Military Flight Safety
The Mi-17 was then lifted and carried away by an Mi-26 , a photo of which appeared in the TOI .Jagan wrote:Photo of the recenly forcelanded Helicopter and report. Note the rocket pods on the Mi-171V
--------------------------------
An MI-17 helicopter of the Indian Air Force that crash-landed on the Markanda riverbed near Damli village in Shahbad, Kurukshetra, on Friday evening. � Tribune photo by Neeraj Chopra
MiG crashes in Rajasthan; 2 pilots killed
March 21, 2006 17:32 IST
Last Updated: March 21, 2006 20:15 IST
A trainer version of the MiG 21 fighter aircraft of the Indian Air Force crashed soon after take-off from Uttarlai airbase in the Barmer district of Rajasthan on Tuesday. Two pilots were killed in the crash.
"The aircraft crashed near Uttarlai village in Barmer district at 3:35 pm," an IAF spokesman said in New Delhi.
The bodies of the pilots were found near the crash site by rescue helicopters.
"So far, no damage has been reported on the ground as the fighter crashed in an open area," he said. A team of flight safety officials from Air Headquarters had also rushed to the spot. The IAF has ordered a court of inquiry to find out the cause of the accident. The ill-fated aircraft was one of the older versions, which are progressively being phased out.
The ill-fated aircraft was one of the older versions, which are progressively being phased out.
After every other crash, you hear this. Does this statement "justifies" the crash or what?
Wings of death
The IAF has lost about 59 MiGs (called flying coffins by many) in the past seven years in air crashes. On March 21 again, two pilots died when a MiG-21 trainer crashed. Mumbai Mirror correspondent Aditi travelled to Khed, a village near Nasik, to meet the family of one of the pilots killed in this mishap. She found out that the family’s initial grief has now turned into simmering anger against the govt’s inaction over the MiGs
Beyond Nifad, off the highway after Nasik, is a little-known village of Khed, full of beautiful vineyards with ripening grapes and a quite calm characteristic of the rural lifestyle. As we wind our way through the vineyards looking for the house of Flight Lieutenant Aniket Kolhe — the IAF pilot who lost his life when the MiG-21 he was flying crashed in Rajasthan on March 21 — not much is forthcoming.
But the moment we mention the word IAF pilot, our search is over.
Once we reach the house, we come across an assemblage of grieving villagers, including Aniket’s father Baliram Kolhe, huddled under a mango tree.
Three days after the funeral of Flt Lt Aniket Kolhe of 101 Squadron, the village still continues to mourn its tragic loss — Aniket was the only fighter pilot from the area.
Clutching some photographs of his son in the Air Force uniform and turning them every now and then, Kolhe, a retired Meteorological Department employee, stares in the void across the sky. “He loved open sky…and truly believed that the country will be strong one day. ‘I have to make my contribution. I will become an ace pilot of the force and you will be proud of me one day, he used to say,’â€
The IAF has lost about 59 MiGs (called flying coffins by many) in the past seven years in air crashes. On March 21 again, two pilots died when a MiG-21 trainer crashed. Mumbai Mirror correspondent Aditi travelled to Khed, a village near Nasik, to meet the family of one of the pilots killed in this mishap. She found out that the family’s initial grief has now turned into simmering anger against the govt’s inaction over the MiGs
Beyond Nifad, off the highway after Nasik, is a little-known village of Khed, full of beautiful vineyards with ripening grapes and a quite calm characteristic of the rural lifestyle. As we wind our way through the vineyards looking for the house of Flight Lieutenant Aniket Kolhe — the IAF pilot who lost his life when the MiG-21 he was flying crashed in Rajasthan on March 21 — not much is forthcoming.
But the moment we mention the word IAF pilot, our search is over.
Once we reach the house, we come across an assemblage of grieving villagers, including Aniket’s father Baliram Kolhe, huddled under a mango tree.
Three days after the funeral of Flt Lt Aniket Kolhe of 101 Squadron, the village still continues to mourn its tragic loss — Aniket was the only fighter pilot from the area.
Clutching some photographs of his son in the Air Force uniform and turning them every now and then, Kolhe, a retired Meteorological Department employee, stares in the void across the sky. “He loved open sky…and truly believed that the country will be strong one day. ‘I have to make my contribution. I will become an ace pilot of the force and you will be proud of me one day, he used to say,’â€
Sad - a parent's grief is numbing, shattering, and one cant argue with it. The closest a parent can come to seeing both sides of the coin is a fighter jock who sees his son dig a hole in the ground. The couple have always been expecting that kind of phone call, that kind of situation, and were thankful for every day that passed without it happening! I guess fighter pilot's wives need to be that little bit tougher.Harshad wrote:Wings of death
The IAF has lost about 59 MiGs (called flying coffins by many) in the past seven years in air crashes. On March 21 again, two pilots died when a MiG-21 trainer crashed. Mumbai Mirror correspondent Aditi travelled to Khed, a village near Nasik, to meet the family of one of the pilots killed in this mishap. She found out that the family’s initial grief has now turned into simmering anger against the govt’s inaction over the MiGs
while accidents are inevitable, what should / can the IAF do to lessen the pain for the near and dear ones left behind? In this case, what can the IAF do to lessen the blow for the parents?Ved wrote:Sad - a parent's grief is numbing, shattering, and one cant argue with it. The closest a parent can come to seeing both sides of the coin is a fighter jock who sees his son dig a hole in the ground. The couple have always been expecting that kind of phone call, that kind of situation, and were thankful for every day that passed without it happening! I guess fighter pilot's wives need to be that little bit tougher.Harshad wrote:Wings of death
The IAF has lost about 59 MiGs (called flying coffins by many) in the past seven years in air crashes. On March 21 again, two pilots died when a MiG-21 trainer crashed. Mumbai Mirror correspondent Aditi travelled to Khed, a village near Nasik, to meet the family of one of the pilots killed in this mishap. She found out that the family’s initial grief has now turned into simmering anger against the govt’s inaction over the MiGs
Nothing, actually. Of course, one assumes the principals of gentle and sympathetic handling and communication will be observed. But beyond that, theres nothing that anyone can do. Logic, of course, is irrelevant at such times.Jagan wrote:While accidents are inevitable, what should / can the IAF do to lessen the pain for the near and dear ones left behind? In this case, what can the IAF do to lessen the blow for the parents?
