. Some of those who were frustrated by continuing anarchy, set up the Taliban to make people strictly follow Islam. The popularity of the Taliban grew when Omar and his motley crowd rescued teenage girls and boys from wayward mujahideen commanders and established some semblance of normality around Kandahar in circa 1994. It was then the Pakistani truckers began to seek assistance of the Taliban for help in clearing the Quetta-Herat road. The Taliban established contact with Ms. BB through JUI-F's Fazl-ur-Rehman as many Taliban had studied in his madrasseh. The ISI came into the picture through Gen. Naserullah Babar, a Pashtun himself, and the rest was history.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 19 Sep 2008 23:19

X-posted...
Book Review from The Telegraph, 19 Sept 2008

Ahmed Rashid's Descent into Chaos

CHRONICLE OF A BLUNDER FORETOLD

Descent Into Chaos By Ahmed Rashid,
Allen Lane, Rs 495

In 1968, with a degree in political science from Cambridge, Ahmed Rashid began his career at the unlikeliest of places: the Balochistan Liberation Front. He could have been profitably engaged in reporting the war between the peasants on the tribal belt and the Pakistani army. Instead, he reinvented himself as a guerrilla rebel and a political strategist for an oppressed people. In the late Sixties, revolution was in the air: student riots in France, race riots in America, the Russian debacle of the Prague Spring. Rashid, swept along by a heady Marxism, spent years travelling and fighting in Central Asia until he harnessed his energies into a more meaningful form of activism: once he relinquished the sword and picked up the pen, he became one of the pre-eminent South Asian journalists to report from the region.

Given Rashid’s intimate knowledge of Central Asia and its people, it is not without reason that one feels slightly let down by Descent into Chaos. With no intention of undermining his achievements — because they are formidable indeed — one feels somewhat dazed by the plethora of facts and figures in this book. Rashid may be justified in calling this work “history in the making” — but it turns out to be a diplomatic history of the region. The result, however valuable, can, at best, be called history without a credible human face.

Rashid’s thesis is not exactly original. The invasion of Afghanistan by the United States of America was motivated by the worst form of short-sightedness. After 9/11, the US had only short-term agendas — hounding out Osama bin Laden, destroying the Taliban and exterminating al Qaida — never taking any longer perspective beyond its scheme of revenge. There was a stubborn resistance to any form of nation-building — Rashid uses it interchangeably with State-building — leaving too many loose ends by the time the US took on Iraq. As a member of an experts group, appointed by Lakhdar Brahimi (former United Nations representative to Afghanistan), Rashid tried his best to persuade the US to assume a nuanced and holistic approach to the war in Afghanistan. But the US blundered its way into the region, putting its trust on the troika of the president, army and the Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan.

Anything wiser was unexpected of the George W. Bush administration. (During his presidential campaign of 2000, Bush did not know the name of the Pakistani president and thought that the Taliban was an all-girl pop band.) The neocons also brazenly undermined every international safeguard that Clinton had signed towards the end of his term. Bush did not send Clinton’s treaty to create the International Criminal Court for ratification to the Senate. He refused to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty or to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and also rejected the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Is it any wonder then that Bush’s cowboy regime would be in denial regarding nation-building in Afghanistan?

Rashid gives a painstaking inventory of the astronomical sums that were wasted on funding Pervez Musharraf in the hope that he would hand over the Taliban insurgents hiding in Pakistan. An internally divided ISI made good use of the US bounty — one half of the ISI funded Islamic extremism, while the rest filled their own coffers. Rashid’s narrative ties one unforeseen disaster with another in a prophetic sweep of history. He makes dour predictions about the rise of the Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the bane of warlordism, the flourishing of the poppy trade and widespread corruption in the US reconstruction teams. Most of his prophecies are Cassandra-like — potent, but nobody pays the slightest attention to them. (In an otherwise densely argued book, Rashid’s account of the conflict in Kashmir seems rather flippant. He treats it summarily, as if the whole situation amounts to little more than a military problem between India and Pakistan.)

It is evident from the profusion of facts (often repetitive) and the endless details (not all of which is strictly relevant) that telling a story is not the greatest strength of this book. Rashid has no sense of how to keep ordinary readers with him — and cramming the narrative with too much detail makes this a needlessly difficult book for non-experts. (For Barack Obama, though, it is compulsory reading.)

Ahmed Rashid certainly does not let his frustration with America dissolve into bleak scepticism. He is prudently hopeful that once the US starts focusing on nation-building — by ushering in democracy — things will start looking up again for Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Is this a very sound theory after all? US nation-building in Pakistan involved plucking out one thorn (Musharraf) and putting back another (Asif Ali Zardari). Rashid’s evident faith in the Pakistan People’s Party is also somewhat misplaced. And isn’t it a bit lopsided to expect America to lead the way for change, with the UN and Nato thrown in as afterthoughts? Surely Rashid must be aware that America is not merely a symptom of the ills afflicting Central Asia, but one of the ills itself.

SOMAK GHOSHAL

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 19 Sep 2008 23:51

Cawthorn
Walter Joseph, Major-General

(1896 – 1970) (Indian Army)

1937 - 1939General Staff Officer 2 War Office
1939 - 1941Head Middle East Command Intelligence Center
1941 - 1945Director of Military Intelligence, India
1943 - 1945Deputy Director of Military Intelligence South-East Asia Command
1946 - 1947Representative of Commander in Chief India to Joint Chiefs of Staffs Australia
1948 - 1951Deputy Chief General Staff, Pakistan
1951 Retired
1952 - 1954Director Joint Intelligence Bureau, Australian Department of Defence
1954 - 1958Australian High Commissioner in Pakistan
1959 - 1969Australian High Commissioner in Canada

We really need to dissect Cawthorne's career.

Johann: can u shed any more light on Cawthorne's background.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 20 Sep 2008 00:37

The interesting thing is Brobst book has no papers by Cawthorn. A lot by Caroe, some by Tuker and a few by Guy Wint.Means stuff is still classified or ossified.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 21 Sep 2008 08:01

Johann: can u shed any more light on Cawthorne's background.

Hi Paul,

I dont have anything yet that can be described as a comprehensive picture, but there are a couple of things that should be kept in mind

- He was commissioned in to the Indian Army back in 1918. The thinking of the Indian Army from the mid 1920s onwards was *obsessed* with the possibility of Soviet invasion from the North-West, combined with communist subversion - the Japanese invasion was only a temporary interruption.

If you remember back in 1927 the Anglo-Soviet near-war crisis revolved around British fears and Soviet training of a revolutionary Indian cadre. That war scare had profound consequences, including Stalin's decision to begin a crash-programme of mass industrialisation in order to support a much larger Red Army. It was in some ways the first Cold War with the Soviets.

In particular many of these old 'India hands' regarded the INC leadership as thoroughly penetrated and controlled by COMINTERN. Pakistan was to be embraced because it was geographically vital to defending the subcontinent from the Soviets, and because the Muslim League was anti-communist.

- His experiences in WWII helped shape his ideas about intelligence organisations. As the CinC/Viceroy's head of intelligence he wanted total strategic integration of all intelligence services - SIS, MI5, SOE, PWE, etc, even all American OSS activities. He had a huge problem with the idea of different intelligence agencies working at cross purposes to each other, placing their individual priorities above the governments priorities.

He certainly seemed to draw a distinction between intelligence at the strategic level, and purely military intelligence. Strategic intelligence involved monitoring other powers policy direction, economic activity, and the broader hostile influence, especially subversion. It also included the ability to conduct or counter psychological warfare.

My impression is that he intended ISID to closely resemble the wartime (ie WWII) intelligence set up of undivided India, which resembled the other theatre intelligence setups.

What the ISI turned in to after his time was something very different - an organisation very poor at delivering strategic intelligence, and first and foremost aimed at internal political intelligence and political dirty tricks. It knew where Ayub Khan's political enemies were, but had no concrete estimations of Indian military plans, or strategic plans - the hallmark of unstable dictatorships.

The criminalisation of the ISID progressed along with the criminalisation of pakistani politics. The growth of violent covert action at the expense of strategic intelligence and psychological warfare is also I think a reflection of the kind of unbalanced Pakistani machismo that manifests itself in the way the PAF for example prizes fighters while neglecting airlift, recconaissance, SAMs, etc.

- Cawthorn was the director of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) from 1960 until 1968. Im not aware of any particular emphasis on the subcontinent at this time. Instead his attentions reflected Australian focus of the time - South East Asia, Indonesia and Vietnam in particular. However I think its still in keeping with the kind of thinking he showed throughout his career, which was on leading the intelligence element in his corner of a global war, whether it was against the Soviets or Japanese Empire. I dont think he ever fought just for Australia, or any one country - I think he was ideological in that sense.

Raj Malhotra · Post by **Raj Malhotra** » 21 Sep 2008 10:08

ISI is composed of deputed officers from PArmy for short and medium, so I don't think it can be even remotely independent of Army leadership

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 22 Sep 2008 20:13

SSridhar wrote:
Dileep wrote:I wonder, is ISI that good?

We KNOW that Paki economics, industry, military, movies all are mediocre, tainted by the Pakiness features of greed, sloth, disintegrity, pervertion etc. Then HOW COME ISI being capable of doing all that, like hunting with the Khan, running with Taliban, bumming kufr, and kufr's hotels, propping, and later kicking musharrafs?
Dileep, ISI operates, just like all other spy agencies, on the principle of 'deniability'. This is the same basis on which the entire Pakistan apparatus has operated since 1947. The Pakistanis had the advantage of the experience and the guidance of the British, to start with, and later on the Americans. The involvement in MEDO/SEATO/CENTO must have immensely helped the fledgeling MI & ISI. It also allowed contacts to be established that would have helped a lot. Later on, the Afghan situation, when distribution of cash & kind was solely entrusted to the ISI by both the US and the Saudis, really made the ISI powerful. The CIA also collaborated heavily with the ISI thus helping to refine its tactics. The motive during 1979-1989 was also to 'deny' everything. The US also went to extraordinary lengths to 'deny' its involvement. The two spy agencies fine tuned the tactic.

ISI is also like other Paki entieties. A part of it, sympathetic to the TTP, got this kaboom done, without the other part, sympathetic to Khan and all the baksheesh, knowing about it.
Like all spy agencies, which have a separate desk for major operations which alone would handle all aspects of that operation, ISID also would have an Afghan desk. All of them would share the same attitude and approach to the problem. Otherwise, they would not have been selected to be part of the desk. At a higher level, the DG, ISI, the Corps Commanders, the COAS and even political leadership would set the overall policy and ensure that everything dovetails into that single goal of 'defeating India'. Hence it is unlikely that ISI has 'rogue elements' within itself. The COAS and CJCSC have taken pains to debunk that theory claiming that the "ISI completes the tasks assigned to it". I do believe that.

and

SSridhar wrote:
Dileep wrote: My question is, when the OTHER entieties in Pakistan works crap, how can you claim that ISI alone works well?

When your basic premise of operation is opportunism, H&D, baksheesh, societal striation and selfishness, how come only ISI works properly?
I am not claiming ISI works well. I am just claiming that ISI works in unison, not as a rogue. The ISI might have botched many missions which we may be unaware of. However, that one strike which was spectacular, is enough to create a feeling of 'ISI working well' in us. Even the PA is capable of pulling off a few victories here and there in a war in spite of the 'culture of entitlement' to land, baksheesh, societal status etc it suffers from. In other words, I am saying that it faithfully executes orders issued by the jihadi command of the PA.

