Talk about KLPD ...vivek_ahuja wrote:"Besides, I think you are clearly well equipped for a nuclear exchange should such a requirement occur…”
--Ashish
Talk about KLPD ...vivek_ahuja wrote:"Besides, I think you are clearly well equipped for a nuclear exchange should such a requirement occur…”
Over the last two weeks, the world economies were getting affected at ever increasing rates as commercial shipping had to be diverted away from well-established routes in the ocean and away from the potential combat zones. Foreign personnel had been evacuated from both India and China in the last week of the war as conditions worsened and the threat levels increased. That affected companies worldwide since China was a production center and India was an information technology center. Once that threshold was achieved where the benefits of the emergency defense deals being made by New-Delhi and Beijing were offset and turned negative by the overall losses in other sectors of the economy, the thought process in Washington and Moscow had changed.
Vivekji,rajanb wrote:So far, the rest of the world is conspicous by its absence.
And whatever Vivekji has dished out so far is very delectable. Let us see if he inroduces a melee of other countries, each following their agenda. If China and India is going to suffer so much, it will also bring the world's economy down.
Agree with you fully. In fact this was covered in one newspaper and that's how I ended up here.Chinmayanand wrote:IIRC , this scenario started in 2008 . Four long years and we all are still waiting for the end. Vivek , certainly has the gift of Saraswati. His scenario writing is so lively as if watching a movie. We want more ...
In 2008 , i did a google search on Indo-China war scenario and i ended up here at Bharat Rakshak .
Pandyan saar, Thanks! The book will be paperback. I suppose readers/buyers can ask amazon etc to convert it into a Kindle version if they prefer it for that format.pandyan wrote:Vivek saar - is it going to be ebook or paper back? Beautiful cover page!
Singha wrote:or some talibunnies could be routed from the local ISI safehouse and asked to launch an assault with blank rounds on the main launch sites, which the valiant SSG will naturally protect again with blanks.
what does SHQ stand for again ?vivek_ahuja wrote:
Sorry for the delay saar, SHQ was at my BRF field HQ last two days and ordered me to abandon the BRF FEBA for that duration. Upon departure of SHQ, I have once again returned.
Bliss to give me a couple hours to clean up and post the next post on this dhaga.
Garver projects an individualist calculus for each state. Its basis in self-interest and self-protection against the Other seems clear-cut, well-established, and unquestionable:
China seems to have two major interests within the new triangle. The first is to prevent close Indian alignment with the United States…[The second] is to avoid paying too high a price to achieve the first objective (of uncoupling New Delhi and Washington)…China’s objective is to persuade India to disassociate itself from the United States while allowing the Sino-Pakistan strategic partnership to continue.
India for its part seems to have three primary interests within the new triangle. The first is to prevent or abort Chinese-US cooperation contrary to Indian policy objectives… A second Indian interest seems to be to play on Washington’s apprehensions over China’s growing power to secure US support, or at least US understanding, for strengthening India’s pre-eminent position in the South Asian-Indian Ocean region via transfers of advanced military technologies, training in modern modes of warfare, and so on……New Delhi may also play on a US desire to co-opt India into the US-led system of global power in order to secure stronger
US support for Indian economic and military development…Finally, India’s third interest within the new triangle is to play on Chinese fears of Indian participation in US inspired “anti-China” schemes to make Beijing more understanding of Indian objections to Chinese activities in the South Asian-Indian Ocean region
The US could worry about Sino-Indian collusion but Garver considers it highly suspect.
US policies of arrogance, economic protectionism or military aggression that threaten both India and China could conceivably force those two countries into alignment. On the other hand, there is every reason to believe that US policies sensitive to the nuances of the new triangle should be able to prevent the emergence of an anti-US, China-India bloc. It could well be in the interest of both New Delhi and Beijing to stimulate Washington’s fears of a possible India-China alignment against he United States, since it would induce the United States to pay more for Chinese and Indian abstention from such a combination (Garver 2002: 51).
