Bharat Rakshak

Interesting. They reserve special hatred for Punjabi Hindus? Coming to think of it, it makes sense. How would they react to Punjabi Sikhs? i am not sure, but somehow think they would be nicer.

surinder

The task of isolating the Western Spur post was given to the Indian 8 Sikh Regiment (800 - 1000 men).

Manning the Western Spur post was Captain Karnal Sher Khan with 21 ORs (Other Ranks, men who are ordinary sepoys and do not hold any specific rank).

Under these circumstances some infantrymen from 8 Sikh also fired at the posts held by Sher and his men, and 'dared them to recite the Kalima, for it will be their final one'. Obviously, the Pakistanis and the Kashmiris did not get any sleep during this time.

As the 8 Sikh regiment began to retreat, Kernal Sher left his position and came out in the open. He started reciting the Kalima aloud. Picking up his machine gun he started charging towards the retreating forces.

"Cowards!" he said, "Where are you running off to? I will not let you run away like this."

"I am reciting the Kalima as you had dared me to." he shouted, "Where are you running off to? Stop and fight. Make this my last Kalima if you can". While saying this he was seen running after the retreating troops, firing at will, with little or no opposition except from the ongoing artillery shelling. 10 or 12 of Sher's men, who had taken up positions on the Western Spur, also opened havoc wreaking fire on the retreating troops to add to their woes.

Captain Karnal Sher followed the Indian troops until he reached the proximity of the 8 Sikh Regiment base camp.

While the 8 Sikh soldiers were taking their defensive positions, they were greeted with the sound of 'Allah O Akbar' followed by intense machine gun fire on those areas where any movement was taking place.

Anticipating a company sized attack, the CO was stunned to see one man, reciting the Kalima aloud, charging towards the center of the camp.

"Come out cowards!" Captain Sher shouted having reached the center, "I will show you how to fight a battle".

Angered by the dare inside their own camp, two Sikh soldiers tried to attack Sher. Their attack was of no avail; the captain, who had started firing in their direction the moment they tried to move, killed both.

Seeing that he no longer had any ammunition, the Indian soldiers, including their CO, came out in the open and showed Sher that he was indeed surrounded from all sides. They started moving closer and closer to him, tightening their circle around him.

"Look around yourself" he said to Sher, "There is nothing more that you can do".

Sher looked around. There were more than fifty men who had surrounded him and could shoot him at point blank range. Instead of giving up, he started reciting the Kalima aloud once again. Seeing that the closest to him was the CO, he charged him and pushed him back by hitting him on the head with his empty machine gun. Seeing that Sher was not surrendering, and was in fact going to attack him for the second time, the 8 Sikh regiment Commanding Officer told his men to open fire on the militant.

The 8 Sikh regiment soldiers opened fire on Captain Sher. Hit many times, he tried to attack the CO for the third time, but of no avail.

Sher had always believed in not dying at the enemy's feet. He was about five feet away from the CO, who could see the desperate attempt Sher was making in not to fall down. Finally, Sher sat down, with his knees bent and touching the ground, and his machine gun still in his hand. The Kalima that he had been reciting so far became lower and lower in volume until it finally stopped. Captain Karnal Sher Khan had died.

Some of the Sikh soldiers became ecstatic that they had indeed made the 'intruder' recite his final Kalima. Two of them ran to Sher Khan's body to kick it from a sitting position into a one where his head was touching the ground.

Seeing the intent of his men, the CO ordered them to stop. He told them that this was a brave man and his body should not be desecrated at any cost. He ordered that Sher's body be brought back to Srinagar rather than being left at Tiger Hill. Upon finding out that Sher was a Pakistani Captain, he made sure that Sher gets a proper military treatment from the Indians. It was he who wrote the citation of Captain Sher, recommending him for the highest gallantry award in Pakistan. The citation can be found at Captain Sher Khan's residence in Fajounabad Charbagh, Swabi.

