Deterrence
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Re: Deterrence
At the question of the recent threat by General Raheel Sharif, of using a tactical nuclear weapon in response to our Cold Start. And the possibility of such a use by the Pakistan Army on these Air Borne troops securing the Projection Area, say in general area of Bahawalpur and Multan. These officers informed, that any land where the Indian Army soldier sets foot, is a deemed Indian territory. Any misadventure by the Pakistan Army of even showing an intent of using a nuclear weapon, let alone the ..
Read more at:
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... t-history/
Read more at:
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news ... t-history/
Re: Deterrence
It suddenly occurred to me that this is a warning aimed straight at Pakistan's nuclear planners such as might exist:
It means that nuking Indian forces will not be allowed as a leg-bye where Pakistan can claim that they used a nuke on their own territory. Once an Indian soldier is in Pakistan that land is Indian territory and nuking that soldier is nuking Indian territory and will invite nuclear retaliationthat any land where the Indian Army soldier sets foot, is a deemed Indian territory.
Re: Deterrence
The quote is from officers in the DGMO. So enjoy it but not too seriously. From a doctrine perspective, the doctrine already covers attacks on Indian forces - anywhere.
Re: Deterrence
Some interesting details on Physics Package and Yeald of Nuclear Device on Russian Cruise missile
http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.ph ... ssile.html
So it seems like TK 66-05 is a TN device with physics package of 140 Kg and yeald of 250 kt
TK-60 which arms the Oniks which is same as Brahmos has a 90 kg Physics Package and low yeald of 10 kt , most likely a pure fission device.
http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.ph ... ssile.html
The Kalibr is a direct descendant of the Soviet-made 3M-10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) sea-launched cruise missile system - its heavy upgrade, in fact. Soviet-made nuclear warheads - 200-kiloton TK 66-02s in the first place - may be easily demothballed and mounted on the advanced missiles. The TK 66-02 type fitted not only the Granat, but the Kh-55 air-launched and 3M-12 Relief cruise missiles as well (the latter better known as RK-55).
The improved 250-kt TK 66-05 model fitted only the Kh-55SM missile. Both warheads weight 140 kg. Another variant is the lighter - 90-kg - 10-kt TK-60 low-yield warhead developed specifically to equip the 3M55 Oniks (SS-N-26 Strobile) antiship missile.
So it seems like TK 66-05 is a TN device with physics package of 140 Kg and yeald of 250 kt
TK-60 which arms the Oniks which is same as Brahmos has a 90 kg Physics Package and low yeald of 10 kt , most likely a pure fission device.
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Re: Deterrence
**
Details of a recently established Pakistani military complex, purported to house tactical nuclear missiles, close to the international border in Punjab have emerged on the social media.
Overhead imagery of the site, at Rahwali Cantonment near Gujranwala, reveals two transport-erector-launcher vehicles, assessed to be those of the Nasr short-range missile, along with support vehicles laid out for inspection.
The site is 70 km from the international border and 100 km from both Amritsar and Jammu, lying in the trough of the strategically vital Shakargarh bulge that had witnessed key battles in 1965 and 1971. Along this bulge lies the vital link to Jammu and Kashmir, with the National Highway passing close to the border.
Images, dated January 27, along with an assessment, have been posted by an officer specialising in imagery interpretation on his personal page. The well-fortified complex, which includes hardened shelters with blast doors, garages, ammunition bunkers, administrative and support areas, is believed to have been constructed in August 2014.
Experts feel a missile base close to the border indicates deployment of tactical or “low yield” nuclear weapons that could be employed to counter an Indian onslaught even if the weapons’ impact area lies inside Pakistani territory. The very brief flight time of short range missiles gives very little reaction time, making it difficult to counter them.
In November last year, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary for the first time acknowledged Pakistan’s plans to use low-yield nukes in a bid to forestall Indian advances across the border. Pakistan claims to have several short range missiles that can be used to deliver tactical warheads, besides longer range ballistic missiles to target strategic assets.**
http://www.defencenews.in/article/Pakis ... itsar-4675
Details of a recently established Pakistani military complex, purported to house tactical nuclear missiles, close to the international border in Punjab have emerged on the social media.
Overhead imagery of the site, at Rahwali Cantonment near Gujranwala, reveals two transport-erector-launcher vehicles, assessed to be those of the Nasr short-range missile, along with support vehicles laid out for inspection.
