Bharat Rakshak

Indian spies, soldiers cross swords on Kargil

Praveen Swami

V.P Malik's book provokes renewed debate on pre-war intelligence

Unusual decision by the Intelligence Bureau chief to bypass RAW
Pakistani activity misunderstood to represent preparations for local peak-seizing operations

NEW DELHI: India's covert services and its former Chief of Army staff, Gen. Ved Prakash Malik, have crossed swords over the root causes of Pakistan's successful offensive in Kargil in the summer of 1999.

In his newly-released memoirs on the conflict, Kargil: From Surprise to Victory, Gen. Malik has asserted that Pakistan's successful intrusions "reflected a major deficiency in our system of collecting, reporting, collating and assessing intelligence." However, India's covert services have hit back, saying they had provided detailed information on Pakistan's offensive plans 12 months before fighting broke out in Kargil.

Controversy over note

Much of the controversy revolves around a secret June 2, 1998 note, personally signed by the then-Intelligence Bureau Director, Shyamal Datta. Based on intelligence provided by the Intelligence Bureau's Leh station, Mr. Datta's note warned of the training of large numbers of Pakistani irregulars in the Kargil sector, who it said were being prepared for a renewed wave of infiltration after the May 1998 nuclear tests at Pokhran.

While such infiltration was unusual, the second part of Mr. Datta's warning was not. Increased Pakistani military activity, it recorded, had been noticed along the Line of Control in the Kargil sector, notably along posts code-named Chor, Hadi, Saddle, Reshma, Masjid, Dhalan and Langar. All these posts, it is now known, functioned as base camps to feed the intrusion which India was to detect only a year later.

Mr. Datta's unusual decision to personally sign the note indicated the seriousness with which he took this information. To put pressure for rapid action, the Intelligence Bureau bypassed the Research and Analysis Wing and Joint Intelligence Committee. Instead, Mr. Datta directly marked copies to the Prime Minister, Home Minister, Cabinet Secretary, Defence Secretary, and the Director-General of Military Intelligence.

Several warnings

Over the next several months, several other warnings were also issued. In July, Intelligence Bureau informants reported the deployment of M-11 missiles on the Deosai Plains and new mine-laying activities. RAW, for its part, reported that new Pakistani troops — the 164 Mortar Regiment, the 8 Northern Light Infantry and 69 Baloch Regiment — had been pumped into the area, and that numbers of troops were being given special training.

Even the military's own covert services made similar determinations. In June 1998, the Kargil Brigade Intelligence Team reported that supplies of ammunition were being dumped, and that terrorists had been seen in Skardu, Warcha and Marol, awaiting infiltration through the Kargil sector. Again, in August, the BIT and the Intelligence and Field Security Unit reported the presence of terrorists preparing to cross the LoC.

As late as November 1999, the Intelligence Bureau's Leh station issued warnings that Pakistan was "training Taliban who were undergoing military training as well as learning the Balti and Ladakhi language." These irregulars, the warning stated, were likely to be inducted into the Kargil sector during April 1999. While the Intelligence Bureau did not realise these `Taliban' were in fact Pakistani troops, its assessment was in general correct.

Far from preparing to meet the onslaught, the Srinagar-based 15 Corps is known to have actually withdrawn numbers of troops from the Kargil sector, ignoring warnings generated by commanders in Kargil that there were serious deficiencies in Indian defences. Military strategists misunderstood Pakistani activity to represent preparations for local peak-seizing operations which used to break out along the LoC every summer.

Sources told The Hindu that India's acquisition of bunker-busting missiles had led Pakistan's Force-Commander for the Northern Areas, Lt.Gen. Javed Hasan, to anticipate an attack on positions from where his forces could interdict traffic on the Srinagar-Kargil road. Gen. Hasan was thought to be readying to seize undefended heights on the Indian side of the LoC to in the event of a local Indian offensive.

If we had a CDS, Kargil war could have been less damaging: Rasgotra

New Delhi, April 27: If India had a Chief of Defence Staffs, the Kargil war could have been "shorter" and "less damaging", said former Foreign Secretary M K Rasgotra here today.

"If we had a CDS, even if one of the chiefs was out the war, the war would have had direction from the word go and the time that was taken in individual consultation, persuading the chiefs of staffs committee, persuading the individual chiefs, and what their role should be, that kind of delay would have been avoided. Probably, the war would have been shorter and less damaging than it actually was," said Rasgotra at the launch of the book "Kargil: From Surprise to Victory" by former Chief of Army Staff V P Malik.

"In a very short paragraph or two, Gen Malik makes a very succinct and a very powerful case for the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff", he said.

