Siachen News & Discussion

[Kashi]

So it is ok for them to kill some Indian villagers, and then 'probably kill 4 times as many villagers on their side' before things settle down? Would not those heights allow very accurate targeting as well as possible attacks?

An evaluation based on the economic argument is likely to consider even a retaliation counter to progress and economy. Combined with lack of reaction to multiple infringements - killing of innocent Indians, and incursions on eastern border - there is very little confidence that the 'economic argument types' will countenance a reactive punishing counter-attack.

Are there no other aspects where bhaichara can be demonstrated first? Maybe suggest something to Pakis - can you suggest any such steps from the opposite side?

viv saar, this bloke is an unadulterated goal-post shifting wind up merchant of the worst kind.

Getting into a debate wth him is like mud wrestling with a pig..after a while you find out that while you are getting dirty, the pig is enjoying itself.

I would suggest that the we move away from any discussion on withdrawls and stuff..unless of course to reiterate that we will not under any circumstances consider that option.

Back to topic, I would like to put this poser to fellow Rakshaks, especially Rohitvats and Brihaspati ji- since the demise of Gyari, what becomes of the Pak troop position at Gyong La? Is it, in principle, possible for us to kick them out of there without major difficulties?

[Aditya_V]

Kashi, I disagree but having this debate many learned gurus here is BRF show the details of past Paki betrayal and why Siachen is important and IA stand is correct. It is better to here all the Aurguments of Enemy/WKK brigade so we have our responses ready.

A typical Paki tactic is throw a irrevalent wild accusation and desi when unprepared are on the back foot, however, once we are aware of the accusations and counteracted, they tend to be evasive.

[Kashi]

Kashi, I disagree but having this debate many learned gurus here is BRF show the details of past Paki betrayal and why Siachen is important and IA stand is correct. It is better to here all the Aurguments of Enemy/WKK brigade so we have our responses ready.

A typical Paki tactic is throw a irrevalent wild accusation and desi when unprepared are on the back foot, however, once we are aware of the accusations and counteracted, they tend to be evasive.

I concur with you Aditya and I have made my views clear in the preceding posts. However, it is also evident that the wum is just not interested in any menaingful discussion. His only aim seems to be to bog down and reduce the Siachen debate to the issue of our withdrawing from there. I am not surprised to see this Paki-tactic emerge rapidly ever since Gyari was wiped out and their position in that area became untenable.

WKK/enemy positions on this matter have hardly wavered and as Munnabhai remarked "Iske round and round kuchh bhi bole, centre mein to baat wohi rahegi". Their arguments are unsurprisingly centred around getting India to withdraw from Siachen at any cost. I think we have heard and seen it all and sudeepj's posts have regurgitated the same codswallop in the same old packaging. Once we get sucked into this line of reasoning, the pig analogy becomes clearly relevant. It is not for nothing that wiser men have remarked- Never argue with an idiot..they bring you down to their level and then beat you wih experience and people watching on may not even tell the two apart.

Which is why, I believe that starting from the irrevocable baseline- No withdrawl from Siachen, it would be more prudent to discuss our options in the region. For instance,

- If we decide to take back Gyong La, in purely military terms how feasible would it be
- How have the Dhruv helicopters helped boost our infratsucture and military posture on Siachen and Saltoro.
- Further infrastructural developments and spin offs from those for the civilian sector- encouraging local firms to manufacture and market adverse climate clothing for instance.

[Virupaksha]

I can clearly see a way in which we can vacate the Siachen glacier.

Pak should vacate Goma, Khokundus, Dansam, Tamsam, Huldi, Khand, Usho, Choricho, khaplu, lunkha and we can occupy them. Then we will not be on Siachen at all. In the interest of peace especially after the recent Gyari disaster, kayani should withdraw from boltoro glacier.

I am sure Sudeep ji will agree to this proposal, all in the interest of cost & maintaining peace and prosperity on the glaciers. Lets make the boltoro glacier, the peace glacier.