The site is 70 km from the international border and 100 km from both Amritsar and Jammu, lying in the trough of the strategically vital Shakargarh bulge that had witnessed key battles in 1965 and 1971. Along this bulge lies the vital link to Jammu and Kashmir, with the National Highway passing close to the border.
Images, dated January 27, along with an assessment, have been posted by an officer specialising in imagery interpretation on his personal page. The well-fortified complex, which includes hardened shelters with blast doors, garages, ammunition bunkers, administrative and support areas, is believed to have been constructed in August 2014.
Experts feel a missile base close to the border indicates deployment of tactical or “low yield” nuclear weapons that could be employed to counter an Indian onslaught even if the weapons’ impact area lies inside Pakistani territory. The very brief flight time of short range missiles gives very little reaction time, making it difficult to counter them.
In November last year, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary for the first time acknowledged Pakistan’s plans to use low-yield nukes in a bid to forestall Indian advances across the border. Pakistan claims to have several short range missiles that can be used to deliver tactical warheads, besides longer range ballistic missiles to target strategic assets.**
http://www.defencenews.in/article/Pakis ... itsar-4675
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Re: Deterrence
Wouldn't a deployment so close to the border be easy for an Indian first strike IF IA decides on a punjab lightning strike? I mean, if LCA 1000kg bomb can do a standoff delivery from 100km away(as discussed in the missile thread), why are the pakis lighting themselves up under the burqas so close? 72 death wish?
By 'easy' I meant, the overall logistics compared to a deep penetration strike with tankers, cover fighters , EC suppression. at this distance, an LCA would hardly need to be 10-20Km into/within Pakiland ?
By 'easy' I meant, the overall logistics compared to a deep penetration strike with tankers, cover fighters , EC suppression. at this distance, an LCA would hardly need to be 10-20Km into/within Pakiland ?
Re: Deterrence
Read the recent Indian Army exercise Shatrujeet which involved para-drops and 100 km deep battle field.
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Re: Deterrence
quite what the point of this dhoti shivering, show-our-privates column I don't know but it's definitely brain farts
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/t ... 581468.ece
And the last para is straight out of Saurabh Joshi's playbook; show the world all details of nuke stuff
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/t ... 581468.ece
Oh no no, don't try to crush Porkis in their moment of economic weakness they're mad mullahs with da bum.However, the clear and present danger to the subcontinent stems from the intent behind Pakistan’s piling up of nuclear weapons. These weapons are not for show, and key functionaries in Pakistan have threatened their use against India. Equally, an extremist mindset in India in taking national security decisions must be eschewed.
India’s hawks naively believe that Pakistan intends its nuclear arsenal merely as a deterrent. If a Kargil-type scenario happens in reverse and the conflict escalates to new fronts, India and the world would not want to test the rationality of Pakistan’s nuclear decision-makers.
Exchanging information on each other’s nuclear doctrines and a robust, consistent discussion on possible nuclear confidence-building measures, and quiet attempts to arrest the tide of sliding bilateral relations could be the best scenario on the 18th anniversary of Pokhran-II.
And the last para is straight out of Saurabh Joshi's playbook; show the world all details of nuke stuff
Re: Deterrence
^^^ Above is a feeble attempt at criticizing the POK-2 tests.
He contradicts in the beginning of his article itself.
But the article is par for the course for anti-national Hindu.
He contradicts in the beginning of his article itself.
IOW Pak already had tested weapons while India had to test to show they work.It must be remembered that while India’s decision to test was a proactive one, the Pakistani call to test was a reaction, a response. Had India not gone first, it would have been nearly impossible for Islamabad to test.
Though nuclear devices were clearly available to Pakistan for some time, the country’s permanent establishment lay low, choosing a policy of ambiguity or suggesting through the media that they possessed a nuclear deterrent.
But the article is par for the course for anti-national Hindu.
Re: Deterrence
And the pivot corps' follow-up exercise.ramana wrote:Read the recent Indian Army exercise Shatrujeet which involved para-drops and 100 km deep battle field.
Re: Deterrence
18 years after PokII time to relook at MND as the neighborhood is getting worse and power equations are changing.
Declining US and rising China tango
Pak and NoKo collusion in missiles and nuke technology.
Declining US and rising China tango
Pak and NoKo collusion in missiles and nuke technology.
Re: Deterrence
I hear news that India is postponing the purchase of the S-400 system due to "Lack of Funds" per Anonymous official in the MoD
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Re: Deterrence
Gagan all maya onlee, it is coming for sure
Re: Deterrence
The relook has been promised in the BJP manifesto. All the government has to do is fulfill its promise. But first reconstitute the NSAB, lying defunct since last year.ramana wrote:18 years after PokII time to relook at MND as the neighborhood is getting worse and power equations are changing.
