Intelligence & National Security Discussion

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satya
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Post by satya »

Two Clever Tips To Surprise Him -Ajit Doval
In the absence of intelligence, all other mechanisms of combating terrorism fail. Even if security agencies are able to foil an attack, there's no guarantee that the terrorist won't strike again. Thus, any reshaping of our security matrix must look at two broad issues.
First, we over-emphasise on coordination between the security agencies to achieve the optimum in terms of gathering and sharing of intelligence. We must instead look at a system of convergence. One where there is systemic convergence of intelligence. This means integration at several levels.
Intelligence in India was born out of the need to formulate policy. Intelligence worked as an instrument for the execution of state policy where inputs would be used to formulate it and then further inputs would see to its effectiveness. So by providing convergence, we can achieve a seamless system that would enable the legally empowered to take action in the shortest possible time when an intelligence input comes in.

This isn't happening in the present design. What we have is one set of people who collect intelligence and another who act on it. So when information gathered by an agency reaches the police station concerned, not only is time wasted but nearly half the intelligence is lost in interpretation. ( makes sense to merge CBI with IB )
Our task, thus, must be to work at integrating the intelligence agencies with the security groups legally empowered to act. Instead of writing official letters to each other, time should be spent to ensure that intelligence inputs are acted upon immediately. This integration must be done at the level of both men and the equipment they handle. Today, these assets and resources are operated by different agencies.

Which is why the time has come to set up a dedicated federal anti-terrorism agency that can integrate the various arms of security forces to combat terror. It is imperative that we set up such an agency that can legally operate and conduct operations based on solid intelligence. Since intelligence only provides inputs, there must be an effective mechanism to fit these inputs within the greater matrix of policy execution.

The second issue is the repeated talk of reforms. Every time we discuss "intelligence failure", we speak of reforms. Reform can only help us to the extent of ensuring that we do not commit past mistakes. But we need a different paradigm when combating terrorism with intelligence.

Which is why the emphasis now must shift from 'reform' to 'transform'. ( as discussed on BR forum to transform the mindset from policing to something out of box idea )What has been done has been done. We have to develop a totally different set of capabilities to cater to our rapidly changing intelligence requirements. This needs to be done at several levels—from our training modules to doctrines to equipment. This transformation has to be across the spectrum of our intelligence capabilities and operations.

Terrorists will always look at soft targets where they will suffer minimum losses. This is precisely why they attacked Jaipur—to demonstrate their ability to strike anywhere within India. Within the security establishment, we have to transform so that we can surprise the terrorist. Else, he will continue to surprise us.

Atleast people connected to establishment have started talking about these pressing issues. Its a small step in right direction .Issue is how soon steps are taken to mend the ways .



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


(Ajit Doval is a former IB director and Kirti Chakra awardee)
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Post by shyamd »

Who is behind the India bombings?
More than 400 people have been killed in a string of serial bombings across India since October 2005, with Jaipur the latest city attacked. The BBC's Subir Bhaumik looks at who might be behind the blasts.

When Mohammed Jalaluddin - alias Babu Bhai - was arrested in the northern Indian city of Lucknow last year, he told his interrogators that Jaipur was one of their "prime targets".

Central Reserve Police Force soldier on guard at temple in Jammu
India's security forces have not come up with convincing answers

"I remember he clearly mentioned two cities, the holy town of Hardwar on the banks of the Ganges and the city of Jaipur as being on their list of targets and we alerted everybody concerned," a joint director of India's federal Intelligence Bureau (IB), told the BBC.

The official was part of the team who questioned Jalaluddin.

Jalaluddin is accused of being the "Indian operations commander" of the Bangladesh-based militant group, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (Huji), at the time of his arrest.

A native of West Bengal, Jalaluddin was trained in Bangladesh and then sent to unleash terror in India in 1999, officials say.

He claimed involvement in the July 2006 serial train bombings in Bombay, in which 187 people were killed.

"He told us that a Huji operative in Bangladesh called Jahangir gave him all the explosives for the Bombay blasts. Jahangir is a Bangladesh national," said the Intelligence Bureau joint director, who did not want to be named.

'Foreign hand'

On the basis of Jalaluddin's confessions, India's Intelligence Bureau did issue advice last year, listing a number of cities like Jaipur that it said were on the "hit list" of the jihadis.


Then for a few months nothing happened and the intelligence advisory was forgotten.

"That is how intelligence works in India. A general advisory on the basis of some confession or an agent report is usually forgotten when nothing happens for a while," says Bibhuti Bhusan Nandy, a former deputy chief of India's Research and Analysis Wing (Raw), that is responsible for external intelligence.

"The intelligence agencies rarely chase up leads to get more specific intelligence and when something like Jaipur happens, they refer to their old report to save their jobs."


After Tuesday's serial explosions in Jaipur, India has again blamed "the foreign hand" - perhaps a euphemism for Pakistan.

Indian intelligence officials say the new democratically-elected government in Pakistan has stressed it wants to improve relations with India.

It has even promised to deport Dawood Ibrahim - the mafia don blamed for bombings in Mumbai in 1993 - which they say has not gone down well with Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).

"Dawood is a prize asset for the ISI, so they will do anything to save him. They want to spoil the climate of improving relations. So we first have infiltration attempts in Kashmir and gun battles along the border after a long time, then we have Jaipur.

Market blast in Delhi
Blasts in Delhi in 2005 caused carnage in city markets
"This is time-tested ISI tactics," says Maj Gen Gaganjit Singh, a former deputy chief of India's Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Indian officials say that the ISI now operates more through Nepal and Bangladesh, where they have developed a secure network of operatives who liaise with militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba or the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami.

"A good number of terrorists, reportedly with Pakistani intelligence support, found Bangladesh as a safe haven. The collective strength of terrorist groups like Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, is now estimated in several thousands. India is their principal target," says a former chief of the Intelligence Bureau, Ajit Doval.

Indian intelligence says in recent months, most major explosions have been traced back to Bangladesh.

Home-grown

"The masterminds were Bangladesh nationals, members of groups like Huji, the explosives were procured in Bangladesh and smuggled across the border and Jaipur may not be an exception to that," says Bibhuti Bhusan Nandy.

"The Huji and the Lashkars have scores of sleeper cells all over India ready to strike on direction from outside."

The government of Bangladesh says it is working to curb the activities of Huji. It banned the group in October 2005 and its leader is currently in prison.

In recent years, Bangladesh has itself been targeted by bombings carried out by Islamic militant groups.

But the real strength of the Islamic jihadi groups responsible for explosions in Indian-administered Kashmir and other Indian states lies not so much in the "foreign hand" but in the proliferation of these "sleeper cells" within India.

Usually a sleeper cell contains no more than three to four militants, armed and trained but asked to lie low until definite orders.

People stand at one of the sites of bomb blasts in Jaipur on May 14, 2008
No group has admitted planting the Jaipur bombs

The Intelligence Bureau estimates the number of these jihadi "sleeper cells" as running into a few thousands.

"They have thrived on Muslim alienation in India since the phenomenal rise of the Hindu right in the country in the mid-1980s," says Pradip Bose of the Calcutta-based Center for Study in Social Sciences (CSSS).

He says it all started with the demolition of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya in December 1992 and has been fuelled by large-scale violence against Muslims, such as in the Gujarat riots in 2002.

"A riot like Gujarat creates a few thousand potential jihadis seeking revenge, so there's no use blaming the foreign hand. We in this country have created this problem," says Mr Bose, a distinguished sociologist.

'Modernise'

A US state department report has put India at the top of the list of countries worst afflicted by terrorism.

It says that India had more than 2,300 terrorism-related deaths in 2007 - about 10% of a worldwide figure of 22,000 terrorism-related deaths that year.

That is an astonishing number considering many of those 22,000 worldwide deaths occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan where wars are being fought.