If ISI is run by the same people, it will not be tough at all for a mid level afsar to be sympathetic to the jeehad of TTP and use the resources available to him to pull this off. With 'deniability' of course!
My contention all along has been the vast majority of PA (and that includes automatically the ISI), is already jihadic in nature. There is no need for any special sympathy. Look, if 85% of population want negotiations with the Taliban (and this was in June 2008 after almost a year of non-stop and vicious suicide bombing) and 50% even want the same with Al-Qaeda, how can the PA alone reflect different sentiments ? Unlike the 50s & 60s, when the army recruits mostly came from the Potohar region, it is very broad based now and the power of the clergy has also increased substantially.

I am not saying one way or another that this is an ISI operation or even the ISID assisted the TTP in this. All I am saying is that if the ISID had been involved, it would have been involved whole-heartedly and entirely, not some fringe or rogue elements alone because there is no such group within ISID. They have all the same worldview.

and

Mathew G wrote:
shiv wrote: This is not the work of ISI IMO, but is a jihadi group trained by the ISI/Pak Army.
The ISI is tantamount to being called jihadists. They helped create and nurture the jihadist. Let's simplify things and just call them jihadists, to this very day there are sympathisers in the ISI echeleons who created/funded these jihadists.

shiv wrote:There are blood relations between army ranks and jihadis.
I know that and I agree with you.

shiv wrote: Pakistan is such a dysfunctional country that it is easy to blame everything on one single evil power like Allah or ISI. It is the "easy explanation"
TSP has always been dysfunctional. I mean we in BR have been trashing the TSP when BR started ...since the nineties when N3, Kaushal, Calvin and all those guys of yesteryear hanged out here (Ok, just to side track, I still see N3 around, his high command is quite light on him)...

Having said all this, IMO the instrumental "force" that led to TSP's failure is the ISI. Not the jihadists.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 22 Sep 2008 21:08

Has no one posted any of Bidanda Chengappa's work on the ISI? He used to be at IDSA.

He likes to make a point about the ISI that I fully endorse - that you can not *really* understand the way the ISI functions either internally or within the Pakistani state simply by looking at a neat little organisational flowchart. Ultimately a great deal of what goes on is personality-driven. Particular individuals are able to accrue power out of proportion to their designation because they are dynamic and/or well connected, and have a dispropotionate impact on policy.

While the ISI is composed of military personnel, they are outside the direct chain of military command. That is a situation somewhat analagous to the National Logistic Cell or the military foundations that serving officers often head. It takes influence and lobbying to get those positions, and holding them grants even more influence and lobbying power. Part of that power means using patronage to fill positions below you with people who are personally loyal to you, and ideologically aligned with your particular viewpoint.

Take Lt. Gen. Mohammad Aziz - he continued to direct ISI policy even after he had been transferred back to Army HQ as Chief of the General Staff, and later Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff which is why Musharraf eventually forced to take the difficult step of pushing him out of the Army in 2004, having run out of places to kick him upstairs. Aziz's power to challenge Musharraf's own authority (and his willingness to do it publicly, eg when Musharraf visited Camp David) over covert policy threatened Musharraf's calibrated policy of always going the extra step to go through the motions of cooperation with the Americans in all areas while remaining passive in most, and actively thwarting them in some. That was unacceptable to Aziz, who felt that Pakistan was selling out its jihadi allies, and fatally weakening itself.

Musharraf was able to win that round, but these kinds of purges weakened institutional army support for Musharraf to the point that it refused to back him in his struggle with the politicians and the Americans.

Now besides this, the ISI like all institutions does have its own institutional culture, and that is independent of flowcharts, and of individuals parachuted in to the top level.

- There is a power, mystique, and fear around the 'agencies' within Pakistan that *is* greater than that of the regular army. That's what it means to be the secret police - the fact that half of what you do is invisible, and the other half unquestionable is very heady indeed. Regular army officers, even those deputed dont get to exercise as much raw power over the wider Pakistani society. That power tends to stick to the people who exercise it.

In dictatorships the secret police, as a vital pillar of the state *do* develop greater lattitude. Stalin tolerated an astonishing amount of independence from Beria because he needed him. The same thing happened later.

- Institutional culture is very, very difficult to change. Musharraf policy was based on pure opportunism; he'd work with the Americans or the jihadis based on whatever was politically necessary for him at the time

The ISI's institutional culture from Zia onwards was consistantly built around ideological commitment to jihad. Musharraf was able to use that in places, but in others, he was in conflict with it.

He could try to gut the agency, but gutted agencies lose effectiveness, and he relied on the ISI as his secret police, a vital element in his never-ending war to stay on top. The most Musharraf could do was replace people at the top, and try to gradually build new patronage networks built around loyalty to him, and committed to the same things he was - opportunism over ideology.

Paul · Post by **Paul** » 23 Sep 2008 10:24

Thanks Johann, if you have any links on Cawthorne or Alfred Lyall, please post them in the thread.

gandharva · Post by **gandharva** » 24 Sep 2008 09:30

Political Destabilization in South and Central Asia: The Role of the CIA-ISI Terror Network
by Andrew G. Marshall

Global Research, September 17, 2008

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Introduction

Recent terror attacks in New Delhi on September 13, 2008, raise the questions of who was responsible and for what reason these attacks occurred. Terror attacks in India are not a new phenomenon, however, in their recent past, they can be largely attributed to the actions, finances, training and resources of one organization: The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). These new bombings bare the same relationship with the ISI as has occurred in the past, and so it must be asked: what is the purpose of the ISI both in Central Asia as well as South Asia?

The ISI appears to play the role of a force for the destabilization of Central Asia, India and the Middle East. It acts as a Central Asian base of operations for the CIA and British Intelligence to carry out Anglo-American imperial aims.

India will be the main focus of this report, due to the escalation of organized terror and violence against it in the past few years. As India is one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, after China, its northern neighbor which also borders Central Asian countries, its place in the New World Order is yet to be set in stone. Do western, and particularly Anglo-American elites allow India to grow as China, all the while attempting to co-opt their banking system to the western banking elite, thus, making them controllable? Or, will India be destabilized and dismantled, as is the plan with the Middle East and Central Asia, in order to redraw borders to suit geopolitical imperial ambitions, creating a network of manageable territories feeding the Metropoles of the New World Order, specifically New York (Wall Street) and London (The City of London)?

The September 13, 2008 New Delhi Bombings: 9/13/08

The Bombings

On September 13, 2008, five blasts ripped through New Delhi within 45 minutes of each other, killing 21 people and injuring roughly 100 more. The Indian Mujahedin claimed responsibility for the bombings, sending emails to major Indian news organizations. In July, bombings took place in the western state of Gujarat, which killed 45 people, and in May in the city of Jaipur, which killed 61 people. The Indian Mujahedin also claimed responsibility for those attacks. This new wave of attacks across Indian cities was intended to "sow panic, inflict civilian casualties and, according to Indian officials, inflame tensions between Hindus and Muslims."

National elections are also approaching in India, giving the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party the opportunity to criticize "the coalition government led by the Congress Party for its inability to prevent bombings like those of Saturday," making it a "major point of vulnerability for the incumbent administration."[1]

What is the Indian Mujahedin?

According to Indian police, the Indian Mujahedin (IM) is "an offshoot of the banned Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)."[2] In fact, it is "the hardline faction of Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) that broke away in 2005 to protest against the diffidence of the moderate faction about declaring a full-scale war on India."[3] Reports also link the IM with the banned organizations, Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami and Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen.[4]

The Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) has reported ties with the Pakistani ISI, in having had cadres of its members being trained by the ISI to launch terror attacks in India. The ISI is also reported to have maintained contacts with SIMI in relation to their operatives traveling around the Middle East, specifically Saudi Arabia, to engage in fund raising. SIMI’s reorganization was also aided by the ISI, which led to the branching out of the hardline element, the Indian Mujahedin.[5]

Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami also has extensive ties with the ISI, as the group carried out terror attacks in Hyderabad in 2007, "at the instance of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence."[6] Many members of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami were trained at ISI camps in Pakistan, and it "receives patronage and support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence." Significantly, "the group’s anti-India operations are planned by the ISI, mostly from the Bangladeshi capital Dhaka."[7]

Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen, the third terror network with extensive ties to the Indian Mujahedin, used to be known as the Harkat ul-Ansar. Harkat ul-Ansar was created by then-Pakistani General and future President Musharraf in the early 1990s, and was active in recruiting 200 Pakistanis to be trained by the ISI and sent to fight a jihad in Bosnia, "with the full knowledge and complicity of the British and American intelligence agencies." This group also has links to those individuals associated with financing 9/11, as well as being involved with the London 7/7/ bombings.[8]

So all three terrorist groups associated with creating and having links with the Indian Mujahedin (IM) have extensive ties with the Pakistani ISI. Since these three organizations created the IM, it is essentially a creation of the ISI itself.
Who Benefits?

Two days before the bombings took place, the Times of India ran a story discussing US defense corporations seeking major contracts in India, including "the single largest one-time military contract in history," India’s buying 126 multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA). The deal is said to be worth $10 billion, "which would not be concluded in the term of this government but by the next government." Two major US companies vying for this contract are defense giants Boeing and Lockheed Martin. India’s Defense Minister A.K. Antony said that his recent meetings with US Defense Secretary Robert Gates and other Washington figures were primarily focused on "Pakistan’s rapid descent into chaos and the stepped up terrorist activity by renegade elements in the country, including provocations on the border and in Kashmir."[9]

Two days later, the attacks within India would confirm the need for a built up defense and military establishment within India. Contracts are sure to be signed.

The bombings also occurred at a time that "India is resisting renewed pressure from the West to send its troops into Afghanistan to boost the coalition troops there." More troops are needed in Afghanistan as the Taliban experience a resurgence, armed and financed by Pakistan’s ISI. However, as the Times of India notes, "India is not about to enter this particular cauldron because its troops would fan the flames in a way that no others would do. They would draw fire from Pakistanis and India would be sucked into a battle, which would have huge implications for its internal security."[10] Perhaps this is the idea?

The attacks also occurred just as "the US Congress is considering the approval of the US-India civil nuclear deal and days before [Indian] Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visits Washington."[11]
The ISI-CIA Islamic Terror Networks

The Mujahideen

The ISI has long established ties with terrorist networks in the region. The ISI was used as a conduit by the CIA in 1979 to finance and arm the Afghan Mujahideen in Afghanistan in the Afghan-Soviet War of 1979 to 1989. The Mujahideen then branched off, with the active financing and support of the ISI, into both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.[12]

During the 1980s, many "officers from the ISI's Covert Action Division received training in the US and many covert action experts of the CIA were attached to the ISI to guide it in its operations against the Soviet troops by using the Afghan Mujahideen, Islamic fundamentalists of Pakistan and Arab volunteers." Further, the "CIA, through the ISI, promoted the smuggling of heroin into Afghanistan in order to make the Soviet troops heroin addicts. Once the Soviet troops were withdrawn in 1988, these heroin smugglers started smuggling the drugs to the West, with the complicity of the ISI."[13]

Al-Qaeda and Yugoslavia

The ISI not only has had close ties to Al-Qaeda, but also to guerillas fighting in the disputed territory of Kashmir between India and Pakistan.[14] The ISI’s connections with Al-Qaeda were so extensive, that even on the night before 9/11, Osama bin Laden was in a hospital in Pakistan protected by Pakistani military and intelligence.[15] The ISI also supported the wars in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia throughout the 1990s, by training and sending militant Islamists into the regions to sow chaos and exacerbate ethnic tensions, leading to the break-up of Yugoslavia. All this was done with the tacit approval, support and complicity of British and American intelligence.[16] The ISI financed its covert terrorist support through the global drug trade, especially important in Afghanistan. The ISI also supported terrorist groups in Chechnya.[17]

