Pakistan nuclear capability, fissile material and sites

[shiv]

From that photo it is possible to dig up the folowing information:

http://scisec.net/?p=214

What I would like you to focus on is something else. Look at AQ Khan. Actually, look at what he is holding. He is holding a soccer ball (football; I don't know how Americans can get away calling NFL "football").

Why a football?

As the ACW explains

...AQ Khan graces the cover, holding a soccer ball (which is basically the size and configuration of the shell of high explosives in a nuclear weapon), standing in front of a blackboard showing a nuclear weapon diagram. The most shocking detail is the notation “Uran Deuteride Initiator.”...

Wiki has a good little discussion on this

...The Fat Man bomb had two concentric, spherical shells of high explosives, each about 10 inches (25 cm) thick. The inner shell drove the implosion. The outer shell consisted of a soccer-ball pattern of 32 high explosive lenses, each of which converted the convex wave from its detonator into a concave wave matching the contour of the outer surface of the inner shell. If these 32 lenses could be replaced with only two, the high explosive sphere could become an ellipsoid (prolate spheroid) with a much smaller diameter...

There might be a bit of a contradiction in all these leaks about Iranian weaponisation.

I am referring to two-point implosion. Global security.org has a good little primer on two-point linear implosion. The football reference here is to what Americans call a "football".

...The two ends of a cylinder, or an ovoid, could be driven toward each other to create a high-density sphere. This two-point detonation greatly reduced the diameter and the weight of the primary.
A linear implosion allows for a low density, elongated non-spherical (football shaped) mass to be compressed into a supercritical configuration without using symmetric implosion designs. This assembly is accomplished by embedding an elliptical shaped mass in a cylinder of explosive. The explosive is detonated on both ends, and an inert wave shaping device is required in front of the detonation points. Extensive experimentation was needed to create a workable form, but this design enables the use of Plutonium as well as Uranium...

For two-point spherical implosion, which is actually more relevant, see the link to Wiki above.

It has been alleged that Iran has a two-point implosion based weaponisation programme.

The Guardian had a good story on Iran and two-point implosion

...The UN's nuclear watchdog has asked Iran to explain evidence suggesting that Iranian scientists have experimented with an advanced nuclear warhead design, the Guardian has learned.The very existence of the technology, known as a "two-point implosion" device, is officially secret in both the US and Britain, but according to previously unpublished documentation in a dossier compiled by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iranian scientists may have tested high-explosive components of the design. The development was today described by nuclear experts as "breathtaking" and has added urgency to the effort to find a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis...

...Documentation referring to experiments testing a two-point detonation design are part of the evidence of nuclear weaponisation gathered by the IAEA and presented to Iran for its response...

The Guardian also notes

...The first implosion devices, like the "Fat Man" bomb dropped on Nagasaki on 9 August 1945, used 32 high-explosive hexagons and pentagons arrayed around a plutonium core like the panels of a football. The IAEA has a five-page document describing experimentation on such a hemispherical array of explosives...

If the UD3 story is true, that Iran might have resumed an active weaponisation programme, then the two-point implosion story might be false. This is because this story basically alleges that Iran is working on a nuclear weapon initially designed by the Chinese and handed down to Pakistan which in turn was handed to Iran.

AQ Khan is holding a football/soccer ball (the number of panels in the actual Chinese design is irrelevant).

That's not two-point implosion.

Perhaps Iran has dabbled with both and has given two-point implosion away as being too risky. Perhaps Iran is using a UD3 trigger for its own design based on two-point implosion or perhaps the two-point implosion story is false.

If the latter, then at least one of the documents much discussed in the context of Iranian weaponisation is baloney.

As matters currently stand we are in no position to determine which of these possibilities is correct.

[shiv]

Also fwiw armscontrol wonk guys have a picture of what they claim as first Chinese nuclear device which was again a uranium implosion type device.

Yes that story is linked off the link I posted above
http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archiv ... initiators

You have no doubt seen the Times of London story, in which Catherine Philp claims to have obtained a 2007 “technical document” from from Iran that “describes the use of a neutron source, uranium deuteride, which independent experts confirm has no possible civilian or military use other than in a nuclear weapon.” (The Times published a more detailed discussion of UD3 in a separate article).

I have no idea whether the document is authentic, but I do want to confirm that Pakistan appears to have used uranium deuteride (UD3) as a neutron initiator.

The Times story doesn’t adequately convey that this is a relatively novel source of neutrons for a bomb design. Technically inclined readers may recall that earlier accusations against Iran focused on more traditional route of polonium-beryllium (Po-Be). Several colleagues have emailed me, expressing surprise that Pakistan is alleged to have used UD3 instead of the Po-Be.

But yes, it appears that both China and Pakistan explored the use of UD3 as a neutron source. There are two data points of which I am aware.

The first, and most colorful, is a well-known picture (above) of AQ Khan from the cover of his book, modestly titled Dr. A. Q. Khan on Science and Education.

AQ Khan graces the cover, holding a soccer ball (which is basically the size and configuration of the shell of high explosives in a nuclear weapon), standing in front of a blackboard showing a nuclear weapon diagram. The most shocking detail is the notation “Uran Deuteride Initiator.”

(A funny side note, the book Deception (2007) by Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark reproduces the image, with a portion of the blackboard redacted. Unfortunately, they redacted the wrong portion!)

Now, you may be thinking “How does that work?”

Four scientists from the Southwest Institute of Fluid Mechanics in Sichuan (which is the part of China’s nuclear weapons complex responsible for hydrodynamic research) published a detailed explanation in a 1989 paper entitled “Fusion Produced by Implosion of Spherical Explosive.” The paper is included in the proceedings of an American Physical Society meeting published as Shock Compression of Condensed Matter, (S. C. Schmidt, James N. Johnson, Lee W. Davison, editors, North-Holland, 1990.)

