Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

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Karna_A
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by Karna_A »

They should have come out and laid out the choices, which would have driven up Musharraf's trouser-laundry bill through the roof and ended the incident right away.
Its a fallacy to think that TSP is actually scared of War. Do you think Hamas/Hijbullah is scared of war? In fact, TSP secretly welcomes it as they have nothing to lose. Any conventional missile attack on Indian chemical plants would cause dozens of Bhopals all over India. Is Indian public ready for that? Of Course same would happen in TSP but as I said, they got nothing to lose. India has more to lose in a war simply cause it has more development.
Covert war is the answer. Pay in the same coin. It's a battle of attrition.
They put one of yours in the hospital, you put one of theirs in the morgue as Sean Connery said in Untouchables.
Last edited by Karna_A on 06 Feb 2009 06:41, edited 2 times in total.
CRamS
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by CRamS »

Karna_A wrote:Its a fallacy to think that TSP is actually scared of War. Do you think Hamas/Hijbullah is scared of war? In fact, TSP secretly welcomes it as they have nothing to lose. Any missile attack on Indian chemical plants would cause dozens of Bhopals all over India. Is Indian public ready for that? Of Course same would happen in TSP but as I said, they got nothing to lose. India has more to lose in a war simply cause it has more development.
Covert war is the answer. Pay in the same coin. It's a battle of attrition.
They put one of yours in the hospital, you put one of theirs in the morgue as Sean Connery said in Untouchables.
Makes sense, but my question is why doesn't TSP do that even without an Indian attack? There is no doubt that a war with the resulting stalemate that would most likely ensue (if all the analysits are to be believed) would be in TSP's interests as they have nothing to loose. But so why don't they start one overtly? What are they scared of?
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by John Snow »


"attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence,
subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence"
Sun Tzu
Karna_A
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by Karna_A »

CRamS,
In this the logic of Indian govt is similar to TSP Govt.
Why would TSP take that step knowing well that it would result in its own Military and Industrial destruction too when it could easily do multiple Mumbai(s) without any meaningful Indian response. Why pay for something when you can get part of it as free?

Covert war has been free for TSP for last 10-15 years.

The Indian logic for not retaliating is why not achieve diplomatically(free) as opposed to paying the price of tit for tat war?
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by enqyoob »

Karna_A:

What is the basis for saying that Pakistan will not back off from war, please? Skirmishes on the border or in Siachen are one thing, but facing the prospect of Indian tanks on the streets of Lahore or Pindi is quite another. The latter means the total loss of the huge holdings of the TSPA senior officers, and I see no reason to believe that they will take any step that results in that. They may CONTROL the wild-eyed jehadis, but the senior staff are just kleptocrats who care only about themselves and their wealth and possessions.

This is where the Pakistani bluff, unchallenged by India for 60 years, has truly paid off.

In 1965 India was on the verge of breaking through, and could have smashed and taken Lahore and Sialkot. In 1971, Rahim Yar Khan was within striking distance, and Pakjab could have been isolated. In each of these cases, the Pak senior staff went into total panic and only the trusted UN Ceasefire saved their behinds.

In 2002 it is true that they massed their army at the border, but it was clearly a bluff.

In 2009 they have strike forces masses at the border, but I don't think they have fuel for everh 5 days. The panic is evident in their statements if you look behind the bravado. So why not push them to the brink and make their bravado collapse? I bet they'll do a Niazi.

Of course I would be betting the lives of a few hundred thousand Indians... but trust me, its a safe bet.. :mrgreen:
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by enqyoob »

The other thing that occurs to me is that desis born after, say, 1990 seem to have a much greater fear of Pakistan that those born a couple of decades b4 that. This is the true victory of Paki and Vote-Banki propaganda in India. I guess it does make sense because they have no memory of the 1965 and 1971 wars, only of this hype about "NewClear-Almed Pakistan". The willingness to sue for peace at all costs seems pervasive, and they make the Pakis appear to be 10-foot giants. Even the 1999 Kargil war has been turned into a mental defeat by this generation, apparently (no generalizing to EVERYONE in this generation, but I have seen this attitude pervasive among so many that the statement is valid).

This is really sad. I think prior generations simply had lower life expectancy, and a much greater sense of fatalism. They (we) understood that there is only one way to deal with a bully - by punching the daylights out of the bully.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by pradeepe »

And it isnt just that we have to run headfirst into an armed conflict. That option is always there as "part" of the offensive in tackling pakistan. Most people in India understand the implications of an armed conflict, but we havent shied away from it either when we had to.

For a start, MKN & Pranab could ( btw, do they realize that they seem to be whispering sweet nothings to each other more than talking to toadistan) announce that all trade, transport and overflights are immediately suspended until pakistan takes meaningful action as determined by India. Or put that question to the public and see if they endorse that. The GoI fears that the most. The day the guvnment starts asking such questions to its people, is the day, they lose their incredibly chankian bail out option from all hard decisions. And out goes the "Inaction is Action" maya.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by Karna_A »