The LeT

The Lashkar e Toiba (LeT) terrorist organization also works very closely with the ISI, and they work together in a "coordinated effort" in orchestrating terror attacks in Kashmir.[18] The LeT is "funded, armed and trained by the Inter-Services Intelligence," and is linked up with Al-Qaeda, and is "the most visible manifestation" of Al-Qaeda in India. The LeT "receives considerable financial, material and other forms of assistance from the Pakistan government, routed primarily through the ISI. The ISI is the main source of LeT's funding. Saudi Arabia also provides funds." The LeT also played a part in the ISI organized "Bosnian campaign against the Serbs," which was directed above the ISI by the CIA and British intelligence.[19]

The ISI and 9/11

The ISI may also have played a roll in 9/11 itself, as its General was in Washington in the lead up to and during the 9/11 attacks, meeting with top intelligence, State Department and Congressional officials, including CIA Director George Tenet, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Senator Bob Graham, Representative Porter Goss, who would go on to become CIA director, and Joseph Biden, who is now Barack Obama’s running mate. The ISI’s General, while meeting with all these top US officials in foreign affairs and intelligence, also happened to be the money man behind 9/11, having wired $100,000 to the lead 9/11 hijacker, Mohammed Atta.[20]

The Liquid Bomb Plot

In August 2006 in the UK, there was a massive roundup of terrorism suspects as the British and Pakistani authorities revealed that they uncovered and prevented a massive terrorist plot to blow up several transatlantic airliners with liquid explosives. This plot is the reason for which people can no longer carry a bottle of water or any liquids through security at airports. However, following the roundups, Pakistan arrested the "lead suspect" who was said to have masterminded the whole operation, Rashid Rauf. Over a year later, Rashid Rauf escaped from Pakistani police custody, however, as it turned out, he was kidnapped by the ISI to prevent him being extradited to the UK.[21]

As Craig Murray, former British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, wrote shortly after the plot was ‘foiled’, "According to John Loftus, a former Justice Department prosecutor, [bomb plot suspects] Omar Bakri and Abu Hamza, as well as the suspected mastermind of the London bombings Haroon Aswat, were all recruited by MI6 in the mid-1990s to draft up British Muslims to fight in Kosovo. American and French security sources corroborate the revelation."[22]

Covert War Against Iran

It was revealed by the London Telegraph in 2007 that the US, through the CIA, was funding and arming terrorist organizations to "sow chaos" inside Iran.[23] ABC News reported just over a month later that the terrorist group was a Pakistani militant group named Jundullah, which is based in the Baluchistan region of Pakistan, just across the border from Iran.[24] Jundullah also has very close ties with Al-Qaeda.[25] Although the US funds this Al-Qaeda-linked group, the funding is indirect, as it travels through Pakistan’s ISI.[26]

So clearly, the ISI has some troubling connections to Al-Qaeda, various other Islamic extremist groups, and British and American intelligence. Where the ISI is operational, so too, are Anglo-American ambitions.

The 1993 Bombay Bombings: 3/12/93

On March 12, 1993, Bombay (now called Mumbai) experienced 13 explosions in a coordinated attack, of which the most significant target was the Bombay Stock Exchange, which killed roughly 50 people. The total number of dead was 257, with roughly 1,400 other injured. Dawood Ibrahim was believed to have coordinated the attacks. Ibrahim is known for extensive ties to Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda,[27] has financed operations of the Lashkar e Toiba (LeT),[28] and was believed to be hiding out in Pakistan.[29] The 1993 Bombay bombings were "organised by Dawood Ibrahim under pressure from the Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan."[30] In 2007, the ISI was reported to have taken Ibrahim and his top lieutenant into custody from the Pakistan-Afghan border.[31]

The 2006 Mumbai Bombings: 7/11/06

On July 11, 2006, Mumbai experienced another major terrorist attack, as seven bombs went off within 11 minutes of one another on trains. The total deaths reached 209 with roughly 700 others injured.

The blame for the bombings was placed on the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and local Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI),[32] which are closely interlinked with each other and have direct links with the ISI.[33] A few months later, following an investigation, Mumbai police "blamed Pakistan's intelligence agency ISI for masterminding the explosions which were executed by activists of the banned Lashkar-e-Toiba and SIMI." The Mumbai Police Commissioner said that, "the attacks were planned by ISI in Pakistan and carried out by Pakistan-based militant group LeT with the help of banned Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)."[34] India even shared evidence of Pakistani ISI involvement in the attacks with the United States.[35]

The bombings led to a postponement of India-Pakistan peace talks, which were set to take place the following week.[36] The Indian Prime Minister had said that, "a peace process with Pakistan was threatened if Islamabad did not curb 'terrorist' violence directed at India."[37] Again, perhaps a peace in the region is not in the interests of the Anglo-Americans.

The 2008 Indian Embassy Bombing in Kabul: 7/7/08

On July 7, 2008, the Indian Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan was bombed, killing 58 people and wounding 141. Two days after, it was reported that, "The Afghanistan government and Indian Intelligence Agencies have confirmed that some elements within the ISI in collaboration with the Taliban/Al Qaeda planned and executed the attack on the Indian embassy." Further, "the ISI Station Head in Kabul, is collaborating with the Taliban to destabilise India's strategic presence in Afghanistan."[38]

The day after the attack, the Afghan Interior Ministry said that, "[it] was carried out in co-ordination and consultation with an active intelligence service in the region," and as the Financial Times reported, "Western diplomats in Islamabad warned that the Kabul bombing was likely to increase the distrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan and undermine Pakistan's relations with India, despite recent signs that a peace process between Islamabad and New Delhi was making some headway."[39]

It was also reported that the Afghan Interior Ministry stated that, "Militants who carried out this week's suicide bomb attack on the Indian embassy in the Afghan capital received their training at camps in Pakistan."[40]

Just weeks earlier, on June 25, 2008, "An Afghan official accused Pakistan's premier spy agency on Wednesday of organizing a recent assassination attempt on Afghan President Hamid Karzai," and that they were "sure and confident" of an ISI connection.[41]

On July 13, "Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) [had] been blamed by India for the bomb attack on Kabul’s Indian embassy."[42] On July 10, "The United States has said there was no evidence suggesting involvement of foreign agents in the suicide bombing on the Indian Embassy in Afghanistan."[43]

However, on August 1, the New York Times reported that, "American intelligence agencies have concluded that members of Pakistan’s powerful spy service helped plan the deadly July 7 bombing of India’s embassy in Kabul," and that, "The conclusion was based on intercepted communications between Pakistani intelligence officers and militants who carried out the attack." Interestingly, "American officials said that the communications were intercepted before the July 7 bombing, and that the C.I.A. emissary, Stephen R. Kappes, the agency’s deputy director, had been ordered to Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, even before the attack." Further, "a top Central Intelligence Agency official traveled to Pakistan this month to confront senior Pakistani officials with information about support provided by members of the ISI to militant groups."[44]

However, given that this is not new information, and that CIA collaboration with these efforts has been widely documented, what was the real purpose of this top CIA emissary going to Islamabad?

Two days after the New York Times report surfaced, it was reported that, "The United States has accused Pakistan’s main spy agency of deliberately undermining Nato efforts in Afghanistan by helping the Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants they are supposed to be fighting." In January, the Bush administration "sent two senior intelligence officials to Pakistan" over "concerns" that the ISI was supporting militants, and further, "Mike Mc-Connell, the director of national intelligence, and [CIA director] Hayden asked Musharraf to allow the CIA greater freedom to operate in the tribal areas." President Bush also "warned of retaliation if it continues."[45]

Who Benefits?

In 2006, it was reported that as Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan, was trying to balance a relationship with Pakistan and India, "Islamabad might be feeling squeezed and do its best to undermine the renewed Afghan-Indian partnership -- at great cost to Afghanistan."[46]

As Time Magazine reported on the day of the Embassy bombing, "The bombing is likely to have regional ramifications, both for India's relations with the neighborhood and those of every other country supporting Afghan President Hamid Karzai." Further, "India and Pakistan have been vying for influence in Kabul for decades, and India — which for years backed the opposition Northern Alliance against the Pakistan-backed Taliban regime — came out on top after the U.S.-led invasion scattered the Taliban and installed President Karzai in power." India has also pledged $850 million in reconstruction aid for Afghanistan.[47]

As the UK Times explained, India is "the only regional power committed to a new democratic Afghanistan. It was no accident that India shouldered part of the cost of the parliamentary and presidential elections. Nor should one ignore the symbolic value of the fact that India is building the new Palace of Democracy to house the Afghan parliament." Further, "The only power likely to offer Afghanistan long-term support is India. Helping Afghanistan would weaken radical Islamism and prevent Pakistan acquiring a hinterland through Afghanistan in Muslim Central Asia."[48]

Historically, the Taliban were financed and armed by the Pakistani ISI, while India had backed the Northern Alliance during the 1990s. After the 2001 invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance was put back into power as the Taliban were deposed.[49] This would explain why the ISI and Pakistan has again become the main supporter of the Taliban.[50] However, in most discussion on Pakistan funding the revival of the Taliban, what is left ignored is the ISI’s continued connections to British and American intelligence. For example, with the London 7/7 bombings, the mastermind was an MI6 asset and he had, along with several of the suspected bombers, connections to the Pakistani ISI.[51]

Interestingly, keeping in mind the ISI’s help in the resurgence of the Taliban, in February of 2008, it was reported that, "Britain planned to build a Taliban training camp for 2,000 fighters in southern Afghanistan, as part of a top-secret deal to make them swap sides." Further, "Afghan government officials insist it was bankrolled by the British. UK diplomats, the UN, Western officials and senior Afghan officials have all confirmed the outline of the plan, which they agree is entirely British-led, but all refused to talk about it on the record."[52]

Conclusion

Ultimately, the benefactors of the Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul and other bombings, such as the recent New Delhi bombing in India, is not Pakistan, but is the Anglo-Americans. Pakistan ultimately will collapse as a result of these actions being taken. The ISI has long been referred to as Pakistan’s "secret government" or "shadow state." It’s long-standing ties and reliance upon American and British intelligence have not let up, therefore actions taken by the ISI should be viewed in the context of being a Central Asian outpost of Anglo-American covert intelligence operations. This connection between American and British intelligence and the ISI is also corroborated by their continued cooperation in the covert opium trade in Afghanistan, whose profits are funneled into the banks of Wall Street and the City of London.[53]

The goal in Pakistan is not to maintain stability, just as this is not the goal throughout the region of the Middle East and Central Asia. Recent events in Pakistan, such as the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, which has been linked to the ISI, should be viewed in the context as an active Anglo-American strategy of breaking up Pakistan, which will spread chaos through the region.[54]

Pakistan’s position as a strategic focal point cannot be underestimated. It borders India, Afghanistan, China and Iran. Destabilizing and ultimately breaking Pakistan up into several countries or regions will naturally spread chaos and destabilization into neighboring countries. This is also true of Iraq on the other side of Iran, as the Anglo-American have undertaken, primarily through Iraq, a strategy of balkanizing the entire Middle East in a new imperial project.[55]

One of the main targets in this project is Iran, for which the US and Britain have engaged in massive acts of terror and orchestrating large battles and conflicts from within the already-failed state of Iraq.[56] The Anglo-American role as terrorist supporters and as covertly orchestrating terror attacks within Iraq is amply documented.[57] To imagine that these same Anglo-American intelligence and covert networks are not using their long-time conduit, the ISI, for the same purposes in Central Asia, is a stretch of the imagination and logic. It is not merely the Middle East that is the target, but Central Asia, specifically for its geographical relationship to the rising giants such as India and China. This also follows in line with Anglo-American strategies in destabilizing the Central European region, specifically the former Yugoslavia,[58] and more recently, Georgia, largely in an effort to target Russia.[59]

What we are seeing with Pakistan and India is an effort to drive the region into chaos. The US allowing blame to be placed on the Pakistani ISI for the Embassy bombings in Kabul has provided an excuse and basis for US military intervention in Pakistan, which has already begun,[60] and which threatens to plunge the region into total war and crisis. But then again, that’s the idea.

