Discussion on Indian Special Forces

[Singha]

ever gun seems to have its share of problems. even the tfta delta force/devgru seem to have abandoned their homegrown M4 and gone with some collab with HK http://www.americanspecialops.com/delta ... /hk416.php. the FN-SCAR has also been dropped after the initial hype it seems. however the M4 still seems to be in wide use in their JSOC units along with the trusty MP5/MP3 family.

[Karan M]

given the bad rep M4/m16 types received in afghanistan, so much so that US had to conduct special trials revalidating it - we should have been more careful. seems to be one more case of buy a glitzy toy which must be ok because khan has it, and khan fights everywhere so must and should be good

that apart, its clear, our entire procurement system is byzantine and riddled with inefficiency. swanky presentations and quick fix purchases are the norm for "small deals" which cumulatively add upto billions while we remain fixated on dog and pony shows like MMRCA. look at the menagerie fielded by BSF, SPG while NSG has been hollering for basic upgrades. no coordination apparent.

meanwhile desi efforts get spanked as hand me down, daal rice sambar idli versus best in class pasta bolognaise. never mind when pasta arrives its either overcooked, or undercooked and needs additional contracts for chef to fix it.

of course US MIC is "best in world", no equal etc. even if h&k innards have to be put into m4 shell to make latter reliable. same for insas would have us all crying bloody murder. putting some israeli processor and software into MMR keeping all the rest same had everyone cry !@#$.

[Mihir]

seems to be one more case of buy a glitzy toy which must be ok because khan has it, and khan fights everywhere so must and should be good

Well, considering how the DDM went to town with the whole HolyShitWeAreBuyingAmericanRIflesThatKilledOsamaZOMG!!!!!!11111One thing, I'm not surprised.

[vishvak]

Wickei article on M-4 doesn't look like propaganda, in fact far from it. There are issues finding a mention or more all over the article. Also mentioned is strange issues of litigation process. Issues are blamed on sandy environment etc. Can't imagine if an Indian rifle would have such issues and baggage of history - reminds at once desert trials in Rajasthan.

[Singha]

do the marcos have any plan of changing their main weapon, which seems to be folding-stock AK56 & MP5(sometimes)? maybe vs the tfta next-gen cloudsourced gizmos, these two oldies are very reliable after daily baths in sea water?

[Aditya_V]

SO INSAS is not so bad after all, some were praising M-4 and calling it Junk. Solution seems to be we should get our private sector involved and develop something better than what OFB produces.

Unless it is a few dozen or so, we should buy Indian stuff for small arms.

[vishvak]

But M4 we purchased must have been the exact replicas of ones used to assassinate osama bin laden holed up in pak for years! Another attack on boko haram leader was met with lots of resistance where SEALs chose to withdraw. link The boko haram terrorists had human shields apparently.

[Aditya G]

do the marcos have any plan of changing their main weapon, which seems to be folding-stock AK56 & MP5(sometimes)? maybe vs the tfta next-gen cloudsourced gizmos, these two oldies are very reliable after daily baths in sea water?

There is one pic of SPB armed with Amogh Carbine.

[koti]

^^ That is a photo-shopped one sab, I've seen it too. The original one was with a Sterling.

[nachiket]

do the marcos have any plan of changing their main weapon, which seems to be folding-stock AK56 & MP5(sometimes)?

AKM, not AK56. Doubt they were buying rifles from the Chinese.

maybe vs the tfta next-gen cloudsourced gizmos, these two oldies are very reliable after daily baths in sea water?

Very likely IMO, at least for the AK. It is after all legendary for its reliability in tough environments.

Buying the M4s when the Khan's were replacing theirs with the HK416 because of problems with the M4 was a stupid move made by people who were apparently struck with severe cases of brochuritis and "khan is king" syndrome.

[wig]

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 444282.cms

story of operation mandhol in 1971, by the 9th Battalion (Commando), The Parachute Regiment

While hundreds of brave soldiers made the ultimate sacrifice during the 1971 India-Pakistan war, the operation 'Mandhol' carried out by 9 Para Commandos unit in Poonch sector of Jammu and Kashmir was the only classical commando raid executed by special forces in the war.

In this operation, the Para Commandos or special forces of the Indian Army had carried the first raid after their formation by entering enemy territory and eliminating their artillery guns.

Chandigarh-based Colonel (retd) K D Pathak was then a captain and second-in-command of the company of 120 men who had carried out the remarkable operation, which made Pakistan change its war doctrine. Operation 'Mandhol' is also part of the curriculum in the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehradun, where cadets are trained as future officers of the Army.

Recalling the night of December 13 and 14, 1971, Col Pathak, 73, said his unit was posted at 'Nangi Tekri' post at the height of 4,665 feet in Poonch sector and was assigned the task of destroying Pakistan's artillery guns positioned near Mandole village, which was around 19km southwest of Poonch. Six 122mm Chinese guns of Pakistani battery were creating trouble for 93 and 120 infantry brigades of the Indian Army.

"We started around 5.30pm on December 13 with one company comprising six officers and around 120 men of 9 Para Commando unit led by Major C M Malhotra," Col Pathak recalled.

According to Col Pathak, it was a cold night and they had to cross waist-deep water of Poonch river to reach Mandole. On reaching the village, they found it completely deserted, but the raiding party locate the enemy guns with the help of an old man. After tracing the gun positions, the party was split into six groups with each attacking one gun. After a fierce battle with the enemy all guns were destroyed with the help of pencil-cell connected timer explosives. During the fight, many soldiers of Pakistan army were killed while several fled. The raiding party of Indians lost two of its men while 20 were wounded.