Ved
I differ with your view.
1. I don't see that article but I hope that was not your own quote The couple have always been expecting that kind of phone call, that kind of situation, and were thankful for every day that passed without it happening! "
This is ridiculous. Who would want to send their children into the armed forces if they need to keep their fingers crossed on evry sortie.
2. Nothing can be done.
Yes - the air force can do a lot more.
It could have have sent an officer to convey the message instead of a phone call. It could have sent some counsellors to assist the family and they should be there with them for sort of duration. Then they can provide someone to help the family through all the bureaucratic bullshit one will have to go through.
While we at BR understand that not all of the deaths could have been avoided, some percentage could have been. None of the previous aCMs had the guts to resign when the AJT was delayed by years.
At the very minimum the IAF can learn from the Navy how it takes care of any unfortunate tragedy.
A lot more can be done but seems like officers once they start climibing the ranks are disconnected from reality.
This poor kid from a village in Mah, did well to break out and be something. He was unfortunate but if the IAF needs any chance of getting more to join then "nothing can be done" will not do.
I differ with your view.
1. I don't see that article but I hope that was not your own quote The couple have always been expecting that kind of phone call, that kind of situation, and were thankful for every day that passed without it happening! "
This is ridiculous. Who would want to send their children into the armed forces if they need to keep their fingers crossed on evry sortie.
2. Nothing can be done.
Yes - the air force can do a lot more.
It could have have sent an officer to convey the message instead of a phone call. It could have sent some counsellors to assist the family and they should be there with them for sort of duration. Then they can provide someone to help the family through all the bureaucratic bullshit one will have to go through.
While we at BR understand that not all of the deaths could have been avoided, some percentage could have been. None of the previous aCMs had the guts to resign when the AJT was delayed by years.
At the very minimum the IAF can learn from the Navy how it takes care of any unfortunate tragedy.
A lot more can be done but seems like officers once they start climibing the ranks are disconnected from reality.
This poor kid from a village in Mah, did well to break out and be something. He was unfortunate but if the IAF needs any chance of getting more to join then "nothing can be done" will not do.
That wasn't an article, friend - its real life, and people live that way!Surya wrote:Ved
I differ with your view.
1. I don't see that article but I hope that was not your own quote The couple have always been expecting that kind of phone call, that kind of situation, and were thankful for every day that passed without it happening! "
This is ridiculous. Who would want to send their children into the armed forces if they need to keep their fingers crossed on evry sortie.
.
2. Nothing can be done.
.
Point taken. However, instead of just sending an officer, the AF, after a lot of thought, decided that the parents/next-of-kin would prefer to know right away and not wait for the 12-15 hours for the officer to get there (and, meanwhile, find out about it in the paper or see it on the TV!), and so both informs them telephonically as well as provides them airfare to get there as soon as possible - provides a liason officer to deal with all the 'bureaucratic bullshit ' - then flies the parents and the body back in a special AF aircraft - after that, the sqn maintains contact with the family in order to clear up subsequent hassles - THAT's what I'm referring to as 'nothing', because I'm taking all that for granted. In cases of age or infirmity etc where physical help is required, the same is ascertained telephonically and an escort is provided immediately. A Lot of parents /next of kin have, much later, got back to the AF and expressed appreciation for the help they got - but then, that's never heard of!It could have have sent an officer to convey the message instead of a phone call. It could have sent some counsellors to assist the family and they should be there with them for sort of duration. Then they can provide someone to help the family through all the bureaucratic bullshit one will have to go through.
.
Ummmmm... they may not have achieved too much by that. Its more difficult to hang on and try and improve the system.None of the previous aCMs had the guts to resign when the AJT was delayed by years.
Most certainly - while the IAF is doing all it can, I'm sure any inputs would be welcome.At the very minimum the IAF can learn from the Navy how it takes care of any unfortunate tragedy.
Far from it, friend. As a matter of fact, one of the reasons why senior officers fly is to retain touch with reality and keep their feet on the ground. The policy is constantly under fine-tuning and inputs from youngsters in the field forms the basis - in any case, one aspect of aviation is that, more than any other vocation, an aircrew stays an aircrew for life - one never really loses touch with the 'real world' in the cockpit.A lot more can be done but seems like officers once they start climibing the ranks are disconnected from reality.
Last edited by Ved on 14 Apr 2006 09:03, edited 1 time in total.
IAF fares better than USAF in terms of lower number of air crashes
The USAF registers 1.25 air crashes every 10,000 hours of flying while the IAF's average accident rate is just 0.75 aircraft in the same operational duration, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Western Air Command Air Marshal A.K. Singh said.
Adding even the latest technology in aviation registers 0.5 accidents every 10,000 hours of flying and the old technology touches well beyond one crash in similar number of flying hours, Air Marshal Singh said.
I think he has got wrong data. the USAF rate quoted is likely for 100,000 hrs not 10,000. USAF fighters have rates like F-16 & F-18 4.x/100K, F-15 2.x/100K , AV8B has around 12/100K.
so basically the USAF crash record is 5 times better if the 1.25 figure is true.
we are somewhere in the range of lower-rung sdre nato members.
so basically the USAF crash record is 5 times better if the 1.25 figure is true.
we are somewhere in the range of lower-rung sdre nato members.
