Many of the dogs' missions are classified, but published reports reveal that dogs have been sent in to houses in West Bank during army attempts to arrest terror suspects.
Lalmohan wrote:unfortunately hounds are not very good at opening doors
shiv wrote:Kasab and co were themselves a pack of trained creatures lower than hounds. Hounds are useful animals and actually develop a bond with humans around them, and should ideally not be sent wantonly into suicidal missions.
As the video shows the way a hiding terrorist (or armed man) is trained to work when cornered is to chuck a grenade (or fire an RPG) and rush out firing seconds after that when everyone outside is stunned by the explosion. Dogs too would be stunned by this.
Could I ask people to stop talking about this absurd idea of setting trained dogs on a couple of terrorists who are hiding in one out of 400 or 500 hotel rooms?
With respect sir - this is an extension of the "Log kya kahenge" argument which is based on "Damn - it took 60 hours to get 10 men see how Pakis are gloating". In other words our thoughts and plans are being guided by taunts and mockery from Pakistan rather than cold hard reality. The cold hard reality is that if one man hides in one room in a 400 room hotel and you don't know if he has hostages or not or if there are innocent people in rooms what are your choices:Karna_A wrote: Right now Al ee tee thinking is that 10 people faced puri hindustani fauz for 60 hours. That creates more potential piglets ready to die.
Operations at the Taj Towers and the Taj Palace Hotel
Layout: The Taj Palace Hotel
· Length of each corridor per floor is about 840 ft, total length of the hotel being about 1.80 Kms.
· Total area- 49,1400 sq.ft.
· 330 rooms, 2-3 rooms in each suite, 140 miscellaneous rooms including generator plants, etc. (in the basement), 17 suites in each floor.
Layout of The Taj Towers:
· 21 floors with with 17 rooms in each floor.
· Total rooms - 323.
Difficulties in Conducting Operations
· Time to break open, enter and conduct quick search of one room took four-five minutes, for 500 rooms- 33-40 hrs,50-63 hrs for the Taj Towers alone.
· Inside the building only 200 SAG personnel operated.
· Large area of operations, ensuring safety of guests/ civilians.
· Thick granite walls of the Taj nullified effectiveness of rocket fire, hence were not used.
· Only one master key was available, hence doors had to be broken open.
· Limited hotel staff was available, no knowledge of various small rooms in the corridors which could be used as hiding places.
· Lack of ambient light inside the rooms and the curtains were drawn from inside.
· Occupants were too scared and never identified themselves or opened the doors upon knocking or calling. Some occupants had ventured out of their rooms earlier and were shot by the terrorists, word of this incident had spread quickly and the hotel staff had advised the guests to shut themselves inside their rooms.
At 0920 h on 27 November, the NSG took over operations from the MARCOS and obtained the hotel layout plan. The Taj Chambers and the restaurants were cleared and secured first. At the Taj Palace, the ground floor was secured and the OP base was set up there.
Top-down operations were launched by approaching the terrace from the service stairs.
Inputs had suggested that two terrorists were present inside the Taj. Contact was established at the first floor during floor clearance. Fire was coming from two terrorists from the left corner of the corridor.
One SAG commando got injured in the middle of the staircase leading to the first floor. It was then that Maj Sandeep Unnikrishnan pulled him down to the basement and asked his squad to stay there and charged the staircase himself, firing at the terrorists. At this moment, two more terrorists unexpectedly fired from the right corner of the first floor corridor, injuring Maj Unnikrishnan. He later succumbed to his injuries.
Eventually, the four terrorists got cornered at the Wasabi restaurant on the first floor.
Due to the wooden spiral staircases and granite walls of the bar, they were immune to NSG fire. IEDs were used to blast open entry into the restaurant and due to the blast effect and shock waves created, one terrorist jumped out of the window and was shot. The rest died inside the restaurant.
Operations at the Oberoi-Trident
Layout:
11 floors, with 33 rooms on each floor, three interlinking corridor at three levels (floors) with the Trident Hotel.
Unlike the Taj, the two terrorists here were not pro-active and after the initial shooting of guests on 26 November, lied low in a room. They opened fire only once while changing their location and on an another occasion when fired at.
They were fixed in room number 1856 which was opened using a master key and fire was drawn from the terrorists. One terrorist was killed while escaping near the lift on the corridor, while the other hid himself inside the bathroom. Later, it was ascertained that he was defiladed from own fire from outside as he had moved into the bathtub.
The Oberoi hotel was cleared by 1400 h on 28 November, and after render safe procedure, handed over to the civil police at 1800 h on 29 November.
Operations at Nariman House
Nariman House is located in a densely populated neighbourhood in South Mumbai. Inhabited by Jews, even residents of the area had no access to it, nor did anyone possess any knowledge of the layout inside.
Sniper detachments were positioned on the surrounding buildings, and the command base was set up near an under-construction building, which provided the vantage point to bring down observed fire on the Nariman House.
The terrorists while moving in had broken the window panes of the house which lay strewn on the ground. Therefore, the sound emanating from the broken glasses alerted the terrorists and would then bring down effective fire on the approaching commandos.