"It was also an uphill task to return to our territory with wounded soldiers and the body of a soldier. Cots, taken from villages, were improvised and turned into stretchers to carry the wounded soldiers. We reached our post at 6.30am," Pathak recounted.

He, however, has one grouse that their feat was recognized only when the delegations of the Pakistan Army, after ceasefire, narrated the heroic act carried out by the Indian troops at Mandhol. "The act of the raiding team did not fetch it many gallantry awards, but for the overall operations in the Poonch sector, the Para Commandos were awarded the 'Battle Honour' in the 1971 war. What can be more proud for the Para Commandos that the operation carried out by them is part of the curriculum of IMA," Pathak said.

The 'Mandhol' operation had so deep an impact on the Pak Army that it had to raise a second line of troops to secure their artillery guns thereby making a change in its war doctrine

[member_23455]

Old news but still seems relevant for this thread it seems.

[Paul]

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 444282.cms

story of operation mandhol in 1971, by the 9th Battalion (Commando), The Parachute Regiment

While hundreds of brave soldiers made the ultimate sacrifice during the 1971 India-Pakistan war, the operation 'Mandhol' carried out by 9 Para Commandos unit in Poonch sector of Jammu and Kashmir was the only classical commando raid executed by special forces in the war.

In this operation, the Para Commandos or special forces of the Indian Army had carried the first raid after their formation by entering enemy territory and eliminating their artillery guns.

Chandigarh-based Colonel (retd) K D Pathak was then a captain and second-in-command of the company of 120 men who had carried out the remarkable operation, which made Pakistan change its war doctrine. Operation 'Mandhol' is also part of the curriculum in the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehradun, where cadets are trained as future officers of the Army.

Recalling the night of December 13 and 14, 1971, Col Pathak, 73, said his unit was posted at 'Nangi Tekri' post at the height of 4,665 feet in Poonch sector and was assigned the task of destroying Pakistan's artillery guns positioned near Mandole village, which was around 19km southwest of Poonch. Six 122mm Chinese guns of Pakistani battery were creating trouble for 93 and 120 infantry brigades of the Indian Army.

"We started around 5.30pm on December 13 with one company comprising six officers and around 120 men of 9 Para Commando unit led by Major C M Malhotra," Col Pathak recalled.

According to Col Pathak, it was a cold night and they had to cross waist-deep water of Poonch river to reach Mandole. On reaching the village, they found it completely deserted, but the raiding party locate the enemy guns with the help of an old man. After tracing the gun positions, the party was split into six groups with each attacking one gun. After a fierce battle with the enemy all guns were destroyed with the help of pencil-cell connected timer explosives. During the fight, many soldiers of Pakistan army were killed while several fled. The raiding party of Indians lost two of its men while 20 were wounded.

"It was also an uphill task to return to our territory with wounded soldiers and the body of a soldier. Cots, taken from villages, were improvised and turned into stretchers to carry the wounded soldiers. We reached our post at 6.30am," Pathak recounted.

He, however, has one grouse that their feat was recognized only when the delegations of the Pakistan Army, after ceasefire, narrated the heroic act carried out by the Indian troops at Mandhol. "The act of the raiding team did not fetch it many gallantry awards, but for the overall operations in the Poonch sector, the Para Commandos were awarded the 'Battle Honour' in the 1971 war. What can be more proud for the Para Commandos that the operation carried out by them is part of the curriculum of IMA," Pathak said.

The 'Mandhol' operation had so deep an impact on the Pak Army that it had to raise a second line of troops to secure their artillery guns thereby making a change in its war doctrine

Did the pakistanis try this tactic out in 1965? Remember reading about this somewhere.

[Paul]

^^^^It is in 1971..http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Se ... ar_of_1965

Indo-Pakistan War of 1971[edit]
The performance of the SSG in 1971 was much better, despite Pakistan's surrender to India, with 1 Commando Battalion making a spectacular raid on an Indian artillery regiment, disabling several of their guns and inflicting casualties.[1]

[KiranM]

To gurus like Rohit and Raja Bose, any idea why some para battalions have been renamed as Special Forces (Airborne)? To me looks like they are the original para infantry for 50th Ind. Para Brigade.

[rohitvats]

To gurus like Rohit and Raja Bose, any idea why some para battalions have been renamed as Special Forces (Airborne)? To me looks like they are the original para infantry for 50th Ind. Para Brigade.

That is the genius master-stroke of some para general who thinks Special Forces and Parachute Infantry battalions are one and the same thing...

And hence, the fancy name...I mean, just look at the stupidity of name - Special Forces (Airborne)...Are Para (SF) battalions not airborne? And what is 'Special Force' about Parachute Infantry Battalions?

I hope this is not just another ploy to get the SF allowance to Para guys as well....

[KiranM]

To gurus like Rohit and Raja Bose, any idea why some para battalions have been renamed as Special Forces (Airborne)? To me looks like they are the original para infantry for 50th Ind. Para Brigade.

That is the genius master-stroke of some para general who thinks Special Forces and Parachute Infantry battalions are one and the same thing...

And hence, the fancy name...I mean, just look at the stupidity of name - Special Forces (Airborne)...Are Para (SF) battalions not airborne? And what is 'Special Force' about Parachute Infantry Battalions?