“US efforts toward all three powers (India, Japan, and Australia) help create a structure of power that will be less inviting to Chinese aggression in the decades ahead – or at least, this seems to be the unspoken thinking that dominates US policy”
The Authors state that“For Beijing the prospect of cooperation with the United States against India is a far more attractive prospect than cooperation with India against the United States” Such an alliance would grant China the first-class status that every state desires:
“Cooperation with the United States in the South Asian region would be a very big step toward the Chinese goal being accepted as the peer of the United States as a global power” (Garver 2002: 50).
Garver’s analysis breaks down to realist renditions on three main elements: borders, strategies, and histories.
and concludes finallySino-Indian relations before the onset of the West teach us the existence of other worlds, other visions, and other ways of being.
This paper is replete with references to pre 1962 bonhomie interestingly makes a parallel with MMS -Wen Statement in 2005.Western knowledge-making, whether academic, state-diplomatic, or policy-oriented, has continued to thrive upon both erasures and racialized, feminized constructions that project the non-Western Other as simplistic (chaotic but not complex),
dehistoricized, decontextualized, and thoroughly demarcated and limited by the parameters of Western interest.It is this postcolonial-feminist and India-China-centered understanding that enables a critical shift from the hypermasculine and imperialistic “triangulation” of the US security discourse towards a radical re-envisioning of India and China.
Staying beneath the provocation threshold constitutes purest common sense for Beijing............Time spent in internal debate would work in China’s favor in any contingency along the Asian seaboard. It would postpone U.S. military movements, perhaps long enough to let the People’s Liberation Army accomplish its goals before the cavalry arrives. The result: a fait accompli. Even better (from Beijing’s standpoint), the United States might simply stand aside, reckoning the goals of such an enterprise too diffuse and abstract, the likely strategic rewards too few, to justify the costs and dangers inherent in combat operations against a fellow great power.
PLA anti-access defenses cannot hoist an impenetrable shield over the Western Pacific and China seas. U.S. forces are already in theater, furthermore, as are allied forces and those of informal partners. American commanders should put these facts to use, patterning operations on Corbettian illogic. They should look for ways to create pockets of naval and air supremacy even while overall command of the seas and skies eludes the allies. By refusing to proceed strictly by logic, the United States can protract a conflict, discover ways to impose high costs on China at low cost to itself, and otherwise sow mayhem in the Western Pacific. It can prevent a Chinese walkover while proving that China cannot win on the cheap. A more accommodating Beijing might result.
“Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration.” How much importance each belligerent attaches to its goals, that is, determines how many lives and resources it is prepared to expend to reach those goals, and for how long.
But there’s a corollary: “Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.” Once the enterprise starts costing more than it’s worth, statesmen should strike the best peace deal they can and exit the conflict. Whatever sunk costs the nation has incurred are just that—sunk, and written off.
All the US needs to do is NOT give the PLA the war it has been planning.
A US/China war is one rare opportunity where the US does NOT need to prove its power straight off, it only needs to trip up China's attempts at proving that it is powerful.
All the pressure is on China – it needs fast quick war with tangible results.
The US needs to give China nothing and make it clear that war with the US means protracted war.
Let the PLA punch the numbers on a protracted war and it will start to look less and less attractive -
Justl like in WW2 – Japanese firebrands refused to acknowledge that war with the US would be anything other than short and swift.
All the talk of defeating china on china's turf is very reckless. First sign of chinese forces being destroyed would quickly result in exchange of tactical nuclear weapons strikes and both sides would have to step back or face a full scale nuclear attack. Best not go there for the sake of humanity.
Bringing the war to US soil would result in a punishing and brutal response particularly if civilian areas are the target. China is dependent on imports of natural resources. Our submarines could interdict much of this. China is now peaking the future belongs to India and her allies.
If indeed that is the calculus, then the answer is simple. DON'T start a war with China. Asians have long memories. Give the Japanese nukes, the first likely target would be America. All direct military conflict between China and America WILL lead to MAD, with Russia enjoying the relative propulsion in rank without having to do much. So strategically this is a no-brainer.
WHY. again, is it that Americans are so gungho about goign to war
"China isn’t going anywhere—and so managing the peace in Asia demands the long view."
