Bharat Rakshak

If india moves in, it will avoid all pop centers
like towns or large villages unless directed from
HQ/delhi to do so for political reasons.

In india-pak a lot of towns do Not have "bypass"
roads and the main road goes right through the
congested interior. Ways have to be found using
subsidiary roads in the ourskirts or preferably
out of tank/RPG range beyond the town limits.

They know it too and will try to use their indep
brigades, mujahids anything they can get hold of
to choke these lines of logistics.

in the raw desert ofcourse its possible to move
cross-country, may not be possible in farmland
for trucks. armour/IAF in these cases have to
"root out" these choke points to let the logistics
flow.

Pak armour in urban areas lose their effectiveness
and mobility and can easily be smashed with carpet
artillery. so they can be located in open country.

They will be using SSG/paras from helos and
sleepers already infiltrated to hit at high value
rear areas like arms dumps and fuel convoys. even
one RPG or grenade can cause quite some damage.

If this is what we think it is, then the Pakistanis can spot it much before we can. I am guessing that the 12th Corps boys are in the Sukkur area and the 11th Corps boys are somewhere in the Punjab area. The 2 Corps chaps will be sitting near RYK and the 1 Corps will be sitting in the bulge.

On April 21, 2002 VCOAS Mohd. Yusuf made a vist to an armoured formation in the thar desert. He was accompanied by Lt. Gen. Tariq Waseem Ghazi (corps commander V Corps, PA 10962 AFWC, FSC (C), Baloch ). The formation had Al-Khalids. He also visited an infantry division under Maj. Gen. Tariq Saleem Malik (GOC-18 HQed peacetime at Hyderabad). These Al-Khalids that they keep talking about are the most likely the PA's `Third Armored Div' which is sitting in this area.

raj singh,

> Am I right in inferring from the above that not only US has consented but also has played role in the deployment of Indian forces at the border?

I am guessing and am not absolutely certain but it certainly seems like that.

Vikram IIRC, Your BRM article was about shallow thrusts and attrition theory.

Would the business of deep thrust (especially if the area may have to be vacated under international pressure) be a contradiction?

Also what do you think about the theory that the strike corps are only used to bring the Pakis to deployment concentration which can be fed to IAF?

Also considering that even in 1971 some economic targets were hit, so why not a pure Air Kosvo like campaign with low intensity?

I am saying low intensity so that IAF can maintain adequate resources for defensive purposes while having limited sorties to hit juicy economic and infrastructure targets.

Do you think that IAF will desist from hitting infrastructure targets under the threat of Pakistan going nuclear (their indirect threat seems to be that they will go nuclear if Indian soldiers **** too hard in their direction).

I may be wrong but your BRM article seemed to indicate that infrastructure targets may not be hit, now if pure military attrition is attempted using shallow thrusts against a enemy in defensive position then there may be a situation of horrendous losses for the attackers. (also Pakistan does seem to value the lives of its soldiers quite low)

I suppose the least loss of life method will be to try and replicate to whatever extend possible the Kosvo type campaign against Pakistan.

Are you thinking of a pincer movement to isolate and encircle V Corps, or are you thinking of a more geographical objective?

Unpublished Indian Official History of the 1971 War - Chapter 9: The Punjab and Rajasthan Front

pages 398-402 (51-55 in the .pdf document) cover 11 Infantry Division's advance to Naya Chor, about 50km beyond the IB, and slightly less than half way to Mirpur Khas.

