Bharat Rakshak

Predatory Behavior of Pacific Coast White Sharks*
Only recently have we begun to understand how Pacific Coast White Sharks feed. Over the last 23 years, David Ainley, Peter Pyle, Scott Anderson and other biologists at the Point Reyes Bird Sanctuary on Southeast Farallon Island (off San Francisco) have been keeping records of White Shark predation events. Attacks on California Sea Lions, Northern Fur Seals, Elephant Seals, pelicans, and even five divers have been recorded off Southeast Farallon. The vast majority of attacks took place close to shore, where these potential prey creatures tend to congregate. Anderson and a colleague, A. Peter Klimley, have also seized opportunities to conduct grass-roots, innovative - and sometimes bizarre - experiments in order to understand how the White Shark chooses and captures its prey.
Photographs showing the silhouettes of a pinniped and a surfboard from below have been widely distributed throughout the media. The similarity between the two shapes is somewhat compelling. Small wonder that "mistaken identity" has been cited as a probable explanation for White Shark attacks on surfers by some researchers. From morphological and physiological studies, it is known that White Sharks have excellent photopic (bright-light) color vision. But does the White Shark actually rely on such a search image? Recently, Scott Anderson has equipped a surfboard with an underwater camera and trolled this rig along the surface at South Farallon. Analysis of the filmed attacks on the board reveal that the Great White typically stalks its prey by swimming along the bottom and strikes by launching a lightning-fast vertical attack. This is consistent with the theory that the White Shark makes use of a search image when hunting pinniped prey.
The Great White uses different techniques when attacking different species of pinniped. Northern Elephant Seals (Mirounga angustirostris) are not easy to catch. They are station wagon-sized, phenomenal repeated deep-divers, and very powerful swimmers. But at the surface, Elephant Seals have all the maneuverability of an aircraft carrier. In order to tackle an Elephant Seal, a Great White typically attacks from below and behind, immobilizes the seal with a tremendous bite to the hindquarters, then retreats and waits for its prey to bleed to death before returning to feed. Hunks of blubber and flesh are sawed away at the surface, but taken to or near the bottom to be swallowed.
This so-called "bite-and-spit" strategy is typically employed by White Sharks feeding on adult Northern Elephant Seals, but does not hold for pinnipeds of lesser dimensions. Smaller seals, such as the 1.5-meter Harbor Seal (Phoca vitulina), are grabbed at the surface and pulled underwater until they stop struggling, then eaten at or near the bottom; juvenile Harbor Seals are simply plucked from the surface like grapes and eaten whole (Harbor Seals seem to be the perfect White Shark snack food: they're abundant, slow-moving, and bite-sized - sort of Phoca McNuggets!) The 2.5-metre-long California Sea Lion (Zalophus californianus) is a more powerful swimmer than the Harbor Seal, and is typically attacked by a White Shark from below, struck in mid-body, dragged below the surface until it stops struggling, then eaten at or near the bottom.
Reflecting upon the White Shark's predatory modus operandi, several interesting patterns emerge. It is interesting that for all three species of pinniped, the White Shark stalks along the bottom, attacks at the surface, and feeds at or near the bottom. It is also interesting that about 50% of the divers that are attacked by White Sharks off the Pacific Coast are hit at the surface, with the shark usually grabbing the legs of the victim. What is especially intriguing, however, is that divers attacked by White Sharks are let go after the initial strike two out of three times. It seems unlikely that the mighty Great White can be so incompetent a predator that prey - once in its mouth - escapes 67% of the time. What's going on here?
To find out, A. Peter Klimley devised a bizarre modification of Scott Anderson's surfboard experiments. Klimley used a similar rod-and-reel rig to troll the waters off South Farallon with the carcasses of seals, pigs, and sheep (If Hemingway had known, he would have spun in his grave: The Old Man and the Sheep?) White Sharks attacked all three types of bait, but consistently rejected the sheep carcasses. Klimley speculates that the high energy demands of the White Shark may be a factor in rejection of food items. On a per-unit mass basis, fat or blubber is a very energy-rich food. Since seals and pigs tend to be quite fatty, they are accepted after the initial strike; sheep tend to have a significantly lower fat content, and may thus be rejected as low-quality food. So, putting all the pieces together, it seems that divers might sometimes be attacked by White Sharks because they are visually mistaken for seals or Sea Lions, but then spat out because they're just too damn skinny to be a worthwhile meal.

