Artillery Discussion Thread

[Misraji]

This is U.S Army doctrine. Not necessary that we have to rely on the same. The LCH will also be hunting for tanks. Also pls mention the advantages of LCH. The ability to fight in high altitude areas is something that only LCH can do.
(Taking a cue from the tank arguments, we cannot forget to mention that being lighter, LCH is better maneuverable than the heavy weight Apache. )
Advantages of LCH
1.Stealth.
2.Very good range.
3.High altitude operation.

I cannot claim to know more than IA about their actual operational requirements.

The next best thing, IMO, is to see what other nations are doing. Hence I quoted the US ORBat.
Moreover, US, Britain, Russia - all of them have heavy specialized gunships and multi-role/light gunships (Mi-17VT1, Lnyx, Cobra) combinations.
Which makes think that IA's requirement is legit.

And since there is no indigenous alternative, procurement seems to be legit too.
Don't see any problem.

Taking hits on thick skin is not an option, just as the lch it will have to avoid getting hit in the first place.

Absolutely. Taking hits is not really any option.
Its the combination of (Armor + Longbow + Network Centric Avionics) that makes the Apache the beast.
As US ORBAT suggests, there are distinct roles for each.

--Ashish

[Philip]

The proliferation of small arms ,anti-air artillery and MANPADs today makes it a very tough environment for any attack helo.In urban warfare,even RPGs have been used to down attack helos,..."a string of RPG helicopter shootdowns" as one report desceribes it.

(http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/07/a ... n_071610w/)

Why such dumb rounds are so lethal is because they are just that......"dumb" ,and cannot be countered by EW,anti-laser devices,etc.The only way to eliminate the threat is going after the shooter by trying to identify his location and blast it to smithereens before he lets off a round.Here are some sobering facts.

The June 9 attack was the latest in a string of RPG helicopter shoot-downs. In fact, the RPG is responsible for felling scores of military rotorcraft of all types, according to news accounts. As the Army prepares nearly triple the number of air assets in Afghanistan, the cheap, easy RPG used in the famous ‘Black Hawk Down’ crash in Mogadishu, Somalia, remains the weapon of choice for militants, Army officials say.

There have been 375 rotorcraft losses, with 496 fatalities through September. Of those, 19 percent are attributable to hostile action and the rest to mishaps in and out of combat, Mark Couch, of the Institute for Defense Analyses, and Dennis Lindell, program manager for the Joint Aircraft Survivability Program Office, stated in a May report to Congress.

Precise numbers are unavailable due to their sensitivity; however, Couch and Lindell said in a subsequent report for the rotorcraft community that the majority of hostile-fire losses are attributable to RPGs and Man-Portable Air Defense Systems, or MANPADS, which are infrared-guided, shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles.

“We have had aircraft shot down either by a combination of small-arms fire and RPGs or massed RPGs, of which one or two or more might hit an aircraft,” said retired Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Schloesser, the former director of Army aviation in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7. “They’re a poor man’s weapon, and they’re available throughout the world.”

Schloesser recalled during his time commanding the 101st Airborne Division in eastern Afghanistan, a Chinook that was felled when an RPG struck its aft pylon. The pilot crash-landed on top of an abandoned farm building in the high mountains, escaping serious injury.

“There are other shoot-downs where that wasn’t the case, so it has always been a significant factor,” he said of the RPG threat.

With the battlefield in mind, the Army has accelerated its aircraft survivability efforts to focus on the ubiquitous “dumb” threats of small-arms fire and RPG’s.

“RPGs are as plentiful as heavy machine guns; they’re cheap, they’re easy and they’re all over the battlefield, so you don’t get away from them,” said Chief Warrant Officer 4 Jon Larue, one of the officials spearheading the Army’s technology effort. Larue is an action officer with the Aviation Division of the Deputy the Chief of Staff G-3/5/7, the division responsible for managing and integrating the modernization process for Army aviation.

“There’s no warning, there’s no defense that you can put up to stop a guy from shooting at you, or detect it until he’s fired the first round.”
‘Cost, ease of use, and lethality’

Common to conflicts since the Vietnam War, the Soviet-made RPG-7 was once a mainstay of the Iraqi army and is now a favorite of insurgents, according to report by George J. Mordica II, an analyst for the Center for Army Lessons Learned.

“The real advantage of this weapon is the cost, ease of use, and lethality,” Mordica writes. “The disadvantage of conducting a close combat attack is the danger of immediate retribution from a superior force. In Iraq, that disadvantage is diminished because the attacker is often willing to give up his life in an effort to create casualties and political unrest.”

A shoulder-fired, muzzle-loaded anti-tank and anti-personnel grenade launcher, the RPG-7 fires grenades with a an effective range of 300 meters against moving targets and a maximum reach of about 1,000 meters. The grenades travel at 200 meters per second and detonate with a bursting radius of 4 meters. One variety self-destructs after flying for 4.5 seconds.

“The most effective use of the RPG-7 against helicopters has been to use the self-destructing round to being down a platform with shrapnel,” Mordica writes. “Engaging from 800 meters away will allow for the 920 meters self-destruct to activate and kill the aircraft.

“Obviously, this technique takes a lot of practice to be effective, but the results of RPG-7 attacks against Soviet helicopters in the mountains of Afghanistan prove that it can be effectively trained.”

Writing in a 1998 issue of Infantry magazine, Lester W. Grau, of the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., described how the mujahedeen in Afghanistan would use RPGs to attack Soviet transport helicopters loaded with troops.

“In Afghanistan, the Mujahideen found that the best anti-helicopter tactics were anti-helicopter ambushes,” Grau writes. “The first variant was to identify likely landing zones and mine them. Then the Mujahideen would position machine guns and RPGs around the landing zone. As the helicopter landed, massed RPG and machine gun fire would tear into the aircraft.”

Grau pegged the RPG as the perfect weapon in an asymmetrical fight: “The chances are, whenever a U.S. soldier is deployed to a trouble spot, the RPG-7 will be part of the local landscape.”

“It’s very comparable to IEDs,” said Schloesser, “in that our sophistication sometimes does not lend itself to an easy solution in the case of a poor man’s weapon that’s commonly available, that’s relatively unsophisticated, and yet devastating en masse and for a relatively well-trained operator.”
Infrared countermeasures

Technology to combat the threat of sophisticated infrared-guided surface-to-air missiles has come further than efforts to counter “dumb” bullets and RPGs.