The government of Pakistan awarded Captain Karnal Sher Khan with Nishan-e-Haider, the country's highest gallantry award.

Is it practically possible for someone on the ground level to really go up to the high command and suggest something so blunt? With the military,which is considered the epitome of discipline this would be heresy. It does not happen in govt. service and certainly would not be tolerated in IA.

I would disagree; I didn't feel their anger and disgust was fake. Can it be that IA top brass is not in touch with the feelings at the grass roots level? (May not be the most prevalent, but festering nonetheless)

Absolutely.. Wish our leaders could get rid of some self-delusional stuff themselves and stop being played for a fool by all & sundry. (Lest someone takes offence, I am refering to the political leadership here).

Does anyone else think that recommending the Paki Officer for a bravery award was also a way of exposing real Paki army’s involvement in the intrusion at that time?

surinder:

Here is an example of what the Pakis thought of Sikhs during Kargil:
.
This about a guy whose body was honorably returned by India to Pakistan and praised by IA for his bravery. The Pakis took a while before deciding to accept the body.

The Pakis are equal opportunity haters.

IMHO, recommending Paki soldiers for bravery awards by IA does not in any way enhance the average Paki's esteem for India, or lessen their hatred towards Kaffirs. It is an unnecessary morale-booster for the enemy.

Arjun Ray was not there during the Kargil War.

I would say he did some excellent work while he was there in so far as the local upliftment was concerned.

I would be honest in stating I know very little of the games played in Delhi and personally I did not have the inclination to know about these 'inside' hatchet jobs, if any.

Army's handling of the media is far from the desired.

I wanted to know if media handling and ops interefered with Unit or Brigade level routine of Kargil war? I remeber Col Lalit Ray was very enthu about giving interviews and also very good with pen.

Does anyone else think that recommending the Paki Officer for a bravery award was also a way of exposing real Paki army’s involvement in the intrusion at that time?

I would also go one step further. Even military leadership and the rank and file!

Rais are never great with the pen! Wink

After all, it DOES require a certain kind of steel to willingly go kill yourself in such a deliberate manner. To launch a suicidal attack in the heat of battle is what valor is about, but to go about your business for weeks, preparing for what is eventually certain death in such an cold and calculating manner requires a different kind of courage (if you can call it that).

Pradeep,

I will agree with most of what you have said however the belief that suicide bombing require courage is not true.
galantry award in every country.

http://news.ft.com/cms/s/570f0340-fe...00e2511c8.html


Jihad culture runs deep in Pakistan
By Farhan Bokhari
Published: July 27 2005 03:00 | Last updated: July 27 2005 03:00

"The most supreme jihad [holy war] is offering one's life for sacrifice - the reward for which is eternal life for a martyr."

This line comes neither from a firebrand Islamic preacher armed with anti-western vitriol, nor from a sermon in a predominantly Muslim country where the Taliban brand of Islam influences many.

Instead, it comes from a school textbook, used for teaching Pakistan studies (history, culture and politics) to 15-year-old children.

Fifty thousand copies of its latest edition, titled "Pakistan Studies for Class 10", were printed in April - more than three years after General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military ruler, turned his back on Afghanistan's Taliban regime and promised to root out militancy in his country.

Creating a Pakistan of distortions
Author: Amit Bhattacharya/ New Delhi
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: July 13, 2003

*
Quote:
Hindus worship in temples which are narrow and dark places, where they worship idols. Only one person can enter the temple at a time. In mosques, on the other hand, all Muslims can say their prayers together.

*The religion of the Hindus did not teach them good things - Hindus did not respect women.

*Hindus, who have been opportunists, co-operated with the English

These aren't the views of a blinkered mullah in an obscure madarsa. They are passages from Pakistan Government-approved social studies textbooks being taught to students of Class IV to VI in the Pak province of Punjab.