Famed oceanographic researcher Jacques Cousteau described the oceanic whitetip as "the most dangerous of all sharks". Despite the greater notoriety of the great white shark and other sharks habitually found nearer the shore, the oceanic whitetip is considered responsible for more fatal attacks on humans than all other species combined, as a result of predation on those shipwrecked or from aircraft downed in the open ocean.

These incidents are not included in common shark-attack indices for the 20th and 21st centuries, but would appear to total in the thousands worldwide, with one incident alone, the torpedoing of USS Indianapolis on 30 July 1945, giving a minimum figure of between 60 and 80 sailors killed by sharks. It is said by some that tiger sharks were responsible for some of the Indianapolis deaths, but this has never been confirmed. Also during World War II, the Nova Scotia, a steamship carrying approximately 1,000 people near South Africa was torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine. There were only 192 survivors, and many deaths were attributed to the oceanic whitetip shark.

Moreover - Dsingh - a good advice for you. Attention span on BR posting is short. If you post a longest ever writing, which you have done in your last two posts; you are loosing the readers. They will glance but not read. Hence you should split your posts into shorter posts. Take a few days longer; readers are not running away. Your hard work should be rewarded with readers atleast giving you a good read. You get my point.



Hari Sud
Toronto

Both countries will and should build their military might as a deterrent. Buth I don't think that deterrent will ever be used.

Both countries are only now recovering from the ravages of centuries of colonial rule. Both have much to lose in a war that would include devastating cruise missle attacks on industrial infrastructure. War with China will not be like a war with Pakistan.

Lastly, as I said earlier, I did not mean to interrupt or derail, Vivek's and Shankar's very interesting scenarios, which I love reading. My conclusion of scenario was culmination of " only worst case scenario". If I did so, then my apologies to you all.

Regards,

DSingh.

Military Affairs Commission


China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) has always defended the party as much as national borders.
During the early years of communist rule, most of the country's leaders owed their positions to their military success during the civil war, and links between them and the PLA remained very close.
But as this generation has died off and reforms have been introduced to make the armed forces more professional, the relationship has shifted subtly.
Party leaders know they are lost without the army's support, as became clear during crises like the 1989 Tiananmen protests. At the same time, senior military leaders realise they need the leadership's backing if far-reaching plans to modernise the armed forces are to be paid for.
The party's control over the armed forces and their nuclear arsenal is institutionalised through the Central Military Affairs Commission. The 11-man commission has the final say on all decisions relating to the PLA, including senior appointments, troop deployments and arms spending. Almost all the members are senior generals, but the most important posts have always been held by the party's most senior leaders.
Important links
The commission also controls the paramilitary People's Armed Police, who have the politically sensitive role of guarding key government buildings, including the main leadership compound of Zhongnanhai in Beijing.
In theory, the commission's chairman is elected by the National People's Congress. But in practice, the job automatically goes to the party's most powerful figure, who effectively becomes commander-in-chief.
The chairmanship was held by Mao Zedong and then Deng Xiaoping, who stayed in the job after he had resigned from all other positions, suggesting to some analysts that this is the real source of power in China.
Jiang Zemin, who became Chairman in 1989, had none of the military background or cachet of his predecessors. But by careful promotions of supporters and budget increases, Jiang ensured strong support from the military and within the Commission.
He resigned in 2004, handing the chairmanship to a man with even weaker military links, Hu Jintao, who has since tried to build his own power base in the military.
wenty years ago, soldiers in China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) spent as much time on "political work" and reading party speeches as military training.
Reforms introduced since the 1980s have made the armed forces much more professional. They have shed one million men in a bid to concentrate on quality not quantity. Emphasis is being put on better training, better weapons and better pay.
Nevertheless, the military's position as defender of the party means it will never be de-linked from politics. Officers and men still have to declare their loyalty to party principles, study its teachings and read leaders' important pronouncements.
PLA officers are also party members, and there is a separate party machine inside the military to make sure rank and file stay in line with party thinking.
In keeping with its more professional role, the PLA has lost influence over non-military affairs. It was forced by Jiang Zemin to give up a vast business empire. It also appears to be losing clout at the top of the party, where there is no PLA representative on the politburo's standing committee.
Some analysts think PLA generals are happy with this, so long as they retain influence over the areas which really matter to the military – specifically the Taiwan issue and relations with America.
There have been suggestions that on at least one of these – US relations – military thinking is different to the party leadership's. Senior military figures are thought to be far more wary of US intentions in the region, especially regarding Taiwan.