TSP may or may not back off the war depending on 3 main variables: So it can change over time as the variables change.
(a) Who the Army Chief is and composition/mentality of Corps commanders.
(b) The advice from KSA, Chicom and
(c) Pressure or lack of it from Unkil
Musharraf was intelligent, in the way he didn't think all out war was in TSP's best interest.
A guy like Beg, Gul or Kayanee: Who knows.
I guess Indian tanks in Pindi were possible before 1987. But after that, it's just wishful though patriotic thinking. TSP would drop a low yield Nuke on Indian strike forces before Lahore, maybe on its own teritorry. Then what the reaction of India would be depends on who the PM and cabinet is. It would be worth the exercise to wargame it. Further TSP conventional missiles would create few Bhopals in Indian cities and also take down few important dams causing massive floods with casualties in millions.
Of course, 90% of TSP would be same with Indian missiles. Question is: Is 30% of India worth 90% of TSP? I think not.
So answer for low cost covert is low cost covert.
narayanan wrote:Karna_A:

What is the basis for saying that Pakistan will not back off from war, please? Skirmishes on the border or in Siachen are one thing, but facing the prospect of Indian tanks on the streets of Lahore or Pindi is quite another.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by RajeshA »

If India wants to deal with TSP effectively, we need a couple of other fronts which can neutralize the friends of TSP also.

We need a front to neutralize the Saudi support to TSP. For that there has to be a Shia option on the table. Before Khatami, there was a constant danger to the Saudis, that the Iranians would just march up over the sand dunes and take over Mecca and Medina. This danger needs to be reactivated. Our involvement in this issue, should be such, that Saudis fear that if we let the leash go, hordes of Shia would fall upon the Saudis, and take them apart. I know this is a bit far fetched considering our diplomatic standing at the moment, but over 5-6 years this thing can change. In fact, we could strive for Shia control over the two holy places, simply because Shia control could also change the outlook of IMs.

China too needs to be neutralized. For that we should strengthen our Tibet card, we should strengthen our relations with Japan and Vietnam. We should enhance our relations with Taiwan, at least the economic and cultural kind. We should build some dependencies with USA, and then throw out our nuclear-test ban out of the window, and improve on our bomb designs. We should work hard, really hard on improving our long-range missile capability, and put sufficient effort in a commissioning nuclear-armed submarines. We also need bring that missile shield on line as soon as possible. We need to bolster our defenses in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Bhutan, besides developing the infrastructure in these places as a top priority. We do need a strong alliance with USA, at least temporarily, to offset Chinese urge to mess around with India.

Thirdly we need to prepare for nuclear war in India.

Those in India, who fear war with Pakistan, probably also fear it, because we think, we are unprepared, and they are right. We are unprepared, but what hurts is, that GoI also does not improve our preparedness level either. The bigger problem is that this Government does not prepare Indians psychologically for war either.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by enqyoob »

Karna_A: The question remains. What is the basis for saying that "Pakistan will drop a low-yield nuke on Indian forces in their territory"?

Again, this is an example of just repeating Pakistan's threats, without trying to see if they are valid. IOW, post-1987, there is a petrification / fossilization in Indian thinking on this.

WHY would Pakistan drop a low-yield nuke, given the rest of what you wrote there? Are they incapable of figuring that part out? Reading the Pakistani newspaper columns by fairly knowledgeable ex-military or diplomat types, it is clear that they don't believe in this instant nuclear-option stuff. Only Indians are petrified by the threat. Pakistanis make it pretty clear that they don't even believe that there is a single nuke left in TSP.

But some other things can be safely assumed:

a) Any large move of tanks into TSP would be preceded by pretty heavy raids on TSP's assets, including storage depots for any nukes. Lists of facilities are exchanged, but that only means that those will be targeted in the first 5 minutes, and that they will be empty.

So the tactical nukes etc. will be in unannounced places, and of course most will be known from intel or aerial / satellite imaging or tapped cellphone communications, so all such facilities will get hit. As long as that air/missile war phase is going on, any use of nukes means a strategic exchange, so it is not going to happen.

b)Any commander who uses tactical nukes knows that he and his entire force will be annihilated, or caught and tortured to death. I don't doubt that Pakistani officers have sworn to defend their slum to the death, but using tactical nukes is the exact opposite: it guarantees the extinction of your slum as well. So will he use the weapons?

c) Meanwhile the choice facing the top brass in TSP is a quick exit or death, and I see no evidence that they will choose the second option.

d) Any field officer who gets tactical nukes in his control, including the knowledge to arm and fire them, becomes an instant coup threat in Pakistan. So allowing tactical nukes to fall into the hands of junior suicidal types is incompatible with survival, and hence there is no way that the top brass will allow that. Consider this: Colonel Abdul is given tactical nukes, and ordered to go fire them at the Indian forces. He has 2 choices:
i) Mass death
ii) Turn around and drive back towards Pindi and aim and arm the nukes, and invite the govt to invite him in as the next Mahdi /CEO. So that he can sue for peace, showing that he saved 100,000,000,000,000,000,000 lives in India AND Pakistan. Instant praise in DC and Dilli.

Which do u think Abdul will choose? Can't the TSPA top brass figure that out?

e) So... the threat of tactical nukes is empty. They cannot afford to let those fall into the hands of anyone who can use them.

f) Once the tactical nukes are gone, and the fuel is over, the TSPA armored divisions have only one option: White Flag Calisthenics.

So the whole TSP threat is a paper tiger. Yeah, I know.. I sound like the mad general in "Octopussy"
Inside 96 hours we will have conquered all of western Europe!


Let me know what are your arguments against these. Simply declaring that "Pakistan will use tactical nukes against advancing Indian forces" is Tom Clancy level of argument, does not survive elementary levels of thinking. One has to look deeper.


