Deterrence

[RoyG]

Tons of options in between. We have to break them piece by piece just like they've been trying to do with us.

[shiv]

Let me start that with a paper, which seeks to explore such lines.
Countering Pakistan’s Asymmetric Warfare

Thanks for posting.

I give the paper a score of 4 on 5. Comprehensive, well researched, speaks of history and the background and moves on logically.

But i have three chief areas of disagreement:

1. The author falls into the cold war trap of assuming that nuclear weapons deter conventional conflict. In fact, as author of a paper on asymmetric/subconventional conflict the man should know that this is a false premise that worked ONLY for the US and USSR during the cold war. India and Pakistan, the USSR and China have fought conventional wars. That apart, non state actors have waged subconventional conflict directly against the US, UK, France and Russia. Nuclear weapons cannot deter subconventional conflict and do not deter conventional conflict between nuclear armed adversaries.

2. The author's suggestion of an army to army dialog between India and Pakistan is as bad as Indian politicians to Pakistani politicians. In each case only one side is the decision maker, the politicians for India and the army for Pakistan. Indian politicians should talk with the Pakistan army. The Pakistan army does not want that

3. The author has completely gone off the rails in his reasons for restarting nuclear testing. He says "deterrence has failed" on the false premise that nuclear weapons would deter conventional conflict. He then goes on to say that testing might change something and restates the Santanam fizzle argument as if failure of deterrence is because of bomb fizzles. My mind boggles at how authors in think tanks of India have not figured out that you do not need megaton thermonukes to deter. Why are we deterred by Pakistan? Where are the Paki thermonuclear weapons? It is not failure of testing or the shape and size of bombs that deter. It is the presence of atomic bombs in the hands of an adversary. If Pakistan is not deterred by our fizzles which can do enough damage why should them be bothered by thermonukes. One can only die once. The Karnad ill-logic has infiltrated this man's thinking in this area

But that apart the paper is comprehensive in listing the options we have.

[Rudradev]

OK, this is a long post, but bear with me: I think it brings some new ideas to the Deterrence debate, at least on BRF.

I'm coming late to the debate between Shiv, JEM, AnandK, RaviG and others a few pages ago.

I think one of the key aspects of deterrence is the distinction between ideology and reality. Indulge me a minute while I explain what I mean by "ideology" here. According to the Yugoslavian philosopher Slavoj Zizek:

It is not only reality which enslaves us. The tragedy of our predicament when we are within ideology is that when we think we escape it into our dreams, it is precisely at that point that we are within ideology. This is the ultimate illusion. Ideology is not imposed upon us; it is the sum of our spontaneous relationship with the social world, and determines how we perceive each meaning of all things that happen.

All individuals in a society buy into some variant of ideology. When things happen in the social world that do not affect the vast majority on a personal level, they become touchstones for our ideology, foci of reaction that either positively or negatively end up reinforcing the ideology of our choice. This is very different from what happens when reality itself comes into direct contact with the lives of a large mass of people.

Consider 1992. When the Babri Masjid was demolished, the absolute reality of it was nothing at all. Nobody had read namaz in that place in 70-odd years. But the perception of the demolition signified something to people in all corners of India and the subcontinent on whose personal reality it did not impinge in any way. It became a touchstone for many people of many different ideologies: secular, liberal, Hindutvavadi, Islamist, leftist etc. to reinforce the greater subtext of their lives into which they had already bought.

In January 1993, terrible riots shook Mumbai. The city abounded with rumors (more touchstones) about how the Muslims (in western Maharashtra!) were gearing up for a great vengeance for the destruction of "their" mosque in UP. Ultimately there was a clash at Radhabhai chawl, where a family of Hindus were reported to have been locked inside their dwelling and burned alive by a Muslim mob. Other than that particular family, of course, this gruesome murder did not at all affect "reality" for the vast majority of Mumbai's people (who might never even have heard of Radhabhai chawl or been anywhere near it). However, the news of the killing was enough to spur retaliatory riots that went on for weeks and killed thousands. Here again, we see ideology in action, spurring masses of people to avenge an event that was "reality" for very few but an ideological touchstone for lakhs.

Why am I talking about all this? Because I want to contrast it with what happened in March 1993. 12 car bombs exploded all around Mumbai, killing over 300. This incident affected everybody in Mumbai within a few short minutes. It wasn't a projected reality that had happened to someone or something somewhere else... it had happened to all of us. Anyone of us could have been killed or maimed. Everyone in the city, all religions and political affiliations, knew this instinctively... all were touched immediately by the reality of it.

The point is: Mumbai's response to this hard reality could not have been more different than its response to the ideological "touchstones" of a faraway Babri demolition, or a single family's traumatic death in Radhabhai chawl. This reality was big enough, immediate enough to encompass all of us. So what did we do? Contrary to the ISI's expectations, we did not rush off on a fresh rampage of riots. We waited calmly and collectedly for the government, the State, to step in and pick up the pieces. And then we went on with our lives.

This contrast between the way people perceive things, and (accordingly) behave, when confronted with removed ideological touchstones vs. immediate, mass-level reality is not unique to my Mumbai 1993 example. The same thing can be seen in the Godhra/Ahmedabad sequence of events: Godhra was an ideological touchstone that triggered deadly riots in Ahmedabad; however, what would seem to be far greater provocations (the Akshardham attack, the various serial bomb blasts) did not have this effect. Trust me, it was not because "Hindus were scared of Momeen wrath" that they did not have the same effect.

Of course, one can ascribe part of this difference in consequences to "greater preparedness of the state's law and order machinery." This, I believe, is largely a cop-out. The far more relevant truth is that people, en masse, behaved very differently in response to very different types of stimuli. The law and order machinery can only do so much when the great mass of people are determined to break the law (as they were when responding to ideological touchstones), and are certainly far more effective when the people (confronting a shared and immediate reality) place their faith in the state and seem inclined to cooperate.

In the case of IC814, we saw the reverse ideology being reinforced by a very different touchstone; in this case, the plight of the hostages and their relatives. The ideology here is the "give peace a chance, Aman ki Asha, why fight over Kashmir, Pakis are just like us" of the left. The touchstone was 50-100 relatives of the hostages holding vigils and protests outside the Prime Minister's house. Here again, the hostage-taking has not affected the vast mass of Indians as an immediate reality. However- for the left-inclined, as well as the fence-sitters, the hostage drama became a perceived epitome of everything they buy into; innocents suffering because of great-power politics, social injustice and religious bigotry (Hindutva BJP govt vs. Talibans and Jihadis.)

This, however, was nothing like the reaction when 26/11 happened. That happened to directly and immediately to us (at least for those of us who lived in Mumbai at the time)... and it happened to lakhs of us, leaving us all feeling equally vulnerable in our homes and streets and railway stations. There is no doubt in my mind that had the GOI wanted to go to war against Pakistan, the people of Mumbai would have backed it to the hilt at the time, and indeed all the people of India's cities who had suffered the right-next-door reality of serial bomb-blasts and terrorist attacks by the Indian Mujahedin.

I am not saying that ideological touchstone events are inconsequential or illusory: far from it. After all the Mumbai and Ahmedabad riots, as also the GOI's response to IC814, were very real and significant indeed.

What I'm saying is that behaviour in reaction tends to be very different... on the part of the public and ALSO the state itself... depending on whether the threat is PERCEIVED in the manner of an ideological touchstone or an immediate, mass-level reality.

This difference has certainly applied to state policy as well. I have heard from my parents stories of the 1971 war... in Mumbai, there were blackouts, air-raid sirens and AA fire on many nights. The immediate reality for people on the Western and especially Eastern borders was far more terrible to contend with, again on a mass level.

By comparison, the Kargil War was distant, not immediate at all. While there were many important ideological touchstone events, such as the atrocity against Captain Kalia, life went on more or less as usual for those who were living through it, other than an emotional patriotic fervour that ran across the country. But emotions are fickle things, on a mass scale. Perhaps this is one reason why the GOI during Kargil never crossed the IB or LOC; unlike 1971 (or indeed 1965), the Kargil war never became a perceptible threat of immediate reality for the vast majority of the Indian people, and there was no way to be sure of the depth and longevity of popular support.

In 1971, by contrast, we stared down a direct nuclear threat from the USS Enterprise and did not stop until we had hacked away half of Pakistan.