2/17/2001: RUSSIA LEASES TU-22M3 BOMBERS TO INDIA
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Izvestiya reported on 17 February 2001 that Russia signed a contract to lease four Tu-22M3 [NATO name 'Backfire'] bombers to India.[1] Eight Indian crews were already undergoing operation training for the bombers in Ryazan at the time of the signing.[2] Press reports have not specified which, if any, weapons would be supplied with the bombers. The primary weapon system of the Tu-22M3 is the Kh-22 [NATO designation AS-4 'Kitchen'] nuclear-capable supersonic cruise missile. Because Kh-22 cruise missiles can carry a 1000kg warhead to a distance of 400km, their export to India would violate Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) rules. Russia maintains that the Tu-22M3 bombers are not strategic weapons and that any cruise missiles supplied with the aircraft would only be armed with conventional warheads.[3]
Sources:
[1] Sergey Leskov, "Oruzhiye pakhnet dengami," Izvestiya, No. 29, 17 February 2001.
[2] Shamil Idiatullin, "NATO vpalo v sostoyaniye povyshennoy boyegotovnosti," Vremya i dengi, 16 February 2001, p. 2; in "Genshtab nachal reklamnuyu KAPO," Oborona i bezopasnost, 28 February 2001; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru.
[3] "Russia to lease long-range bombers to India," Times of India, 10 February 2001. {Entered 3/13/01 RG}

ECEIVE RUSSIAN CRUISE MISSILES
ITAR-TASS reported on 10 December 1999 that four Russian-built Project 877EKM [NATO name 'Kilo'] diesel-electric submarines in Indian service will be armed with the Club missile system, which includes the 3M-54E (sometimes referred to as Alfa) anti-ship cruise missile [NATO designation SS-NX-27] with a range of up to 220km and the 91RE1 anti-submarine missile. The four submarines include three vessels already in Indian service and one still under construction in Russia.[1] According to an agreement signed on 5 November 1999, Russia will transfer 3M-54E technology to India, enabling it to produce these weapons and develop other, domestic missiles based on the 3M-54E. According to some reports, India has already begun work on a 1200km land-attack cruise missile.[2] In addition to the submarines, the Club system will arm Indian surface warships. India ordered three Russian Project 1135.6 frigates which will also be armed with the Club system, and there are reports that the system will eventually equip Delhi-class destroyers.[2,3]
Sources:
[1] "Chetyre indiyskiye podvodnyye lodki proyekta 877EKM budut vooruzheny noveyshim rossiyskim raketno-torpednym kompleksom 'KLAB'," ITAR-TASS, 10 December 1999; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/.
[2] Mohammed Ahmedullah, "Russia Sells Its Latest Cruise Missile to India," Navy News and Undersea Technology, 6 December 1999; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://www.web.lexis-nexis.com/.
[3] Nikolay Novichkov, "Dlinnaya ruka dlya 'KILO'," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 17 September 1999; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.ru/. {Entered 6/18/2001 MJ