P.S. After u have had a chance to read this, I am going to move these posts to RahulM's thread on "Boom or Bluff?" where I see that more authoritative ppl than I have also gone a lot deeper than the Tom Clancy assumptions. But they have not yet pointed out that real reason why tactical nukes cannot be used - the coup threat. The only interest on this thread is that Indian non-response is largely because of unthinking Indian self-terrorization.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by CRamS »

Karna_A:

There are elements in your thesis I agree with, but over all I disagree that only covert options are the best answer. First of all, as much as Sindhis and Balchis hate TSP, I doubt they have as vile a vengful, suicidal motivation to attack TSP mainland as much as the Punjabi (and some Mohajir) dominated pigs in collusion with Indian muslims 5th colmnists have to attack Indian mainland. It is for this reason TSP will be more successful in covert warfare. India simply does not have the kind of assets in TSP as much as TSP has in India.

I am still of the opinion, the if the entire Indian state, and that includes aam junta like you and me, the politicians and media elite, and perhaphs even sections of military top brass, shed our cowardly attitude towards TSP, there are military and ecomomic pressures we can bring to bear. I mean think about it. If Indian elite b@#$%^ds are really serious about detering TSP, do you think a vengful terrorist like Musharaff will will be allowed to come to India and spew his bile? Do you think, tough economic sanctions would not have been applied by now? Give me a break.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by Prem »

I think before the initiation of punishement , we should let Sindhi, Baluchis and Nationalistic Pashtoons know that our intent is to practice Danda Love to Pakjabis only . The idea is to give them chance to decide their own course of action and consequences.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by ramana »

Even better will let them implement/enforce Danda love.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by Prem »

ramana wrote:Even better will let them implement/enforce Danda love.
The card should be kept for taking surrender Dacca ishtyle. Hope Arora's son is in the Military. :mrgreen:
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by Karna_A »

narayanan wrote:Karna_A: The question remains. What is the basis for saying that "Pakistan will drop a low-yield nuke on Indian forces in their territory"?
There are numerous sources for the info. As I said before, for each chief, it would/can be different.
But the best thing is to put yourself in the TSP PA Chief position. What would you do if you are PA Chief and Indian forces are say 5km from Lahore/Pindi given all your psychology/training
http://www.unidir.ch/pdf/articles/pdf-art1827.pdf
http://www.boloji.com/opinion/0676.htm
http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_di ... ear_option

The same applies to India if Chicom forces are close to Lucknow/Kanpur having come through Nepal. India would and should do same.
The tactical nukes would still be used through planes and missiles so they would still be under control of TSP chief.
So 2 the questions are
What would you do if you are TSP chief and Indian forces are closing into Lahore.
What would you do if you are Indian PM and Chicom forces and closing into Lucknow.
For both, the answer for me is the same.
Should the Pakistan army find itself unable to stop the Indian juggernaut, it may consider launching nuclear strikes against India's mechanized forces operating inside its territory. However, Pakistan has a lot to lose by initiating nuclear strikes. Its military leaders are well aware that while India will sustain considerable damage in a Pakistani first strike, India's massive retaliatory strike will completely destroy major Pakistani cities, industry and combat forces and Pakistan will cease to exist as a nation state.
Last edited by Karna_A on 07 Feb 2009 02:14, edited 2 times in total.
ramana
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by ramana »

Actually if there is a collusion between TSP and Chicom forces in any invasion of India the NFU goes. ABV already said this long ago. Dont know if its the same doctrine of seat warmers.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by putnanja »

Anjuman for public hanging of Ajmal
Anjuman for public hanging of Ajmal

Vidya Subrahmaniam

NEW DELHI: The Anjuman Minhaj-e-Rasool has passed a resolution demanding the public hanging of Mohammad Ajmal ‘Kasab,’ the Pakistani national caught alive during the November 26 Mumbai terror attacks.

The resolution was passed at a meeting of the Anjuman’s National Council of Advisers on February 4 and 5 in Ajmer.

At a press conference in Ajmer on Thursday, Anjuman chairman Maulana Syed Athar Hussain Dehlavi said there was no place for terrorism in Islam and in the teachings of the Holy Prophet. The Anjuman strongly condemned terrorism and wanted Ajmal hanged in full view of the public. There was no sanction in Islam for the activities of groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba.

“Muslims are patriotic”

The Maulana described the Indian Muslim as a patriotic citizen, who was ready to lay down his life for the country. He appealed to Muslim youth not to be swayed by emotion, and affirmed that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India. Reading out from the resolution, the Maulana demanded that the government immediately withdraw its affidavit filed in the Supreme Court, which described the keeping of beard as a non-obligatory practice in Islam.

Key issues

He said the meeting discussed three specific issues related to Indian Muslims — identity, security and equity — and noted that the Indian Muslims were not a minority but formed the second largest majority in India.

The Maulana regretted that despite this, political parties were treating the community casually. He was also critical of the Muslim leadership, blaming it for the current plight of the community
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by brihaspati »

The Islamic leadership never itself commits suicide - it sends others to die. I would disagree with the general understanding here - this is the Indic viewpoint of "shaurya", and Abhimanyu type self-destruction for "veera-dhrama". We cannot necessarily model others by our oown concepts. My hunch is that faced with defeat, they will not do anything that jeopardizes their retreat with some chances of preservation of wealth and freedom. They will bluff till the last moment, but then negotiate. The danger comes from the more fanatical lower ranks for whom the the theologians might have a greater believability factor and who may stage a mini-coup in the last resort. But in my studies on Islam's military history - I rarely find the elite or military leadership willing to go to final annihilation, if possible to avoid. India can and should call TSP's bluff after taking reasonable precautions of moving Indian populations out of range. The latter can be passed off as regular and routine public safety exercises.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by ShauryaT »

Karna_A: I think you missed some important questions.