I hope this is not just another ploy to get the SF allowance to Para guys as well....

I hope the creation of a joint Special Operations Command will also result in a separate Army Special Forces regiment. It is high time. I guess it is the fixation of having 'special' attached.

[wig]

Papers released after three decades in UK reveal UK sent special forces officer to assist Delhi in 1984 Golden Temple operation

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140114/main7.htm

excerpts

Secret correspondence from the British national archives shows how a UK special forces expert visited New Delhi and advised the Indian authorities on how to retake the Golden Temple, despite acknowledging that any military action could “exacerbate the communal violence in the Punjab.”

The name of the Special Air Service (SAS) officer and details of his hush-hush visit have not been made public, but a top secret letter written on February 23, 1984 by BJP Fall , Principal Private Secretary to the British Foreign Secretary, states, “The Indian authorities recently sought British advice over a plan to remove Sikh extremists from the Golden Temple in Amritsar. The Foreign Office decided to respond favourably to the Indian request and, with the Prime Minister’s agreement, an SAD (SAS) officer has visited India and drawn up a plan which has been approved by Mrs Gandhi. The Foreign Secretary believes that the Indian Government may put the plan into operation shortly.”

a photo of the letter
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140114/ind6.jpg



and the UK government now orders a probe " British PM orders probe into Thatcher link to Operation Bluestar"

British Prime Minister David Cameron has directed his cabinet secretary to establish the facts behind claims that Margaret Thatcher's government may have helped Indira Gandhi plan Operation Bluestar in 1984.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/worl ... 771352.cms

[sum]

Good read on various 2SF ops:
Predators | SF rock stars share their daredevilry tales

Didnt know 2SF was in Hebbal!! Was only aware of 109 TA (Para) being in the Benson Town/Hebbal area!

[Karan M]

Good good, with these guys around Bangalore is covered.

[svinayak]

and the UK government now orders a probe " British PM orders probe into Thatcher link to Operation Bluestar"

British Prime Minister David Cameron has directed his cabinet secretary to establish the facts behind claims that Margaret Thatcher's government may have helped Indira Gandhi plan Operation Bluestar in 1984.

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/worl ... 771352.cms

When the Khalistani are inside UK plotting against India from late 1970s then UK govt is obliged to keep GOI informed and help to track the criminals. Unless UK declares India as a enemy country in the 1980s and at war with India HMG has to cooperate in tracking all criminals who are plotting against India. This applies to all friendly govt which GOI deals with.

[rohitvats]

When the decision to have NSG hubs was taken post 2008 Mumbai attacks, Bangalore was given bye because of presence of Para Regimental Centre and some pending decision to base a SF battalion in the city. The Para SF unit is located just prior to Hebbal lake on right hand side (when coming from airport) where the earlier Military Farm was located. IIRC, 2 PARA is the battalion which took part in 1971 Tangail drop. The lineage I think is from Maratha.

[sum]

More on 2 SF from Tarmak:

Making of Predators | Hell Week: Most-dreaded training capsule for SF soldiers

Bangalore: For every solider dreaming to become a Special Forces (SF) operative will have to cross one of the most dreaded training modules spread across seven days. The Hell Week, embedded towards the fag end of the three-month probation period, aims to put a soldier under acute stress mode. A solider gets to sleep for only three hours during the entire week.
During a visit to the SF unit in Bangalore, an official told Express that Hell Week ascertains the mental and psychological endurance levels of a soldier. “It is an intense pressure checking mechanism, specially designed by experts. The main feature is sleep deprivation for days together, though you will get to sleep for a couple of hours, again the schedule will be decided by the instructor. There’s restriction on the food pattern and you can eat only what is provided and when it is provided,” he said.
During the Hell Week, a solider is also assessed on the level of training in ambush, camouflage, concealment, surveillance and firing. “In addition, there’s an IQ test, written assignment, night PT and psychological assessment. Every five to 10 minutes, the physical and mental stress levels are changed and alternated. The instructors too keep changing every six hours,” the official said. Soldiers are tested for their patience levels and also their ability to perform under heightened stress conditions. All these training patters are done with a stand-by medical team and ambulance kept ready 24 x7.
The soldiers are also made to swim with hands and legs tied and even put into mud and water again and again. “The experienced divers keep a close watch on these exercises. There’s a surprise element in every aspects of the training during the Hell Week. You will never know what the next mission is and when it would get over. The probation ends with this seven-day unforgettable session,” the official said.
Post Hell Week, a solider gets to know about the limits of stress his mind and body can withstand. “A rare sense of belief sets that there’s nothing impossible for a man. It also helps to know each and every part of the body better. The confidence will reach unbelievable levels. In SF, we look for the right man for the right job,” says the official. The concept of Hell Week is extremely popular among the Navy SEAL selection and training in the United States.
There are many who give up the dream of becoming a SF operative during the Hell’s Week. And, there are many others, who complete the final seven-day module and yet not get selected. “Our motto is Balidan, means Sacrifice. Our motto says it all,” says the official.

[sum]

Making of Predators: Taking a soldier beyond his physical and mental limits

The traffic on the road was slowly picking up the numbers. Most signal lights were still orange. Newspaper hawkers were exhibiting their speed skills in despatching sorted-out bundles. Soon after descending one of the Bangalore’s famous flyovers, you would find a simple gate painted in maroon. There are no boards. It is still darkness and gun-toting soldiers check the credentials to ensure that they are letting in the right man.