Such and other illuminating instances of how young minds in Pakistan are being fed on falsehoods and hatred, find mention in a recently released document, The Subtle Subversion - The State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan, prepared by the Islamabad-based Sustainable Development Policy Institute.

The document, part of an independent initiative for furthering a 'progressive, moderate and democratic Pakistan', highlights the extent to which public education is being used as a tool of national and social indoctrination for political ends. This, the study notes, 'has created deep social problems and encouraged the development of a more violent polity."

The trend of resorting to stereotypes, omissions of historical periods and falsehoods, says the study, found fillip during the dictatorship of Gen Zia-ul-Haq. In 1977, Gen Zia called a national education conference, the goals of which were "to redefine the aims of education... and bring education in line with Pakistani faith and ideology."

Under the new policy, Islamiat was made compulsory up to BA, as was the teaching of Arabic to students of all religions. Madarsa certificates were equivalent to university degrees. The measures literally thrust a narrow version of Islam down the throat of Pakistan's minorities. Islamisation was turned into an article of faith, as this line from a curriculum document shows: "The Ideology of Pakistan be presented as an accepted reality, and be never subjected to discussion or dispute."

One of the papers in the document argues that the hate material against Hindus was, in part, a result of promotion of the 'Ideology of Pakistan'. Interestingly, says the paper's author A H Nayyar, despite the bloody partition, school textbooks during Pakistan's first 25 years were relatively free of the current pathological hatred. For instance, "history books contained chapters on not only the Harappan civilisation, but also the mythologies of Ramayana and Mahabharata. The great kingdoms of the Mauryas and Guptas were extensively covered, often with admiration. One still found in school textbooks chapters on M K Gandhi, using words of respect for him and admiring his qualities. Some books mentioned that the most prominent religious leaders were all bitterly opposed to the creation of Pakistan."

Then came the 1970s and 'Indo-Pakistan History and Geography' was replaced with 'Pakistan Studies' and Pakistan defined as an Islamic state. The history of Pakistan became equivalent to the history of Muslims in the subcontinent. So much so that "the Quaid-i-Azam was turned into a pious, practicing Muslim."

In contrast, books like this 1956 edition of Tareek-e-Pakistan-o-Hind, were quite objective even with regard to Mohd bin Qasim, who brought Islam into the subcontinent.

The book says: "(Qasim) laid the foundation for Muslim rule in India. But the first brick of the foundation were defective... Had Qasim and the conquerors relied less on the sword to increase their numerical strength... we would have been spared the events because of which we are presently facing tribulations."

Compare that with this unprecedented piece of 'historical' narration from a current textbook of Pakistan Studies: "Pakistan came to be established for the first time when the Arabs under Mohd bin Qasim occupied Sindh and Multan in the early years of the eighth century and established Muslim rule in this part of the South- Asian subcontinent. Pakistan under the Arabs comprised the lower Indus Valley."

The textbook then proceeds to trace the development of 'Pakistan' during the Ghaznavids, Khiljis and the Mughals: "After the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, the process of the disintegration of Mughal rule set in, and weakened the Pakistan Spirit."

Analysing the use of history as an official imagining tool to conjure Pakistan, Ayesha Jalal is quoted thus: "When petty officials carry the brief of writing history as victory, the imaginings of power can discard the stray 'truths' of pure inspiration and pretend to monopolise the enterprise of creativity. A sort of amnesia descends."

The study, that looked into problems associated with four key areas taught to Classes I to XII - Social/Pakistan Studies, Urdu, English and Civics - also makes recommendations to undo the damage and bring education in line with the democratic aspirations and pluralistic reality of Pakistan.

