Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

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sankum
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by sankum »

MOD should be more forthcoming in declaring the actual breakup of orders given or intended just like in developed countries instead of lobbies leaking all the news through paid news.

DAC clearance of 32 Dhruvs for Rs 7000 Cr for IN and CG @16 helos each would not have cost more than Rs 2500 Cr when compared to similar order for Dhruvs for IA. The rest Rs 4500Cr could very well be for sensors and weapons to be fitted to the Helos of ASW version for navy if ever it is the case.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by rohitvats »

Viv S wrote:The 'urgent' requirement for LUHs seems to be chalked up primarily to the Siachen op. That being the case, lets just lease (not even buy), just enough to support it. Order extra Dhruvs as gap-fillers for the plains formations pending arrival of HAL's LUH. Can someone tell me how many helicopters we have based at Leh (?) right now?
The fact that vested interest rake up the LUH issue and link it to Siachen does not mean the requirement is limited to Siachen. Funny thing is, it is the IAF which supports Siachen with Cheetah while IA operates ALH.

Indian Army operates more than 100 Cheetah and Chetak helicopters in what are termed as Recce & Observation Squadrons. These are in addition to sanctioned strength (for now) of 126 ALH and 60 WSI Dhruv/Rudra.

It is these R&O Squadrons which need the LUH as of yesterday. The requirement was sounded out to the government well in advance - but as with everything else under UPA-1 and UPA-2, nothing came of it inspite of trials having been done and commercial proposals submitted. Which IIRC, expired on 30th June after six month extension.

And no, you cannot simply order more Dhruv helicopters as 'gap-fillers' - for as simple a reason as HAL's hands are full in delivery what has been ordered so far by various Services.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by Viv S »

rohitvats wrote:The fact that vested interest rake up the LUH issue and link it to Siachen does not mean the requirement is limited to Siachen. Funny thing is, it is the IAF which supports Siachen with Cheetah while IA operates ALH.
Where is the scope of the requirement being questioned? Its the urgency of the requirement that is in question. And that urgency is being chalked up primarily to harsh operating conditions in Siachen. That being so, lease an appropriate of LUHs for Siachen ops.
It is these R&O Squadrons which need the LUH as of yesterday. The requirement was sounded out to the government well in advance - but as with everything else under UPA-1 and UPA-2, nothing came of it inspite of trials having been done and commercial proposals submitted. Which IIRC, expired on 30th June after six month extension.
'As of yesterday' because? Low serviceability? Falling airframe life? Will a delay of say.. two years or so waiting for HAL's LUH (maybe less, factoring the time taken to negotiate a new tender) be such a blow to the fleet?

And if so, just why can't they be supplemented by new-build Cheetals? No high altitude rotor blades required (intended for R&O squadrons).
And no, you cannot simply order more Dhruv helicopters as 'gap-fillers' - for as simple a reason as HAL's hands are full in delivery what has been ordered so far by various Services.
Same argument as with the Tejas (i.e. HAL can't build more)? That might have been a credible if not for the fact that the bulk of the 197 helicopters contracted (like the Rafales) are to be license-built at HAL as well.

Whatever the circumstances behind it, fact is the country has an opportunity at this stage to partially wean itself of its crippling import dependence. The Services couldn't care less but the MoD ought to.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by Philip »

This is not a + or- post reg. stealth fighters,JSF whatever,but an interesting historical note as to what happened in the Balkans/Kosovo War when a US F-117 was shot down.The NATO bombing campaign in the Balkans was an abject fiasco.I remember posting (Jeez! That was 15 years ago,how time on BRF has flown) some hilarious western media battlefield reports where they hit everything that moved except Serbian armour. Part of this was the very imaginative use of decoys/dummies by the Serbs.It just shows,as we've seen in the Ukraine,that legacy SAMs and radar systems are still relevant today.AWST in its latest issue has some info on the BUK SAM system,v. interesting as to its ability to track and engage multiple targets which earlier SAM systems (SA-6) couldn't.

http://www.jameshasik.com/weblog/2014/0 ... -f-35.html
08 June 2014
General Hostage's logic from the Kosovo War doesn't actually support the F-35

Last Friday, Colin Clark of Defense One had another interesting article in the Super Hornet versus Joint Strike Fighter debate—"Gen. Mike Hostage On The F-35: No Growlers Needed When War Starts”. Specifically, he reports, the head of Air Combat Command labels as “old think” the idea that the downing of an F-117 during the 1999 Kosovo War should be taken as evidence that stealth aircraft should be backed up by high-powered electronic-magnetic warfare:

"We have one F-117 shot down in 78 days of flying over that country, thousands of sorties. They shot down one airplane. And they shot down one airplane because we flew across the same spot on the ground for weeks at a time. It took them multiple weeks to figure out how to shoot the thing. Then they had to get four or five systems to do it. It took them weeks to take it out. I can accept that kind of attrition rate. I obviously don’t want to lose anyone, but good Lord, one airplane over the course of 78 days, that’s pretty impressive."

Let’s review the facts. The bombing campaign opened on 24 March 1999. The first F-117 knocked out of action—serial #82-0806, piloted by Lt. Col. Dale Zelko—went down on 27 March. That is, the Yugoslav Air Defense Force (PVO) didn’t need “weeks" to figure out how to shoot it down. However bad the American tactics, the Yugoslavs needed three days, an old P-18 meter-band search radar, an old S-125 Pechora surface-to-air missile, and some clever modifications to both by the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Zoltan Dani. It helped that his radars weren’t being jammed at the time.

On 30 April, the USAF lost another F-117 as a battle-damage write-off. On 2 May, an F-16 Falcon—serial number 88-0490, piloted by Lt. Col. David Goldfein—was bagged as another victory by Dani’s battalion, the 3rd of the 250th Missile Brigade.

So, the attrition rate was not one airplane in 78 days. It was three in 78 days. That might seem impressive, except that the result of all that bombing was the destruction of only 21 Yugoslav armored vehicles (apart, of course, from the general ransacking of Serbian and Montenegrin economic infrastructure). The bizarre rules of engagement imposed on NATO forces kept aircraft so high in the skies that they generally couldn’t find ground targets, and the ones they did find were frequently just decoys.