I had previously sort of steered clear of mentioning this on the blog, but between AQ Khan’s entrepreneurial activities and the Times of London, there’s not much point in denying it.

I won’t put the paper on line, but you can readily purchase your own copy.

Update | 3:09 pm ISIS has placed Farsi and English versions of the document online, along with a short analysis that basically describes the process outlined in the Dong et al paper.

Late Update | 6:12 pm Danny Stillman and Tom Reed mentioned the picture and the Dong et al paper in Nuclear Express on pp 250-251:

In 1997, a publishing house in Lahore, Pakistan, relaesed a collection of mid-1980s to mid-1990s lectures by A. Q. Khan entitled Dr. A.Q. Khan on Science and Eduction. This book discloses some of Dr. Khan’s early knowledge about nuclear weapons, including a sophisticated neutron initiation scheme. Initiators are the devices needed to assure an adequate supply of neutrons to the weapon core at the moment of maximum supercriticality. During World War II, the United States achieved this result by mixing beryllium and polonium at the center of an implosion. In later years the United States and most other nuclear weapons states turned to pulsed neutron tubes, essentially mini-accelerators, to produce a surge of neutrons when needed. But in 1989, at an American Physical Society conference in Albuquerque, the Chinese explained their very different approach to neutron generators. That Chinese initiation scheme appears with Dr. Khan’s book, and thus the origins of Pakistan’s A-bomb are unambiguously confirmed.

[shiv]

All the material dug up so far is part of my ultimate inner jihad to determine the veracity of the Hatf/Nasr story of 30 cm diameter rocket with nuclear warhead. Going back to my auntie, Smt. Wiki about what the US did to put cigars of Pu in an artillery shell to compress them into a sphere. All the incomprehensible gobbledygook posted by people who actually know about Pu phase change and density seems to come into play here and my auntie is unlikely to teach me or Pakis her recipes.

Anyhow:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/W79

Linear-implosion uses a mass of nuclear material which is more than one critical mass at normal pressure and in a spherical configuration. The mass, known as pit, is configured in a lower density non-spherical configuration prior to firing the weapon and then, small to moderate amounts of explosive collapse and slightly reshape the nuclear-material into a supercritical-mass which then undergoes chain-reaction and explodes. Three methods are known to compress and reshape the nuclear-material; collapsing hollow spaces inside the nuclear material, using plutonium-gallium alloy, which is stabilized in the low-density delta-phase at a density of 16.4 (and which collapses to denser alpha-phase under moderate explosive-compression), and shaping an explosive and nuclear material so that the explosive pressure changes a stretched-out, elliptical or football shape to collapse towards a spherical or more spherical end-shape.

A bare critical mass of plutonium at normal density and without additional neutron reflector material is roughly 10 kilograms. To achieve a large explosive-yield, a linear-implosion weapon needs somewhat more material, on the order of 13 kilograms. 13 kilograms of alpha-phase (highest density) plutonium at a density of 19.8 g/cm^3 is 657 cubic centimeters, a sphere of radius 5.4 cm (diameter 10.8 cm / 4.25 inches).

Linear-implosion weapons could use tampers or reflectors, but the overall diameter of the fissile-material plus tamper/reflector increases compared to the volume required for an untamped, unreflected pit. To fit weapons into small artillery-shells (155 mm and 152 mm are known; 105 mm has been alleged to be possible by nuclear-weapon designer Ted Taylor), bare pits may be required.

Linear-implosion weapons have much lower efficiency due to low pressure, and require two to three times more nuclear-material than conventional implosion weapons. They are also considerably heavier, and much smaller than conventional implosion weapons. The W54 nuclear warhead used for special purposes and the Davy Crockett nuclear-artillery unit was about 11 inches diameter and weighs 51 pounds. The 155 mm W48 is 6 inches in diameter and weighs over twice as much, and probably requires twice as much plutonium. Independent researchers have determined that one model of US Army conventional implosion fission-weapon cost $1.25 million per-unit produced, of which $0.25 million was the total cost for all non-nuclear components and $1 million the cost of the plutonium. Linear-implosion weapons, requiring two to three times more plutonium, are considerably more expensive.

[Amber G.]

Shivji , Yes! that picture... (I still remember scratching my head and laughing why any one put "Uran Deutride" in that picture ..I was told that in some paki papers that portion was redacted not to give the secrets away!..- I remembered The UD3 initiators was brought up in BRF before wrt to Iran/Paki design ... a search gave:
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... D3#p789980
(Few posts above and below too)
Also lookup, eg, this story:
http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-rep ... eutron.pdf

Another thing I wonder, if Pakis have stolen all the gold (Paki's design, I was told, used kilos of gold as reflector/salt)..

[GuruPrabhu]

only a complete imbecile will draw a picture of a mushroom cloud in great detail when lecturing on nuclear matters. Plus, what's with the gratuitous mention of JJT and Chadwick? Is photochor saying that he is Nobel material?

[vina]

only a complete imbecile will draw a picture of a mushroom cloud in great detail when lecturing on nuclear matters. Plus, what's with the gratuitous mention of JJT and Chadwick? Is photochor saying that he is Nobel material?

No way. PhotoChor wasn't lecturing or doing anything. No lecturer in any class is going to spend so much time drawing a mushroom cloud or anything in such great detail with color and shading and other artwork, to explain it. If at all, it will be a hastily drawn scrawl. . This looks more like a staged "propah gandah" stuff with some kid drawing up some Kabooom and shading it (nice arrows and allow, looks copied from a high school /pop sci kind of book), and some E=MC2 kind of conversion .. all the hall marks of some pimply faced science /wannabe high school kid/undergrad drawing up some random Nook stuff and equations and photo chor dropping in and also doing Propah Gandah with the football and all and posing as if he is Nobel (Noble?..) material.