- What will PRC do, if IA is near Lhasa?
- What will PRC do if IA attacks, Guiyang, by passing through Burma?

Why presume that only PRC has the capability to attack?
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by enqyoob »

There is nothing there. The "sources" who say that TSP will use tactical nukes are exactly what I describe as "tom clancy" - things like STRATFOR. The "Kashmir is a FlashPoint" types. Please read the counter-arguments in the "Boom or Bluff" thread.

If Indian forces are near Lahore, that is after the TSP's air defenses are down - who the heck would send mass armored forces to Lahore before the air war is won? Also, I don't see why the Indian attack at that point would be a concentrated mass of tanks - it is much more likely to be a widespread, fast-moving attack, avoiding the population centers until the TSPA has been taken out. Any use of tactical nukes then means suicide of the ones using the nukes, and the end of TSP. So I think in that situation, mass surrender or panicked retreat is the most likely scenario.

Also, note that you are forced to argue that the top leadership will retain control of the tactical nukes. I agree - which means that they won't use it as long as they can escape. In fact if you read writings by Beg in 1999-2000, you might have seen his article "WARS FOR A CEASEFIRE" which points out that in every war, Pakistani strategy is mainly to try and hold territory until there is a UN /US ceasefire. They have never gone in for suicide. In 1965, whenever a pocket of Pakis found themselves bypassed, they just surrendered to whoever would accept their weapons.

Better question is: "Will the Pakjabi Top Leadership commit mass suicide just because Muzzafarabad, Skardu and Gilgit bases are not answering their telephones?" or because Muridke and Peshawar resemble Gaza?

If I were a Paki commander, I would do a quick reality check. As long as the Big Brass are still giving stupid orders, I would pretend to be carrying them out. If there is hope of a quick ceasefire, I might ask my troops to hide, scatter, keep their weapons, try to survive and fight on.

But once I see that this time it is a real attack, and that the Brass in Pindi are leaving on their private jets, then I would swiftly change into my burqua and melt into the countryside, keeping enough bullets to try to protect my harem and goats from the rampaging "tribesmen" who will come when the Indians pull out. Because common sense will tell me that the Indians are only targeting the military, and the far worse threat is the Pathans and Balochis who have always wanted to visit Lahore and Faisalabad and Multan.

If I have any tactical nukes, I know I am a target (my captured assistants will gladly sell me down the river), so it is time to exit switfly. I would guard the nukes dearly, because later I can sell them to the Americans for big bucks and maybe a visa, once the Indian wave has washed over. So I get a gaudily decorated truck, and my "batman" Majeed, load up our 5 shells into crates, get several cans of diesel, pile a lot of dung over them and drive off. Suddenly these are worth a lot more than all my real estate holdings.

(Sorry, but u asked, this is so clearly the Paki mindset, but it requires deep study on the BENIS dhaga to understand it)
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by ramana »

N^3 Need a good cartoon for that!
But that is the reality of TSPA affsar class.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by Sumeet »

Shiv since you are saving key pictures that depict misery of non muslims at the hand of muslim violence here is one from TSP.

In a recent shia-sunni battle:


A wounded Pakistani boy waits for treatment in a local hospital after an explosion in a mosque during an evening prayer ceremony in the city of Dera Ghazi Khan, Pakistan, Thursday, Feb. 5, 2009. A suicide bomber blew himself up among worshippers streaming toward a Shiite Muslim mosque in central Pakistan on Thursday, killing 24 people and wounding dozens more, police said.

LINK1



Relatives of a victim of an explosion in Dera Ghazi Khan, react in a local hospital in Multan, Pakistan, Thursday, Feb. 5, 2009. A suicide bomber blew himself up among worshippers streaming toward a Shiite Muslim mosque in central Pakistan on Thursday, killing 24 people and wounding dozens more.

LINK2
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by VikramS »

Sumeet Can you not inline graphic images please; interested people can click through.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by Prem »

Shankar Ji,
Can you please ad the tactical nuke scenario in your storeyline? Basically Moderator Narayan is saying Baki Jernail will lack t..ical to use tactical nuke. There is another factor , Baki wont use Nuke in Punjab , they will try the trick at different place. This is why atatcking and destroying Pakjab alone will releave the unwanted burden on Mother Earth.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by CRamS »

Paging R-man, SSridhar & other experts:

I can understand why TSP would say Mumbai was planned in India, and had Indian elements (of course there was local Muslim support, no doubt about it) because once that happens, Somini, Beeb, Bakra etc will justify Mumbai by bringing in Gujarat, Babri Masjid etc. But what would TSP's motivation be to bring in Bangladesh into the equation? I mean its not as if TSP needs to draw a wedge between this pipsqueak terrorist entity BD and India, there is no love lost between the 2 anyway. Why would TSP bring in BD?
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by enqyoob »

Since I want to get away from this discussion, let me drop my other chappal along with what Prem mentioned.

The tom clancy types argue that
If India attacks and threatens to break up Pakistan, the Pakistanis will use Tactical Nukes


To which I ask
So what?