IAF circular puts operators in piquant situation
CHENNAI : An Indian Air Force circular issued for all defence-controlled aerodromes has put civil airline operators in a piquant situation.
The May 18 circular, issued by Squadron Commander Wg.Cdr. S.K. Dhyani, is said to be in violation of two major safety clauses. One refers to passenger-window shutters. The civil aviation requirement is that window shades be kept open for all takeoffs and landings, so that the crew can identify the location of a fire in case of crash-landing. If the shutters are closed, passengers will face the danger of being evacuated into a live fire.
The second clause pertains to the fire-fighting category of the airfield. For all jet operations, the International Civil Aviation Organisation requires a minimum fire-fighting category. The circular mentions that the required fire-fighting category may not be available as their priority is only for Air Force planes and not for civil aircraft.
On the Pune airfield the entire central section of the length of the runway is sprayed with resin coating to prevent damage of the surface by the exhaust from fighter aircraft. As rubber deposits increase with every takeoff and landing, this surface when it becomes wet during rain will prove dangerous.
Close shave for two IAF jets; no casualties
Two Indian Air Force (IAF) jets narrowly avoided a mid-air collision Monday, landing safely after the incident, officials here said.
The incident occurred when the nine-aircraft Suryakiran aerobatic team was performing at Ahmedabad as part of the platinum jubilee celebrations of the IAF.
'Two aircraft came perilously close and their wingtips brushed. However, the pilots managed to safely land both aircraft. There were no casualties,' an IAF spokesman here said.
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... ewsid=7752
[quote]MiG-21 mishaps due to adulterated fuel
From Kalyan Ray DH News Service New Delhi:
In a revelation, the Centre has identified “possible contamination of fuelâ€
[quote]MiG-21 mishaps due to adulterated fuel
From Kalyan Ray DH News Service New Delhi:
In a revelation, the Centre has identified “possible contamination of fuelâ€
Cross posts
Jaguar crash - pilot killed
Aircraft "blew up" shortly after take-of???
http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=444548
http://www.hindu.com/2007/01/19/stories ... 970900.htm
Jaguar crash - pilot killed
Aircraft "blew up" shortly after take-of???
http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=444548
http://www.hindu.com/2007/01/19/stories ... 970900.htm
Tragic loss.
Sounds errily identical to the Jaguar crash that killed the CO of #6 Sqn when he was delivering bomb on the same range 3 or 4 years ago. The bomb fuse was suspected to be defective and it blew up too soon; blowing the mother aircraft in flight (IIRC a sole observer saw the Jaguar explode in mid air), but as Ved said on this forum the Indian Manufacturer was very defensive and refuse to owe up.
Sounds errily identical to the Jaguar crash that killed the CO of #6 Sqn when he was delivering bomb on the same range 3 or 4 years ago. The bomb fuse was suspected to be defective and it blew up too soon; blowing the mother aircraft in flight (IIRC a sole observer saw the Jaguar explode in mid air), but as Ved said on this forum the Indian Manufacturer was very defensive and refuse to owe up.
Like other froum members I too acquired a complimentary copy of HAL's in house magazine. People have posted photos elsewhere of baby MKIs - but I will be OCRing articles.
This is the first one (on Flt Safety) - written by a Gp Capt Valluri - whom I do not know personally - but occupies the same post that my late cousin Wing Co Suresh used to occupy.
This is the first one (on Flt Safety) - written by a Gp Capt Valluri - whom I do not know personally - but occupies the same post that my late cousin Wing Co Suresh used to occupy.
Making Planes as safe as houses
By Gp Capt (Retd) Motilal Nalluri
Flight Safety needs to be understood as every conceivable thought, word or deed, that goes
towards providing Safety in Flight.
Confused? Let us define Safety: Safety is everything that leads to freedom from death, injury, occupational illness, damage or loss to equipment or property, and detriment to the environment. So this mantra, applied to flight is Flight Safety.
Whats so special about Flight Safety that sets it apart from Industrial, Traffic or Domestic Safety?
It is Nature's design that we are not meant to fly. We are transgressing, and therefore the need for extra caution. It is the hostile environment and gravity that inteNene. It is not like an automobile breakdown where you pull-up and scream for a tow-truck. Yet, aircraft have proven to be inherently safe and highly reliable. They are designed and built to exacting standards, to anticipate and avoid failures. All systems are duplicated to provide double or triple redundancy so as to minimize the consequences of failures and ensure that the aircraft functions to full capacity even if something has failed.
Practical aviation, if dated from the Wrights, is just over a hundred years old. Flight Safety is as old as aViation. But right from Day One, the approach has been scientific but not necessarily systematic; it has been reactive rather than proactive. It has been of relatively recent times (about two decades ago) that the approach has seen a huge paradigm shift towards preventing the first occurrence of an accident before it happens, rather than to putting into place corrective measures to prevent a recurrence.
No doubt accidents do occur, and preventive measures do have to be put into place. A measure of the efficacy of these preventive measures is the ability to use them as the means of identifying future hazards and not allowing such hazards to materialize as accidents.
The Systems Approach
Systems Safety is relatively new as a term. The concepts were recognized some decades ago, but it is recently that these have crystallized and gained universal acceptance. Likewise, it is recently that some degree of standardization has been achieved. Systems Safety is now becoming a universal practice.
Systems Safety is an effort to make things safer by scientifically using engineering and management tools to identify, analyse and control hazards. It goes above and beyond conventional methods of regulatory compliance and adherence to codes and procedures.
Regulations and codes may not pre-emptively identify hazards, which may be unique to a given system or a system operating in a given environment.