Rasgotra said he was referring to a paragraph in the book which reads: "The first thing I (General V P Malik) had to do was to explain the operational situation and its serious political and military implications to my colleagues in the COSC and get them on board to fight the war jointly. I was convinced that the Air Force must make its presence felt by using its power in Kargil." The next paragraph reads: "Admittedly the Army, Navy and Air Force were faced with their respective problems when it came to timely mobilization for war. But these problems could be overcome, if all three services planned, coordinated and implemented a joint military strategy and, more importantly, put across our points of view to the CCS in unison."

'Kargil changed the way Army thinks'
[ Friday, April 28, 2006 12:04:02 pmIANS ]

NEW DELHI: The 1999 Kargil war in Jammu and Kashmir, in which Pakistani intruders occupying the heights were evicted after a bitter battle, changed the way the Indian Army thinks, says the man who commanded the force at the time.

"The Kargil war and events thereafter have highlighted some new trends which have had a marked influence on the conduct of warfare and the structure of the armed forces," Gen. (retd) V.P. Malik writes in his just-released book "Kargil: From Surprise To Victory".

Some of these trends are being driven by technology, others by strategic considerations and concepts.

"The objectives are varied: to avoid escalation of violence, to minimise collateral damage, and to achieve success with minimum losses," Malik says.

This has had a threefold impact on strategies and tactics, the first of which is that the separation among the tactical, operational and strategic levels of warfare is getting blurred.

"While there was always some degree of overlap among these levels, due to the increasingly pervasive influence of IT on warfare, this overlap is increasing," Malik writes.

"Even a small military action along the LoC (Line of Control that divides Jammu and Kashmir between India and Pakistan), or a terrorist act in the hinterland, tends to become issues for consideration and decision making at the strategic level.

"It is a situation wherein a junior military officer is expected to understand political considerations and a political leader is expected to know the tactical and operational factors," Malik maintains.

Thus, fast flow of information, quick assessments and transparency at the three levels is essential as communication gaps can be fatal.

"To a considerable extent, all these aspects became evident during the Kargil war," Malik states.

Second, "there is need for more effective integrated command, control, communications and intelligence systems, apart from faster decision making at tactical, operational and strategic levels of command," he maintains.

Third, there is greater need for politico-military synergy.

"At the military level, the actual fighting during a war has to be conducted in a more integrated manner; hence the need for more integrated capabilities and 'jointness' to obtain optimum results," Malik states.

However, with nuclear weapons here to stay, the author feels, the possibility of an all-out high-intensity regular war will remain low.

"Even if a conventional war does break out, it is likely to be limited in time, scope and space. Such a war would have to be conducted within the framework of carefully calibrated political goals and military moves that permit adequate control over escalation and disengagement," Malik writes.

He says, "I am not one of those who believes that war makes the state and states exist only to make wars. No one in his or her right senses wants a war on their hands, least of all democracies like India and people like me who have studied, participated in and conducted wars.

"But the armed forces have to be prepared for all possible conflict contingencies so long as wars remain an instrument of state policy."

'Vajpayee ignored my warning on Kargil'

Press Trust of India

New Delhi, April 30, 2006


In remarks that are likely to reopen the debate on intelligence vis-a-vis the Kargil crisis, the then Army Chief says the possibility of a conventional conflict with regular Pakistani forces was consistently negated and that Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee also ignored his statement on the subject.



General VP Malik, who headed the force during the 1999 Kargil crisis, also brought in a new angle in his just-published book Kargil - from surprise to victory that China made a "demonstrative support" to Pakistan at the height of the conflict and that its forces almost sparked off a stand-off on the Sino-Indian border in Arunachal Pradesh.



He asserts that there were no intelligence reports to warn of the surprise Pakistani moves to infiltrate troops through wide gaps in defence.



"RAW (external intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing) which was responsible for keeping track of the movement of Pakistani military units and for the order of battle of the Pakistani army formations, showed no accretion in the force level of the Force Commander Northern Areas (FCNA) in the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir during a period preceding the intrusion," Malik says in the book.



Intelligence Bureau had remained focused on jihadi activities and its report had only implied that jihadi infiltration could take place in the Kashmir valley or Dras-Kargil sector, he says.



"Prior to the intrusion the FCNA had realigned the areas of responsibility of its brigades and moved the reserve battalion, usually based in Gilgit, to the LOC. RAW and military intelligence units in 3 infantry division did not notice these developments."



The intelligence reports may have indicated an enhanced level of artillery fire exchange in Kargil during the forthcoming summer, but the possibility of a conventional conflict with regular Pakistani forces was consistently "negated".



Malik says even after the intrusion had been detected, the Brigade commander did not realise the seriousness of the situation dismissing the intruders as handful of militants and tasked the units accordingly.