As long as Indian commanders observe reasonable prudence and avoid large gatherings, intense "bridgehead" type congestion etc., tactical nukes are not going to solve any problem for their users. There are many ways to project force across a border - concentrating fire on one narrow corridor and everyone racing through that hole is hardly the best way to do it, when we have such a long border with TSP. A good, serious invasion to break up Pakistan will first smash the PAF and PN, cut off fuel, destroy fuel storage and ammo/ missile stores, air defences, rail and road links etc. THEN there may be artillery barrages, but there may also be helicopter / parachute - delivered forces injected behind the front two defensive lines of TSPA to welcome them as they start the backward race, and turn retreat into rout. Beyond that, it will be a spread-out attack along the whole border.

Whom are the Pakis going to nuke? And if they do, isn't it inside "their" own territory?

From the Indian pov, the choice is between having the Pakis nuke themselves, or wait until they do it in an Indian city. I say that the former is a better choice.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by ramana »

Also N^3, Indian army tactic is not to attack on a narrow front like a spearhead but a broad 40~80km front like a shamsher(assault sword). So question of nukes on attack formation doesnt arise.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by ramana »

Text of interview with RAND's Christien Fair on recent report on Mumbai terrorist attack.

Interview with C. Fair
'India does not have influence over Pakistan'

Q&A: C Christine Fair, senior political scientist, RAND Corporation
KS Manjunath / New Delhi February 8, 2009, 0:50 IST

India should review its Kashmir policy for itself, not for others, C Christine Fair, senior political scientist, RAND Corporation, tells KS MANJUNATH

How would US President Barack Obama reorient the country’s policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan?
In some measure, the logic behind the appointment of Richard Holbrooke, US special envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, was to address Pakistan’s regional concerns, including its disputed borders, such as the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the LoC, among other regional issues. It was intended to demonstrate to Pakistan that the US was sensitive to its regional concerns. If you take the Kashmir issue publicly out of the portfolio, the efficacy of this initiative in communicating concern for Pakistan’s security is diminished. This is especially true because it is widely seen to have been removed from him due to effective Indian lobbying. With the current remit, he may work behind the scenes on Kashmir.

But a number of experts (Teresita Schaffer, Karl Inderfurth) have made explicit statements that Holbooke’s brief does not include Kashmir.
India has to decide what kind of neighbour it wants. It has to figure out what type of Pakistan it wants and what policies it must have to achieve that objective. For a number of reasons, India should resolve its internal Kashmir issues not only due to Pakistan but due to its own domestic political concerns. However, I think it is important to note that regional issues are not the most important driver of Pakistan’s behaviour in the region. For this reason, I am sceptical that the Holbrooke effort will achieve the results that people are hoping for. Pakistan’s fears of India are much greater than the border issues and the US has limited capability to make Pakistan feel less insecure.

Has Pakistan become a rentier state like Afghanistan since it has received $12 billion in aid in the past decade?
A rentier state is often defined as one whose expenditure up to 40 per cent is supported by an external power or other rentier income (oil, gas, etc). Afghanistan cannot collect enough domestic revenue to sustain its national defence or other government expenses, much less its development budget and recurring expenditures. Pakistan doesn’t meet these kinds of criteria for a rentier state. They are not comparable. But on the other hand, it is a rent-seeking state. It seeks rent based on its strategic importance for the US. And it has been successful in doing so in its six decades of existence.

How important is Iran in addressing the problem emanating from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border?
It’s a question of choices. The Bush administration chose not to engage Iran. That was a strange choice considering that Iran played a positive role during the Bonn Process (that laid the foundation for rebuilding Afghanistan after the Taliban was ousted). What it got in return was inclusion in the “Axis of Evil.”

A word on the recent RAND report on India’s handling of the Mumbai terror attacks.

The report identifies that India’s police have been very neglected in terms of training and equipment. Some of these police forces are deeply corrupt. India, like many countries, has problems communicating intelligence reports to the local police. The US has the same problem in terms of how the CIA communicates with the FBI and the FBI with police departments.

The difference is that America’s neighbour is not a haven for terrorist organisations that can attack the US. The salience of the problem for India is much greater considering the neighbourhood it lives in. The RAND report has said that India needs to really focus on internal security.

What “best practices” can India borrow from the US to revamp the system?

The US and India, I am sure, do have a dialogue on these issues. Ultimately, it is a question of political will and resources. Many Indian interlocutors have explained to me that the Mumbai Police have a certain notoriety for being corrupt. Yet, Mumbai is so important and needs high-quality metropolitan policing with support from a domestic investigative agency. And Mumbai needs good coastal security. But these changes are hard in a large bureaucracy. They are hard in the US system. Since policing is a state subject, reforming police forces is very difficult. Since it’s about political will and political resources, India can choose to make internal security a priority like it made its nuclear programme a priority.

What’s your reading of the various steps taken, such as the setting up of the NIA and amending laws?

India moved very quickly on legislation. Now, we have to see how it will be implemented. For example, there were many recommendations by the Kargil Review Committee, but how many have been implemented? Scepticism is warranted until action is seen. The Kargil Review Committee was very aggressive and came out with an effective analysis and excellent suggestions. But, correct me if I am wrong, very few recommendations were actually implemented. If you know your neighbour is going to be a source of terrorism or proxy war, as it has been since 1947, why would internal security not be a priority?