It's not just the Islamic jihadis but also separatists like the United Liberation Front of Assam (Ulfa) and Maoist rebels in India who use serial bombings on a regular basis.

The US report also questioned India's "outdated and out burdened law enforcement and legal systems".

"Until we modernise our intelligence gathering and hold it publicly accountable, we cannot win the fight against terrorism," says Amiyo Samanta, a former Intelligence Bureau joint director and retired chief of police intelligence in West Bengal state.
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Post by suvod »

says Pradip Bose of the Calcutta-based Center for Study in Social Sciences (CSSS).
Anybody know who this moron is? Seems like another creation of the western media. In a few years he'll another pro-fool bidwai.
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Post by Keshav »

suvod wrote:
says Pradip Bose of the Calcutta-based Center for Study in Social Sciences (CSSS).
Anybody know who this moron is? Seems like another creation of the western media. In a few years he'll another pro-fool bidwai.
Honestly suvod, was that little tidbit the only thing you took away from that article?

Someone should work on assassinating Dawood. I can't imagine how much information he must have about India in his networks.
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Post by sanjaychoudhry »

Anybody know who this moron is? Seems like another creation of the western media. In a few years he'll another pro-fool bidwai.
It has always been a strategy of western journalists to quote only the alienated Indian leftists and liberals in all their stories who can be counted upon to make anti-Hindu or anti-India statements. The name of NDTV, CNN-IBN and JNU is taken with reverence by these western journalists and they make it a point only to approach leftist or communist professors, mediamen and sociologists for quotes. They have an entire database of such people prepared by their embassies in India. Any new Western journalist coming to India is handed over this list. The embassies keep a track of Indian leftists and spot new ones which can be put to use. They are lured by free foriegn trips, international awards and free stay in five star hotels abroad to attend seminars and conferences.
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Post by csharma »

10 years ago, when CNN was covering the Indian nuclear tests, they were interviewing Praful Bidwai. Now, they might hear what they want to hear but I do not think it changes anything on the ground.
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Post by sanjaychoudhry »

csharma wrote:10 years ago, when CNN was covering the Indian nuclear tests, they were interviewing Praful Bidwai. Now, they might hear what they want to hear but I do not think it changes anything on the ground.
Perception becomes reality after some time. Do not under-estimate the power of sustained propaganda with people as guinea pigs.
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Post by shyamd »

A specialist on Sri Lanka, Narayanan has done his utmost to bring in experts on China into National Security Advisory Board. CChina has become a prime target of Indian intelligence, particularly and not only because of China’s ties with Pakistan. As a result of that effort, the former Indian ambassador to both China and the United States, K. Shankar Bajpai, who is also chairman of a Delhi based think tank has joined the NSAB.

New members include: H. K. Dua, , N. Ravi, editor of The Hindu, has been a member of NSAB for several years. Admiral K K Nayyar.
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Post by Keshav »

sanjaychoudhry wrote:
csharma wrote:10 years ago, when CNN was covering the Indian nuclear tests, they were interviewing Praful Bidwai. Now, they might hear what they want to hear but I do not think it changes anything on the ground.
Perception becomes reality after some time. Do not under-estimate the power of sustained propaganda with people as guinea pigs.
“Make the lie big, make it simple, keep saying it, and eventually they will believe itâ€
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Post by Vikas »

Keshav wrote:
sanjaychoudhry wrote: Perception becomes reality after some time. Do not under-estimate the power of sustained propaganda with people as guinea pigs.
“Make the lie big, make it simple, keep saying it, and eventually they will believe itâ€
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Post by vsudhir »

About the proposed federal investigations bureau

Shishir Gupta’s analysis is factual and level-headed. He blames the states for stalling the proposed FIA. Its all about turf because law and order is a state subject (and also because state satraps can be snared in federal stings now). I find the states’ argument all too predictable and indefensible. While law and order may be a state subject, terror should not and cannot be treated as a mere L&O problem. The state control of organized crime act (SRCOCA) further setsup dedicated fast-track courts to try terror and underworld cases. About freakin’ time!

The center should simply go ahead with the bill even if there’s no uninaimous consensus among the states. Just like what the NDA did with the VAT system. Eventually all states did fall in line.
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Post by ramana »

Looks like B Raman saab is cracking down on his own. And we missed his first article. And its an ouch coming from him who defended the agencies stoutly in front of the KRC.

From Deccan Chronicle, 30 May 2008

[quote]
Crack down on inept intelligence
By B. Raman
This is the second article of a series

Preventive intelligence, preventive physical security and thorough investigation and successful prosecution are the main pillars of effective counter-terrorism. Intelligence agencies all over the world complain that for every successful terrorist strike, there were at least two or more which were thwarted due to timely intelligence collected by them. They also complain that while they are blamed for their failures, no public credit is given to them for their successes because the details of their successes are not announced to the public for reasons of operational secrecy. This is true. At the same time, intelligence officers should understand that the public would judge them by their known failures, not by their unknown successes. Known failures are a bit too many in India.

Complaints made against the Central intelligence agencies by police officers responsible for prevention are, one, they give general intelligence and not specific. If they are able to get specific intelligence, terrorist strikes can be easily prevented. And two, intelligence agencies try to protect themselves in advance from any criticism by flooding the police with a large number of low-grade reports. They focus on quantity, and not quality.

After having served as the head of the counter-terrorism division of the Research & Analysis Wing for six years, I have to admit the validity of such complaints. It is not as if the intelligence agencies do not give specific intelligence. They do often. A good example, which is now publicly known, is the intelligence gathered by R&AW about the plans of the Khalistani terrorists to kill Rajiv Gandhi when he went to Rajghat in October 1987. R&AW was able to get complete details of this plot, including when, where and how the Khalistanis would try to kill Rajiv Gandhi. The report was totally correct, but R&AW’s credibility with the Delhi police was so low that they did not act on this report thinking that it must be one of those “gupsâ€
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Post by ramana »

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Post by Nayak »

Get IB to do its work
Much has been written on the need for a federal agency to combat terrorism. What we need is political commitment to internal security and an IB that delivers actionable intelligence to stop terrorists from striking at will

Much has been written on the need for a federal agency to contain terrorism. This addition is not a policeman's view. It is the opinion of one who has seen the police establishment from the Home Departments of two States and two Union Territories.

First, a word about the intra-police hierarchy. A Home Department is generally headed by the State Chief Minister assisted by the Home Secretary. Lt-Governors and Chief Secretaries perform similar roles in Union Territories. Willy-nilly what the public thinks (at that point of time) gets priority. While the police hope to be judged by declining crime rates projected through crafted statistics, the political executive focusses on anything from murder and rape to car lifting and drunken driving.

Intelligence gathering is limited to anticipating tension from oncoming Navratras, Muharram the march of the kanwarias and suchlike. Turnout at political rallies, student and labour unrest all add up to provide a stereotyped repertoire which keeps lots of policemen busy, achieving little to anticipate or contain terrorist activities.

Bilateral discussions between neighbouring police establishments are largely confined to the movement of unlicenced liquor, arms or stolen cars. Forecasting bomb scares is as far as State CID reports go, but there the matter ends. In terms of relative importance, security and special branch do not have the clout, importance or visibility of the crime branch or range charges that supervise district policing. Those entrusted with intelligence gathering are always trying to wriggle out. There is also no money to be made.

This situation is completely reversed at the Centre where IB and RAW are first, followed by CBI and then the paramilitary forces, BSF and CRPF. The IB is the premier organisation, its members mentored, professionally trained and nurtured to collect intelligence on internal security -- a job they have executed with some distinction. IB officers wear no uniform and sport no flags or stars, but they are held in awe because of their intelligence. As retired members have divulged, they also serve as sleuths for the central ruling party.