But, is anyone listening? Textbook case of falsehoods

*Hindus very cunningly succeeded in making the British believe that the Muslims were solely responsible for the (1857) rebellion- Social Studies, Class VIII

*In order to appease Hindus and Congress, the British announced political reforms. Muslims were not eligible to vote. Hindu voters never voted for a Muslim- Social Studies, Class VIII

*Hindus lived in small, dark houses- Social Studies, Class VI

*There ought to come out (in essays) an angle of propagation of Islam and the ideology of Pakistan- Class Iv, V Urdu curricula

*While Muslims provided all types of help to those wishing to leave Pakistan, the people of India committed cruelties against the Muslims. They were murdered and looted- Civics of Pakistan, Intermediate classes

RayC, I believe you are confusing (our) hatred of the Paki Jihadis to mean all things across the border and all things muslim. To a civilian, the soldier who sneaks into your house in the middle of the night and kills your sleeping baby is no different from the fidayeen who blows himself up in the high street. Both are driven by a twisted (from our POV) ideology. That the soldier in the first instance was stopped at the border and died fighting ferociously does not make him valorous.

I have lived and worked very closely with Pakis for about twenty years as I've said before. I have hosted them in my house, given them food and shelter, allowed them to pray in the same room where our temple is located. I DO understand the unique nature of every human being in certain situations and you cannot tar an entire culture/country/people with the same brush. However, you CAN assume that when certain people from that same society take up arms against you, they then become the enemy and I would NEVER praise him for his so called bravery in killing me and mine.e

Just my humble opinion.

Why should we eat and relish tandoori chicken? They are, after all, Frontier food!

RayC:


I invite you to the Food and Wine thread where there is an article by Jiggs Kalra on the origins of Kebabs etc!

With all due regards, I would like to state that I differentiate between a terrorist and a soldier.

The Moslems are more wedded to their religion and indeed there are parts of their scripture which ensures that they are encouraged to act a little beyond the realms of humanity. Therefore, when I plan any action, I cater for such a psychological quirk. I wish you all could lay your hands on the Diary of the officer which was captured by 2 MAHAR (AFAI Remember). It is weird beyond comprehension. It was solely devoted to Allah as the guide and was to this officer a great motivator inspite of all the odds he was facing!

While I agree one should not go overboard over the enemy's valour, but one should not also downplay the same. One doesn't have to do that to the troops at all. They are watching what is occurring before their eyes. Can one say that what you are seeing is not what you are seeing? Yo can't fool the troops. Further, if you are watching Madri Gras, can you tell that it is a Bar Dance of Mumbai? Troops will talk after the event. It is better to appreciate the same in the correct perspective and educate them, than allow them to draw wrong lessons and glorify the event once they go home in the same manner as as the stuff about "wanting to cross the LC, but the fool govt got cold feet" or "should have gouged a few eyes like the Pakistanis, but then we wanted a clear policy so that we could CYA". You see, after the event, people become heroes and also a lot of fairy tales emerge (In the Line of Fire). It is always good to face the truth and explain it in the correct perspective so that it is not skewed beyond recognition once the memories fade.

I am not a Moslem and so I do not know if they can say so that they are not seeing what they are seeing in front of their eyes in case of Indian valour, but then we Indians cannot tell lies to our troops or to our conscience.

If that is a weakness. Then so it is!

I also assure you that the above notwithstanding, on the battlefield, a Pakistani is no friend of mine. I will ask for no quarter and neither will I give any. But I will not be a barbarian.

I apologies to you all on behalf of all likeminded soldiers and officers and on my behalf. Sorry, we are such a let down to blood thirsty segment of the Indian population.

I am sure you would have done a better job of it than us and then maybe Paksitan would never attack us.

JC

Telegraph wants to interview me tomorrow.

Any advice?

But as far as your post is concerned may I use your side agrument?

"Cowards!" he said, "Where are you running off to? I will not let you run away like this.

For the most part, the battle-field is lonely and silent with bursts of action in between.

In any case, it is only in the lull that any negotiation of surrender can take place.

when he can take a few of the enemy with him in a last desparate stand?