[Amber G.]

GP - My thoughts were very similar, when I first saw that photo... (photo was also used -with some redacted words - on brochures to peddle centrifuges and stuff )
I, for one, congratulate PAEC for their good deeds like leaning about mushrooms etc (Link given again below)
(http://www.paec.gov.pk/paec-news.htm#p-ma11-news2)
I can almost hear the response from PACE

We Pakis of Paec think with our cranium.
make maizieum. wheatium even mushroomium,
'cause not a single ass,
will forever work for grass,
and you can't eat Pu or uranium.

[Amber G.]

Is photochor saying that he is Nobel material?

...Not Just (These mugs are available in many places..)

[shiv]

only a complete imbecile will draw a picture of a mushroom cloud in great detail when lecturing on nuclear matters. Plus, what's with the gratuitous mention of JJT and Chadwick? Is photochor saying that he is Nobel material?

No way. PhotoChor wasn't lecturing or doing anything. No lecturer in any class is going to spend so much time drawing a mushroom cloud or anything in such great detail with color and shading and other artwork, to explain it. If at all, it will be a hastily drawn scrawl. . This looks more like a staged "propah gandah" stuff with some kid drawing up some Kabooom and shading it (nice arrows and allow, looks copied from a high school /pop sci kind of book), and some E=MC2 kind of conversion .. all the hall marks of some pimply faced science /wannabe high school kid/undergrad drawing up some random Nook stuff and equations and photo chor dropping in and also doing Propah Gandah with the football and all and posing as if he is Nobel (Noble?..) material.

I think the drawing was done by a chela and Photochor (in his handwriting) added the names of scientists and the words "Uran Deuteride" and 1 Kg U 235 = 20 Kt etc. The handwriting is different.

[JE Menon]

>>only a complete imbecile will draw a picture of a mushroom cloud in great detail when lecturing on nuclear matters.

Indeed. But what is truly interesting to note is that this is a very stylised mushroom cloud. It has that specific Islamic trait that you would find in Islamic architecture. Observe the pointed upward thrust at the middle of the mushroom cloud - in both the main cloud and the inner cloud. Do you really think any nuclear weapon beside an Islamic nuclear bomb would behave that way?

>>Plus, what's with the gratuitous mention of JJT and Chadwick? Is photochor saying that he is Nobel material?

Not to mention Szilard and Fermi He's covering all bases, our man Xerox Khan...

[Amber G.]

^^^ also Bragg..(x-ray diffraction).. I was also struck by this random sprinkle of names as if some one is invoking all the devta's in an Arati (eg aka Surdas .."Sesh, ganesh, dinesh, mahesh, suresh hu jai nirantar gaye..")

Also the scrawling of additional words (as Shiv said) ..eg "Uran Duteried" (why not UD3 or just a leave it as " neutron source/initiator").. U238 as "reflector" ...

BTW, for anyone, who has seen photochor's "scientific" popular articles in newspapers this is about par for him.

[Amber G.]

For Gaganji's archives .. . (Sorry if already posted)

From Karachi - IDEA 2004
(In the background you can see nuclear capable missiles and other hardware from Pak)
(Photo is not photo shopped.. it is an actual sign as can be seen by the source url)
(Sign , they say, honors photchor.. )


And Shaeen II from the same place ..
http://img.slate.com/media/1/123125/122 ... aheen2.jpg

[Amber G.]

Gaganji, Shivji and other experts in the field ---

Was thinking something .. not easy to describe in an open forum, but may be interesting and useful to consider.. but for that .. I have a question.

How reliable is our info about where all the maal (Enriched/weapons grade U and Pu is stored?.. How secure is the proximity of these places? (all the places or at least majority of places).. Can one sneak in, (or bribe some low level guy to sneak in) say within a few hundred meters (or even a kilometer) of that point (where the maal is actually stored)?

[Amber G.]

Construction of new Pakistani reactor
Construction of a third nuclear power reactor at Pakistan's Chashma site officially started on 28 May, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Chashma Nuclear Power Plant unit 3, also known as Chasnupp 3, is a 340 MWe pressurized water reactor (PWR) being constructed by China. It is expected to start commercial operation in 2016. There are already two 300 MWe PWRs at Chashma, also supplied by China. Chasnupp 1 started operating in June 2000, while Chasnupp 2 began operating in May 2011. The construction of Chasnupp 4, another 340 MWe PWR, has already been approved and is expected to begin in 2012. The main construction contract for units 3 and 4 - a project costing some $2.37 billion - was signed in June 2010 by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute (Snerdi). Pakistan also has a Canadian-supplied 125 MWe pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) near Karachi, known as Kanupp.

From: http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/indtalk.aspx

[shiv]

AmberG - I wish I could answer that question. It's got to be the most closely guarded secrets in the world -not just by Bakis but also by US/Indians anyone who is interested. If Bakis find a leak they will kill the people responsible.

But I suspect there are enough satellite photos of Pakistan to have a lists of suspicious sites. But humint may be the final arbiter

[khan]

^ What is interesting to see is the rest of the stuff on the board ; there is a mention of Thomson, Chadwick et al looks like Photochor was addressing some nanhas in lab/uty and at the same time boasting about his pilfered bomb design.