acquisition of Tupolev-22M3 (Backfire C) for the Indian Navy raises some questions of its intended role since the 'M3' version is designed for strategic bombing/maritime strike. In Indian Navy service its main weapon is projected to be the supersonic PJ-10 BrahMos ASCM (Anti-Ship Cruise Missile) and possibly a capability to carry Nuclear bombs, that DRDO and BARC say are available. If primary high speed reconnaissance role is also the peace time role intended, Tupolev-22MR would have been the better choice since the 'MR' version carries a giant SLAR (Side Looking Airborne Radar) in what was previously the internal bomb bay. This subject is interesting as TU can serve both recce and deterrence at low cost. The IAF is getting the Phalcon and we had recommended joint use and TU 22M can be a great force multiplier.
The Tupolev-22MR can conduct aerial reconnaissance from a great slant distance without having to over-fly its intended 'targets', thanks to the SLAR. However, prudence dictates that the Indian Navy should settle for at least two "compact" squadrons (6 each) of the Tupolev-22M3/MR in appropriate mix. As a standard Indian practice, European/Israeli radar, avionics and detection systems may well be integrated with the Indian Navy’s Tupolev-22M3s. The Russians are also projecting an upgraded Tupolev-22M5 version, and the Indian Navy may be interested. Of equal importance is the induction of an "extended range" BrahMos ASCM to further increase the stand-off distance and range.
he Indian aircraft-carrier battle group will additionally be supported by Tupolev-22M3 "Backfire" bombers and Akula II (Type 971 Bars) SSNs (Submarine, Nuclear powered, hunter-killer) also armed with air and submarine launched versions of BrahMos. Enemy surface units are to be overwhelmed with a saturated missile attack from surface, sub-surface units and airborne platforms providing very little reaction time, thanks to the sheer speed and sharp evasive maneuverability offered by BrahMos.
Although the effectiveness of aircraft-carriers are sometimes criticized, citing their vulnerability in context to proliferation of precision-guided munitions and missiles and supported by increasingly accurate GPS (Global Positioning System) guidance, it is still relatively invulnerable for its ability to move and maneuver in contrast to fixed military installations. Unless equipped with extremely sophisticated electronic and space based sensors, it is very difficult to precisely locate an aircraft-carrier battle group in open Oceans. Moreover our aircraft-carrier battle group will derive protection not only from its own air elements and associated surface and sub-surface platforms, but also from land based long ranged interceptor-fighters in the class of Sukhoi-30MKI in conjunction with friendly AWACS an in-flight refueling aircraft. Land based Tupolev-142 "Bear-F" will provide extended ASW coverage. It is reasonable to assume that the projected Indian Navy aircraft-carrier battle group comprising of "Admiral Gorshkov" in conjunction with Tupolev-22M3 and Akula II is set to dominate the Arabian Sea and parts of Indian Ocean in near future. It is second in capabilities only to the heavy naval presence of United States in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean region.

Lastly, as I said earlier, I did not mean to interrupt or derail, Vivek's and Shankar's very interesting scenarios, which I love reading. My conclusion of scenario was culmination of " only worst case scenario". If I did so, then my apologies to you all.

Regards,

DSingh.

e first air-launched BrahMos will be integrated on a Naval Tu-142 strat-recon aircraft. BrahMos CEO Dr A Sivathanu Pillai told LiveFist, "We are working towards development trials on the Tu-142. The people at Tupolev are being very helpful. It is a fantastic aircraft. It is a perfect platform for payload capacity and to carry the telemetry systems we will require for the development trials, planned in two years."

I wrote here a few weeks ago that the Su-30 integration of the BrahMos was on the backburner for now. Now, Dr Pillai has confirmed this to be the case. The facts: the Sukhoi Design Bureau is steeped in the PAK-FA fifth generation fighter programme, and has accorded low priority to providing consultation to BrahMos on the structural changes required to the Su-30MKI airframe fuselage and wings for integration of the air-launched missile. A thought process transpired briefly in 2006 that the structural changes could be carried out by HAL, considering that it was license manufacturing the Su-30s at Nashik. However, the Russian partners in BrahMos (NPOM) are understood to have put their foot down, and said that any changes to the Su-30MKI airframe would need to in consultation with the Sukhoi Design Bureau. So now, with a finned reduced-booster missile ready for tests, the Su-30MKI configuration waits for the design bureau to deign its time

And finally, the Navy's Ilyushin-38 is officially off the table as a potential carrier of the BrahMos. Three months ago, the Navy asked BrahMos not to proceed on design integration of the missile with the Il-38 platform. The reasons: after integration of the BrahMos on an Il-38's belly hardpoint, ground clearance became dangerously low -- a potential threat during landing.