You have just entered a Special Forces (SF) unit of Indian Army, an elite group, operating out of one of the oldest erstwhile military farms in the country. It was around 5.45 am and the SF boys were all lining up for the roll call. “We are called Predators, a very fascinating nickname. In 15 minutes, we will begin the Predators' PT,” the Commanding Officer (CO) of the unit, who did not want to be named, told Express. At 6 am, with no sign of sunrise yet, the Predators began their PT sessions. “You cannot be a passenger in SF. It is a voluntary job, but we demand the best out of the boys. We push them beyond their limits,” says the CO. The training is split into three modules: physical, skill (basic/ advance) and collective.

[sum]

X-post:

As suspected, Blore is now under cover of 2SF:
Making of Predators | Vital installations, buildings in South India under complete SF radar

The Special Forces (SF) unit of the Indian Army based in Bangalore has quietly mapped all big government and private establishments in South India to act quickly and effectively in case of a terror strike. “We are ready to take off at very short notice and can be deployed in any part of South India,” its Commanding Officer, who did not wish to be identified, told Express.
Operating from a 180-acre erstwhile military farm, the unit is in regular touch with the Internal Security Division (ISD), Karnataka’s counter-terrorist police unit. The Special Forces unit was established in Bangalore five years ago in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, which claimed 164 lives.
Over these five years, the unit has prepared dossiers with detailed layouts of every major government, private and commercial establishment in the four southern states. These are stored in the form of satellite images, photos and maps at the unit. A few years ago, the SF team had done a mock drill on the 13th floor of Bangalore’s ITPL after entering the building through the 16th floor. It executed another mock drill at a Wipro unit.
In 2011, the unit collaborated with NSG Commandos and conducted security training at a Taj hotel. In 2011, the unit went on a UN mission to South Sudan. “Our boys have done recce missions at almost all places in Bangalore which are VAVPs,” said the CO. In army terminology, VAVP stands for Vital Area, Vital Point. The unit has trained with the ISD and the two are geared to work together on specific inputs. “Mysore is also on our radar,” he said. Force-1, the elite special commando force of Maharashtra designed on the lines of NSG, was trained by the SF unit, while Karnataka’s ISD had sought its help.
An Army aviation unit using advanced light helicopter Dhruv makes regular visits to the unit. The Indian Air Force station in Yelahanka is the nearest air strip available for the SF to launch major missions.

[rkhanna]

If an Military SOF unit is spending time doing domestic civilian recon for HRT type ops what is the role of the NSG?

[merlin]

If an Military SOF unit is spending time doing domestic civilian recon for HRT type ops what is the role of the NSG?

Eggjactly.

[Aditya G]

What if 2para were to rotate out to j&k or n.e? All this knowledge will be wasted.

[Karan M]

If an Military SOF unit is spending time doing domestic civilian recon for HRT type ops what is the role of the NSG?

NSG was our equivalent of GSG-9/FBI HRT.
But with threats escalating and all sorts of new battlefield scenarios emerging, makes sense for SF to pick up these skills as well (CQB, Reflex shooting etc). 1.3 Bn people in this country, so many towns and villages. Population of Delhi alone is greater than that of whole of Greece.

[member_23455]

If an Military SOF unit is spending time doing domestic civilian recon for HRT type ops what is the role of the NSG?

What if 2para were to rotate out to j&k or n.e? All this knowledge will be wasted.

Less than 3 Kms (can I say Klicks coz it's the sexy SF thread ) from me is the NSG "hub" for Mumbai. One glance at it will tell you the clusterf### it is - there was a report the other day, no doubt leaked by one of the disgruntled NSG chaps that they have to train only by night because they have residential buildings overlooking their training area.

The post 26/11 strategy of placating everyone with cosmetic changes will come home to roost one day (actually they manifested themselves on 26/11 as well betwen NSG and MARCOS) because questions like the ones being raised here are swept under the carpet by apologists who would like us to believe that years of hard-earned Urban CT Ops wisdom globally can be wished away with gloriously homespun logic, mixed with healthy doses of patriotism.

[Karan M]

Leaving aside the pompous proclamations of the resident google expert on everything from naval aviation to determining NSG competence via pictures, time to return the thread to its focus with some recent published work on some past operations.

There are interesting vignettes on Black Thunder from Tavleen Singh's Darbar & the 26/11 Ops from "The Siege 68 Hours Inside The Taj Hotel" respectively. In the former, the NSG (from Tavleen Singh's first hand view) come across as a grim epitome of what they were meant to be.

In the latter, the sheer stupidity displayed by the politicos and some gentlemen like Gafoor (who sets a new benchmark for for third rate leadership if the book is to be believed), is hard to read (to say the least).

Colossal incompetence in terms of delaying the NSG movement to Mumbai and then leaving them with minimal assistance and its clear the NSG folks felt likewise (the book makes it clear how baffled they were by the delay in getting them there). MARCOS team per the book, was a "complex operation, they had not trained for and had the wrong equipment".

The question bears asking, what exactly did the MARCOS train for - were they but glorified Marines in all but name, if they did not have extensive training in room clearance? How were they expected to fight for Bombay High f.e. if it was taken over?

Either the book is wrong, or it raises some hard questions.

Eitherways, it shows the importance of now having all military SF revise their curriculum to incorporate CQB operations in an extensive manner.