Declining US and rising China tango
Pak and NoKo collusion in missiles and nuke technology.
Re: Deterrence
X posted from the “India Nuclear News and Discussion 4 July 2011” thread.
“India’s Nuclear Options and Escalation Dominance” by Toby Dalton & George Perkovich:
Carnegie Endowment For International Peace
“India’s Nuclear Options and Escalation Dominance” by Toby Dalton & George Perkovich:
Carnegie Endowment For International Peace
Since the early 2000s, Indian strategists have wrestled with the challenge of motivating Pakistan to demobilize anti-India terrorist groups while managing the potential for conflict escalation during a crisis. The growing prominence of nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s national security strategy casts a shadow of nuclear use over any potential military strategy India might consider to strike this balance. However, augmenting its nuclear options with tactical nuclear weapons is unlikely to bolster Indian deterrence in convincing ways. ……………………
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Re: Deterrence
Today (Buddha Poornima) Buddha smiled some years back
Re: Deterrence
it was May 11 right?prasannasimha wrote:Today (Buddha Poornima) Buddha smiled some years back
Re: Deterrence
^^^ Smiling Buddha May 18, 1974
Operation Shakti May 11 & 13, 1998
Operation Shakti May 11 & 13, 1998
Re: Deterrence
Pakistan, India and Nukes
AAD means a second strike capability? How? Now, Pakistan is saying that India should not even develop defensive weapons, should allow Pakistan to strike first because it has a 'First Use' policy and then keep quiet after absorbing the nuke strikes.However, the new version of this [AAD] missile signifies the fact that India is indeed preparing for a second-strike capability,
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Re: Deterrence
They are trying to justify their increased nuke productions, tactical weapons & sub based weapons plan.
We should encourage the Pakis to go for nuke subs. They will probably make people eat grass for 2-3 nuke subs or deploy them on conventional subs.
The fact that "crown jewels" will be away from the Pureland in a platform which are "prone to difficult to investigate accidents",should be encouraged.
When someone sinks a Paki sub with nukes in peace time, without owning up, who will the Pakis blame?
We should encourage the Pakis to go for nuke subs. They will probably make people eat grass for 2-3 nuke subs or deploy them on conventional subs.
The fact that "crown jewels" will be away from the Pureland in a platform which are "prone to difficult to investigate accidents",should be encouraged.
When someone sinks a Paki sub with nukes in peace time, without owning up, who will the Pakis blame?
Re: Deterrence
Carnegie wants India to deploy tactical weapons in response to Al Bakistan?
Pakis have set up a few bunkers in Pano Aqil cantt opposite Jaisalmer with M-11 (Hatf-3) missiles [290km range, 0.8m dia, 700kg warhead]
Nasr is bakwaas, it is the M-11s that need to be watched. These might carry their fizzles which are their 'tactical bums'.
Pakis have set up a few bunkers in Pano Aqil cantt opposite Jaisalmer with M-11 (Hatf-3) missiles [290km range, 0.8m dia, 700kg warhead]
Nasr is bakwaas, it is the M-11s that need to be watched. These might carry their fizzles which are their 'tactical bums'.
Re: Deterrence
Pakistani nukes in submarines would be the world's worst nightmare
It would make the terrorists job much easier and frankly the country that helps them would be one those at the receiving end .. doesn't need much thinking as to how that can happen
It would make the terrorists job much easier and frankly the country that helps them would be one those at the receiving end .. doesn't need much thinking as to how that can happen
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Re: Deterrence
Which is what India should target for.kit wrote:Pakistani nukes in submarines would be the world's worst nightmare
Make Pak world's problem. Then sit back and enjoy some chai.
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Re: Deterrence
There was a post in a blog where google earth showed Nasr TEL's in a camp very close to the border.Gagan wrote:Carnegie wants India to deploy tactical weapons in response to Al Bakistan?
Pakis have set up a few bunkers in Pano Aqil cantt opposite Jaisalmer with M-11 (Hatf-3) missiles [290km range, 0.8m dia, 700kg warhead]
Nasr is bakwaas, it is the M-11s that need to be watched. These might carry their fizzles which are their 'tactical bums'.
So apparently a nuke tipped missile and the wonderful weapon against Cold Start is within the artillery/mortor range of IA.
I take PA plans to drive it away from the battlefield before firing the maal? or fire before Cold Start?