It is rather obvious that the word "additional" does not refer to a comparison between worst case expectations and reality. It has to do with a comparison between two possible realities - one where the enemy fights to the end, and the other where he surrenders even though he has the ability to cause further casualties. It is irrelevant what casualties you are prepared to accept - in one case you have lost more men than in the other. Academic posturing as in "Oh, but we expected to lose so many men anyway" is completely irrelevant. I

Actually, that has already been done both by the Brig. and by Johann.

RayC,
Far be it for us to give you talking points but these should be emphaized:
It was a covert intrusion by regular troops not withstanding the fiction in Zhut Namah(copy right R Singh) by Mushy.
It was a retreat for all practical purposes.

Quote:
Actually, that has already been done both by the Brig. and by Johann.


Ok, I will ask again because they have'nt been exactly clear.

RayC, is there a confirmed or at least, significantly desirable tactical advantage to this? (Consider all factors including the jihadi psyche of the pukes) Yes or No?

The above is going off somewhere else. What I said was so very simple - You are prepared for the worst case scenario already - To minimise or have no casualties under that situation - Therefore, an easier situation is irrelevant even if desirable in terms of resource expenditure.

The general and his Kargil

Khaled Ahmed

Rahul Singh
New Delhi, October 6, 2006

For seven years, Indians believed that the 1999 Kargil conflict was won, at least partially because of the excellent teamwork between the Army and the Air Force. But Air Chief Marshal (retired) AY Tipnis, who was the air chief then, has a different story to tell.

Breaking his silence for the first time, in an interview to be published shortly in the magazine FORCE, Tipnis has made some damning comments on the army's handling of the conflict. He has claimed there was utter lack of co-ordination between the Army and the Air Force, and expressed "strong sympathy" for the Army, which had not properly assessed the intentions of the enemy.

Tipnis has also said that the Army did not tell the Ministry of Defence about the Pakistani intrusions until very late, "possibly because it was embarrassed to have allowed the present situation to develop".

Tipnis said, "I observed the ground situation was grave. The Army needed IAF help to evict the intruders. But it was not amenable to the air headquarters' position to seek government approval for use of air power offensively as the Army was reluctant to reveal the gravity of the situation to the MoD."

He has also criticised the Army for not communicating intelligence to air headquarters. "There had been no call for a joint briefing, leave alone joint planning. The Army just made repeated requests for helicopter fire support," said Tipnis, who had been against deploying helicopters, believing they would be too vulnerable.

He said the then army chief General VP Malik "appeared to get agitated on my reluctance to use helicopters". In fact, if Tipnis is to be believed, a livid Malik stormed out of a meeting of the three service chiefs on May 24 saying, "If that is the way you want it, I will go it alone."

Tipnis had explained to Malik that helicopters would not be able to mask their approach while heading for enemy locations on the LoC ridge line and would be picked up by the enemy. Tipnis recalled Malik's response: "Do you think in my 40 years of service, I have learnt nothing about helicopter operations?"

Malik, who is currently in Goa, refused to comment on Tipnis's version of Operation Safed Sagar, the code name for the IAF's role in Operation Vijay.

Tipnis claimed too that in the second week of May 1999 the Air Force had had repeatedly offered to help the Army, "but they said they could handle the situation".

He also mocked the army's decision to use "egg-shell-strong" Cheetah choppers in offensive action against hostile fire, saying it like presenting a chicken for an animal sacrifice ritual.

He said the Army was upset that Air Officer Commanding (AOC) J&K had not accepted Northern Command's fire-support demand. The truth was that the AOC did not have the authority to do so and Tipnis was "not successful in persuading the Army to accept the essentially of government clearance for air support".

Tipnis is expected to reveal much more in a book he is currently working on, tentatively titled 'Up and Away into the Blue Yonder'.