The building had iron grills on all sides and the curtains were drawn from inside. The terrorists had blasted the inner staircase connecting the floors, however could not prevent the commandos from negotiating them.
The maid while escaping with baby Moshe, informed that the terrorists had moved over to the adjacent Merchant House. At one time, the locals had speculated on the possibility of six terrorists including a female being present inside.
Owing to such mixed inputs, the clearance of all neighbouring buildings became a necessity and operations commenced on the intervening night of 27/28 November.
The signal intercept provided by the Mumbai Police, revealed the terrorists shooting down the remaining two female hostages, who had already been shot earlier.
The force was divided into an assault group, which slithered down the helicopter at 0715 h on 28 November, while the support element brought down observed fire on the building. There was no time for rehearsals.
The sixth and the fifth floors were cleared first and contact was established with the terrorists at 0800 h on the fourth floor.
It was at this moment, when Hav Gajender Singh, while attempting to break into the room from the front door was fired upon by the two terrorists from divergent locations inside the room.
After this attempt, another entry point was created using an IED. Co-ordinated fire was brought down from two sides now, ie, the front door and the broken wall, while the commandos moved into the room and neutralized both the terrorists.
The objective was cleared by 1825 h on 28 November.
Summary
In all, eight terrorists were killed during the operation by the NSG and a total of 610 hostages/guests rescued from all the three locations.
The NSG suffered two fatal and 18 non-fatal casualties.
shiv wrote:With respect sir - this is an extension of the "Log kya kahenge" argument which is based on "Damn - it took 60 hours to get 10 men see how Pakis are gloating". In other words our thoughts and plans are being guided by taunts and mockery from Pakistan rather than cold hard reality. The cold hard reality is that if one man hides in one room in a 400 room hotel and you don't know if he has hostages or not or if there are innocent people in rooms what are your choices:Karna_A wrote: Right now Al ee tee thinking is that 10 people faced puri hindustani fauz for 60 hours. That creates more potential piglets ready to die.
1) Send 1200 men - 3 men to storm each room knowing that you will surely get your man soon, but may lose at least one commando or more if he is ready to kill before being killed. Also how do commandos attack a room without being killed. If they throw a grenade it it may kill innocent people
2) Send a smaller group to individually clear out rooms trying to be as safe as possible and trying to minimise casualties while guarding all the escape routes.
Once a terrorist is hiding and the hotel is silent - any gunfire or noise from the terrorist will pinpoint his location and make it easier for the security forces. That is why even the terrorists started lying still an speaking (on the phone) withe very low voices towards the end of the operation. And by waiting the terrorists were getting more tired and disoriented. And as far as Nariman house is concerned the intercepted calls made it reasonably certain that the hostages had been killed, and that is why that house was blasted room by room. They could not do that in the hotels because they would not have known how many live guests were hiding.
But once they knew where the terrorist was and that he had no hostages - they have blasted him with Shri Shri Shri Carl Gustav or Shrimati IOBputri Grenade . If you are a medical man check out the injuries on some of those bodies. The entire body is singed, clothes tattered and face looks like its been hit by a storm as often happens when one is killed by an explosion. Even the death of Fahadullah comes from a loud bang (which makes the handler say "Arrey!") followed by gunfire. The commandos have located the bathroom he was hiding in - blasted the door with explosive and sprayed his musharraf with gunfire.
The 60 hour business is a bogey. It had to take that long after the initial delay of several hours. At most if the commandos had come 6 hours earlier it may have been 50 hours and not 60 hours. All too often I have seen on BRF threads - naive comments that ask "Why did they have to send a 200 man team to kill two infiltrators in Kashmir". The answer is that this is not a boxing match with 3 minute bouts. You have an armed killer who can kill hundreds and he has to be overwhelmed. Even then we lose men - because it is that dangerous.
At the time, it was reported that one or more rooms in the hotels had large stocks of weapons and ammo, collected over a long period. Or sent in by insiders.Something is not right about the amount of ammo and grenades expended by the scum.
There is no way that the amount that they were shown carrying initially lasted them all through out the ops.
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan wants both India and the US to share details of the interrogation of David Coleman Headley, the alleged Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operative who is currently in America's detention, so that the 'myth' surrounding the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks is unearthed.
"Although India and the US are not bound to share findings of investigation, however, they need to share them with Pakistan in order to unearth the myth of Mumbai attack," The Nation quoted a top Pakistani official, as saying on conditions of anonymity.
They only want to know whom he has named so they can cover their asses.chaanakya wrote:ISLAMABAD: Pakistan wants both India and the US to share details of the interrogation of David Coleman Headley,
Any guesses as to what our pappi jhappi head of government will do?shiv wrote:They only want to know whom he has named so they can cover their asses.chaanakya wrote:ISLAMABAD: Pakistan wants both India and the US to share details of the interrogation of David Coleman Headley,
chetak wrote: Any guesses as to what our pappi jhappi head of government will do?
For those of you who do not want to sign in to YouTube to see the above video, you can watch this one.shiv wrote:Tomorrow will be the 2nd anniversary of 26/11
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q-35hzc8PQ4
