Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 16 May 2011 20:30

I realise that there is a "Pakistan nuclear proliferation" thread - but the topic tends to get filled with evidence of proliferation from Pakistan - which is now old hat. What is in the news currently is Pakistan's efforts to build vast numbers of nuclear weapons.

I thought it might be a good idea to focus our attention on what Pakistan is doing and what can be gained from public sources.

Let me start with a couple of papers that analyse the amount of fissile material Pakistan has and what it may be producing.

Here is one pdf that suggests that Pakistan will face a Uranium crunch by 2020
http://www.princeton.edu/sgs/publicatio ... ay-Raj.pdf

The study finds that Pakistan may have sufficient natural uranium to fuel
the three reactors, if they are approximately 50MWt each, but that for some of these enrichment
capacities, there will be a shortfall of natural uranium by 2020. The paper considers
the impact of alternative sources of enrichment feed such as depleted tails from
previous enrichment activity and reprocessed uranium from low-burn-up spent fuel
from the Khushab reactors. There are signs Pakistan early on may have enriched some
reprocessed uranium, possibly acquired from China. It finds that by 2020, Pakistan
could have accumulated approximately 450 kg of plutonium from the Khushab reactors
and 2500–6000 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) (90 percent enriched) for enrichment
capacities ranging from 15,000–75,000 SWU. These stocks would be sufficient for
perhaps 100–240 simple fission weapons based on HEU and for 90 plutonium weapons.
Pakistan may be able to produce more weapons if it either increases its rate of uranium
mining or has more advanced weapon designs requiring less fissile material in each
weapon.

The following paper makes an asessment of Pakistan's current state
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/si ... mr08cv.pdf

As of 2007, Pakistan may have accumulated a stock of about 1.4 tons of highly enriched
uranium for its nuclear weapons (enough for perhaps 50 – 60 weapons assuming 25 kg
per warhead). It may be producing perhaps 0.1 tons of HEU per year (i.e. about 4 weapons
worth a year). Pakistan also has about 90 kg of weapon plutonium (enough for
15 – 20 warheads) from its reactor at Khushab, which yields about 10 kg (about 2 weapons
worth) per year. This suggests that Pakistan may have fissile material sufficient
for perhaps 65 – 80 weapons and may be increasing its stock by the equivalent of about
6 weapons worth per year.

Pakistan is expanding its fissile material production capacity. There are two additional
production reactors under construction at Khushab. Each of these new reactors could
produce about 10 kg of plutonium a year, if they are the same size as the existing reactor
at the site. Imagery from late 2006 shows that Pakistan has also been working on a
new reprocessing plant at Chashma, presumably to reprocess the spent fuel from the
new production reactors.

Pakistan also has about 1.2 tons of safeguarded reactor-grade plutonium in the spent
fuel from its nuclear power reactors. This is not reprocessed.

I will also cross post Gagan's images in due course - and try and dig up an archived article I have about Pakistan's nuclear weapon desiign. It is also worth looking at the material available in public about the technology and testing required to make reliable small nuclear bombs that can be called "tactical" and the amounts of fissile material they would need and the possible weightts of such weapons which would indicate the mode of delivery.

Ravi Karumanchiri · Post by **Ravi Karumanchiri** » 17 May 2011 02:06

You know......

shiv wrote:I will also cross post Gagan's images in due course.....

..... about that.....

Within the last year, I've completed a rather unique kind of project for a major US retailer. As part of the deliverables, I figured out how to script ".kml" files using an MS Excel spreadsheet solution that I've created. The data goes into my spreadsheet, and after a bit of copy-and-paste into a 'shell file' that I've also created, the result is a ".kml" file.

If you have 'Google Earth' installed on your computer (even the free version), and you double-click on one of my ".kml" files; the 'Google Earth' software will load the file and bring you to that part of the earth, where you will see a bunch of pins, and by clicking on the pins, up will pop a small, scrolling text box that can contain a great deal of information. I even know how to integrate pictures into these pop-up windows, and I know how to customize the pin icons too.

I have admired Gagan's Google Earth image collection, and I appreciate his efforts very much. A few days ago, I tried to find his email addy, but he does not have one listed on his BRF profile.

Gagan, if you're reading this, please send me an email. You can find my email addy by going to my website, which is http://www.ravikarumanchiri.com (it is front-and-center in white text, right under the pic). After confirming that you are you (Gagan on BRF, if you will oblige me by including a designated message in one of your BRF posts), I will work together with you to create and distribute the ".kml" file that would showcase your Google Earth discoveries in the TSP.

Hope to hear from you, Gagan.

DEAR shiv, please try to bring this post to Gagan's attention. Thanks, RK

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 17 May 2011 05:49

Great stuff Ravi - I am sure Gagan wil see tis - but in any case I will email him. Gagan's profile on the forum is bursts of activity with slightly more prolonged absences unlike chronic sores like me whose presence is felt every day.

PS - I had an archived article speculating of Paki weapons designs. But I can't seem to be able to locate it.

..will be back on here

Ravi Karumanchiri · Post by **Ravi Karumanchiri** » 17 May 2011 06:09

shiv wrote:... I had an archived article speculating of Paki weapons designs. But I can't seem to be able to locate it....

Judging by TSP nuclear smuggling efforts (inbound to Pakistan) that have been mentioned in the press over the years; I would guess they are going for the "exploding bridgewire" type designs, probably using 'Perkin Elmer' Krytrons.

I would be surprised if they went with a slapper detonator.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 17 May 2011 06:15

Found something
http://www.boell-pakistan.org/downloads ... GE_(2).pdf

a) Nuclear Warhead Development
The current size of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is a secret. Various plausible estimates have placed it in
the range of 60-100 warheads in the 5-20 kiloton range. Given that India has chosen not to announce
limits upon the size of its nuclear arsenal, one can safely assume that Pakistan has also not set a fixed
numerical target. The US-India nuclear deal has essentially removed all possibilities for a fissile material
cutoff in the forseeable future. Subject to material and technical constraints, one assumes Pakistan will
seek to make as many warheads as possible, as well as make them more powerful and efficient.
So what could be the constraints for future expansion of the nuclear arsenal?
The maximum number of uranium-based warhead cores that can be produced by Pakistan depends on
the quantity of highly enriched uranium produced in centrifuges at the Kahuta enrichment facility, and
perhaps at undeclared facilities elsewhere in Pakistan. The initial HEU production was achieved using
replicas of the aluminum P-1 centrifuge, brought from Europe by A.Q.Khan in the mid-1970’s, which had
a capacity of less than 1 ―separative work unit‖ (SWU). This was the mainstay of the centrifuge program
initially, and was supplemented in the late 1980’s by the P-2 model which had a throughput of 5 SWU’s.
Typically, centrifuges are cascaded together in groups of approximately 164.

More advanced centrifuges using faster rotor speeds, made possible by the indigenous development of
stronger steels, or possibly by smuggled maraging steel, were subsequently made at the Kahuta
Research Laboratory (KRL) . The P-3 was the first of the two later centrifuges. It is a four-tube model
with a throughput of just under 12 SWU/yr. According to the reference cited, the P-4, which is still more
advanced, may have a throughput of slightly over 20 SWU/yr. Although there is information about the
types of these centrifuges in operation, their numbers are not known but are almost certainly in the few
thousands by now. One therefore expects that the yearly production rate of HEU is currently several
times larger than in the mid 1980’s and that it will keep expanding.