After getting the go-ahead from the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security), the IAF launched its offensive with MiG-21s and Mi-17s on May 26 - more than two weeks after IAF vice-chief Air Marshal `Ben' Brar had asked army vice-chief Lieutenant General Chandrashekhar whether all was well. Tipnis claimed that Chandrashekhar indicated that the Army could handle the situation. The IAF lost a MiG-21, a MiG-27 and a Mi-17 during Operation Safed Sagar.

From ANI

Islamabad, Oct.9 (ANI): The Pakistan Army brass, including Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf, saw the frequent visits of Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes to the Siachen Glacier and Kargil as part of preparations by the Indian Army to launch an offensive on Pakistani positions




In his book - "In the Line of Fire", Musharraf says those visits prompted General Headquarters (Rawalpindi) to start plugging gaps ranging from nine to twenty-eight miles along the Line of Control, a plan that was given formal clearance and approval in January 1999, just months before the Kargil War.

Musharraf says that when the Indian brought four divisions and the artillery of their strike corps into the area, he ordered the Force Command Northern Areas (FNCA) to shore up defensive positions in "coordination with the freedom fighters to deny access to the watershed by India".

This statement in the book suggests that for all practical purposes, the so-called freedom fighters could have been Pakistan infantry soldiers.

This view is further substantiated by Musharraf's statement that "Our field commanders were fully enagaged in supporting them in the face of the growing momentum of the Indian operations. We wanted to dominate the areas held by the freedom fighters (800 square kilometres) in Mushko, Dras and Kaksar."

He further goes on to say that the Indian build-up continued during the entire month of May, and the evaluations that followed, made the Pakistan Army brass realize that "India had created a serious strategic imbalance in its system of forces. It had bottled up major formations inside Kashmir, leaving itself no capability to attack us elsewhere, and most seriously, had left the field open for a counter-offensive with which we could choke the Kashmir Valley."

Musharraf says in his book that the Kargil conflict should be seen as a "tactical manouevre of limited dimensions, but with significant strategic effects.

He emphatically beleives that Kargil brought about a " near parity of forces both in the air and on the ground along the international border, and ruled out the possibility of India deciding on an all-out war."

"I would like to state emphatically that whatever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding a solution to Kashmir is due considerably to the Kargil conflict," says Musharraf in his book. (ANI)

Copyright ANI

Ajai Shukla

October 10, 2006
The inglorious build-up to the 1999 Kargil war is back in the headlines. In a literary version of the seven-year itch, the opposing army chiefs who directed that war, Generals Pervez Musharraf and V P Malik, have in quick succession produced autobiographies that unsurprisingly recount very different versions of the conflict.

What is noteworthy, though, is last week's sharp rebuttal of General Malik's account by Air Chief Marshal Anil Tipnis, who led the Indian Air Force during that period. General Malik's book insinuated that the air chief was reluctant to support army operations at high altitudes. Now Tipnis has hit back with the charge that the army chief had lost his nerve and was hiding the gravity of the Pakistani intrusions from the government.

This would be a mere historical aside were friction between the armed services the exception rather than the rule. But the unseemly squabble between the Kargil chiefs is only the visible tip of a nasty iceberg. Sadly, the army, air force and navy find themselves in an increasingly unhealthy fratricidal competition for attention, roles and resources.

The government has never appointed a Chief of Defence Staff, the senior-most military officer who can co-ordinate the requirements of the three services, and the ministry of defence has neither the technical expertise nor the inclination. Many senior generals believe that this is a divide-and-rule strategy to keep the military weak and under civilian control.

Whether or not the conspiracy theorists are right, and whatever the fallout on inter-service camaraderie, the financial outcome is that India's vast defence budget -- Rs 89,000 crore this year -- is spent in a planning vacuum, distributed between the three services in a historically constant ratio. Mature democracies with experience of security planning, also called strategic cultures, plan top-down in order to get "more bang for the buck".