The implication is that the indian offensive was largely confined to the tracks and paths for more than purely navigational reasons which would be solved today by GPS. This is an advantage to the defence, because the potential axes of advance become fairly clear.

so two factors - can the demands of two corps actually be met both before *and* along potential axes of advance after they cross the IB? Laying fuel and water lines up to jump of points will simplify things - I'm sure Ravi can give a good idea of the average consumption in hundreds of tons/day for the strike and holding corps. The more axes of advance, the more complicated logistics become. Sustaining intense combat or high rates of advance will not be possible unless the logistics can keep up with them. If the answer is no then of course the IA would find it more effective to use a single corps in an advance

The other factor will be tactical surprise/ deception. Strategically it will be impossible to hide the buildup - though intentions cant always be judged from roadwatch and satellite photos. The Pakistanis have done a good job of integrating their ranger and mujahid battalions into defensive operations. The artillery division and STA batteries will improve standoff detection and firepower, but unless the Indians have a decisive night operations advantage the Pakistanis will simply throw enough people into the meatgrinder to bog things down until the inevitable cease fire. Now if the IAF is capable and willing to allocate sufficient interdiction sorties the balance shifts again.

In other words the shorter the time frame of the conflict, the harder it will be to acheive a decisive victory along a Barmer-Mirpir Khas advance. The soil and balance of power doesnt seem condusive to the kind of rates of advance anything like Operation Desert Storm

Raj, that's exactly why I said that an exercise in Barmer may indicate a major shift in doctrine - we would be going from a doctrine of no pauses/shallow penetration, to a doctrine of deep thrust.

Added later

But I should also add that the theme of my previous article was that India would mount a land campaign in such a way as to give Pak minimum chances to use their nukes. The change in doctrine seems to me to be consistent with that overall aim.

BTW does all this terminology of deep thrusts and shallow penetrations sound too, ahem, explicit for young impressionable minds?

I think this is a valid point - the IA strike corps may be used to draw the PA strike corps out, and then their warfighting ability would be destroyed through a combination of IAF strikes and long range arty fires.

Re infrastructure targets, do you mean refineries, power plants and so on; or do you mean logistics centers like railway junctions and expressways? Or both? IAF has indicated (During Ex Brahmastra) that it wants to wage a stretigic campaign before the IA corps are allowed to slip off their leashes, and infrastructure/economic targets are likely to be in their list. I am not sure how this plays into the nuclear use loop - anyone else want to take a shot?

Added later

Kosovo type of campaigns can't work with Pakistan - once the first IAF strike sortie crosses IB, it's total war. If we don't go for it, they will. So it would be only wise to plan with all escalatory contingencies in mind.

Johann
Again, let me nuance. Threatening Mirpur Khas may be as effective as taking it, if the aim of the attack is to frighten. A callibrated attack in this area gives them time to think without panicing; shows deadly seriousness without murderous intent; inflicts grievous harm without permanent crippling. All previous Indo-Pak wars have ended without any decisive final solution- this was not unintended. A pulled punch is entirely consistent with the Indian way of fighting. This is not satisfying to a lot of people, but we are this way only.

<B>Could someone please answer these.</B>

How many guns are there in an arti division?
How many tanks are there in a tank regiment ?
What does an armoured division or brigade consist of?
How would you define a strike corps?(I mean what differentiates it from normal corps in terms of weapons)

Water and food form a major part of logistics.
For a back of the hand effort , One can say each soldier has 5 litres of water , 2 nutritional meals and a light breakfast.
Of course at the front one does not have time for that.Water with sugar ,vitamins form an important part.A glass of water with Glucon-D is energetic and quick to consume.Along with strike corps a team of Disease Vaccination and food treatment must move .They can help in using food available in conquered land that can be used.

Will the TES or any of the IRS series of satellites be part of Parakram-II? Doesn't make sense having strategic assets in the sky and leaving them out of a major exercise like this. Haven't heard/read anything about this particular aspect in any media reports so far.

Actually i meant both type of targets.

I referred to the Air Kosvo campaign not to say that any IAF action can be caliberted to prevent full war but to say that can the whole campaign be structured in a way to minimise ground action and reduce man power losses (also reduce risk of nuke scenario jangling on the nerves of international players).

i.e. to say practically the whole war is fought by IAF and if Pak goes in for its riposte doctrine it only gives an excuse to IAF to intensify the air action. the ground forces simply remain in defensive positions.