So how does this all relate to the subject of this thread: deterrence?

In every possible way.

Let's start with Pokhran 1998. The tests were, for the vast majority of the Indian public, an ideological touchstone: a moment of triumph in a tremendous achievement by our scientific and defence establishments, with the all the implications of strategic independence it conveyed. When the US tried to sanction us as a result of these tests, the logic was entirely dependent on the distinction between ideological touchstones and immediate, mass-level reality. This is, in fact, the logic of all sanctions regimes: to convert the pride of a nation's people over a distant touchstone event into a harsh and
immediate reality of economic pain in their everyday lives, and thus to reverse the people's attitude towards the state from support to resentment.

Today we have certain views of why the Pakistanis will use nuclear weapons. Too often these views are wrapped up in the idea that an ideological touchstone event will be enough (a "Redline") to provoke Pakistan into first use of nuclear weapons. This is based, very largely, on our own ideological perception of Pakistan: oh, they are mad fanatical Muslims, they are capable of anything if they think that Islam Khatrey Mein Hai.

This perception: that Pakistan is capable of first use of nuclear weapons against India in response to a threat they perceive in the manner of an ideological touchstone, NOT an immediate mass-level reality: is exactly what Pakistan would like us to believe. That is what would keep us indirectly paralyzed from a strategic point of view. We might dream that anything at all might be perceived as an ideological touchstone by Pakistan: an air/land war confined to POK/northern areas, retaliatory strikes across the LOC against terrorist camps, even the destruction of mosques on our own soil! As long as WE THINK Pakistan is capable of using nukes against us for these sorts of reasons, on the basis of ideological rather than realistically perceived threats, Pakistan effectively deters us to the point of being able to blackmail and paralyse us.

Let us be very clear about this. Our deterrence with China is stable precisely because there is no confusion about why China would ever directly use nuclear weapons against India. China would never use nuclear weapons against India unless China perceived an existential threat from India at the level of an immediate, mass-level reality: which could only happen if India used strategic nuclear weapons in a massive strike against China. There are many, many steps up the conventional escalation ladder between an India-China border conflict and that nth-level use of nuclear weapons by India.

Even a full-fledged invasion of Tibet by India... while it might be an ideological touchstone to many members of the Beijing Politburo... would be, we can be practically sure, insufficient to goad China into actually using nukes against India. They will throw all their conventional might into the counterattack, every economic instrument they own, every sub-conventional asset they have; but unless and until Beijing adjudges a real, immediate possibility of Indian nukes slamming into the cities of China's east coast, the first use of nuclear weapons by China is off the table. With China we can wrestle over Tibet and the Northeast for months before it would ever come to a nuclear exchange; we would exhaust each other conventionally long before there was a need to threaten Delhi, Calcutta, Guangzhou or Shanghai. In that sense, the (perceived) absence of multi-megaton Indian nukes is exactly what convinces China that Indian use of such weapons against them is never going to be an immediate, mass-level reality. Meanwhile, our every additional procurement of conventional power deters their adventurism on our borders, because it promises more pain and punishment for China in the event of incursions; this process has fallen sharply behind under the MMS non-government, but will hopefully take off in high gear soon.

The answer with respect to China is clear then. Ramping up conventional capabilities to match or exceed China, from a "deterrence" POV at least, is arguably more effective than testing multi-megaton nuke designs. I do not say this as an argument against testing multi-megaton nuke designs... after all, we have other enemies to worry about in the world... but there are better ways to deter China, at any rate, than that.

Now back to Pakistan. We need to realize, first of all, that Pakistan... yes, even a Pakistan run by Mullah Omar or Hafeez Saeed or some other allegedly "Mad Taliban"... is not going to use nukes against India in response to an ideological touchstone event. Never. We can destroy every mosque in India, kill millions of Indian Muslims in pogroms or gas chambers, and they will rant and rave and send terrorists against India by the lakhs... but they will not use a nuclear weapon, not even one delivered by jihadi. The price they will pay for that is too great, and they know it.

As long as we believe the "Mad Mullah" bluster, we think that they just possibly might use a nuclear weapon against us for such reasons... and that is exactly why they don't declare "no first use". But they won't actually do it. In fact, if for argument's sake, GOI did pursue a genocidal policy against Indian Muslims... the utility of that policy to Pakistan's rulers would be much greater as an ideological touchstone to motivate their OWN jihadis, rather than as a pretext to nuke India. If they nuke India, it's all over for them... why would they opt to finish the game at that stage, with such a nice card in hand?

Carrying on to levels of military engagement with Pakistan, it is important to consider whether each level of escalation would be perceived by Islamabad as (a) an ideological touchstone event or (b) a real, immediate, mass-level threat. What if India invaded POK and the Northern Areas, but did not cross LOC/IB anywhere else? I strongly doubt there would be any perception of a real, immediate threat in Islamabad. Of course they will fight back with conventional forces and sub-conventional jihadis; our assault on Kashmir would be a strong ideological touchstone event after all.

But all that "jugular vein" talk is just to convince India that such an assault would be perceived by Islamabad as a real, existential threat... not merely an ideological touchstone... and hence, that they might retaliate with nuclear weapons. Remember, the entire foundation of Paki deterrence "redlines" is to convince us that various actions by India would be perceived by Pakistan, not merely as ideological touchstone events but as real, immediate, mass-level threats. It is only on this basis that they can convince us that a given "redline" has any credibility.

Two more developments to analyze in the context of the ideological touchstone/immediate mass reality dichotomy.

One is the fact that the spate of Indian Mujahedin/LeT attacks on Indian cities, which began in 2005, peaked in 2008, had mostly died down by 2010-11 (other than a stray Varanasi, Hyderabad or Bodh Gaya; and even those were on a far smaller scale than 26/11, Bangalore, Ahmedabad etc.) Why was this? Of course, there are many reasons that potentially confound my thesis: better policing, better intelligence etc. in India; too much domestic political instability in Pakistan; international pressure on Islamabad, etc. However, I believe that at least one contributing factor was that the ISI discerned a distinct hardening of Indian public attitude.

When bombs go off routinely in your own city, on the road that your daughter takes to school every day, and your own neighbour's father-in-law loses an arm or a leg... it becomes a very different situation for all Indians, Hindu/Muslim/whatever, than LOC artillery exchanges or jawaan beheadings or IEDs in Sopore and Baramulla. Those remote happenings can be likened to ideological touchstone events... we jingoes on BRF will bemoan them and curse the absence of GOI retaliation, the voices of nationalist political opinion will rage about "fitting replies" and so on... but other than a flash of angry emotion in front of the TV screen, the vast majority of the Indian public just forgets about them and gets on with life.

What was happening with the Indian Mujahedin attacks was that Pakistan was running into a situation of diminishing returns, and more worryingly for them, a heightening probability of blowback. The Pakistan threat was becoming, for crores of common Indians, no longer ideological, no longer academic, but real, immediate, and omnipresent. As a result, the calculations were becoming dangerously unpredictable for Pakistan. When this turn in mass-level threat perception happens, there is a risk that the vast majority of Indian people will look to Delhi (as they did in the Mumbai blasts or 26/11 aftermath, for example) and say: "PM Saab, do what you have to do, nukes or no nukes these Pakis have to be punished." In fact, I would go so far as to say that these attacks were at least one factor in the massive landslide election of Narendra Modi as Indian PM... a huge own-goal for Pakistan.

Which brings me to the second point I want to discuss in light of this dichotomy: Cold Start. Nobody in India has made it officially clear that we have the capacity or will to mount a Cold Start response; in fact, the IA has denied that such a doctrine even exists (after having abundantly dispersed news of its existence via track 2, 3, 4 etc. channels). End result: the Pakis clearly believe that Cold Start is a possibility, and it has caused major Shalwar-wetting in Islamabad.

What happened was basically this.

Initially, Pakistan tried to convince India that they could use nuclear weapons in response to a mere ideological touchstone... "Islam ko khatrey mein dalengey tho hum nuclear attack kar saktein hain." This was the tactically brilliant reasoning behind Pakistan's initial "redlines"... we call our bomb the Islamic Bomb, we call our delivery systems Ghauri and Ghaznavi, and if we feel that Islam is in danger we will use them against you. Then, Pakistan began a policy of subconventional jihadi attacks under this nuclear umbrella; the well-known policy of nuclear blackmail.