If U.S doesn't get out of Asia where it doesn't belong, China may come to latin america in the future.
“We (Keating and Mehta) talked a little about the potential development of a Chinese aircraft carrier. I related (to Mehta) a conversation I had with a senior Chinese Naval officer during which he proposed, in his words, that as China builds aircraft carriers — he said plural — we can make a deal,” the PACOM chief said after meeting the top Indian military leadership besides the National Security Advisor and Foreign Secretary.
The proposed “deal” envisaged that after China has its own aircraft carriers — it remains the only major naval power currently without such a capability — the Pacific region could be divided into two areas of responsibility.
“(The Chinese officer said) You, the US, take Hawaii East and we, China, will take Hawai West and the Indian Ocean. Then you will not need to come to the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean and we will not need to go to the Eastern Pacific. If anything happens there, you can let us know and if something happens here, we will let you know,” Keating recalled.
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/china ... al/459851/
@Dean:
Yeah, why didn't I think of that!! With all that technology embargo, China would have no choice but stay decades behind. No way to get away from that!!
Hmm… One item announced this week was poignant. About 70 of the top Chinese scientists and engineers skipped the 20th anniversary shindig celebrating China's space program, and instead pay their own way to travel to S. China to attend a new product announcement for a 300 men company. The product? A 50 ton vibration table. It happens to be the world's biggest. It was not so long ago that these R&D equipment (vibration costs over 80% of system failure in fast moving things like missiles and such) were totally denied to China. Then China started makging them domestically. Then the embargo was raised from 1 ton, to 2 tons, then 3 tons, etc. Today the embargo stands at 9 tons and up.
You know what prompts fast development in China?
Last year this company started to export to America, and requires all American buyers to sign contracts swearing that the machines would not be used for military purposes. Ironic.
BTW, even in today's environment, China's economy is growing at 7.5%. IF the developed world's economy recovers, there is no question that the rate will go back up to clost to 10%. That is hardly faltering.
In regards to the "value" China attaches to these various provocative claims on other country's territory I believe it boils down to thier self described need to redeem their honor after the last centuries of being "humiliated" as they say. So giving up the Senkaku Islands won't quench their thirst I'm afraid. Their goad is to evict the US from their "rightful" sphere of influence…like existed once upon a time a thousand yrs. ago.
Even if a conflicts starts sometime within next 2 decades, China will be badly outnumbered. Number of assets, knowledgable support staff and money will be all in West's favor (US, GB, Germany, Italy, France + Australia, Japan, Korea and India). Not to mention production facilities, skilled labor and superior engineering skills coupled with China's dependence on foreign oil.
1. Friendly fire - isn't.
2. Recoilless rifles - aren't.
3. Suppressive fires - won't.
4. You are not Superman; Marines and fighter pilots take note.
5. A sucking chest wound is Nature's way of telling you to slow down.
6. If it's stupid but it works, it isn't stupid.
7. Try to look unimportant; the enemy may be low on ammo and not want to waste a bullet on you.
8. If at first you don't succeed, call in an air strike.
9. If you are forward of your position, your artillery will fall short.
10. Never share a foxhole with anyone braver than yourself.
11. Never go to bed with anyone crazier than yourself.
12. Never forget that your weapon was made by the lowest bidder.
13. If your attack is going really well, it's an ambush.
14. The enemy diversion you're ignoring is their main attack.
15. The enemy invariably attacks on two occasions:
a. When they're ready.
b. When you're not.
16. No OPLAN ever survives initial contact.
17. There is no such thing as a perfect plan.
18. Five second fuses always burn three seconds.
19. There is no such thing as an atheist in a foxhole.
20. A retreating enemy is probably just falling back and regrouping.
21. The important things are always simple; the simple are always hard.
22. The easy way is always mined.
23. Teamwork is essential; it gives the enemy other people to shoot at.
24. Don't look conspicuous; it draws fire. For this reason, it is not at all uncommon for aircraft carriers to be known as bomb magnets.