Endnotes

[1] AP, Police detain suspects after 5 blasts in New Delhi. International Herald Tribune: September 14, 2008:
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/14/asia/india.php

[2] Reuters, FACTBOX-Indian Mujahideen Islamic militant group. Reuters News Service: September 13, 2008:
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LD514149.htm

[3] Pradeep Thakur & Vishwa Mohan, Indian Mujahideen is just hardline version of SIMI. The Times of India: August 17, 2008: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Indi ... 371985.cms

[4] Vicky Nanjappa, The truth about Indian Mujahideen. Rediff India Abroad: November 23, 2007:
http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/nov/23court15.htm

[5] Animesh Roul, Students Islamic Movement of India: A Profile. Global Terrorism Analysis: April 6, 2006:
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news ... id=2369953

[6] PTI, Suspect said ISI behind Hyderabad blasts: cops. Rediff India Abroad: October 6, 2007: http://ia.rediff.com/news/2007/oct/06hydblast.htm

[7] SATP, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI). South Asia Terrorism Portal: 2001:
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries ... s/HuJI.htm

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[22] Craig Murray, British Army expert casts doubt on 'liquid explosives' threat, Al Qaeda network in UK Identified. The Raw Story: September 21, 2006:
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[23] William Lowther and Colin Freeman, US funds terror groups to sow chaos in Iran. The London Telegraph: February 25, 2007:
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[24] Brian Ross and Christopher Isham, ABC News Exclusive: The Secret War Against Iran. ABC News: April 3, 2007:
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[25] Zahid Hussain, Al-Qaeda's New Face. Newsline: August 2004:
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[26] Michel Chossudovsky, "Islamic Terrorists" supported by Uncle Sam: Bush Administration "Black Ops" directed against Iran, Lebanon and Syria. Global Research: May 31, 2007:
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[27] Vishwa Mohan, Interpol sends special notice against Dawood Ibrahim. The Times of India: April 8, 2006:
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[28] Robert Windrem, Possible al-Qaida link to India train attacks. MSNBC: July 11, 2006:
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[29] PTI, Dawood Ibrahim is a global terrorist: US. Rediff: October 17, 2003:
http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/oct/17daw.htm

[30] Rediff, 'ISI pressured Dawood to carry out Mumbai blasts'. Rediff.com: December 22, 2002:
http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/dec/22isi.htm

[31] S Balakrishnan, Dawood, Tiger Memon in ISI custody. The Times of India: August 7, 2007:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/arti ... 260818.cms

[32] ToA, LeT, SIMI hand in Mumbai blasts. Time of India: July 12, 2006:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/arti ... 733318.cms

[33] SATP, Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). South Asia Terrorism Portal: 2001:
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[34] ToA, Mumbai Police blames ISI, LeT for 7/11 blasts. The Times of India: September 30, 2006:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/arti ... 052996.cms

[35] AP, India shares evidence of Pakistan's alleged involvement in Mumbai bombings with US. The International herald Tribune: October 7, 2006: http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/10/ ... mbings.php

[36] Sudha Ramachandran, India's soft response to the Mumbai bombings. Asia Times Online: July 19, 2006: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HG19Df03.html

[37] Reuters, Manmohan warns Pak: Stop terror. Express India: July 14, 2006:
http://www.expressindia.com/news/fullst ... wsid=71060

[38] V K Shashikumar, ISI, al Qaeda planned Kabul blast: Sources. IBNLive: July 9, 2008:
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[39] Aunohita Mojumdar and Farhan Bokhari, Kabul blames spy agency for suicide blast at India embassy. The Financial Times: July 8, 2008:
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[40] Roman Kozhevnikov, Afghanistan says embassy bombers trained in Pakistan. Reuters: July 9, 2008:
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[41] AP, Afghanistan blames Pakistan for attempt to kill Karzai. CTV: June 25, 2008:
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[42] Agencies, India blames Pakistan for Kabul embassy attack. Gulf News: July 13, 2008:
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[43] PTI, No foreign hand in Kabul blast: Robert Gates. Rediff: July 10, 2008:
http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/jul/10kabul2.htm

[44] MARK MAZZETTI and ERIC SCHMITT, Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say. The New York Times: August 1, 2008:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/world ... rldspecial

[45] Christina Lamb, Rogue Pakistan spies aid Taliban in Afghanistan. The Times Online: August 3, 2008:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/w ... 449330.ece

[46] Amin Tarzi, Afghanistan: Kabul's India Ties Worry Pakistan. Radio Free Europe: April 16, 2006:
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[47] Jyoti Thottam, Afghan Bombing Fuels Regional Furor. Time Magazine: July 7, 2008:
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[48] Amir Taheri, A vicious attack on India’s crucial role in Afghanistan. The Times Online: July 9, 2008:
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[49] Scott Baldauf, India-Pakistan rivalry reaches into Afghanistan. Christian Science Monitor: September 13, 2003:
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[50] Ron Moreau and Mark Hosenball, Pakistan’s Dangerous Double Game. Newsweek: September 13, 2008:
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[51] Michel Chossudovsky, London 7/7 Terror Suspect Linked to British Intelligence?. Global research: August 1, 2005:
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[52] Jerome Starkey, Revealed: British plan to build training camp for Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. The Independent: February 4, 2008:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world ... 77671.html

[53] Andrew G. Marshall, Afghan heroin & the CIA. Geopolitical Monitor: April 1, 2008:
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[54] Michel Chossudovsky, The Destabilization of Pakistan. Global Research: December 30, 2007:
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[55] Andrew G. Marshall, Divide and Conquer: The Anglo-American Imperial Project. Global Research: July 10, 2008:
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[56] Andrew G. Marshall, Breaking Iraq and Blaming Iran. Global Research: July 3, 2008:
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[57] Andrew G. Marshall, State-Sponsored Terror: British and American Black Ops in Iraq. Global Research: June 25, 2008:
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[58] Andrew G. Marshall, Breaking Yugoslavia. Geopolitical Monitor: July 21, 2008:
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[59] Andrew G. Marshall, The Georgian War. Geopolitical Monitor: August 30, 2008:
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[60] BBC, Pakistan soldiers 'confront US'. BBC News: September 15, 2008:
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Andrew G. Marshall is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).

Andrew G. Marshall is a frequent contributor to Global Research. Global Research Articles by Andrew G. Marshall

http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=10242

gandharva · Post by **gandharva** » 24 Sep 2008 09:30

Deleted

gandharva · Post by **gandharva** » 24 Sep 2008 09:30

deleted

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 24 Sep 2008 22:29

X-posted...

Johann said

Dileep wrote:I am trying to fit a model to ISI here. Unless all the aliens who came from mars thronged to the ISI and left the rest of the Paki entieties alone, we should assume that the basic Pakiness should be the undercurrent at ISI as well. So, what it is? What have we seen in other areas of organization, dating from the old Muslim kingdoms, through the Muslim league to the post independence Pakistan?

And what different ways this same underlying principle apply to, say, a business, the Paki govt, and ISI? Why we say the former two sucks and the latter executes things with efficiency?

I think I found the answer, thanks to the smart discourse by Sridhar and Johann.

It is in the POV. All organizations are run the same way, based on personal greed. Greed for money, power and comforts. Ruthless greed that will make you starve and kill your own kin.

When it comes to the business and government, they are executed with the same efficiency, but the problem is, what is the target? It is not the benefit of the people or stakeholders. The real aim is the amassment of personal wealth and power. Since they don't do the normally intended purpose, we think they suck

When it comes to ISI, they do things exactly the same way, but here the notional and real targets coincide, so we think they do a great job.

The first thing the ISI got really good at was political surveillance, and political dirty tricks. It was good for Ayub Khan, and it was good for the ISI and every one in it.

The ISI later became very succesful at cultivating jihadis, and at building and maintaining the infrastructure for insurgencies and urban terrorism. I dont think this can be explained purely in terms of self interest - drug money, Gulf oil money, US Cold War money, etc.

Zia really did initiate a change in ethos of the Pakistani security establishment, a mix of Pakistani nationalism and Islamist zeal that came before the influx of money. That commitment to a goal bigger than just personal/family wealth and power, or the wealth and power of the boss your patronage network did make the ISI more effective, and more dangerous. Zia felt squeezed east and west (1977-80 was a bad time for Pakistan), and he was determined to change that, and start pushing east and west. This larger commitment what Musharraf's opportunism ran in to within the ISI, with its readiness to sacrifice Pakistani national and Islamist interests whenever they imposed unacceptably high costs for Musharraf.

The 'Pakiness' that comes in to the ISI is the criminalisation of its ranks, and the lack of good sense in recongising how Pakistan might build influence through non-lethal, and/or non-jihadi means, and its poverty when it comes to external intelligence gathering and analysis, i.e. the information-decision edge in international statecraft. Its covert action efforts have been tremendously succesful at fanning Islamism and jihad, but it wasnt able to secure Afghanistan for Pakistan, and it hasnt been able to detach one piece of Indian territory, or prevent India's economic success.

When it comes down to it the ISI's greatest *effectiveness* is in;
a) propping up the PA's political power within Pakistan
b) tremendously enabling and expanding the underground economy in the Indian Ocean Region, making some Pakistanis very rich, and marginally adding to Pakistani state influence
c) making Muslim-majority areas outside Pakistan (Afghanistan, Kashmir, etc) a living hell, which gives Pakistan most of its few diplomatic cards

That's the order I'd put them in.
-------------

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 01 Oct 2008 20:27

X-Posted...

Nitesh wrote:Confidential Spanish report accuses ISI for supporting Taliban
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/10/ ... aliban.php
MADRID, Spain: A report marked confidential and bearing the official seal of Spain's Defense Ministry charges that Pakistan's spy service was helping arm Taliban insurgents in 2005 for assassination plots against the Afghan government.

The report, which was obtained by Cadena Ser radio and posted on the station's Web site on Wednesday, also says Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence spy agency, or ISI, helped the Taliban procure improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, to use in attacks against vehicles.

It alleges that Pakistan may have provided training and intelligence to the Taliban in camps set up on Pakistani soil.

"The plan is that the TBs (Taliban) use these RCIEDs (remote control IEDs) to assassinate high-ranking officials," the report warns. The August 2005 document, which is marked "confidential" and topped with the Defense Ministry seal and the title of Spain's military intelligence agency, does not describe the source of the information.

Cadena Ser did not say how it obtained the report

The Defense Ministry and the Spanish prime minister's office said it had no comment on the document. Fernando Reinares, a terrorism analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute in Madrid and former chief counterterrorism adviser at Spain's Interior Ministry, said the document appeared to be an internal government report meant for the eyes of high-ranking officials.

Spain has about 800 soldiers deployed in northwest Afghanistan.

The report also warns that "it appears possible" that advanced training camps exist in Pakistan "where the Taliban receive training, help and intelligence from the ISI and where they are also developing new kinds of IEDs." The report says the Taliban had also been receiving help from al-Qaida.

Reinares said the report on the alleged ISI-Taliban link is in keeping with information from other Western spy agencies.

"The intelligence services have done nothing more then confirm a reality which has also been reported by other Western agencies," he told The Associated Press. Reinares said Spain has developed a strong military and police intelligence operation in Pakistan, particularly since the terror attacks of March 11, 2004.