Many U.S. military aircraft are equipped with these systems: the Common Missile Warning System, which uses ultraviolet sensors to detect missile launches, track them and launch flares that confuse the missile’s infrared seeker, and Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures, which uses jamming lasers to misdirect infrared-guided missiles.

Matt Schroeder, manager of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project at the Federation of American Scientists, said funding of these systems has been “money well spent,” as MANPADS have appeared in arms caches in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, in Afghanistan.
Supersonic, subsonic rounds

Meanwhile, Defense and Army officials are taking aim at RPG and small-arms fire attacks against helicopters. Until recently, the Army’s main investment against this has been aircraft survivability equipment like adding additional armor, redundant critical systems and more crash-worthy fuel tanks.

“All of the aircraft survival equipment systems on board to date that we’ve put a lot of money into, both for Iraq and Afghanistan, have been oriented toward the surface-to-air missile threat, IR-guided [missiles], and those systems have done yeoman’s work preventing that from happening,” Schloesser said.

Because there is no system yet that can divert “dumb” bullets or RPGs, the focus has been to determine the origin of the fire and alert pilots.

“Now we’re taking a different focus in recent years, to try to give the pilot that situational awareness to let him know he’s being fired at,” said Ray Gentzyel, chief of Army G-3/5/7’s aviation systems division. “Now we’re trying to give him an indication in the cockpit so that he can use his maneuvers for survivability.”

The DARPA and BBN Technologies have been developing a device that detects such attacks and locates the shooter, and it was installed on a UH-60L Blackhawk for testing in February. In March congressional testimony, DARPA director Regina E. Dugan said several more systems would be deployed Afghanistan for operational testing.

Called the Helicopter Alert and Threat Termination system, or HALTT-A, the system uses 16 sensors mounted on the helicopter’s fuselage to detect the supersonic shock wave caused by firing bullet.

BBN also makes the similar Boomerang ground acoustic shot detection system, which also hones in on the sounds of bullets being fired. That system indicates the “o’clock” azimuth of incoming small-arms fire, announces that direction using a recorded voice and indicates the range and elevation on an LED screen display.

Larue said situational awareness is crucial so that pilots can take evasive action to protect themselves, their passengers and the airframe. Often, aviators are unaware they have been shot at until they inspect the airframe after landing.

“We don’t want a pilot to walk around the aircraft and say, ‘Holy smokes, I was fired at because I have three or four bullet holes in his tail boom,’” Larue said. “We want him to know exactly when that took place so he can react, so he doesn’t have to come home and find out an hour after the mission.”

Because the RPG-7 fires with smoke and a flash, but no supersonic bang, it is tough to detect with acoustic sensors alone. Army officials said detecting the ballistic threat presents the nascent technology with a complex problem probably best met by a combination of ultraviolet, infrared and acoustic sensors.

[Nick_S]

Apache is a heavy duty gunship.

It can survive hits from 23mm projectiles as opposed to 12.7mm of LCH

Absolutely. Taking hits is not really any option.

Yep, helo armour is not something you actually want to rely upon. Rather avoid taking hits - which LCH may possibly be better at since it should be more mobile.

The two main differences i see are - Payload and the Longbow radar.

While Longbow radar is supposed to be uber awesome, i just dont see it as being enough of a reason to go Apache.

Also, IMO, Apache's network centric capability is not that relevant since IA is not connected as USArmy. Plus the network centric capability can be integrated into LCH as well.

Just my 2c.

[Misraji]

Yep, helo armour is not something you actually want to rely upon. Rather avoid taking hits - which LCH may possibly be better at since it should be more mobile.
The two main differences i see are - Payload and the Longbow radar.
While Longbow radar is supposed to be uber awesome, i just dont see it as being enough of a reason to go Apache.
Also, IMO, Apache's network centric capability is not that relevant since IA is not connected as USArmy. Plus the network centric capability can be integrated into LCH as well.
Just my 2c.

I don't mean to be rude, but I have no clue how one can substantiate any of the above claims
- That agility is better than armor when it comes to a multiple helos vs enemy armor.
- That Network Centric warfare is not THAT relevant for IA
- Longbow radar is uber awesome but not worth it.

Please provide something like
- Actual incidents, kill rates etc
- Any simulations done
- Any Studies/Papers.

On the other hand we have the case of multiple armies doing what the IA is doing.
We do not have an indigenous heavy attack helicopter.
I do not see what the problem is.

Here. Try this

Comparative tests of the AH-64A and AH-64D were performed at Fort Hunter-Liggett in California in the spring of 1995 and demonstrated just how big an advance the AH-64D really was. AH-64As were credited with 75 kills of adversary targets, along with losses of 28 gunships and 34 kills on friendly targets. AH-64Ds scored 300 kills on adversary targets, losing only four machines and inflicting no "friendly fire" kills. A British officer who qualified on the AH-64D in 1996 described the contrast between the old and new variants: "There's just no comparison."

With respect to the Karbala incident:

The AH-64's most recent combat action was in the American invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003. They suffered badly in the Iraq campaign, with all 32 Apaches dispatched to one attack shot up and one of them shot down. This incident suggested to critics that the day of the manned helicopter gunship is ending and that it will soon be replaced by fixed-wing or rotary-wing robot gunships. Defenders of gunships reply that the fiasco was mostly due to unimaginative tactics plus the fact that the enemy had been alerted that the Apaches were coming. They further pointed out that most of the shot-up Apaches were back in service in a short time, since the type had been designed to absorb significant battle damage and go on fighting.

Clicky
Google Cache

With respect to Longbow-hellfire combination

The LONGBOW system employs fire-and-forget LONGBOW HELLFIRE AGM-114L missiles that can be launched from defilade, increasing battlefield survivability. The LONGBOW HELLFIRE missile locks on targets before or after launch and has been used in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

And Hellfire has a range of 5.6miles.
Thus armed with Longbow-Hellfire combination, AH-64D can snipe at targets in a fire-and-forget mode from distance of 5 miles in all weather conditions.
That is not the case with any wire-guided, laser-guided or command-guided missiles (IR guided are limited by weather conditions)

Why is it the case that folks have already taken a stand w.r.t two points
- There is no need for heavy attack helicopter (because of 2c)
- Everybody in IA is corrupt.