An IB report can finish promising careers and hold Opposition leaders and even sitting Cabinet Ministers to ransom. IB not only updates Prime Ministers and Home Ministers but its men whisper into the ears of political managers, particularly those that keep Chief Ministers under watch.

IB plays an important role at election time. Predictions on which way the wind is blowing are valuable even if they later turn out to be askew. No wonder many Directors of the Intelligence Bureau secure governorships. Such rewards seldom befall heads of other Central police establishments.

Against this background where would a 'federal agency' fit in? Would it be able to replace the Intelligence Bureau? Unlikely. The IB's clout is much too well entrenched to allow any new federal agency to upstage it. Instead of planning another edifice why not start by strengthening the State CID and Special Branches? And here the example of the Committee of Finance Ministers that spearheaded the VAT taxation system comes to mind.

A gigantic financial reform was effected without amending the Constitution or establishing any new agency. In the face of stout political and ideological differences and despite continuous opposition from powerful lobbies of traders (often the financiers of political parties) every state eventually chose to change the Sales Tax law. Because they saw sense in doing it. The "how" of it bears telling.

The Finance Minister of West Bengal, who chaired the Committee, conveyed a sense of urgency to other Finance Ministers of the need to contain tax evasion and generate resources. Once sensitised, the commitment to financial reform made the rest happen. On a similar note no right-minded person (and that includes politicians and policemen) would be averse to containing terrorism within his State. What is needed is a forum and a channel for constant interaction on a subject of utmost importance and growing intricacy.

The Intelligence Bureau needs a strong secretariat that can constantly share information that impacts on internal security with the States. The States, in turn, can share their experiences and learn from sister States. A "give and take" atmosphere must replace the "we and they" attitudes. There is also a need to upgrade the intelligence and anti-terrorism set-up in every State by imparting professional knowledge and sophisticated skills badly needed for unearthing prejudicial activities.

However, the bottom line is the need to want to contain terrorism. The FBI example has succeeded because the US has a two-party system and an FBI Chief has a 10-year term (not two). In India, coalitions wooing and cohabiting at the Centre and playing ducks and drakes in the State have come to stay. What is needed is to concentrate on terrorism and deal with it continuously because it is the primary responsibility of Governments even when public memory has faded.

When people in authority want to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, terrorism gets fertile ground to flourish. We need Chief Ministers and Home Ministers with a commitment to internal security and an IB pledged to contain terrorism in every State, regardless of any master's voice.

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Post by sanjaychoudhry »

X-posted from PsyOps thread:

India's spy chief controversy continues
Link

Just read the article to see the amount of dirt thrown on the RAW chief. Anti-Chaturvedi stories are appearing again and again in some Middle Eastern newspapers (very strange!) and the level of personal detail given about Chaturvedi's daily life is staggering.

Some intelligence agency is obviously feeding the Gora editors who are manning Arab newspapers. Otherwise there is no way they can get access to so much information about the Indian intelligence chief. Somebody agency wants to see the back of Chaturvedi desperately. What has he done to cheese off CIA so much?
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Post by sum »

Just read the article to see the amount of dirt thrown on the RAW chief. Anti-Chaturvedi stories are appearing again and again in some Middle Eastern newspapers (very strange!) and the level of personal detail given about Chaturvedi's daily life is staggering.

Some intelligence agency is obviously feeding the Gora editors who are manning Arab newspapers. Otherwise there is no way they can get access to so much information about the Indian intelligence chief. Somebody agency wants to see the back of Chaturvedi desperately. What has he done to cheese off CIA so much?
Has to be a case of CIA(or not sure which other agency!!??) feeding the details of this article(or else they are blatant lies)....

Somehow, the article goes overboard in criticism and appear to be a poor attempt at negative psy-ops with references like "dumb and dumber" and "seen more at golf course than office" etc
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Post by ramana »

Could also be infighting within kaccha folks. When politicial leadership is not strong, such infighting comes to the surface. Some fool/coterie thinks he/their will better his/their chances if he/they brings the chief down.
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Post by abhischekcc »

sanjaychoudhry wrote:X-posted from PsyOps thread:

India's spy chief controversy continues
Link

Just read the article to see the amount of dirt thrown on the RAW chief. Anti-Chaturvedi stories are appearing again and again in some Middle Eastern newspapers (very strange!) and the level of personal detail given about Chaturvedi's daily life is staggering.

Some intelligence agency is obviously feeding the Gora editors who are manning Arab newspapers. Otherwise there is no way they can get access to so much information about the Indian intelligence chief. Somebody agency wants to see the back of Chaturvedi desperately. What has he done to cheese off CIA so much?
WRT the article linked by sanjay, look at the wikipedia entry for Ashok Chaturvedi. The article copies many points from the wikipedia entry. :D

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashok_Chaturvedi

:D


Here is a reason in wiki:
Chaturvedi has also been described as being part of the intelligence clique in India who had developed close relations with the Soviet Union and the communist bloc during the Cold War. There is now a perception that Chaturvedi's intent is to re-establish close relations with Russia's external Intelligence agency the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (SVR) or the Foreign Intelligence Service.[7] [8]
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Post by ramana »

If this is foreign spy-ops nothing prevents the IB folks from rolling the local purveyors of the stuff.
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Post by shyamd »

Octopus Reflexes
Isn't it time India's intelligence functioned with a centralised brain? Opinions are split.

SAIKAT DATTA
The Many Merits Of Being Monolithic

The Union home ministry has drawn up the broad operational contours for a federal anti-terror agency. Its key features:

* The agency will have three wings devoted to intelligence, investigation and operations. Its dedicated manpower will be drawn from the police pool.
* The anti-terror outfit will be empowered to conduct operations in any state across the country
* The agency will investigate terror attacks independently
* It will have the mandate to liaise with foreign intelligence agencies
* The set-up will act as the central pool for data on all terrorist activities. It will also maintain records of terror-related arrests and interrogations.
* Its investigation wing will have specialised units to deal with money laundering for terrorist activities and cyber terrorism
* A blueprint for a police university specialising in terrorism is ready. It will be located outside Delhi-in Haryana.

***
Federally Working...

...The Pros

* Will create a dedicated agency for the country to combat terror
* Can gather intelligence, liaise with foreign agencies, and take action to prevent terror attacks
* Will have a far strong expertise to investigate terrorism
* Will provide a ready, coordinated pool of talent and expertise

...The Cons

* Threatens Centre-state relations as enshrined in the Constitution
* Law and order being a state subject, there is the risk of states not liking the interference of federal agency
* Can create political turf wars between union and state governments

***

"A federal agency to probe terror crimes would not serve any purpose. Terrorism can be handled only through effective policing, maintaining communal harmony and eliminating unnecessary fears."
—Bihar chief minister Nitish Kumar
Across the political spectrum, everyone is agreed that the fight against terrorism has to be sharpened. In fact, after the May 13 serial blasts that killed 66 people in Jaipur, intelligence failure and poor policing are being repeatedly cited as significant factors. But when it comes to setting up a federal mechanism with the exclusive mandate to fight terrorism, there is no consensus among our politicians. Take Nitish Kumar. The Bihar CM was the first off the block to reject the very idea of a federal agency. And, ironically, he was part of the BJP-led NDA government that mooted the idea more than four years ago.

Post Jaipur, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has resurrected the federal agency concept. In fact, even in May 2004, when the UPA government came to power, it was pretty high on his wish list. But he knew that a political consensus on this wasn't easy. Four years later, the PM and the Union home ministry are giving it one more shot. But there is stiff opposition from state governments as well as the Left parties. For them, law and order is a state subject and any federal agency would create a serious constitutional crisis that can adversely impact Centre-state relations.