The problem was that across the Allied side, public opinion about the war ranged from lukewarm to downright hostile. So, just as in 1995, NATO was trying to run a war without actually getting anyone killed. This meant that the air campaign was more fencing match than knife fight. After such a high-profile American loss in the first week, the air headquarters in Vincenza had all the more political motivation to restrict bombing to the safest of situations. That may say a lot about why losses were limited to survivable damage, at least until the end of April.

It does seem remarkable that the loss rate for presumably stealthy aircraft was actually higher than that for non-stealthy aircraft. The observation is hardly statistically meaningful, but the inversion of the logic does indicate that General Hostage’s point about the F-117 isn’t just inaccurate; it’s irrelevant. The PVO needed just three days to figure out how to shoot down a stealth fighter, and the attrition rate from such a one-sided and choreographed war probably shouldn’t be cited too broadly in defense of preferred purchases.
- See more at: http://www.jameshasik.com/weblog/2014/0 ... ZiWs6.dpuf
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by Rien »

Viv S wrote:
Where is the scope of the requirement being questioned? Its the urgency of the requirement that is in question. And that urgency is being chalked up primarily to harsh operating conditions in Siachen. That being so, lease an appropriate of LUHs for Siachen ops.

Whatever the circumstances behind it, fact is the country has an opportunity at this stage to partially wean itself of its crippling import dependence. The Services couldn't care less but the MoD ought to.
GoI has indigenization as an official policy. So they definitely have to chose the less expedient of the options rather than rushing to buy imports because it is an emergency.
member_26622
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by member_26622 »

@ Phillip and Victor - I have to choose what to 'read' and 'reply', in my limited time - not going to take your bait!
member_26622
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by member_26622 »

rohitvats wrote: for as simple a reason as HAL's hands are full in delivery what has been ordered so far by various Services.
That's the predicament exactly. Instead of ordering in 100's, we keep ordering 40 LCA?, 124 Arjuns and no order so far for 155 mm desi guns ?.

Replicating production lines to double or triple output involves minimal uncertainty - expanding capacity without orders is never done though.

Hoping things are straightened out by Modi govt - Real orders means a lot more than mere talk or goal setting.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by rohitvats »

Have you taken this upon yourself to post nonsense on every thread on military forum? And just because this nonsense is supposedly in defense of 'indigenous' production, it gives you some moral high ground and people are expected to put up with such ill-informed posts repeatedly?
nik wrote: BTW - Expecting 'nonsense' comment on above from die hard importistas!
And you think you're acting cute by posting the bull-sh1t as above? You don't know jack-sh1t about anything here but feel the urge to come and literally puke on the forum. And expect people to suck-it up because you're supposedly for domestic MIL-IND Complex?
150 posts, assume 33% need LUH delivery every 3 days i.e. 20 deliveries per day, rest are Dhruv compatible. This is an inflated number in my humble opinion as I will really challenge what LUH can do which DHRUV cannot. Most of the times these helicopters do not even touch down, just hover for transfer and are off based on my readings , So LUH or DHRUV is immaterial if not touching down, plus Dhruv delivers twice as much in payload.
No less than the current Helicopter Test Pilot of HAL - and who happens to be ex-IAF and has flown in Siachen - had clarified on this very forum that geographical needs necessitate the requirement of mosquito class helicopter on Siachen. But no, here we have your EXPERT opinion on why LUH or Dhruv is immaterial for Siachen Operations! And that is based on what? Some illogical back-of-the-envelope calculation coupled with some half-arsed reading without even bothering to read/ask/search for pertinent information.

And just because some stupid magazine runs a story and links requirement for LUH with Siachen, you jump-up and down and paint the whole requirement as 'import' scam. Never mind that LUH requirement is meant to replace Cheetah and Chetak in IA/IAF service and HAL is supposed to be developing a LUH of it's own. Extending your argument further, even HAL needs to drop the development of LUH because after all, ALH can pretty do everything which LUH can, so why waster money on LUH? Right?

Think before you post such juvenile stuff. And from next time, don't expect it to go w/o a reply.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by rohitvats »

nik wrote: That's the predicament exactly. Instead of ordering in 100's, we keep ordering 40 LCA?, 124 Arjuns and no order so far for 155 mm desi guns ?. Replicating production lines to double or triple output involves minimal uncertainty - expanding capacity without orders is never done though. Hoping things are straightened out by Modi govt - Real orders means a lot more than mere talk or goal setting.
Dude, do you even bother to think before posting such idiotic stuff? What is the bloody relationship between number of units ordered for Arjun and LCA and Dhruv?

Just a couple of pages back, a poster had made an effort and given a detailed break-up of total ALH + variants ordered by various services - the number stands at phenomenal 350+ helicopters including those already inducted. You think this is a piecemeal order?

Secondly, why would you need additional production facility if the existing rate of production per annum can be increased? Like how as of 2012, HAL has production capacity of 25 ALH per annum which was to be increased to 36 ALH/annum to meet the demand.

Finally, IA itself will induct 200+ ALH and WSI-ALH into service - and these will be 'new' inductions i.e. they will not be replacing anything in IA but be a new category all together. Have you ever bothered to think that maybe, there is some correlation between numbers ordered and absorption capacity of a particular Service? That is takes time to build capacity to induct a new system especially when you've never operated anything in the class earlier? Like having a pool of pilots and engineers and the whole paraphernalia?

So, HAL has more than enough orders. And seems to have increased the production capacity to meet that order.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by rohitvats »

Viv S wrote: Where is the scope of the requirement being questioned? Its the urgency of the requirement that is in question. And that urgency is being chalked up primarily to harsh operating conditions in Siachen. That being so, lease an appropriate of LUHs for Siachen ops.
Just because someone comes out with an idiotic report does not mean you need to jump up and down on it, isn't it? Further, the urgency of requirement FOR SIACHEN is there because of HAL not bothering to develop the right kind of blades for Cheetal helicopters which were in fact ordered as 'interim' purchase pending induction of LUH.