--Ashish

[rohitvats]

I have no clue how one can substantiate any of the above claims
- That agility is better than armor when it comes to a multiple helos vs enemy armor.
- That Network Centric warfare is not THAT relevant for IA
- Longbow radar is uber awesome.

Please provide something like
- Actual incidents, kill rates etc
- Any simulations done
- Any Studies/Papers.

<SNIP>

Aiyoooo!!!! How dare you ask these oracles of high-knowledge and upper hand in everything under the Sun to come up with facts and figures? You plebeian...you need to be flogged for asking the Oracles - whose wisdom and eyes - see everything..Don't you know that they know it already? Take their word as final or burn in the fires of hell, you heathen!!!

[Misraji]

Aiyoooo!!!! How dare you ask these oracles of high-knowledge and upper hand in everything under the Sun to come up with facts and figures? You plebeian...you need to be flogged for asking the Oracles - whose wisdom and eyes - see everything..Don't you know that they know it already? Take their word as final or burn in the fires of hell, you heathen!!!

...
It is a bit of a sorry state though. We need to imbibe the scientific methodology for reasoning.
This 2c logic without any facts, figures or comparisons is complete hindrance to any serious discussion.

--Ashish

[Nick_S]

I don't mean to be rude, but I have no clue how one can substantiate any of the above claims
- That agility is better than armor when it comes to a multiple helos vs enemy armor.
- That Network Centric warfare is not THAT relevant for IA
- Longbow radar is uber awesome but not worth it.

Please provide something like
- Actual incidents, kill rates etc
- Any simulations done
- Any Studies/Papers.

Firstly those are not claims. Just possible suggestions which I understand could be wrong since i dont claim to be a military expert like you sir.

To be honest, i dont know the real state of IA in terms of its network centric capabilities, but i doubt it has invested as much funds as US army has. Perhaps you can "provide something" that proves IA has the same top to bottom network centric warfare capability that US army has and which Apache is designed to exploit?

On the other hand we have the case of multiple armies doing what the IA is doing.

So do you think the French, German & Australian armies use of Tiger is inappropriate?
Is arguing one helo is better for India simply because so-and-so country uses it a valid argument?

With respect to Longbow-hellfire combination.....

Yes, its a good feature. But I was concerned about the quantity vs quality aspect of the Longbow system. Only half of the 22 Apaches that we are getting for $1.4 billion will have the Longbow radar. For the same amount of funds, a lot more LCH could be bought.

(And before you come back to say it - yes, i know the Apaches can share the Longbow data but in the end only half the helos will have these so you have to wonder how much coverage will so few systems provide on such a massive potential battlefront with 24/7 needs in battle.)

[Nick_S]

Aiyoooo!!!! How dare you ask these oracles of high-knowledge and upper hand in everything under the Sun to come up with facts and figures? You plebeian...you need to be flogged for asking the Oracles - whose wisdom and eyes - see everything..Don't you know that they know it already? Take their word as final or burn in the fires of hell, you heathen!!!

That was truly a highly informative post sir. Thank you for your useful contribution towards helping others who just want to understand certain things.

[SagarAg]

Aiyoooo!!!! How dare you do not believe these oracles of high-knowledge and upper hand in everything under the Sun who come up with facts and figures? You plebeian...you need to be flogged for countering the Oracles - whose wisdom and eyes - see everything..Don't you know that they know it already? Take their word as final or burn in the fires of hell, you heathen!!!

Aigaaa!! rohitvats ji just gave the perfect description of his reputation onlee!

And Misraji just tell me how will 22 Apache fit in IA/IAF war doctrine.

Aiyoooo!!!! How dare you ask these oracles of high-knowledge and upper hand in everything under the Sun to come up with facts and figures? You plebeian...you need to be flogged for asking the Oracles - whose wisdom and eyes - see everything..Don't you know that they know it already? Take their word as final or burn in the fires of hell, you heathen!!!

That was truly a highly informative post sir. Thank you for your useful contribution towards helping others who just want to understand certain things.

Nick_S saar the posts above by rohitvats ji is filled with deep sensible knowledge which is contributing to people's time and forum bandwidth.

[vic]

Nobody can deny that Apache and M777 are sophisticated super costly weapons. The issue is whether we should buy them or try to address our defense needs with other alternative cheaper indigenous methods. Are these weapons are Agustawestland of defense needs?

[member_22906]

^^

The issue is not only about whether to buy them or make them but also in what time (for the urgent requirements). MSC and other mountain divs on the China border are urgent requirements, therefore we need them as of day before yesterday...

[Misraji]

And Misraji just tell me how will 22 Apache fit in IA/IAF war doctrine.

The same way earlier 27 Mi-35s did it so far. The Apaches are a replacement for another heavy gunship.

--Ashish

[vic]

The issue is whether we are using valuable resources on only 22 heavy attack helos which cannot be used in Himalayas, are extremely vulnerable, very costly and can be replaced by indigenous solutions like LCH, even IJT, or LCA etc. If I say modified Saras everybody will attack me and Rohit will have a fit of happiness.

[Will]

With so few of them being ordered they must be reserved for some special Ops doctrine.

[SagarAg]

And Misraji just tell me how will 22 Apache fit in IA/IAF war doctrine.

The same way earlier 27 Mi-35s did it so far. The Apaches are a replacement for another heavy gunship.

--Ashish

So which attack helicopters complimented Mi-35s in its service history in IAF. Answer is NONE. It was the lone soldier in our inventory. Now we have Rudra, LCH. We have the capability now, role IAF should be to develop its war doctrine based on them. But instead of boosting funds for their development, we are seeing IAF going for 16 Rudra attack choppers. The same old story, we have the indigenous capability but the numbers are missing. And here we have IAF going for 22 Apache for mind boggling high price.

IAF needs to follow development policy and adapt its helicopter acquisition to new developments instead of following a replacement policy. That's my point.

[abhik]

And Misraji just tell me how will 22 Apache fit in IA/IAF war doctrine.

The same way earlier 27 Mi-35s did it so far. The Apaches are a replacement for another heavy gunship.

--Ashish

Misraji, Which heavy gunship did the Mi-35 replace?

[abhik]

Point 1 - Long term plan calls for each Corps of the IA to have a Combat Aviation Brigade. For Strike Corps, it would consist of Heavy Attack Helicopters + ALH + Medium Lift Helicopters (Mi-17 class).

Any open source info for the above? Thank You.