The AQK blackboard picture looks staged. Look at the backboard:
1. The drawings on the board are needlessly detailed. This is especially true off the mushroom cloud, but is also true of the the core drawing and the chain reaction. If he were genuinely delivering a lecture using mainly the backboard, he would have done the drawings as necessary and only to the level detail needed to communicate his point.
2. Given the time period, (I am guessing 1990-2001) if he had material/drawings prepared before hand for his lecture, the logical way to present it would be by way of an overhead projector.

To me, this picture is a stage managed glory seeking exercise. That kind of an attitude causes me to doubt the existence of the Pakistani bomb as illustrated on the board.

In my experience, people that have been thru a painful development process (even a stealing process in the Paki context) do not need to find validation with nonsense like this.

[GuruPrabhu]

In my experience, people that have been thru a painful development process (even a stealing process in the Paki context) do not need to find validation with nonsense like this.

Khan sahab, I agree 400% with you.

It is abundantly clear that TSP has not gone through any "development process", painful or otherwise. The "stealing" didn't work either. They are simply painting Chinese maal.

You can google international conferences on nuclear tech and aerospace tech and you will find talks by Indian scientists all over the place. But, you will not see any from packees. Why are the geniacs so shy to talk about their "painful development"?

[my guess is that GUBO hurts too much and no one wants to lecture on the painful process]

[shiv]

From 2006
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/clint ... kar/14745/
‘Clinton’s n-hoax forced Pakistan to end Kargil war’

A former Pakistan foreign official has accused the Clinton administration of playing a “hoax” to put “pressure” on Islamabad to withdraw its troops and end the 1999 Kargil conflict with India.

Shamshad Ahmad, who was the Pakistan Foreign Secretary at that time and also attended the meeting between former premier Nawaz Sharif and US President Bill Clinton in Washington, said in an article published in a leading daily here that the American president asked Sharif if he was aware that the Pakistan Army had began moving nuclear-tipped missiles to the borders.

“In my view, it was only an American hoax to bring Pakistan under pressure for withdrawl,” he said. Ahmad also said that there was no need for Musharraf in his book In the Line of Fire to give an explanation that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons at that time.

In his book, the Pakistani president has said it was a “myth that we (India-Pakistan) came to the brink of nuclear war. The limits of our forces were nowhere in sight, still less in danger of being crossed. ”

“By exploring a bomb does not mean that you are operationally capable of deploying nuclear forces across the border over selected target.

“Any talk of preparing for nuclear strikes is preposterous,” he has said in his book, an account contradicted by former US Secretary Strobe Talbott and Clinton’s aide Bruce Riedel in their separate accounts on Kargil.

Riedel, whom Clinton kept along with him even during the one-to-one meeting with Sharif has said in his account that the former American President asked Sharif ‘if he knew how advanced the threat of nuclear war really was. Did Sharif know his military was preparing their nuclear tipped missiles,” for which Sharif appeared surprised.

[Lalmohan]

sharief appeared surprised because he knew there was no bum!
possible, but he was probably too much in the dark to know what the faujis were really up to
if there was no bum, i doubt if the faujis would have told him
perhaps photochor is being hidden because he knows there is no bum...

[shyamd]

Who is this retired General Kidwai who handles the entire gamut of Puki n assets per Mullen?

[sum]

The man who secures Pak nukes

LAHORE: Before his posting as the Director-General of the Strategic Plan Division, Lt. General Kidwai was serving as the Manager of the Strategic Plans Division. Considered close to Musharraf, Kidwai was made the Colonel Commandant of the corps of Artillery Regimental Centre in 2004. Musharraf himself used to be affiliated with this corp.

[shyamd]

^^ Thanks. Interesting.

[shiv]

One of the aims of this thread was to check the veracity of Packee nuclear claims based on what is publicly available - in addition to me own deep expertise in nuclear matters.

If you use public statements you get two fundamental assumptions:
1. Pakistan is set to get worlds 3.14159th largest arsenal by (insert date here ______)
2. Oh Pakistan has Chinese nukes anyway.

The third possibility is that Pakistan has mainly Pindi chana gas and vacuum bulbs and no nukes apart from a few tarrel bilathel gifts.

I have been digging up some info:

One link claims that Botox Bebe aid Pakistan would be ready to test by 1977 (http://www.enotes.com/topic/Chagai-I)

The next Paki link says preparations were started in 1977 to test by 1979 (http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/june/chagai.htm)

But wait!! This is what Xerox Khan said:

http://www.haaretz.com/misc/article-pri ... 2C2.239%2C

When did you develop the centrifuges?

"On April 6, 1978, we succeeded for the first time in enriching uranium."

Was this enriched uranium weapons grade?

"No, it was a low level of enrichment. But it was sufficient to make us understand that we were capable of enriching uranium."

When did you begin to believe that you had fissile material for nuclear weapons?

"We achieved 90 percent enrichment in early 1983."

And when was the bomb ready?

"In December 1984, I wrote a letter to General Zia [then president of Pakistan] and told him that the bomb was ready and we could test it with a week's advance warning."

Ready by 1977? Ready by 1979? ready by 1984? What the furk?

But we also know the following, courtesy Xerox Khan again

In 1982, a Pakistani military C1130 left the western Chinese city of Urumqi with a highly unusual cargo: enough
weaponsgrade uranium for two atomic bombs, according to accounts written by the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, and provided to The Washington Post.

The uranium transfer in five stainless1steel boxes was part of a broad1ranging, secret nuclear deal approved years earlier by Mao Zedong and Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto that culminated in an exceptional, deliberate act of proliferation by a nuclear power, according to accounts by Khan, who is under house arrest in Pakistan.

U.S. officials say they have known about the transfer for decades confronted the Chinese who denied it but
have never raised the issue in public or sought to impose direct sanctions on China for it. President Obama, who said in April that "the world must stand together to prevent the spread of these weapons," plans to discuss nuclear proliferation issues while visiting Beijing on Tuesday.