As for leasing part, well, you really think that is how the system works in India? And did you think through this suggestion - Leasing simply will not mean taking 20-odd choppers on hire. There will be expense related to training, conversion, logistics, maintenance and the whole paraphernalia. Not to forget it also means grounding the 10-odd Cheetal ordered by IAF in 2006 whose delivery was completed in 2012-13. Wastage of money all-around, don't you think?
'As of yesterday' because? Low serviceability? Falling airframe life? Will a delay of say.. two years or so waiting for HAL's LUH (maybe less, factoring the time taken to negotiate a new tender) be such a blow to the fleet? And if so, just why can't they be supplemented by new-build Cheetals? No high altitude rotor blades required (intended for R&O squadrons).
'As of yesterday' because both IAF and IA are already short of the number of Cheetah/Chetak types sanctioned. As against sanctioned strength of 213 Chetak and Cheetah units in it's fleet, IA in 2012 had 184 units.

And IA had ordered 20 Cheetal as 'interim' purchase as of 2013; there is only a limit to which you'd go with interim purchase to shore up your numbers. Simply because you're sinking your money into something which will get replaced sooner than later. And which is a price you're paying for tardy decision making.
Same argument as with the Tejas (i.e. HAL can't build more)? That might have been a credible if not for the fact that the bulk of the 197 helicopters contracted (like the Rafales) are to be license-built at HAL as well.
Again, as I told one poster earlier, please check facts before making these sweeping statements.

HAL's hands are full with trying to meet the present numbers ordered with a production rate which was supposed to reach 36 per annum from 25 units/annum after 2012.

If HAL wanted to service this requirement in double quick time, it was up to HAL to put a parallel production line. It has ample orders. It is for HAL to answer why it did not do so? If you ask me, it made no sense. Because production rate needs to match the induction capacity of the Service as well. There would be X number of Squadrons sanctioned under 11th and 12th Defense Plan and will be raised accordingly. And you'd want availability of equipment to be in-line with this planning schedule of the Service.

Increasing production rate of existing capacity makes more sense and which HAL did.

The total order for LUH will stand at 384 units with 197 imports planned. And I don't think LUH will be assembled/produced in same production line as ALH - because HAL would've enough business justification to start another line.
Whatever the circumstances behind it, fact is the country has an opportunity at this stage to partially wean itself of its crippling import dependence. The Services couldn't care less but the MoD ought to.
You see, the Services do care very seriously about their core mandate. Because when yellow-matter-hits the fan, it is no skin off anyone's back but the Services. So, they're worried about their operational preparedness. And frankly, any promise of a deadline from DRDO or HAL or DPSU has no sanctity. It has been proven up teem number of times.

The entire order of 384 LUH may well fall into the lap of HAL as a windfall due to inept decision making by UPA. But the question is - will it meet the requirement in respectable time frame? The domestic LUH first flight is now expected by end-2015.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by Indranil »

I have often heard this logic that Tejas would have arrived today if IAF had ordered hundreds of them at the outset. I don't buy it.

The testing and qualification is waiting because for want of orders. The rolling out of the first SP is not waiting for want of orders. What about LCH? There are firm orders for it. TD-3 is yet to be seen (it was supposed to start flying 2 years back according to revised estimates).

It is right that small numbers mean slower production rate (8-aircraft per year). We can blame IAF/MoD for that. But at least HAL/ADA has to stick to the production rate that they promise. Deliver the first 20 aircraft on time (whatever you deem as reasonable) and with stringent quality control. Orders are bound to follow. For me the ball is firmly in HAL/ADA's court. I will blame them till I see 4 SPs in 2014 (as they had promised).
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by NRao »

I have often heard this logic that Tejas would have arrived today if IAF had ordered hundreds of them at the outset.
Orders do not translate into a well qualified, certified plane!!!!!!!!

Heck if we were to wait until we get a perfect plane, we should be still using hand cranked starters in our cars - recall that ignition mechanisms, even in this day and age, fail!!!!

Orders help reduce the financial risks a designer + builder are subjected to. That is it.

Technical issues *may* get resolved faster - if at all. But, that should not be an expectation. The LCA being the first air craft - for all practical purposes - was/is the bleeding edge in-house technology. And, that carries a huge amount of risk. Failure is nearly guaranteed.

From a technology point of view all that would have been different is instead of MK-I and MK-II it would have been MK-I.01, MK-I.02, ..... MK-I.99. But each would fly, the 01 with nothing more than paint and .99 with nearly all the gizmos, IOC and perhaps FOC.

Would have been fun.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by abhik »

indranilroy wrote:I have often heard this logic that Tejas would have arrived today if IAF had ordered hundreds of them at the outset. I don't buy it.

The testing and qualification is waiting because for want of orders. The rolling out of the first SP is not waiting for want of orders. What about LCH? There are firm orders for it. TD-3 is yet to be seen (it was supposed to start flying 2 years back according to revised estimates).

It is right that small numbers mean slower production rate (8-aircraft per year). We can blame IAF/MoD for that. But at least HAL/ADA has to stick to the production rate that they promise. Deliver the first 20 aircraft on time (whatever you deem as reasonable) and with stringent quality control. Orders are bound to follow. For me the ball is firmly in HAL/ADA's court. I will blame them till I see 4 SPs in 2014 (as they had promised).
Now that you mentioned it, how come the LCH has a large 'firm' order but the LCA doesn't?
Delay in the LCA production is not just because of technical issues but also because HAL did not take it up on a priority basis.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by rohitvats »

^^^ whatever prevented HAL from taking the LCA production seriously? Knowing fully well the criticality of the system.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by deejay »

NRao wrote: Orders help reduce the financial risks a designer + builder are subjected to. That is it.
HAL is a PSU and if I understand correctly is sheltered to a large extent from Financial risks with the GOI being the underwriter. The IAF is the ordering agency where too the GOI funds, all on the Tax payers money. Placing large orders and taking away financial risk from one entity underwritten by the GOI and placing the burden on another entity of the Government all on tax payers money does not seem to make sense to me, but I am no economist hence will accept more informed views here.
NRao wrote:Technical issues *may* get resolved faster - if at all. But, that should not be an expectation. The LCA being the first air craft - for all practical purposes - was/is the bleeding edge in-house technology. And, that carries a huge amount of risk. Failure is nearly guaranteed.