Those who are all for peace, say aye.

[Yayavar]

VIV let me suggest some steps.

1) Hand over all United Jihand council members with head and trunk seperate

2) Perform Lal Masjid type operation on Mudrike.

3) Withdraw from POK as part of peace park plan and allow indian inspection of such withdrawal.

4) Hand over worthies like Dawood etc. and give a list of ISI operatives in INdia.

5) Do a Lapland type war and try and liberate the Shasgam valley.

6) COnsidering the disputed status of POK, to blow up all bridges and abandon KKH.

I will be more trusting if the above 6 are done.

These sound like good approaches but I would like to get Sudeepj's view .

[Yayavar]

So it is ok for them to kill some Indian villagers, and then 'probably kill 4 times as many villagers on their side' before things settle down? Would not those heights allow very accurate targeting as well as possible attacks?

An evaluation based on the economic argument is likely to consider even a retaliation counter to progress and economy. Combined with lack of reaction to multiple infringements - killing of innocent Indians, and incursions on eastern border - there is very little confidence that the 'economic argument types' will countenance a reactive punishing counter-attack.

Are there no other aspects where bhaichara can be demonstrated first? Maybe suggest something to Pakis - can you suggest any such steps from the opposite side?

viv saar, this bloke is an unadulterated goal-post shifting wind up merchant of the worst kind.

oh! it dont matter ..I've only two points from the first and will continue to ask -- why is it ok to sign off on the lives of some Indian villagers("shell some villages along the highway"); and what mechanism exists to make the retaliation non-binding away from the pressure/control of the economic argument, bhaichara, west-kya kahega types? Maybe Sudeepj has answers to these.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP> Indira col is the only 'pass' connecting Siachen glacier to Shaksgam valley, if you could call it that. The height of the pass, is 5900 meters!

Like I said sometime back, you need to read on the topic a bit more and go beyond the obvious available.

Fist and foremost, please read this detailed account of Siachen by Harish Kapadia. HK is an acclaimed mountaineer and had traversed length and breadth of Siachen and climbed many peaks surrounding the glacier.

Here is his account of expedition to Siachen in 1998: http://www.indianmountaineeringfoundati ... acier.html

Some excerpts:

We were treading on the historical ground . It was a great feeling moving up the glacier once again. Soon we passed the entrance to the Terong valley in the east. We were familiar with this valley, having explored it thoroughly in 1985 and again in 1996. Many memories were recalled. We stayed at the northerly turn of glacier. Several peaks rose in the south and east while in the west we saw the Gyong la valley which led to the famous pass of the same name. Many expeditions had come up to the Siachen by this pass from Gyong valley in the west.

The link between Shaksgam Valley and Siachen is not Indira Col but Turkestan La. Please see the map below:

The ridge, on which we were standing, rose gently towards north and a deep notch was seen on it. This was the Turkestan La (North) which was reached by Col. Francis Younghusband (later Sir) in 1889. It is sometimes fondly called Colonels Col. Discussing the locations with the army, we found that there was much confusion about names, heights and location of the passes and cols on the Indira ridge. This is a long ridge leading from foot of Sia Kangri to Colonels Col and turning south to Turkestan La (East). This is the northernmost ridge of India at present and it forms a major divide between South and Central Asia. It is essential to clearly note the exact locations of cols on this ridge.

The easternmost pass on this ridge is Turkestan La (North). It is an easy pass on both the sides and this was reached in 1889 by Col. Younghusband.

We were faced with the Indira Ridge and a vast panorama. To north was the Indira Col (West) (the main Indira Col). I decided to reach this Col with Sherpa Pemba Tsering. After a walk of about 2 hours we were at the pass. At the pass we made a safe anchor and walked on the northern cornices to safely look down the Urdok glacier. This beautiful flat glacier led northwards to join the Shaksgam river which was visible. Several peaks were visible but unfortunately Gasherbrum I was in clouds. On the north was Chinese Turkestan where trekkers in recent years had roamed freely. Apart from the political divide we were standing on a major geographic divide too. The waters from this col drained in the south to the Siachen glacier, Nubra, Shyok and Indus rivers to merge with the warm waters of Arabian Sea.