The amount of natural uranium mined from presently known deposits, principally in the district of Dera
Ghazi Khan, is another constraint. Pakistan has declared to the IAEA that it mines 40 tons of uranium ore
yearly. This is distributed between the fuel fabrication for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) and
for fissile material production.

Pakistan almost certainly has a handful of plutonium-based warheads whose smaller weight makes them
more suitable for delivery by missiles over longer ranges. Plutonium-rich spent reactor fuel is produced by
the one non-safeguarded 50 MW (thermal) reactor in Khushab which has been functioning since 1998. It
produces an estimated 10kg/year of plutonium, which is roughly 2 bombs worth. Recently disclosed
satellite imagery shows that there are two similar units that are currently under construction, with the
latest unit’s construction having been activated in 2007. Reprocessing of the spent fuel, done at the
New Labs near Islamabad (and now possibly at the Chashma nuclear complex too) is necessary for
chemically extracting the weapons-grade plutonium.

Satellite images obtained in 2009 suggest an increase in plutonium separation capacity , based at the
New Labs section of the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) near Islamabad.
Earlier, defence analysts in the US had pointed out that a series of commercial satellite images from
February 2002 through September 2006 showed the construction of what appeared then to be a second
plutonium separation plant adjacent to the original one, suggesting that Pakistan was planning on
increasing its plutonium stock. An assessment of fissile stocks in South Asia has been attempted using
publicly available information .

The actual number of fission warheads constructed of either type will, in addition to the plutonium
available, also depend on the existence of adequate facilities for metallization, explosives, electronics,
mechanical component construction, etc. A nuclear weapon has typically about 2000 parts and is a highly
complex piece of equipment. Much of the metallization and weapon fabrication work is done in and
around the Heavy Mechanical Complex in Taxila, and the adjoining military city of Wah. Many stages of
fabrication are involved, the first of which involves conversion of the fissile material in gaseous form into
pure metal, then machining it to precise dimensions to make the core. None of this is trivial. But, once a
design has been standardized, it becomes easily possible to produce many copies. At the current
production rate of a few fissile cores annually, warhead production would most likely follow the same rate
and further expansion of warhead production facilities is unlikely to be a major constraint.

Although the numbers of Pakistani warheads and delivery vehicles is a closely held secret, a former top
official of the CIA is quoted in the September 2009 ―Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists‖ as saying ―It took
them roughly 10 years to double the number of nuclear weapons from roughly 50 to 100‖ . Pakistan has
successfully blocked efforts at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to limit fissile materials. It says
India’s nuclear weapons make this necessary.

Making more powerful nuclear weapons is the next logical step. Boosted nuclear weapons, which use the
same fissile materials, are relatively easy to make . A few tens of grams of deuterium or tritium gas are
inserted inside the bomb. The additional neutrons released result in more complete fission and can
double or even triple the explosive power.

The Khushab reactor is also a source for tritium production. Earlier, the PAEC had attempted to produce
it by irradiating lithium . By 1987, the PAEC was able to acquire from West Germany parts for a tritium
purification facility. Later, Pakistan attempted to procure from Germany 30 tons of aluminum tubing, used
to ―clad lithium for irradiation in a reactor‖ .In a congressional record of May 1989, Pakistan is said to
have ―acquired from West Germany United States-origin tritium — originally destined for H-bombs – as
well as tritium recovery equipment. It also obtained a United States-origin high-power laser, the latter as
part of a package of equipment for making nuclear fuel.

Composite core weapons, whose idea is over 60 years old, are another possibility. By combining two
materials – a smaller plutonium sphere encased in a shell of highly enriched uranium – Pakistan could
make more bombs than if the cores were made of plutonium and uranium separately.
The fusion bomb requires a qualitatively different science. There is little doubt that Pakistan is seeking to
make such a weapon, although one has little idea of the progress made so far. A plasma physics group in
the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), established over 20 years ago, is known to be looking
into fusion weapon matters. India claims to have already developed a fusion weapon – one of the devices
tested on May 11, 1998 was announced to be of this type.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 17 May 2011 08:51

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html

The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has built 24-48 HEU-based nuclear warheads, and Carnegie reports that they have produced 585-800 kg of HEU, enough for 30-55 weapons. Pakistan's nuclear warheads are based on an implosion design that uses a solid core of highly enriched uranium and requires an estimated 15-20 kg of material per warhead. According to Carnegie, Pakistan has also produced a small but unknown quantity of weapons grade plutonium, which is sufficient for an estimated 3-5 nuclear weapons.

Pakistani authorities claim that their nuclear weapons are not assembled. They maintain that the fissile cores are stored separately from the non-nuclear explosives packages, and that the warheads are stored separately from the delivery systems. In a 2001 report, the Defense Department contends that "Islamabad's nuclear weapons are probably stored in component form" and that "Pakistan probably could assemble the weapons fairly quickly." However, no one has been able to ascertain the validity of Pakistan's assurances about their nuclear weapons security.

Pakistan's reliance primarily on HEU makes its fissile materials particularly vulnerable to diversion. HEU can be used in a relatively simple gun-barrel-type design, which could be within the means of non-state actors that intend to assemble a crude nuclear weapon.

The terrorist attacks on September 11th raised concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. According to press reports, within two days of the attacks, Pakistan's military began relocating nuclear weapons components to six new secret locations. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Pervez Musharraf fired his intelligence chief and other officers and detained several suspected retired nuclear weapons scientists, in an attempt to root out extremist elements that posed a potential threat to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

Concerns have also been raised about Pakistan as a proliferant of nuclear materials and expertise. In November, 2002, shortly after North Korea admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the press reported allegations that Pakistan had provided assistance in the development of its uranium enrichment program in exchange for North Korean missile technologies.

In the 1990s, China designed and supplied the heavy water Khusab reactor, which plays a key role in Pakistan's production of plutonium. A subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation also contributed to Pakistan's efforts to expand its uranium enrichment capabilities by providing 5,000 custom made ring magnets, which are a key component of the bearings that facilitate the high-speed rotation of centrifuges.

According to Anthony Cordesman of CSIS, China is also reported to have provided Pakistan with the design of one of its warheads, which is relatively sophisticated in design and lighter than U.S. and Soviet designed first generation warheads.

China also provided technical and material support in the completion of the Chasma nuclear power reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility, which was built in the mid 1990s. The project had been initiated as a cooperative program with France, but Pakistan's failure to sign the NPT and unwillingness to accept IAEA safeguards on its entire nuclear program caused France to terminate assistance.

Gagan · Post by **Gagan** » 17 May 2011 08:58

Hi everyone,
Really interesting and timely topic. Will be posting all google earth images, new images, items re-checked here.

My mail address is : gaganbrf at gmail

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 17 May 2011 09:39

Gagan wrote:Hi everyone,
Really interesting and timely topic. Will be posting all google earth images, new images, items re-checked here.

My mail address is : gaganbrf at gmail

G, meet R. R, meet G

Ravi Karumanchiri wrote:
Gagan, if you're reading this, please send me an email. You can find my email addy by going to my website, which is http://www.ravikarumanchiri.com (it is front-and-center in white text, right under the pic). After confirming that you are you (Gagan on BRF, if you will oblige me by including a designated message in one of your BRF posts), I will work together with you to create and distribute the ".kml" file that would showcase your Google Earth discoveries in the TSP.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 17 May 2011 09:50

A public request to use nukes against the US if need be:
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/20 ... dia_reacts

The editorial asked Pakistan's rulers to give a fitting reply to Americans if they continued to behave like enemies. The editorial warned Pakistanis that the enemies of the countries have their eyes on Pakistan's atomic program, which according to the author, "is the main asset of Pakistan as our rivals had marched ahead in conventional warfare in which we cannot compete."