From a technology point of view all that would have been different is instead of MK-I and MK-II it would have been MK-I.01, MK-I.02, ..... MK-I.99. But each would fly, the 01 with nothing more than paint and .99 with nearly all the gizmos, IOC and perhaps FOC.

Would have been fun.
Since 1.01 to 1.99 mean a 100 aircraft in development phase with at least 50 being below half the capability mark, this would become a very expensive development programme. Plus I am assuming that some others on the forum would not ask the IAF to order a 100 of each .01 increment.

To cut the development cost but in resonance with your idea, HAL has done and planned exactly that but named it differently. These being named:
>Technology Demonstrators: 02 ac
>Prototype Vehicles: 05 ac (only 04 tail nos given)
>Naval Prototypes: 05 ac (planned)
>Limited Series Production: 08 ac
(sourced from wiki)
Additionally, the initial 20 ac will be IOC 2 levels and not FOC levels. All in all a very structured programme with fair amount of stages and landmarks. Could we have done more? Maybe. I think what LCA has brought out is the need for User - Developer joint project management group which on one hand coordinates internally for better project management and on the other side engages the media to keep folks like us from spreading unnecessary FUD or FOD in aviation terms.

@indranilroy sir, an article posted earlier says deliveries of SP 1- 4 from Sep 14 as per an HAL official. I am reposting the link, someone had provided earlier (http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 041_1.html)
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by NRao »

HAL is a PSU and if I understand correctly is sheltered to a large extent from Financial risks with the GOI being the underwriter. The IAF is the ordering agency where too the GOI funds, all on the Tax payers money. Placing large orders and taking away financial risk from one entity underwritten by the GOI and placing the burden on another entity of the Government all on tax payers money does not seem to make sense to me, but I am no economist hence will accept more informed views here.
No problem with your logic (in fact, I am finding out that in India everyone is right or no one is wrong - that is the way the system is set up. Nothing to do with the people).

However, forget accounting or finances (they are important, however), the issue is totally different.

The topic was:
logic that Tejas would have arrived today if IAF had ordered hundreds of them at the outset
By ordering more, (over time) one has more platforms to resolve problems. Parallelism replaces serialism. Problems gets solved faster. So, a product should arrive faster.

I am very slowly finding the "problem" with India is more cultural than anything else.

Those 4 vids are an eye opener. But, it is very good that someone put that together - a great starting point.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by sankum »

2012 parliament report gave the sanctioned and actual strength of helicopter in IA as
Sanctioned Actual
CHEETAH 157 129
Chetak 56 55
ALH 125 49
ALH-WSI 60 0

Thus we had 184 LUH as compared to required 213 LUH and 49 ALH as compared to sanctioned 185 ALH.

Total IA Helicopters were at 233 nos. as compared to sanctioned strength of 398 nos.

Future IA Helicopter strength will be 259 LUH+ 230 ALH+ 39 Apache +114 LCH= 642 Helicopters.

Further 80 to 160 HAL 13t IMRH is likely to be ordered by IA taking the Helicopter fleet to 722 to 802 nos.

Future IAF Helicopter strength will be 125 LUH+ 76 ALH+ 22 Apache +65 LCH +15 Chinook+ 179 Mi17 = 482 Helicopters.

Future IN Helicopter strength will be 50 LUH(3t class)+ 49 ALH+ 48 MRH+ 75 NMRH +14ka31 = 236 Helicopters.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by member_26622 »

@ Rohitvats -> Your prior comments on my posts are abusive and show no constraints. You have bigger issues and am going to neglect for thread sanity reasons (Nor can do anything given your status).
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by rohitvats »

nik wrote:@ Rohitvats -> Your prior comments on my posts are abusive and show no constraints. You have bigger issues and am going to neglect for thread sanity reasons (Nor can do anything given your status).
Please don't pretend you're babe in the woods chased by a big-bad wolf you can do nothing about!

As for my 'STATUS', in case you'd been following BRF, you'd have understood that no-one enjoys any special privilege here. Not even the Moderators. They're held to same standard as any other poster. And more than anyone else on this forum, the collegium of Moderators is itself pretty harsh on each other when it comes to conduct of their fellow Moderators.

So, if you so please, go ahead and report my post. And let the other Moderators take a call on that.

Now, coming to my 'bigger' issue - well, you're actually right for the first time. I do have issue with the kind and level of debate you bring to this forum. Because I see nothing being added to the body of knowledge except noise and cantankerous attitude. You make no effort to understand any topic but do not feel any constraint to post what you post.

Did you see the post just before yours (the one where you referred to me) by another poster? That poster also broadly shares the same ideas as you do but he at least makes an effort to read and understand the topic. No one is asking you to do a PhD on a topic and then contribute - but at least make an effort to gain some understanding of the topic!

You see, apart from being a Moderator, I'm also a poster on this forum. And I've every right to call you out on your posts. And I will.

You've every right to have whatever opinion and views you want to harbor - but please be careful of how you put them on the forum.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by Viv S »

rohitvats wrote:Just because someone comes out with an idiotic report does not mean you need to jump up and down on it, isn't it? Further, the urgency of requirement FOR SIACHEN is there because of HAL not bothering to develop the right kind of blades for Cheetal helicopters which were in fact ordered as 'interim' purchase pending induction of LUH.
Developing rotor blades specifically for the Cheetal at this or even a previous stage, is/was simply not feasible. As to the significance of the Siachen operation, what happens in South Block may not be released but its more than likely that its been used by the services to lobby for the LUH import sanction.
As for leasing part, well, you really think that is how the system works in India? And did you think through this suggestion - Leasing simply will not mean taking 20-odd choppers on hire. There will be expense related to training, conversion, logistics, maintenance and the whole paraphernalia. Not to forget it also means grounding the 10-odd Cheetal ordered by IAF in 2006 whose delivery was completed in 2012-13. Wastage of money all-around, don't you think?
Yes that'll mean expense related to training, conversion, logistics and maintenance, however a lease option allows the service to eventually rationalise on a single type resulting in savings on training, conversion, logistics and maintenance over the long term. And opting for a limited LUH lease in lieu of a full course 197 aircraft dinner, by no means implies that the Cheetals delivered by HAL ought to be grounded.
'As of yesterday' because both IAF and IA are already short of the number of Cheetah/Chetak types sanctioned. As against sanctioned strength of 213 Chetak and Cheetah units in it's fleet, IA in 2012 had 184 units.
That shortage cannot be met by through interim orders. The (likely Eurocopter) LUH program in question on the other hand will be delivered over a fairly long period.
And IA had ordered 20 Cheetal as 'interim' purchase as of 2013; there is only a limit to which you'd go with interim purchase to shore up your numbers. Simply because you're sinking your money into something which will get replaced sooner than later. And which is a price you're paying for tardy decision making.