Second, India leaked the idea of Cold Start (backed up by many visible military exercises involving combined arms and IBGs). This called Pakistan's bluff about the nature of its redlines. We said: "Phug you and your redlines. What "Islam khatrey mein hai"... even if we send some pivot corps across IB to thoroughly phug up Pakistani military assets, you STILL won't respond with a nuclear strike, because you will STILL perceive such an attack as an ideological touchstone event rather than a real, immediate, mass-level existential threat. And we KNOW you're not going to use nukes in response to a mere ideological touchstone event."

This is important to understand. Cold Start was not merely a deterrent stance against further Paki terrorist attacks. Its very existence called into question the very credibility of Pakistan's stupidly-defined redlines. It showed that we didn't believe they would use nukes in response to an ideological touchstone event, which was the whole basis of their nuclear blackmail.

This took the deterrence initiative away from the Pakis. They responded by building over a hundred tactical nuclear weapons, to show how serious they were about deterring something like Cold Start. But what was the net effect? Basically the redlines had shifted. From vague claims that they would use nukes against India for any situation in which "Islam Khatrey Mein Hai", Pakistan's redlines had now moved to the more specific and more withdrawn definition of "we will use tactical nukes against Indian IBGs that cross the border to punish our tall fair TSPA."

It's important to realize that this, in itself, is a small (though very incomplete) victory for India in the deterrence game. The game is all about pushing the question: will my enemy see XYZ as an ideological touchstone event, or as a real, immediate, mass-level existential threat? The enemy tries to convince us that XYZ will be seen as a real, immediate, mass-level existential threat that would be cause for first-use of nuclear weapons. We call the bluff behind such claims and push the redlines back, saying: "we believe we can do XYZ to you but you won't retaliate with nuclear weapons, because despite your claims, you do NOT see XYZ as a real, immediate existential threat." As the process goes on, more and more potential actions by India come under the publicly acknowledged category of "ideological touchstone event" rather than "real existential threat"...and hence, lose credibility as a cause for Pakistani first use of nuclear weapons. Thus, Pakistani redlines move further and further back.

It is an iterative, attritive game. Step by step we push their redlines back. If you think carefully about this, one great advantage we have in the game is that we have already declared no-first-use of nuclear weapons: so the Pakis do not have the option to play the game back at us by questioning the credibility of our redlines. Our redlines are there: you use nukes, you get nuked, no more and no less. The Pakis, tactically brilliant, thought that by being vague about the conditions for their first use of nuclear weapons, they could paralyse us with nuclear blackmail. Cold Start was leaked to undermine the credibility of their redlines. Calibrated escalatory steps along and across the LOC and IB will continue the undermining process. Each time we do something and Pakistan does not respond to it with nukes, the credibility of their nuclear deterrent is further eroded.

The end game is to make it publicly accepted knowledge* that the Pakistanis will not use nukes against a Cold Start IBG, an Indian column advancing into POK/NA, or indeed anything short of a Zhukov-on-Berlin type invasion by Indian armed forces. India would not take mount such an invasion unless it was fully prepared to escalate to all-out nuclear war with Pakistan, i.e. never; and Pakistan would not use nukes in any circumstances short of that. Once that becomes publicly accepted knowledge, Pakistan is deterred.

* we know that they know that we know that they know: see this short video for a clear explanation of what I'm talking about... http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=pl ... -son3EJTrU

[Agnimitra]

According to the Yugoslavian philosopher Slavoj Zizek:

It is not only reality which enslaves us. The tragedy of our predicament when we are within ideology is that when we think we escape it into our dreams, it is precisely at that point that we are within ideology. This is the ultimate illusion. Ideology is not imposed upon us; it is the sum of our spontaneous relationship with the social world, and determines how we perceive each meaning of all things that happen.

All individuals in a society buy into some variant of ideology. When things happen in the social world that do not affect the vast majority on a personal level, they become touchstones for our ideology, foci of reaction that either positively or negatively end up reinforcing the ideology of our choice. This is very different from what happens when reality itself comes into direct contact with the lives of a large mass of people.

Rudradev ji, a very sound thesis. I agree that this can be factored into deterrence theory. But it can work both ways - In terms of gauging how close the enemy is to their "ideological touchstone", a lot depends on the "level" of their ideological brainwashing - because that determines their sense of existential threat and regret. A "strategic" view of deterrence means there are more factors that determine the dynamics of individual encounter with reality versus mass ideological reaction:

1. The specific ideological quotient - affected by alternative ideological "options" that one can defect to, as well as being forced to confront alternative enemies than oneself.
2. The enemy's specific ideological quotient and level of consolidation.
3. The role of one's own govt in creating options to enjoy the fruits of existence within one's own land, versus creating or inviting unreasonable difficulty.

All 3 are currently going in favour of India (after a long time working the other way), and they need to be capitalized by this admin.

Specific ideological quotient is a factor in why so many American soldiers experience a cognitive dissonance and morale problems when they actually go into combat - because the ideological brainwashing about "defending freedom", "gifting democracy", etc. collapses in the face of the reality they witness as they step on foreign soil. Their will to fight takes a hit.

Conversely, the fiercest, most sadistic and most enthusiastic jihadi volunteers in Syria are from countries such as the UK. That is because their Sunni Islamist ideological brainwashing in the UK finds strong confirmation when they see the reality of Shi'a Assad's actions on the ground. Or the US's actions in Afghanistan, etc.

In terms of gauging how close the enemy is to their "ideological touchstone", a lot depends on the "level" of their ideological brainwashing. The level of ideological conviction of a scotch-swilling TFTA jernail is different from that of a mid-ranking kernail who has climbed the social ladder and also become a Wahabandi after leaving behind his Barelvi roots.

Specific Ideological Quotient is the level of conviction sometimes called "nairbhayam" (नैर्भयम्) in Sanskrit - because it represents the exact level of circumstances/actions that one can undergo/undertake "fearlessly". The nairbhayam of a fat wadhera is different from that of a TFTA jernail is different from that of a Wahabandi kernail.

As a significant section of Pakjabi society comes up into an urbanized lifestyle - characterized by greater material possessions (or at least aspirations) as well as increasing Wahabandization - it is necessary to gauge what makes them tick, and their specific levels of nairbhayam.

If one has aggressive intent (retrieving PoK, etc.), and if the level of ideological conviction and sense of "mission" of the current decision-makers is reasonably high, then it limits one's options.

One way to moderate the nairbhayam of the Paki awaam is to allow them to confront the clear and present danger (or at least foolishness) of taking a panga with India. As it is, they are brainwashed that everything that goes wrong from Baluchistan to electricity shortages are due to Hindu bania. That ideological brainwashing needs a dose of reality. Part of that reality can be conveyed by soft power initiatives, like Modi is now doing - the maa ka aashirvaad, the human face, the cordial invitations and enthusiastic handshakes, while also having a tough image (important). The mere presence of Modi is conveying to Pakis that not all Indians are cowardly small-hearted banias - this means that a cordial gesture by Modi means much more than one from MMS or Gujral or even Vajpayee (all too goody goody). In addition to this soft-power, internal terrorism and also lack of growth opportunities within Pakjab also needs to be inflicted so that the aspiring middle-class Pakis feel their dreams are threatened by their own government's anti-India obsession, AND also if they are too ambitious in holding on to territories that have exploited - such as PoK, Baluchistan, etc. They need to understand that their wish to live life fully or die meaningfully can indeed be realized IF ONLY they stop being "self-defeating".

This also means that a "strategic" deterrence would involve ideological schism and re-orientation to "Hindustaniat". Watch the speech at Shastra University by Doval, which we were commenting on in GDF - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DuSNC7qZwi0

It also means that strategic deterrence would mean forcing them to confront a revengeful and consolidated group of Afghan co-religionists on the other flank. As well as internal Shi'a-Sunni violence - whose bearing on the PoK question needs to be highlighted far more by GoI as we move to offer help to persecuted Shi'a.

Relative nairbhayam is also a factor. The type of mass-orientation is important in determining the levels of response. One hears that one of the reason the last 10 years in Gujarat saw no funny tricks from the local Islamists was because of the utter consolidation of Hindus. So the level of nairbhayam of Gujarati society went up considerably, and that of the Islamists went down. If Modi can achieve more and more national consolidation, at least among Dharmics, that will drive down Paki nairbhayam, which depends on Leftist slicing and dicing Dharmics into a Paki's favourite "shooders", "mazloom Sikhs", and other such caste-based groups.