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 May 2011 10:27

UK Express reports:

US to protect Pak Nukes

US ‘TO PROTECT PAKISTAN’
Story Image

Barack Obama would order troops to parachute in to protect key nuclear missile sites

Sunday May 15,2011
By Marco Giannangeli, Exclusive
2)

US troops will be deployed in Pakistan if the nation’s nuclear installations come under threat from terrorists out to avenge the killing of Osama Bin Laden, the Sunday Express can reveal.

The plan, which would be activated without President Asif Ali Zardari’s consent, provoked an angry reaction from Pakistan officials last night.

Barack Obama would order troops to parachute in to protect key nuclear missile sites.

These include the air force’s central Sargodha HQ, home base for nuclear-capable F-16 combat aircraft and at least 80 ballistic missiles.

A US source told the Sunday Express: “The plan is green lit and the President has already shown he is wiling to deploy troops in Pakistan if he feels it is important for national security.”

However, news of the plan has further increased tension between the US and Pakistan with relations already at an all-time low after the Operation Geronimo raid by the US Navy Seal special forces team that killed Bin Laden at the house where he had been hiding in Abbottabad, near to a Pakistan military academy.

An angry Pakistani official said: “Pakistan has an elaborate command and control structure and is fully capable of defending its strategic assets under any circumstances and does not need any assistance from any country, including the US, to safeguard its nuclear installations.”

The plan reflects growing concern over reprisals for the Al Qaeda terror leader’s death. More than 80 people were killed and 140 injured when two Taliban suicide bombers struck at a military academy in the north-western town of Charsadda on Friday.

Alex Neill, of the Royal United Services Institute, said: “The United States places its own national security issues above all other sovereignty issues and trust in Pakistan’s abilities are extremely low.

“If Obama can persuade congress that placing US troops at the installations is necessary to protect US citizens from possible nuclear attack, then that’s what he will do.”

The Pentagon yesterday refused to deny the existence of the plan, with a spokesman saying only: “We are confident that Pakistan has taken appropriate steps towards securing its nuclear arsenal.”

Altair · Post by **Altair** » 17 May 2011 13:58

shiv wrote:A public request to use nukes against the US if need be:
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/20 ... dia_reacts
The editorial asked Pakistan's rulers to give a fitting reply to Americans if they continued to behave like enemies. The editorial warned Pakistanis that the enemies of the countries have their eyes on Pakistan's atomic program, which according to the author, "is the main asset of Pakistan as our rivals had marched ahead in conventional warfare in which we cannot compete."

John Kerry must have hid his head in a elephants arse. If he thinks he can write in blood that he is not interested in Paki nooks after knowing Pakistani intentions then there is no value for that blood.

Prasad · Post by **Prasad** » 17 May 2011 14:00

Taqqiya is no one-way street! That is something they're overlooking. Especially when it comes to the US.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 17 May 2011 20:26

Using the first post of this thread as an information source I am assuming that Pakistan will have, by 2020, 5000 kg of Highly Enriched weapons grade Uranium and 450 kg Plutonium.

How many weapons can they realistically make out of this? The only known public information we have is that the Chinese design of bomb weighed 1500 kg. (I found a cite on the net). Of course we can assume that China has supplied its latest bomb designs but I believe that is unlikely. I have some reasons for saying that - but I will come to that in due course.

The minimum required amount of Plutonium for a bomb is about 5 kg. IIRC that should give 20 kt +/- a few kt with boosting. A Plutonium bomb cannot have the "gun" design - but could be the implosion type that requires some precision engineering and some tricky components like switches. There is no reason to think that Pakistan has no access to all those. It also requires beryllium and Tritium and Pakistan has access to both I guess. But it has to be a very efficient design. It gets easier if the mass of Pu used is larger. At best - using the most advanced designs - the Pakis can get about ninety 20 kt weapons from 450 kg Pu. France - that made the biggest pure fission weapons got only about 130 kt. So if Pakistan wants bigger fission bombs with Pu they have to use up more Plutonium. 25 kg per bomb is the upper limit that is practicable and if they use up 25 kg per bomb they get a total of 18 bombs of 100 to 150 kt.

I would have thought that the Pakis may choose a mix of say ten 100-150 kt bombs and 40 20 kt bombs - giving a total of 50 Plutonium bombs. The advantage of Pu bombs is they give more bang for the buck (i.e more bang per unit weight of bomb) - so the lighter bombs to be delivered long distances woudl preferably be Pu. Pakistan can get between 20 and 90 Pu bombs. I am guessing 50.

What about Uranium bombs. Uranium bombs are "sure shot" terrorist friendly bombs. If you have about 50 kg Uranium you can use a simple "gun design" that is guaranteed to explode and give you about 20 kt. But these bombs are big. A well designed South African bomb of about 10-15 kt using 55 kg Uranium weighed 1000 kg - 63 cm diameter and 1.8 meters long. Deliverable by aircraft. With 500 kg Uranium Pakistan can have 100 such bombs. It is likely that Pakistan is going for a more efficient design - using maybe 15-20 kg of Uranium (minimum) . With such a design Pakistan can get about 300 x 15 kiloton warheads.

Uranium has an inherent disadvantage. You collect up a lump of Uranium near critical mass (55 kg) and it will start melting. So if you say you will use 40 kg mas on one side and 30 kg on another side - you still get only 25 kt or so in a large unwieldy bomb. I am guessing that Pakistan will make a large number of 15-20 kt reliable Uranium bombs that are big.

How big? How heavy?

Look at the image on the following page that plots US bomb designs yield to weight
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:US_nu ... arison.svg

Notice that most of the bombs that are between 10 and 100 kt weigh between 100 and 1000 kg (for the USA).

Pakistan's weapons - as per the above analysis are between 10 and 100 kt. Now look at Pakistan's nuclear delivery vehicles. The minimum throw weight is 500 kg. Even the 80 km Hatf - touted as "tactical nuke delivery" has a payload of 500 kg. There is no delivery vehicle with a lighter payload advertised as part of Pakistan's strategic arsenal. (No, not the 300 kg warhead Babur despite some claims)

It is likely that Pakistan's lightest 20 kt warheads are 500 kg or more. If they yield 2 kt it's not an issue. As long as they explode. But they are likely to contain a minimum amount of 5 kg Pu or 15-20 kg Uranium at best. Not less. A lot more Paki warheads will be in the 500-1500 kg range - up to a maximum of about 100 kt if they have done their experimentation (hydrodynamic) right and have enough Tritium for boosting.

I would say Pakistan has the capability to produce 250 -300 warheads max. Not much more. Tritium is a special problem. It is required for boosting. It is only Tritium boosting that will make a 5 kg worth of Pu warhead work. Or else you will need 9 or 10 kg. Pakistan obtained Tritium from China and I don't know how much they produce. Tritium decays and I think it becomes useless in 10-12 years unless replaced.

How much confidence Pakistan has in her warheads will decide the actual number. At best they will have 300 (by 2020). But if they are short of critical materials and do not have sophisticated designs - they may have as few as 100 to 150 reliable warheads - mostly of the heavier type requiring air delivery or larger missile.