Systems Safety begins with system conceptualization and is applied through the initial design and manufacturing; sustained throughout the operational lifecycle of the system, and followed through with the disposal of the system at the end of its life. The process involves sustained measures to identify hazards and alleviate them through suitable risk
control measures. Within HAL, the efforts towards the Systems Safety approach have been steadily progressing. These include the following:
+ Formation of Systems Safety Cells at the Aircraft / Engine Manufacturing and Overhaul Divisions comprising experts from Design, Ouality, Production and Flight-Test, and including members from RCMA and OCRI.
+Applying predictive maintenance and trend analysing tools.
+ Investigating all flying incidents and major flight / ground snags to establish the cause
and implementing remedial measures.
+ Continuously reviewing repetitive snags to explore and evolve design improvements for their elimination.
+ Monitoring the implementation of all remedial measures and assessing their efficacy.
+ Maintaining fleet-wise records of accidents, incidents and snags to reiteratively conduct detailed analyses followed by appropriate improvement actions.
Over the years, there have been many aircraft accidents and incidents. Some of these have been repetitive and were found to have been the result of an unfavourable combination of adverse circumstances, thus making the determination of the exact cause difficult and protracted. Often there was no exact cause but a combination of causes.
Automatically, these lent themselves to be tackled by a Systems approach.
Case studies
HPT -32 engine connecting rod failures The HPT-32 aircraft is powered by a six:-cylinder, horizontally opposed, naturally aspirated, air-cooled, fuelÂinjection type of petrolengine. The engine is produced by one of the foremost manufacturers of small piston engines for aircraft in the world.
A few years after the aircraft induction into IAF service, there were some instances of connecting rod failures. The connecting rods are probably the most severely stressed parts of a piston engine. Even the smallest undesirable overload could cause their failure. What was proved to be happening was that the connecting rods' big end bearings were seizing because of oil-starvation, resulting in their failure as a secondary result. A thorough audit was carried out of the maintenance, overhaul and repair processes of the engine both at the field level and at HAL. All deficiencies were addressed immediately and the problem was resolved.
So it was a big surprise when the problem re-emerged many years later and resulted In a series of failures. The question that came up was: What has gone wrong? Were the rod failures primary or secondary?
Joint review by the IAF and HAL of the corrective measures put in place earlier indicated that they were all in place. The operational utilisation of the aircraft remained the same, and the exercise profiles had not seen any significant change. So then, why were the rods failing once again? Detailed analysis of the failures once again did not reveal any specific problem except that in all cases symptoms of oil-starvation to the connecting rod bearings was seen.
Why exactly the oil-starvation was taking place could not be pin-pointed, as the severe damage caused by the failures ended up removing all traces of the blockage in the oil system. After detailed analysis, two possible areas of concern emerged - oil and the connecting rod bearings. The connecting rod bearings were being sourced from a different supplier, but this too was an OEM-approved source. Could the problem be due to poor quality of these bearings? The engine oil in use had been substituted a few years earlier with indigenously produced 0il, albeit with all the usual checks and certifications. Engines received for overhaul in recent years were sometimes seen to have corrosion, and spalling of the tappets was also seen in a few cases. Could this be the problem?
As it happens in such critical cases, the elimination of the problem took precedence over determination of the exact cause; one simply cannot afford to experiment, try and err So, after a systematic thought process and consultation with OEM, a multi-point remedial strategy was put into place:
The oil samples, both new and used, were examined in a number of laboratories to confirm adherence to specifications and estimate deterioration in quality with usage. The oil in use was found to conform to the required specifications. But the cause of increased instances of corrosion remained unexplained. Hence the oil-change and oil-filter inspection and change frequency was increased.
Corrosion prevention measures were reviewed and new and stringent Instructions were issued for field compliance.
Filter inspection during oil change was identified as a key point for detecting impending failures, and as such new procedures were introduced for field compliance. While the OEM stated that there was no insufficiency in the standard of the bearings, a modified type of bearings, which had a better load-bearing capability, were immediately adopted.
The Spectrometric Oil Analysis Programme (SOAP), was introduced with the intention of predicting failure through identifying the undesirable shedding of metallic particles from surfaces undergoing rubbing.
All flight and maintenance operating procedures (which had some minor deviations) were brought into strict line with the laid-down procedures.
The success story is that ever since all these corrective measures were strictly enforced, this ~ problem has not recurred. The instances of corrosion too have reduced, and oil system malfunctions are better taken care of.
MiG-21 rotary-slide valve seizures
The governing of the MiG-21 aircraft's engine is through a device called a Rotary-Slide Valve (RSV).
It is a fuel-control valve that has a rotating spool and sleeve, the combined actions of which are instrumental in regulating the fuel supply to the engine.
The problem was that this item would seize in flight, leaving the pilot with no option but to eject. As the investigations progressed, it emerged that the seizure was being caused by the entrapment of fine, hard particles of silica (sand) between the moving surfaces of the extremely close tolerance parts of the valve. Was this due to residues of abrasives left behind during manufacture / overhaul of the fuel pumps at HAL? This was ruled out through laboratory tests. Some of the seized RSVs showed high levels of retained austenite. Could this be the cause? Or did it have to with the design of the RSV?
A detailed and highly regimented operation was put in place in both the IAF and HAL to improve what is called "fuel discipline". OEM had introduced redesigned RSVs with improved cooling and flushing. A decision was immediately taken to introduce the modified RSV. So, a
long and arduous programme was launched to recall all the fuel pumps from the field to verify that they were correctly assembled and to ensure that all unmodified RSVs would be replaced with modified ones. These and other corrective measures have been strictly enforced and there has been no further case of this problem.
Conclusion
HAL is committed to delivering safe, reliable and operationally-efficient aircraft to its users. Quality and safety are the top priorities at all times.
The writer is AGM (Flight Operations & Safety)
The recent Air Forces Monthly (April 2007) Issue has photographs of the IJT Crash - credited to Alan Warnes and Sanjay Simha.