To be frank, India cannot do much to influence Pakistan’s behaviour at this juncture. New Delhi does not have real military options that are game-changing and the options that do exist have huge risks. But the cost of inaction by India is also very high. Clearly, India does not have influence over Pakistan and given the current political and military configuration in Afghanistan, the international community, particularly the US, has limited influence over Pakistan. Depending on China’s priorities, it could be roped in to influence Islamabad. All of this stresses the importance of strong defensive measures to protect the public from all sorts of internal and external threats.

How strident would the current administration be about multilateralism and about the reform of the UN Security Council?

Who doesn’t swear by multilateralism, it’s like apple pie and children. On UN Security Council reforms, there are many countries, such as Japan, that believe they are ahead of India in the queue. But as you know, the US is not in a position to dictate Security Council reforms.
I think in the immedaite aftermath a number of us were suggesting that internal security has to be stepped up and GOI should do everything it can to shore up internal security. Might be a good time to bring police into concurrent list. The nexus between criminals and poltiicans has to be broken. What prevents the govt from prosecuting the Mumbai mafia under antioanl security legislations? IOW those found dealing with ISI should be prosecuted under the National Security laws and those not having connections should be prosecuted under normal laws.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by enqyoob »

Which of course raises the question of how many Indian State Governments are "rentier" governments, existing only through the baksheesh of the mafia, expatriate deposits, etc., and how beholden the Central Govt Cabinet is to these. No better example than Maharashtra.... Where is Rahul Mehta and his NJBP explanation??
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by svinayak »

ramana wrote:Text of interview with RAND's Christien Fair on recent report on Mumbai terrorist attack.

I think in the immedaite aftermath a number of us were suggesting that internal security has to be stepped up and GOI should do everything it can to shore up internal security. Might be a good time to bring police into concurrent list. The nexus between criminals and poltiicans has to be broken. What prevents the govt from prosecuting the Mumbai mafia under antioanl security legislations? IOW those found dealing with ISI should be prosecuted under the National Security laws and those not having connections should be prosecuted under normal laws.
What is not discussed in the change in the laws from 2000, 2004, 2005 and 2007 which resulted in more attacks. POTA and many laws were changed in that period which created more opportunity for the terrorists to organize, plan and get support for their terrorists acts.

Why is there a change in the political view of these laws over last 10 years.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by shynee »

Surgical strikes are feasible militarily: Army chief
NEW DELHI: Against the backdrop of much-debated option of surgical strikes against terror infrastructure in Pakistan post-Mumbai terror attack, Army chief Gen Deepak Kapoor has said that such strikes are "very much feasible" militarily.

"Surgical strikes are definitely feasible but whether you wish to take that decision or not is a separate issue," he said when asked whether such strikes were feasible.

"Definitely, yes. Whether you would like to look at doing it (carrying out such strikes) by air or artillery or by another means or physically there," he said in reply to questions.

Asked if the armed forces were ready for such strikes if the political leadership had given the go-ahead, Kapoor said, "we are an army which has been involved in operations in Kashmir and Northern Command on a perpetual basis and on an on-going basis. Therefore, the question of not being ready is not frankly not relevant. And we would have been fully ready to do our task."
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by Prabu »

Its time to reform the RAW, its policies and working methodology, including training, and deployment and co-ordination with NIA, and other agencies. Go all out on aggressive training mode ! Train, Train, and Train !

Then Get inteligence ALL OVER THE GLOBE ! share, and act or make otehr players to act .
If there is no action, then there be some sort of follow up, to initiate action !

RAW should break out of 'iron cage' of bureaucracy: Sood
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by RajeshA »

‘What Pakistan does ultimately is our sole concern’: Indian Express

Interview with Pranabda.
Pranab Mukherjee: And here I must make a very small observation that there is no tension.

Q: Tension goes up when you say all options are open.

Pranab Mukherjee: Diplomatic options are there, other options are there too. But I had just said that other options are also open.

Q: So you do not see any tension. No troop movement? No activity on the borders?

Pranab Mukherjee: No tension and no troop movement from our side. We haven’t done anything to cause any tension.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by Karna_A »

Narayanan,

Well, that's exactly what I am saying.
Too many times the premise itself wrongly starts at:
(a) TSP has no nukes OR
(b) TSP will not use nukes

But the most important is to WarGame what would happen if TSP does use it, and how to minimize the after effects. If the premise itself is wrong, there would be no planning/preparation for the later scenario. General Sunderji was no fool to have started it almost 25 years back.
narayanan wrote: The tom clancy types argue that
If India attacks and threatens to break up Pakistan, the Pakistanis will use Tactical Nukes


To which I ask
So what?

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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by enqyoob »

Ah! But that is because we never wanted to use this Brahmastra. It is equivalent to
Damn the torpedoes! Full Ahead!

This works on ships because the janata cannot exit rear "tut-suit" as they say in La Paris.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by ramana »

Prabu wrote:Its time to reform the RAW, its policies and working methodology, including training, and deployment and co-ordination with NIA, and other agencies. Go all out on aggressive training mode ! Train, Train, and Train !

Then Get inteligence ALL OVER THE GLOBE ! share, and act or make otehr players to act .
If there is no action, then there be some sort of follow up, to initiate action !

RAW should break out of 'iron cage' of bureaucracy: Sood

You have to get the police out of RAW first.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by Prabu »

ramana wrote:
Prabu wrote:Its time to reform the RAW, its policies and working methodology, including training, and deployment and co-ordination with NIA, and other agencies. Go all out on aggressive training mode ! Train, Train, and Train !