Fundamentally tells you... Nasr is just a MBRL.
Re: Deterrence
x-post. from Chetak.
No Exceptions for a Nuclear India
No Exceptions for a Nuclear India
No Exceptions for a Nuclear India
By THE EDITORIAL BOARD
JUNE 4, 2016
America’s relationship with India has blossomed under President Obama, who will meet with Prime Minister Narendra Modi this week. Ideally, Mr. Obama could take advantage of the ties he has built and press for India to adhere to the standards on nuclear proliferation to which other nuclear weapons states adhere.
The problem, however, is that the relationship with India rests on a dangerous bargain. For years, the United States has sought to bend the rules for India’s nuclear program to maintain India’s cooperation on trade and to counter China’s growing influence. In 2008, President George W. Bush signed a civilian nuclear deal with India that allowed it to trade in nuclear materials. This has encouraged Pakistan to keep expanding a nuclear weapons program that is already the fastest growing in the world.
Now, India has Mr. Obama’s strong support in its bid to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a 48-nation body that governs trade in nuclear-related exports and aims to ensure that civilian trade in nuclear materials is not diverted for military uses. Membership would enhance India’s standing as a nuclear weapons state, but it is not merited until the country meets the group’s standards.
Photo
President Obama and Prime Minister Modi meeting last November. Credit Stephen Crowley/The New York Times
All group members have signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, either as nuclear weapons states (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China) or as non-nuclear weapons states (everybody else). India has refused, which means it has not accepted legally binding commitments to pursue disarmament negotiations, halt the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and not test nuclear weapons.
President Bush squandered an opportunity to demand more of India when he signed the 2008 deal, which opened the door to American trade in nuclear technology for civilian energy, something India had insisted was a prerequisite to more cooperation and lucrative business deals.
As part of the 2008 deal, the Indians promised they would be “ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices” as other nations with advanced nuclear technology. But they have fallen far short by continuing to produce fissile material and to expand their nuclear arsenal.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group is to discuss India’s application later this month. Mr. Obama is lobbying for India to win membership through a special exception. If he succeeds, India would be in a position to keep Pakistan, which has also applied for membership, from gaining membership because group decisions must be unanimous. That could give Pakistan, which at one time provided nuclear technology to North Korea and Iran, new incentives to misbehave.
Opposition from China, which is close to Pakistan and views India as a rival, could doom India’s bid for now. But the issue will not go away. India is growing in importance and seeking greater integration into organizations that govern international affairs. If it wants recognition as a nuclear weapons state, it should be required to meet the nuclear group’s standards, including opening negotiations with Pakistan and China on curbing nuclear weapons and halting the production of nuclear fuel for bombs.{explains what Modi agreed to at the recent NSS meet}
Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook and Twitter (@NYTopinion), and sign up for the Opinion Today newsletter.
A version of this editorial appears in print on June 5, 2016, on page SR8 of the New York edition with the headline: No Exceptions for a Nuclear India. Today's Paper|
Re: Deterrence
India's NSG bid.
I find it strange that India seeks membership to a group that has provided an exemption to India not equating to our position as an independent NWS but under specific conditions that bars India from additional tests and other conditions that no other NWS is asked for.
It seems we seek to "formalize" these non-parities. I have no doubt that at least the same and maybe other conditions would be attached as a pre-condition to membership that would not be at par with any other NWS.
From a deterrence perspective, it is a real shame that a government that declared its support for a "review" of the deterrence doctrine in its manifesto is taking a step that seeks to formalize the sub par status of India's nuclear weapons, due to its limited and failed tests.
This position is disregarding the evil troika that has made progress in the quality and quantity of their payloads, proliferation of delivery vehicles and technology, arms deals and other strategic agreements that are clearly meant to harm India's security interests.
The US - a receding global power has been in no position to stop these Adharmic alliance and only a muscular response from India has any hopes of securing Indian security interests.
On another note, in light of the absolute mismanagement by the MEA of the ways in which they have gone about misusing political capital by way of using the PM's offices as its chief sales person and failing, maybe it is time to ask for the head of S. Jaishnakar as an accountable consequence of the failure?
Link to the conditions for the exemptions in 2008.
https://www.armscontrol.org/system/file ... tement.pdf
I find it strange that India seeks membership to a group that has provided an exemption to India not equating to our position as an independent NWS but under specific conditions that bars India from additional tests and other conditions that no other NWS is asked for.