One of the phtoos - probably by Warnes shows the aircraft at a point when its port wing hit the runway and broke - the nosewheel is turned thru 90 degrees, signifying it was skidding sideways at that time, and the canopy was quite clearly wide open. This was before the aircraft continued its skid off the runway and the dust cloud that we clearly saw in the other pictures. So the photo confirms that the canopy definitely opened and others were not imagining it. now the reason for the canopy opening is left for debate.
One of the phtoos - probably by Warnes shows the aircraft at a point when its port wing hit the runway and broke - the nosewheel is turned thru 90 degrees, signifying it was skidding sideways at that time, and the canopy was quite clearly wide open. This was before the aircraft continued its skid off the runway and the dust cloud that we clearly saw in the other pictures. So the photo confirms that the canopy definitely opened and others were not imagining it. now the reason for the canopy opening is left for debate.
vishal wrote:I had posted this in the Indian Military Aviation thread but it deserves to be archived. Hence a separate thread.
A pilot's moment of glory
http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/oct/31anil.htm
M P Anil Kumar
October 31, 2007
The Indian Air Force uses the Kiran aircraft, manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, for both basic and advanced flying training including weaponry. Kiran is a two-seat trainer. On solo sorties, the pilot tenants the left seat and the right seat is vacant.
October 29, 1984. Sarmat air-to-ground range, Jamnagar, Gujarat. 3.20 pm
Nirmal, flying solo in a Kiran, was turning left sharply to align with the practice target for the first pass of firing front guns. As he was more than halfway through the turn north, in a twinkle, he flew through a flock of cranes and heard several thuds of these critters smashing into the airframe.
One bird crashed into the windshield, splintered it, hit the starter panel, ricocheted into his face and smacked his head hard like a heavyweight boxer's uppercut. It stamped splotches of hotchpotch of meat, blood and plumage on his bone dome (helmet) visor. The unexpected blow, the temporary blinding, the flying smithereens and the piercing noise discomposed him. It made his hair stand on end.
Though he panicked, he reflexively got the wings level, raised the visor and coaxed the Kiran into a climb to gain height, with the intention of returning to base. He glanced at the engine instruments; the parameters were okay. After checking the wake for signs of smoke, he ruled out fire, and opened full throttle to power the climb. The flying controls were alright. Panic subsided.
The compass read 020. He quickly inspected the wings and the left air intake, and found a massive hole on the leading edge of the left wing. Out of the blue, he heard the sound every pilot dreads -- of the engine unwinding and going silent. The engine had quit -- a dire emergency. Despite the loud windblast, he could hear his palpitating heart. Every nerve and sinew turned taut.
For reasons of aerodynamics, you always take off and land into the wind. Runways are constructed depending on the prevailing winds in the place, and are specified in two digits after docking the last digit of its three-digit magnetic bearings. For example, if the lay of the runway is east-west, the orientation is 090-270, and the runway is addressed as 09 and 27.
Sarmat Range is situated west to northwest of Jamnagar airfield and along the Gulf of Kutch. At the time of the flame out, Nirmal was northwest and approximately six kilometres away from runway 06. With the engine thrust gone, height was of paramount importance, and therefore he continued the climb to convert extra speed into height. As the speed washed off rapidly and the aircraft approached the vertex of the climb, he smoothly manoeuvred the Kiran into a right descending turn onto heading 140, and flew at the gliding speed of 130 knots (240 kph).
Kiran has a small panel (starter panel) mounted atop the main instrument panel that contains circuit-breakers and switches to operate both the engine and armaments. During the descending turn, Nirmal was nonplussed to detect that the bird strike had flattened the starter panel to near horizontal position. He straightened the starter panel, flicked the armament switches to safe positions, reset all the engine switches and circuit-breakers except the guarded LP (low pressure) cock switch as he could not discern whether it had tripped or not.
As the compass needle advanced to 140, he made an assessment of his position. It was a bright day, the visibility was infinite and he could see the Jamnagar runway and beyond clearly. The altimeter read 2100 feet and he had under six kilometres to traverse to runway 06. Given the likely rate of descent, he reckoned force-landing was possible, but it would be touch-and-go because of the additional drag produced by the damaged airframe, the knocked-out windshield and the two front gun pods fixed to the underwing pylons. He mentally charted the flight path he would follow to join the final approach for landing. He commenced a left descending turn to follow the flight path he drew up. The nerves eased up.
He thought of an attempt to relight (restart) the engine, but scrapped the idea as he presumed bird ingestion was the cause of engine failure. The hydraulic pressure was okay, but with a dead engine, he had to utilise the residual hydraulic pressure judiciously. So he decided to use it to lower the undercarriage only, and would not down the flaps although a flapless final approach was exacting to execute. To stretch the glide, he would delay the lowering of undercarriage. He tightened all harness-straps, just in case he had to forsake force-landing and eject.
Though RT (radio telephony) was inaudible with heavy background noise due to the windblast, he changed over to Jamnagar ATC (Air Traffic Control) frequency, and screamed, "Mayday, mayday, mayday..." and announced his intention to force land on runway 06. He had a quick glance at the Air Speed Indicator; the speed had dropped below 130 knots (because of extra drag). He lowered the nose some more to increase speed to 130 knots, but he would have to tighten the glide to make up for the loss of height. "Can I make it?" he reassessed the situation. "Yes, just about, but I have to be on the ball and fly by the seat of my pants," he braced himself. He continued the descent, on a wing and a prayer.
As he neared the finals, he raised the nose a bit to reduce speed gradually to 105 knots -- the speed for flapless approach. Speed 105 knots. Glide -- perfect. As he patted himself, to his mortal horror, he found an aircraft lining up for take-off. "He's going to balk my landing," he cringed. His heart pounded in his mouth again. He hollered on RT telling him to clear off. To no avail. He bellowed again, which sounded more like a full-throated plea. Even Providence must have heard it, for, the offending aircraft vamoosed into a nearby pen.