From the Siachen history section of the article:

Contrary to the popular belief, the Siachen glacier has been visited by many since more than a Century. The glacier, originally known as Saicher Gharni was place of interest and several Baltis from the western valleys visited the glacier. Many decades ago it is believed that a small Yarkandi village existed at the entrance of the Teram Shehr glacier. (Bullock-Workman found the walls of such a settlement in 1912). Here on the glacier Yarkandis met the Baltis and traded with them.

The section below is from an expedition in 1911-1912:

They entered the glacier crossing over the Bilafond la and camped on the glacier with a large entourage of porters and two Alpine guides. They climbed many peaks and visited almost all the corners of the upper Siachen. Grant Peterkin was a surveyor attached to this expedition. He surveyed the glacier thoroughly and named a few peaks, particularly Teram Kangri, Apsarasas and Ghent. This expedition spent more than two months on the glacier and they visited almost all the major side valleys. Names like Sia la, Junction Peak, Hawk, Tawiz and few others were given by this expedition. They also visited and named Indira Col, after Goddess Laxmi.

This is from 1929:

At the same time, in 1929, the Duke of Spoleto expedition (Italian) crossed the Karakoram by Muztagh pass and reached Turkestan La from north. They descended from Turkestan la (East) after discovering Staghar and Singhi glaciers.

I hope people now don't underestimate the linkage between Siachen and Shaksgam Valley. Also, I hope there not no further doubts about possibility of movement between west-to-east on Saltoro and then north to Shaksgam Valley.

Finally, here is a view of the Shaksgam Valley:



The site here (http://www.panoramio.com/photo/44499304) has a treasure trove of photographs from a recent Russian expedition to Shaksgam Valley and Aghil Mountains (north of Shaksgam Valley). Each photo location is marked on the google maps by the photographer so one can find out their location in the Valley.

Please see how close these people came to the southern face of ridge which has Indira Col and Turkestan La. And then think what a professional army with proper engineering and aviation support do. You might also want to see the linkage between east part of Shaksgam Valley and area north of Karakorum Pass. Earlier, people have explored the Shaksgam Valley bu crossing over north from KK Pass and then turning east.

[sudeepj]

Sudeepj: Enemy guns on those ridges would not matter all all..would they?

Are you talking about the Kargil ridges?

Only following up on your scenario about not needing to hold Kargil heights.

If the Leh-Srinagar highway was not the only highway connecting Leh to Srinagar, what would they achieve by being there? Their lines of comm. were quite stretched in some places. At most they would be able to shell some villages along the highway.

We would probably pay them 4 times over in Neelam valley or some other area advantageous to us. After a while, Pakistanis would request a flag meeting, and agree to withdraw..

It was only because of the highway that uphill battles had to fought..

So it is ok for them to kill some Indian villagers, and then 'probably kill 4 times as many villagers on their side' before things settle down? Would not those heights allow very accurate targeting as well as possible attacks?

Attacks on what? and with what? Instead of dealing in hypotheticals, why not take a look at the terrain and see what kind of military material the Pakistanis could bring across and how they would sustain their men, once they came down from the ridges. No invasion across those heights is possible. The only possible route, that I could see, is along the Shyok valley.

Accurate targeting, but on what? some villages, which could be evacuated.. Some villages were evacuated for the duration of the war in any case! So if Civil lives were not at stake, should we have lost 600 lives for some property? We paid a price of 600 odd soldiers lives, and 1000 or so injured, two jets shot down, and one chopper. This price would not be paid by any military general, if the Srinagar Leh highway was not disrupted. The attack would have come at a place of our choosing.