25. Never draw fire; it irritates everyone around you.
26. If you are short of everything but the enemy, you are in the combat zone.
27. When you have secured the area, make sure the enemy knows it too.
28. Incoming fire has the right of way.
29. No combat ready unit has ever passed inspection.
30. No inspection ready unit has ever passed combat.
31. If the enemy is within range, so are you.
32. The only thing more accurate than incoming enemy fire is incoming friendly fire.
33. Things which must be shipped together as a set, aren't.
34. Things that must work together, can't be carried to the field that way.
35. Radios will fail as soon as you need fire support.
36. Radar tends to fail at night and in bad weather, and especially during both).
37. Anything you do can get you killed, including nothing.
38. Make it too tough for the enemy to get in, and you won't be able to get out.
39. Tracers work both ways.
40. If you take more than your fair share of objectives, you will get more than your fair share of objectives to take.
41. When both sides are convinced they're about to lose, they're both right.
42. Professional soldiers are predictable; the world is full of dangerous amateurs.
43. Military Intelligence is a contradiction.
44. Fortify your front; you'll get your rear shot up.
45. Weather ain't neutral.
46. If you can't remember, the Claymore is pointed towards you.
47. Air defense motto: shoot 'em down; sort 'em out on the ground.
48. 'Flies high, it dies; low and slow, it'll go'.
49. The Cavalry doesn't always come to the rescue.
50. Napalm is an area support weapon.
51. Mines are equal opportunity weapons.
52. B-52s are the ultimate close support weapon.
53. Sniper's motto: reach out and touch someone.
54. Killing for peace is like screwing for virginity.
55. The one item you need is always in short supply.
56. Interchangeable parts aren't.
57. It's not the one with your name on it; it's the one addressed "to whom it may concern" you've got to think about.
58. When in doubt, empty your magazine.
59. The side with the simplest uniforms wins.
60. Combat will occur on the ground between two adjoining maps.
61. If the Platoon Sergeant can see you, so can the enemy.
62. Never stand when you can sit, never sit when you can lie down, never stay awake when you can sleep.
63. The most dangerous thing in the world is a Second Lieutenant with a map and a compass.
64. Exceptions prove the rule, and destroy the battle plan.
65. Everything always works in your HQ, everything always fails in the Colonel's HQ.
66. The enemy never watches until you make a mistake.
67. One enemy soldier is never enough, but two is entirely too many.
68. A clean (and dry) set of BDU's is a magnet for mud and rain.
69. The worse the weather, the more you are required to be out in it.
70. Whenever you have plenty of ammo, you never miss. Whenever you are low on ammo, you can't hit the broad side of a barn.
71. The more a weapon costs, the farther you will have to send it away to be repaired.
72. The complexity of a weapon is inversely proportional to the IQ of the weapon's operator.
73. Field experience is something you don't get until just after you need it.
74. No matter which way you have to march, its always uphill.
75. If enough data is collected, a board of inquiry can prove anything.
76. For every action, there is an equal and opposite criticism. (in boot camp)
77. Air strikes always overshoot the target, artillery always falls short.
78. When reviewing the radio frequencies that you just wrote down, the most important ones are always illegible.
79. Those who hesitate under fire usually do not end up KIA or WIA.
80. The tough part about being an officer is that the troops don't know what they want, but they know for certain what they don't want.
81. To steal information from a person is called plagiarism. To steal information from the enemy is called gathering intelligence.
82. The weapon that usually jams when you need it the most is the M60.
83. The perfect officer for the job will transfer in the day after that billet is filled by someone else.
84. When you have sufficient supplies & ammo, the enemy takes 2 weeks to attack. When you are low on supplies & ammo the enemy decides to attack that night.
85. The newest and least experienced soldier will usually win the Medal of Honor.
86. A Purple Heart just proves that were you smart enough to think of a plan, stupid enough to try it, and lucky enough to survive.