Until 1984 Pakis had nothing to test. They were ready to test after the Cheenies provided them with Uranium. I wonder how many more bluffs and contradictions wil come up from the Pakcees?

[shiv]

Well Xerox Khan says Pakhanastan has one bomb in one place
http://www.spiegel.de/international/wor ... 46,00.html

The plant was always secured by a fully armed army contingent and the perimeters were made impregnable using various tiers. Since then the security of our nuclear assets has been taken care of by the National Command Authority which has put in place a system whereby decisions are to be taken by a number of people who also possess specific security codes. It would thus be impossible, even if there were an infiltration of extremists, to pass all the components of the security system and get to the bomb.

[Lalmohan]

one bum-one love-one khan!
(ein volk, ein reich, ein fuhrer!)

[shiv]

one bum-one love-one khan!
(ein volk, ein reich, ein fuhrer!)

ein bum, ein liebe ein schweinhundt?

[Lalmohan]

ein bum, ein teil des grases, ein dumkopfschweinhundtziegeliebhaber

[shiv]

New paper. New estimates
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/4/91.full

Will try and compare different estimates in a separate post

[shyamd]

A very serious issue.
Pak for non-deployment of ballistic missile system

Pakistan is pushing for the signing a pact for the "non-deployment of ballistic missile system" targeting each other as a major confidence building measure (CBM) between the two counties ahead of the foreign ministers meet later this month. Not keen to bite the bullet, India argues that
this issue cannot be restricted to the India-Pakistan context, but should be placed in the larger South Asian security framework (that includes China) that New Delhi has to deal with.

However, CBMs such as finalisation of a border ground rules, return of inadvertent crossers, exchange of commandants between the national defence college and national defence university of Pakistan, and meetings between director general coast guard and his Pakistan counterpart and exchange of military bands are among the expected outcomes of the meeting between the two ministers.

Senior Indian government sources told HT that the pact for signing the non-deployment of ballistic missile system has been raised by Pakistan for some time now. "When the two foreign secretaries met in Islamabad last month also this issue came up", said a senior official.

New Delhi says that its ballistic missile system cannot be seen through the context of India-Pakistan and it has a larger South Asia security framework, explained the official.

"A step by step approach is what we have been following to address the trust deficit between the two sides. And we are discussing all the issues of mutual interests", an official explained.

India has very serious concerns over infiltration which foreign secretary Nirupama Rao too took up with his Pakistan counterpart Salman Bashir when they met in Islamabad last month.

“But the ceasefire between two countries by and large remains. So we need to build on that”, said the official.

In that context comes finalisatioan of border ground rules. This will be guidelines for both the sides to go about in case of an incident, instead of the situation getting "flared up."

There are many incidents of people accidently straying into each other's territory. So both the sides are trying to put in place a mechanism so that the inadvertent crossers are sent across.

[Anujan]

^^^
Brown shalwars over Arihant. Also I wonder if Paki nukes will be mated with road mobile missiles at all!! With everyone from brigadiers to karnails turning out to be jihadis, they cannot entrust it to them (forget attacking India, the COAS, if he has any sense, should be shivering in his shalwar over the possibility of a JDAM over GHQ or Isloo).

[shiv]

New paper. New estimates
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/4/91.full

Will try and compare different estimates in a separate post

I was curious about these public source estimates and collected up several reports to compare them. The important thing of course is that the "number of warheads" in all news items is a theoretical estimate which is arrived at in the following way:

• A. Look at available satellite images of reactor and facilities; draw conclusions about their capacity and efficiency and make a guesstimate about the amount of enriched U235 or Pu that can be produced per year
• B. Based on above estimate "A", calculate the total amount of U235 or Pu that Pakistan might have accumulated
• C. Use the above figure "B" to calculate the number of warheads by assuming 15-20 kg Uranium per warhead and about 6 Kg Plutonium per warhead.

Clearly the estimates can only be approximate and only various Intel agencies will have better info. If you look at estimates - you find

Here is what has been published over the last few years

2007
http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/si ... mr08cv.pdf

As of 2007, Pakistan may have accumulated a stock of about 1.4 tons of highly enriched
uranium for its nuclear weapons (enough for perhaps 50 – 60 weapons assuming 25 kg
per warhead). It may be producing perhaps 0.1 tons of HEU per year (i.e. about 4 weapons
worth a year). Pakistan also has about 90 kg of weapon plutonium (enough for
15 – 20 warheads) from its reactor at Khushab, which yields about 10 kg (about 2 weapons
worth) per year. This suggests that Pakistan may have fissile material sufficient
for perhaps 65 – 80 weapons and may be increasing its stock by the equivalent of about
6 weapons worth per year.

2009
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/125954.pdf

Most observers estimate that Pakistan has about 60 nuclear weapons.9 Pakistan’s nuclear
warheads use an implosion design with a solid core of HEU, approximately 15-20 kilograms per
warhead. 10 Islamabad reportedly continues to produce highly-enriched uranium for weapons at a
rate of at least 100 kilograms per year.11

2010
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/4/91.full

As of late 2010, the International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated that
Pakistan had an inventory of approximately 2,600 kilograms (kg) of highly
enriched uranium (HEU) and roughly 100 kg of weapon-grade plutonium
(International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2010). This is enough to produce
160–240 warheads, assuming that each warhead’s solid core uses either 12–18 kg
of HEU or 4–6 kg of plutonium.

But the same ref above suddenly increases the yearly HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) production to nearly twice the amount 2-3 paragraphs later.