The first responders bear the brunt of keeping such attackers at bay for casualty/general populace evacuation to take place. Its clear getting as many boots to the fight ASAP is critical.

The latter book is a very hard read (written from the perspective of the terrorized and the Pakistani terror apparatus is shown clearly) and the military component is a very minor portion (almost an afterthought despite claims of being a complete overview of the event and access to ex NSG insiders including the ops commander). The heroism of the ordinary staff pervades the book despite what should have been their total helplessness in front of the Pakistani murderers.

But there are still interesting details on the NSG ops and the role of Major Unnikrishnan (truly led from the front, pushed the terrorists back and saved one of his men, RIP sir). They came late, but worked methodically and effectively under a strict timeline. Only if they had been sent to Mumbai earlier, and more importantly if the Mumbai Police/ MARCOS had been staffed, trained more effectively many more lives would have been saved. India's restrictive gun laws have meant security at all these establishments is also pretty much toothless.

When time serves will post relevant excerpts from both books.

One excerpt though at how the loss of the Major was received.

NSG Chief was Jyoti Dutt, Ops commander was Brigadier Sisodia.

"They called it in, death confirmed". Jyoti Dutt asked to to talk to the men holding the landing, worried that the Black Cats aura of invulnerability had been pricked and that the advance would falter. Brigadier Sisodia thought that was the difference between the police and the army. Chief Dutt had come from the former, and worried about the men's ability to shoulder the loss. The Brigadier, seconded from the Sikh regiment told him: These men will not even register the Major's passing until the hotel is ours".

[Karan M]

For Reference - on several key details in below check out with the book above wrt the Taj (rest not so much). Below provides the authoritative view of the entire ops.

A year since 26/11: OP Black Tornado: A Case Study

Following is the report of a presentation, "Urban Counter Terrorism Operations: OP Black Tornado-A Case Study" by Maj Gen Abhaya Gupta, SM, VSM, IG (Ops), NSG (now retired) held at the United Service Institution of India, New Delhi, on 4 March, 2009.
Opening address by Lt Gen PK Singh, PVSM, AVSM (Retd), Director, USI:

Lt Gen PK Singh reflected that the subject “Urban Counter Terrorism Operations” is a very apt and hot topic for discussion worldwide, especially since 26/11.
The potential and probability of such un-conventional attacks taking place in any part of the world is a potent threat today, and hence the need for understanding the nature and environment of such a warfare in an urban setting and to counter it, The Royal United Services Institute in the UK held a seminar shortly after the Mumbai attack, realizing the need for comprehending such scenarios and the RAND corporation in the US had also sought inputs from USI on the response mechanism of the Indian security agencies to the Mumbai attack.

Lt Gen Noble Thamburaj, PVSM, SM, VCOAS (now retired):
Lt Gen Thamburaj asserted that it would be unfair to categorize that the entire country was held to ransom for 60 hours during the Mumbai attacks, though certain machineries of the government had stopped functioning.

The army and the NSG had to assume and get on with the job, as no clear picture of the unfolding situation was presented by people already on the ground.

Dwelling on the role played by the media, he believed that it was in fact, very well behaved and had not crossed the ‘Lakshman Rekha’ assigned to it or had hindered operations in any way.

The media had done a service to the nation by bringing the operations to the centre stage and forced the government to take hard decisions.

Maj Gen Abhaya Gupta, SM, VSM, IG (Ops), NSG
Part-I: ‘Operation Black Tornado’- The Mumbai Operations.
On the night of 26 November 2008, firing incidents had taken place at various locations in Mumbai. Initial reports suggested a gang-war taking place. However, in a few hours, it was confirmed to be a terrorist situation.
In an encounter with the Mumbai Police, one terrorist had been killed and one captured alive.
The National Security Guard (NSG) was inducted into Mumbai at 0300 h on
27 November 2008 after covering a distance of 1163 Km from New Delhi by
air transport.

Initially two targets were identified- The Taj Palace hotel and the Oberoi- Trident in South Mumbai. Accordingly, forces were divided into two parts, under the command of DIG (Ops) NSG and Deputy Force Commander, 51 SAG.

Preliminary briefing was provided by Mumbai Police and the hotel staff.

Accretions were being flown in for simultaneous operations.

Later, a terrorist situation was confirmed at a third location- the Nariman house, hence the task force was further divided into three sub-task forces, one each for the Taj, Oberoi-Trident and the Nariman house.

The second contingent arrived on 27 November and the third along with support elements on 28 November.

The Task Force comprised of 195 army personnel drawn from the 51 and 52 Special Action Groups (SAG).

Two sniper detachments from the Taj were sent to the Nariman House to pin down the terrorists present there, within the building.

The operational strategy was to neutralize the terrorists through ‘shock’ action using varied methods of insertions and tactical manoeuvering:-
· Using small ‘HIT’ teams of 5 personnel each.
· Inter and Intra Co-ordination and Communication.
· Top-down innovative tactics.
· Use overwhelming small arms fire to pin down the terrorists.
· Render safe procedure (RSP) to sanitize and secure the buildings.

Operations at the Taj Towers and the Taj Palace Hotel
Layout: The Taj Palace Hotel
· Length of each corridor per floor is about 840 ft, total length of the hotel being about 1.80 Kms.
· Total area- 49,1400 sq.ft.
· 330 rooms, 2-3 rooms in each suite, 140 miscellaneous rooms including generator plants, etc. (in the basement), 17 suites in each floor.