Then Get inteligence ALL OVER THE GLOBE ! share, and act or make otehr players to act .
If there is no action, then there be some sort of follow up, to initiate action !

RAW should break out of 'iron cage' of bureaucracy: Sood
You have to get the police out of RAW first.
Yes ! Completly agree. But who should initiate this process ??! Our NSA Narayanan ?
HM -Chidambaram ?? or PM himself ? or Chief of NIA ? I can't see any strategic thinking which is going on in UPA ? The last reports I read about NIA was that NIA chief do not have offcie to sit !? HM -Chidambaram BUSY countering BJP, rather than coutering terrorism and in review / revamp of our inteligence mechanism ! :roll:

# Even Us offcials are acknowledging the speed in with the NIA has been formed, fine !
But what are the NIA objectives ? How it will cordinate with other agencies ? What are its power and authority over others ?
# Whats are the revised Job description for all inteligence agencies ? RAW, IB, NIA, MI, state inteligence net works etc. What specific jobs each one will do ?
# Why are we shying away to probe Local help for 26/11 ? Many experts have said (including former NSA) strike and remove all terrorist net works, in POK and in India !
# US officials are commenting on our kargil reports and saying Nothing has been done on the ground ! No implementation even after 10 years. Should we need a US expert to say that Kargil report covers all aspects & very good and we did not implement any of the recomendation by KS commitee ? ( I think it was KS commitee, correct me if i am wrong !)
# We need to bring in one simple thing called Accountability ! in Govt jobs. Especially the inteligence agencies !! No passing the buck ! Political bosses are also to be made accountable !
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by IndraD »

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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by sum »

X-post:

Even ex-Diplomats start feeling depressed now:
Link
Mumbai attacks: anatomy of a failed strategy

Kanwal Sibal

Lack of a bilateral response to the Mumbai attacks has allowed others to patronise us with advice to observe restraint, avoid tensions, engage in a dialogue with Pakistan, combat terrorism jointly, etc.

Our post-Mumbai strategy has lacked purposefulness and coherence. We have been overly cautious in our reaction to the Mumbai carnage, as if the overriding concern was to somehow salvage the policy of engagement with Pakistan pursued in recent years. We were defensive in accusing “elements in Pakistan,” and not the state agencies, of the outrage, despite the common sense view that such a highly organised, skilful commando-style operation could not have been mou nted without institutional connivance and notwithstanding the earlier evidence of the involvement of the Inter-Services Intelligence in blasting our Kabul Embassy. Subsequently, the Prime Minister chose to mention the involvement of “official agencies.”

We invited the ISI chief to India believing, presumably, that Pakistan would assist us in unravelling the Mumbai massacre, identifying, prosecuting and punishing the perpetrators and accomplices at the Pakistan end, with accompanying steps to eliminate the involved extremist groups; in sum, that Pakistan would reverse its entrenched policy of promoting terrorism against India by officially sponsored non-state actors. How we could believe this when the joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism proved totally unproductive is perplexing. And now we are publicly holding the ISI culpable for Mumbai.

The invitation to the ISI chief also suggested that we either believed that the civilian government was in sufficient control or that it and the military were largely of one mind on non-state actors targeting India. That both were unfounded assumptions is implicit in the question we now ask who really is in charge. The response of the civilian government to the Mumbai mayhem has been confused and contradictory because of internal pressures and, ultimately, it has been tutored by the military. The recent democratic gains made by Pakistan, the vitality shown by sections of its civil society and the relative political retreat of the armed forces have buckled under the stress caused by the Mumbai mayhem. Confronted with hard choices, the establishment has quickly reverted to standard posturing. Pakistan’s denials of any complicity by its nationals, its defiance in the face of Indian allegations, its belligerence to the point of creating a war hysteria, its repeated demands for evidence and proposals for joint investigation constitute well-rehearsed tactics of fending off external pressure.

Having voluntarily limited our options in responding to Mumbai, we became vulnerable to manipulation by Pakistan. We have been obliged to participate in the charade of presenting evidence, as if Pakistan’s “legitimate” doubts about the involvement of its nationals had to be removed, and that as a rule-of-law country with an independent judicial system, Pakistan had the intention and will to act seriously on the evidence proffered — a potential British Foreign Secretary David Miliband wants tested. Demanding evidence and then doing somersaults over Ajmal Amir Iman’s identity, promising time-bound completion of investigations and sharing results and then delaying progress, rejecting evidence handed over as “information,” leaking out news that the Mumbai attacks were planned outside Pakistan and then backtracking, thereafter seeking to implicate Bangladesh in the hope of creating tensions between India and the newly-elected government there, and falsely announcing that Pakistan’s preliminary response had been communicated have not only bared the Pakistani masquerade but also made us party to the trivialisation of the Mumbai aftermath. We now affirm helplessly that we have no option but to patiently wait for Pakistan to perform.

Victim India has been reduced to petitioning for justice from guilty Pakistan. Even if Pakistan’s civilian government did not direct the Mumbai attack, the manner in which it has resisted admission of any culpability of its nationals, shielding in effect the perpetrators through obfuscation, prevarication and defiance, has made it an accessory to the crime. To believe that this government can and will deliver justice would be displaying a high degree of gullibility.