But security experts believe there is an urgent need to set up a central agency which can carry out anti-terror operations across the country, conduct its independent investigations and gather its own intelligence. Here are some of the reasons they cite to justify the creation of such an outfit:

* Terrorism in India is largely sponsored by external elements. Most of the terror groups operating in India have bases outside the country. If there is a bomb blast in Jaipur, its planning and execution could have been done in as diverse places as Dhaka or Karachi.Today, there is no single agency to tackle this cross-border threat effectively.
* There is no standard operating procedure to investigate terror crimes. The police of each state probes in its own way. Also, since most terrorist strikes have a pan-Indian footprint, the police are handicapped when it comes to carrying out probes outside their own state.
* There is no central data pool on terrorists and terror activities available to investigators. For example, when there was a bomb blast in Ajmer in October '07, the Rajasthan police couldn't find a single clue. It was the Intelligence Bureau which finally pointed out that the bombs had been wrapped in a Telugu newspaper. This was the first clue leading the investigating team to Hyderabad.
* The state police are not authorised to liaison with foreign intelligence agencies while investigating a terrorist attack.
* There is no formal structure between the police of various states to share data. After the Jaipur blasts, the Rajasthan police was groping in the dark till the Union home ministry brought in experts, who immediately saw similarities with earlier bomb attacks in Hyderabad, Lucknow and Varanasi. Members of the Mumbai, Delhi, Andhra Pradesh and UP police were sent to Jaipur at the request of the Centre to aid the investigation. By time considerable time had been lost, adversely affecting the probe.
* While central agencies like the National Security Guards and the Special Group are dedicated anti-terrorist forces, they can intervene in states only after the state government formally sought help from the Union government.

On the other hand, a dedicated central agency would make the response time quicker in the case of an attack. It would also raise intelligence gathering to a level where terror strikes can be prevented. "The need for a federal agency to combat terrorism has never been felt more acutely," Mahendra L. Kumawat, special secretary in charge of internal security in the ministry of home affairs, told Outlook. "If you study the probe into the Purulia arms drop case, you will see that crucial time was lost because the case was handed over to the cbi after seven days. In combating terror, we need to react much faster than that," he adds.

The performance of the existing intelligence agencies has clearly proved to be inadequate. While the IB has been burdened with gathering political intelligence, the external intelligence agency, raw, has come in for severe flak from the highest quarters. National security advisor M.K. Narayanan recently told the Union cabinet that raw was spending more time analysing events rather than generating intelligence. "raw doesn't have any major primary sources of information, and now depends mostly on secondary sources," a source told Outlook.

While the UPA and the previous NDA governments have been keen to set up a federal agency, the state governments have been steadfast in their opposition. Most argue that law and order, as enshrined in the Constitution, is a state subject. Says CPI(M) MP Nilotpal Basu: "A federal agency will turn the constitutional position on Centre-state relations on its head. Which is why the Left parties are opposed to it. What we need is better coordination between the central and state agencies. The present record of the central agencies in fighting terrorism isn't very flattering."

But can any amount of coordination ensure that the first tip-off on a possible terrorist attack will translate into action? Experts agree this is unlikely. Points out Ajit Doval, a former IB director: "Not only is time lost between an actionable intelligence input and the action on the ground, but the present structure of intelligence sharing and operations on the ground ensures that more than 50 per cent of the intelligence is lost in translation.And then there is no law at present that can back the war against terrorism. "

Which is why, while hearing the public interest litigation on police reforms filed by Prakash Singh, a former director general of police, the Supreme Court observed that there is a need for setting up a federal agency. The apex court sought the opinion of the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), the Soli Sorabjee Committee on a model police bill, the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPRD) and the Union of India on setting up a federal anti-terror agency. While the NHRC, BPRD and the Sorabjee panel agreed that such an agency was imperative to winning the war against terrorism, the Union government continued to hold back its opinion. "It has been more than two years and the court is yet to hear from the government," says Singh.

Interestingly, the Justice V.S. Malimath committee set up at the beginning of this decade to reform the criminal justice system had made similar recommendations. It felt that a "dedicated unit" along with special federal courts and prosecutors be set up to fight terrorism. It also urged the government to change existing laws to give it more teeth. But these prescriptions fell on deaf ears. With states not warming up to the idea, the central government did not act.

But Prakash Singh feels that setting up a federal outfit should not be seen as a centre-state issue. "A terrorist attack is an act of aggression against the Union of India. It is a low-intensity war and we must have a federal response to it. How can state police forces trace black money flowing across continents to fund terrorism or even cyber-terrorism? This is why we must have a central agency," he says.

With India's security agencies notorious for engaging in their own turf battles, the last thing we need is a fractured response to a terrorist threat. Experts say a new agency with a clear and independent mandate would be more focused and effective. But will our politicians agree? Or, will the PM's latest effort fall at the altar of centre-state relations.
New Digits In The Alphabet Soup
Would it also remain a non-starter, like the DIA and the DNA: marred by a confusion of mandates and severe deficits in manpower -- including the lack of suitable manpower within the limited contingents sanctioned -- and in resource allocation.

AJAI SAHNI

Once again, a major terrorist incident -- this time in Jaipur -- has set off a strident and polarised national political debate on 'counter-terrorism policy', with parties and leaders pulling out the same tired old rabbits from their tattered hats. One of these proposals has caught particular attention, having been articulated, for the first time, by the Prime Minister -- though the union home minister assures us that this has been under discussion for more than 20 years; this is the prospect of setting up a Federal Crimes Bureau (FCB) to look into a particular set of crimes, identified by their complexity, gravity or dispersal across state boundaries, including terrorism.

This has enthusiastically been seized upon by most commentators and, in principal, the concept of federal crimes and a federal agency to deal with them appears to be impeccable. The arguments in support of this proposal -- and the failure of the proposal in the face of the apparent obduracy and cussedness of the states -- has been widely documented over the past days, and will not detain us here.

The issue at hand is that the proposal to create a new setup for federal crimes reflects an approach that remains fragmented, divorced from the realities of the acute institutional deficits and near collapse that afflict existing state organisations, and the inability to comprehend -- leave alone cope with -- the sheer diversity of terrorist activities and operations, of which the occasional attack is only the most dramatic of many manifestations.

The FCB proposal has resurfaced urgently out of concerns over the continued and persistent failure to 'solve' virtually all the major terrorist incidents of the past three years, and on the grounds that the states 'botched' investigations, or were not able to efficiently pursue leads beyond their own territorial jurisdictions. The FCB, duly empowered and 'naturally' reflecting an efficiency far superior to various provincial units, it is argued, would be far more effective in investigating these trans-state crimes, and in hunting down terrorists and bringing them to book. If evidence is necessary, look at the long history of successes of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

This is a pattern of reasoning that has been recurrent in the creation or conceptualisation of a number of other institutions set up over the past years, blindly imitating foreign -- and particularly US -- models. In the security context, two examples come immediately to mind: the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Department of Net Assessment (DNA). Both these have proven to be non-starters, marred by a confusion of mandates and severe deficits in manpower -- including the lack of suitable manpower within the limited contingents sanctioned -- and in resource allocation.

The National Security Guard (NSG) is another case in point. Set up as far back as in 1984 to engage in high risk counter-hijacking and counter-terrorist operations, it has been able to establish a substantial infrastructure for training and research, an excellent pool of trained manpower, and particular expertise and a database on improvised explosive devices.Nevertheless, its utility has remained severely limited -- indeed, peripheral -- within the counter-terrorism efforts in the country, essentially as a consequence of deficiencies in conception and design, which saw the country's elite counter-terrorism group located at a single, centralized establishment, with acute limitation on rapid transportation to the points of engagement -- the areas of terrorist threat or attack.