[shiv]

Brilliant post Rudradev.

Deterrence is a psychological game with nuances that everyone does not seem to catch. I am not saying that some people are more clever than others so that they "catch" things that others don't. I am saying that the most nuanced game is played with the deepest knowledge of how the other party tends to think. Intel inputs and psychological profiling - which don't reach us on BRF, are readily accessible to those who are in the business of building the deterrence doctrine.

And that was a good video..

[member_20317]

I think you veterans of BRF should also game the possible presence of Indian funded Russian equipped Afghan armed forces at the Paki West. How can that develop in future and how will that affect the duality of perceptions and convictions.

Agnimitra ji also hinted at it when he said "It also means that strategic deterrence would mean forcing them to confront a revengeful and consolidated group of Afghan co-religionists on the other flank."

Personally I think by structuring the deal the way it is getting mentioned, we will be able to give out an adequate perception which should hang around the paki neck for sometime. But it also allows the Pakis to test our convictions sometime in the future when say a pliable mukhauta PM gets selected in Delhi. This they can do by simply pushing the Afghans and doing nothing to us, directly.

Will we at that time be better advised to root for the Afghans from their own soil or to force the Paki hand in PoK. Should such an arrangement also ultimately turn into a Friendship Pact also.

All this presuming off course, that the real Big Four (US, Rus, Cheen, EU) maintain at constant ratio, their respective share in the strategic presence in Afghanistan.

Or does this degenerate into a Nuke exchange at some point.

.............

Great post BTW Rudradev ji. Much clarity achieved for me.

[Agnimitra]

RudraDev / ravi_g ji,

China has already tested India's specific ideological quotient w.r.t. certain territories, via its repeated incursions, most prominently the DBO incursion. Forget nuclear warfare, India was not even prepared to formulate a conventional response to these incursions in Ladakh and Arunachal P. So these territories have been determined as being "softened" in terms of Delhi's ideological calculus. I am not sure if that's the way Delhi chunkians want to keep it, or whether it was just a lack of spine. For instance, STFU-TSP intentionally keeps its Afghan borders "soft". Anyway - India similarly needs to find out which other parts of India-facing Pakhanastan can be "softened". This continuous process is strategic deterrence.

[Anand K]

Continuing of Rudradev's and Agnimitra's points, in Pakistan's case I am not so sure if we could make a distinction on where the ideological touchstone ends and where "immediate reality" (which is again perception based) begins. First of all we are not entirely sure if it's Army or Allah who's really calling the shots w.r.t strategic warfighting and survival questions. Surely there's a deep interplay and interlope between these two 'A's, which is extremely unhealthy for developing a clear deterrence perception within their own side. IMO we are aware of the risk in gauging the depth of this interplay and actual red-line and this makes our decision making much more difficult.
Even way back in Sunderji's "Blind Men of Hindoostan"(?) there was a Senior Pakistani General, high on Shahadat and proto Ghazwa-i-Hind who was messing up their warfighting calculus. IIRC there were a couple of Pakistani characters who weren't doves per-se, but had a logical approach to the nuclear war thing and they were ultimately overcome by the extraneous religious dimension. (Heck, even in our cozy little "Laila" we didn't know what was happening till that Deus Ex Machina phone call came from inside the TSP power structure right? So there! ) The Americans and Russians didn't have to deal with THIS level of uncertainty. Like, nobody was thumping the Das Kapital or Atlas Shrugged or even The Bible in the respective war-rooms and spewing Apocalyptic End-of-Times BS. Maybe a glassy-eyed Reagan quoted a Bible verse or two but I'm pretty sure Don Regan or Cap Weinberger slapped him back to consciousness right away.

Perhaps this is why we have decided to publicize a fixed NFU + MR strategy - too much uncertainty regarding your enemy. Add to this other issues like close proximity, limited resources, internal security and post-war calculus etc etc. Perhaps we have "resigned" ourselves to committing to fight if the provocation is grave enough - even if it's in the nuclear shadow. And in that case there's no use talking about graded response or escalation ladder if nukes are used from Pakistani side.
Or maybe we Yindoos fully understand TSP is fully run by RAPES/Army and that they lie through their teeth always and so we play our own Crazy Reagan game to keep TSP (and the 3.5) guessing. And meanwhile keep to the old penny-pinching minimal nuclear inventory ourselves.
Or maybe we have understood that in TSP there is only one 'A' i.e. Allah and the War is inevitable - and this explains the espoused maximalist MR doctrine, which we are indeed pursuing and fielding.

[shiv]

RudraDev / ravi_g ji,

China has already tested India's specific ideological quotient w.r.t. certain territories, via its repeated incursions, most prominently the DBO incursion. Forget nuclear warfare, India was not even prepared to formulate a conventional response to these incursions in Ladakh and Arunachal P. So these territories have been determined as being "softened" in terms of Delhi's ideological calculus. I am not sure if that's the way Delhi chunkians want to keep it, or whether it was just a lack of spine. For instance, STFU-TSP intentionally keeps its Afghan borders "soft". Anyway - India similarly needs to find out which other parts of India-facing Pakhanastan can be "softened". This continuous process is strategic deterrence.

Agnimitra, may I point out that "visible" actions of territorial protection by India and a perceived failure of the government in "visibly" protecting the borders combined with a media onslaught that suggests that India is softening up are, like Rudradev's Babri or family burning in Mumbai, "ideological touchstones" that we (lay people) feel deeply about.

But the fact is that the media do not necessarily give us the whole picture and when I think about it, the government need not appear soft. They can, like Paki generals, release reports to the media that Chinese incursions have been repulsed or that a demarche was handed down and the Chinese backed down. That would be beneficial to a government that was really backing down by making them appear strong and resolute while their actual behaviour was exactly the reverse. The fact that a weak image is openly allowed with no attempt to clear up what is obviously an emotional ideological touchstone (territorial integrity) could mean that media reports of weakness and softness are not necessarily accurate.

JMT etc..but OT for this thread

[Agnimitra]

Perhaps this is why we have decided to publicize a fixed NFU + MR strategy - too much uncertainty regarding your enemy. Add to this other issues like close proximity, limited resources, internal security and post-war calculus etc etc. Perhaps we have "resigned" ourselves to committing to fight if the provocation is grave enough - even if it's in the nuclear shadow. And in that case there's no use talking about graded response or escalation ladder if nukes are used from Pakistani side.

Anand K ji, publishing a very "clear, logical, reaction-oriented" behavioral choice of one's own helps to set parameters in a game with an enemy that barely has control of its own collective mind (wadhera versus jernail versus kernail, etc). The goal here is to game a Nash equilibrium towards a set of choices that favours one's own medium-term national priorities.

As and when our national priorities change, we publish different choices of action and make a public ideological shift. As an example of the latter - right now 20 km Chinese incursions in Ladakh or Arunachal are being tolerated by shiv ji and even giving goI the benefit of the doubt, because the ideological touchstone is "territorial integrity". But tomorrow if the specific ideological quotient is re-calibrated to a national passion for Tibetan "Shivabhumi", then forget incursions, the very presence of the Chinese in Tibet will be a matter of tension.

But given our immediate national priorities for the short and medium term, it may be unwise to recalibrate our ideological sensitivity to that extent just yet. Nevertheless, the Tibetan PM in exile was invited to Modi's swearing-in this time...an example of some "micro-tuning" in the nation's ideological sensitivity index.

The fact that a weak image is openly allowed with no attempt to clear up what is obviously an emotional ideological touchstone (territorial integrity) could mean that media reports of weakness and softness are not necessarily accurate.

shiv ji, as I said to Anand K above, you are imagining a more chunkian behind-the-scenes scenario to make GoI look good - I am not saying you are wrong or right. But the fact is that you currently have the "space" to argue like that only because of the low ideological sensitivity of the Indian people to what happened. "Territorial integrity" itself is sort of low ideological sensitivity - considering we already got threashed and a lot of our territory taken in 1962...considering that devout Hindus, Sikhs and Indian Buddhists need to line up for limited Chinese visas to make the pilgrimage to Kailasa-Mansarovar..etc. On top of this already low ideological sensitivity, you are justifying a violation of even the current territorial boundaries of India.