(??)

don't know..

50 tanks.. 40 regular and 10 reserves.

It consists of tanks,APCc, anti air units and support units.

Strike corps has offensive weapons (tanks, helicopters) while holding corps has defensive weapons to stop the invading army.

Each Regiment is a self contained unit. (i.e they have their own means/way to support themselves once provided for x number of days in ammunition, food, water, etc.)

Each soldier gets a ration from his regiment.

Indian Soldiers do not plunder the conquered territory., it is against the geneva rules and basic Indian ethics.

Random thoughts...
The Italian scholars report (Landau Network) indicated that the SPD thought that a destruction of their warmaking assets would be a redline. Even Ahrari in his Asia Times article thought that the TSP doctrine was First Use (FU) if the Intl boundary was crossed.
So maybe PK-II is to carry on without triggering redlines as Vikram is alluding to? If this true then it would severely challenge the TSP nation state for the Sindhis would be quite upset that they are considered dispensable.
Has anyone tied in the news that the Strategic Forces Command has been setup and the Lok Sabha notified? What bearing does that have on PK-II?
-----------
And also of living of the land as suggested in addition to Sandeep's points, those supplies could be compromised. So no one relies on hoping to get/commandeer suplies. The days of pilaging bands is over with the Mongols.

If a redline is triggered, where does the mushroom come up? over the advancing column, or over a city?

if I were hungry and no food in sight, I would
plunder warehouses and shops and eat what I found.
sheep, goats and fowl would be game too.

the local mukhia or feudal lord needs to taste
the grub first ofcourse

Sometimes man doesnt live by food alone (even in war), for further deatils see/rent 'Two Women" *ing Sophia Loren (won Oscar for best foreign film directed by Vittorio De sica)

Gd lets get serious now. Rummaging countryside takes away time from job at hand besides the Indian version of MLRE sounds quite tempting. Read the Saink Samachar April 2002 issues.
Crossing the redline.
The TSP has intimated its US interlocutors(Cohen especially) that it would go after an advancing column in its own territory. Such experts pontificate that its a use in self defence.

The Indian response has been that they would consider the NFU breached and would respond massively. The counter is what about wind pattern and fallout etc. That is why all thos chotus were tested.

Lets take the TSP stated position. From PV and PK-II we know that the columns move on abroad and deep front. So a single strike on any of them would be a brutus fulmen(useless thunderbolt) and would serve to make the IA very angry and give them a chance to repeat Sherman's march.
So I think while talking about strikes on columns they would go for counter value targets.(Ghulam Ishaque Khan- GIK told Robert Gates in 1990 about this delusion and was warned that TSP would be finished in any wargame scenario in US). Where is anybody's guess- Rajasthan or Punjab and Delhi. This is where it stops when I last thought about it.

There is a old RAND study that thought that India might still carry on conventionally and raze the TSP. It would conduct a TN test. But that was before the 98 tests.
-

Also check the armoured regiment structure..

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Structure-Armd.html

TOI: India begins war games on Pak border
Note its an AFP report so will be on yahoo et al.

JODHPUR: India on Thursday began military exercises with thousands of combat troops near the border with Pakistan.

An Army spokesman said that the Army would conduct the exercises with support from the Air Force in the Thar Desert, but would remain 90-150 km from the Pakistan border.

"The war games should end on May 15 and will test some of the Army units which have been deployed along the border with Pakistan since December last year," said the spokesman.

Tensions between the two South Asian states, which have fought three wars since independence in 1947, were sent spiralling on December 13, when Islamic militants allegedly linked to Pakistan attacked the Indian parliament, leaving 14 people dead.

Since then, both India and Pakistan have deployed nearly one million troops along their shared border.

Indian defence ministry sources confirmed New Delhi had given advance notice to Islamabad about the war games.