[rohitvats]

That was truly a highly informative post sir. Thank you for your useful contribution towards helping others who just want to understand certain things.

My dear sweet heart, when you comment on a topic, you can do either of the following things -

1. Research the topic and based on the same come up with certain POV and back it up.
2. Ask others about it.
3. Give your POV based on your knowledge base.

But if one were to go by the content of your post(s), there is nothing of the above. If it is learning that you seek, there is no evidence of the same. You have passed a judgement without even bothering to spent 5 minutes on Google which could have thrown up some results. Writing 'Just my 2 cents' does not absolve you of this basic courtesy which you need to extend to others when you participate in the forum.

And since your plank of argument against AH-64 is WRT to network centric operations of the IA (and Services), here are some pointers. Please do go through them a little bit in detail and share your learning wit others as well.

1. You posted (or, Cross-Posted) the video of IAF Iron-Fist fire power demonstration. But did you bother to see the whole of it? If you had, you would have seen the example NCW in IAF. In that video, a UAV picks up presence of certain 'Camps' and relays the information back to the Master Control Center. The MCC relays the information to 2 x Mirage-2000 for bombing the targets. While ex-filtrating, an AWACS pics up 2 x F-16 of PAF and vectors the Mirages to intercept them.

Does the above sound good enough for NCW for you?

2. Another point - Did you see the live streaming of UAV images during the same firepower demo? Apart from the intelligence gathering element, that is example of real time Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for which otherwise IAF will have to risk high performance jets.

3. IA is in various stages of implementing various Tactical Command, Control, Communication and Information (TAC C3I) systems. Here is a list of those:

- CIDSS (Command Information Decision Support System)
- ACCCS (Artillery Command, Control & Communication System)
- BSS (Battlefield Surveillance System)
- ADC&RS (Air Defense Control & Reporting System)
- BMS (Battlefield Management System)

There is reason Army is pushing for inducting more and more UAVs in the system. These UAVs can pass real time information to the ground exploitation systems which can then pass the same to other airborne platforms.

4. Indian Army has been validating various NCW related equipment and techniques and capability during various exercises. Here are some excerpts:

http://intellibriefs.blogspot.in/2007/0 ... ntric.html

These were but some of the elements of Exercise Ashwamedha that 25,000 Indian Army troops were engaged in along an 80-mile long and 40-mile wide front in the scorching heat of Rajasthan's Thar Desert. Pallu is located some 400 km from state capital Jaipur.

'We fight to win. What we are aiming at is to validate our network-centric warfare capabilities and night fighting capabilities,' the Indian Army chief, Gen. J.J. Singh told reporters here Wednesday on the penultimate day of the five-day drill.

'We have progressed reasonably well in both areas in validating our concepts,' a very pleased looking Singh added.

Network-centric warfare means the ability to convey information in real time through satellite imagery, UAVs (unarmed aerial vehicles) and battlefield radars from the scene of action to the highest level of command and vice versa to facilitate quick decisions in an evolving situation.

Night vision devices like handheld thermal imagers, the TISA integrated fire control system of the T-72 main battle tank (MBT) and the LORROS long-range radar light up a battlefield like day and enable effective counter-action against advancing forces.

'The exercise will enable the integration of surveillance systems and night vision devices with the weapons systems of the army and the air force,' Brigadier Amarjeet Singh, the army spokesman for the exercise, explained.

'The aim is to integrate the various fighting elements so that combat power is optimised and simultaneous and concentrated attacks can be staged at several points along a front.

5. Here is an interview with DG Information Systems of IA. Please read through it:

http://www.spslandforces.net/story.asp?id=220

Here is an excerpt:

SP’s: How is the Indian Army visualising the transformation to this type of warfare? What is the type of framework (intra and inter-service) involved and what are the types of projects initiated in this regard? How is partnership with the private industry functioning in the field?

DGIS: Advancements in the field of ICT during the past over a decade mandates transformation of Indian Army into a network-centric force. The overall concept of a net-centric Indian Army envisages convergence of ‘shared situation awareness’ and ‘decision support tools’, aimed at shortening our observe, orient, decide and act (OODA) loop. The Army is currently in the process of enhancing net enablement, and the frameworks needed to integrate disparate projects have already been accomplished. In the Indian Army, besides automating the operational aspects, greater effort is now directed towards the training to enhance exploitation of the net-centricity in our peacetime functioning as well. The private industry is actively involved; directly (in MIS project) and indirectly through development agencies (OIS project) and greater association from industry is on the cards with the categorisation of certain important automation projects in ICT domain, as ‘Make’ projects.

SP’s: What is the current status of Indian Army’s command, information and decision support system (CIDSS) which involves the development of the artillery command and control, and communication system (ACCCS); air defence control and reporting system; electronic warfare system; battlefield surveillance system (BSS); battlefield management system (BMS); and futuristic infantry soldier as a system (F-INSAS)?

DGIS: As brought out in Question No 1, automation of operational information system is currently at various stages of development and fielding. Automation of operational system is being concurrently pursued right from soldier level upwards to strategic level. Moreover, all these systems are being evolved in an integrated manner. As a result, fully integrated operational information system is expected to be fielded as per the priorities w.e.f. 2015.

Nick - there is enough body of knowledge on BRF if one were to seek the same. There are article on BR itself on this topic. As I said earlier, little bit of research never hurt anyone.

[Misraji]

So which attack helicopters complimented Mi-35s in its service history in IAF. Answer is NONE. It was the lone soldier in our inventory. Now we have Rudra, LCH. We have the capability now, role IAF should be to develop its war doctrine based on them. But instead of boosting funds for their development, we are seeing IAF going for 16 Rudra choppers. The same old story, we have the indigenous capability but the numbers are missing. And here we are seeing IAF going for 22 Apache for mind boggling high price.

IAF needs to follow development policy and adapt its helicopter acquisition to new developments instead of following a replacement policy. That's my point.

M-17s, Alouettes, Cheetahs ... All have armed versions in service for light firepower duties.
There are some duties that LCH simply cannot perform.
Its more akin to Cobra than Apache.
Tangling with armor, taking on battle-damage, long-range snipe attacks.
These were earlier done by Mi-35. Now they are to be done by Apache.

Lets not split hairs between Army vs Airforce and then drag a completely different helicopter into the affair.

LCH has been ordered in HUGE numbers. 179 have already been ordered.
Name other air-forces that plan to have such large fleets of light-attack/armed-scout helos.