As I said above, this may be wise in keeping with immediate national priorities. But in time, assuming we make progress enough to re-prioritize and allow other civilizational building-blocks to float to the surface, we will have to publish a new ideological sensitivity index for the reading and viewing pleasure of our neighbors. That will have to be published, both, for nuclear AND conventional warfare, as well as other aspects of relations like trade, etc.

[ShauryaT]

Here is another one that seeks to see how far can we push in conventional action under a nuclear overhang. This one a little closer to the objectives I have in mind. Still looking for some Orbat and scenario specific works. One thing that is concerning is - as of today - the relative power ratios between India-Pakistan have narrowed (thanks to 10 years of sleeping at the wheels). Almost all the papers are making wishes of what our forces ought to be. Most are still not clear on the policy objectives to achieve, beyond bashing the enemy.

Conclusion
Two factors which emerge are that Pakistan is neither deterred nor
dissuaded by India’s conventional or nuclear deterrence. Therefore, the
strategy and doctrine has to be evolved to send a clear signal of zero
tolerance to provocation. Of course, the cost is heavy but there is no option
but to undertake massive retaliation by combined arms, to meet these
parameters. A proactive strategy should have tenets of punitive actions to
ensure degradation of war-waging capability and a deterrence to disrupt and
dissuade Pakistan from waging proxy war. But to be able to do that, India will
have to build the capabilities and capacity needed to sustain and survive the
friction of war. When a nation goes to war, the timeframe and escalation level
should not be the limiting or binding factors. The limiting factor for conflict
termination should be the objectives of war and nothing else. Whatever may
be the means, whatever may be the methods, what must be definite is the
certainty of punishment, to deter Pakistan from future misadventures.
The concept needs to be evolved into a short swift war to fight forward
rather than luring the enemy deep into one’s territory. The armed forces
need to move forward from a war of annihilation to a war of manoeuvre to
defeat the strategy rather than concentrating on the destruction of the army.
Flexibility and resilience needs to be built to swiftly change from a “defensive
campaign” to an “offensive campaign” without wasting time. In the end, it is
imperative to remember what Sun Tzu had said, that no nation has benefited
from war and certainly not from a protracted war.

Pakistan: A Military Challenge in The Backdrop of
Nuclear Symmetry

[ramana]

I would put a low pass filter on CLAWS products. The director was instrumental in a study group o give up Siachen.
How credible is he on deterrence and is he totally indigenous?

[ShauryaT]

Change of guard but policies will continue?

Those acquainted with my writing are no doubt aware of my antipathy for Dr. R Chidambaram, erstwhile Chmn, AEC, and for the last decade, S&T adviser to the PM whose removal has been advocated by me post-1998 tests. He has been the greatest retardant of the nuclear weapons program — by placing it in the no-testing mode. He’s finally gone, and good riddance. What little good he did do — by calculating the equation of state for the fissile material in our n-weapons was long ago frittered away by his dogmatic championing of the “no need for more N-tests”-thesis, which has been lapped up great many in the policy Establishment and the commentariat, who are a little too mindful of the American don’ts than is good for the national interest.

That the former scientific adviser to the PM V Saraswat’s name is being bandied about as RC’s replacement is problematic for three reasons: (1) He is absolutely innocent of any intimate knowledge of N-weapons/warheads, (2) lacking any technical insights of his own, he has blindly toed the RC line — and believes that software and simulation is enough to make modifications in the failed thermonuclear design (S-1 tested in 1998) and to render the extant fusion arsenal credible. The third reason is in a generic sense similar to RC’s — he’s wedded to the idea of the ballistic missile defence system, he being the chief promoter of this project. Physics, as I have argued, is against the BMD, but Saraswat has managed to keep this exorbitantly priced project funded by making wild promises of superior performance that cannot be supported by the orchestrated tests DRDO has conducted so far. It has screwed up the country’s deterrence posture. As S&T adviser he’ll ensure a lot of good money goes down that sinkhole. It’s one of the many projects that India cannot afford, and ought to be if not shut down altogether, continued with as only a technology demonstrator.

PS: Shiv ji, the above by your favorite analyst

[Anand K]

It has screwed up the country’s deterrence posture.

Does it now?
While there is a bit of information from US BMD-waalahs on why they should pursue BMD w.r.t to Deterrence Posture we haven't seen that level of (public domain) information of BMD in Indo-Pak (forget Indo-China for now) context. A lot of Old School guys in the US were also dead set against BMD "messing up calculus" in the US-Russia/US-China game and did not think the NoKo-Iran angle warranted it either.

I mean, what are WE exactly trying to do with pursuing a BMD dimension - is it supposed to be complementary to the stated NFU + MR stance or is it supposed to be something else altogether?

[shiv]

PS: Shiv ji, the above by your favorite analyst

I am amazed that he talks of physics. The man knew less than my first year college level physics when I attended his talk. He was blabbering some nonsense.

I wonder if he knows what "equations of state" means.

It does our country no good to have the blind leading the blind by pot calling kettle black. if Chidambaram is a nicompoop, Karnad does not score much higher in my book.

[ShauryaT]

I mean, what are WE exactly trying to do with pursuing a BMD dimension - is it supposed to be complementary to the stated NFU + MR stance or is it supposed to be something else altogether?

No one who is serious about nuclear weapons relies on a nascent BMD to be part of any doctrine. It is best that this is pursued as a TD project for now and any incorporation of these systems is done only after due user testing in realistic conditions. The last thing we need is ANY semblance of reliance on an unproven BMD to further the illogical coded version of a blanket NFU that no one believes.

[ramana]

+108.BMD is good to take out some rudimentary strikes. What's need is multiple kill modules like bhramararm.

[shiv]

I mean, what are WE exactly trying to do with pursuing a BMD dimension - is it supposed to be complementary to the stated NFU + MR stance or is it supposed to be something else altogether?

No one who is serious about nuclear weapons relies on a nascent BMD to be part of any doctrine. It is best that this is pursued as a TD project for now and any incorporation of these systems is done only after due user testing in realistic conditions. The last thing we need is ANY semblance of reliance on an unproven BMD to further the illogical coded version of a blanket NFU that no one believes.

Shaurya you are merely echoing Karnad. Incidentally I disagree with this nonsense TD/Tech Demonstrator project business. Projects must have some aim/purpose. Just because other nantions have done X is does not mean that we should do exactly the same thing. We can and must follow our own path based on out threat perception

[Anand K]

The US under LBJ had fiddled with the Sentinel and Safeguard "Thin-Line Defense" system that were "solely" to protect their own silos and not the cities during a less-than-massive attack. Then thre was a move in the early 70s to have BMDs for protecting only NCAs! Now all these collapsed under the weight of it's own WTF! contradictions, MIRV tech, huge arsenals in both sides, lobbying in Washington D.C. and ICBM heavy forces - and also due to steep decline of the American Safeguard/Soviet's Galosh and other ABM projects. Then the US-USSR threw up their hands in the air and mashed together the 1972 ABM treaty - and Reagan tried to sidestep it and Bush Maama finally buried it for a Rogue State onlee BMD.

Now in our context, Pakis are right next door, they don't have MIRVs (and even the Chinese won't be crazy enough to give them those) and their arsenal are smaller. So where are we "formally" putting the S-300/PAD/AAD in the deterrence picture since there are so many reports/comments on fielding them to protect our cities? The Pakis promise a FU on battlefield targets and OTOH our BMD is reportedly designed for Step-3 or 2 of the Paki escalation promise. With this one could imply that we are indeed committed to an MR (and perhaps a solid NFU stance too) against their FU nukes. The AAD/PAD will take care of the few nukes the Pakis throw at our dark and narrow cities after our MR response (which would ostensibly target a lot of their nuke infrastructure as well). Surely we are not designing our BMD for any massive nuclear FU which only the US and to an extent China can do.

PS: Now what would happen if the Pakis did a massive FU against our forces and cities is another matter and is perhaps the cornerstone of all our BMD expansion chatter. And even this may go for a toss if they field 400+ nukes like the Chinese.