Given the stakes - $1.5 billion (probably closer to $2 billion), the Cheetal remains a cost effective stop-gap option.

LUH unit value - $7.5 million (min.)

Cheetal - $3.5 million (Rs 418 crore for 20 units)
If HAL wanted to service this requirement in double quick time, it was up to HAL to put a parallel production line. It has ample orders. It is for HAL to answer why it did not do so? If you ask me, it made no sense. Because production rate needs to match the induction capacity of the Service as well. There would be X number of Squadrons sanctioned under 11th and 12th Defense Plan and will be raised accordingly. And you'd want availability of equipment to be in-line with this planning schedule of the Service.
HAL may not be able deliver additional Dhruvs during period effectively nixing it as a stopgap option. Accepted.
The total order for LUH will stand at 384 units with 197 imports planned. And I don't think LUH will be assembled/produced in same production line as ALH - because HAL would've enough business justification to start another line.
How does this refute the original argument? The same HAL that's tasked with building its the indigenous ALH is also tasked with manufacturing the Fennec. The two are bound to overlap with the basic problem here.

Back in 2007 when the LUH contract was going through the first round of 'finalization' the LUH wasn't on the horizon. 197 foreign LUHs followed by 187 domestic LUHs was still justifiable.

Its now 2014. Given its experience HAL can deliver on the LUH within the same time-frame as it would take productionalize the Fennec after a winner is shortlisted and contractual negotiations conclude. And deliver it in whatever quantities the services require - there are no technical limitations on the scale of production.

A gap if any, can be serviced by an interim order. But, nothing could be less productive than churning out Fennecs from one line and in parallel producing functionally identical domestic LUHs from another line. That's where the current plan takes us.
Whatever the circumstances behind it, fact is the country has an opportunity at this stage to partially wean itself of its crippling import dependence. The Services couldn't care less but the MoD ought to.
You see, the Services do care very seriously about their core mandate. Because when yellow-matter-hits the fan, it is no skin off anyone's back but the Services. So, they're worried about their operational preparedness. And frankly, any promise of a deadline from DRDO or HAL or DPSU has no sanctity. It has been proven up teem number of times.
And that's the bane of our system. The services are concerned only with operational preparedness. Which has brought upon us the unenviable tag of the world's largest arms importer while China at the same time has overtaken UK & France to becomes the world's fourth largest arms exporter.

All well and good as long as the services continue to get want they need, right upto the point when the economy nosedives and the wheels come off the military import wagon. And even if it didn't, fact is, China is growing faster than us and their defence industry is developing faster while still remaining cost effective. As a result not only does it have far larger budgets, for every dollar spent its gets a better return than we do.

And again, ultimately the fault does not lie with the services. Its the MoD's job to look the big picture, recognize the country's defence needs are best served by backing the domestic industry, and just as importantly exploiting its outstanding cost effectiveness. And if that means twisting the IA/IAF/IN's arm when necessary (and it very often will be), one can only hope the new govt has stones to do that.
The entire order of 384 LUH may well fall into the lap of HAL as a windfall due to inept decision making by UPA. But the question is - will it meet the requirement in respectable time frame? The domestic LUH first flight is now expected by end-2015.
When can you expect the first HAL built Fennec to be delivered to the Army? 2018? Later?
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by Viv S »

indranilroy wrote:I have often heard this logic that Tejas would have arrived today if IAF had ordered hundreds of them at the outset. I don't buy it.
Arrived today? Certainly not. But when's the Rafale getting here? 2018-19 for the first off-the-shelf squadron assuming the contract is signed in 2015-16. Perhaps 2020-21 for the first HAL delivered squadron.

In that time frame we can not only put the Tejas Mk1 into a high rate of production but also start Mk2 deliveries.
It is right that small numbers mean slower production rate (8-aircraft per year). We can blame IAF/MoD for that. But at least HAL/ADA has to stick to the production rate that they promise. Deliver the first 20 aircraft on time (whatever you deem as reasonable) and with stringent quality control. Orders are bound to follow. For me the ball is firmly in HAL/ADA's court. I will blame them till I see 4 SPs in 2014 (as they had promised).
What is the point really? Lets say HAL delivers the first 20 aircraft on time with strict quality control, the Rafale deal will already have been signed in the interim, all the confidence instilled in the public isn't going to change the facts on ground. And assuming the Rafale is going to be ordered in any case, well then I say let HAL take its own sweet time because that 40 Mk1 order isn't increasing at all.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by Vivek K »

What is holding up ramped up production of the Tejas - Engines? Industrial Capability? Skilled Manpower? Resources? Corruption? Foreign Lobbyists (like some here)?

Do we not dream big in India? With such a large country, why can we not churn out aircraft in the hundreds? What is the bottleneck?
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by wig »

IAF seems to be saddled with a Shortage of Airport Support Vehicles at forward bases

More than 13 years after a “gross inadequacy” of aircraft support vehicles (ASV) at forward IAF bases was highlighted during Operation Parakram, the situation continues to be the same.

The IAF has an inventory of 18 types of ASVs and the actual holding of all types of ASVs was far less than their authorisation. Shortfalls in eight types of ASVs range between 47.83% to 100% and between 25% and 36.92% in another seven types. The shortfall in the remaining three types is below 25%. ASVs are specialist equipment that are used for aircraft operations and play a direct and vital role in operational preparedness.