China will never hesitate to have a shooting war
with India. Wake up and enshrine this in your Brain cells.

Dear Mr. Sud and Malay:

I apologise , for length of my post, for being so long. However it was my final post for rationale and conclusion of the "worst case scenario- The sinking of carriers". I do agree with you it is cumbersome to read the long posts as well. I would like to point out following points-

1. Such a massive aid/ help to India amounted to only 40-45 Billion Dollars in 2012. Looking at Indian economy, Gross GDP was approaching 1 trillion dollars in 2007. With conservative 7.5 to 8% growth rate Indian economy would approach almost 2 Trillion dollars with almost 500 to 600 Billion dollars in Forex reserve ?. Hence this aid was less than 2% of GDP, was not a gamble for either Russians or Americans. However basis for the help was not based upon claculation of $$ amount, but rather, what would had been consequence ( to the world )of worst case scenario of Nuclear exchange with Chinese?

2. Threat of Nuclear brinkman ship is not new to the world. It had been experienced in 1945( resulting in Japanese Surrender), in 1960's during Cuban Missile Crisis, (resulting in withdrawl of Russian Missiles from Cuba), In 1971, by Americans ( Nixon), against India during India- Pak war ( and subsequent pressure of Russians on India to conclude war soon, and not complete the capture of all the Kashmir), and last one by PINKIS/ PUKIS in
2001 against India,( and subsequent American Pressure on India, not to invade PAKIs).

We all know in nuclear exchange, no one is winner, however after math would had put whole humanity to shame, as it would have brought human sufferings to unimaginable level, and economic human losses, which could not be measured in even BillionsX Billions X Trillions of Dollars. The 40-50 Billion Dollars of help was a drop in ocean, India would have written check next day for this massive help.

3. We also know if you carry or keep Guns, then you intend to use it if some one is coming to kill yoy or rob your house( i.e when time comes?) There is more chances of nuclear exchanges with any country based upon mistrust and miscalculations, than after rational analysis. If a line has been crossed for Nuclear Thresh hold, then they would be used. If defense minister perceived, that India and China are going to dismember India and take away Kashmir and Punjab in west, and North-East India on Eastern Front, then in the defense minister's view this threshhold has been crossed?

4. Malay- Military help on massive scale and sharing Intel is not new( e.g Americans to Russians and British in WW II, to India in 1962, British again in Falk Lands, Russia to India in 1971, Americans to Israelis in 1973, Russian to India resulting in Operation Blue Star). If your friend, with whom you have treaty, to protect each other, is not going to help you, then who else? As a Super power you would have problem with credibility. Lease of two three additional Akulas to India and 200 MIG29 SMT and 60 SU30 are less than 20 Billion Dollars)

5. Choosing between India and China is not easy one. But if you analyze reccent US strategic thinking, they are quite concerned about Chinese' military capabilities. Every one would be concerned about fighting Chinese and confronting them directly. But India had no choice but to fight it out, below Nuclear thresh hold? They would always chose India, over India.They would sell or allow to sell high tech military stuff to India, than China, which is their strategic competitor.

6.There is economic interest and then there is military one. If you have to chose between them and you have only one choice, you would most likely to chose your military's interest first. America can always build its business, later on.

7. Electronic war fare capabilities are something, which are kept secret. Once your adversary knows them, they become in effective.You come to know them only once a while, when they are used. Israelis have used them successfully against Syrians in 1981, making their SAM batteries useless in Bekka Valley, by using E3 Sentries and killing their Radars by Anti radiation missiles. They used the Tactis to knock out suspected Syrian nuclear sites in 2007, whch no one has used them, except Americans ( against Iraqui's in Desert storm I and Against Serbians). I am not aware if IAF used this technique against PUKI's or even if they have this Tech?

Lastly, as I said earlier, I did not mean to interrupt or derail, Vivek's and Shankar's very interesting scenarios, which I love reading. My conclusion of scenario was culmination of " only worst case scenario". If I did so, then my apologies to you all.

Regards,

DSingh.