The UK& US used to have a school to develop improvised explosives as part ot the SOE in WWII and then onwards.Immortalized by the charcter "Q" in Ian Fleming's works. Maybe the ISI learnt from the need to work with available materials.

arun · Post by **arun** » 02 Oct 2008 13:19

The article from the Spanish radio station that scooped the story is available at the below link. The document in question is reproduced on the link. Both are in Spanish :

El espionaje español acusa a los servicios secretos pakistaníes de colaborar con Al-Qaeda y los talibanes

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 04 Oct 2008 09:24

X-posted....

Restructuring the ISI

Throughout this period, including that of the Taliban, the CIA continued close collaboration with the ISI, often referring to the ISI as ‘among the most efficient and well organised intelligence organisations in the world’ and as ‘our closest and most reliable partner’. In private, it went so far as to acknowledge that it (CIA) received greater cooperation from the ISI than it did from Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency.

During this period, the ISI was the sole actor supporting and, whenever necessary, participating in the Afghan jihad, and the principal one involved in the originally indigenous uprising in Indian administered Kashmir. {I really admire these Paki elite RAPEs. They make it a point to lie consistently and at every opportunity.}

Consequently, apart from senior officers, a large percentage of middle and even junior ranking officers became infused with admiration for the courage and conviction of the mujahideen. Some became ardent, even stringent, Muslims, even though they had moderate backgrounds; others were religiously inclined to start with and only became more so; all were ardent believers in the concept of and necessity for jihad, whether in Afghanistan or Kashmir, or elsewhere in the world. Many of them were intended to serve out their military careers in the ISI. Some were even re-employed post retirement till superannuation at the age of sixty. {The estimate of 60 to 70% of the PA being Islamist is thus getting reinforced}

In the post 9/11 scenario, when the Pakistani government decided to take a U-turn on its Taliban policy and, a few years later, on its policy of supporting militancy in Kashmir, a large number of ISI personnel felt personally betrayed, including the incumbent Director General Lt Gen Mahmood, who even attempted, successfully on occasions, to subvert then COAS Gen Musharraf’s personal efforts.

Therefore, if in the period between 2000 and 2003, the ISI had been accused of hosting potential rogue elements, there would have been justification for it. However, in 2000, when Gen Mahmood was sacked, Gen Ehsan took over as DG ISI with the principal task of purging it. He was succeeded by Gen Kayani, now COAS, who completed the process: there are now no rogues or pro-jihad elements in the ISI today. {So, the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul in which the ISI was involved came with the direct approval of the PM of Pakistan and the DG of the ISI}

There is, however, one astounding reality. The appointment of the DG ISI used to be the prerogative of the prime minister, another prerogative assumed to himself by Musharraf. Yet, seven months after the newly elected government assumed power, even after it got rid of Musharraf, Lt Gen Nadeem Taj, a known Musharraf loyalist and a Musharraf appointee, continued as DG ISI!

Since it would be unfair to underestimate President Zardari, it is highly unlikely that this controversial retention is an oversight. Therefore, it would be fair to assume that there was method to this apparent madness, not visible to the ordinary eye. Gen Taj has finally been replaced by Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha, who is held in high esteem in the army. The change has occurred in routine, on the retirement of some three-star officers and promotion of others to their vacancies. That, perhaps, might have been one consideration; the change should not be seen as succumbing to US pressure.

sum · Post by **sum** » 10 Oct 2008 08:46

X-posting to keep the thread alive:

So, we have another kaboom in Pak which seems to have totalled the HQ of ATS of Pak..Does this mean that the "legendary" omnipresent ISI without whose permission even a fly cant fart is just a urban legend? While we may heap scorn on our agencies, our lesser regarded agencies have managed to ward off such catastrophic attacks despite the country being filled with 5th columnists.

Does this mean that all the PR about the "greatest and bestest(sic)" ISI is just hot air? What else can explain multiple suicide bombers attacking the heart of the national capital at will twice within a month??
Or could it be that its brightest officers are assigned to the Afghan and Indian desks with the "not upto the mark" personnel being pushed into the internal security desk?

A_Murali · Post by **A_Murali** » 13 Oct 2008 09:32

Pakistan spy chief briefs lawmakers on horrors of Taliban threat

Islamabad - Taliban militants are using children as fighters and suicide bombers, Pakistan's new spy chief told lawmakers in a rare briefing on threats posed by Islamic militants the country's North West Frontier Province (NWFP), media reports and officials said Thursday. Militants are brainwashing innocent children to use them for killing people, Lieutenant General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, who was appointed director general of the military's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) last week, told the closed-door joint session of the parliament's upper and lower houses the previous day.

Horrifying videos and slides shown during the presentation bore images of children, aged 10 to 14, carrying various sorts of lethal weapons, the Urdu-language Jang newspaper reported.

A female lawmaker fainted when a 10-year-old child was shown cutting a person's throat with a knife.

Young men were used in a majority of the suicide attacks carried out in the last couple of years across the country, Pasha told parliament.

The briefing, which continued on Thursday, was called by President Asif Ali Zardari to build national consensus on the country's fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, who recently intensified suicide bombings against security troops, public places and the nation's political leaders.

The ISI chief told the joint house meeting that Pakistan's military had made enormous sacrifices since it joined the international fight against terrorism following al-Qaeda's attacks on Untied States in 2001.

"The lawmakers were informed that 1,368 soldiers were martyred (killed) and 3,348 wounded," military sources told Deutsche Presse-Agentur dpa.

Meanwhile, 581 fighters of Arab and Central Asian origin, believed to be linked with the al-Qaeda network, were eliminated, 311 injured and 330 arrested in actions across the country, said the official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Pakistani security forces carried out several offensives in tribal areas and some districts of NWFP, and killed 2,224 local Taliban militants, injured 1,089 and arrested 2,414 over the last seven years.

The civilian casualties in dozens of suicide or other attacks by militants as well as air air artillery strikes by Pakistani forces were not included in the data.

The closed-chambers briefing is only the third of its kind since 1974 and comes when the nation stands divided on cooperation in the US-led fight against terrorism.

Recent US airstrikes on suspected hideouts of al-Qaeda and Taliban militants have fuelled anger in Pakistan, increasing calls for ending the alliance. Islamists and conservatives are pressing for talks with militants rather than using force against them.

Opposition lawmakers were not completely satisfied with Wednesday's briefing.

Khurram Dastagir Khan, a lawmaker from former prime minister Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), said the briefing was "rather superficial as it only gave us a resume of events, but no diagnosis."

Another PML-N legislator, Ayaz Amir, said questions would be raised during Thursday's briefing "as to how Pakistan was thrown in this war and which country had brought this fire to our doorsteps."

"We need to change this policy to come out of the quagmire in which we have been stuck up to now," he was cited as saying by the English-language Dawn newspaper.

http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show ... hreat.html

sum · Post by **sum** » 13 Oct 2008 10:09

A female lawmaker fainted when a 10-year-old child was shown cutting a person's throat with a knife.

Wonder how many would have fainted if the footage of Paki gunship copters and F-16 bombing entire villages was shown?
It was these same ^$&#% who were rejoicing with each other when turds were cutting Indian trooper throats during the early days of J&K disturbances.Remember Jag,jag..mo,mo...han,han, you Pakis??
Payback time now(from the same actors as before!!!)

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 13 Oct 2008 11:19

Meanwhile, 581 fighters of Arab and Central Asian origin, believed to be linked with the al-Qaeda network, were eliminated, 311 injured and 330 arrested in actions across the country, said the official who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The Pakistanis keep claiming all exotic stuff but, on the ground, there is absolutely no proof.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 14 Oct 2008 20:03

Philip wrote:Viewing the world from the ISI's spyglass.

http://www.dawn.com/weekly/mazdak/mazdak.htm

How our spymasters view the world
By Irfan Husain

IT is difficult to read an article about Afghanistan, the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the UK or the US without coming across a reference to Pakistan’s ubiquitous Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). In fact, the ISI has become our only instantly recognised brand name abroad.

Normally, spooks operate out of the glare of publicity. However, the ISI has become so intertwined with many of the region’s trouble spots that it is blamed for almost every terror attack, whether it is guilty or not. To listen to its many critics abroad, the ISI is a rogue agency that dabbles in Islamic causes from China to Chechnya, and from Bosnia to Bangladesh.

Unfortunately, its domestic record does not inspire the same sense of invincibility and competence. Take the recent attack on Islamabad’s Marriott hotel as an example. Here, a small truck loaded with over half a ton of high explosives was able to penetrate into the heart of a heavily guarded capital, a stone’s throw away from the presidency and parliament. And this is when friends have been stopped much further away, and their cars searched as a matter of routine.

This was only one intelligence failure out of many. Last year’s fiasco over the Lal Masjid complex is still fresh in our memory. Even more damningly, the country is struggling to cope with the extremist insurgency in the tribal and settled areas on our borders with Afghanistan. Unanimously, observers place this problem at the ISI’s door for having created the Taliban, and for having supported them all these years. The agency’s links with Al Qaeda have repeatedly come under the spotlight as well.

The recent changes at the top of the ISI might shift its direction, but the agency will remain opaque and unaccountable for the foreseeable future. All countries have outfits that spy for them, and do their dirty work. Not for nothing has spying been called the world’s second oldest profession. But generally governments have made it a point to separate the domestic (or counter-intelligence) tasks from overseas activities, usually by creating different agencies. Thus, while the FBI operates within the US, the CIA works abroad. Similarly, MI5 is the British counter-intelligence agency tasked with domestic security, while MI6 carries out Westminster’s secret foreign agenda.

Originally, the ISI was established to gather military information abroad, while Military Intelligence (MI) was the counter-intelligence outfit. However, as Shuja Nawaz makes clear in his extensively researched recent book Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within, the ISI was heavily involved in domestic politics under Yahya Khan. The agency continued to play this role under Bhutto, and greatly expanded it under Zia to repress the dictator’s many political foes.

It was during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the eighties that the ISI attained its current reputation. With a vast infusion of cash from the US and Saudi Arabia, the agency was expanded and its budget raised to astronomical levels. Staffed almost entirely by military officers, it remains secretive and unaccountable. To this day, we know next to nothing about this enormous state within a state.

During her brief first stint in power, Benazir Bhutto made an attempt to reform the ISI by appointing a committee to make recommendations. Headed by Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan, it produced a set of recommendations. But frozen into inactivity by the constant attempts to destabilise it (by the ISI, among others), the PPP government was unable to act on them. Since then the agency has continued to accumulate power, and under Musharraf it became a powerful weapon against his opponents.

But these domestic activities have come at a cost. Deeply embroiled in national politics and quixotic adventures abroad, the agency has taken its eye off the ball. The result is a conflagration set off by its own creations among the many extremist outfits it created to fight our proxy wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir.

However, before we blame the ISI for all our woes, we need to see the region and the world through the eyes of our spymasters. One problem with having army officers running the ISI, GHQ and the country for much of the time is that they tend to reinforce each other’s viewpoint. Suspicious and contemptuous of civilians, they are convinced that they, and only they, have the motivation and the strength to protect the country.

With this mindset, when they analyse threats to Pakistan, to the east they see a powerful India — a country that has locked horns rather successfully with our army four times. To the west lies Iran, a neighbour with which we have no territorial disputes. To the north and north-west is Afghanistan, a troubled, turbulent country that our army has traditionally viewed as its backyard, especially after the Soviet incursion and Taliban rule. This is where our generals have looked in their search for an elusive ‘strategic depth’.

In the post-9/11 world, Afghanistan has become the focus of the West’s attention, and serious attempts are finally being made to stabilise and strengthen our neighbour. However, an independent and strong Afghanistan is our GHQ’s worst nightmare: with Indian influence there growing, our military planners fear an alliance between the two countries that would effectively encircle Pakistan.