Even visual aerial surveillance and aerial reconnaissance had failed to pick up some telltale signs of the massive intrusion.



The book says even after the intrusion had come to light, it was sought to be painted as infiltration and occupation of heights by jihadi elements.



It was only after the Aviation Research Wing managing to photograph a Pakistani military helicopter flying over Indian territory in Kargil areas and interception of telephonic conversation between then Pakistani Army Chief Pervez Musharraf, at that time on a visit to Beijing, and his Chief of General Staff Mohd Aziz Khan had the contours of regular Pakistani troops involvement been brought home to Indian policy makers, it says.



"I questioned this assessment and pointed out that all the evidence available with the army indicated that the intrusion was by the Pakistani army.



"The Prime Minister did not pay much attention to my statement and only the Secretary of the National Security Council Satish Chandra pointing to RAW and IB chief whispered to me General Malik inki bhi to laaj rakhni hai (we have to save their honour too).



"I consider this remark unforgettable," Malik writes.



In future there could be other Kargils in the making, he says. The Pakistan army's nexus with radical Islamist and the Jammu and Kashmir militants has the potential to bring India and Pakistan to the brink of war again.



"Chinese had inducted one company in the area opposite Chantze, with the rest of the battalion waiting in the wings," Malik discloses in the book.



He says it was not only at Kameng, but the Chinese army enhanced its level of activity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh as well from where some of the forces had been thinned down to be redeployed in Kargil.



"This enhancement in PLA activities along the LAC coincided with the start of the conflict in Kargil" Malik says which at military level, indicated a demonstrative support to Pakistan.



Malik says this ran contrary to Beijing's assertions in recent years that it was pursuing an independent foreign policy and that its relations with Pakistan would not be at the cost of India.



The Chinese forces also made a show of force in Demchok, in eastern Ladakh, constructed a track from Spanggur to south end of Pangong lake and a track in Trigg heights.



He says India also received intelligence reports that PLA's Director in the Department of Armament had visited Islamabad during the conflict to help Pakistan army overcome its critical deficiencies in conventional armament, ammunition and equipment.



"Lack of road communication and vulnerability at Trigg heights did not give us a particularly comfortable military posture," Malik says adding, Indian forces had increased vigilance to match the PLA patrolling to make sure that operational situation on the Sino-Indian border was not permitted to escalate.

In the timeline the Chinese Embassy got bombed in Belgrade around May 6th. Was there a connection?

NATO Bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Bombi ... n_Belgrade

On May 7 1999 in Operation Allied Force, NATO bombs hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, killing three Chinese journalists and outraging Chinese public opinion. The United States and NATO later apologized for the bombing, saying that it occurred because of an outdated map provided by the CIA. This was challenged by a joint report from The Observer (UK) and Politiken (Denmark) newspapers [1], which claimed that NATO intentionally bombed the embassy because it was being used as a relay station for Yugoslav army radio signals. The bombing strained relations between China and NATO countries and provoked angry demonstrations outside Western embassies in Beijing.

I would like to know of the Kargil review team at Monterey Institute if any discussion came up about Chinese moves?
Also what troops were disengaged from Chinese front?

http://www.indianembassy.org/inews/June ... reign.html


External Affairs Minister visits China

June 16, 1999

The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh has said his visit to Beijing has led to better understanding between India and China on regional and global issues, including the security perceptions of the two countries. Speaking to newspersons in Beijing at the end of his two day visit, he said new initiatives are already on the anvil.

Mr. Singh, who met Chinese Premier, Mr. Zhu Rongji on the last day of his visit, emphasised enhancing trade and economic relations between the two countries saying that these have not been sufficiently tapped. Mr. Jaswant Singh, the first External Affairs Minister to visit China in eight years, described his visit as 'rewarding'. The talks were fruitful and a consensus has been reached on a number of matters concerning bilateral ties, he said.

As far as LTG Kishan Pal Singh Yadav is concerned, he is a brilliant tactician who commanded utmost respect from his men. A very humble man with a vision of falcon. LTG Kishan Pal was against sending so many troops to their death. His plan was to wait for few months when weather worsened unleash the Air Power, it would have given enough time to prepare troops for extreme cold weather fighting, with enough war reserves, extreme weather gear.