The duties of Rudra are different. Rudra is to serve in armed escort role.
Hence the Army, the primary user, has ordered 60.
IAF simply has no such requirement except (probably) for Garuds. Hence the smaller number.

Misraji, Which heavy gunship did the Mi-35 replace?

The Frivolous answer: Which Gunship did Mi-24 and Cobra replace in Soviet and US service? None. They were the first of their breed.
Similarly, Mi-35 replaced Chetak armed with ATGMs.

n 1977, it (The Squadron) joined the ranks of the fighting forces of the IAF, when the role of the Unit was re-designated to that of ATGM (Anti Tank Guided Missile). All helicopters were modified to carry 4 X AS 11B wire command, self propelled and guided missiles. Since then, the unit has taken part in numerous Army/Air co-operation exercise involving tactics for the new role of ATGM. The pilots are being imparted training including live firing to enhance their operational capabilities in this particular role and this process still continues, thereby keeping the unit in operational readiness at all times.
..SNIP...
On 04 Apr 90, the Unit shifted from Sarsawa to Batihnda and was re-equipped with the mighty Mi-35, thus becoming a dedicated Attack Helicopter unit of the IAF.

History of Firebirds, No 104 Squadron.


--Ashish

[rohitvats]

Point 1 - Long term plan calls for each Corps of the IA to have a Combat Aviation Brigade. For Strike Corps, it would consist of Heavy Attack Helicopters + ALH + Medium Lift Helicopters (Mi-17 class).

Any open source info for the above? Thank You.

That is based on two sources:

- An article in FORCE Magazine written by ex-DG of Artillery.
- Various reports in main stream media on the topic of induction of attack helicopters in IA.

BTW - the first Combat Aviation Bde has been formed under 14 Corps in Leh, Ladakh.

[abhik]

^^

The issue is not only about whether to buy them or make them but also in what time (for the urgent requirements). MSC and other mountain divs on the China border are urgent requirements, therefore we need them as of day before yesterday...

Note that the MSC/additional divisions itself and also road projects are stuck because of lack of funds. So in such a situation is rationalizing our weapon purchases not the reasonable thing to do?

[abhik]

Misraji, Which heavy gunship did the Mi-35 replace?

The Frivolous answer: Which Gunship did Mi-24 and Cobra replace in Soviet and US service? None. They were the first of their breed.

So is it also not plausible that they could be the last of their breed?

[rohitvats]

So which attack helicopters complimented Mi-35s in its service history in IAF. Answer is NONE. It was the lone soldier in our inventory. Now we have Rudra, LCH. We have the capability now, role IAF should be to develop its war doctrine based on them. But instead of boosting funds for their development, we are seeing IAF going for 16 Rudra attack choppers. The same old story, we have the indigenous capability but the numbers are missing. And here we have IAF going for 22 Apache for mind boggling high price.

IAF needs to follow development policy and adapt its helicopter acquisition to new developments instead of following a replacement policy. That's my point.

Dude, not only are you ignorant but refuse to learn and educate yourself even when information is right in front of you.

You are making a fool of yourself here with these posts.

First and foremost - Indian Army has placed firm orders for 60 Rudra helicopters. Which will be deployed across 06 Squadrons to be raised by Army Aviation Corps. @ 1 Squadron per Corps. This number will only rise in the future.

Secondly - IA has also placed orders for 114 Light Combat Helicopters. And IAF has placed orders for 64 LCH. This when the aircraft is yet to receive even IOC as of date. They are OK with getting these machines in 2015-2016 time frame.

As for Apaches - just because you cannot wrap your head around the idea of Heavy Attack Helicopters and capabilities therein, does not mean IA or IAF do not. Those 22 Apaches are for the IAF. To be spread across 2 x Squadrons. There is a reason that IAF (and IA) did not even ask for Tiger/A129/Rooivalk/AH-1Z Super Cobra class of helicopters.

If you spend fraction of time that you do in writing these nonsensical posts of yours on actually researching something, maybe you can make lesser fool of yourself here.

Rest assured, you're going to see in excess of 60 Apaches in Indian Army service for deployment in plains.

[rohitvats]

So is it also not plausible that they could be the last of their breed?

Well, not exactly.

The doctrinal requirement of the respective countries will decide the nature of future platform.

US Army wanted a heavy duty Anti-Tank helicopter and the result is the Apache - and its latest variations. There is a reason US Army did not go for the upgraded Cobra Gunship after Vietnam - even when Marines did. In case of USSR/Russia, they graduated from Mi-24/35 to Mi-28 and Kamov Ka-28/30/32. These are heavy attack helicopters on the lines of AH-64D.

A study in contrast is the development of Tiger Attack helicopters - they come in various versions and apart from anti-tank role, these were developed for working as direct fire support, fighting scouts and reconnaissance. They are meant to fulfill many roles in one chopper. Hence, they are lighter than AH-64D/Mi-28 class of helicopters. For example, in Australia, apart from the anti-tank role, the Tiger was expected to supplement and eventually replace the Kiowa OH-58 Armed Reconnaissance helicopters.

I expect our very own LCH to evolve on this line as well.

[Misraji]

So is it also not plausible that they could be the last of their breed?

Sure. Its plausible. Highly improbable though.
USA is coming out with AH-64E with planned procurement to order of 600odd.
Russians are procuring new Mi-28N and Ka-50s.
China has the WZ-10.
There is a definite need for heavy gunship and its not going away any time soon.

Point 1 - Long term plan calls for each Corps of the IA to have a Combat Aviation Brigade. For Strike Corps, it would consist of Heavy Attack Helicopters + ALH + Medium Lift Helicopters (Mi-17 class).
..SNIP..
Rest assured, you're going to see in excess of 60 Apaches in Indian Army service for deployment in plains.

Never concentrated on ORBAT before.
From ORBAT, if one can surmise planned procurements, deployments and strategies, then its a damn cool thing.
Thank you, Rohit saar. This is gonna be fun ...

--Ashish

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>Thank you, Rohit saar. This is gonna be fun ...

--Ashish

It is not, actually.

As a matter of fact, it points to the prevalent standard of debate on BRF. Where someone latches onto some fancy word and then uses the same brush to paint every argument. Nothing by way of research on topic. Nothing by way of analysis. Most of the knowledge and information is available at the push of a button. There are fantastic articles on evolution and role of helicopters in general and attack helicopters in particular. Their role in Deep Battle Concept of USSR and Airland Battle Concept of US Army.