JMT

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 May 2011 20:45

OTh, all this fizzle material production is a cover for comapct PRC bombs given to TSP as part of strategic alliance, with launch authority delegated to TSP. This avoids the headaches of stockpile maintenance and concerns of supply chain management and potential leakages etc. US has shown a proclivity to forgive and forget any PRC transgressions and this wouldn't be a first. And another advantage for US in this case is control of firmly in PRC hands to ensure no loose nooks.

This could explain the repeated visits to PRC at times of TSP crisis manufactured or otherwise.

The TSP's periodic outbursts to lose control of nooks is to scare up the US Congress to give more money* and India to give more concessions.

* With US budget pressures this tactic will get less traction in future.

Muppalla · Post by **Muppalla** » 17 May 2011 21:35

Pakistan’s Nuclear Surge

Exclusive satellite imagery taken in April 2011 exposes a new nuclear facility (circled) in Khushab, Pakistan—which now has the fastest-growing nuclear program in the world. The facility was undetectable in satellite images take as recently as December 2009. Pictured directly above the circled area are two white boxes which are also nuclear reactors. Image by © GeoEye

Even in the best of times, Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons program warrants alarm. But these are perilous days. At a moment of unprecedented misgiving between Washington and Islamabad, new evidence suggests that Pakistan’s nuclear program is barreling ahead at a furious clip.

According to new commercial-satellite imagery obtained exclusively by NEWSWEEK, Pakistan is aggressively accelerating construction at the Khushab nuclear site, about 140 miles south of Islamabad. The images, analysts say, prove Pakistan will soon have a fourth operational reactor, greatly expanding plutonium production for its nuclear-weapons program.

“The buildup is remarkable,” says Paul Brannan of the Institute for Science and International Security. “And that nobody in the U.S. or in the Pakistani government says anything about this—especially in this day and age—is perplexing.”

Unlike Iran, which has yet to produce highly enriched uranium, or North Korea, which has produced plutonium but still lacks any real weapons capability, Pakistan is significantly ramping up its nuclear-weapons program. Eric Edelman, undersecretary of defense in the George W. Bush administration, puts it bluntly: “You’re talking about Pakistan even potentially passing France at some point. That’s extraordinary.”

Pakistani officials say the buildup is a response to the threat from India, which is spending $50 billion over the next five years on its military. “But to say it’s just an issue between just India and Pakistan is divorced from reality,” says former senator Sam Nunn, who co-chairs the Nuclear Threat Initiative. “The U.S. and Soviet Union went through 40 years of the Cold War and came out every time from dangerous situations with lessons learned. Pakistan and India have gone through some dangerous times, and they have learned some lessons. But not all of them. Today, deterrence has fundamentally changed. The whole globe has a stake in this. It’s extremely dangerous.”

It’s dangerous because Pakistan is also stockpiling fissile material, or bomb fuel. Since Islamabad can mine uranium on its own territory and has decades of enrichment know-how—beginning with the work of nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan—the potential for production is significant.

Although the White House declined to comment, a senior U.S. congressional official who works on nuclear issues told NEWSWEEK that intelligence estimates suggest Pakistan has already developed enough fissile material to produce more than 100 warheads and manufacture between eight and 20 weapons a year. “There’s no question,” the official says, “it’s the fastest-growing program in the world.”

What has leaders around the world especially worried is what’s popularly known as “loose nukes”—nuclear weapons or fissile material falling into the wrong hands. “There’s no transparency in how the fissile material is handled or transported,” says Mansoor Ijaz, who has played an active role in back-channel diplomacy between Islamabad and New Delhi. “And the amount—they have significant quantities—is what’s so alarming.”

That Osama bin Laden was found in a Pakistani military community, and that the country is home to such jihadi groups as Lashkar-e-Taiba, only heightens concerns. “We’ve looked the other way from Pakistan’s growing program for 30 years,” says Sharon Squassoni, a director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. What we’re facing, she says, is “a disaster waiting to happen.”

A Defense Department official told NEWSWEEK that the U.S. government is “confident that Pakistan has taken appropriate steps toward securing its nuclear arsenal.” But beyond palliatives, few in Washington want to openly discuss the nightmare scenario of terrorists getting hold of nuclear material or weapons. “The less that is said publicly, the better,” says Stephen Hadley, national-security adviser to President George W. Bush. “But don’t confuse the lack of public discussion for a lack of concern.”
...
...
...
With this fourth nuclear facility at Khushab coming online as early as 2013, and the prospect of an accelerated nuclear-weapons program, the U.S. is facing a diplomatic dilemma. “The Pakistanis have gone through a humiliation with the killing of Osama bin Laden,” says Nunn. “That’s never a time to corner somebody. But with both recent and preexisting problems, we are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe. Both sides need to take a deep breath, count to 10, and find a way to cooperate.”

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 May 2011 21:51

^^^^

Exclusive satellite imagery taken in April 2011 exposes a new nuclear facility (circled) in Khushab, Pakistan—which now has the fastest-growing nuclear program in the world. The facility was undetectable in satellite images take as recently as December 2009. Pictured directly above the circled area are two white boxes which are also nuclear reactors. Image by © GeoEye

Even in the best of times, Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons program warrants alarm. But these are perilous days. At a moment of unprecedented misgiving between Washington and Islamabad, new evidence suggests that Pakistan’s nuclear program is barreling ahead at a furious clip.

According to new commercial-satellite imagery obtained exclusively by NEWSWEEK, Pakistan is aggressively accelerating construction at the Khushab nuclear site, about 140 miles south of Islamabad. The images, analysts say, prove Pakistan will soon have a fourth operational reactor, greatly expanding plutonium production for its nuclear-weapons program.

“The buildup is remarkable,” says Paul Brannan of the Institute for Science and International Security. “And that nobody in the U.S. or in the Pakistani government says anything about this—especially in this day and age—is perplexing.”

Unlike Iran, which has yet to produce highly enriched uranium, or North Korea, which has produced plutonium but still lacks any real weapons capability, Pakistan is significantly ramping up its nuclear-weapons program. Eric Edelman, undersecretary of defense in the George W. Bush administration, puts it bluntly: “You’re talking about Pakistan even potentially passing France at some point. That’s extraordinary.”

{THis puts TSP above UK and France two of the P-5 and there is no expression of concern from US.}

Pakistani officials say the buildup is a response to the threat from India, which is spending $50 billion over the next five years on its military.
{India which has two nuke armed challengers and covert one supporting both of them still has much less numbers and this is lost to the US elite/experts.}{/i]

“But to say it’s just an issue between just India and Pakistan is divorced from reality,” says former senator Sam Nunn, who co-chairs the Nuclear Threat Initiative. “The U.S. and Soviet Union went through 40 years of the Cold War and came out every time from dangerous situations with lessons learned. Pakistan and India have gone through some dangerous times, and they have learned some lessons. But not all of them. Today, deterrence has fundamentally changed. The whole globe has a stake in this. It’s extremely dangerous.”

{This guy helped US cover up PRC proliferation to TSP in the 90s after the Cold War eneded and he is now:(( !}

It’s dangerous because Pakistan is also stockpiling fissile material, or bomb fuel. Since Islamabad can mine uranium on its own territory and has decades of enrichment know-how—beginning with the work of nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan—the potential for production is significant.

Although the White House declined to comment, a senior U.S. congressional official who works on nuclear issues told NEWSWEEK that intelligence estimates suggest Pakistan has already developed enough fissile material to produce more than 100 warheads and manufacture between eight and 20 weapons a year. “There’s no question,” the official says, “it’s the fastest-growing program in the world.”

