shiv wrote:Rajesh back in the 50s, Taiwan held a UN security council seat. That seat was offered to Nehru by the US, Nehru refused. . . Nehru I believe did not want to take something that was "offered " by the US to keep China out for fear of appearing aligned with USA
It was much worse than simple refusal. Nehru said that India would not consider an UNSC seat unless China was first inducted into that position. Nehru argued this position forcefully even in the Commonwealth meetings where Australia & South Africa were more anti-communist than even the US at that time. In 1958 India tabled an item to discuss the inclusion of Mainland China and expulsion of Formosa and argued its case bitterly. In July 1959, India once again proposed that the General Assembly of the United Nations should take up the question of admitting Peking China in the place of the Kuomintang representatives, in spite of what had happened recently in Tibet. Soon thereafter, when asked about referring Tibet to the UN, Nehru pointed out that the U.N., “great body as it is, has rather prevented itself from considering such matters in the sense that, when it does not recognise a certain great country, then to pass judgment on it becomes difficult.” While the British wanted both Taipei and Peking to be in the UN, the US did not want Peking at all, it was India that argued forcefully for the expulsion of Taipei from the UNSC and replacing it with Peking. Nehru was the first Asian leader to recognize the rebel Mao-Tse-Tungs seizure of power.
One has to recall the prescient statements made by Sardar Patel in his now famous letter to Nehru on November 7,
1950. I had posted this here some years ago, but will quote extracts once again
The Chinese government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intentions {It hasn't changed, has it ?}. . .The final action by the Chinese [in Tibet] is little short of perfidy . . .The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he [our Ambassador to China] made to the Chinese Government on our behalf.{Again, don't we see almost similar inconsistency in our approach ? Things might have been slightly better but are not a whole lot better} . . . This feeling [of distrust in us by the Chinese], if genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to them, indicates that even though we regard ourselves as friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With the communist mentality of 'whoever is not with them is against them', this is a significant pointer, of which we have to take a due note.
During the last several months, outside the Russioan camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of the Chinese entry into the UNO and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa. We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence with America and Britain and in the UNO. In spite of this, China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism, perhaps mixed with a little hostility.
I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince China of our good intentions. friendliness and goodwill. Their [the Chinese] last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the enry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.
Thus, for the first time after centuries, India's defence has to concentrate on two fronts simultaneously. {What a clear conclusion way back in 1950 !}. . . We shall now have to reckon with a Communist China in the north and the northeast, a Communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not in any way seem friendly to us.
The question of the Chinese entry into UNO. In view of the Chinese rebuff, and the method it has followed in dealing with Tibet, I doubt whether we can advocate its claims any longer. The UNO would probably threaten to virtually outlaw Chinain view of its active participation in the Korean War. We must determine our attitude on this question also.