But what do we get - Pure and unadulterated BS. Sigh!!!

God knows there are N things wrong with our procurement process and Services - but that does not give people the license to use one argument again and again w/o even bothering to check the context. And them someone comes out with some harebrained idea like single-tube Pinaka on 4 x 4 vehicle, attaches 'domestic' to it and voila, we have the panacea for all that ails our MIC and Services and their requirements.

[SagarAg]

M-17s, Alouettes, Cheetahs ... All have armed versions in service for light firepower duties.
LCH, Rudra are dedicated attack helicopters and have the capability of heavy firepower duties.
There are some duties that LCH simply cannot perform.
Its more akin to Cobra than Apache.
Tangling with armor, taking on battle-damage, long-range snipe attacks.
These were earlier done by Mi-35. Now they are to be done by Apache.
That is my point exactly. IAF needs to change its war doctrine according to development of new attack choppers indigenously. If they didn't had a role for Rudra previously then they need to fit it into its armory and change its tactics accordingly. War doctrines are formed according to the capabilities you have and not on the tech you desire. Being indigenous, LCH, Rudra will be ready for battle again after taking damage before Apache. They can be modified/upgraded at will by IAF/IA at anytime without any hurdles. At any point of time LCH/Rudra will be more battle ready than Apache. Bulk orders of Rudra will help boosting the helicopter market in India not in US. It will provide jobs, opportunities to manufacturer of parts in India not US.
Lets not split hairs between Army vs Airforce and then drag a completely different helicopter into the affair.

LCH has been ordered in HUGE numbers. 179 have already been ordered.
Name other air-forces that plan to have such large fleets of light-attack/armed-scout helos.
I will be very happy if India becomes/or is the largest user of light-attack/armed-scout helos in the world. India will therefore emerge as market leader in this field which will help further in developing export variant of these helos and create a niche sector for itself by supplying these in large quantities around world.

The duties of Rudra are different. Rudra is to serve in armed escort role.
Hence the Army, the primary user, has ordered 60.
IAF simply has no such requirement except (probably) for Garuds. Hence the smaller number.
Are you sure Ruder will only be used for armed escort. I was hoping it will also be used for solo/group swift strike role.




--Ashish

[Misraji]

It is not, actually.

As a matter of fact, it points to the prevalent standard of debate on BRF. Where someone latches onto some fancy word and then uses the same brush to paint every argument. Nothing by way of research on topic. Nothing by way of analysis. Most of the knowledge and information is available at the push of a button. There are fantastic articles on evolution and role of helicopters in general and attack helicopters in particular. Their role in Deep Battle Concept of USSR and Airland Battle Concept of US Army.

But what do we get - Pure and unadulterated BS. Sigh!!!

God knows there are N things wrong with our procurement process and Services - but that does not give people the license to use one argument again and again w/o even bothering to check the context. And them someone comes out with some harebrained idea like single-tube Pinaka on 4 x 4 vehicle, attaches 'domestic' to it and voila, we have the panacea for all that ails our MIC and Services and their requirements.

Oh. You misunderstand, Sirjee. I was not commenting on the quality of the debate.

I was commenting on the fact that I finally understood (from you, thanku) as to how to analyze procurement numbers and strategies for weapons systems.
By studying existing ORBAT, proposed changes and reading on historic battles, one could figure out how doctrines+strategies would influence new procurements and vice-versa.
In short, you did not give me the fish, you taught me how to fish. Much appreciated.

--Ashish

PS: Thank you for the new terms, "Deep Battle Concept" vs Air-Land Battle concept. Will look it up.

[Philip]

We don't have unlimited budgets for attack helos.Even the US dumped the Comanche.Therefore in the Indian context it would make sense to have almost every helo to have some armament capability.The Lancer is just one good example.Using our med. lift MI-17Vs to have weaponry as std. another good idea.I would even suggest that almost all future Dhruv/ALHs are built to the armed std.Tjhis way they could fight back if attacked.

[KrishnaK]

The IA post parakram is a different beast no ? From conversations like the ones below, it's apparent we're going to be acquiring more TFTA gold plated systems onlee. If we're actually interested in pursuing what we claim we'll do.

ParGha
A rose by any other name is still a rose! We may yet evolve new nomenclature but I don't think we are there yet, nor is it necessary. The definition of what constitutes a division or brigade can be quite flexible. Gurmeet doesn't suggest anything more radical than "IBGs based on combinations of infantry divisions and armored brigades". My reading of Gurmeet is that the IBGs being proposed are similar to the US Cavalry Divisions in composition.

You're correct in your assertion that IBG will be Division sized formations with some additional elements to boost the firepower.A RAPID paired with (I) Armored Brigade+additional artillery assets (like more tube and especially, rocket artillery)+integral airpower (attack heptr.+IAF assets) is one such candidate for IBG.

However, there are two problems with this - (a) it will require the Pivot Corps to pit their only strike assets and will leave them without any assets to counter PA counter-offensive. (b) RAPIDs are still disbalanced wrt mechanization - which might or might not be a problem depending on the objectives of IA.

IMO, the gilt-edged IBG would consist of Mechanized Division paired with (I) Armored Brigade with rocket artillery and air assets. Also, the holding power of Pivot Corps need to be boosted to higher level to contain the spill over from any Indian offensive.

Rohit
You anticipated my next post. I agree about the need for mechanization and see the US Calavry Division as the gold standard for what we are trying to achieve.

Ramana
I agree with Rohit that we simply don't yet have the assets to build these IBG. There is shortage of artillery, helicopters and inadequate mechanization. Perhaps large scale induction of Dhruv and use of MPV type or wheeled APC vehicles, which can be cheaply built, provide fillip to mechanization. But the requisite numbers of SP artillery is nowhere in sight. If we were able to achieve these numbers, then even with greater dispersal of forces, we could potentially a significantly superior force to the enemy. Note the handicap below in terms of air power and mechanization for us.