{Give them more F-16s! creates jobs in US}

What has leaders around the world especially worried is what’s popularly known as “loose nukes”—nuclear weapons or fissile material falling into the wrong hands. “There’s no transparency in how the fissile material is handled or transported,” says Mansoor Ijaz, who has played an active role in back-channel diplomacy between Islamabad and New Delhi. “And the amount—they have significant quantities—is what’s so alarming.”

That Osama bin Laden was found in a Pakistani military community, and that the country is home to such jihadi groups as Lashkar-e-Taiba, only heightens concerns. “We’ve looked the other way from Pakistan’s growing program for 30 years,” says Sharon Squassoni, a director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. What we’re facing, she says, is “a disaster waiting to happen.”

{Now some wisdom. What disaster she envisages happening?}

A Defense Department official told NEWSWEEK that the U.S. government is “confident that Pakistan has taken appropriate steps toward securing its nuclear arsenal.” But beyond palliatives, few in Washington want to openly discuss the nightmare scenario of terrorists getting hold of nuclear material or weapons. “The less that is said publicly, the better,” says Stephen Hadley, national-security adviser to President George W. Bush. “But don’t confuse the lack of public discussion for a lack of concern.”
...
...
...
With this fourth nuclear facility at Khushab coming online as early as 2013, and the prospect of an accelerated nuclear-weapons program, the U.S. is facing a diplomatic dilemma. “The Pakistanis have gone through a humiliation with the killing of Osama bin Laden,” says Nunn. “That’s never a time to corner somebody. But with both recent and preexisting problems, we are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe. Both sides need to take a deep breath, count to 10, and find a way to cooperate.”

After the Chagai tests I wrote that TSP is now a US problem and not just Indian problem anymore. I still stand by that. US failure to prevent PRC transferring nukes to TSP to test and field is what led to the Nuclear Enabled Terrorism (NET) from TSP to wards India and even the US.

Newsweek article doesnt come to terms with this because the very experts being quoted were players at that time.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 17 May 2011 22:09

ramana wrote:^^^^

{THis puts TSP above UK and France two of the P-5 and there is no expression of concern from US.}
>>>US will be permanently in Asia for another 50 years for sure.

{India which has two nuke armed challengers and covert one supporting both of them still has much less numbers and this is lost to the US elite/experts.}
>>>This image is important to show that the real problem is India.The perception is built so that this is a IndiaPakistan problem. This elaborate charade created from 1970s was to force behaviour changes in PRC and Pakistan. This management of the behavior of these two states was done using this incentive of nuclear and missile proliferation.

{This guy helped US cover up PRC proliferation to TSP in the 90s after the Cold War eneded and he is now:(( !}

>>>Great effort is put not to show the proliferation by China.

After the Chagai tests I wrote that TSP is now a US problem and not just Indian problem anymore. I still stand by that. US failure to prevent PRC transferring nukes to TSP to test and field is what led to the Nuclear Enabled Terrorism (NET) from TSP to wards India and even the US.
>>>It may have been western enabled startegy against India.

Newsweek article doesnt come to terms with this because the very experts ebing quoted were players at that time.

Muppalla · Post by **Muppalla** » 17 May 2011 22:21

^^^^
Same snakeoil is being sold on BRF and we need to bring the real truth. This thread it timely and inspite of slowness, I sincerely hope we can extract truth on this thread.

My take -
1) Pakistan has no real capability to do anything on its own including JDAMs, suitcases or even bullock cart ones
2) Nukes are parked by US and also China using China as conduit because publicly or privately China gives two hoots to proliferation talk.
3) The purposes of Nukes are:
a) increase H&D of PA inorder for PA to sell to Pakistani population, Islamism that Pakistan has some great things achieved to spread Allah.
b) Destroy India in case of India attacks Pakistan due to terror attacks in India
c) Never allow JK to be settled with advantage to India

To rest of the arguments are all BS. The numbers are all cooked up. The number like 90, 100 are all dependent upon how much is the Parking lot built by US and China to park them. Yeah, you park more cars, the number of cars in a parkinglot increases. Or you can create a fake image of the Parkinglot to show there are more. Or you can just announce that there are more cars in the lot.

In addition, US uses nuke-nood threat to PA to get what it wants from PA. H&D issues. Realistically if a nuke explodes in India, it is either by China or Uncle and nothing else. Period.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 17 May 2011 22:36

Muppalla wrote:
In addition, US uses nuke-nood threat to PA to get what it wants from PA. H&D issues. Realistically if a nuke explodes in India, it is either by China or Uncle and nothing else. Period.

Both US and PRC have an incentive to make sure that Pakistan does not use Nukes. Lot of information will be traced back to PRC if anything happens.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 17 May 2011 22:38

Muppalla,

It is hard for some proud Indians to believe but 90% of the time India really wasn't at the centre of *anyone's* thinking outside South Asian countries like India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh.

India has been the victim of much larger games between bigger, more powerful players.

- Pakistan took the uranium route after the Ford administration stopped the French from exporting a reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility to the Pakistanis in the 1970s.

- The Soviet Union, not India was the PRC's main enemy in the 1970s and early 1980s when China began proliferation to Pakistan. India was quite secondary until the 1990s.

- China's decision to proliferate to Pakistan came at the same time when it proliferated to North Korea, Iran and Algeria. Those other acts of proliferation were about shifting the global balance of power against the US as much as it was against the Soviet Union.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 May 2011 22:42

And what will anyone do with that information?
Recall the ring magnet charade in 1990s? The info about PRC conducting one of its small 45 tests for TSP in 1992?
Such info will be used by US to make the PRC gubo a little bit thats all.

Meantime Yindus will get radiated. So please get to reality.

--
Johann, You speak of proliferation (incorrect word to describe the act of giving gasolene to an arsonist) as if its passing some benign stuff. What the PRC did was horrofic and US sat on the info hoping that India will get frightened and fall into their arms. "Breaking the Labryinth"

If India is set on fire the world will be too.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 17 May 2011 22:59

Ramana,

The US was tough on Pakistani nuclear acquisition up until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

After that it all went downhill - the short term goal of using Pakistan to hurt the Soviets took priority, and they've been too embarrassed to fully own up to that policy shift ever since.

As India grows more powerful India's views on what needs to be done about the Pakistani nuclear threat will carry much more weight.

While that will be a welcome improvement, it will not be a solution in itself. US opposition to India and China's nuclearisation had little effect. US opposition to the nuclearisation of Iran and North Korea had little effect. History suggests that nuclearisation is almost impossible to stop when a country/govt feels severely insecure and is determined to acquire a deterrent of its own. God knows the Pakistanis have amongst the most pathological insecurity complexes to be found anywhere in the world

However, to reduce the scale of Chinese proliferation just to Pakistan is to underestimate the scale and the ambition of what the Chinese did from the Mediterranean and Africa all the way to the Korean Peninsula. Deng Xiaoping's plan was to use proliferation as a means of ensuring that in the medium to long term there could be no more 'super-powers' with the power of nuclear deterrence in many hands across the world.

The Chinese may yet regret the export of instability from North Korea and Pakistan from behind their deterrent shield. Its nice to think that the Chinese have the power to stuff the genie back in the bottle, but its wishful thinking, just like assuming and hoping America can always control Israel. The best we can hope for is that they will strengthen containment of such rogue regimes instead of undermining it. Unfortunately China is still some ways from reaching such a position, and who knows when it will actually get there. Americans, particularly Democrats/liberals have often been prematurely hopeful.

rsingh · Post by **rsingh** » 18 May 2011 00:24

Dera Ghazi Khan facility

image of the Suleman mountain range approximately 20 kilometers from the Dera Ghazi Khan nuclear site.