Finally, there's something called the Nitze's 3rd Criterion which is/was a practical yardstick in BMD calculus from Reagan Era (this was what finally killed the SDI IIRC) - "Marginal Cost Effectiveness—that is, it should cost less to increase one’s defense than its opponent’s costs to increase their offense against it". Maybe this holds true in the Indo-Pak context and that's why we are pursuing a BMD. On that note, what I would be interested to see is where our BMD stands in the Indo-China nuke war context since China is in a whole different league.

[ShauryaT]

CHINA-PAK NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION - India should counter the challenge diplomatically - G Parthasarathy I know most dismiss BK's idea of assisting Vietnam, but it is really the best response to Chinese perfidies.

[shiv]

LeT, JuD trying to acquire WMDs, claims book

“The JuD believes it is likely to acquire access to nuclear technology by not going against the Pakistani State. It may come sooner than we con imagine given the JuD’s ability to realise its plans systematically and cool headedly,”

This is correct. The author is saying what has been occurring to me in recent days. The Pakistani army, JuD and LeT are getting ideologically closer - with Pakistan's "Army Two" of pious jihad pasand Muslims being the government paid functionaries as opposed to "private parties" like JuD.

But it is misleading to think that LeT/JuD will acquire nukes separate from the Pakistan army. Their acquisition of nuclear weapons will be by coopting the Pakistan army and filling up the Pakistani army with JuD/LeT and Taliban sympathizers.

Like I said - it will be 6 to 7 years (around 2020 to 21) before the US starts admitting that Jihadis have nukes in Pakistan

As far as India is concerned, we must be ready for nuclear war. India may get hit by a few nukes, but we must be ready to nuke the shit out of Pakistan. The situation is too serious for any lesser plans.

[ShauryaT]

A Little Hit and a Big Miss

Don't be fooled by a minor success. America's interceptor missile-defense system is still a failed $40 billion boondoggle.

Overall, out of 17 highly scripted intercept attempts from 1999 to 2014, the system hit its target nine times, a 53 percent success rate. For the first eight tests, the system had five hits, or 63 percent. But in the last nine tests, the system has hit only four times: a depressing 44 percent success rate. These numbers attest that, despite the recent hit, this is still a prototype technology that should not have been put into production.

[prahaar]

As far as India is concerned, we must be ready for nuclear war. India may get hit by a few nukes, but we must be ready to nuke the shit out of Pakistan. The situation is too serious for any lesser plans.

Shivji,
Your assertion seems ominous. When compared to your past assertions about the idea of fighting a nuclear war, indicate a breakdown of deterrence, do you believe that it will break down in the indicated period of 2020-2021? And again based on your previously stated implications, "nuke the shit out of Pakistan" may not be sufficient. So what is the level of arsenal that India should plan?

Is my reading correct or have I misunderstood?

[shiv]

Shivji,
Your assertion seems ominous. When compared to your past assertions about the idea of fighting a nuclear war, indicate a breakdown of deterrence, do you believe that it will break down in the indicated period of 2020-2021? And again based on your previously stated implications, "nuke the shit out of Pakistan" may not be sufficient. So what is the level of arsenal that India should plan?

Is my reading correct or have I misunderstood?

You have "cornered me" and I must respond.

Up until recently I had this strange idea in my head that the Pakistan army forces protecting their nukes were some kind of special group that were genuinely interested in keeping those nukes away from "jihadis/Taliban/LeT" apart from Yahud/Hanud and great Satan.

To me it is becoming increasingly evident that all the factions in Pakistan that are supposedly opposed to each other (eg army and assorted jihadis) actually share common goals and a common outlook. That means that the forces protecting the nukes have no difference in outlook from the LeT or the Taliban. They have common enemies and share a common threat perception. Another way of saying this is that the LeT and Taliban both have access to nuclear weapons right now - weapons they can use if push comes to shove. Of course those weapons will be used via the Paki army because the Paki army is an ally.

I have no change in my old thought that India is already at risk from Paki nukes. And I still believe that the threat to India can only be diluted by making Pakistani nukes a threat to everyone in the world, including the USA and China. Only such a situation would force the US and China to rethink the support they give to the Pakistani army - support which actually helps the LeT and the Taliban as well.

I believe that one way to increase the threat of Pakistani nukes being used on entities other than India (such as the US or China) is to increase the fear of Indian attack and to increase the risk that Pakistan will be badly mauled in a nuclear war with India. The Pakistani army knows that it will not prevail and if India raises Pakistan's threat levels, they will respond by becoming even more brazen and aggressive (they will not chicken out or back down). An increase in the number of hot headed hawks in the Pakistan army can occur with the influx of suicidal jihadi thoughts that already exist within the LeT and the Taliban. Those ideas need to diffuse into the Pakistani army so that they are openly visible to all.

The good thing about the LeT and Taliban is that they are anti-US and having both entities infiltrate and take over the thinking of the Pakistani army is advantageous to us. It is good for India if rabidly anti-US elements can be seen to control Pakistani nuclear weapons. I believe they already do - but the US refuses to see it. We need to increase the threat we put on Pakistan and reassure them that their nukes will be met with a response that leaves nothing in Pakistan. You can think up the numbers yourself - but rather than number I like to think of specific targets that will ensure that all Pakistani jihad leaders will be vaporized and dead at the end of a nuclear exchange. Jihad and the Ialsmic nation will be holy ash, in other words.

[shiv]

Minimum deterrent and large arsenal

Although the 42-page-long BJP election manifesto had only one short paragraph addressing strategic nuclear policy, that presumably does not reflect the priority that the newly elected government will attach to the subject. It is well-known that the BJP lays great importance on national security, of which nuclear policy forms an important component. Indeed, one of the first tasks undertaken by the Modi government was the appointment of a National Security Advisor.

Sooner or later the new government will undertake, perhaps quietly, a review of our nuclear doctrine. Now is an appropriate time to offer suggestions on what needs to be revised and what can be left as is.

The current official nuclear doctrine, released by the Cabinet Committee on Security on January 4, 2003, summarises our nuclear policy in eight succinct points. Of these, only a few of them really call for significant modification, because in recent years things have been relatively stable on the South Asian nuclear front.

This is despite the fact that both India and Pakistan continue to produce weapons-usable Plutonium at the Dhruva reactor and the Khushab reactors respectively. Pakistan may also be continuing to produce some weapons-grade Uranium at its centrifuge plants, despite its overall Uranium ore constraints. All this fissile material is presumably being assembled into warheads. So both arsenals have been growing, as have all the attendant dangers of maintaining a nuclear force. Nevertheless the situation has, by and large, just been “more of the same.” Therefore there is no call for any radical change of our nuclear doctrine. But a few features do need to be clarified and others underlined.
No First Use

During the election campaign, the only brief reference to nuclear issues was a statement attributed to Narendra Modi that he would retain the principle of No First Use (NFU). His statement is very welcome, particularly since simplistic expectations were that Mr. Modi would bring a more hawkish approach to nuclear issues. Maintaining a doctrine of NFU, apart from being generally in tune with India’s non-aggressive ethos, has considerable diplomatic value. After our 1998 nuclear tests elicited the anticipated international opprobrium, the inclusion of NFU thereafter in the 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine helped soften the criticism, especially in comparison to Pakistan, which till today retains the option of a first strike.

However, although NFU has moral and diplomatic value, there should be no illusions about its impact on hard strategic decision makers on the other side. What matters to them is not any statement of intentions (like NFU) but the actual capabilities of the adversary. Pakistani colleagues one meets in Track II invariably say they set little store in our NFU. It makes no operational difference in their nuclear plans.

What matters more for nuclear confidence building is the actual state of alert. India has been sensibly following a system of keeping its warheads de-mated from their missiles and delivery aircraft. This introduces a minimum built-in delay in launching an attack after the decision to do so has been made. It greatly reduces the risk of an accidental or hastily decided launch. The new government should continue our policy of a de-mated de-alerted posture.

One clause currently in the Doctrine merits some revision. It states that “ ....[our] nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere...retaliation to a first strike will be massive.” Now, threatening retaliation “against a nuclear attack on Indian territory” is one matter. It is the basic component of nuclear deterrence and should apply whether the attack on our territory is small or big, as long as it is nuclear.