Just for comparison -

1st Cavalry Division US Army
1 x HQ battalion
4 x Brigade Combat Teams (208 M-1, 224 M2/M3, 48 Recce AFV, 64 M109)
1 x Combat Aviation Brigade (Heavy) - (24 x AH-64, 38 x UH-60, 12 x CH-47 Chinook and 12 x HH-60M = 86 helicopters)

Indian RAPID
1 x HQ Battalion
2 x Infantry Bde (non-mechanized)
1 x Armd Bde (110 T-72, 90 BMP-2)
1 x Division Artillery Bde (no SP)

Indian Indp Armd Bde
3 x tank regiments (165 T-72/55)
1 x BMP battalion (45 BMP-2)
1 x artillery regiment (no SP)
1 x reconnaissance squadron

[SagarAg]

Dude, not only are you ignorant but refuse to learn and educate yourself even when information is right in front of you.

You are making a fool of yourself here with these posts.

First and foremost - Indian Army has placed firm orders for 60 Rudra helicopters. Which will be deployed across 06 Squadrons to be raised by Army Aviation Corps. @ 1 Squadron per Corps. This number will only rise in the future.

Secondly - IA has also placed orders for 114 Light Combat Helicopters. And IAF has placed orders for 64 LCH. This when the aircraft is yet to receive even IOC as of date. They are OK with getting these machines in 2015-2016 time frame.

As for Apaches - just because you cannot wrap your head around the idea of Heavy Attack Helicopters and capabilities therein, does not mean IA or IAF do not. Those 22 Apaches are for the IAF. To be spread across 2 x Squadrons. There is a reason that IAF (and IA) did not even ask for Tiger/A129/Rooivalk/AH-1Z Super Cobra class of helicopters.

If you spend fraction of time that you do in writing these nonsensical posts of yours on actually researching something, maybe you can make lesser fool of yourself here.

Rest assured, you're going to see in excess of 60 Apaches in Indian Army service for deployment in plains.

Ahh!! Finally, a post from you rohitvats ji which have some knowledge in it apart from as usual hitting out at me/other posters for their view point which contradict your mindset but nvm I think that's your style.
Agreed with you that LCH has been ordered in excess 114+64 and Rudra 60+14 by IAF/IA and the orders will increase further down the line. But why this kolaveri di for 22 Apache at such a high price. We have all the required capability which can be successfully handled by LCH, Rudra, Mi-35, Mi-17 in attack/strike/defensive/scout roles. What significant addition in terms of capability will Apache bring to the table, at such a high cost which could have been used for other more pressing/immediate demands, only IAF/IA can tell.

We don't have unlimited budgets for attack helos.Even the US dumped the Comanche.Therefore in the Indian context it would make sense to have almost every helo to have some armament capability.The Lancer is just one good example.Using our med. lift MI-17Vs to have weaponry as std. another good idea.I would even suggest that almost all future Dhruv/ALHs are built to the armed std.Tjhis way they could fight back if attacked.

+1 Philip saar.

[rohitvats]

Ahh!! Finally, a post from you rohitvats ji which have some knowledge in it apart from as usual hitting out at me/other posters for their view point which contradict your mindset but nvm I think that's your style.

Just because you type something on the lines of - 'I think so' does not mean you have a POV.

Making posts like yours is more suitable to making gossip on 'chai-ka-thela' than being on a forum where subjects are discussed and debated based on certain knowledge base. Which you evidently lack and have not displayed any inclination to acquire.

But don't worry. You'll learn. Or fade out. That is the nature of the beast.

Agreed with you that LCH has been ordered in excess 114+64 and Rudra 60+14 by IAF/IA and the orders will increase further down the line. But why this kolaveri di for 22 Apache at such a high price. We have all the required capability which can be successfully handled by LCH, Rudra, Mi-35, Mi-17 in attack/strike/defensive/scout roles.

Sigh!!!

You talk about capability of LCH+Rudra+Mi-17 in the same breadth and compare them with Apache? What next? Compare LCA with Rafale?

OK. Answer me this - why are we getting LCH when Rudra is there? After all, Rudra can fly to same altitude, carry almost the same payload (Rockets + ATGM) and would cost less than an LCH? Let us have more of Rudra and not waste money on LCH.

The reason is in terms of capability. LCH represents a certain capability customized to undertake particular roles. Which Rudra cannot. Similarly, a heavy attack helicopter like Apache brings certain capabilities to the table. There is more to a Combat Helicopter than the Missiles and Rocket pods hanging outside on stub wings.

Mi-17 - Ability of Mi-17 to fire rockets does not translate to their automatic use as fire-support helicopters - they are primarily, as American would describe, Combat Support helicopters. Those rocket pods will allow them to fight their way in and out - IF THE NEED ARISES. And not as a matter of routine. We barely have enough for fulfill the primary requirement.

Rudra - IMO, it helps IA fill the need for Direct Fire Support for the Infantry and Mech Infantry guys. This is one platform which will help lift the dependence on IAF for CAS. And something which can be deployed in numbers across the entire spectrum of the army. And relatively low cost will allow army to field them in numbers.

LCH - This is going to be IA's baby as far as the main Attack Helicopter of IA is concerned. I have no doubt that this machine is going to evolve on the lines of Tiger Attack Helicopter. A single platform fulfilling multiple roles - Direct Fire Support, Anti-Tank, Armed Reconnaissance and Scout. The first choppers are expected to come online by 2015-2016. The next iteration is unlikely to come into picture by 2020-2022 time frame.

AH-64D Apaches - These are going to be the main punch of the IA and IAF in pure heavy anti-tank roles. We face a strong armored and mechanized infantry threat from west and if CSD is to materialize, Heavy Attack choppers of Apaches kind are a must. These versatile platforms can help punch a hole in during offensive as well as stop enemy armor during counter-attack or break-out.

As a nation and army, which is still building up capability in many areas, Apaches represent a potent force which helps cover many a short-comings.