The reality is, there is already a multiplicity of agencies concerned with intelligence gathering, investigation and enforcement relating to various aspects of terrorist activity, and this abundance of institutions has combined with an acute paucity of resources in each, compounded by severe difficulties of coordination and sharing of intelligence between these, and tremendous duplication of functions and consequent waste of already scarce resources. This multiplicity of agencies concerned with intelligence gathering itself suggests a significant problem of coordination, intelligence sharing and focused response strategies.

An unpublished review by this writer of the state's capacities to monitor hawala and other illegal financial operations by terrorists revealed, for instance, that there were at least fifteen central agencies variously charged with financial intelligence monitoring and enforcement across the country. Each of these agencies was under-resourced and struggling to maintain a modicum of efficiency in executing a fraction of its mandate.

Adding FCB to the existing alphabet soup of intelligence, investigative and enforcement agencies does not hold any promise of a unique or efficient solution to the current crisis of terrorism, unless there is a complete and uncharacteristic reversal of the country's recent history of institution building. At best, another shell organisation, overburdened by an ambitious (and largely imitative) mandate, but deprived of the means to secure its objectives, would be set up, creating a new drain on national resources. Building up such an organisation would take years, if not decades, and it would, at least initially, scavenge its manpower from other existing and hard-pressed security, intelligence and enforcement organisations

This, however, is not the only argument against the FCB. A simple 'crime investigation' model envisaged for the projected Federal agency certainly would not work with terrorism -- though such an agency may (as existing state and central agencies sometimes do) succeed in solving the occasional terrorist crime.

Terrorism is a continuous and complex activity involving persistent networks, and effective counter-terrorist action cannot be reduced to the task of investigation -- however efficient -- after an attack. There is a necessary integrity of preventive, intelligence and investigative functions in counter-terrorism. Given the complex linkages and the diversity of criminal, collusive and subversive operations -- encompassing the entire gamut of financial, violent and political crimes -- that underpin terrorism, and the unique threat these activities now constitute for the security and integrity of the country, intelligence, investigation, and enforcement can no longer be treated in isolation.

Effective counter-terrorism involves the tracking and evidentiary documentation of a wide range of continuous subversive and criminal activities that only periodically manifest themselves in the theatre of a bomb blast or other terrorist attack.According to recent disclosures, UK's internal intelligence agency, MI5, for instance, created dossiers on over 8,000 'at risk' individuals -- those who, by belief, conduct or association, appeared especially vulnerable to extremist mobilisation -- in addition to the surveillance and investigation of 1,600 suspects believed to be involved in 200 terrorist networks and 30 'active plots'. This is the scale and scope of counter-terrorism intelligence and investigative operations under a single Central Agency in a country as small as the UK.

What, then, of a federal agency to tackle terrorism and other crimes envisaged under the jurisdiction of the proposed FCB? The solution lies in taking the most suitable among existing central agencies, expanding its mandate and legislative cover, and drastically augmenting its resource complement.

Inevitably, a turf war will break out the moment such a proposal is articulated. Advocates supporting the Central Bureau of Intelligence (CBI) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB) can be expected to make persuasive cases as to why either of these is best suited for the task (and the concomitant augmentation of power and resources), and even more persuasive cases why the other agency is particularly unsuited.

Within a purely investigative context, the CBI would appear to be a strong possible candidate for the undertaking. Despite the severe, and in may cases extremely valid criticisms of the CBI on its record of investigations, and particularly its politicisation (a criticism that would apply, equally, to virtually every agency of government today), the fact remains, the CBI is the country's premier investigative agency.

As already stated, however, a purely investigative model has little relevance in the context of the centre's counter-terrorism role, and the necessary functions a proposed central agency would be required to perform if it is to deal with the wide range of tasks -- with both internal and external dimensions -- that are necessary if the limitations of state agencies are to be overcome in dealing with this trans-state and trans-national challenge.

Within the limited spectrum of existing agencies, it would appear that the IB has the most proximate resemblance in functions to those that would be required by a proposed Federal Agency for Counter-Terrorism. It has nation-wide intelligence operations and has created a very substantial data bank of intelligence on terrorist organisations and individuals (although its national database project has virtually stalled for lack of resources and clarity of purpose). Crucially, while the IB is not an investigative agency, a number of states credit very significant investigative breakthroughs in major cases of terrorism to IB cooperation and support. The IB is, of course, tremendously hamstrung by gaping deficits in manpower, capacities and resources, and is not even -- at the present stage -- capable of effectively fulfilling its present mandate. A massive revamp, expansion and upgradation of the IB has long been on the cards, and the capacities and functions that are necessary for the efficient operation of this organisation overlap profoundly with those that would be assigned to the proposed Federal Agency.

This line of evolution also makes greater sense within the context of prevailing and fractious centre-state relations.Cooperation -- and not conflict -- with states is necessary, and the IB has been operating in continuous collaboration with state agencies on the issue of terrorism (no doubt, with some conflict and mutual dissatisfaction), and this mechanism needs to be deepened and strengthened, even as the IB's mandate is formally augmented.

Crucially, the reality is that the states are so deeply concerned about the problem that, if the capacities, technical resources and expertise were created in a central agency, they would be eager to seek and secure its cooperation in resolving cases of terrorism and in effectively countering the networks and support structures of terrorism -- unless political confrontations are engineered over the issue of jurisdiction, or politically partisan allegations of failure or bias undermine cooperation between central and state agencies.

Ajai Sahni is Editor, South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR); Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management. Courtesy, the SAIR of the South Asia Terrorism Portal,
ramana
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Post by ramana »

It looks good but raw personnel have to be the foreign liason. Maybe they get seconded to this new fish. Cant be two views on that part.
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Post by Kakkaji »

200 Pak organisations raise funds for terror: IB
An IB dossier claims that most of the funds raised by terror outfits come through self-styled NGOs and charity organisations.

According to the IB, there are at least 200 entities in Pakistan raising funds for terror operations.

The afore-mentioned document suggests that the nexus between Indian gangsters and Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence, the ISI, agency is also getting stronger by the day.

According to the report, Maharashtra is a key transit point for funds, with most of the money landing there before being dispatched to the rest of the country.

An IB official told rediff.com that the financial channel is carefully monitored by terror outfits, and that the money ends up at the sleeper cells for use after passing through several levels.

IB sources say the money collected in Pakistan is transferred to Dubai through hawala operators before it reaches India.

The IB states that of late the base for the terror operations have shifted out of Kashmir, and attributes it to international pressure, the peace talks between India and Pakistan, and stepping up of security in the state.

However, the IB states that during a recent meeting convened by the ISI it was decided to bring Kashmir back on the boil, and that this may lead to renewed terror attacks in that state.

The government document also notes that the ISI has been stoking increased militancy in Punjab and the north-eastern states.


Since 2006 several terror cells set up by the ISI have been neutralised in Kashmir, forcing it to look beyond. The ISI then re-launched its Operation Pin Code and Operation Topac with a view to destabilising the entire country. That is where Punjab and the north-east come in.

The IB report says the Ludhiana blasts of October 2007 indicate that the ISI is desperately trying to revive Sikh militancy which had died a natural death in the late 1980s. The ISI has taken upon itself to roil Punjab so that it could have a partner in carrying out terror operations.

The IB also states that the ISI has been trying to improve its ties with militants in the north-east. The arrest of six People's United Liberation Front members in Karnataka recently pointed to the ISI's plans for the region. The six men had been suspended from the PULF over their links with the ISI, and the internal clashes over its involvement with the indigenous militant groups.

The first stage in Topac and Pin Code involves low-level insurgency through placing operatives in key locations across the country with a view to subverting the police force, communication networks, and financial institutions.

Phase two, which is underway, deals with stepping up terror in the border areas and elsewhere, through the Afghan mujahideen and Bangla militants who will have entered the country to carry out terror strikes.
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Post by John Snow »

The IB and DRI are bunch of jokers who are just there to please the politicos in power. I wonder our GOVT, IB and RAW are taking the offer made by Merkel to release all the names of the account holders and the sums deposited in Lichenstein!