87. Murphy was a grunt.
88. Beer Math --> 2 beers times 37 men equals 49 cases.
89. Body count Math --> 3 guerrillas plus 1 probable plus 2 pigs equals 37 enemies killed in action.
90. The bursting radius of a hand grenade is always one foot greater than your jumping range.
91. All-weather close air support doesn't work in bad weather.
92. The combat worth of a unit is inversely proportional to the smartness of its outfit and appearance.
93. The crucial round is a dud.
94. Every command which can be misunderstood, will be.
95. There is no such place as a convenient foxhole.
96. Don't ever be the first, don't ever be the last and don't ever volunteer to do anything.
97. If your positions are firmly set and you are prepared to take the enemy assault on, he will bypass you.
98. If your ambush is properly set, the enemy won't walk into it.
99. If your flank march is going well, the enemy expects you to outflank him.
100. Density of fire increases proportionally to the curiousness of the target.
101. Odd objects attract fire - never lurk behind one.
102. The more stupid the leader is, the more important missions he is ordered to carry out.
103. The self-importance of a superior is inversely proportional to his position in the hierarchy (as is his deviousness and mischievousness).
104. There is always a way, and it usually doesn't work.
105. Success occurs when no one is looking, failure occurs when the General is watching.
106. The enemy never monitors your radio frequency until you broadcast on an unsecured channel.
107. Whenever you drop your equipment in a fire-fight, your ammo and grenades always fall the farthest away, and your canteen always lands at your feet.
108. As soon as you are served hot chow in the field, it rains.
109. Never tell the Platoon Sergeant you have nothing to do.
110. The seriousness of a wound (in a fire-fight) is inversely proportional to the distance to any form of cover.
111. Walking point = sniper bait.
112. Your bivouac for the night is the spot where you got tired of marching that day.
113. If only one solution can be found for a field problem, then it is usually a stupid solution.
114. Radios function perfectly until you need fire support.
115. What gets you promoted from one rank gets you killed in the next rank.
116. Odd objects attract fire. You are odd.
117. Your mortar barrage will put exactly one round on the intended target. That round will be a dud.
118. Mine fields are not neutral.
119. The weight of your equipment is proportional to the time you have been carrying it.
120. Things that must be together to work can never be shipped together.
121. If you need an officer in a hurry take a nap.
122. The effective killing radius is greater than the average soldier can throw it.
123. Professionals are predictable, its the amateurs that are dangerous.
124. No matter which way you have to march, its always uphill.
125. The worse the weather, the more you are required to be out in it.
126. The quartermaster has only two sizes, too large and too small. (or "on order")
127. The only time suppressive fire works is when it is used on abandoned positions.
128. When a front line soldier overhears two General Staff officers conferring,
he has fallen back too far.
129. Don't ever be the first, don't ever be the last, and don't ever volunteer to do anything.
130. If at first you don't succeed, then bomb disposal probably isn't for you.
131. Any ship can be a minesweeper . . . . once.
132. Whenever you lose contact with the enemy, look behind you.
133. If you find yourself in front of your platoon they know something you don't.
134. The seriousness of a wound (in a firefight) is inversely proportional to the distance to any form of cover.
135. The more stupid the leader is, the more important missions he is ordered to carry out.
136. When the pin is pulled, Mr. Grenade is not your friend.
137 When the enemy is closing, the artillery will always be to long
138 Smart bombs have bad days too.
139 Uncrating and assembly instructions are always inside the crate.
140 If you have a personality conflict with your superior: he has the personality, you have the conflict.
141 If you enter the CO's Presence with an idea, you will leave his Presence with the CO's idea.
142. All or any of the Murphys Laws above combined.
The question boils down to who is allowed to play in China's backyard. A quick glance at a map shows that the Western Pacific is a lot closer to Bejiing than Los Angeles. But the U.S. has allies over there: Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam (who'd have believed it?), and the biggest flashpoint of all, Taiwan. China regards Taiwan as a renegade republic that must be reclaimed for the Fatherland, while the other nations claim resource-rich waters and islands that resource-hungry China also calls its own. Considering that China versus its neighbors, with the possible exception of Japan, is like Mike Tyson versus Tiny Tim, America is the only power that can stand up to the biggest kid in the neighborhood. It's not a question of altruism. The U.S. has its interests. So does China. Much mayhem may ensue.