Pakistan may be producing 120–180 kg of HEU per year, an amount sufficient for 7–15 warheads. The uranium ore is mined at several locations throughout Pakistan, with more mines scheduled to open in the future. Uranium is extracted from the ore and processed into uranium hexafluoride and uranium metal at the Dera Ghazi Khan uranium processing facility in southern Punjab. Enrichment takes place at the Kahuta and Gadwal plants southeast and northwest of Islamabad, respectively (International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2010; Landay, 2009; US Department of Commerce, 1998).

For several years, Pakistan has operated a 40–50 megawatt thermal plutonium production reactor, Khushab-I, near Joharabad, and a second reactor, Khushab-II, at the same site is also believed to be operational (Albright and Brannan, 2011a). Each of these plutonium production reactors is capable of producing an estimated 6–12 kg of weapon-grade plutonium per year (depending on operating efficiency), for a combined total of 12–24 kg annually—enough for three to six nuclear weapons, assuming low-to-medium skill levels (4–6 kg per weapon) and a yield of 10 kt. At these rates, Pakistan may be producing enough HEU and weapon-grade plutonium for 10–21 warheads per year.

There is also an interesting table which I will link for what it is worth. It may not be worth much other than a a talking point for ignorant "nuckelar eggsperts" like me

[shiv]

up

[Ravi Karumanchiri]

NOTICE ALL FOLLOWING THIS THREAD..... Today at 3:30PM EST, which is just over two hours from this post time, there will be a broadcast on the US Network "C-SPAN", which streams online at http://www.c-span.org, specifically this page (I think)....

http://www.c-span.org/video/?401987-1/d ... ar-program

December 14, 2015
Pakistan's Nuclear Program

The Atlantic Council holds a panel discussion with nuclear policy and South Asia experts on Pakistan’s nuclear program



ADDED MOMENTS LATER: Having just now visited the Atlantic Council website, I can report more clearly, that the "Panel Discussion" is on the topic of "The Wisdom of a Grand Nuclear Bargain with Pakistan".

This event has a designated "hashtag" for any Rakshaks on Twitter to use...... #ACPakistan




SCREEN SCRAPED....

The Wisdom of a Grand Nuclear Bargain with Pakistan
December 14, 2015 - 3:30 pm
Atlantic Council, 1030 15th Street NW, 12th Floor (West Tower)
Washington, DC
Register

The Wisdom of a Grand Nuclear Bargain with Pakistan​

A Conversation with:

Dr. Toby Dalton
Co-Director, Nuclear Policy Program
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Dr. Gaurav Kampani
Nonresident Senior Fellow, South Asia Center
Atlantic Council

Dr. Sameer Lalwani
Deputy Director, South Asia Program
Stimson Center

Moderated by:

Dr. Bharath Gopalaswamy
Director, South Asia Center
Atlantic Council

Earlier this year, various news outlets reported that the Obama administration was exploring a nuclear deal with Pakistan. The deal would work to better incorporate Pakistan into the global nuclear order, exchanging legitimacy for its accepting nuclear constraints. Many analysts believe Pakistan's nuclear weapons program poses a substantial threat to international and South Asian security. One of four nuclear weapons states outside the normative and legal apparatus of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Pakistan is assessed to have the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world.

The South Asia Center will convene a panel of experts including Dr. Toby Dalton, Co-Director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dr. Sameer Lalwani, Deputy Director of Stimson's South Asia Program, and Dr. Gaurav Kampani, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council's South Asia Center, to discuss policy options to address international concerns over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.


On Twitter? Follow @ACSouthAsia and use #ACPakistan.

If you have any questions regarding the event, please contact Ben Polsky.

Bios
Bharath Gopalaswamy is the Director of the South Asia Center. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, Gopalaswamy managed the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where he oversaw developing projects on South Asian security issues. He has held research appointments with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and with Cornell University's Judith Reppy Institute of Peace and Conflict studies. Dr. Gopalaswamy holds a PhD in mechanical engineering with a specialization in numerical acoustics from Trinity College, Dublin. In addition to his studies abroad, he has previously worked at the Indian Space Research Organization's High Altitude Test Facilities and the EADS Astrium GmbH division in Germany.

Toby Dalton is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his research focuses on cooperative nuclear security initiatives and the management of nuclear challenges in South Asia and East Asia. Dalton is author of “Beyond Incrementalism: Rethinking Approaches to CBMs and Stability in South Asia” (Stimson Center, 2013); co-author with Jaclyn Tandler of the Carnegie Paper “Understanding the Arms ‘Race’ in South Asia”; and co-author with Mark Hibbs and George Perkovich of the Carnegie Policy Outlook “A Criteria-Based Approach to Nuclear Cooperation with Pakistan.” From 2002 to 2010, Dalton served in a variety of high-level positions at the U.S. Department of Energy, including acting director for the Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security and senior policy adviser to the Office of Nonproliferation and International Security on issues relating to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, the nonproliferation regime, and a range of countries, such as Pakistan, India, China, North Korea, and Israel. He also established and led the department’s office at the U.S. embassy in Pakistan, managing critical bilateral and multilateral nonproliferation issues and overseeing the implementation of U.S. nonproliferation and counter proliferation initiatives. Dalton previously served as professional staff member to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a Luce Scholar at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul, a research associate at the National Bureau of Asian Research, and a project associate for the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program.