The Headlines read Indian Black Money Holders List on Offer:

It appears the indian investigators,might still have their best chance to trace all those stashed away black money in Lichenstein.Located between austria and switzerland.The catch is Whether the Manmohan singh led government and especially its finance minister is really keen to take up the offer and seek the information that is on offer by asking for the same.It appears lot of information on Indians who have stashed away their illgotten wealth away in lichenstein,could be made available to the Indian govt authorities,by the german govt authorities,which has obtained a list of all the account holders at the LTGs Lichtenstein bank.The shocker is that the German Govt is willing to share the information with Indian authorities,since February 2008 free of charge.Several countries across the globe had availed the oppurtunity,what one cannot understand is,What is preventing Govt of India to seek the information from German authorities and go after the culprits.Is it because several politicians from the Congress party,could be caught.Is it what they fear.Why not use the god send oppurtunity and get access to all those ill gotten wealth,without taking recourse to beg those to declare their assets.Whats preventing the Govt to take bold decisions.
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Post by shyamd »

Indian former spies come in from cold to seek compensation
16 hours ago

MAHAL, India (AFP) — Balbir Singh says he thought he was serving India and would be hailed as a hero when he became a spy.

But now he's fighting in the Indian courts to make legal history and win compensation for 10 years spent in a Pakistani jail after being caught and convicted.

Singh is among several dozen former "secret agents" or informers who have launched similar court cases against the Indian government demanding payouts ranging from 500,000 to 800,000 rupees (12,500 to 20,000 dollars).

"I'd have been happy to die in a Pakistan jail. At least I'd have died a martyr," said Singh, 58, the father of two teenagers.

Around 100 former "spies" live in three districts of northern Punjab state bordering Pakistan, according to rights activists.

It is impossible to know how many spies are recruited every year as India officially denies spying on its nuclear-armed neighbour with which it has fought three wars.

But their hopes for recognition and compensation have been spurred in recent months after two cases involving Indian prisoners in Pakistani jails put the spotlight on former secret agents.

In March, Indian prisoner Kashmir Singh, who spent 35 years on death row in Pakistan after being convicted of espionage, was pardoned and returned home to northern Punjab state to a hero's welcome -- and confirmed he had been a spy.

Last month, the hanging of another prisoner, Sarabjit Singh, over a 1990 bombing in Lahore that killed four people was postponed indefinitely. Singh's family denies his role in the bombing and says he was not a spy.

"Spying is an endless game. It goes on uninterrupted, even when the situation is normal," said Maloy Krishna Dhar, a former joint director of India's Intelligence Bureau.

"The 25-mile (15-kilometre) area from the border is always a strategic concern for armed forces for which shallow penetration agents are needed," he said.

"Shallow penetration agents" are hired to find out details about military movements as well as the construction of dams, bunkers and canals along the border, and similar plans that cannot be determined with the use of satellites.

The men in Punjab's border areas are hired through word of mouth. Some, such as Balbir Singh, seek out intelligence officials to get hired, lawyers say.

"Many of them are nationalistic and highly motivated," said lawyer Ranjan Lahkhanpal, who is representing Balbir Singh.

Other former spies are in the process of launching cases.

One is Mohinder Singh, 61, whose bitterness is evident in his face, which contorts with anger as he talks about his days in a Pakistani jail.

"There it was just confinement, but what we face here is injustice," said the rickshaw puller, sentenced to seven years in jail in Pakistan for illegally crossing the border after escorting Indian spies.

"Two years of my sentence were dropped, but I spent 10 extra years in jail because the Indian government did not approve my repatriation," he said.

Mohinder Singh, who returned in 1986, is relying on the testimony of other spies whom he escorted across the border.

Balbir Singh says he has documents from Pakistani jail authorities proving he was incarcerated, and shows a letter from an official of India's intelligence agency saying he was hired to spy.

The authenticity of the documents and his claims could not be officially verified.

"No one can ever identify who recruited them. The burden of proof rests on the spy to show he was recruited," said ex-intelligence official Dhar.

Balbir Singh now works as a security guard, earning 2,500 rupees (about 60 dollars) a month. He was among dozens of people who went to greet former prisoner Kashmir Singh when he crossed into India.

The two men were hired for the same mission and arrested together as they travelled by bus in Pakistan, where they had been sent to bribe a military clerk and obtain a classified document, according to Balbir Singh.

While Kashmir got a death sentence, Balbir was sentenced to 10 years in prison and was freed in 1986.

"The Pakistan clerk confessed and we were caught. I was given an electric shock on my genitals in jail," Balbir Singh said at his home in Mahal village.

Despite India's refusal to admit that it spies on Pakistan, lawyers for the alleged ex-spies say they're hopeful of getting compensation thanks to the media attention they have received since Kashmir Singh's release.

"Even though there's no proof here, many people have orders from Pakistan courts that they were held under the Official Secrets Act," said lawyer Lakhanpal, who is representing 35 former spies in the Punjab High court.

"The courts cannot turn down this proof," he said.
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Post by ramana »

Every so often articles like this show up displaying the fractures within the IPS

From Pioneer, 18 June 2008
Race for CBI chief's post hots up with shortlisting of names

Rakesh K Singh | New Delhi

The race for director's post of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has peaked up following short-listing of a six-men panel, including agency's special director ML Sharma.

Others in the race include Special Secretary (internal security) ML Kumawat, Director General of the elite National Security Guards JK Dutt and Director General of Police of Himachal Pradesh Ashwani Kumar. Kumar, a Karnataka cadre IPS officer, has also been empanelled on the list that is yet to be officially announced. Current CBI Director Vijay Shankar superannuates in July end.

The Centre had filtered a list of 68 IPS officers of the batches of 1971, 1972, 1973 and 1974 for selection of the panel for the top slot in the CBI.

The short-list will be vetted jointly by the Union Home Secretary Madhukar Gupta, Central Vigilance Commissioner Pratyush Sinha and secretary of the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) and a final call be taken by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who also holds the charge of personnel ministry.

The sources said the last word on the final selection of a candidate for the director's post in the CBI will be that of UPA chairperson Sonia Gandhi.

While the CBI officials expect the job to be given to Sharma, those in the Union Home Ministry are backing Kumawat for the slot. However, Dutt's proximity to Gandhi makes him a strong contender, the sources said and added that Kumar could turn out to be a dark horse for the final reckoning.

While Sharma (Rajasthan cadre) and Kumawat (AP cadre) are 1972 batch IPS officers, Dutt is a 1971 batch official of the all-India service of West Bengal cadre.
If 1971 officer was the favorite, why seek all the younger batches? and look at the extra-constitutionality of the process!
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Post by svinayak »

Because it sia bidding process among the business lobby. Lobby is involved with every thing inlcuding the highest agency
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Post by Anabhaya »

Acharya wrote:Because it sia bidding process among the business lobby. Lobby is involved with every thing inlcuding the highest agency
Another conspiracy? Sorry, there is no evidence to indicate there is a business lobby trying to influence CBI appointments.
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Post by ramana »

Business folks are interested in CBI as its charter is economic crimes. So could be true to an extent. Th ebig fear is the Lichentsein acounts that Germany's Merkel was talking about and the PM not being interested yet. But note the final selection is not dependent on business lobby.

meanwhile a very good B Raman article

Fiddling must stop

Gives good background.
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Post by ramana »

To augment the above post.

