Bharat Rakshak

RayC,

The issue of pulling troops off the CI grid is probably a key Pakistani motive for the Kargil operation. Most Pakistani accounts or explanations stress that the attack was intended to aid the forces inside Kashmir, but aren't necessarily clear on how that would occur.

I strongly suspect that's shorthand for pulling troops out of the CI grid, which would give LeT/HuM/Hizb and company some breathing space - a tacit admission that things weren't going well.

Tim

does anyone know if there was a hike in terrorist incidents in the valley after the troops were pulled out of CI duties?

from memory, I don't recall many incidents

surely, the jehadis would have been ideally positioned to bite the IA logistics at the time? So Kargil was just a feint to let these guys off the hook for a while?

another thing, with increased pressure on NH1A, did Mushy seriously think that we would abandon Siachen and Ladakh? Isn't that a wish too far?

It is still not clear to me what Mushy's strategic objective was... but then I'm not tactically brilliant

Daulat,

From this link

SATP Data Sheet

there was a spurt hike in total incidence of violence, number of security forces and civilians killed after Kargil and a sharper increase in the number of terrorists killed.

While the longer term average of civilians and security forces killed since 1999 shows only a gradual increase, the corresponding average of terrorists killed is much higher. Good going, Musharraf.

So even with a Div. pulled off the CI grid post Kargil, it appears that the good guys are making do with less quite well.

Tim's contention is plausible.

The plan to dominate the NH1A by an incursion was possibly to ease off the high density deployment in the Kashmir Valley so as to allow the terrorists some manoeuvre space. But the main strategic coup that they wanted to pull off was to choke off Ladhak. It would have done well immensely for bargaining on Siachen. It must be remembered that apart from all the reasons that are trotted out for the holding of Siachen by India, one of the factor that is often lost out, is the fact that by holding Siachen, India has turned Pakistan's flank.

In so far as the terrain in Kargil and Ladhak is concerned, the terrain being what it is, it is immensely difficult, though not impossible, to oust any force which occupies a height. J&K is replete with such examples.

Maybe Pakistan gambled on this military fact.

However, the fury of the Indian reaction as also the fact that Pakistan could not sustain the infiltrated troops with the logistic support necessary to "entrench" itself was the cardinal reason for their failure to capitalise on the incursion.

It is not feasible to sustain an infiltrated force through porter columns solely along rugged and jagged mountain spines which has no tracks, in a contested combat environment. It is feasible only during peacetime. To sustain such infilitration, it is essential to have lines of communication (roads and tracks, that is) opened and secure.

Ray sahab,

In an earlier post on "bayonet strength", you had said that new equipment, while necessary, cannot be inducted without corresponding increase in manpower.

Were you referring to the IA? If so, what equipment were you talking about?

Thanks again.

Ray Sahib:

What does it mean to "turned Pakistan's flank"?

Thanks.
-s

Turn the flanks means look the other side too.

Earlier they were facing towards the South. Now they are facing both the South and the East and hence more vulnerable. Being more vulnerable, it means commiting more troops and equipment by having to pull out from elsewhere and thereby making such areas less secure and so on and so forth.

Anoop,

What all weapons has the infantry acquired in addition to the weapons they had to fight a classical battle? When looking at weapons system include the weight of the ammunition to be carried for an effective employment of that weapon in one fight.

Consider the weight that the trooper has to carry. Unlike the US Army, we are foot bound. Our terrain and combat environments are varied.

with NH1A choked and the valley in ferment, maybe Mushy thought that this was the strong blow that would make the yindoos crumble once and for all

were casualties from the shelling on NH1A ever released? Or was it just the effect of preventing any movement that was critical

RayC, I believe you once said that the PA side of the Neelam has good road access, are they not vulnerable in the same way to our arty?

On Siachen, i appreciate that the flank has been turned, but no one surely is in a realistic position to exploit that flank, are they?

Arty only deters. It cannot stop movement totally.

The terrain is difficult in the Siachen, but the possibility cannot be ruled out.

Does anybody know why we did took hardly any POWs in the Kargil fighting? When the occupied positions were recaptured, you would think that there would be some wounded or surrendering Pak soldiers there, no? This has mystified me since '99.

There were seven or nine Pakistani Troops taken POW. Mostly these guys were badly wounded soldiers apart from a couple of them. They were repatriated around Aug 14 , 99. The Kargil CD on BR (by Kunal Verma) has interviews with all of them.

H Sen - a few thoughts

1. those amongst the NLI who could walk, walked
2. those that could not, died of the environment, casevac is not easy up there
3. memory of saurabh kalia and platoon was fresh

a while back i refered on this thread to a book i found in a book shop (didn't buy) which another forumite had read, in it a western traveller encounters a young IA officer who has just come down from fighting in kargil - he talks of bitter hand to hand fighting with no quarter given

I highly recommend this VCD (and, in fact, all the VCDs available at BRF Store).