Sameer Lalwani is Deputy Director for Stimson’s South Asia program. From 2014-15, Lalwani was a Stanton Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at the RAND Corporation. He completed his Ph.D. in political science at MIT and remains a Research Affiliate at MIT’s Center for International Studies. His research interests include grand strategy, counterinsurgency, civil-military relations, ethnic conflict, nuclear security, and the national security politics of South Asia and the Middle East. Sameer has conducted field research in Pakistan, India, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, and the British archives. His work has been published through RAND, Oxford University Press, the Journal of Strategic Studies, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The National Interest, CTC Sentinel, the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, and a number of other outlets. Previously he was a fellow at George Washington University’s Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, a member of the CNAS Next Gen National Security Leaders Program, a participant in the CSIS Nuclear Scholars Initiative, and a policy analyst with the New America Foundation. He holds B.A. in political science from University of California, Berkeley.

Gaurav Kampani is a Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council's South Asia Center. He is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Tulsa. From 2013 to 2014, he was a Postdoctoral Transatlantic Fellow in International Relations and SEcurity at the Norwegian Institute of Defense Studies in Oslo. Between 1998 and 2005, Dr. Kampani was a Senior Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, CA. From 2010 to 2011, he was a Staton Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. Dr. Kampani's research interests cover international security and focus on the relationship between domestic institutions and strategic policy, military strategy, operations planning, and weapons development. Dr. Kampani's teaching spans world politics, the global commons, US foreign and national security policy, and South Asia.

[ramana]

X-Post from STFUP thread...

Putting the link here for convenience. Thank, Ravi Karumanchiri, for drawing attention to it.
http://www.c-span.org/video/?401987-1/d ... ar-program

Very briefly, the US is concerned about Pakistan's growing nuclear program - tactical nuclear weapons, full spectrum deterrence, etc., and no articulation of what is sufficient. The US has been wondering if there is any way of putting a constraint on Pakistan's nuclear program. It feels it has few sticks, and only the NSG membership carrot.

Gaurav Kampani argues,very effectively IMO, is that Pakistan is a revisionist power, seeking to upset the status quo not through internationally accepted mechanisms but by jihad-under-the-nuclear-umbrella, and essentially it won't accept anything reasonable until that revisionist strategy is abandoned.

There is a lot more than that, overall lays out the current strategic landscape, including China-Pakistan.

You have captured the essence accurately even as the above discussion brings out exactly what we have been discussing here lately, namely 'security-seeking' vs. 'civilizational enmity'.

The American analyst Toby Dalton (in association with Michael Krepon) propagates the usual American 'security' model along with that Pakistani Sameer Lalwani while Gaurav Kampani explains the 'civilizational' aspect.

The weak defense put out by the Pakistani Sameer Lalwani and his demeanour of presentation were interesting by contrast. He was pathetic and his furious pace of delivery hides his insecurity, I thought.

I made a rough transcript below.

Toby Dalton

• Why should there be a consideration of a nuclear deal with Pakistan? That is because there is a growing nuclear danger, nuclear terrorism or nuclear war because of Pakistan. Perception of this threat has changed recently even though its nuclear security has improved. It is a threat to peace & security and Pakistan is being scrutinized.
• Many things contribute to this increased awareness of nuclear threat such as Pakistan’s TNW programme, testing of longer range systems and sea-based nuclear weapons etc.
• The scrutiny has led to some sense of a need to think through options vis-à-vis Pakistan. The options are not good if one looks at incentives vs. leverage. On the leverage side there is very little. The US record of ‘punitive sanctions’ especially against n-weapon holding countries is not particularly good.
• If one talks to Pakistani officials, they are satisfied with their nuclear posture, with where they are today in terms of n-weapons.
• The ‘reputation’ of Pakistan comes into play when it comes to joining international nuclear regime. Pakistan’s first priority is to keep India out of NSG , second is if India joins NSG the Pakistan also does so. This, then, gives a leverage to ‘negotiate’ with Pakistan on that basis. For this, there has to be a change in internal logic in Pakistan.
• So long as there is a military-driven logic for n-weapons, it is not possible for Pakistan to take measures needed to join international nuclear regimes. We had a discussion with Pakistan a year ago about it joining NSG. When asked abou how they intended to go about that, they said that they would do exactly what the Indians did. This is a cognitive dissonance by Pakistan because Pakistan is not exactly India.
• We postulated two futures for Pakistan. One, the ‘status quo’ in which Pakistan will continue to produce weapons, (a prediction based upon the fissile material capacity suggests 350 weapons) {though Toby Dalton did not mention the timeframe for these many weapons}. This is because the Pakistani military would want a nuclear arsenal whenever there is a qualitative or quantitative gap in conventional military capabilities between the two countries.
• The question also arises then at what point the additional n-weapons become meaningless. Therefore, there is an alternative second future which says that if the additional weapons are not going to provide n-deterrence, and if Pakistan feels secure, then it opens up certain possibilities for leverage. The leverage is to prescribe a nuclear force structure for Pakistan.
• We have suggested five things for Pakistan to do. These are exemplars, not prescriptions or demands. Changes in its declaratory policy, formalizing its recessed nuclear posture, thinking about numerical and geographical constraints on its TNWs, limiting fissile material production and signing CTBT without waiting for India to do so with the caveat that if India tests again, Pakistan could exercise its ‘supreme national interest’ clause to wriggle out.
• Is it wise to seek this path with Pakistan? We have also received criticism that we only looked at Pakistan and not India.
• If there is an open-door for India and a closed-door for Pakistan, then it limits our policy options. There is therefore wisdom in thinking about a bargain with Pakistan.