We have to distinguish between crime and terror: the political dimension of terrorism has to be dealt with. We have been manoeuvred into talking essentially about trying and bringing to justice those guilty of the Mumbai killings either in India or Pakistan. The larger issue of Pakistan taking visible and credible steps to begin the process of weeding out the terrorist groups, incarcerating their leaders, clamping down on their front organisations, choking their finances, etc., has receded into the background. We have settled down to demanding the minimum from Pakistan, unmindful of the stark reality of international relations that unless the disparity in power is overwhelming between two contending parties and one side can impose its will, you will always get less than what you ask.

Our core strategy has been to gear the U.S. to deal with the Mumbai carnage as an act of international terrorism and not as an offshoot of our long-standing feud with Pakistan over Kashmir. Mr. Miliband has delivered a serious blow to this strategy, opining in writing that Kashmir is a call to arms to terrorists targeting India and lecturing the Indian leadership during his visit to settle Kashmir. This untimely attention to Kashmir just when elections have been held there successfully is in line with the Obama administration’s desire to renew U.S. diplomatic efforts to resolve Kashmir in order to reduce Pakistan’s sense of vulnerability on its eastern frontier so that it can give requisite attention to controlling its western frontier.

We calculated that bilateral restraint will strengthen our diplomatic posture in pressing the major powers to take condign action against Pakistan on our behalf. Why we could have believed that Mumbai would weigh more heavily in the balance for the U.S. than Afghanistan when dealing with Pakistan is unclear. However shocking the Mumbai assault at the human level and worrisome in terms of tactics terrorists can employ in urban situations elsewhere, U.S. pressure on Pakistan has to be subordinated to Washington’s overriding need to maximise Pakistani cooperation against the al-Qaeda and the Taliban forces out to destabilise Afghanistan.

For Barack Obama, it is exceedingly important to register success in Afghanistan, both to justify his searing criticism of George Bush’s neglect of it and to match the results of the intended “surge” there with that in Iraq under the same General Petraeus. Several statements made by Mr. Obama on the importance of stabilising Afghanistan with more robust Pakistani cooperation and the nomination of Richard Holbrooke as a Special Envoy for Afghanistan-Pakistan reflect the high political stakes involved. Mr. Holbrooke’s truncated mandate should not lull us into believing that we will be relieved of pressure. Mr. Obama’s strategy will include pressure on Pakistan leavened with sweeteners in the form of military and economic aid. Conditioning non-military aid to Pakistan, when the U.S. itself is more vulnerable and dependent, will be a complex exercise. Significantly, military aid is not being subject to Pakistani good conduct because the Pakistan army has to kept in cooperative humour. Mr. Miliband has ruled out the use of economic aid as a pressure point as that would hurt the common man in Pakistan. Without the pressure points of economic and military aid being exercised, Pakistan is not likely to change course radically, least of all towards India. Fear that the Pakistan state may collapse and the country’s nukes may fall into the hands of extremist elements will ultimately trump any real pressure on the country.
Political cover

Against this background, our reliance on the U.S. to get redress for Mumbai seems to be a political cover for avoiding bilateral action for various reasons: reluctance to admit failure of past policy, risk aversion, nervousness about U.S. reaction, disinclination to start on the wrong foot with the Obama administration and electoral considerations. Lack of a bilateral response, however, has allowed others to patronise us with advice to observe restraint, avoid tensions, engage in dialogue with Pakistan, combat terrorism jointly with it as Pakistan too is a victim of terrorism, etc. The effort is to shield the Pakistani government from official culpability and keep the focus on non-state actors.

Periodic tough-sounding statements from our leaders about all options being open, etc., are for effect to cover up lack of real action. The disconnect between verbal muscle-flexing and limp action reduces our credibility further. As time passes, options not used become more difficult to use. Initiative lost cannot be easily regained, especially when other powerful actors become involved. By doing nothing we have little leverage left. Had we taken some bilateral political measures, besides threatening to blacklist companies selling advanced weaponry to Pakistan and demanding that economic assistance by international financial institutions be made conditional on Pakistan meeting concrete benchmarks in eliminating terrorist activity within its territory, etc., we would have increased our leverage with third countries. Tactically, some of these steps should have been taken before the Obama administration took over in order to retain some bargaining options. Now it is too late.

By avoiding bilateral action we have imposed no direct cost on Pakistan, besides weakening pressure on others to act meaningfully to staunch terrorism against us. With America promising substantial military and economic aid, Pakistani rulers can conclude that, as before, a judicious mix of action and inaction on terrorism directed at U.S. interests and deniable support to terrorism against India can be a paying policy. In sum, with some tactical refining, it threatens to be business as usual for all the players.

(The writer is a former Foreign Secretary.)
Bottom line: Despite what many might say, we have goofed up big time after 26/11.
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Re: Indian Non-response to Terrorism after Mumbai

Post by IndraD »

Al-Qaeda warns India of more Mumbai-style attacks

ISI speaks through mouth of Al Qaeda

A top al-Qaeda commander, who was reported killed in a US drone strike last year, has appeared in a video warning India of more Mumbai-style terror attacks if it tried to attack Pakistan.

"India should know that it will have to pay a heavy price if it attacks Pakistan," Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, believed to be al-Qaeda's military commander in Afghanistan and ranked behind No 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri, said in a 20-minute video in Arabic received by BBC.

"They will target your economic centres and raze them to the ground." :eek:
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