National aims and political objectives, formulated by a country's political leadership, are translated into a defence policy by the MoD. This becomes the military's bible; an integrated headquarters under the CDS, with real control over planning and financial resources, translates the MoD's directive into actual operational plans. To implement these plans, the integrated headquarters allocates responsibility and finances to the army, navy and air force.

How would this tried and tested system work in an Indian context? First, a body like the National Security Council would make the big (and difficult) strategic decisions: for example, should India retain the capability to beat Pakistan quickly in a conventional war? Or, with Pakistan's nuclear capability making full-fledged war unlikely, should India concentrate on combating insurgency and terrorism? If the NSC chose the latter, it could throw in a caveat: retain the ability to strike terrorist camps in the border vicinity. India's nuclear deterrent would also need careful and regular review at this top level.

Why must these priorities be spelt out clearly? Because India simply cannot afford to cater to every possible military eventuality. No developing country can pay for both the mind-numbingly expensive tanks, air defence systems and logistics needed to support deep thrusts into Pakistan, and for building real capability against cross-border terrorism: surveillance and intelligence systems, special forces, and high-tech personal equipment and communications.

Armed with clear priorities, the military would then do its planning. Assuming the government chose to focus on low-intensity conflict (insurgency and terrorism), the CDS would spell out the capabilities needed. He would lay down specific military issues, such as surveillance levels, firepower, and what forces are needed to physically take out a terrorist camp. Inter-service co-ordination is crucial to deciding who is allotted what task. A terrorist camp can be struck with the army's long-range artillery, or with air force ground attack aircraft, or with Special Forces infiltrated across the LoC. Since these capabilities come from different services (Special Forces could someday be an independent service) a CDS would decide who does what.

Instead, today, we retain all options -- nuclear war, conventional war and insurgency/terrorism -- without building conclusive capability in any. The political leadership refuses to provide a clear direction because tough decisions are politically vulnerable; it's much easier to look away. The army, navy and air force, instead of planning cohesively to build a finite set of capabilities, stock expensive arsenals that make each feel good, but that overlap functionally. Glossy brochures from arms companies are key drivers of weapons procurement in each of the three service headquarters, fuelling grandiose visions of "blue-water" or "strategic" capabilities.

But rather than appoint a CDS who could optimise the contribution of all three services from a single headquarters, government after government has chosen to fuel the fratricide.

Historically, inter-service rivalry has always hindered military efficacy. In the Pacific campaign in World War II, the friction between the US Navy, Marines and the Air Force almost brought the campaign to a halt. India cannot afford such a lack of strategic direction: higher decision-making and military planning between the services urgently needs to be harmonised.

BEYOND THE LINE OF FIRE
By telling lies about Kargil, Pervez Musharraf has sowed the seeds of distrust in the minds of his own people, writes Jyoti Malhotra


Feeding half-truths
A few weeks ago, President Pervez Musharraf was being seen as having pulled off another coup under the nose of the toughest Indian hawks when he got Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to agree to a mechanism on counter-terrorism. As New Delhi struggled to explain how and why the Agra summit of five years ago had culminated in the successful agreement in Havana, lo and behold, the general had committed a self-goal. In the course of the scores of talk shows, interviews and press conferences that he subsequently gave to the Western media in America, the Cuba declaration lost potency by the minute.

Instead, Musharraf’s book, In the Line of Fire, and additionally, his visibly recalcitrant mood at the meeting with George W. Bush and Hamid Karzai, shifted international focus once again to the competitive politics of the war against terror on both sides of the Durand Line. Once again, American TV networks are beginning to cry themselves hoarse about which leader is paying lip service and who is fighting the war — body, mind and soul.

In India, though, the Musharraf book is being perceived as a pack of lies. General Ved Malik, the Indian army chief during the Kargil war, has said as much. Other armymen and politicians have wondered why Musharraf has felt the need to concoct so many semi-truths about Kargil. Especially, when one thought that Musharraf was smart enough to either side-step the matter, or, if he truly wished to come to grips with the India-Pakistan problem, to come clear and tell the truth about Kargil.