During Operation Parakaram, ASVs at operational locations were found to be grossly inadequate and did not match the requirement of the detachments. Keeping this in view and bottlenecks in transportation of the ASVs from the parent bases, the IAF felt that it would be essential to make permanent positioning of specialist vehicles at operational locations.

Accordingly, in May 2004, the Ministry of Defence agreed for procurement of additional ASVs for pre-positioning at operational locations. After working out its requirements, Air Headquarters accorded “in principle” approval for procuring 408 ASVs for Rs 132 crore. However, the case for procurement did not proceed further.

Consequently, to tide over the deficiency, Western Air Command (WAC) made temporary arrangements for pre-positioning of ASVs at operational locations in two phases. The first phase was for WAC forces and the second phase for “out of command” forces through of temporary allotment of ASVs on loan from the units within the command. The objective was to support quick mobilisation of forces at designated locations and reduce dependability on airlifts or civil hired trucks and overcome bottlenecks in transportation.

In Phase-I, 67 ASVs comprising nine types were to be positioned immediately at forward locations for WAC forces but it was later observed that, 46 ASVs, about 69 per cent of Phase-I requirement and the entire quantity under Phase-II were yet to be placed at the operational locations of WAC.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140804/nation.htm#9
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by member_28397 »

Vivek K wrote:What is holding up ramped up production of the Tejas - Engines? Industrial Capability? Skilled Manpower? Resources? Corruption? Foreign Lobbyists (like some here)?

Do we not dream big in India? With such a large country, why can we not churn out aircraft in the hundreds? What is the bottleneck?
No accountability is the reason, sarakri laperwahi is the problem, hiring people based on quota is the reason, I have seen when one of my friend who was intern helped DRDO to finally reverse engineer Fire Detection And Alarm System for tejas. None of the sarkari employees were interested. People get retired in the single project which was never taken to its logical end and the whole system starts again, officers at higher level kills the zeal and capabilities of younger motivated joinees in PSUs like DRDO, its time to change the system from its core before we expect to achieve something in core areas like defense research and development/manufacturing.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by deejay »

And that's the bane of our system. The services are concerned only with operational preparedness. Which has brought upon us the unenviable tag of the world's largest arms importer while China at the same time has overtaken UK & France to becomes the world's fourth largest arms exporter.
Viv S, you say that the sole focus on Op Preparedness by Services made India the largest importer while China is a major exporter. I say, China is a major exporter because it is a great Manufacturer. It is ahead of us in every manufacturing segment (not just military) and if it so decides it will beat us even where we lead. The focus of the Services on Op Preparedness is necessary and not optional. Meanwhile we must ramp up our Manufacturing (in all sectors).

Op Preparedness or Ops Status of a formation is a tangible, quantifiable datum which is measured and assessed. These are minimum requirements and not wish lists. IAF has a set up of DASI and at command level CASI which regularly carries out this inspection. I am not aware of IA and IN methodology on this. But Non Ops Status is a nightmare. India with its experience should know that we have enough military headaches. Our Op Preparedness is so low that in 2002 we could not deploy quickly enough in Op Parakram, in 2008 we could not stop Mumbai attacks and nor did we know how to retaliate, in 2013 and 2014 Chinese move kilometers in our territory and we take months to find out. The Services need to focus on Op Preparedness or sack the General's and Air Marshal's who let these happen. The Navy was asked to take up responsibility in South China Sea and it was hesitant. The Army Chief briefs the PM - We are not ready. Why does India keep a standing military of such a size if this is the return? It is because we are not Prepared and must remain focused to achieve this. All weapons requirement is a derivative of this focus. Now, to get these weapons on time and at the best cost start the acquisition.

The set up of mil - ind complex is as of now unguided. It needs to be harnessed with a GOI policy and legislation, military and para military strategy, procurement set up for military and para military, Operator -OEM project management groups, Oversight mechanisms and delivery / compliance / closure reporting for each deal. Unless, some structure which can deal with the entire spectrum happens we at BRF will gun for the throats of all Generals and Air Marshals while the situation will not improve.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by Viv S »

deejay wrote:Viv S, you say that the sole focus on Op Preparedness by Services made India the largest importer while China is a major exporter. I say, China is a major exporter because it is a great Manufacturer. It is ahead of us in every manufacturing segment (not just military) and if it so decides it will beat us even where we lead. The focus of the Services on Op Preparedness is necessary and not optional. Meanwhile we must ramp up our Manufacturing (in all sectors).
Ramp up manufacturing but to what end? Until HAL receives an order size that can justify a high rate of production it can't invest in that infrastructure. Those orders can either come from the IAF or they can come through the IAF (if the MoD decides to stop being a mute spectator).
Op Preparedness or Ops Status of a formation is a tangible, quantifiable datum which is measured and assessed. These are minimum requirements and not wish lists.
Minimum requirements for which final objective? Just deterrence against Pakistan? Achieving aerial supremacy against the PAF? Achieving a stalemate with a positive loss ratio against the PLAAF? Achieving aerial supremacy against the PLAAF?
The Army Chief briefs the PM - We are not ready. Why does India keep a standing military of such a size if this is the return? It is because we are not Prepared and must remain focused to achieve this. All weapons requirement is a derivative of this focus. Now, to get these weapons on time and at the best cost start the acquisition.
We're not operationally ready but then we're not flush with cash either. Given our limited resources, the objective has to be on maximizing the return on our investment, in terms of combat capability. That is not something the services seem particularly concerned about. When they was scrounging around for cash in the 90s, the services or the MoD for that matter would never have passed up a good bargain. After a decade of large sustained hikes in funding, that spirit of thriftiness seems to have faded.