A high-security weapons storage area northwest of Karachi appears to be a potential nuclear weapons storage site.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 May 2011 06:01

The narrative of blaming PRC for the nuclear arming of TSP is one sided.

Its a tactic of the village zamindar who blames the dacoit in the jungle for terrorizing the villagers, while secretly providing aid to the dacoit.

It ignores the multiple players in Western Europe: Holland, UK, Germany (URENCO), Swiss had in the AQK network.

It ignores the responsibility of US as leader of the West and the NPT community in acquiescing to the PRC transfers. And continued inaction after Cold War was over: PRC test in 1992, Ring Magnets, Nodong, M11 missiles etc.

Also claiming PRC armed TSP as a Cold War action ignores the fact that TSP was in no position to confront the FSU even if it had nukes.

So some thing is not right in this picture.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 18 May 2011 06:44

Without getting into a discussion of whether Pakistani nukes are actually Chinese nukes repainted I want to make a few comments on what I have gathered about nukes in general.

The best "sure fire" nuke is a lump of Uranium. It takes one heck of a lot of effort to enrich Uranium to end up with 90% U235 and Pakistan, for all intents and purposes, seems to have put in that effort. As I stated above - Pakistan could make about 100 sure fire Uranium nukes with 5000 (to 6000) kg of enriched Uranium. But even making a nuke of this class requires some engineering capability of the level the US had in the 1940s - but I am sure Pakis have that.

The problem with nuke design appears to be making the nukes "more efficient" - so you get bigger bang from smaller lump of nuclear material so that you can make you stockpile into more bombs. The difference is significant. If Pakistan make the most rudimentary "sure fire" bombs they will be about 150 nukes at most. That number can go up to 350-400 if they can make extremely efficient designs. Problem is "sure fire" Uranium weapons are big and heavy and may not be efficiently missile deliverable. They may be gravity bombs.

There is another alternative. That alternative is to make maybe half (say 75) "sure fire" nukes and use the rest of the material to fashion smaller nukes that will exist in the stockpile of weapons - but do not have a definite 400% guarantee of producing the designed bang. Some of them may work as stated. Some may be full fizzles. Most will produce some bang - maybe 0.1 kt to 10 kt. Even 0.1 kt is a big bang. It is equal to 100 tons of TNT going off in one place - i.e 100 x 1000kg High Explosive bombs (that is the load of a squadron of F-16 dropping bombs). The bang is biggish - but may not be devastating in a nuclear sense.

It would be interesting to know what design choices have been made by Paquis. The design choices have some impact on what is being done with the nuclear material. I will come to that in a separate post.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 18 May 2011 08:10

shiv wrote: It would be interesting to know what design choices have been made by Paquis. The design choices have some impact on what is being done with the nuclear material. I will come to that in a separate post.

Plain old Plutonium based fission and boosted fission would be their best choices. TSP has been on the plutonium route since 2004. PRC help in this area is a virtual guarantee. So, the chances of a failure of these devices are low.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 18 May 2011 09:45

ShauryaT wrote:
shiv wrote: It would be interesting to know what design choices have been made by Paquis. The design choices have some impact on what is being done with the nuclear material. I will come to that in a separate post.
Plain old Plutonium based fission and boosted fission would be their best choices. TSP has been on the plutonium route since 2004. PRC help in this area is a virtual guarantee. So, the chances of a failure of these devices are low.

Shaurya - then their total numbers of devices are correspondingly low - if you look at the figures from the link in my first post.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 May 2011 09:51

shiv, To achieve progress in this area there have to be similar progress achievements in the related areas. Can't have excellence only in one area and hardly any in the related fields:chemistry, electronics, machining, etc etc.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 18 May 2011 10:16

ramana wrote:shiv, To achieve progress in this area there have to be similar progress achievements in the related areas. Can't have excellence only in one area and hardly any in the related fields:chemistry, electronics, machining, etc etc.

Agreed - unless prefab Chini maal is coming in like you suggested. Anyhow - I have a few more "opinion posts" to make - so will write more soon.

Rudradev · Post by **Rudradev** » 18 May 2011 10:32

Shiv: the simplest gun-type HEU devices may be "sure-fire", but being that they weigh on the order of 3000 kg they are far from "sure-deliver." As you mentioned they are good only for gravity bomb platforms... and how many of these fuggers can Pakistan reasonably hope to deliver successfully with their F-16s? It doesn't make sense at all, for Pakistan to build more of these than the number of serviceable F-16s it has (surely they won't entrust delivery to Chengdus or Bandars, or assume that the F-16s designated would make more than one trip.) So on the outside, 50-60 big dabbas ranging from 10-20kT. The rest of the HEU they may try to package into smaller "tactical" weapons, or make dirty bombs from it or whatever.

The most valuable of their crown jewels are the ones they will make from Pu. According to your Princeton link, the estimate is that in 2020 they could make "90 Pu weapons." This estimate is based on having harvested ~450 kg of Pu at 5 kg of Pu per weapon i.e. (assuming "Fat Man" level implosion tech) about 20-30 kT per weapon. Maybe as much as 45 kT if the Chinese have got much better at design over the decades.

From the same link the Pakis are expected to have harvested some 150 kg of Pu from Khushab at the present time; ie. 30 weapons of 20-45 kT per weapon. Pretty well set to go because they are ALL tested Chinese designs (Pakis didn't test a single Pu device at Chagai.) If these are capable of being delivered by missiles (and again, likely they are because the missiles are also Chinese designed)... then they represent the bulk of Pakistan's nuclear threat to India. The HEU dabbas will be loaded onto F-16s and sent out to find their targets, inshallah... and with Phalcon and IAF interceptors on alert they most likely won't get anywhere near their intended destinations.

As for capability: I had made this post in 2009 and I think the figures still hold good to a large extent.
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 61#p613861

Reposting a part of it:

....

Ok, so considering all of the above, if you were the Paki jernail in charge of coming up with nuclear war doctrine against India: what would you do?

First of all, I wouldn't start one. No matter what. Let Slumbad threaten and bluster as much as they want, lower the "redlines" wherever they like. I know what's coming if I start a nuclear war with India, just as the Fizzle Ya did when they refused to fly in support of the TSPA during Kargil.

But if it came to that, how could I use my very limited assets to best effect?

Firstly, my low-yield weapons would be a roll of the dice. Load them on to F-16s and hope for the best (I would have no time or excess warheads to mess around with Babur-Shabur and all that $hit). Use them against IA troop formations as necessary to prevent our own troops from being overwhelmed. It is unlikely that I will use them against military targets where a conventional airstrike or missile strike would serve the purpose just as well.

Other F-16s with low-yields would be sent against Tarapur, Nangal, Kota, Narora, Baroda to attempt to hit Indian nuclear installations near populated areas. If any remained, use them against urban economic centres near the border: Gurgaon, Ankleshwar, Noida, Chandigarh, other sites in Gujarat and Punjab.

Now the crown jewels. 27 missile-mounted warheads of between 25-40 kT. Given the British estimates of how many warheads are required to take out Moscow, and the relative ineffectiveness of a 1 MT warhead against London... it makes the most sense to use ALL these crown jewels against ONE Indian city. Maybe two, but I personally think just one.

Not much to guess about which city that will be. My heart is heavy to say this, because I was born and brought up there and still have close relatives living there... but I'm pretty sure that it will be Mumbai.