To prevent this from happening, it is in the ISI’s interest to destabilise Afghanistan. In order to achieve this, the Taliban have to be covertly supported. However, as we have seen, this policy has caused serious problems with our home-grown extremists. Balancing the competing demands of a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, and peaceful extremists within Pakistan, is testing the capabilities of our intelligence agencies, and exposing the limits to their power.

More and more, Pakistan is being blamed for the losses being incurred by western forces in Afghanistan. With mounting casualties, the Americans are being drawn into our tribal areas to combat militants our forces are unwilling or unable to take on. Against their wishes and interests, Pakistan and the US are being sucked into a conflict that can benefit only the forces of extremism.

If we are to step back from the brink, we need to seriously review our options and the threats we face. It is clear that India has no serious territorial claims beyond hanging on to the part of Kashmir it has controlled for the last 60 years. Thus, to keep nearly half a million soldiers on our eastern border when we face a mortal threat from within, as well as from our north-west border, is a strategic blunder of suicidal proportions.

It’s high time we took a close look at the dangers facing us; but to do so, we cannot look through military eyes any more.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 24 Oct 2008 02:08

ISI chief Pasha supervised the August offensive against Pakiban in Swat and in Bajaur. He sacked 13 generals who were running sections and sub departments of ISI. Among them was the director of special ops.

arun · Post by **arun** » 06 Dec 2008 11:00

Pakistan's Jihad

In the war on terror, Islamabad is both with us and against us.

by Bill Roggio & Thomas Joscelyn
12/15/2008, Volume 014, Issue 13

Just two days after the gunmen's siege in Mumbai ended, Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari went on CNN's Larry King Live to plead his case. Even before the Indian authorities had brought the rampage to an end, they were laying blame on their neighbor to the north. And Zardari wanted the world to know they were wrong. "This is not the time to point fingers," Zardari protested. "The state of Pakistan is in no way responsible."

Instead, Zardari said, "I think these are stateless actors who have been operating all throughout the region. …….. The gunmen plus the planners, whoever they are, [are] stateless actors who have been holding hostage the whole world."

Zardari was partly right. In all likelihood, neither he nor his supporters had anything to do with the attacks. So, if you define the "state of Pakistan" as the president and his immediate cohorts, his words ring true. Of course, there is more to Pakistan's government, including its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the powerful military intelligence organization over which Zardari exerts little control. And there are good reasons to suspect that the ISI had a hand in the Mumbai attacks, which killed more than 180 people and wounded nearly 300.

The United States and India have named the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) terror organization as the main perpetrator of the attacks. Indian authorities captured the lone gunman to survive the assault, and he reportedly admitted being trained by the LET. India also claims to have intercepted phone conversations between the Mumbai attackers and one of the LET's leaders in Pakistan. The full investigation will take some time to unfold, so it is too early to name all of those responsible. It is, however, a safe bet that the LET was heavily involved.

Contrary to President Zardari's claims, the LET is no "stateless actor." In fact, the LET is and always was a creature of the ISI.

Throughout the war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United States, as well as other states, all sponsored the Afghan resistance fighters or mujahedeen. But Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were principally responsible for creating and sponsoring the most radical Islamic terrorist groups within the mujahedeen's ranks. This nexus is what first gave us Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda and, later, Mullah Omar's Taliban.

The same nexus also gave us the LET. In fact, bin Laden and his spiritual mentor, Abdullah Azzam, reportedly played instrumental roles in the LET's founding. In the late 1980s, they met with members of the Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI), an Islamist political party in Pakistan, and convinced its leaders to create a militant wing responsible for waging jihad in Kashmir. The result was the LET. And the struggle for control of Jammu and Kashmir, territory sandwiched between China, India, and Pakistan that had been disputed since the partition of 1947, would never be the same.

As the war in Afghanistan came to an end, the ISI began to reallocate its resources. The jihadists had proven their merit as guerrilla fighters, and the ISI found it convenient to use them elsewhere. Veterans of the Afghan conflict formed the LET's first cadres, and, using Saudi cash, the ISI quickly expanded the LET's operations. By the early 1990s, the LET emerged as one of the ISI's primary instruments for waging its proxy war against Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir.

The consequences of the ISI's decision are plain to see. The conflict over Kashmir was relatively terror-free in the late 1980s, but just a few years later Islamist terrorist groups were launching thousands of attacks. As Praveen Swami, a reporter for Frontline magazine in New Delhi, explains in his book India, Pakistan, and the Secret Jihad, there were only 7 terrorist attacks in Jammu and Kashmir in 1988. In 1992, there were 3,920. The total number of civilians killed per year, including Muslims, increased from less than 30 in 1988 to more than 1,000 in 1993. Data on the number of attacks and total casualties vary by source. But according to Swami's estimates, which we find to be conservative, more than 41,000 people, including Indian forces, terrorists, and civilians, died between 1988 and 2005.

India has played its part in the violence in Jammu and Kashmir, but the prime mover has been the ISI and its jihadist proxies, including the LET. The ISI not only gives these groups safe haven and trains and supplies them, it also frequently coordinates their movements. Consider one telling example. In 1999, conventional Pakistani and Indian forces fought for control of Kargil, a mountainous district in northern Kashmir. During the coldest weeks of the conflict, the Indians ceded the highest ridges for warmer ground below. After the Indians left their positions, LET members moved in. The LET held this strategic battleground until their replacements--regulars in Pakistan's army--arrived. Such is the depth of cooperation between the LET and Pakistan's military establishment.

The ISI launched the full-scale jihad in Jammu and Kashmir, but it did not stop there. The LET and several sister organizations also backed by the ISI began attacking India proper long ago. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), another ISI creation focused on Kashmir, has often been the LET's partner in crime. So has the Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen (HM), which was founded with the ISI's help in the late 1980s. And an Indian-based organization called the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), which is sponsored by the ISI and deeply connected to its Pakistani brethren, has been instrumental in launching attacks inside India. These four organizations have killed hundreds. According to the website satp.org (South Asia Terrorist Portal), these groups, along with other smaller allied jihadist organizations, are responsible for dozens of attacks inside India between September 2001 and October 2008.

Until this latest attack, the most devastating assault perpetrated by these groups in recent years occurred on July 11, 2006. On that day, terrorists detonated seven bombs on Mumbai's commuter rails. According to Indian officials, the LET and SIMI were responsible. The attack left more than 200 dead and 700 or so wounded.

It is in this context that 10 or more gunmen laid siege to hotels and other locales in Mumbai in late November. Far from being the work of "stateless actors," the attack was perfectly consistent with the ISI's longstanding policy of waging jihad against India and its interests. In fact, Indian authorities have reportedly found direct evidence of cooperation between the ISI and the LET in the latest attack. The ISI allegedly trained the LET terrorists responsible and provided other logistical support for the operation. Thus, when President Zardari went on CNN to proclaim Pakistan's innocence, he avoided any substantive discussion of the ISI's role.

Even so, Zardari's comments are not altogether meaningless. They touch upon a central fault line in this war on terror. The president of Pakistan has essentially admitted what we should all know by now: There is currently no political force inside Pakistan capable of reining in the ISI and its many jihadist allies. Zardari had hoped for improved relations with India, but he was powerless to stop the Mumbai attacks. The jihadist forces have become entrenched within Pakistani society, which is home to dozens of extremist and terrorist organizations.

Indeed, the extent of the radicalization of Pakistani society is deeply troubling. It is the direct result of decisions made by Pakistani administrations decades ago.

Itinerant preachers had made their way back and forth from the Arabian peninsula for centuries, carrying with them a form of Wahhabism, the official state religion of Saudi Arabia. In time, a Pakistani variant evolved into its own strain of radical Islam called Deobandism. While this made some inroads among Pakistanis, it was not until the late 1970s that Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq made it the official policy of the Pakistani state to support the Deobandis, and radical Islam blossomed.

As Charles Allen notes in his masterly work God's Terrorists, there were only 200 madrassas, or religious schools, on Pakistani soil at the time of the India-Pakistan partition in 1947. By 1972, this figure had grown to 893. Of these Pakistani madrassas, 354 (40 percent) openly espoused Deobandism. After President ul-Haq threw the full support of his military behind the movement and turned on the spigot of Saudi petrodollars, radical Islam really took off. In 2002, Allen notes, Pakistan's minister of religious affairs "put the total number of madrassas in Pakistan at ten thousand, of which …... no fewer than seven thousand" are Deobandi. It was the proliferation of Deobandi madrassas that led directly to the birth of the Taliban, which follows the Deobandi creed and continues to find new recruits among students of Islam. The most radical madrassas instruct more than 1 million students each year and provide a comfortable abode for terrorists planning attacks.

One result is that today the president himself is not safe. The jihadist hydra nearly killed Zardari on September 20, when a truck bomb leveled the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad. Zardari had stopped off to chat with an old friend, narrowly avoiding death. The assassins were more successful with Zardari's wife, Benazir Bhutto, who was killed by jihadists in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, on December 27, 2007.

All of this has important ramifications not only for India and Pakistan, but also for the United States and the rest of the free world. There is no question that Pakistan has played an instrumental role in the war on terror. President Musharraf's regime, including friendly elements within the ISI, killed or captured hundreds of al Qaeda operatives in the wake of September 11. But it is now clear that the ISI's long-term strategy for seizing power throughout South and Central Asia by sponsoring jihadist proxies remains undeterred.

Moreover, this strategy conflicts directly with American interests. Just as the ISI created the LET and its sister organizations, the ISI has also been the primary benefactor of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Even as Pakistan gave the United States vital assistance in the war on terror, the ISI continued to sponsor America's enemies behind her back. There are numerous examples that can be cited.

Both NATO officers and Afghan officials have long maintained that the Taliban's Shura, or leadership council, is based in the Pakistani city of Quetta. In May 2006, Colonel Chris Vernon, then the chief of staff for Coalition forces in southern Afghanistan, told the Guardian that this was common knowledge. "The thinking piece of the Taliban is out of Quetta in Pakistan," Vernon said in an interview. "It's the major headquarters. They use it to run a series of networks in Afghanistan." Other anonymous U.S. and NATO officials backed up Vernon's statements.

Afghan president Hamid Karzai went so far as to say he knew the exact location of Taliban chieftain Mullah Omar and had passed on this information to the Pakistani government, only to have it ignored. "Mullah Omar is for sure in Quetta in Pakistan. And he knows that and I know that," Karzai told the Council on Foreign Relations in September 2006. "And we have given [President Musharraf] information. We have even given him the GPS numbers of his house, of Mullah Omar's house, and the telephone numbers."

Despite these warnings, the Taliban's leadership has remained free. The ISI has ensured their safety. But the ISI's complicity in the Taliban's and al Qaeda's terrorism goes far beyond the provision of safe haven.

Pakistani intelligence officers have been caught aiding America's foes inside Afghanistan. In December 2006, Afghan security forces captured Sayed Akbar, an ISI officer. Akbar had been tasked by Pakistani intelligence with serving as a conduit to al Qaeda, which was operating along the Afghan-Pakistani border in the Kunar region.

An aide to President Karzai told reporters that "evidence and documents [had] been seized with [Akbar] proving his destructive activities in Afghanistan." Afghan officials said Akbar confessed to conducting "illegal activities" in Afghanistan. According to Akbar, he had escorted Osama bin Laden as he traveled from Afghanistan's Nuristan province into the mountainous district of Chitral in northwestern Pakistan in 2005. While there have been numerous bin Laden sightings along the Afghan-Pakistani border, he was reported to have been sheltered in Chitral at this time. In fact, FBI agents visited Chitral in early 2006 to assess the reports.