Point is, with the economy having slowed down the focus needs return to the value-for-money factor. We may not be able to spend as much as the Chinese do, but we can at the very least be smarter about how we spend it. (In that context, point to note is that the Indian industry offers some of the most cost competitive products in the market.) In an ideal world, one would have wanted the MoD and the armed forces to work in synergy to achieve that goal. In a slightly less idealistic world maybe the services could have taken the lead. In the real world, the best one can hope for is that the MoD wakes up to its mandate, knocks heads together and gets the job done without breaking the bank.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by deejay »

Viv S wrote: Ramp up manufacturing but to what end? Until HAL receives an order size that can justify a high rate of production it can't invest in that infrastructure. Those orders can either come from the IAF or they can come through the IAF (if the MoD decides to stop being a mute spectator).
You missed my point completely. You were blaming Services for falling behind in the defence manufacturing. Who will you blame for falling behind every where else. It is a fact that we have not kept up with Chinese in any sector and not just defence. To match with them we need to change a lot of things. Services alone are not responsible for this mess. Answers need to be sought at all levels in all spheres.
Viv S wrote:Minimum requirements for which final objective? Just deterrence against Pakistan? Achieving aerial supremacy against the PAF? Achieving a stalemate with a positive loss ratio against the PLAAF? Achieving aerial supremacy against the PLAAF?
No. Ops Status here has nothing to do with Pakistan or China but more to do with capabilities for which we have the Services. At a micro level we may consider the example of a helicopter unit (I repeat, example only). A unit of 10 helicopters may be tasked to keep one helicopter for ORP, one for SAR stand by, 02 for outstation detachments, 02 for local flying. In case the unit fails this minimum objective for say 05 days in a period of 07 days it may be labeled non ops. Non Ops can also happen if the personnel are found below a given level of proficiency. The Services are in a broad sense a sum of all the Units Ops Status. Being ready to undertake such minimum peacetime activities is Op Preparedness in peacetime. Wartime Op Preparedness is another level which showed up in Op Parakram.

Viv S wrote: We're not operationally ready but then we're not flush with cash either. Given our limited resources, the objective has to be on maximizing the return on our investment, in terms of combat capability. That is not something the services seem particularly concerned about. When they was scrounging around for cash in the 90s, the services or the MoD for that matter would never have passed up a good bargain. After a decade of large sustained hikes in funding, that spirit of thriftiness seems to have faded.

Point is, with the economy having slowed down the focus needs return to the value-for-money factor. We may not be able to spend as much as the Chinese do, but we can at the very least be smarter about how we spend it. (In that context, point to note is that the Indian industry offers some of the most cost competitive products in the market.) In an ideal world, one would have wanted the MoD and the armed forces to work in synergy to achieve that goal. In a slightly less idealistic world maybe the services could have taken the lead. In the real world, the best one can hope for is that the MoD wakes up to its mandate, knocks heads together and gets the job done without breaking the bank.
I am uncomfortable writing this as this is not my domain. But... India since independence has always been short on funds. Yet we have a massive standing military. This was created by us. We allot it less than 2% of GDP, which is fine, but most of it goes in paying salaries. How do we justify such huge salary out go if we are not Op ready? The focus in our debates is solely on Capital expenditure and not the back breaking fixed costs. Some members have asked for 1000 LCA's without realizing that this means 50 LCA sqns alone. That much cost for manpower, training, airfields, land area, facilities costs, pensions for life time, etc is ignored.

In my Ideal world, the IAF would first identify towards what objectives are we equipping. Are the objectives, purely defensive or is their aggressive role encompassed. Will we fight a war to invade or temporarily capture some territory? Will the IA require CAS deep inside TSP and only on the borders of China? Or are we equipping for any possibility? The last is what I fear has become the guiding principle. It is the most expensive and impossible to achieve target.

Wherever we had guidance, our indigenous systems have shown great progress. The Nuclear No First Strike policy has resulted in some of the best developments of our mil - ind complex capabilities. Wherever, the Generals do not know the whats and the whys, we are leaving them to decide at will what they think is needed and hence a mess. The MMRCA (it seems to me) has no guiding reasons for procurement. We want them but for what exact purpose or role? Identify this and we can deduce the quantities and cost justifications for it. Is it just replacing obsolete x with modern y? If this is so, why did we buy x in the first place? What will we do with MMRCA that we will not be able to do with an LCA or a Su 30? And further, how does Rafale as MMRCA help us in Op Preparedness?
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by Manish_Sharma »

deejay wrote: Some members have asked for 1000 LCA's without realizing that this means 50 LCA sqns alone. That much cost for manpower, training, airfields, land area, facilities costs, pensions for life time, etc is ignored.
It was realized and not ignored that the manpower will increase and even the argument was forwarded that instead of giving 40 billion $ of foreign exchange to a foreign country the money will go inside desh mostly except what we have to import for Tejas like engine and few other parts.

But 1000 Tejas buzzing all over himalayas - Rajasthan - Punjab will wipe out chi-pork forces completely.

Plus knowing the inside and out of the plane we can go on upgrading it..... without paying through our nose, like in M2k deal.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by shaun »

thank you admins and hello every one .

well this is my 1st post , few days back watched an episode on mahindra XUV 500, from designing to manufacturing everything have been done concurrently. Although aerospace is different ball game but my question is it possible for two different entity, ADA for designing and HAL for manufacturing to have proper synergy to make Lca a sucessfull product . wouldn't in idle situation lca should have been designed and manufactured both by Hal or atleast Ada should have come under Hal ?
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by NRao »

Welcome.
from designing to manufacturing everything have been done concurrently
Can you elaborate on that please?

Seems to me, anything is possible, as long as those involved agree to a process and there are adequate funds.


Looks like the problem India has is funds. The previous government - IMHO - seems to have misled, especially on the MMRCA front.

But, pertaining to the LCA (specifically) I suspect the issue is they are unable to agree on a "process". The IAF, in fact, seems to have allergy for it - perhaps not lately.

I am sure there are other issues ....................

?????
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by shaun »

well it was a discovery 'inside out' episode , what I meant is, while the car was in design phase the factory needed for manufacturing the car too was being built . so by the time prototype came out they have already set the equipment needed for manufacturing the car. kinda concurrent engineering .

well about Lca the problem lies with news we get about it . Most of the media persons dont have proper knowledge about the stuffs they report about . this gives us a hazey picture about the project , some complaining nd other praising and when we find things not upto our expectations we start the blame game. what I feel is MOD , IAF , HAL and all should be transperent about LCA programme.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by NRao »

Such things can be done - not a big deal. The problem (with the car or plane manufacturer) is about financial risk. In the car, the manufacturer seems assured of some sales (whatever they may be) and based on that he has built-out (design + prototype + whatever). IF HAL/DRDO/etc are assured of similar returns (they cannot risk as the car manufacturer) then sure, they can do anythign anyone else can do. If the car guy fails he falls on his own sword - fires the GM/CEO, etc. The dynamics in a government organizations is different. And, it is not that there is no wastage in gov orgs - plenty. But, the consequences are different (perhaps none in some cases).
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by shaun »

Yes its not a big deal but GOI run companies not willing to take financial risk is not digestible as we can see from AI saga , etc.