"These military exercises normally take place at this time of the year in Rajasthan. We inform them routinely as we conduct these operations," said the defence source.

Under a 1991 agreement between the two countries, each side is required to give advance notice to the other of all exercises within a distance of 75 km from the border.

A previous exercise in Rajasthan in 1987, codenamed 'Operation Brasstacks', drew India and Pakistan dangerously close to war

------------------
So that is why no notification is required. Kudos to babus!

bharat,

> How many guns are there in an arti division?

3 guns = 1 troop
2 troops = 1 btty.
3-4 Bttys = 1 Regiment.
3 Regts = 1 bde
3 Bdes = 1 Div
+ reserves at each HQ level above btty.(approz 20% reserve strength)
do the math.

> What does an armoured division or brigade consist of?

1 amrd. div = 2 amrd bdes + 1 mech inf bde + 1 arty bde + support troops (signals, eme, s&t etc...)

> How would you define a strike corps?(I mean what differentiates it from normal corps in terms of weapons)

i think a strike corps has an armd div and an arty div and a mech inf div (or equivalent assets). In some sense a strike corps can really move, both in terms of supporting units and in terms of the way the the troops and commanders think.

Aggression is built into the corps, which is why i feel some people say a strike corps has `forward momentum' and one should be careful about moving them even by accident.

> Water and food form a major part of logistics.
For a back of the hand effort , One can say each soldier has 5 litres of water , 2 nutritional meals and a light breakfast.Of course at the front one does not have time for that.Water with sugar ,vitamins form an important part.A glass of water with Glucon-D is energetic and quick to consume.Along with strike corps a team of Disease Vaccination and food treatment must move .They can help in using food available in conquered land that can be used.

No clue about this. But the pakistanis will poison the waterholes on their sides so there are going to complications when people decide to cross.

Bharat - table of organisation (TO) for an IA armoured regiment now on BR thanks to Jagan and Rakesh.

The following data is from orbat.com

IA independant armoured brigade (support elements not listed):

3 tank regiments
1 BMP battalion
1 artillery regiment
1 reconnaissance squadron

The breakdown is a little bit different for armoured brigades attached to Reorganised Plains Infantry Division (RAPID) with 2 armored regiments and 2 mechanised battalions instead. The RAPIDs were Gen Sunderji's intiative in the 80s- improving mobility by mechanising infantry and putting them on BMPs.

IA Armoured Division TO:

HQ
Signal Regiment
Engineer Regiment
EME Regiment (Electrical and Mechanical Engineers – Maintenance)
Army Supply Corps Battalion
Supply Company
Artillery Brigade
-3 X 155mm Medium Regiments (18 guns each)
Air Defense Artillery Group
-1 X Self Propelled SAM Regiment
-1 X Self Propelled AAA Regiment
Reconnaissance & Support Battalion
-3 Companies
6 Tank Regiments (45 tanks each)
4 BMP Battalions
-3 companies (approximately 825 men)

Strike Corps possess a full armoured division, unlike holding corps which have at best an independant armoured brigade. They also have a full engineer brigade (for mobility - laying bridges, clearing mines, etc) and the RAPIDs are spread among them, though they still have regular infantry divisions as well - money hasnt been found yet to completely mechanise them. At least two of strike corps have IAF attack helicopter squadrons attached to them. They seem to get a lot of the best stuff first in terms of platforms and systems.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

One of Napoleon's great innovation was finding ways to centrally organise the acquisition and storage of food and then supply his troops at the front wherever they were. There was still dependance on local suppliers but at least it wasnt each and every man foraging for himself - with major improvements in discipline. It also allowed him to campaign for longer and gave him flexibility in terms of directions of advance.

With tinned rations forward resupply was greatly simplified - but there's still nothing like a hot meal to lift your spirits. Cooking however is not easy when people are shooting at you or you have to stay on the move. If however things are static enough to allow cooking, and the field kitchens havent caught up with you there is a long and honourable tradition even to this day of field-expedient self catering.