Perhaps the most brazen example of the ISI's support for the Taliban and other terror groups operating in Afghanistan occurred in the mountainous Afghan border province of Nangarhar. Lieutenant Colonel Chris Nash, the commander of an embedded training team that advised Afghan border police, dropped a bombshell last September when his presentation on his time in Afghanistan from September 2006 to March 2007 made the rounds on the Internet.

A slide in the presentation claimed the ISI was supporting U.S. enemies fighting in Afghanistan. The slide read: "ISI involved in direct support to many enemy operations ……. classification prevents further discussion of this point." The support included "training, funding, [and] logistics."

Nash said multiple U.S. and Afghan intelligence reports indicated that the ISI "flew repeated helicopter missions into Afghanistan to resupply the Taliban during a fierce battle in June 2007," according to the Army Times. The ISI helicopters resupplied a "base camp" in the Tora Bora region in Nangarhar, where Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda fought pitched battles with the U.S. military and Afghan militias before retreating into Pakistan.

The camp was run by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami, an insurgent group long sponsored by the ISI, as well as the Taliban and al Qaeda. "A helo flew in the valley, went over to where we knew there was a base camp, landed, [and] 15 minutes later took off," Nash said. The helicopters made three separate flights to resupply the joint insurgent force. "From NDS [Afghan intelligence] sources that we had in the opposing camp, [we know] they were offloading supplies," Nash told the Army Times. Nash explained that the resupply efforts took place over the course of three months.

The most recent and damning allegation of ISI perfidy in Afghanistan was leveled by U.S. intelligence after a suicide bomber rammed a car packed with explosives into the outer wall of the Indian embassy in Kabul. Fifty-four people, including an Indian defense attaché, were killed in the July 7 bombing.

The Indian embassy bombing was carried out by the notorious Haqqani Network, run by former mujahedeen leader Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj. Both Jalaluddin and Siraj have close ties with al Qaeda's leader, Osama bin Laden.

The Haqqanis have extensive links with al Qaeda and the Taliban, and their relationship with the ISI has allowed their network to survive and thrive in its fortress stronghold of North Waziristan. The Haqqanis control large swaths of the tribal area and run a parallel administration with courts, recruiting centers, tax offices, and security forces. They have established multiple training camps and safe houses used by al Qaeda leaders and operatives, as well as by Taliban foot soldiers preparing to fight in Afghanistan.

American intelligence agencies confronted the Pakistani government with evidence of direct ISI involvement in the bombing of the Indian embassy, the New York Times reported in August. "The conclusion was based on intercepted communications between Pakistani intelligence officers and militants who carried out the attack, the officials said, providing the clearest evidence to date that Pakistani intelligence officers are actively undermining American efforts to combat militants in the region."

The ISI officers involved in the Kabul bombings were not "renegades," the New York Times reported, and the intercepts indicated that "their actions might have been authorized by superiors." U.S. intelligence officials also said "elements of Pakistan's government seemed to be directly aiding violence in Afghanistan that had included attacks on American troops" and were providing intelligence to Taliban and al Qaeda operatives on the U.S. covert air campaign targeting terror leaders in Pakistan's tribal areas. The Haqqani Network has been a prime target of these attacks; almost 60 percent of U.S. airstrikes this year have occurred in North Waziristan.

In the wake of the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, the ISI reshuffled its leadership. But the changes were most likely cosmetic. As the attacks in Mumbai illustrate, the ISI continues to sponsor terrorism. Indeed, the attacks in Mumbai were yet another wake-up call for the United States and the West.

Decades ago the ISI made a pact with the devil. There is no evidence that it can be redeemed any time soon. Given the ISI's deep roots within Pakistan's culture and its capacity to drive policy even against the wishes of the elected officials, curtailing the power of this rogue agency will be difficult at best. Indeed, the ISI is now one of the principal backers of radical Islam in the world.

The allure of Islamist extremism runs deep in Pakistan's officer corps. For many, this is an ideological war. Consider what "retired" ISI general Hamid Gul, who still exerts much influence in Pakistan, said in 2003:

God will destroy the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan and wherever it will try to go from there. The Muslim world must stand united to confront the United States in its so-called War on Terrorism, which is in reality a war against Muslims. Let's destroy America wherever its troops are trapped.

The same mentality compels the ISI and its surrogates to claim territory in the name of Islam. Pakistan's jihad in India and Kashmir is not just the product of a decades-old geopolitical rivalry. For the ISI, it is part of a Manichaean struggle between the forces of Islam and the rest of the world. As Praveen Swami notes in his book, the LET's leadership has openly talked of conquering large swaths of India on behalf of Muslims. After the Kargil war of 1999, LET chieftain Hafiz Muhammad Saeed threatened, "The real war will be inside [India]." He swore his forces would "unfurl the Islamic flag on the Red Fort." As Swami explains, the Red Fort in New Delhi "has been a long-standing motif in Islamist Discourse, as old as Partition itself." It is no wonder that in the wake of the Mumbai attacks, the Indians have demanded that the Pakistanis turn Saeed over. But it is doubtful that the Pakistani military will comply.

In the current crisis, the military shows signs of closing ranks with extremist elements as fears of a conflict with India increase. Just days after the Mumbai attacks, an army corps commander described Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud as a "patriot" and said the conflict with the Taliban in the northwest was merely due to "misunderstandings." In turn, the Taliban-dominated tribes pledged to send three million fighters to the Indian frontier in the event of a conflict.

Past efforts to purge the military of officers sympathetic to or openly supportive of the extremist cause have had only limited success. Former President Pervez Musharraf conducted multiple purges of the ISI after the September 11 attacks and attempts on his own life, but they had limited effect. Recently, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, a Bhutto loyalist, tried to bring the ISI under government control, but met resistance. Within 24 hours, the announcement that the ISI would be placed under the office of the prime minister had been rescinded.

The United States is now faced with an awful truth. Pakistan is both an ally and an enemy. The attacks in Mumbai are only the latest demonstration of the tactics the ISI is willing to sponsor in its quest for power in the subcontinent and beyond. We should be mindful that ISI-sponsored terrorism is a central component of our enemies' worldwide designs. It should not come as a surprise if someday we find ISI-backed terrorists laying siege to New York or Washington, just as they lately brought carnage to Mumbai.

Bill Roggio is managing editor of the website Long War Journal and adjunct fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Thomas Joscelyn is the senior editor of the Long War Journal.

The Weekly Standard

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 Dec 2008 03:00

Op-Ed. Telegraph, Kolkota, 18 Dec 2008

DANGEROUS PLAYERS IN AN ELABORATE CHARADE
Given the long history of US support enjoyed by the Inter-Services Intelligence, India faces a tough challenge ahead, writes Abhijit Bhattacharyya

Help wanted

Hamid Gul, the sixth boss of the Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan, assumed charge at the height of the Soviet-Afghan war in April 1987 and was witness to six memorable events connected with his country: first, the death of his military boss and the nation’s president, General Zia-ul-Haq, in an air crash on Wednesday, August 17, 1988, in Bahawalpur. Second was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Kabul, beginning February 15, 1989. Third was the beginning of civil war in Afghanistan following the vacuum created by the Soviet defeat and US withdrawal. Fourth, the accession of Benazir Bhutto as the first woman prime minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Fifth was his brazen support to the Khalistan movement, and the last was the masterminding of the Kashmir turbulence, before abdicating the post of the director-general, ISI, in May 1989.

Born in Sargodha in 1935, commissioned in the Armoured Corps in 1954, and having served, first as the director-general of military intelligence, then of the ISI, and finally as the lieutenant-general of the Strike Corps II in Multan, Gul is remembered more for his 27-month stint at the ISI than for anything else. General Zia-ul-Haq picked up Gul for his hardcore Islamic views as the former was keen to radically Islamize the Pakistani army. Gul successfully nurtured right-wing politicians and created Islami Jamhoori Ittehad, a religion-based political party to counter Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party. Although he failed to stop Benazir from becoming the prime minister, he succeeded in incurring her wrath, which paved the way for his ouster from the ISI in May 1989.

When the Soviets began withdrawing from Kabul in February 1989, Gul’s tactics of direct action to capture Jalalabad to install a puppet Afghan government with the help of the Mujahideen, ended in total failure due to the inability of the Mujahideen to switch over from their traditional expertise of guerrilla warfare to conventional military operations. On the Khalistan front, Gul was equally adventurous and innovative as he felt that “backing the Sikh separatists was the only way of pre-empting any fresh Indian threat to Pakistan’s territorial integrity”. He finally believed that “keeping the Indian Punjab destabilized is equivalent to the Pakistani army having an extra division at no cost to the Pakistani taxpayers”.

Today, Indians should scan through leading newspapers from 1987 to 1989 to find out how many innocent lives were lost, how and where. Indians should reflect on the contemporary reports from 1989, when Benazir was new to the machinations of the Pakistani army and the ISI, which were headed respectively by the Azamgarh-born refugee (mojahir), Mirza Aslam Beg, and the Sargodha-born Punjabi, Hamid Gul — the two anti-democracy stalwarts, who accepted the first female prime minister in Pakistan more out of compulsion than choice.

Politically too, the ISI, during Gul’s tenure, successfully created the coalition of the anti-Benazir religio-political force, called IJI. Gul, therefore, stood out not only as a military general and a spy-master but also showed features of a religious preacher and political leader.

Gul’s succession to the post of the ISI chief in April 1987, however, was partly owing to his being a favourite of the station chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, Milton Bearden, and the then US Ambassador to Pakistan, Arnold Lewis Raphel, both of whom considered Gul as an ally waging the jihad of the Mujahideen against Kremlin in Kabul, and a potential national leader of Pakistan. The US-Gul honeymoon, however, was short-lived, owing to Washington’s loss of interest, as the mission of military mayhem of Marxist Moscow was complete. This re-energized the free-for-all fight among Muslim militants, militia, middlemen and the merchants of death in the vast arid land of Afghanistan. Subsequently, the fury of the United States of America multiplied, as evidence appeared in the late Nineties that Gul, despite being a retired man, somehow was able to give the Taliban an advance warning of the US attempts to assassinate Osama bin Laden with missile strikes. The worst allegation against Gul followed in 2004 in the US media that the former ISI boss was a key participant in the 9/11 plot and “Osama bin Laden’s master planner”.

President George W. Bush had recently asked, “Who controls the ISI?” The world today is asking this question too, but very few, so far, has paid any heed to bleeding India’s recurring plea to take a united stand against the machinations of the military, mullah, and militants of Pakistan, a combination that makes the ISI not only the State within a State but also something more than that. The ISI is not merely a “non-state actor” as referred to by the leader of the Opposition in the Indian Parliament on December 11, 2008. The ISI is a parallel State that gets money from Islamabad’s exchequer, but operates on auto-pilot with several State actors as well as extra-territorial factors that determine its course, direction, aim, speed and the angle of attack on its targets by pouring in money

Thus, Pakistan government apart, the nearest and dearest traditional supporters of the ISI have been the US, the CIA and some countries in the Middle-East. History shows that the likes of Gul first played the role of a pawn and subsequently that of a power-broker from the wrong side of the fence. Today, the reality is that the US is unlikely go against the ISI and Pakistan beyond a point. Or else history will expose the US’s actions, which, of course, were born out of the strategic compulsions of the superpower. Thus, despite the love-hate relationship between the CIA and the ISI, Associated Press reported on July 22, 2004, that the “9/11 Commission Report fails to mention possible ISI connection to 9/11”. This, despite reports that the commission was given a document by a high-level, anonymous source claiming that the “ISI was fully involved in devising and helping the entire 9/11 plot.” The document blames Gul for being the “central participant in the plot.” It noted that Gul is a self-avowed “admirer” of bin Laden and that the CIA considers Gul to be “the most dangerous man in Pakistan”. A senior Pakistani political leader said, “I have reason to believe Hamid Gul was Osama bin Laden’s master planner.” The 9/11 document also suggested that “Pakistan’s appearance of fighting al Qaeda is merely an elaborate charade and top military and intelligence officials in Pakistan still closely sympathize with bin Laden’s ideology.” Despite this exposure, the 9/11 commission’s final report rarely mentioned the ISI.