Mumbai affords the maximum capacity for counter-population damage (density, and lack of escape routes); counter-economic damage (it is the financial capital) and also has the Turbhe plant, BARC and TIFR. It is closer to the border than Hyderabad or Mangalore.

....

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 18 May 2011 13:42

shiv wrote:A public request to use nukes against the US if need be:
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/20 ... dia_reacts
The editorial asked Pakistan's rulers to give a fitting reply to Americans if they continued to behave like enemies. The editorial warned Pakistanis that the enemies of the countries have their eyes on Pakistan's atomic program, which according to the author, "is the main asset of Pakistan as our rivals had marched ahead in conventional warfare in which we cannot compete."

The Americans are finding out that Pakistanis are paranoid regardless of how one behaves. Earlier on, the Americans thought that there could have been some basis of Pakistani paranoia of India when they claimed India wants to destroy Pakistan. Now Americans have to write it "in blood" to assure the Pakistanis that they do not intend to take their nukes, and still the Pakistanis would not believe the Americans and threaten them with nukes!

So those Americans who were talking about India handing over Kashmir to the Pakistanis, they should now talk about America handing over their nuclear arsenal to Pakistan to placate Pakistani angst!

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 18 May 2011 19:07

The internet informs me that Uranium in the form Uranium hexafluoride gas is enriched and the enriched gas can be converted to metal - which should appear as a powder of pure metal if my source is right. That poder then has to be fashioned ino a ball or cylinder or some such thing to make the core of a nuclear bomb.

Now look at it this way. Suppose my Paki uncle left me 1000 kg of 90% enriched Uranium powder in his will what would I do with it if I did not want to sell it to Iran?

I have two choices

Choice 1: fashion it all into bomb cores
Choice 2: Store the powder in ingots (or as powder) while I decide what sort of bomb core I want to make

You see- if I make bomb cores - it freezes the design absolutely. If my bomb is a "sure fire" one that uses up 55 kg of Uranium then I cannot quickly change my mind and use that material for two or three more efficient bombs. I will have to melt and remould the Uranium to get 2-3 cores out of that 55 kg lump. Instead if I make three 15 kg cores and then start worrying about whether they will work - I will have to melt them all.

So there is a disadvantage in making cores. The big advantage of making cores is that they will be readily available for phyrring at the kafir upstart filthy Indians. So definitely, one can expect that the Pakis have a set of ready cores waiting to be mated with a deiivery system to take them to dirty kafir India. But I am equally certain that Pakistan maintains a stockpile of nuclear material that has not be fashioned into a particular bomb core - for the purpose of "future development".

What would Pakistan do with ready cores.? Available information suggests that they are not mated to delivery systems. This makes sense because - as someone had pointed out a ready-to-use warhead is a tempting thing for a lot of people to use, or a rebel could fire off one at India for the heck of it. So the way of minimizing the risk is to

a. Keep cores separate from warhead
b. Keep cores together in one place that can be secured. If 50 cores are kept in 50 places the security problems are multiplied 50 times (at least)

Keeping cores together in one place exposes them to the risk of total destruction in one enemy nuclear attack. Besides - the act of arming aircraft or missiles will be noticed if the place of storage is under surveillance. So the best thing would be to split up the cores and store them in many different locations. One news item after 9-11 suggested that Pakistan moved its nuclear bombs to six different locations. Now all 6 locations would be vulnerable to a counter force nuclear attack but "spiriting them all away to safety" would not be possible.

But apart from bomb cores I am certain that Pakistan has a stockpile of Uranium that is not yet fashioned into bomb cores. Where would they store the? They are likely to store them in a place near the nuclear bomb making units where the stores can be accessed easily.

These storage areas are likely to be really attractive to various people

In the first place India will bomb the shit out of these places if the Pakistani army does something so silly as to launch an 60 km Hatf/Nasr with a nuke. So much for "graduated escalation". The US of course will be watching for any movement (as would India) which would suggest that any nukes are being armed.

But there will be many other countries interested in enriched Uranium. I don't believe for one second that terrorist could do anything with Uranium. Unless you have the engineering, physics and chemistry and scientific set up to make a bomb out of Uranium you will get a better kick by stuffing the Uranium up uranus. So it would be countries and not terrorists interested in that Uranium and countries have money to pay and bribe. That would be where the Uranium is headed if push comes to shove. Oh yes - "terrorists" may get Uranium - but all this "dirty bomb/shirty bomb" may be a stupid thing. The correct thing would be to sell any Uranium to a prospective buyer for a hefty price.

So Pakistan may be paid to look after its Uranium with the added threat that they will get butt kicked if they "lose" any of it. In fact Pakistan needs to be bombed if there is any sign that the nukes are leaving the storage areas. This may be the single biggest reason for supporting the Shitistan army. The Crapistani fauj will be obliterated if they try and use their nukes for sale or for war, but like keeping Osama safe - they could well be paid for keeping the fissile material safe.

No doubt they will try to have it both ways - i.e get paid but still use the nuke material in some way.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 18 May 2011 21:01

OK folks - I think Pakistan's "Nasr" anti-cold start tactical nuke is a bluff
http://www.thefridaytimes.com/13052011/page7.shtml

This system is probably a four-tube adaptation of a Chinese-design multiple rocket launcher (MRL), possibly the A-100 type, on an eight-wheeler truck, capable of carrying four, ready-to-fire 20-foot ballistic missiles of about 300mm (11.8 inch) diameter. A ballistic missile differs from a rocket by having its own guidance system (probably inertial) and spring-out fins that adjust course during flight for targeting accuracy. MRLs typically have 10- to 20-tube launch racks of smaller bore. The truck-launcher otherwise may be a Chinese knock-off of the Russian 300mm Smerch MRL system sold to India.

Taken at face value, the press release implies that Pakistan has either developed or acquired nuclear warheads small enough to fit inside a missile whose diameter probably is just under 12 inches, and possibly of relatively low yield. Technical experts will have their own questions about whether Pakistan has been able to do this by itself. Pakistan probably produced significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium only after the May 1998 tests, is not believed to have test-detonated any nuclear weapons since, and any professional military is averse to using untested weapons. Plutonium allows for lighter weapons than uranium, but an implosion assembly with a diameter under 12 inches would be a real feat. That said, Lt Gen (r) Khalid Kidwai's presence at the test and association with the press release would give the nuclear assertion more than ordinary credence. Kidwai has been in charge of organising Pakistan's nuclear command and control system and overseeing nuclear weapons development since 1999.

The smallest nukes ever made are barely under 30 cm diameter
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Nwfaq/N ... #Nfaq4.2.2

The absolute minimum possible mass for a bomb is determined by the smallest critical mass that will produce a significant yield. Since the critical mass for alpha-phase plutonium is 10.5 kg, and an additional 20-25% of mass is needed to make a significant explosion, this implies 13 kg or so. A thin beryllium reflector will reduce this, but the necessary high explosive and packaging will add mass, so the true absolute minimum probably lies in the range of 10-15 kg.

The W54 warhead used in the Davy Crockett had a minimum mass of about 23 kg, and had yields ranging from 10 tons up to 1 kt in various mods (probably achieved by varying the fissile content). The warhead was basically egg-shaped with the minor axis of 27.3 cm and a major axis of 40 cm. The W-54 probably represents a near minimum diameter for a spherical implosion device (the U.S. has conducted tests of a 25.4 cm implosion system however).