All:

Is it possible that the GoI might be intending to send a strong message to TSP that India's answer to solving the Kashmir tangle is another Bangladesh like dismembering of TSP's Sindh region ? You push off Kashmir for good or else Sindh will be targetted by us. Now that we are making guesses of GOTUS connivance with GoI in this operation and also going by Israel's aggressive pursuit of their agenda, babus could have made this calculation? If we see more unrest in Sindh in the coming days, I would assume this could be a strong theory. Anyways, am just theorizing here and am not sure how practical this could be. Can anyone construct or deconstruct this ?

Thanks.

There is something that troubles me about many of the posts here -- the easy (too easy, IMO) assumption that Pak nuke threats are toothless. All this talk of "deep thrust here" and "shallow penetration there", "Rahim Yar Khan is too close, but Hyderabad is feasible" etc., as if the Pakis have no say in the matter.

Would someone care to come up with a coherent explanation for this assumption? I mean, other than a vague seat-of-the-pants feeling, what exactly is causing these casual assumptions that Pak will just let India walk all over their territory in Sindh/Punjab and confine themselves to tactical (i.e. non-WMD) responses?

Mohan, to believe that the Paks would go nuclear is to accept that they are suicidal.

The correct question is not, "when will the Paks go nuclear", but instead, "under what conditions will the Pak Army elite, with their perks, priviliges etc. decide that life is no longer worth living for them and their children, and that it is now time for them to kill themselves, their children, their society etc".

Put in those terms, things become a little clearer.

BTW, the use of jargon such as "deep thrusts" etc, is quite OK for the Paks. In their current bent over position with respect to the US, they're quite used to it.

Vikram , Johann thanks for the info.
Mohan,
What is being discussed is various goals of battle.An independent Sindh is the high end goal that would be only after Rawalpindi ,Islamabad are razed to the ground.
The main strategy is to push for maximumdamage in weapons and systems in a short war.
Mohan, the nuke factor is the reason we are holding and deliberating.
But we can't hold back forever.
By going for a larger war we are going to hurt Pakistan more heavily and also strike at militant HQ.
If we continuously fear the PAk nuke then one day a Pak Head would give us a 2 day limit to clear of from Kashmir or the nukes would fall.
IF we retaliate now then there will be a thought always existing in Pak military that the nuke threat is for territorial integrity of main Pakistan and detterence.

The RAPE and associated cabal of Mullahs are very
very logical people intent on self-preservation
inspite of their rhetoric. That is an axiom.

infact I believe this "shift" to the south because
the "north (sukkur)" is too easy and hence
escalatory is itself a FALLACY and shows highly
defeatist and reactionary thinking. Pak now says
"my threshold is 5km inside the border Anywhere!"
..where do you shift now ?

If you cant attack his weakest spot and most prominent targets why attack at all ? what is the
use of pinpricks when Pak is made to know we shall
"accept" any yardstick they throw up and abide not
to cross it ?

My theory is that GoI is going to obey NO such
Pak-bluster threshold when & if the time comes.
The Most vulnerable spots will be attacked and
Uncleji will be working overtime to ensure that
nukes are not used by both - which suits us just
fine.

As a related note to Pakistan's rationality or lack of rationality, I think the Packees realise that India may not end up being as rational as we claim.

Not a happy thought.

They had better keep their troops and nukes ready actually. As a nation Indians show time and again a chilling mental immunity to the concept of massive casualties. This is something I had last suggested in the post-Pokhran period discussions as part of a general subcontinental psyche assessment.

"Marne do saalon ko"

is answered with

"Murrenge lekin hamare saath tumhe bhi le jayenge"

Pakistan is not that safe. Let them rant and wail. If they get their act together they may find an India that is willing to coexist peacefully.