He regained his breath and heartbeat, and stole a glimpse of the hydraulic pressure gauge.
Popularly known as Fido, Flight Lieutenant Rajendra Singh was in a Kiran waiting to line up for take-off. He was one of Nirmal's flying instructors, and both were alumni of the Sainik School, Kazhakootam, Kerala [Images].
Fido had fixated his focus on Nirmal's struggle to force land, and was pleased when Nirmal adeptly intercepted the glide path for a flapless landing. But something was amiss. "Check undercart," he prompted on RT, and soon beheld the three wheels lowering but slower than normal. As Nirmal rounded off the Kiran over the runway threshold for touchdown, he snatched an agreeable prospect: A sureshot Shaurya Chakra for this stupendous deadstick landing. His (Fido) chest swelled with pride. But what he saw deflated the pectoral swell and made him jump out of his skin.
The canopy of Nirmal's aircraft rocketed skywards followed in a trice by the ejection seat. In no time, the seat with Nirmal strapped to it reached the cusp of its trajectory and then tumbled down. The drogue chute opened and immediately stabilised the descent. Fido's heart skipped a beat. The Kiran has a Martin-Baker ejection seat and the minimum forward speed to eject at ground level is 90 knots. What if Nirmal had decelerated below 90 knots when he rounded off? But before the consequences of this doubt paralysed him, he was sighing at the sight of the main parachute fully deploying when Nirmal was only inches above the runway.
It was a whisker. He could almost hear the thwack of Nirmal's boots landing hard on the runway. Fido just witnessed a live ejection.
Pilot Officer O M Nirmal Kumar, with barely 200 hours of flying experience, nearly pulled off an improbable forced landing of a crippled jet. Jet pilots will vouch that to force-land a jet is the devil's own job, and Nirmal made a damned good fist of it.
To put things in perspective, the elapsed time between the bird hit and the ejection was mere 100 seconds. Yes, one minute and 40 seconds! The tumultuous final approach lasted just 11 seconds! Here's to Nirmal for that masterly effort 23 Octobers ago.
Aftermath
The parachute opened just in time to break his landing shock on the concrete runway, which left both his ankles badly sprained and swollen. He was hospitalised, and put on lumbar traction for few days. Poultice and hot fomentation shrunk the swellings. Fortunately, there were no other injuries, and he was back in the cockpit before long.
Autopsy
An engine failure could not be freakier. The aircraft suffered extensive airframe damage but no bird was sucked into the engine. Kiran uses a low-pressure (LP) cock to regulate fuel supply to the engine. Switching off LP leads to fuel starvation and the engine shuts down in few seconds. Though the LP switch in the starter panel has a guard, the bird collision on the starter panel was hard enough to trip the switch through the guard! This was what caused the engine failure!
But why did he eject, not land? In the cockpit, when the undercarriage (wheels) is down and locked, three green lamps illuminate (pilots refer to this as three greens), each lamp indicating the position of the three wheels. When you lower the undercarriage in the air, three red lamps light up to signal its unlocking and unsafe position, and onto three greens when they lock down fully.
Fido's reminder to lower undercart coincided with Nirmal checking the hydraulic pressure. He lowered the undercart and kept a hawk's eye on the indicator. It's three reds all the way until he flared out over the runway threshold for touchdown, and therefore unsure of the wheels locking down. There he had to make the life-and-death call: To do a hazardous belly landing with the undercarriage in an unsafe position or to save himself through a risky ground-level ejection. When confronted to make that proverbial split-second decision, he settled on aborting the landing and ejected.
Whenever an aircraft with iffy RT/undercarriage approaches to land, it's the job of the ATC to fire a green/red flare to signal thumbs up/down for landing. In Nirmal's case, for the ATC, it was too close to call to fire either flare!
The sting in the tail
Here's what might have happened. Mind you, Nirmal was essaying to land on runway 06, and given the time (3.22 pm), the bright sun glowing behind his back made it tough to confirm three greens in the 11-second nerve-wracking home stretch. Simply, it was one of those days.
The last word
As often happens in military aviation, the aircraft had the last word! The undercart had locked down. As if unimpressed by her last nanosecond abandonment, she touched down, rolled on along the centre line of the runway and swerved left close to the middle-marker, and halted on the runway shoulder, thereby ensuring that she did not block the runway!
Maybe one can interpret that as her way of winking and saying 'cheers' to her captain's exceptional endeavour to bring her back home.
M P Anil Kumar is a former MiG-21 pilot.
Slight correction ... Nirmal was a flt cadet at that time. The really exceptional part hasnt come out, and that is the quick decision (from a flt cadet, mind you) immediately after the bird hit/flamout while doing a safety height at 100mts over the range, when he pulled up to gain height and decided to go for the runway on his right. Good show!! And happy birthday to Fido too!shiv wrote:vishal wrote:.......Pilot Officer O M Nirmal Kumar, with barely 200 hours of flying experience, nearly pulled off an improbable forced landing of a crippled jet. .......To put things in perspective, the elapsed time between the bird hit and the ejection was mere 100 seconds......... M P Anil Kumar is a former MiG-21 pilot.
Resurrecting this thread with a cross post
http://www.ibnlive.com/news/new-jet-tra ... 272-3.html
New Delhi: A newly-inducted Hawk jet trainer of the Indian Air Force crashed at Bidar in Karnataka on Tuesday. Both pilots survived the crash.
The British-made trainer aircraft went down shortly after take-off from the Bidar training base. The pilots were experienced instructors.