There is no way Pakis have a less than 30 cm diameter warhead.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 18 May 2011 21:27

Ramana,

I wouldnt hesitate to say that the US looked the other way after the Soviet invasion, or that the Khan network did a lot of procurement in Western Europe, especially in Germany during the period in question. However that pales utterly in comparison with the Chinese and North Korean role.

The Chinese transferred an entire working design, and according to Danny Stillman facilitated a joint test at Lop Nur. They helped Pakistan with setting up its uranium fuel cycle, and provided the unsafeguarded reactor at Khushab to produce plutonium. They facilitated contact with the North Koreans which led to the trade of ballistic missiles for enrichment technology, and then used Pakistan to facilitate ballistic missile sales to Saudi Arabia.

How would you have known about the ring magnets or M-series transfers if they had not been published in the western press based on leaks from within the USG? These issues were major irritants in Sino-American relations in the early 1990s.

There is no question in my mind that the US and EU should have taken a tougher line on Chinese proliferation, and Pakistani procurement in the 1980s. However the evidence of any number of cases is that sanctions have never done much more than slow down determined states from weapons acquisition.

In the end the only defence is a credible deterrence on the one hand, and encouraging political change on the other. The Americans could not prevent the Soviets from gaining nuclear weapons, and the Soviets couldnt stop the South Africans from building them. Yet nuclear weapons could not save the Soviet Union or apartheid South Africa. They will not save Pakistan.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 18 May 2011 22:14

The Pakistanis have an Army Strategic Forces Command (ASFC) headed by a Lieutenant General. There is also an Air Force Strategic Command (AFSC) headed by an Air Vice Marshal. Each of these answer to their bosses, i.e. the PA and PAF chiefs.

However it doesn't seem as if either of these control the cores. My guess is that this is fundamentally an SPD responsibility, along with integration. Physical storage is probably in SPD controlled facilities within existing military and strategic weapons production sites.

I would agree that core storage is probably not far from sites where AFSC/ASFC delivery platforms would be operationally deployed. In the case of mobile platforms like aircraft and TELs that presents a wide array of possibilities. Monitoring AFSC and ASFC exercises would be important in terms of determing where these might be.

I also expect that there are a number of dummy sites.

MASINT (which is certainly being collected) could help identify actual sites, but if there is a shell game being played, or active spoofing (both of which are highly likely) that would still make it very difficult to identify them.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 May 2011 22:26

The unassembled stuff is a chem/rad hazard. Its the assembled stuff thats a real threat and needs to be thought about. There has to be some communications to and fro between the controllers and the controlled about this. Even if its an abdul on a donkey showing up near a masjid near a facility.
The two chains of command are for the two different delivery options: missile and airplane.

Ravi Karumanchiri · Post by **Ravi Karumanchiri** » 18 May 2011 22:33

ramana wrote:The narrative of blaming PRC for the nuclear arming of TSP is one sided.
<snip>
It ignores the multiple players in Western Europe: Holland, UK, Germany (URENCO), Swiss had in the AQK network.

It ignores the responsibility of US as leader of the West and the NPT community in acquiescing to the PRC transfers. And continued inaction after Cold War was over: PRC test in 1992, Ring Magnets, Nodong, M11 missiles etc.

Also claiming PRC armed TSP as a Cold War action ignores the fact that TSP was in no position to confront the FSU even if it had nukes.

So some thing is not right in this picture.

While I am reluctant to argue to get anyone off the hook with matters as serious as nuclear proliferation involving Pakistan; I'd like to note for the record that both the Dutch and the Swiss had fairly advanced prosecution efforts underway, to counter the AQ Khan network, and that in both cases, these prosecutions were closed under intense diplomatic pressure from the United States. Some of this was revealed in the press, and some in Wikileaks. I don't know the particulars WRT the UK and Germany, but I wouldn't be surprised if the Germans, in particular, were also reluctant sources of proliferation. (The Brits are anyone's guess, IMO.)

Therefore, by my estimation, the primary blame should fall on the Americans and not so much on their (sometimes reluctant) proxies, and also on the Chinese, but not so much on their (client-state) proxy North Korea.

The lynch-pin, however, is the US. Objectively, it make no sense for America to enable TSP with nukes -- not even during the height of the cold war. Of course, American foreign and strategic policy is notoriously short-sighted and myopic. The reason the TSP was armed anyway, I think can be traced, at least partially, to the deep influence wielded by Saudi Arabia over the United States. The Saudis, being the protectors of the two mosques, have long wanted a hedge against Isreal's nuclear stockpile. To prove themselves 'egalitarian' in the ME, the Americans looked the other way on Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, which was funded at least in part by the KSA and probably also the UAE. The Gulf Arabs pay for them, the Pakistanis build them, the Chinese help them, and the American run interference for everyone. If the Americans didn't provide this service, the Chinese would gladly step-in and go it alone, to curry favour in the Gulf and in Pakistan.

The Americans are loath to see this happen, and so they play their part. It started as a ploy to counter the Soviets, and then to counter China -- and now, it's their greatest worry. How ironic!

The two roots of this evil dynamic are petro-politics and suspicion between Arabs and Israelis. Compounding the problem is so-called superpower strategy and the ambitions of a rising China.

What does all this mean WRT this particular thread? It means that Pakistan's nuclear cores and bomb assemblies are in crates. These crates are close to aircraft that can fly to the UAE and Saudi Arabia at a moment's notice, in case of a shooting war between India and Pakistan. This also means that the numbers of warheads on hand for the TSP will not equal their theortical production limit, but will rather be a lesser number, because some will certainly be sent to the gulf, whether for safe-keeping, or because it's their property. It also means that the warheads destined for the TSP's gulf-state benefactors will not be fixed to missiles, but may be ready for fitting onto NoKo-origin missiles, which are also in the Pakistani arsenal.

I would look for sites in the TSP where there are both the right kind of ballistic missiles, and also UAE/Saudi aircraft with sufficient range and speed to bring warheads out of Pakistan.

The corollary implication of this is that even a completey flattened TSP may have a 'second strike capability' with weapons flown-in from the gulf.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 18 May 2011 22:43

Rudradev,

Ghauri was originally an all-KRL product. That meant an HEU warhead. KRL is still clearly heavily involved in Ghauri, and continue to show up whenever it is test-fired. KRL had the closer ties to the North Koreans because of the centrifuges for missiles trade.

The Shaheens on the other hand (produced by NDC, originally part of PAEC but now NESCOM) were probably designed from the outset to go the Pu route. PAEC and NESCOM/NDC seem to be the main conduit for direct technology transfers from the Chinese from the late 1980s onwards.

Ramana,

The PAF is likely to have a cruise missile option in the form of Babur.

KrishG · Post by **KrishG** » 18 May 2011 23:08

^^^ Important point.

Shiv, do we have any estimates of the number of weapons reserved for the Arabs and whether any of those weapons are actually in the Gulf ? And how would this deal with the Arabs affect the number of weapons available to TSP ?

IMHO, maybe a nuclear Iran will help Indian interests in a way by making the Arabs feel insecure enough to ask TSP to deploy nuclear weapons in the Gulf to act as a deterrent to Iran. Why Iran ? Because the Arab leadership's (note leadership) mortal fear of the Israelis have waned and the chances of a major Arab-Israeli confrontation, which would threaten the existence of Israel (thereby forcing it to use Nuclear weapons) are as good as nil at present. That's why a nuclear Iran would force the Arabs to make TSP deploy nuclear weapons in the gulf.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 18 May 2011 23:49

Are there any details on which force which protects the nukes? Or any equivalent of NEST in Pakistan?