Is present Tejas assembly rig setup for mk1 can not be calibrated for mk2 ?? or they going to open another mk2 assembly rig?? The design phase was and is funded by GOI . Even the flight test and instrument calibration done by NFTC. HAL have to only source materials and act as system integrator.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by Raja Bose »

nik wrote:@ Rohitvats -> Your prior comments on my posts are abusive and show no constraints. You have bigger issues and am going to neglect for thread sanity reasons (Nor can do anything given your status).
If you have issues about a post's contents, report that specific post (or posts). Don't just go on some random tirade like a spoilt child and expect mods to figure out what your takleef is by digging through pages of a thread. BTW Mods as posters get no special privileges and are held to the same or higher standards than the rest of the forum so if you have specific complaints about a mod or one/more of their posts, report those specific posts in question and other mods will take a call. There is no favoritism or bhai-bhai at play here.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by member_26622 »

Chiming in to share relevant (a bit dated) experience here - Concurrent engineering is a calculated risk essentially.

While the parts/sub-assemblies are designed, early stage drawing are shared for jigs and fixture design + development, also called manufacturing engineering. We actually had engineers from the assembly and machine shop integrated within the design team, kind of critical from assembly process + packaging perspective (packaging is how things are placed say under the hood). Even ease of repairs in repair shops is considered.

Starting with Upside - Time to market for the product is shaved by 6 months or more. Benefit is obvious - early sales and associated profit streams for the investment. The project will break even earlier which would make Anand Mahindra happy (risk goes down), plus competition and other factors.

Downside - Unless their is a huge change is layout, things work out Ok. Changes happen but their is enough flex to redo fixtures as engineers are tracking continuously. But, field trials can come back and ask for major modifications. At that point, one will have to just forgo the investment in jigs/fixtures/tools. This risk is lower when the company has done this a few times as they have built experience. First time around, no one in R&D wanted to take this 'known and logical' bold step until team champion pushed folks to do it.

It becomes a tradeoff between the early profit stream vs. potential write off. All of this makes sense from a continuous production line perspective. But fighter planes follow batch manufacturing since orders are small - LCA is further small, just 40 units over I believe two years ( Believe F-16 was an exception, had a production line couple of miles long). Most of the tools and fixtures are generic/simplistic which slows down process but speed is not critical when making so few per year.

Concurrent engineering ideas still hold. And you correctly pointed out - If design and manufacturing teams (companies) work together, a manufacturing line should have been ready while advanced trials were in progress-not after.

A closing thought - Benchmarking F 35 productionering process would be good learning for ADA/HAL teams.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by NRao »

Benchmarking F 35 productionering process would be good learning for ADA/HAL teams
That, and more, was expected to come out of the FGFA project. Or is it the PMF or PMI or whatever.

If you have not figured it out, the F-35 - originally called The Turkey - now is called The Dud. Nothing to learn from a Dud.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by member_26622 »

Raja Bose wrote: BTW Mods as posters get no special privileges and are held to the same or higher standards than the rest of the forum so if you have specific complaints about a mod or one/more of their posts, report those specific posts in question and other mods will take a call. There is no favoritism or bhai-bhai at play here.
<Deleted comment as found the report link>

Ok, I will take your advice. I can deliver same treatment but like I said previously - No point in starting a flame war which the poster might be yearning for and get banned. Followed old saying - Barking dogs seldom bite.
Last edited by member_26622 on 05 Aug 2014 04:37, edited 5 times in total.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by member_26622 »

NRao wrote: If you have not figured it out, the F-35 - originally called The Turkey - now is called The Dud. Nothing to learn from a Dud.
F-35 can be a turkey or Dud or whatever we want to call it. The point was about productioneering, not how good the plane is. The comment was not a pitch for F-35, but I could not write Rafale or Eurofighter ( The forum is filled with plane aficionados pitching why one is better over another anyways - cost of every one of them is mind boggling for any relevant numerical strength IMO).

Boeing is the other firm which can churn out planes at a fast pace (and low cost unless its a FMS deal-opinion here). But that would not be a relevant comparison.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by NRao »

US set to woo India with classified info, intel swap
The Americans are also willing to deepen service-to-service engagements with advanced and multilateral military exercises as well as to strengthen Indian capabilities on the borders. On the agenda will be the purchase by India of six more C-17 heavy lift aircraft, 10 Chinook CH 77 heavy lift helicopters, 22 Apache Longbow attack helicopters and 200 Honeywell engines for upgradation of the Jaguar fighter fleet.

US military sources told HT Washington was also willing to look at the advanced surveillance requirement for Indian troops manning the 4,088-km Line of Actual Control (LAC), high-speed interceptor boats for patrolling the disputed Pangong Lake in eastern Ladakh as well as low-level radars to plug gaps in air defence.

South Block officials said both countries need to get into joint development and manufacturing of military systems, which would create jobs and nullify the possibility of Washington blocking the sale of spares in the event of any disagreement
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Re: Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

Post by shaun »

Well we did have our own jets , Marut and Kiran , both manufactured by HAL. What production engineering went in to those , even Hals existing assembly lines for imported stuffs can shed some light about the production engineering that is going into for manufacturing Tejas.

If say Hal can manufacture ( they have to anyway ) say 20 IOC standard tejas by the end of this financial year ,would not it "force" IAF to haste induction of at least IOC certified tejas. Even some points related to FOC like supersonic drop tanks and having a new radome which had issues regarding ingress of water have been rectified .

FOC about spin chute and BVR firing wont need substantial design change though Guns can be a issue for air intakes.
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