The book, instead, has once again tried to draw wool over the eyes of Musharraf’s Pakistani readership. The general has tried to come across as a blue-blooded hero, one who either conceived or approved of the Kargil stratagem that would put pressure on India to seriously talk Kashmir. The failure is all Nawaz Sharif’s, of course. First, Sharif was told about the invasion plans and he never did a thing, and secondly, he sold the country for thirty pieces of silver on July 4, to the Americans.

The truth is, Pakistan lost the Kargil war not only because its invasion of Indian territory was a blatant act of treachery — considering that both sides were aglow in the aftermath of the bus ride from Amritsar to Lahore — or because the Indian army was that much better, or because the United States of America intervened and roundly told off the Pakistanis to get back. Pakistan lost the Kargil conflict for all the above reasons in July 1999. However, the fact remains that Pakistan — and General Musharraf has played a big role in this — has refused to come to terms with the defeat at Kargil. And so the Pakistani army will continue to lie and cheat and dissemble, only so that it can continue to tell its own people the semi-untruth.

That, then, is the real value of In the Line of Fire. A large part of the book is inspired prose, but there are large parts too that are economical with the truth. The Kargil war — who lost, who won, how only 5,000 Pakistani soldiers took part in the war, since most of those who fought were Kashmiris waging an armed struggle against the Indian state — is one episode. Another is about India’s copying the Pakistani nuclear programme. Yet another part is about a comment that Richard Armitage, the then US deputy secretary of state denies ever having made, about bombing Pakistan back into the Stone Age if it refused to help in the war against terror.

The Stone Age comment can be contested one way or another. As for the Indian nuclear programme, maybe Musharraf was just being loyal to A.Q. Khan. But denying Kargil? Denying the deaths of Pakistani soldiers at Kargil? Musharraf may be sowing the seeds of permanent distrust of the Pakistani army in the minds of the Pakistani people. Remember, Musharraf has refused to take off his uniform even in the 2007 elections. In time, the people’s distrust of its own army may become so strong that they may demand systemic reform, or that the army has to be subject to the political class.

The tragedy is that Musharraf need not have lied about Kargil. Too much is in the public domain, too many people know what really happened. Television ensured that it became India’s first living-room war. Not telling the whole truth to his own people either betrays a fear of the system or a fear that he may be asked to be counted by his people — and that he may fall short.

Like it or not, Musharraf is a real hero for most of Pakistan. This is not only because he commands real power, but also because he is seen as having tried to reform his country, to cleanse it of the overweening influence of the mullahs, to roll back the creeping religious hold on everyday life.

However, India need not be frothing at the mouth over Musharraf’s Kargil lies. The Pakistani general’s inability to deal with the full truth at Kargil can be a source of strength for India. New Delhi can rest assured that if a leader cannot tell his own country the truth about a major event in the nation’s life, then he has lost touch with his people.

For the first time in years, Musharraf seems human. Even when the summit with Atal Bihari Vajpayee fell apart at Agra in July 2001, the visiting Pakistanis seemed to have been somewhat wronged by a concatenation of circumstances that included out-of-turn speeches by spokespersons of the Bharatiya Janata Party. New Delhi was on the backfoot in Agra as India refused to have a dialogue with the offending party about its offences.

In Cuba, too, Manmohan Singh seemed to have been under some political flak for the counter-terrorism mechanism, especially since the prime minister was hard put to respond to the general’s insistence that the mechanism be led by the intelligence chiefs of both sides. Musharraf even offered that the director-general, Inter-Services Intelligence, lead the Pakistani side. But the prime minister demurred, saying things needed to be discussed first.

All of the above was forgotten as soon as Musharraf left Cuba and flew to the US to launch his book. Lights, camera, action! The sequence of events was worth any Clint Eastwood movie. In fact, it seems that Eastwood, long ago, had actually made one with a similar name.