If we work backwards from trying to figure Pakistan's threshold for nuclear first use, i.e. what would surely make them use nukes, would it be safe to assume that an all out attack on Lahore (where i guess a majority of the elite have vital interests)would precipitate a nuclear strike?

What else would have the same result?

as I said, GoI is going to be "as mad as them"
if/when time comes.

its ridiculous to think of attacking someone only
upto where it doesnt really hurt him. why should
Pak kowtow to any coercion if they are not hurt?

they will just withdraw carefully and let us
reach our self-imposed threshold, bluster a while
then go home under UN supervision

the Game isnt played that way.

Raj

IMHO any strategic air campaign would be a non-starter unless IAF can guarantee that it will take out all of Pak's nukes in the first couple of hours. Let me put it another way: If IAF mounts an extremely successful raid and takes out 50% of Pak's radar coverage, how do you think Mush will react? Simple - he will push the button. So all that will be achieved is the speeding up of the one eventuality we are trying to avoid. Let's take it a step down then. What if IAF/IN attack Karachi and go on the defensive after one successful raid? Simple. Pak's generals will have no alternative but to launch their strike corps, at a place of their choosing. We can smash them, but it will involve a land battle. So if we are going to fight a land battle anyway, why do it at their initiative?

Ashok
This should also answer your question - there are red lines other than an attack on a pop center like Lahore.

Rudra
But, my friend, we may not always be so mad that we want to dismember them right away. There are a lot of contingencies where we do not want to invite total war, but still want to administer some serious pain. RYK will always remain a prime target, but if our goals are more limited, then our actions should communicate just how serious we are and not anything more than that. Secondly, I think you underestimate the difficulty (for Pak) of defending Sindh in that area. Think of their difficulties in moving huge formations that far south. Look at the map and see what their LCs are in that area. And consider that they will need to tie down huge formations elsewhere, lest they leave huge gaps in their defenses. India's strategic strength lies in maximizing our options, and a southward attack offers a very attractive alternative for a host of reasons.

Added later
-----

I must also add, after reading some of the recent posts, that taking their nukes into account is not the same as letting them dictate our moves. In chess, the best move is one that anticipates the opponent's moves and forces his hand. Same in war - escalating too quickly and too hard is a sure way of loosing ones control over the entire situation. What I am trying to think through here is no less aggressive than a full blooded charge to RYK or Pindi. It's just more controlled, and offers more alternatives for them to back down. In a way, it is a plains equivalent of what we did in Kargil. And please don't tell me that we did not get all we wanted at that time.

On the issue of nuclear redlines etc...

They have categorically stated that they will pursue the nuclear option if the `space threshold' is crossed.

If for an instant or so, lets say the Pakistani strategists forget the vital question that Kgoan put, i.e.

"under what conditions will the Pak Army elite, with their perks, priviliges etc. decide that life is no longer worth living for them and their children, and that it is now time for them to kill themselves, their children, their society etc"

and choose to restrict themselves to the other question:

"When will Pakistan go nuclear"..

in that case possibly a nuclear hit in less fertile and economically weaker (and less inhabited) regions of Sindh will seem far more attractive than something similar in Punjab.

If IAF mounts an extremely successful raid and takes out 50% of Pak's radar coverage, how do you think Mush will react? Simple - he will push the button.

Can we be sure of the above?In any war with Pakistan ,the IAF will go for the PAF ADGES with a vengeance.More and more IAF a/c are acquiring PGM capability etcetc..so it seems a reasonable assumption to make.Besides which we have SBM and others confirming the above.
So the point is what exactly constitutes the redline..apart from depth considerations(land).

The state the PAF is in,they are going to be limited to CAP apart from the occasional strike package.(As compared to make or break attempt by the IAF).OTOH,to avoid unsustainable attrition,the IAF has to take out the C3I n/w that supports the PAF-esp their radar.In part at least.