D Singh So what you envison is that some one will ship in stuff just like after 1962 and that India will fight with that? And why would other powers do that? BTW do you know the strings that came after 1962? Please read K Subramanyam's works to see how bad they were and how India got rid of them.


One cant crow in borrowed feathers.

roject Seabird, christened INS (Indian Naval Ship) Kadamba, will be the first operational base with a port controlled exclusively by the Navy, allowing it to position and manoeuvre its operational fleet without worrying about the movement of merchant vessels. The Navy's existing bases, including its two operational ones in Mumbai and Vishakhapatnam, are located in enclaves within commercial ports, making for an unsuitable situation especially in times of war. The Rs.35,000-crore fully integrated INS Kadamba is expected to be the biggest naval base this side of the Suez. The base will provide the Navy with the much-needed depth of defence at sea. Although initially it will only have a plethora of land assets, it will only be a matter of time before it gets its share of operational assets (ships) and their command. By the end of the year, the Navy plans to base around 10 ships of the surface fleet - mainly of diesel and gas turbine design, which include missile destroyers, missile frigates, missile corvettes, auxiliary ships (such as survey ships and tankers), and offshore patrol vessels. This figure will be increased to 30 in a phased manner by reallocating vessels that are now based at the overcrowded Mumbai base. The final configuration would of course depend on how serious the Naval High Command is about decongesting Mumbai and on the availability of repair facilities at Kadamba's fledgling Naval Ship Repair Yard (NSRY). Indications are that the more recent acquisitions of the Navy, especially of Russian make (such as the Abhay (Pauk II) Class corvettes), or of Russian design, will be based at Karwar. INS Kadamba will allow naval ships to come in, be berthed, shiplifted, dry-docked, repaired and turned around - all crucial requirements if the Navy is to maintain the hull and structure of its 150-odd surface ships, support vessels and submarines in a high state of sea worthiness.

Given its potential and size, INS Kadamba could also become an independent command, or even be part of a tri-services command. According to Commodore K.P. Ramachandran, Naval Officer-in-Charge and Station Commander (Karwar) (he will also be INS Kadamba's first Commanding Officer), the base will be headed by the Flag Officer Commanding (Karwar), who will be tasked by the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Naval Command. Commodore Sridhar Karnik, Commander, Project Seabird, said: "Right now our tooth-to-tail ratio is low. We have created the basic infrastructure - the harbour, anchorage, accommodation, roads - now we need the add-ons. Once that is done we can get our ships and launch them."
Spread over 11,200 acres (4,480 hectares), the base will encompass a 26-kilometre stretch along the high water line of the seafront from Karwar Head in the north, through the Baitkol, Kamath, Binaga, Kwada and Belekeri Bays. It will, for most part, be sandwiched between National Highway 17 in the east and the Arabian Sea in the west. Karwar, with its bays and islands, has always been thought of as an ideal site for locating a naval base. The sea is deep less than half a mile from the coast, making berthing and navigation easy and the need for dredging minimal. The tidal conditions are such that there is little scope for siltation. Offering natural protection from wave action is the Binaga Bay, stretching out into the open sea from Karwar Head, a rocky promontory in the north, and the Tadri river in the south. Also providing cover to the bay are the Anjadip, Arge Button and Round islands. Karwar's hilly terrain provides excellent camouflage to ground installations. And crucially, the extent of land available will not only enable the Navy to disperse its forces, a necessity in times of an attack, but enable any future expansion of the base.

Down under the oceans both the Indian Akulas tok out the torpedoes from the tubes and replaced them with some thing far more sinster. And finally Agni 3 launchers in central and eastern India powered up as they went to highest possible alert level on receipt of special code from defense ministry coming to them via dedicated underground fiber optic cable.

EASTERN NAVAL COMMAND –VIZAG -0100 HRS

Vice admiral Prakash Rao at the latest infra red satellite photos and the synthetic radar images taken by a Russian satellite and forwarded to him from naval head quarters .Side by side he placed the daylight images received through Tech Sar and it was obvious the PLAN invasion fleet have made significant increase in their approach speed across the gulf of Thailand ,so as to enter quickly the Singapore strait /Malacca strait where the heavy commercial traffic will make any kind of concerted attack impossible. ...