Revealed: Australia's spy targets

Goes to confirm what B Raman was saying that at teh begining of every govt the agencies get tasked to do their work. Crisis driven reviews are after the crisis onlee.
Revealed: our spy targets
PHILIP DORLING
13/06/2008 10:34:00 PM
China, North and South Korea and Australia's close ally, Japan, are priority targets for Australian intelligence, according to classified briefing papers prepared for Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon.
The papers, written shortly after the election of the Labor Government, offer a rare insight into sensitive details of intelligence priorities, the structure and resourcing of the top secret Defence Intelligence Organisation.

The disclosure of DIO's focus on Japan comes after Prime Minister Kevin Rudd's meeting in Tokyo with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and expressions of Japanese support for Mr Rudd's proposed International Commission on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

The briefings, seen by The Canberra Times, show that DIO's transnational, scientific and technical intelligence branches keep a close watch on Japan's nuclear power industry and civilian space programs.

According to one Defence intelligence analyst, this is more than a watching brief.

"We put quite a lot of effort into the Japanese target," he said.

"After all they have lots of nuclear reactors, an advanced space sector and an enormous stockpile of plutonium. There's no Japanese intention now to get nuclear weapons, but who knows what the world will look like in a decade or two decades' time.

"A disarmament commission is all very fine, but the Japanese have all the knowledge and kit to become a nuclear power in a matter of months if they wanted to and we have to cover all the possibilities however remote they may seem now."

The issue of Japan's growing plutonium stockpile has recently attracted significant international attention, with Australian National University emeritus professor Gavan McCormack labelling Japan "a plutonium superpower".

DIO is the Defence Department's intelligence assessment agency.

It draws on information gathered by Australia's intelligence collection agencies, the Defence Signals Directorate and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, defence attaches posted at embassies, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and liaison with allied defence intelligence agencies.

Although the leaked papers confirm that much of the organisation's analytical effort has been devoted to support defence force operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor and the Solomon Islands, the agency's long-term focus is on Australia's strategic interests in North Asia, South-East Asia (especially Indonesia), Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific, and on transnational issues, in particular weapons proliferation.

DIO's North Asia branch comprises three separate sections devoted to analysis on China, Japan and the Koreas.

The Global Operations branch includes sections devoted not only to Afghanistan and Iraq, but also Iran.

The briefing papers highlight a range of examples of DIO's intelligence product, including analysis of Iran's ballistic missile and uranium enrichment programs, North Korea's ballistic missile program and analysis of the September 2007 Israeli attack on an alleged nuclear facility in Syria.

DIO's intelligence products make extensive use of signals intelligence information and spy satellite imagery sourced from the United States National Reconnaissance Office.

The organisation provides day-to-day briefings for the Defence Minister on events around the world with a highly classified minister's morning brief and a DIO daily intelligence summary.

However, while DIO is eager to meet the immediate needs of its minister and the Government, the briefing papers indicate that the agency's overall structure and priorities reflect the recommendation of the 2004 inquiry into Australian intelligence agencies conducted by Philip Flood that the organisation focus on "supporting defence strategic policy and meeting the strategic assessment needs of the Australian Defence Force".

In its briefings, DIO is keen to contrast media reports with "more accurate secret intelligence", but nonetheless acknowledges its own heavy use of so-called "open source" information drawn from the media and the internet.
So thats an example of a Commonwealth agency.
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Post by putnanja »

ramana
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Post by ramana »

From B Raman's bolg/website:

MY TWO BOOKS ON INTELLIGENCE: THROUGH CIA'S EYES
B.RAMAN

I found the following reviews in the web site of the library of the US Central Intelligence Agency at
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for- ... shelf.html

Intelligence Services AbroadB. Raman, The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2007), 294 pp., index.

———, Intelligence: Past, Present and Future (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2002), 416 pp., bibliography, index.

K. Sankaran Nair, Inside IB and RAW: The Rolling Stone that Gathered Moss (New Delhi, Manus Publications, 2008), index.

History has always been important to retired Indian intelligence officer B. Raman. In Kaoboys of R&AW, citing the CIA “historical division” precedent, (27) he reveals that in 1983 Rameshwar Nath Kao, the first chief of India’s foreign intelligence service—the Research & Analysis Wing—established a historical section. Unfortunately, it was abolished in 1984 when Kao left office. Raman was not surprised; he knew that in India organizational change often followed new leadership. Raman had joined the Indian Police Service in 1961 and was transferred in 1967 to the External Division of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), then India’s foreign intelligence element. He became a Kaoboy when R&AW was established as an independent entity in 1968. After assignments in Paris and Geneva, he headed the Counter-Terrorism Division from 1988 to 1994 and then retired to accept a cabinet secretariat position, where he served on various antiterrorism commissions and testified twice before the US Congress. After his permanent retirement, citing the precedents set by retired CIA officers, he decided to write these memoirs.

Kaoboys of R&AW tells about India’s struggle to develop a full range of intelligence service capabilities while at war with Pakistan and China and while managing conflicts among religious factions and dealing with tribal disputes on its borders. Raman also examines charges of CIA disinformation campaigns and covert action operations against India, R&AW efforts to counter domestic and foreign terrorist acts, and the constant turf battles with the Indian domestic intelligence service, the IB.

The book has two central themes. The first is the relationship of R&AW to the prime ministers under which it served, and the problems created when two of them were assassinated. Those unfamiliar with India get a sense of its political history. The second theme is the pervasive threat to national security from Pakistan and separatist groups as well as the actions taken to deal with provocations and incidents. Raman does not provide operational detail in terms of tradecraft or case studies. There is a chapter on R&AW relations with foreign intelligence agencies that concentrates on high-level contacts with the CIA and French services. An example of the latter is a visit to the CIA by Kao where he is received positively by DCI George Bush. He views the relationship with the CIA as a mix of cooperation when interests coincide and the reality of the operational imperative. As an example of the latter, he mentions instances in which the CIA recruited two R&AW officers. He does not mention the reverse possibility.

Kaoboys of R&AW gives a good high-level overview of the formation, evolution, and current status of the Indian intelligence services.

In his earlier book, Intelligence, Raman presents a survey of Indian intelligence from colonial times, when the IB was created (he calls it the “world’s second oldest internal security agency”—the French being the first) (1)—to the present eight intelligence agencies that form India’s intelligence community. His approach is topical, covering all elements of modern intelligence—military, political, technical, collection, analysis, covert action, counterintelligence, oversight, and management of the intelligence process. For comparison, he often refers to the experience of US intelligence agencies and the commissions formed to investigate them. For example, as a basis for establishing India’s military intelligence element, he cites in great detail the precedents of DIA’s formation and its evolution. (31–36) Similarly, the NSA, NRO, NGA and related agencies provide the rationale for counterparts in India. When discussing the requirement for good counterintelligence, examples from the UK are cited and the Aldrich Ames case is analyzed as an exemplar of what should and should not be done.

In short, Raman’s Intelligence is a text book by an experienced intelligence officer who certainly understands the fundamental elements of the profession and provides a framework for successful operations, not only in India, but in any democratic society.

K. Sankaran Nair’s Inside IB & RAW does not deserve the professional attention Raman’s books have received. Although the dust jacket claims Nair served as a head of R&AW, in fact, he held the post for less than 3 months in the 1970s.(174) He spent more time in the IB, and the book has some interesting stories about his attempts in the 1960s to advise recently formed African nations about security services. Overall, though, he provides little beyond anecdotal “scribblings”(95) focusing on personal episodes and dealings with his superiors that are of no great intelligence value. It is a memoir covering his entire life, and while it no doubt recounts some impressive political accomplishments, it is primarily of local interest and a minor contribution to the intelligence literature.
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Post by ramana »

I thought the British SIS under Sir Thomas Walsingham of Queen Elizabeth's rein was the first organised intelligence service in thr modern world. The Merchants of Venice had their own services but they were not states.