As a sideways thought,another thing is that "attrition" theories may not necessarily work.Any leadership which sacrifices entire regiments etc for deniability can get away with lots.(in_front_of _their brainwashed populace)
Besides which -we take out xxx tanks,xxx fighters etc.China may well supply them equivalent amounts at peanuts/long term payments.
Status quo restored.Back to square 1.

Regards,
Nitin

Hey, what took you so long???

No disagreeemnent re the ADGES part - my choice of a radar example was not entirely coincidental. The thing is that with army, events move at 30 miles /day. With AF, they move at mach speed. This truism has not gone unappreciated by IAF brass. If you recall, Tippy took his time in initiating air strikes after being cleared to do so. So I would certainly think that loosing a decent chunk of your ADGES would cross the red line as surely as Kharga Corps crossing Ichogil.

Now now. Don't join them pessimists, boss Pakis can deny all they want, but the Tricolor flies on Tiger Hill and N Sharif is in KSA. Maybe young hotheads like you don't get to rub Paki faces in dirt, but other than that we did just fine Also, a strike corps or two sitting 40 km inside one's territory is a tad bit less deniable than a few Shia regiments!

The other thing to keep in mind is that attrition is not only about equipment but trained personel as well. When you knock out a tank, you also (usually) take out its crew. Even if you get a new tank, who is going to run it? And even if you get some ragtags to jump into it, can they actually fight to any effect at all without the requisite training?

Second, how will the new machinery be supplied? With respect to PRC, if we can cut off the Aksai Chin <--> PoK link, that leaves only the sea, and you can be damned sure that IN will jump any Packeeland bound ship. I doubt anybody in the ME will be stupid enough to mix in such a conflict, and our better links with Afghanistan will make supply over that route also problematic for the Packees.

Not withstanding the above arguments, if they do have easy access to a steady supply of hardware, it will distort the timelines of an attrition based strategy, but not the strategy itself.

++Rajesh

Also how do they plan to cross redlines while the US troops are in place for the OBL chase? By mobilizing in Jan '02 India showed that it was quite willing to take the fight into TSP. And the US vacated the bases give to it during GWOT/GOAT(BR term) and its naval patrols went back to the Persian Gulf. So some sort of understanding must have occured between 12/13 and Jan '02. Some media accts suggested that US was upset when Vij moved his strike elements forward without their knowledge or rather understanding. If Vij were on his own he would be cooling his heels in civvies. But he is not. So he probably did so under orders to smoke out the TSP assets.

ramana, what I dont understand is why was Vij "punished" with a transfer if he was following orders? But the greater question would be why was the GoI so eager to reprimand an IA commander just to get on the US' good side? If there was a any quid pro quo what was the quid for India's quo?

The pakis figured out that India had no intention of attacking when Vij was shunted and gave away India's cards in my book.

>>They have categorically stated that they will pursue the nuclear option if the `space threshold' is crossed.

they have categorically stated a lot of things.
how else would they communicate their threats ?

problem is , what they say and what they will
actually do (with Uncleji hovering in the wings
with a couple of B-2s) is miles apart.

its all bluff. lahore is fair game, anything is
fair game.

bakwas qureshi can shout all he wants "if you
come 10.0347m inside its ok, but 2.1mm more than
that and I will shoot myself in mouth"

I really dont know. But Vij did his duty and I think it was to smoke the other side. Also it had to be senior officer like him or else it would look bad. Also note the move was done knowing that uncle is watching from sky. That it self tells you it was planned. It wasnt the Vij transfer that told the TSP. It was uncle assuring him dont worry while you help keep looking for OBL.

Why did India feel compelled to shunt out Vij? The MoD could have chalked it up to miscommunications or something. The public "disciplining" of an IA commander at the supposed behest of the US looks extremely awkward not just for people on BR but more importantly for the IA rank and file who most likely don't have a knowledge of the big picture.