Sameer Lalwani

• I see a a lot of potential good for both the US and India in the report of Toby Dalton & Micheal Krepon if Pakistan were to implement their suggestions
• There will be a reduction in nuclear risk in South Asia. For example, the gravest danger comes from TNWs and if Pakistan can be persuaded to limit the number of such weapons and their deployment, it could help in crisis management that could come from a terrorist attack or a ‘misattribution’ of an attack or a simple escalation on the LoC firing which happens on a routine basis. A recessed posture would strengthen crisis stability.
• Greatest crisis scenarios in Pakistan come from a compromised command& control, unauthorized launch,theft or capture of n-weapon. These are exacerbated by TNWs.If incentives are offered to Pakistan to ‘restrict’ TNWs that would be useful for all parties involved or anybody who cares for nuclear proliferation.
• Measures suggested by Toby Dalton & Michael Krepon would be beneficial to India because they are aspiring to be a ‘great power’ and they can pursue that policy rather than being engaged in a competition with Pakistan.
• For Pakistan, this shows a path out of isolation. This would also stop Pakistan from taking ‘provocative actions’ to pull people to the table
• There are two criticisms I have heard. One that it rewards Pakistan’s wuest for parity with India and the other that it could setback India-US relation. But reward is incorrect because there would be no ‘material balance’ with India (What is this material balance?} because signing CTBT or FMCT or restrictions on TNWs would be costly and negate the parity. As for impact on India-US relationship, the US is deft enough to manage any fallouts. For example Greece-Turkey or Japana-South Korea or Japan-China.

Gaurav Kampani

• The idea of accepting Pakistan has been in the air since 2010. This gained prominent effort from the US after the successful Iran deal.
• Pakistan wants a deal similar to India-US deal and it does not want any compromise on its FMCT & CTBT postures.
• Within the Beltway, outside of the US administration, the three concerns on Pakistan are its rapidly expanding arsenal, the scope and ambition of its weapons programme and the possibility of an implosion of the state.
• The Carnegie Endowment & Stimson Centre approach misses a fundamental point that there is an underlying link between Pakistan’s grand strategy and its nuclear trajectory. One of the reasons for the India-US deal is that India is a status-quoist and a ‘normal’ power. By contrast, Pakistan is a revisionist state and it is a power that believes in radical ideology to up-end the international status-quo and its instruments are non-state actors with radical Islamist ideology. So, there is a link between Pakistan revisionism, its arsenal size, posture and the threat to Pakistan’s internal stability. Faced with Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail using non-state actors, India has threatened to use conventional forces and this in turn lead to Pakistan deploying TNWs as well as adopting a ‘full spectrum’ deterrence. Hence the idea that we can persuade Pakistan to move from ‘full spectrum deterrence’ to a more moderate ‘strategic deterrence’ will not work. We are wasting our time in asking Pakistan to change its nuclear deterrence strategy
• If Pakistan were to become a ‘normal’ state, India would not have to threaten it with conventional forces and Pakistan would not have to deploy TNWs
• There is an argument to use Obama administration’s strategy in Iran of asking it to set aside its radical groups in lieu for a nuclear deal is seductive but flawed with respect to Pakistan. One, Iran was still ambivalent about its n-weapons and this opened the door for negotiations. Within Pakistan’s strategic community, there is no ambivalence on TNWs or full spectrum deterrence. Second, in the case of Iran, there was no linkage between the state’s support of terrorism and its pursuit of n-weapons. In Pakistan’s case, n-weapons are a keystone in its revisionist and radical grand strategy (28:00Min). Hence, while it made sense to negotiate with Iran independent of the radical nature of the Iranian state, the same approach is invalid in the case of Pakistan. We have to address the nettlesome task of addressing the Pakistani revisionism as part of a grand nuclear deal.
• In perspective, the US goals since WW II have been to promote democracy, market capitalism and stop revisionist powers. Any approach in which we divorce the revisionism of Pakistan from its nuclear-weapons programme would end up treating the symptom rather than the disease.

[shiv]

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[ramana]

https://bharatkarnad.com/2017/01/25/aba ... -promises/



Recall that during Op Brasstacks in 1987 when Pakistan army feared its inability to contain an Indian armoured rush headed by Lt Gen Hanut Singh’s II Corps, and General Khalid Arif, VCOAS but de facto COAS on the other side, had taken the calculated risk of concentrating his main force plus army reserves –North and South, at the chicken-neck to cutoff Kashmir from the rest of India if India proceeded to bisect Pakistan at the Indus, the canny Zia ul-Haq arranged for Kuldip Nayyar to “interview” AQ Khan, ex-Bhopal, and so-called “father of the Pakistani Atom Bomb” (though all the fathering and mothering was done by the Chinese nuclear scientists who had transferred the design and start-up materials — fissionable uranium, etc) and Dr Mubarakmand of the Pak Atomic Energy Commission, AQ Khan, and company were merely involved in screwing it all together). Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons only in 1990, but AQ Khan’s exaggerated hints of Paki nukes at the ready and all that nonsense, hit its mark. Rajiv Gandhi and his government lost their nerve and called off the breakaway Op Trident, as his mother had done in early 1982, when she had bailed out virtually at the last possible minute on the early-1982 strike on Kahuta planned jointly with Israel, and again early in 1984 when she stayed the IAF from carrying out its mission to take out Kahuta [planned incidentally by the late Air Cmde Jasjit Singh, then Director, Operations (Offensive) at the Air Hqrs]. [The joint Indo-IsraeIi plan had, as I have mentioned in my books and writings, been communicated to me by Major General, Aahron Yaariv, Moshe Dayan’s legendary MI Chief during the 1956 Sinai Campaign, and I had written about it in the autumn of 1987.]

Rest not relevant to this thread......

[Gagan]

Someone's deterrence just went up in smoke!

Sandeep ‏@SandeepUnnithan 10h10 hours ago

'Yield of Pak N tests couple of KTs...their (tactical N) doctrine born out of necessity?' Dr Anil Kakodkar @FINSHQ

Pakis have been trying to make virtue out of failure.
All they have are fizzles. They call them "tactical warheads"