Layout of The Taj Towers:
· 21 floors with with 17 rooms in each floor.
· Total rooms - 323.

Difficulties in Conducting Operations
· Time to break open, enter and conduct quick search of one room took four-five minutes, for 500 rooms- 33-40 hrs,50-63 hrs for the Taj Towers alone.
· Inside the building only 200 SAG personnel operated.
· Large area of operations, ensuring safety of guests/ civilians.
· Thick granite walls of the Taj nullified effectiveness of rocket fire, hence were not used.
· Only one master key was available, hence doors had to be broken open.
· Limited hotel staff was available, no knowledge of various small rooms in the corridors which could be used as hiding places.
· Lack of ambient light inside the rooms and the curtains were drawn from inside.
· Occupants were too scared and never identified themselves or opened the doors upon knocking or calling. Some occupants had ventured out of their rooms earlier and were shot by the terrorists, word of this incident had spread quickly and the hotel staff had advised the guests to shut themselves inside their rooms.

At 0920 h on 27 November, the NSG took over operations from the MARCOS and obtained the hotel layout plan. The Taj Chambers and the restaurants were cleared and secured first. At the Taj Palace, the ground floor was secured and the OP base was set up there.

Top-down operations were launched by approaching the terrace from the service stairs.

Inputs had suggested that two terrorists were present inside the Taj. Contact was established at the first floor during floor clearance. Fire was coming from two terrorists from the left corner of the corridor.

One SAG commando got injured in the middle of the staircase leading to the first floor. It was then that Maj Sandeep Unnikrishnan pulled him down to the basement and asked his squad to stay there and charged the staircase himself, firing at the terrorists. At this moment, two more terrorists unexpectedly fired from the right corner of the first floor corridor, injuring Maj Unnikrishnan. He later succumbed to his injuries.

Eventually, the four terrorists got cornered at the Wasabi restaurant on the first floor.

Due to the wooden spiral staircases and granite walls of the bar, they were immune to NSG fire. IEDs were used to blast open entry into the restaurant and due to the blast effect and shock waves created, one terrorist jumped out of the window and was shot. The rest died inside the restaurant.

Operations at the Oberoi-Trident

Layout:
11 floors, with 33 rooms on each floor, three interlinking corridor at three levels (floors) with the Trident Hotel.

Unlike the Taj, the two terrorists here were not pro-active and after the initial shooting of guests on 26 November, lied low in a room. They opened fire only once while changing their location and on an another occasion when fired at.

They were fixed in room number 1856 which was opened using a master key and fire was drawn from the terrorists. One terrorist was killed while escaping near the lift on the corridor, while the other hid himself inside the bathroom. Later, it was ascertained that he was defiladed from own fire from outside as he had moved into the bathtub.

The Oberoi hotel was cleared by 1400 h on 28 November, and after render safe procedure, handed over to the civil police at 1800 h on 29 November.

Operations at Nariman House

Nariman House is located in a densely populated neighbourhood in South Mumbai. Inhabited by Jews, even residents of the area had no access to it, nor did anyone possess any knowledge of the layout inside.

Sniper detachments were positioned on the surrounding buildings, and the command base was set up near an under-construction building, which provided the vantage point to bring down observed fire on the Nariman House.

The terrorists while moving in had broken the window panes of the house which lay strewn on the ground. Therefore, the sound emanating from the broken glasses alerted the terrorists and would then bring down effective fire on the approaching commandos.

The building had iron grills on all sides and the curtains were drawn from inside. The terrorists had blasted the inner staircase connecting the floors, however could not prevent the commandos from negotiating them.

The maid while escaping with baby Moshe, informed that the terrorists had moved over to the adjacent Merchant House. At one time, the locals had speculated on the possibility of six terrorists including a female being present inside.

Owing to such mixed inputs, the clearance of all neighbouring buildings became a necessity and operations commenced on the intervening night of 27/28 November.

The signal intercept provided by the Mumbai Police, revealed the terrorists shooting down the remaining two female hostages, who had already been shot earlier.

The force was divided into an assault group, which slithered down the helicopter at 0715 h on 28 November, while the support element brought down observed fire on the building. There was no time for rehearsals.

The sixth and the fifth floors were cleared first and contact was established with the terrorists at 0800 h on the fourth floor.

It was at this moment, when Hav Gajender Singh, while attempting to break into the room from the front door was fired upon by the two terrorists from divergent locations inside the room.

After this attempt, another entry point was created using an IED. Co-ordinated fire was brought down from two sides now, ie, the front door and the broken wall, while the commandos moved into the room and neutralized both the terrorists.

The objective was cleared by 1825 h on 28 November.

Summary

In all, eight terrorists were killed during the operation by the NSG and a total of 610 hostages/guests rescued from all the three locations.
The NSG suffered two fatal and 18 non-fatal casualties.