But adding on the phrase “or on Indian forces anywhere” is a different matter. The rationale behind it was presumably to deter a nuclear attack on our forces should they enter alien territory or the high seas in combat. Such an eventuality is not implausible after Pakistan developed the Nasr — a nuclear capable battlefield missile which could be used on Indian forces if they march deep into Pakistani territory. However, threatening retaliation against that with a massive nuclear attack from our side can boomerang on our credibility. Pakistan’s battlefield nuclear attack is likely to be small (by nuclear standards). They would not want to spread much radioactivity on their own soil. It is also unclear whether they can develop a sufficiently miniaturised warhead to fit the Nasr, and how much damage such a warhead could do. It may achieve at most a few hundred fatalities. This is still a terrible loss of Indian soldiers and armoury. But it would be far from being “mass destruction.”

However, such a battlefield nuclear attack will place India in a dilemma. Having threatened in our Doctrine to inflict a “massive” nuclear retaliation, can we really go ahead and kill lakhs of their civilians in response to a much smaller attack, that too on their own soil? It would be a disproportionate response, which would go against our national sensibilities and attract widespread criticism from around the world. Surely, there are more proportionate non-nuclear ways of inflicting punitive retaliation.

Yet, if we do not counter attack after having threatened to do so, that would invite derision that we are “a soft state” incapable of hard nuclear decisions and would erode the credibility of our future deterrence, not only against Pakistan, but also against China.

It may therefore be better to limit massive nuclear retaliation only against nuclear attacks on our country and say nothing in the Doctrine, one way or the other, about attacks “on Indian forces anywhere.” Should the latter take place, we always have the option of some appropriate, measured retaliation.
What deterrence needs

Next, consider the characterisation in our Doctrine of our nuclear force as a “credible minimum deterrent (CMD)”, where the requirement of “minimum” has been spelt out as what is needed to “inflict unacceptable damage” to the adversary. These represent a very judicious choice of words selected, in fact, by the last BJP administration. It is designed in part to temper over-zealous weapon enthusiasts from going on an endless spree of building nuclear bombs. It recognises the dangers of possessing an unnecessarily large arsenal of nuclear weapons, beyond what is essential for deterrence. The new government must ensure that the agencies concerned respect CMD in spirit and substance.

Unfortunately, our arsenal of nuclear bombs has already gone way over the minimum required to “inflict unacceptable damage” on any rational government, be it Pakistan or China. (Should Pakistan someday be taken over by irrational extremists to whom death of lakhs of civilians is “acceptable”, then no arsenal, however large, will deter them anyway. With respect to China, what deterrence needs is not more bombs than what we already have, but longer range missiles capable of reaching major Chinese cities.)

As to credibility, large arsenals, beyond a point, do not enhance it. What does is a show of determination and toughness on other non-nuclear fronts, such as terrorism or border incidents.

(R. Rajaraman is professor emeritus, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.)

[ramana]

That's old Prof emeritus.
wind bag.

[SSridhar]

I have sent my comments in 3 parts. Let me see if they publish.

[prahaar]

The good thing about the LeT and Taliban is that they are anti-US and having both entities infiltrate and take over the thinking of the Pakistani army is advantageous to us. It is good for India if rabidly anti-US elements can be seen to control Pakistani nuclear weapons. I believe they already do - but the US refuses to see it. We need to increase the threat we put on Pakistan and reassure them that their nukes will be met with a response that leaves nothing in Pakistan. You can think up the numbers yourself - but rather than number I like to think of specific targets that will ensure that all Pakistani jihad leaders will be vaporized and dead at the end of a nuclear exchange. Jihad and the Ialsmic nation will be holy ash, in other words.

Thanks for the response, the post was not meant "corner" or any such. My main focus was about whether India can respond to a nuclear attack by Pakistan without being nuked by any other nuclear powers (under the guise of stopping non-P5 darkies trying to kill each other). In other words, can India fight and win a nuclear war with Pakistan without other P5 not trying to wash hands in the behti Ganga.

My own thinking is that when India increases its nuclear arsenal to an extent when it can deter at least the Chinese government with unacceptable damage (they have not yet demonstrated the irrational behavior of our neighbors to the west). So unless India is capable of fighting a two front nuclear war, India cannot retaliate effectively (at par with the conventional doctrine).

[merlin]

I have sent my comments in 3 parts. Let me see if they publish.

Please post if here if they do not publish it.

How does the fellow propose using INS Arihant if the missles it carries are demated from their warheads?

[SSridhar]

It is published under the handle 'Subramanyam'

[Johann]

Its certainly possible to argue that the PA's officer corps as well as rank and file are getting more conservative (partly because the children of traditional officer class are less interested in military service). I can see this having an effect on policy.

Yet I can not see them diluting their collective, institutional power and ambition, by letting in anyone else directly participate in their decision making process or interfere with their chain of command, especially of nuclear weapons.

- The PA does not like to share power in general. It absolutely refuses to substantively share power on anything to with defence.

- PA chain of command has for the most part held up under the strain of largely fighting fellow Muslims over the last decade.

- Pakjab, the recruiting base of the Army is still in love with the Army, and trusts it more than any other organisation out there.

- The PA knows from experience that India has never accepted the 'non state actor' argument in any major terrorist or insurgent attack, and has held the Pakistani government directly responsible.

On a side note with the growing spirit of Sunni extremism that you see growing from below in Pakistan the first and greatest enemy is actually the Shia. The US, India and Israel are all great enemies of course, but the most immediate genocidal project is aimed at them and by extension Iran. As long as the US was in Afghanistan, Bagram Airbase was the first place I'd expect a 'loose nuke' to go off. After withdrawal I'd say Mashhad, the largest shrine complex in Iran, and the heart of Shi'ism in the country (Qom is the head). Who would nuke Pakistan for that act? No one.

[shiv]

- Pakjab, the recruiting base of the Army is still in love with the Army, and trusts it more than any other organisation out there.

Christine Fair is at pains to point out that this is no longer the case - Punjab is not the main recruiting ground. She has referred to this in her Hudson institute video - with data and graphs and her take on it.

Watch for 3 minutes from the point linked below
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=pl ... X0M#t=2521

As per Fair - the "thinking" of the Paki army is unlikely to be the old "Punjab" model but is likely to have changed.

The other point of course is an article that says the Paki army is now divided into the old style "secular" "Army One and the new Islamist jihadi Army two
http://idsa.in/system/files/monograph36.pdf
Religion as the Foundation of a Nation The Making and Unmaking of Pakistan
by P K Upadhyay

According to Pervez Hoodbhoy, religion (has) deeply divided the Pakistan military now. Perhaps it might be more accurate to think of it as two militaries. The first, -The Army One -headed by Gen.Kayani seeks to maintain the status quo and the Army’s pre-eminence in making national decisions. The second- The Army Two - is Allah’s army. This awaits a leader even as it launches attacks on Pakistani military installations, bases, top-level officers, soldiers, public places, mosques and police stations. Soldiers have been encouraged to turn their guns on to their colleagues, troops have been tricked into ambushes, and high-level officers have been assassinated. Allah’s army hopes to launch Religion as the Foundation of a Nation |95 its final blitzkrieg once the state of Pakistan has been sufficiently weakened by such attacks.176

What separates ‘Army-One’ and ‘ISI-One’ from ‘Army-Two’ and ‘ISI-Two’? This may not be immediately evident as both were reared on the ‘Two-Nation Theory’ and are thoroughly steeped in anti-Indianism since their early days in Army Cadet Colleges at Petaro and Hasan Abdal. They also share a deep-rooted contempt for Pakistani civilians. This attitude has resulted in roughly half of Pakistan’s history being that of direct military rule. Still, they are not the same. The One’ers are “soft Islamists” who are satisfied with a fuzzy belief that Islam provides solutions to everything, that occasional prayers and ritual fasting in Ramzan is sufficient, and that Sufis and Shias are bonafide Muslims rather than mushriks or apostates. They are not particularly interested in defending the Sunni states of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, or the GCC. But should a lucrative overseas posting come the way of an individual soldier or officer, well, that may be another matter. While having a dislike of US policies, they are not militantly anti-US.