To put my previous comments in perspective.

an agricultural activity map of Pakistan. http://www.onkhura.com/savekirthar/fig3.gif

Is this news anything to do with PkII or the news of strategic command?

India, U.S. to conduct first joint military exercise
By Rezaul H. Laskar, Indo-Asian News Service

http://in.news.yahoo.com/020503/43/1n82i.html

New Delhi, May 3 (IANS) India and the U.S. will conduct their first joint military exercise in Uttar Pradesh state later this month, marking another significant step forward in growing defence ties.

The wargame, codenamed "Ex Balance Iroquois," will have the Indian Army's elite Paratroop Brigade and Indian Air Force aircraft exercising along with troops from the U.S. Pacific Command Special Forces and C-130 aircraft of the U.S. Air Force, an Indian defence ministry spokesman said Friday.

The decision to stage the exercise at Agra in the second week of May was taken at a meeting of the India-U.S. army executive steering group held here in February.

The steering group charted a road map for army-to-army cooperation and worked out a schedule of joint exercises, training and visits. The wargame at Agra will be the first in a series of joint exercises.

The exercise will come close on the heels of India's first major defence deal with the U.S. and the joint patrolling of the vital sea routes in the Malacca Straits by the navies of the two countries.

India last month concluded a $146 million deal to purchase of eight weapon locating radars from the U.S. Significantly, the deal was made under the Foreign Military Sales arrangement, whereby the purchase is made directly through the U.S. government and not the manufacturer of the defence hardware.

The AN/TPQ-37 "firefinder" radars are designed to pinpoint enemy mortars, artillery and rocket launchers after tracking a shell fired by them.

A decision to broaden defence ties between the two sides was taken by the India-U.S. Defence Policy Group (DPG) in December last year. The move was aimed at helping both countries counter threats like the spread of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, narcotics trafficking and piracy.

The DPG specifically decided to take steps to facilitate joint training for combined humanitarian airlift, combined special operations training and ground and air exercises by small units.

Super-Imposing the two map links on this thread, Mirpur Khas looks like its right on the edge of the desert. Stop for Chai Pani or a post nuclear lunar landscape.

Also, there is shown to be a railway line from Barmer to Mirpur Khas. Is it in use by any chance?

Food for thought indeed.The funda thats a bit elusive is that the IAF is going for massive force multipication..AWACS and the like.At kargil our in theater force was..formidable.Might have taken time to assemble(i'll have to look it up).IFF problems and fog of war could have ensued.With AWAC's and the like ...IAF can do more with less.And the PAF is in deep sh1t.What i am trying to say is,that the IAF apparently *is* focusing on obliterating entire sections of the PAF.
So can we say that = nuke threshold ?

:) I "threw" that part to get a quick response.Slow day.My feelings exactly.

What i meant is buggers are like the hydra.They regenerate.Now how to handle *that* is strategy fundae ..God knows..so i wont digress.
But one thing i have learnt.Even if pakistan =pakhtoonistan + bewakoofistan+ mullahistan +..they'll think they have won every war there is.

Rajesh,
The links/transport are onething.What i mean is India cant sustain a million day war of attrition .We will have to deescalate after giving the pakis a bloody nose.The point is at that time, materially speaking they can run up the numbers in a few years via their big bhai as the "normal" routes would have been re-established .

Trained people yes.But in a few years time.They can be a nuisance.(When were the pakis logical?They buy into their own myth making.)Now as to what exactly India does is a moot point..for the powers that be would have surely factored the above in consideration.

So the bloody nose will
a)have to be very bloody(which brings us to nuke threshold as to how much blood spilt is kosher)
b)An unambiguous message to both the Paki cabal and the bakra public that your day is BAD.

As Vikram says the latter has a significance of its own.

I have this feeling the reason why the Nonprolif types and their western backers are a bit "scared" is this ..if the IA/IAF/IN pull off a victory with nukes as the backdrop...then all their cherished values of detrrence fall flat.

Regards,
Nitin