PART-II: Challenges Ahead

The various shortcomings and lessons learnt from the Mumbai incident:-
· Traditional thinking on conflict management needs to change.
· Failure of co-operation and synergised effort between various agencies.
· Lack of any broad-vision, higher level direction, communication and co-ordination.
· Is there an active role for higher commanders in Counter-terrorist operations and if so what should it be?
· With the new urban terror environment, the troops to task ratio needs to be discussed; essential need for reserves at each level, for quick insertion and re-deployment.
· With Urban terror terrain undergoing a sea change from single/double storey buildings to malls, hotels, offices, etc. with multiple entry points, there is a need to evolve new tactics and techniques to counter terror.
· How do we ensure minimum casualties; more time it takes, more is the pressure to accomplish the task, whereas in moving swiftly there is a risk of incurring casualties.
· Need to generate tactical intelligence for which suitable finances and resources be made readily available.
· Radio communication problems- more hand held sets are required.
· Hostage- terrorist identification was a problem.

Recommendations/ Milestones to be achieved
· Need for a better synergy between the centre and the states.
· Launch multi-faceted and integrated operations.
· State governments should be made more accountable, since law and order is a state subject.
· Enhance professionalism of state forces.
· There should be a clear channel of Operational command.
· National Policy should be in line with Constitutional provisions.
· Harmonise all instruments of National Power- Start from a position of strength- military operations, but compliment it with political solutions.
· Need for a media policy – Start was made, but left mid-way.
· Take steps to deter/dissuade our neighbours from indulging in such attacks.

Discussion
· What should be the role of the army and should garrison units take own initiative and respond to such situations as had emerged in Mumbai? Ghatak platoons can be trained and made available to localise the terrorists, till such time as specialised forces arrive.
· Should the army get involved in an urban terror environment? The actual assault is always carried out by the army as CPMFs are not adequately trained and equipped to deal with such situations. Even in Mumbai, the first responders, in the initial few hours had failed to ‘fix’ the terrorists at one location and isolate them.
· The scope of employing chemical agents against terrorists has been studied by the NSG, but since they release odour and are found to be harmful to some categories of people, such as heart patients, old people, etc, it cannot be employed in a wide area where all kinds of people are present.
· NSG has no authority to jam mobile/radio communication and lacks the equipment to block transmissions in larger areas, even in case of airline hijacking; no consensus has been evolved to jam transmission.
· The helicopter assault on Nariman House could not be launched at night due to lacking of night avionics capability in helicopters. In the morning the operation was delayed due to hazy weather conditions.
· Diversion for other tasks is distracting the SAG from its primary role. Is police culture in NSG diminishing its ethos, and therefore should it be under Police control?
· Intelligence agencies need to be made more accountable and brought under Parliamentary oversight. Developing Human intelligence capabilities is the key to prevent terror attacks.

Conclusion
The presentation was well attended by the officers of the service headquarters and veteran officers. It provided an authentic and precise account of the operations carried out in Mumbai, coming as it did from the horse’s mouth, i.e. the IG (Ops) NSG, who operated from Ops rooms established at the Taj and Nariman Point. The debate generated led to pertinent issues being addressed. The new terror environment and the growing liberalism in society is presenting numerous soft targets to the barbaric terrorists who are a much different and a highly indoctrinated and motivated lot. They come with a pre-meditated will to die and hence look to inflict maximum casualties. Therefore, capturing such ruthless and radical bunch of terrorists is well nigh impossible and neutralizing them before they wreak havoc is a challenge facing all counter-terrorist agencies including the elite NSG. There is a need to change and re-orient our tactics to deal with such a lot of terrorists and at the same time minimize own casualties.

Lest We Forget
Maj Sandeep Unnikrishnan, AC, 7 BIHAR, 51 SAG (Posthumous)
Hav Gajender Singh, AC, 10 PARA (SF), 51 SAG (Posthumous)
The 51 and 52 Special Action Groups of the NSG were conferred with 1 Kirti Chakra, 1 Shaurya Chakra, 6 Sena Medals (Gallantry), 1 Sena Medal (Distinguished) and 1 COAS Commendation Card for OP Black Tornado.

Simply put, there is no other option now but to qualify all SF units and even Tier 2 units (Ghatak units f.e.), CPMF units, state units into CQB scenarios. In our crowded, chaotic environs, if a multi target, multi city attack takes place, the first respondents have to hold the line for as long as possible.

[rohitvats]

Given the geographical realities of India and the complex nature of threat we face, it is but necessary that some sort of quick reaction capability is built-in with IA Special Forces along with dedicated training module(s) in urban counter terrorism.

However, the action needs to be thought out in more detail and needs to dovetail if overall threat assessment of this nature + requirement of SF for other operational tasks. The act of creating NSG hubs was typical of our ad-hoc reaction done more for 'show' effect than anything else. I'm not against the act of creating such hubs - but it needs to be thought through like provide large and secure facility along with proper training aids like indoor/outdoor firing range, PT areas, obstacle course area and helipad for quick movement.

The IA/IN SF units are located as per the operational requirements of the service - if we had a structure like JSOC which manages all special forces and is responsible for doctrine+administration+operational matters, it could have streamlined the deployment of IA+IN Special Forces keeping in mind the dual tasking - internal and external. IMO, the presence of 2 Para (SF) in Bangalore is fortuitous - I think the battalion is Southern Command asset and has been placed in Bangalore along with other Southern Command formations. Might also have to do with presence of IAF Helicopter Unit (HU) and fixed wing transport assets in Bangalore.

We could ideally divide the country into sectors/zones and IA+IN Special Forces made responsible for responding to internal threats in these sectors. For example, the MARCOS assets under Eastern Naval Command could become responsible for AP+Orissa+some other areas. They can be pushed in till the time NSG lands on the ground. It goes without saying that assets for movement will have to be factored in and provided from word go - along with clear chain of command.