As an aside, Western nations (primarily European) are rethinking the role, and hence nature, of attack helicopters because these is no threat of Red Army hurtling down the Fulda Gap. The development of Tiger helicopter is case in point. Today, the commitments by western nations is of a different kind. French forces in Mali required a chopper with long legs which could double up as the eyes-in-the-sky as well as shooting up the bad guys. And something which required low maintenance. Please see the induction of this chopper in Australian Army service on similar lines even when AH-64D was offered to them. As I said earlier, these Tigers are even replacing the OH-58 Kiowa (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_OH-58_Kiowa) in service.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurocopter_Tiger#Tiger_ARH

The Tiger ARH (Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter) is the version ordered by the Australian Army to replace its OH-58 Kiowas and UH-1 Iroquois-based 'Bushranger' gunships. The Tiger ARH is a modified and upgraded version of the Tiger HAP with upgraded MTR390 engines as well as a laser designator incorporated in the Strix sight for the firing of Hellfire II air-to-ground missiles. Instead of SNEB unguided rockets, the ARH will use 70 mm (2.75 in) rockets from Belgian developer, Forges de Zeebruges (FZ). 22 of the variant were ordered in December 2001. Most of the helicopters will be operated by the 1st Aviation Regiment based at Robertson Barracks in Darwin.[72] The first two ARH helicopters were delivered to Australia on 15 December 2004. ARH deliveries were to be completed by June 2010. Full operating capability was planned for December 2011.[72]

There is another more important angle to import of Heavy Gunships - it de-links the development of LCH from the induction program and replacement cycle of IA and IAF. Delay in LCH (God forbid) will not affect the operational readiness of the Army or IAF.

[KrishnaK]

The AN/APG-78 is capable of simultaneously tracking 128 targets and engaging the 16 most dangerous ones, and can initiate an attack within 30 seconds, while passing data on the other targets to other Longbow Apaches via data link.[213][214] The data link is housed in a radio modem integrated with the sensor suite allows data to be shared with ground units and other D-models; allowing them to fire on targets detected by a single helicopter.

[Nick_S]

My dear sweet heart , when you comment on a topic, you can do either of the following things -

.....
3. Give your POV based on your knowledge base.

^Yes, thats what i did. I do not claim to be an expert.

But if one were to go by the content of your post(s), there is nothing of the above. If it is learning that you seek, there is no evidence of the same. You have passed a judgement without even bothering to spent 5 minutes on Google which could have thrown up some results. Writing 'Just my 2 cents' does not absolve you of this basic courtesy which you need to extend to others when you participate in the forum.

Sorry, but you are confused. I asked you in my first post on this topic what Apache can do which more LCH cannot do. There is no "judgement" passing.

Also, since we are talking about basic courtesy, you being an ex-army officer does not absolve you of the basic courtesy of having decent manners on a public forum and posting without making condescending remarks unbecoming of an army officer.

If you do not want to reply, then dont do so. No need to write Johnie Walker inspired comments like:

Aiyoooo!!!! How dare you ask these oracles of high-knowledge and upper hand in everything under the Sun to come up with facts and figures? You plebeian...you need to be flogged for asking the Oracles - whose wisdom and eyes - see everything..Don't you know that they know it already? Take their word as final or burn in the fires of hell, you heathen!!!

And since your plank of argument against AH-64 is WRT to network centric operations of the IA (and Services), here are some pointers.

Wrong. My argument was over the quantity vs quality aspect along with the fact that the precious little taxpayer money that we have could be mostly retained within India.

Though, thank you for the informative post on the IA / IAF NCW. Its good to see investments being made in NCW. Hopefully, LCH should be able to exploit this NCW network as well through on-board data links.

I wont be asking you directly any more questions on this, since i will simply be wasting my time.

[pentaiah]

I wonder what role then a/c like jaguar or LCA in ground attack config have if helicopters can take on CLAW like ops
Where is the space for warthog A10 or SU24 like a/c

[member_20296]

I am no arms expert, just a tax payer & a normal job holder, not so important for the country otherwise. But was just curious, when we can have a T-90 V/S Arjun MBT run why can't we have LCH V/S Apache against same given set of missions in all kind of terrains ??

[pentaiah]

One is Indian the other is Red Indian (aka as Native American)

[KrishnaK]

deleted, duplicate post

[KrishnaK]

I wonder what role then a/c like jaguar or LCA in ground attack config have if helicopters can take on CLAW like ops Where is the space for warthog A10 or SU24 like a/c

Being able to operate from close to battle lines and hence better reaction time ? Would it also be more accurate with it's chain gun ?



From keypubs, not sure if it's factual or not. Resident gurus could criticize/edit/add.

If you have a column of tanks in the enemy rearzone riding down a road to the battlefront, then an F-16 with WCMD or sensor-fused munitions will be the best option.

If those tanks are spread over the battlefront engaging your troops, then an Apache is much better. It is much easier to target and track various individual targets (better be moving!) on the battlefield with a near-the-earth attack chopper than with a fast jet at medium heigths.

Plus, while the f-16 might kill a bunch of tanks somewhat near each other with WCMD or similar, it will not be able to engage 16 seperate targets in a single mission ( and I´m not even talking about detecting them all).

http://www.army-technology.com/projects/apache/

The Longbow Apache can effect an attack in 30 seconds. The radar dome is unmasked for a single radar scan and then remasked. The processors determine the location, speed and direction of travel of a maximum of 256 targets.

Each AH-64D can track 16 individual targets and can carry 16 hellfires too. Rough calculation: assuming only 1/4th can really be engaged because they're spread out, a squadron of apaches (10 ?) can take out 40+ in one go from around 8 kms away ? Only 3 of those 10 need to have the longbow to be able to target all 40 in ONE GO. That's a longewala class attack stopped in it's tracks right there.

[Singha]

karbala incident: I wonder how the apache is expected to fight over the thickly populated and built up villages and towns of TSP assuming thats what they are for given their alt limitations. ravi rikheye has noted there are no really open iraq style areas anymore in TSP due to exploding population. villages and towns are good places to fight from as strongpoints as they usually straddle key roads and bridges as well.
in karabala if a swarm of 32 apaches could not intimidate the iraqi army you think 10 will scare anyone in TSP/razakar units? and the TSP has liberally equipped itself with manpads as the prime component of their AD.

in tanks too the highly mobile but lighter armour of the T-series might suffer as they get channeled into narrow zones by minefields, DCBs and are unable to move freely as the old soviet designers planned. they will take hits and burn.

seems to be a combo of Frogfoot/warthog, more agile and numerous Rudra/LCH, industrial scale bombardment platform, beefed up rocket and tube artillery units and merkavaish urban warfare oriented technology(Arjun2 urbangorilla model) is what we need to deal with TSP. all of this will be useful in china front as well because cheen will at us strongly with atgms and tanks.

there is absolutely no word if the apache datalink modems are being procured for the LCH as well so that solitary apaches can "lead" and distribute target info to LCHs. might need american combat system and hellfire on LCH as well to truly work. also given the IAF-IA fight over apaches the chances of such mixed units are close to zero in operational use.