You always live and learn!
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Post by svinayak »

Anabhaya wrote:
Another conspiracy? Sorry, there is no evidence to indicate there is a business lobby trying to influence CBI appointments.
I know you may not like to believe this but the Indian govt and formation is heavily influenced with business lobby money in the last 10 years. If you have any connections to these people you would know what is being discussed here.
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Post by John Snow »

Boss You dont have to limit yorself to last 10 years, If you go back 1960s (I limit this date for my memory limitaions), 1970s, 1980s, all the time business was financing the parties, it was then mostly for license permits and excise duty tarif changes before the budgets so that people can cook books, the quote of PTF (Reliance) stell cement food palmolive oil all were commodities that business could make money share spoils with GOI. For that matter even sanitary inspectors job is politically auctioned , because of unlimited bribes that can be generated.

Read how business made deals with Mughals, Nizams, Robert Clives etc...

Also read Dogs of war
Also read about Banana trade Chqita wars
Tilak
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Post by Tilak »

RAW in-charge in Beijing recalled after honeytrap probe
22 Jun 2008, 0125 hrs IST,TNN
NEW DELHI: The Indian mission in Beijing is busy shooting itself in the foot at a time when India-China relations are on a downswing.

Fresh controversy enveloped the mission with RAW station chief Uma Mishra being recalled this week, apparently for a poorly handled investigation into a "honeytrap" case.

Mishra is expected to return to India soon and this will be the second time a RAW official has returned from Beijing under a cloud.

Earlier, another RAW staffer, Manmohan Sharma, was recalled for his alleged affair with a Chinese interpreter. In connection with the Sharma case, an assistant to deputy chief of mission Saurabh Kumar has already been sent back.

The assistant, Gangadharan, was called back to Delhi on "special duty" and then given a recall letter and now it is believed that Kumar himself may be posted out as well after barely a year as deputy chief of mission. Kumar's replacement is believed to be another MEA official from Vietnam.

Just what's happening in Beijing?

Amid the sheer inefficiency, lack of checks and poor professionalism, there's a strong possibility of an ego spat between MEA and RAW. The trouble apparently began after the Manmohan Sharma incident.

While RAW, responsible for external intelligence, cried foul and said its official was above board and the problem had really to do with a quarrel between Sharma's maid and interpreter, MEA differed and claimed that a probe had found evidence that Sharma had been "penetrated" by the Chinese. Sharma's apartment was apparently bugged.

The Gangadharan recall thereafter is being seen as a tit-for-tat affair between MEA and RAW. On being called back to Delhi, he was not even allowed to go back to Beijing to bring back his family, said sources.

Mishra's recall is rather more serious as she's a counseller level officer.

It is said that her return is a result of not conducting the investigation of the Manmohan Sharma incident properly with sources saying that MEA was unhappy at her alleged refusal to pass on details of the Sharma affair to the ministry.

The turn of events reflects poorly on both organisations. Certainly, when relations with China need closer attention, India should be better served by both agencies.
sum
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Post by sum »

Why is that Indians always shoot themselves in the foot through their own inter-agency wars instead of even giving a chance to our enemies?? :roll:
Sad to read about the MEA-RAW spat snowballing ito such serious matters... :x
Avinash R
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Post by Avinash R »

Joining hands to tackle terrorism
By Bidanda M Chengappa

It is a normal practice in border states for the Army to jointly interrogate terrorists apprehended along with the police services.


The Army’s role in recently apprehending PREPAK militants from Manipur resident in the city adds a new dimension to civil-military relations in Karnataka. The Bangalore based-Intelligence Corps unit of the Army along with their counterparts in Manipur and elsewhere were reportedly tracking the movements of these militants over the last three months.

Today the only security services which operate in Manipur are the Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence, Border Security Force ‘G’ branch and Special Services Bureau.

The City Crime Branch of the Karnataka Police had to perforce be involved in the operation as a formality only because the Army has neither powers of search nor arrest. The Karnataka Police has the ability only to operate within the states’ boundaries while its ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ pick up information about individuals who threaten the stability or security of Karnataka. So much so the state police lack a reach outside Karnataka, which puts them at a disadvantage against militants who arrive here to seek sanctuary from other areas. To that extent, the police are dependent on Central intelligence agencies like the Military Intelligence (MI) or the Intelligence Bureau (IB) to apprehend terrorists. Both the MI and the IB cannot make an arrest on their own but have to be ‘fronted’ by the policemen to do so.

Only a few months ago the Army’s Intelligence unit got involved in the interrogation of two terrorists arrested in Hubli along with the state police. Clearly the trans-border linkages of the apprehended terrorists with Pakistan in this case interest the Army which has enormous experience in such interrogations over the years in insurgency affected states.

It is normal practice in the border states of Jammu and Kashmir, besides the northeastern region for the Army to jointly interrogate terrorists apprehended along with the police services. A joint interrogation cell which comprises Army, police and para-military personnel in the border-states facilitates this practice where an arrested terrorist is subjected to interrogation within 24 hours. The participation of the Army’s Intelligence Corps personnel in Karnataka in the interrogation thereby supplements the police effort.

Otherwise the Army’s Intelligence Corps personnel interacts with its counterpart civil security agencies on a quarterly basis through the platform provided by the subsidiary multi-agency Centre to share intelligence inputs among themselves. This arrangement is fine because Karnataka is not a disturbed area — except for the practice of terrorists taking sanctuary here. However, the Army now seeks to interact with the state police service on an “occurrence basis” whenever there is an arrest or an attack.

The recent anti-terrorist operation therefore demands ‘seamless’ inter-agency channels between the Army’s MI and state police services to tackle the emerging threat of terrorism taking shape in the country.
ramana
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Post by ramana »

Does India have any laws to protect their agency personnel's identities like the Brits? I see in name of turf wars ids are being exposed left and right. I guess its all right as otsiders have the roster!
shyamd
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Post by shyamd »

Former spies can bare and tell no more
Ajay Banerjee
Tribune News Service

New Delhi, June 23
Facing embarrassment after several former spymasters from the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) authored books exposing the shortcomings of various governments in the past, the Government of India has now issued a notification to muzzle the former spies.

The formal notification bans officers from sharing their experiences through writings or through the electronic media. The terse notification issued by the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) lists out around a dozen organisations about which books cannot be written in future. The notification was circulated in the South Block and the North Block last week and has sent ripples across the corridors of power.

Now, the officers cannot write about the functioning of these organisations, their character and the role played by them in various operations over the years. An officer, before retiring or on being repatriated to his parent cadre, will have to given a written undertaking that he/she will not reveal anything known during the course of his job.

In the past few years, books by the former spy operatives - all senior officers - exposed the political classes and pointed out at glaring errors in handling various crisis faced by the government in the past. Some of these books are regularly quoted and are accepted as an authentic view of the happenings in India’s recent history.

For example, the books by former Director IB, Ajit Doval, are considered the most authentic view on the Kandhar hijack in 1999 and also the operation Black Thunder conducted at the Golden temple, Amritsar, in 1988. The book “Open Secrets” by former Joint Director IB M.K. Dhar blames the Congress for terrorism in Punjab and reveals the intrigues of the Indira Gandhi government.

Maj Gen V.K. Singh (retd), who served in the RAW during the Kargil war, is behind bars for violating the Official Secrets Act. He questioned the NDA government’s sagacity behind making public the telephonic conversation between then Pakistan Army chief General Pervez Musharraf and his Chief of Staff, intercepted by the RAW during the 1999 Kargil war. Another joint director of RAW, B Raman, penned a telling account in his book “The Kaoboys of RAW”, so did RAW chief K. Shankaran Nair who also raised uncomfortable questions in his book.
ramana
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Re: Intelligence & National Security Discussion

Post by ramana »

Raz ko raz rahne do. I fully agree as Indian press has an adversial relationship with GOI. What was the need for delay. While at it create a new agency totally covert as RAW is not that anymore.
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