[member_23455]

some sort of quick reaction capability is built-in with IA Special Forces along with dedicated training module(s) in urban counter terrorism.

...and unfortunately this very real need - especially now that you have active shooter threats rather than "conventional hostage taking" increasingly become the norm - has been used as an excuse to create these hubs, which unfortunately dovetails into politicians need to show that something has been done, and for empire builders within these forces to expand their budgets and organization.

Ironically, this goes against the very heart of all "pure SF thinking" where capability is sought to be increased with ridiculously high levels of training and resourcing (including mobility), and lesser manpower instead of conventional thinking where an increase in capability has to be synonymous with more men and material (in our case we have shortfalls even on material).

Mix up two diametrically opposite POVs and you will get sub-optimal results.

[rohitvats]

...and unfortunately this very real need - especially now that you have active shooter threats rather than "conventional hostage taking" increasingly become the norm - has been used as an excuse to create these hubs, which unfortunately dovetails into politicians need to show that something has been done, and for empire builders within these forces to expand their budgets and organization.

Ironically, this goes against the very heart of all "pure SF thinking" where capability is sought to be increased with ridiculously high levels of training and resourcing (including mobility), and lesser manpower instead of conventional thinking where an increase in capability has to be synonymous with more men and material (in our case we have shortfalls even on material).

Mix up two diametrically opposite POVs and you will get sub-optimal results.

It does not help if we use cookie-cutter approach to evaluate every situation.

I, for one support the idea of regional hubs for NSG - but not of the variety we have today. Ideal situation would be to replicate Manesar level facilities in regional hubs to ensure the adequacy of infrastructure for constant training+practice - Manesar can serve as training center which further works as force HQ along with resources for regional and national role.

We simply cannot escape the reality about India's geography - none of the important economic centers are less than 1.5 hours of flying time from Delhi - you will need to add further minimum of 30 minutes for QRT to get on-board+take off and another minimum of 30 minutes before this force can be bought to bear on the scene of action. Regional hubs with adequate manpower and assets can respond much more effectively and in timely manner.

Coming to the quantity part - well, quantity is a relative term. For a nation with a million+ strong standing army, it would not be difficult to get manpower for 8-10 51 SAG type battalions with ~500-600 men each. And the support staff and assets. And if the same cannot be done for various reasons, the IA+IN special forces units can be earmarked for certain geographies in case of emergency.

The issue is more of long term planning with clear objectives and end-results.

[Pratyush]

But do we have the trained manpower needed to build the different hubs for Nsg type forces in 4 metros.

The more important question is, that given the way Indian economy is developing. A lot of tier 2 and 3 cities will develop over the next 10 years or so. They will all need a dedicated qrt in the vicinity. Will having a regional hub help or hinder in a 21/11type situation. In the absence of trained local police.

[member_23455]

Ideal situation would be to replicate Manesar level facilities in regional hubs[/b] to ensure the adequacy of infrastructure for constant training+practice

So, you have answered your own question. From a "uniquely Indian" understanding of how we work and our systems, why embark on an exercise which has a high degree of failure. Also why not reflect why countries with similar (not same) expanses have opted for a different type of "decentralization", as the kind of ideal being sought by us does not work in practical terms, even in advanced nations.

none of the important economic centers are less than 1.5 hours of flying time from Delhi - you will need to add further minimum of 30 minutes for QRT to get on-board+take off and another minimum of 30 minutes before this force can be bought to bear on the scene of action

Actually, let me make this argument even more extreme....which you probably missed from my earlier post. With the active shooter threat, you literally have a "Domino's type" response required of 30 minutes - if the idea is to minimize civilian casualties, not just say "got the ba$%^&*#" . On the surface of it this would make the regional hubs a no-brainer...no? Except we are not able to deliver on those.

Please think more on this - this requires a different type of decentralization...but one that is less visible, and hampers empire builders, Ironically, our military SFs already do this in their specialized domains.

Coming to the quantity part - well, quantity is a relative term. For a nation with a million+ strong standing army, it would not be difficult to get manpower for 8-10 51 SAG type battalions with ~500-600 men each.

Even in your statement, the lead in is from a conventional sub-text that underlines your POV. I have already flagged off the problem with viewing things from that prism.

[vaibhav.n]

I think 9 and 4 Para are with Northern Command, 1 Para with Western Command, 3 Para with South Western Command, 2 and 10 Para with Southern Command and 11 & 21 Para with Eastern Command.

[member_23455]

But do we have the trained manpower needed to build the different hubs for Nsg type forces in 4 metros.

The more important question is, that given the way Indian economy is developing. A lot of tier 2 and 3 cities will develop over the next 10 years or so. They will all need a dedicated qrt in the vicinity. Will having a regional hub help or hinder in a 21/11type situation. In the absence of trained local police.

What constitutes "trained manpower" is the billion dollar question, is it not?

Rohit Sharma and Shikhar Dhawan were trained manpower playing for the No.1 ODI team in the world. Till they got to New Zealand.

Unfortunately, there is only one way to find out whether the naysayers or the feel good types will be proved right.

[member_23455]

I think 9 and 4 Para are with Northern Command, 1 Para with Western Command, 3 Para with South Western Command, 2 and 10 Para with Southern Command and 11 & 21 Para with Eastern Command.

10 Para (SF) with Southern or South Western? If there has been a change, the "desert heritage" part will be kissed goodbye for good!