Air-Sea Battle—and a U.S.-China War—would be primarily a missile war. China would use its vast arsenal, including carrier-killing ballistic missiles originally designed to carry nukes, to target the platforms that project U.S. power: airbases in Taiwan, Japan, and islands such as Diego Garcia and Guam, as well as the mobile airbases that are the U.S. Navy's aircraft carriers. If China can neutralize American airpower, it will render American ground and sea forces (except for subs) impotent, and then Beijing can go about its business as it invades Taiwan or the Spratly Islands. Under Air-Sea Battle, America would use its own missiles to destroy China's sensor network; if China can't detect the carriers in the wide-open ocean, it can't shoot at them. Then American forces would destroy own China's missile forces, and then... who knows how this war would end.
a game that realistically simulates ground combat as practiced by the People's Liberation Army, which seems to moving away from human-wave tactics to a high-tech Western-style military. But that's the problem. We don't know how China would fight. Other than Korea 1950-53 and brief border conflicts with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979, the Chinese military hasn't fought a war except against its own people. The U.S. has much more combat experience, but how much a decade of chasing barefoot Taliban will prepare us for fighting an enemy with high-tech aircraft and missiles is another question.
Read the rest.The Second Sino-Indian War started with border skirmishes in disputed territories between India and China[2] starting December of 2056. The initial skirmishes turned into artillery crossfire on no-man-zone for three months.
Following an impending nuclear and all out invasion threat from India in March 2057, China launched an all out retaliation and invasion of India. China called upon her allies in the region to join the war.
After Pakistan and Burma joined the Chinese-led invasion into India, as well as Vietnam joining China, Pakistan and Burma's naval operations against the Indian navy in the Indian Ocean, Japan declared war on China and launched naval, air and marine operations against China. Japan's actions triggered North Korea to join the war on the Chinese side. Thus, leading the Sino-Indian War into a regional war in South and East Asia.
According to the US Navy, the aim of the exercises is to ‘strengthen the stability of the Pacific Region.’ India, though, officially dismisses this sweeping rhetoric, arguing that the exercises are simply a learning opportunity for the Indian Navy. Sources say the emphasis of this latest ‘learning exercise’ for the Indian Navy will be on anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, air defence, live-fire gunnery training, and visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) operations.
So what is Japan’s interest in taking part? For a start, while Japan’s relations with Moscow and Beijing are erratic, India is seen as a stable and reliable long-term partner, a point underscored by Japan’s recently released National Defence Programme Guidelines.
After touching on the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which provide the traditional parameters of Japanese interests, the guidelines state that Japan must increase its cooperation with India and other countries that share the common interest of enhancing the security of maritime navigation from Africa to the Middle East to East Asia.
India, for its part,hopes to secure access to defence platforms and technologies that Japan has made a priority, such as maritime patrol, air defences, ballistic missile responses, transportation and command communications.
There are two main reasons for India’s courting of Vietnam. One is that both India and Vietnam have had experience bearing the brunt of Chinese aggression – India in 1962, and Vietnam in 1979. More recently, the collapse of the Soviet Union – long a security guarantor for both India and Vietnam in Asia – left New Delhi and Hanoi without their all-weather, all-powerful friend.
But India also has an eye on bolstering ties in East Asia – and not just with Japan. Last September, Antony, who is fast emerging as a quiet but effective player in India's military diplomacy, became the first-ever Indian defence minister to visit South Korea.
Indeed, Seoul is seen as a perfect counterbalance to the China – North Korea -Burma – Pakistan axis that New Delhi and the United States regard as a major irritant to Asia-Pacific stability.
Late last week the Hainan provincial government enacted regulations that provide for boarding or even seizing ships that “illegally” enter Chinese-claimed waters or land on Chinese-claimed islands. Yesterday the Wall Street Journal reported that Chinese fishing boats cut the cables on a Vietnamese vessel exploring for oil over the weekend. And of course Beijing has taken to printing a map in newly issued passports that includes the “nine-dashed line” enclosing most of the South China Sea. Commentators rightly speculated about where Hainan’s directive applies,
Scant days before the Hainan government promulgated its regulations, the news broke that ASEAN governments intend to negotiate a regional trade bloc that also encompasses Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and ... China.
This Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership will exclude the United States, which has been pushing an eleven-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership.That seems a tad perverse at a time when Southeast Asians look to America as their balancer of first resort against China, which wants to modify the regional order to their detriment. Why should Beijing desist from objectionable policies if it knows it will pay no price for them?
chaanakya wrote:Murphys Law of Combat Operations
10. Never share a foxhole with anyone braver than yourself.
12. Never forget that your weapon was made by the lowest bidder.
22. The easy way is always mined.
37. Anything you do can get you killed, including nothing.
54. Killing for peace is like screwing for virginity.
57. It's not the one with your name on it; it's the one addressed "to whom it may concern" you've got to think about.
58. When in doubt, empty your magazine.
71. The more a weapon costs, the farther you will have to send it away to be repaired.
75. If enough data is collected, a board of inquiry can prove anything.
The two launch sites described above are the most actively visible in the satellite images. But there are more sites that appear to be involved in missile operations. North along the main road is what appears to be five smaller dispersed parking or launch platforms. None of these sites had any vehicles or infrastructure visible in 2005, but the new image shows one 13-meter truck present at four of the five sites. One of the sites appears to be upgrading with new access roads, a building, and half a dozen service vehicles (see right).
Further to the west, approximately 10 miles (17 km) from site 1 and 2, is another road leading north into the mountains. Along this road, another eight possible dispersal launch sites are visible. No 13-meter trucks, buildings, or other vehicles are visible at these sites.
Whereas targeting New Delhi could be considered normal for a non-alert retaliatory posture like China’s, targeting Russian ICBM fields and air bases would be a step further in the direction of a counterforce posture. But again, it is unknown exactly what role the Delingha missiles have, and the DF-21 may not be accurate enough to pose a serious risk to hardened Russian ICBM silos. Regardless of targeting, Delingha appears to be very active.
A single B-2 stealth bomber with conventional JDAM bombs would probably be sufficient to incapacitate the Delingha missile launch sites. One of the most striking features about the sites is their high vulnerability to attack. All appear to be almost entirely surface-based facilities (although Site 2 has an underground structure), and a mobile missile launcher is extremely vulnerable once it has been discovered. The sites were possible DF-21 launchers were detected are located within a distance of about six miles (10 kilometers). A single high-yield nuclear warhead would probably be sufficient to neutralize the entire force visible in the images.
But an adversary might not even have to cross the nuclear threshold. A single U.S. B-2 bomber loaded with non-nuclear JDAM bombs (see this video) would probably be sufficient to neutralize the dozen launch sites seen in the images. The United States has begun to incorporate such advanced conventional weapons into its strategic strike plans to give the president “more options.” Since China has repeatedly pledged that it “will not be the first to use such [nuclear] weapons at any time and in any circumstance,” some might conclude that a conventional strike on Chinese nuclear forces would not trigger Chinese use of nuclear weapons. But whether Beijing (or anyone else) would indeed stand idle by as its nuclear forces were taken out by conventional weapons is highly questionable.
Probably other members could put in a request.I want to buy Novel Chimera by Mr Vivek Ahuja. It is scheduled to release in Amazon. Could you please make it available through Flipkart in India. and If we can pre book the copy for quick delivery.
More details on the book here.
http://mach-five.blogspot.in/2012/12/i- ... wn-by.html
Second Artillery Corps missile units are organized into what the PLA refers to as “bases”. There are six bases, each located in a different geographical area. Described in the terms used by the Russian military, these bases are analogous to Russia's “Missile Armies”. Each base has numerous subordinate missile brigades, with each brigade maintaining one or more garrisons, various underground facilities (UGFs), rail transfer points, and field launch positions.
Identifying field launch sites for the 2nd Artillery Corps' missile force can be a difficult proposition, and there are likely hundreds of such locations as yet unlocated. Careful analysis can be used to identify likely locations, however. The majority of these positions will contain a hardened concrete pad where the associated missile will be erected for launch. Certain missile systems will typically have very similar or even identical launch positions. Usually, it appears that most units within a given base will adopt a similar launch site design for a given missile type, although this is not uniform.