Once India-China relations deteriorated after the 1998 nuclear tests, the PLA adopted an offensive posture on the LAC. The PLA constructed a road approximately five km inside Indian territory in the Trig heights area. The Army reported about 120 incidents of PLA violation of the Trig heights area in 1999, 99 in 2000 and 98 in 2001. China also started claiming new pockets of dispute consequent to aggressive patrolling inside Indian territory, especially in the Western and Eastern sectors. For example, the PLA started patrolling on Pangong Tso Lake surface in the Western sector in 1998 and the next year it constructed a motorable gravel track from their post in Spanggur up to the southern bank of the lake and increased their activities in Rechin La and Siri Jap in the Western sector, none of which were recorded as disputed areas in 1995. The PLA at many places has moved up to its 1960 claim line in the Western sector. In the Eastern sector where Indian presence is strong, the PLA has repeatedly attempted to push its grazers mingled with soldiers into Indian territory. In a desperate attempt to seek better relations with China, New Delhi had sought to silence Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Mukut Mithi in October 2000 when he reported multiple intrusions in his State’s territory by the PLA. The 554 km-long Middle sector is the smallest of the three sectors and least contentious. Under the 1954 agreement on trade and intercourse both sides had agreed to six border passes in this sector which implicitly indicated an agreed border here. However, when talks for the Middle sector began in 1998 China made claims in four areas of Lapthal, Sangcha, Pulam Sumda and Kavriki in addition to the 1995 recorded areas of dispute in Barahoti.

China, in essence, has been trying to assert its claims and seek fresh bargains on the basis of de facto possession of pockets that are being grabbed through intrusions and aggressive patrolling, says Praveen Sawhney. This would ensure that the LAC is not delineated in its entirety in any hurry as that would result in stability on the LAC.

I should add that its not the Chief of Army sTaff's business to monitor what patrols are doing - .

But jagan when so many of these patrols went missing and almost every clue pointed towards hundreds of armed intruders invading indian territory it was about bloody time General Malik took notice ,yes ? not to mention the total lack of artillery and air power in the beginning of the campaign , which again came under the general's purview .

I have always wondered about why during Kargil we needed to send men straight up the steep hills to fight. We could have just waited for the snow to fall and bomb the base camps of the Paki intruders and hurt their supply lines. I am not knowledgable about such issues, though. Could you throw some more light (or point to some link) to the alternatives to our plan in Kargil? More info on LTG Kishan Pal Singh's plans?

Thanks.

s

Jagan - there was a period of 3 wks between missing patrols, reports of intruders by different sources and initial firefights between the Pakis and men of the Punjab regmt (forget which batt). There was more than enough information coming in to suggest that large areas of Indian territory had been ingressed. The fact that intrusions took place at the height and weather conditions of Kargil should have been more than enough to clue in a veteran general that this is more serious than the usual. It WAS Gen Malik's job to bring to the notice of the politicians that territorial integrity had been lost and serious action was needed. In that regard, he totally failed. Too much time passed before action was implemented. The buck stops with him!

when a war gets started, the CAS does not fight it. The C-in-Cs in the Op Commands are the people really responsible and should not need to have their hands held for reassurance but have their hands left fully free. The Chief should be doing only two things in war :-

(a) Chewing his fingernails through worry over whether or not his C-in-C underlings are on the ball, one step ahead of their opponents and working with a well-oiled basis of trust and confidence with their other-service colleagues in the theatre.
(b) Rattling about from place to place to stiffen the resolve and morale of the boys and girls in blue, particularly in those places where they took a beating.

I have always wondered about why during Kargil we needed to send men straight up the steep hills to fight. We could have just waited for the snow to fall and bomb the base camps of the Paki intruders and hurt their supply lines. I am not knowledgable about such issues, though. Could you throw some more light (or point to some link) to the alternatives to our plan in Kargil? More info on LTG Kishan Pal Singh's plans?

Thanks.

s

I think the thread is being distracted. The prinicpal reason for it is the revelation of the Chinese role. No one is expecting Malik to lead from the front. Can we get back to topic?
Jagan please.

Jagan Boss
If Malik was honorable why did he approached Mahendra Singh Tikait who was in cahouts with Maulana Yadav, then Defence Minister to become COAS, that after the fact, Army Board did not find him worthy of becoming COAS. Secondly, Why was LTG Kishan Pal Singh retired so quickly after Kargil. He was the commander who tooke over and won the war for India. His exit was very unceremonial. LTG KPS has deep disdain for these Dhotiwala, even though he will never say it out loud because he is Man Of Honor who still believes in the supermacy civilian authority. Another point, why did Bewda Vajpayee so quickly offered ceasefire to enemy against the advise of his Field Commander who explicitly told these Moron Politicians, that this is the time to destroy Paki H&D once for all. Nation was ready, we had the momentum in every possible way.

I have always wondered about why during Kargil we needed to send men straight up the steep hills to fight. We could have just waited for the snow to fall and bomb the base camps of the Paki intruders and hurt their supply lines.

Kargil is now a study subject at US utys. Eg.
link: http://www.stanford.edu/class/history5n/

aditya - don't mean to doubt you, but how does an IRBM perform a dog-leg manouevre?