It seems we seek to "formalize" these non-parities. I have no doubt that at least the same and maybe other conditions would be attached as a pre-condition to membership that would not be at par with any other NWS.
From a deterrence perspective, it is a real shame that a government that declared its support for a "review" of the deterrence doctrine in its manifesto is taking a step that seeks to formalize the sub par status of India's nuclear weapons, due to its limited and failed tests.
This position is disregarding the evil troika that has made progress in the quality and quantity of their payloads, proliferation of delivery vehicles and technology, arms deals and other strategic agreements that are clearly meant to harm India's security interests.
The US - a receding global power has been in no position to stop these Adharmic alliance and only a muscular response from India has any hopes of securing Indian security interests.
On another note, in light of the absolute mismanagement by the MEA of the ways in which they have gone about misusing political capital by way of using the PM's offices as its chief sales person and failing, maybe it is time to ask for the head of S. Jaishnakar as an accountable consequence of the failure?
Link to the conditions for the exemptions in 2008.
https://www.armscontrol.org/system/file ... tement.pdf
Re: Deterrence
You are back to square one -failed tests and all. Testing has the possibility of rescinding all deals including the 2008 one. Membership in NSG doesn't add or diminish that. The Indian establishment would have taken a considered decision based on its capabilities and there is no reason to believe that except for a few on BRF everyone in the Indian establishment is either a fool or sold out, corrupt fellow including Modi. Your criticism of why the MEA and PMO push is or was bad is not clear except for what sounds like ranting.
Re: Deterrence
We'll test at some point.Supratik wrote:You are back to square one -failed tests and all. Testing has the possibility of rescinding all deals including the 2008 one. Membership in NSG doesn't add or diminish that. The Indian establishment would have taken a considered decision based on its capabilities and there is no reason to believe that except for a few on BRF everyone in the Indian establishment is either a fool or sold out, corrupt fellow including Modi. Your criticism of why the MEA and PMO push is or was bad is not clear except for what sounds like ranting.
In the meantime, we should begin construction of DAHRT and LIF.
Re: Deterrence
Aap ke mooh mein ghee shakkar! I hope we do, not withstanding 2008 India US nuclear agmt, NSG, whateverRoyG wrote:We'll test at some point.
In the meantime, we should begin construction of DAHRT and LIF.
Re: Deterrence
Any country that wants to make it big in today's world has to have a proven TN design.la.khan wrote:Aap ke mooh mein ghee shakkar! I hope we do, not withstanding 2008 India US nuclear agmt, NSG, whateverRoyG wrote:We'll test at some point.
In the meantime, we should begin construction of DAHRT and LIF.
India will bide its time and test when it is ready.
May be tom, 5 years, 10 years from now. But it will happen.
Re: Deterrence
The graph below shows the minimum and maximum radius of a Pu implosion fission warhead correlated with weight.
A 300 kg warhead correlates well with a 30 cm radius. A 10-15 Kt fission warhead would be within easy reach of Brahmos. With pinpoint accuracy however its utility would probably be only for hardened bunkers because we have no policy of counter force. For our Pakistan requirements a 1 meter diameter Prithvi and a 1000 kg warhead would allow a 50 to 80kt boosted fission warhead cheap and no need for pinpoint accuracy.
I think most megaton warheads are now legacy warheads and efficient TN warheads would be 200-250 kg and 200-400 kt. Just a guesstimate. I am sure a Google search will allow people to come up with figures different from what I have quoted off the top of my head
As a digression I want to point out that on BRF we started discussing things about Pakistan that did not become mainstream in the world, followed by India for over 10 years. I am hoping that the exact weights and yields of our warheads (with some allowance for error in yield like +/- x kt) is well known to strategic planners along with how and where they will be used as well as coordinates of those targets. I am guessing that Islamabad and Karachi offer fairly large unmissable targets
A 300 kg warhead correlates well with a 30 cm radius. A 10-15 Kt fission warhead would be within easy reach of Brahmos. With pinpoint accuracy however its utility would probably be only for hardened bunkers because we have no policy of counter force. For our Pakistan requirements a 1 meter diameter Prithvi and a 1000 kg warhead would allow a 50 to 80kt boosted fission warhead cheap and no need for pinpoint accuracy.