Army-Two and ISI-Two, on the other hand, are soldier ideologues who have travelled further down the road of Islamism. Large numbers of them regularly travel to Raiwind, the headquarters of the Tabligh Jamaat and whose preachers are still allowed open access into the Army, despite restrictions. The Two’ers are stricter in matters of religious rituals, they insist that officers and their wives be segregated at army functions. They keep an eye out for officers who secretly drink alcohol, and how often they pray. Their political philosophy is that Islam and the state should be inseparable. Inspired by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, who preached that 7th century Arab Islam provides a complete blueprint for society and politics, they see capturing state power as a means towards creating the ideal society along the lines of the medieval Medina state. Many Two’ers are beardless, hence hard to detect. They are fundamentally anti-science but computer-savvy. For them, modern technology is a tool of battle. Like the proverbial ostrich, the One’ers fiercely defend the myth of army unity. They dismiss mutineers as isolated individuals.

[merlin]

Sometimes I have idle thoughts of planning for deterrence breakdown and not deterrence. Assume that you *will* get nuked, either by Pakistan alone, or by Pakistan acting in concert with China and the West and plan your nuclear posture around that. Only cost would get in the way then and no uncertainty about whether or not we will get nuked.

[shiv]

My main focus was about whether India can respond to a nuclear attack by Pakistan without being nuked by any other nuclear powers (under the guise of stopping non-P5 darkies trying to kill each other). In other words, can India fight and win a nuclear war with Pakistan without other P5 not trying to wash hands in the behti Ganga.

I have said ever since the start of this thread something to the effect that anyone who uses nuclear weapons will change the thinking of everyone else in the world.

What that would mean in practice is that IF Pakistan nukes India and India nukes Pakistan back, the US (or China) simply cannot join the nuclear war for the following reason - a reason that is quite apart from fallout and other disastrous effects.

The minute the US lands a nuke on anyone it will be a signal to China, Russia and others that the US is a ready nuclear warmonger who is ready to join someone else's nuclear war. That would be highly dangerous to everyone and China and Russia would have to get ready to nuke the US at some time in future if this is the sort of nuclear restraint the US shows. The same effect will occur if anyone else joins an India Pakistan war - so I believe countries will only step back and watch in horror if an India and Pakistan nuclear exchange occurs. It also means that India can successfully kill all hopes of Pakistan being the foremost Islamic nation or Caliphate in spite of damage to India. Pakistan has continuously accused India of wanting to destroy Pakistan and so that promise will have to be kept and no one will interfere.

Of course it will be painful for India, but post such a war everyone will be coping with recovery - but there will be no Pakistan problem. Only injuries, burns and fallout problems.

This is a promise we must keep for Pakistan. It is important that we remain ready to deliver this promise to Pakistan and not act as if we are squeamish. No Islamabad. No Rawalpindi. No Murdike. No Bahawalpur. No Abbottabad. No Karachi. No Lahore. No place for army generals to live or Hafeez Saeed to collect donations or Dawood to run his business, or ISI to print fake currency. Pakistan's survival hinges on what they do with their nukes.

[Johann]

Hi Shiv,

The fact that there are many more Zia like types in the PA today is absolutely true. But again, Zia for all his hobnobbing with the JI and mullahs had no interest in giving them authority over the PA or defence policy, and zealously guarded the chain of command while greenwashing the PA's culture. What Fair calls 'army one' and 'army two' share an obsession with preserving the PA's power and prestige within Pakistan. So I don't see Army two sharing nukes or decision making, unless for some sort of attempt at deniability.

The question I suppose is how destructive can the culture clash between 'army one' and 'army two' become? And how will that affect nuclear C2 and deterrence policies.

I need to look up Fair's data from the AJPS article more closely, but as she pointed out it wasn't even Punjab as a whole, but a handful of districts within Punjab that served as the recruiting base in 1972. Its a fact that Pakhtuns are much represented within the PA these days, but so are large numbers of previously neglected districts in Punjab, especially south Punjab.

Certainly the ties between the PA and Pakjab have not yet weakened. Whether this is because of PA landholdings, enlisted recruitment, or the investment of Fauji Foundation investment, or just the weight of history isn't clear. Let alone whether that is going to change.

[ShauryaT]

C. Fair has a whole paper, specifically on the issue of recruitment profiles of the PA and its changes released about a year back. It is this paper that was the material for the new book she has. But, however you slice it, even after perfect balance between demographics and personnel of PA, the fact remains Punjab will dominate - being 60% of the population and likely have a higher proportion of officers coming from the Punjab due to historical reasons and are more likely to have even a higher share of influence for a long time to come.

She speculates that "maybe" what will cause change in the state of affairs in TSP, is this diversity of recruitment profiles, and that these non-punjabi recruits shall not share the "ideology" of the punjab recruits. It is a long shot and IMO unlikely to have a major impact.

The LeT/JuD influence on the PA et al is quite limited and quite frankly irrelevant IMO. The biggest danger stems from the ideology of Pakistan and those of its key bearers the PA itself. There is no use squatting flies like the LeT, if we do not have the heft to take on the main ideology and its protectors. I thought Shiv ji always maintained that there is no difference between LeT/TTP and PA and the PA is the big dog. LeT et al would not exist, were it not for the PA and the ideology of the Pakistani state.

As for the PA not backing down and escalate to exchange of Nukes....their record shows otherwise.

[shiv]

I thought Shiv ji always maintained that there is no difference between LeT/TTP and PA and the PA is the big dog. LeT et al would not exist, were it not for the PA and the ideology of the Pakistani state.

True this was my position until recently but for the past few weeks I have been basing a change of view on various factors (reports and my own analysis) that the thinking of the LeT and Pakistan army are coming close enough for them to become fused into one entity where one cannot say that PA dominates LeT or LeT dominates PA. They are one and the same - with LeT being the non uniformed wing of the Pakistan army.

For many years we on BRF have tended to state that the PA can "rein in" jihadis when necessary. While i sometimes had my doubts about this I did not actively disagree - I only felt that some jihadis could go "out of control". But one thought that I never had before is what i am having now - i.e that the Pakistan army has acquired a jihadi mindset that has gone far enough to make ita proper jihadi army counterpart to the LeT and even the Taliban. After all, school children from the 1973 to 1977 period who were the initial people to be indoctrinated into Islamist studies would now be in their 50s and senior officers in the Paki army

As for the PA not backing down and escalate to exchange of Nukes....their record shows otherwise.

I have no fundamental disagreement with this assessment and I am not going to make the patronizing argument that "one must not underestimate one's adversary"

But I also believe that we must utilize the impotent anger that the Pakistan army and their jihadi colleagues must feel by gloating at them and mocking their cowardliness and the orders they take from the US so that they angrily overrule any moderates. The Pakistan army simply must be made totally Islamist and anti-US so that Pakistani nukes get aimed at the west as well. We have everything to gain by doing that. It is normal for entities like the US to be ready to strike a Machiavellian deal with Pakistan as long as their nukes are turned at India alone. They did that at least once before. Changing that is necessary and for that proper Islamists must take over. The Pakistan army, under control of the US is also beholden to the US and gets aid because they control the nukes that are aimed at India only. Somehow this must change.

Hilary Clinton's advice about not keeping snakes in one's backyard is good but the US has been quite happy to keep a snake in India's backyard. And the US is still helping that snake. Time to get the snake to turn on the US. We are screwed either way - we have been under threat and continue to be under threat. But how nice it would be to know that Pakistan's 100 nukes have 50 aimed at someone else too.

[Karan M]

Shaurya you are merely echoing Karnad. Incidentally I disagree with this nonsense TD/Tech Demonstrator project business. Projects must have some aim/purpose. Just because other nantions have done X is does not mean that we should do exactly the same thing. We can and must follow our own path based on out threat perception

+1.

Assume India BMD @ one city can stop 10 incoming TSP missiles. So TSP to nuke a large portion now has to dedicate 15 missiles.
That means, simply put 5 less TSP missiles on any other Indian target and 5 less from their inventory.

[K Mehta]

^ Or 5 more missiles and warheads to be produced, maintained, protected and hidden in case the war doesnt arrive. BMD's main purpose is to create a cost on the enemy while giving a degree of protection to the intended high value area.

Just because the program is nascent doesnt mean it is not useful. Its like just because I dont have a raincoat, I shouldnt use an umbrella or a hat to cover my head. If I can keep my head from getting wet, I will have a lesser worry.

[Christopher Sidor]

^^^
Extremely good point. The purpose of BMD, even a rudimentary one, is to make sure that ones opponent starts to think, Shit my payloads might not get through. There are two means to counter this. One to build more missiles, which will increase the cost for your opponent and the second is for your opponent to throw in the towel.