Ironically, the Hawk advanced jet trainers have been acquired as enablers to reduce the accident rate of the Indian Air Force. But these aircraft have got off to a bad start adding to the tally of IAF crashes this year.
The first lot of 10 Hawk aircraft were inducted into the IAF in February this year. India is acquiring 100 more of these jet trainers.
According to reports, the fleet of 10 Hawks, purchased off the shelf from Britain, have been grounded until an inquiry is held.
-------------
Hawk fleet grounded after crash, IAF says new aircraft had old parts
[quote] NEW DELHI, APRIL 30: India’s newly acquired fleet of Hawk fighter trainers has been grounded for a second time after one of them crashed at the Bidar airbase on Tuesday afternoon while taking off on a training mission. Both pilots escaped unharmed.
While the entire fleet has been facing problems since the induction in February due to lack of spares, the grounding comes weeks after the IAF discovered that the new aircraft contained parts that were rusted and appeared to be old and used.
This came as a surprise as the trainers — 66 were bought in a Rs 8,000-crore deal inked in 2004 — are new and were inducted barely three months ago. In fact, only 10 aircraft have arrived until now from the assembly line in UK.
After Air Hqs informed the Ministry of Defence about the matter, the Defence Secretary has been asked to head for London on May 19 to raise the issue with top UK government officials.
As first reported by The Indian Express on March 23, the fleet had earlier been grounded, shortly after the aircraft arrived in January, due to lack of spares and technical problems.
Sources at Air Hqs said that the British High Commissioner has also been contacted and an official communication has been sent to the original manufacturers, the UK-based BAE Systems.
It is learnt that the problem with the Hawks pertains to certain parts like the undercarriage and the pitot-static tube —it gives the pilots feedback on airspeed and altitude — that IAF technical teams discovered were rusted.
The fleet will now remain grounded until the reason behind Tuesday’s crash is investigated. The IAF’s training schedule is likely to get affected as the first course on the new trainers was set to begin at Bidar in July.
While a court of inquiry has been ordered into the crash and human error is not ruled out, IAF sources say that initial investigation points to a fault either in the undercarriage or the yaw controllers that are used to stabilise the aircraft. The IAF says that both pilots were experienced instructors with several hundred hours of combat flying in their logbooks.
Officials from BAE Systems, who concede that there are “small issuesâ€
http://www.ibnlive.com/news/new-jet-tra ... 272-3.html
New Delhi: A newly-inducted Hawk jet trainer of the Indian Air Force crashed at Bidar in Karnataka on Tuesday. Both pilots survived the crash.
The British-made trainer aircraft went down shortly after take-off from the Bidar training base. The pilots were experienced instructors.
Ironically, the Hawk advanced jet trainers have been acquired as enablers to reduce the accident rate of the Indian Air Force. But these aircraft have got off to a bad start adding to the tally of IAF crashes this year.
The first lot of 10 Hawk aircraft were inducted into the IAF in February this year. India is acquiring 100 more of these jet trainers.
According to reports, the fleet of 10 Hawks, purchased off the shelf from Britain, have been grounded until an inquiry is held.
-------------
Hawk fleet grounded after crash, IAF says new aircraft had old parts
[quote] NEW DELHI, APRIL 30: India’s newly acquired fleet of Hawk fighter trainers has been grounded for a second time after one of them crashed at the Bidar airbase on Tuesday afternoon while taking off on a training mission. Both pilots escaped unharmed.
While the entire fleet has been facing problems since the induction in February due to lack of spares, the grounding comes weeks after the IAF discovered that the new aircraft contained parts that were rusted and appeared to be old and used.
This came as a surprise as the trainers — 66 were bought in a Rs 8,000-crore deal inked in 2004 — are new and were inducted barely three months ago. In fact, only 10 aircraft have arrived until now from the assembly line in UK.
After Air Hqs informed the Ministry of Defence about the matter, the Defence Secretary has been asked to head for London on May 19 to raise the issue with top UK government officials.
As first reported by The Indian Express on March 23, the fleet had earlier been grounded, shortly after the aircraft arrived in January, due to lack of spares and technical problems.
Sources at Air Hqs said that the British High Commissioner has also been contacted and an official communication has been sent to the original manufacturers, the UK-based BAE Systems.
It is learnt that the problem with the Hawks pertains to certain parts like the undercarriage and the pitot-static tube —it gives the pilots feedback on airspeed and altitude — that IAF technical teams discovered were rusted.
The fleet will now remain grounded until the reason behind Tuesday’s crash is investigated. The IAF’s training schedule is likely to get affected as the first course on the new trainers was set to begin at Bidar in July.
While a court of inquiry has been ordered into the crash and human error is not ruled out, IAF sources say that initial investigation points to a fault either in the undercarriage or the yaw controllers that are used to stabilise the aircraft. The IAF says that both pilots were experienced instructors with several hundred hours of combat flying in their logbooks.
Officials from BAE Systems, who concede that there are “small issuesâ€
cross post
RaviBg wrote:Has anyone else reported this?
IAF woman cadet dies in aircrash
IAF woman cadet dies in aircrash
By Our Special Correspondent
New Delhi, May 12: A lady flight cadet trainee of the Indian Air Force was killed on Monday afternoon when the Hindustan Piston Trainer aircraft she was flying crashed near Medak in Andhra Pradesh. The crash took place north of the Air Force Academy at Dundigal in Andhra Pradesh. The lady flight cadet was undergoing training at the Air Force Academy. IAF officials in New Delhi confirmed that she trainee had "sustained fatal injuries" and died in the crash. An enquiry has been ordered into the cause of the crash which took place at about 3 pm on Monday. This is the fourth IAF aircraft to have crashed this year so far. In the past five years, 62 IAF aircraft have crashed.