The only significant mention is a brief comment that the ISI was the Taliban’s “primary patron”. The director-general, ISI, lieutenant-general Mahmood Ahmed (1999-2001) is mentioned twice, both in the context of post-9/11 diplomacy. It is noted that the details of 9/11 plot were widely known by the Taliban leadership, but the report fails to consider if the Taliban shared this knowledge with their “primary patron.” Far from criticizing Pakistan, the commission praises the country for its support in the war on terror and suggests that the “US should greatly increase its foreign aid there”. Given this attitude, India should recall the popular adage, “God helps those who help themselves.” The geopolitics of realpolitik can only be ignored at India’s own peril.

We started the ISI thread long before the terrorist attack as we recognize the ISI is a Great game agency created by the past masters via Aussie generals.

neerajb · Post by **neerajb** » 22 Dec 2008 21:38

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/w ... 380189.ece

A monster out of control: Pakistan secret agents tell of militant links

The Islamic fundamentalists who run the Markaz-e-Taiba complex near Lahore like to boast that it was inspired by Aitchison College, Pakistan's poshest private school. It is, as they describe it, the Eton of Wahhabi Islam, complete with polo ponies and a swimming pool.

Yet when it comes to their links to Pakistan's intelligence service and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the militant group blamed for last month's attacks in Mumbai, they seem to suffer from collective amnesia. “We've never had any connection to either,” Mohammed Abbas, the administrator of the complex, told The Times.

But it was here, in April 2001, that Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, LeT's leader at the time, called a meeting of his supporters in the 75-acre complex of red-brick buildings and neat lawns. Most of the visitors wore the obligatory long beards, but among them was an elderly man with no beard, only a thin, military-style moustache.

He was Hamid Gul, the former head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. “Yes, I visited there,” General Gul told The Times. “Retired army officers used to go, too. They used to hold annual fixtures to raise funds and motivate people.”

General Gul, 72, was the ISI chief from 1987-89 and had long since retired by 2001. Since the attacks in Mumbai, however, such meetings have added weight to India's assertion that Pakistani intelligence has close ties to LeT and other militant groups involved in attacks on Indian soil.

Pakistan's Government is under unprecedented international pressure to sever any such links and “rein in” an intelligence agency that is widely regarded as a law unto itself. Indian officials say that the ISI was complicit in Mumbai, and that the one captured militant has confessed to receiving training from a former ISI officer.

Washington wants four former ISI officers, including General Gul, to be added to the UN terrorist list. Senator John Kerry, the new head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also made a direct appeal to President Zardari on a visit to the region last week. “It is imperative that the intelligence service of Pakistan [is not able] to make its own choices or operate outside of the standards that we have a right to expect,” Mr Kerry said.

The question is whether Mr Zardari is strong enough to comply: the ISI vetoed his efforts to place it under the Interior Ministry and to send its chief to India after the Mumbai attacks. Many Pakistanis also feel that the Government cannot comply without undermining their strategic interests in Kashmir and Afghanistan.

The ISI makes no secret of its former support for LeT and other militants as proxies to fight Indian rule in Kashmir and to offset India's influence in Afghanistan. “These jihadis were there and we supported them. I think any intelligence agency worth its name would have done the same,” one senior ISI officer told The Times.

His next remark summed up much of today's relationship between the ISI and the likes of LeT: “It's a monster we created and now we can't get it back in the bottle.”

The ISI had forged ties with jihadist groups throughout the 1980s when the CIA used it to support the Mujahidin against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. When an uprising began in Indian-ruled Kashmir in 1989, the ISI saw an opportunity to weaken its neighbour. General Asad Durrani, ISI chief from 1990-92, denied supporting LeT in his tenure, but admitted that Pakistan had an interest in supporting such groups. “Given Kashmir's history, we can't be expected to remain uninterested,” he said.

The ISI officially severed links with LeT in 2002 after the group attacked India's Parliament, but Indian and US intelligence believe that it maintained covert support, probably through ex-ISI officers. Generals Gul and Durrani and the serving officer all admitted that some retired ISI agents may have shared the ideology of the militants.

All three said that it would be impossible to channel serious support to militants from inside or outside the ISI without the knowledge of the agency's leadership. As for the Mumbai attacks, they said that it was not in the ISI's interests to antagonise Washington and provoke another conflict with India during an economic crisis.

Many Indian and Western analysts agree, saying that the ISI probably trained LeT militants but was not directly involved in Mumbai. “There almost certainly are still ISI links to LeT, but the question is how much operational control does the ISI have?” Lisa Curtis, a former CIA analyst and South Asia expert at the Heritage Foundation, said.

She and other experts are urging Mr Zardari to appoint a civilian head of the ISI and dismantle all the militant groups it has supported. The ISI is unlikely to accept either solution until the international community also addresses Pakistan's concerns in Kashmir and Afghanistan. “Cleansing the ISI is America's dream, but this is Pakistan's first line of defence,” said General Gul. “It keeps the country united.”

Controversial ISI leaders

Hamid Gul 1987-89: admits ties to LeT leadership; banned from travel to Britain

Asad Durrani 1990-92: admits support for militant groups; fierce critic of US

Javed Nasir 1992-93: now belongs to an Islamic missionary movement

Nasim Rana 1995-98: began arming and training the Taleban in Afghanistan

Ziauddin Butt 1998-99: maintained close relationship with the Taleban government

Mahmood Ahmed 1999-2001: dismissed under pressure from the US after the September 11 attacks because of his Taleban links

Ashfaq Parvez Kayani 2004-07: favoured by the US, went on to become current Army chief

Ahmad Shuja Pasha 2008: formerly oversaw operations against militants in northern Pakistan

Cheers....

joshvajohn · Post by **joshvajohn** » 27 Dec 2008 00:34

I would like to ask many bigger questions -
such as what were the connections between drug dealings and ISI
how the connections of money exchange is done with earnings from drug supplies and then arm supplies with an awareness of ISI or even with the help of ISI?

the previous ISI fellow told that they were aware of sept 11 as an organised event?!! Was ISI aware of such events?

Is there a way Terror and intelligence cooperate to reach the same ends?

How far the intelligence in general should be accountable to the international govts? There should be a resolution in UN about the role of intelligence and also if they are found wrong there should be a public inquiry into the matters?

ISI seems to manipulate the Pak Army and play the threat of army over the govt as a possible blackmail to support and activiate their terrorism?

Do ISI gets information about Indian facilities for attack and provide them to Terrorist groups such as parliament attack?

Many things have to come up openly...

Rishirishi · Post by **Rishirishi** » 29 Dec 2008 05:57

We hear a lot about ISI. But the greater issue is how strong support or cooperation the agency has with Pakistan armed forces?

If the US really wanted, they could have forced Pakistans state bank into colapse and taken and forced the ministry of finance to cut funding for military projects.

ukhrul · Post by **ukhrul** » 29 Dec 2008 15:10

ISI have gained a lot from the recent development, moving the army from Afghan border, they have allowed AlQaeda to get shelter in Pakistan, using the pretext of Indian aggression. So this way they managed to restore the damaged image of the Paki army in front of the jehadis.

joshvajohn · Post by **joshvajohn** » 29 Dec 2008 17:14

I also have a feeling that some individual persons or some people in Western intelligence want to protect their secrets and so wish to protect ISI personals or terrorist link personal who worked closely with them to carry out similar ends. Unless the governments in the West demand their intelligence to brief them on these issues, even the presidents and prime ministers of these countries are ignorant about these issues altogether in the name of national top secrets. While some of these may not go public but these intelligence personal should undergo a proper enquiry into these links and those who engaged in drug-arm-terror links should be held accountable. Unless these are worked out, the terror support within Western intelligence forces will remain more dangerous for their own countries and people!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
At times they are hijacked with revelation of such knowledge itself. If you do not support us (terrorists) and do not put pressure on our government (such as Pakistan) to arrest and hand over us to other countries (including US), we will reveal your secrets!!!!! This is what ISI or some terror linked agencies would say to these intelligence!

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 27 Feb 2009 21:49

X-posted from the TSP thread....

Rudradev wrote:
anjali wrote:If only the US would stop the incessant aid to TSP and let it die a miserable sorry death (that it so deserves)...

http://www.newser.com/article/d96iph7g0 ... ilure.html

@#$$%%^&* WTF...is there no damn justice in this world ? This whole US aid to TSP makes absolutely no sense...

Anjali:

Yes it does, it makes a lot of sense. We just have to switch off the "halo effect" for a moment and look at the US and its mechanisms for promoting national interest.

You'll find it an open secret that the ISI learned everything it knows from the CIA. Pakistan has been an ally of the US ever since it became a member of SEATO in 1955.

In those days the USA was a brand new superpower. It was guided by the British in developing policy towards all the former British-Empire territories and their surrounding regions. These regions included the Middle East and Central Asia... very crucial for their oil deposits and as a bulwark against the USSR.

The British did not trust newly-independent India because they thought Nehru was too leftist to faithfully do the Americans' bidding. So they fully backed Pakistan as their chosen agent of American policy in the region. Accordingly, the Americans started pumping aid into Pakistan at that time and have basically carried on doing so ever since.

Not only that, but Pakistan's army was seen as a key instrument in the hands of America to stop the USSR's Communist expansion, and to help control the Islamic Middle East. In order to perform these tasks, it was necessary that the Pakistan army should have a top-quality intelligence service. So the British, through an officer named Major General Cawthorne, gave birth to the ISI in 1948.

Just a few months before, in September 1947, the United States' National Security act established the American intelligence agency that we now know as the CIA. It was from the British that the fledgling CIA received its education in all aspects of intelligence operations and doctrine for former British-Empire territories and their neighbouring regions of influence.

Thus the CIA's Office of Near East and South Asia Analysis, and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, are in fact Siamese Twins. Siblings nurtured from birth by a common parent, the British SIS and Foreign Office, to perform complementary and mutually inter-dependent roles in the pursuit of what was then a common goal. To stop Russian Communism, and maintain Western influence over the crucial oilfields of the Middle East.

From then until now, the US' dealings with the Indian Subcontinent and Middle East have mainly focused on security interests. Thus, the CIA has been an extremely influential source of advice and its input has always been sought whenever the US Government needed to formulate policy towards these regions.

And of course, the CIA's office of Near East and South Asia Analysis has always been a true, loyal and devoted twin brother to its Pakistani counterpart, the ISI. They are bachpan se jigri dost. They are bhai-bhai to an extent, perhaps unmatched by any other pair of transnational organizations in the world. They have a relationship of interdependence and mutual loyalty to an extent that is actually hard to imagine.

Compared to such a relationship, incidents like 9-11 are nothing: the merest blink of an eye, a tiny aberration, a little misunderstanding between brothers. The CIA will always, always back the ISI's view on all matters regarding the Indian subcontinent, because of the mammoth institutional inertia imposed by the two agencies' fraternal ties.

So you can count on the fact that, any input towards US foreign policy from the CIA... whether it involves giving aid to Pakistan, or blaming India, or promoting Kashmiri secession... will invariably resonate with the interests of the ISI. And because Washington doesn't have any other organization in the region with anywhere close to the depth and breadth of experience as the CIA, the most influential voice in determining US foreign policy towards the region will continue to be the CIA. That is why the US aid to Pakistan makes sense, and will continue to make sense.