I think most megaton warheads are now legacy warheads and efficient TN warheads would be 200-250 kg and 200-400 kt. Just a guesstimate. I am sure a Google search will allow people to come up with figures different from what I have quoted off the top of my head
As a digression I want to point out that on BRF we started discussing things about Pakistan that did not become mainstream in the world, followed by India for over 10 years. I am hoping that the exact weights and yields of our warheads (with some allowance for error in yield like +/- x kt) is well known to strategic planners along with how and where they will be used as well as coordinates of those targets. I am guessing that Islamabad and Karachi offer fairly large unmissable targets
Re: Deterrence
Do not think there is any credence to the view point that we have or are planning a nuclearised Brahmos. It will be antithetical to all we know of our doctrine and positioning. Also, it will negate use of Brahmos as a weapon safely below red lines of escalation for conventional precision strike, at least on land. The capability to nuclearize the Brahmos was not in doubt.
Pakistan's game is the instability paradox, India's game is NOT to be ambiguous in our asset base or doctrine. Hence, calls for even Prithvi to be reserved only for conventional use, as Agni I can safely replace that role and can be launched from safe distances without forward deployments.
Pakistan's game is the instability paradox, India's game is NOT to be ambiguous in our asset base or doctrine. Hence, calls for even Prithvi to be reserved only for conventional use, as Agni I can safely replace that role and can be launched from safe distances without forward deployments.
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What about the possibility that Pakistan is fine tuning its nuclear weapons via North Korea in return for ballistic missile tech .. the koreans have no problems with testing !
Re: Deterrence
Everyone on earth is fine tuning his weapons, testing or no testing
Re: Deterrence
The US is on a $1 trillion revamp of their nuclear arsenal and words of these Ayatollahs will not have ANY effect on capabilities, which will react only to a capability NOT a risk assessment of adversaries and even then there may not be reassessment. Trump is only a short and largely irrelevant blimp in the story.
Nuclear Orthodoxy After Trump -- The Real Requirements of Deterrence By Michael Krepon
Nuclear Orthodoxy After Trump -- The Real Requirements of Deterrence By Michael Krepon
Nuclear deterrence theory works until it fails, and then the foremost danger is that it will fail catastrophically. The prevention of catastrophic failure rests on extremely limited use, after which national leaders might somehow be able to intervene to stop the madness—even though they have failed to prevent a war.
Absent orthodoxy-busting leaders such as Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, the path of least resistance (although it still prompts great resistance) is to down-build nuclear arsenals one decrement at a time. This process is slow going and prone to disruption. More progress will become possible if leaders take a hard look at the belief system that has produced this huge, deathly monument to wishful thinking.
There has never been an ideal time to fundamentally reassess the most extreme tenets of nuclear orthodoxy—not during the Cold War, not during big drawdowns after the Soviet Union dissolved, and not now, with Vladimir Putin’s landgrabs and saber-rattling. But the presidential candidacy of Donald Trump demands reassessment of this belief system, which is very expensive to maintain and which cannot withstand serious scrutiny.
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More crap from Crapon.
Fools only Indian peaceniks.
Don't know why these morons want to denuke only India.
Fools only Indian peaceniks.
Don't know why these morons want to denuke only India.
Re: Deterrence
More fooling business.
Pakistan offers nuclear non-testing agreement to India
Pakistan offers nuclear non-testing agreement to India
Foreign Office spokesperson Nafees Zakaria today said that following the nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan had proposed to India simultaneous adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) but the proposal did not elicit a favourable response from India.
"Once again, in the larger interest of peace and stability in the region, as also in the global context, Pakistan has indicated the possibility that the two countries may consider a bilateral arrangement, which is reflective of its policy of promoting restraint and responsibility in South Asia and its consistent support for the objectives of the CTBT," he said.
"The bilateral non-testing arrangement, if mutually agreed, could become binding immediately without waiting for the entry into force of the CTBT at the international level," the spokesperson added.
He said while the unilateral moratoriums declared by the two countries were voluntary, legally non-binding and could be withdrawn unilaterally, a bilateral arrangement will be mutually binding and difficult to withdraw from unilaterally.
Both countries could consider working out the details of the arrangement and mutually agreed confidence-building measures in relation to it. It could set the tone for further mutually agreed measures on restraint and avoidance of arms race in South Asia.
He said a bilateral arrangement on non-testing will also send a positive signal to the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) countries which are discussing the non-proliferation commitments of non-NPT states in relation to the question of membership.
Earlier, Aziz had said that Pakistan is prepared to consider translating its unilateral moratorium into a bilateral arrangement on non-testing with India.
He had added that Pakistan is confident of the merits of its membership application as its export controls were harmonized with those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Australia Group.
Re: Deterrence
Pathetic attempt by their Chinese masters to box India into the "subcontinent"