It may be recalled that less than two weeks ago, on April 29, a brand new Hawk 132 Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) aircraft of the IAF had crashed at Bidar Air Force Station in Karnataka. But in that case, the pilots had escaped unhurt. Meanwhile, two Hawk aircraft arrived from UK on Monday along with large quantities of spares as per the induction plan, IAF officials said. Two more Hawk aircraft would arrive in the first week of June.
The Hawk AJT which crashed last month was one of the 10 new aircraft inducted into the IAF just two months ago in the presence of the Indian defence minister, IAF chief and British high commissioner. The Hawk aircraft is manufactured by BAE systems, a British company. The total contract signed between the government and BAE systems provides for the procurement of 66 Hawk AJT aircraft out of which 24 will be bought "off the shelf" from BAE while the remaining 42 will be manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. after technology transfer from BAE.
Re: Flight Safety
189 posts, 35,821,378,456 views.
IB4TL? Anyone want this thread around? Anyone willing to write up the info here for BRM/SRR? The Mahdi-e-Thread-Deleti is here.
A WELL-INFORMED article on Indian Flight Safety systems with your name on it! Imagine the GLORY! The FAME! The NOTORIETY!
IB4TL? Anyone want this thread around? Anyone willing to write up the info here for BRM/SRR? The Mahdi-e-Thread-Deleti is here.
A WELL-INFORMED article on Indian Flight Safety systems with your name on it! Imagine the GLORY! The FAME! The NOTORIETY!
Re: Flight Safety
Yes please. crashes are inevitable. this one to capture all.narayanan wrote: Anyone want this thread around? !
Re: Flight Safety
Ah, it just occurred to me that "No Posts For Months" is actually a wonderful thing on a thread meant to capture news about crashes. Long may this thread remain dormant. Infinitely long, in fact..
Thanks, the Mahdi will go hunt elsewhere...
Thanks, the Mahdi will go hunt elsewhere...
Re: Flight Safety
the raisin deiter for this thread was expressed by me in the first post in June 2005Jagan wrote:Yes please. crashes are inevitable. this one to capture all.narayanan wrote: Anyone want this thread around? !
It is salutary to both the Indian Public and the IAF that one reacted with indignation and the other responded effectively to make this thread reach a stage when someone has to ask if it is needed.
Let it be please.
Re: Flight Safety
http://frontierindia.net/indian-air-for ... ft-crashed
Indian Air Force MIG-21Trainer aircraft crashed
Written on November 12, 2008 – 2:16 pm | by Frontier India Strategic and Defence |
One MiG-21 (Trainer) aircraft of IAF crashed near Chabua village, district Tinsukia (Assam) on 12 Nov 08 at about 1035 hrs. The aircraft had got airborne from Chabua air base and was on a routine training-flying mission. The pilots Sqn Ldr Supandeep and Fg Offr Nanda ejected safely.
There were minor damage to cultivated field and no individual was injured/killed as a result of air crash. An inquiry has been ordered to investigate the reasons for the accident.
Not withstanding this crash, IAF MiG-21 crash reduction measures have been very successful.
Re: Flight Safety
http://in.rediff.com/news/2008/nov/12an ... s-safe.htm
A differing rank:
A differing rank:
Why were two senior experienced officers in the trainer? Probably a mistake in reporting.Squadron Leader Subhandeep and Wing Commander Nanda, the two pilots of the MIG jet aircraft, ejected and landed safely with the help of their parachutes, the sources said.
Re: Flight Safety
its possible that the Sqd leader was getting his bad weather rating check\training.
Re: Flight Safety
MIG-23(Trainer) Aircraft Crash
One MiG-23 (Trainer) aircraft of Indian Air Force crashed near Air Force Station Hashimara on 17 Nov 08. The aircraft had got airborne from Hashimara air base and was on a routine training-flying mission. The pilots ejected safely. There is no reported damage to civil property and no individual was injured or killed as a result of air crash. An inquiry has been ordered to investigate the reasons for the accident.
One MiG-23 (Trainer) aircraft of Indian Air Force crashed near Air Force Station Hashimara on 17 Nov 08. The aircraft had got airborne from Hashimara air base and was on a routine training-flying mission. The pilots ejected safely. There is no reported damage to civil property and no individual was injured or killed as a result of air crash. An inquiry has been ordered to investigate the reasons for the accident.
Re: Flight Safety
Sad news
One Suryakiran down during practice at Bidar.
Re: Flight Safety
IAF pilot killed in Surya Kiran crash-Rediff
An Indian Air Force fighter pilot on a training sortie was killed when a Surya Kiran trainer aircraft crashed near Bidar in Karnataka on Wednesday morning.
The pilot, who had joined the Surya Kiran Aerobatics team recently, was on the Kiran Mk II trainer aircraft, when the mishap occurred at 8.45 hours, IAF sources said.
The deceased pilot was identified as Wing Commander Daliwal.
The aircraft took off from Bidar and the crash took place a few minutes later at a vacant plot near the air force station.
The Air Headquarters immediately ordered an inquiry into the mishap.
This is the second fatal Surya Kiran air mishap in the last six years, the previous one reported in March 2006 at the same air base when two pilots were killed.
An Indian Air Force fighter pilot on a training sortie was killed when a Surya Kiran trainer aircraft crashed near Bidar in Karnataka on Wednesday morning.
The pilot, who had joined the Surya Kiran Aerobatics team recently, was on the Kiran Mk II trainer aircraft, when the mishap occurred at 8.45 hours, IAF sources said.
The deceased pilot was identified as Wing Commander Daliwal.
The aircraft took off from Bidar and the crash took place a few minutes later at a vacant plot near the air force station.
The Air Headquarters immediately ordered an inquiry into the mishap.
This is the second fatal Surya Kiran air mishap in the last six years, the previous one reported in March 2006 at the same air base when two pilots were killed.