An evaluation based on the economic argument is likely to consider even a retaliation counter to progress and economy. Combined with lack of reaction to multiple infringements - killing of innocent Indians, and incursions on eastern border - there is very little confidence that the 'economic argument types' will countenance a reactive punishing counter-attack.

To make up *my* mind, I put fwd five criteria, not just the economic one. To refresh your memory, they are strategic/political/cultural/economic/cost of operations(human/monetary). If you want to make up your mind differently, its your prerogative. Why beat up a strawman?

Are there no other aspects where bhaichara can be demonstrated first? Maybe suggest something to Pakis - can you suggest any such steps from the opposite side?

Sure. Give up some terror network that will not end up destabilizing the civil govt. there. Such as Paresh Baruah (though he is said to be in China these days), or give up the Indian Mujahedin network, or some muhajir don shon from India. Thats the best I could think of. I personally feel, that without such a gesture to show good faith, we should not move fwd on Siachen.

[Kanishka]

Hai Koi Jawab: Debate on Siachen: Paki Point of View. Very similar views are being pedelled here by few.
Pakis want India to vacate Siachen but are not prepared to discuss or settle Kashmir.
Note how Pakis beg MMS and offer international guarantee while attacking the Indian Army .
You will keep hearing "not a blade of grass grows" kind of phrase all throughout the video.
Makes one wonder why Pakis are so interested in such a useless area?
Sushant Sarin does a good job in rebutting Paki POV.

[sudeepj]

@rohit,

Thanks for the link, it was interesting reading. Ill update the map with the new (to me) information.

All along, my hunch has been, that occupation of Saltoro ridge and Siachen, protects nothing but the ridge and the glacier, and that the glacier is not a possible invasion route for getting into the Nubra valley, south of the Glacier snout.

Please correct me if I am wrong, but I see one of your counters to this as, there can be an invasion down the Indira Col/Turkestan La, and threaten the upper Nubra valley, as the Glacier has been traveled up and down by multiple expeditions over the years

Note, that all passes from Shaksgam valley - Siachen are at a height of 5800 - 6000 meters or so. This is a height at which there is less than 50% the concentration of Oxygen at sea level. Clearly, the crossing of the Glacier itself is no easy task either. Further, there are no references of motorized transport (other than snow mobiles) across the glacier, only mules and manpack. How will an invasion force support itself through the Glacier? Then there is the matter of getting material up from Shaksgam valley, to the Indira Col/Turkestan La itself, a distance of 10-12 kms over glaciated terrain, and an elevation gain that I am not sure of. Note that at present, no chopper can carry substantial payload at these heights, except the desi Dhruv.

At most, one man can man pack 40kgs (combat pack weight for long range patrols at normal altitude in US). This needs to include food, kerosene, shelter material, warm clothing and ammunition. Further, because the route is a multiday route, the porters will need to carry their own food for the duration of the hike both in and out. Plus they will need to evacuate casualties, from weather and the fighting, back out the glacier (at least four men per casualty, likely eight). Now I dont have military figures for these heights, but how much material will an invasion force of, say, 300 men take? How much will a battalion take? The situation of this hypothetical invasion battalion will become even worse in the winters, when the northern passes on the Glacier close up. Any sustenance will have to be via air. For this, the invasion force will need to run the gauntlet of Indian Airforce and manpads. For the air sustenance to be done, the enemy will need air superiority. And if the enemy has air superiority *and* wants to invade the nubra valley down the glacier, he will get through eventually. With his effort in the air, the enemy can blow up the supply dumps on the Glacier below, and starve the soldiers protecting the glacier.

Further consider, that because the Glacier is under monitoring by the Indian Army, a sizeable movement down the glacier, of say anything more than 30 people, the progress down the glacier will have to be made under artillery fire. After all, we have a road head to Dzingrulma, and can position towed and self propelled medium guns in the upper Nubra valley, even Pinaka MLRS to take out the enemy supply dumps on the Glacier. The upper Nubra valley is quite broad, and if we want to, we can even position tanks up there. The river is quite shallow, and the valley floor is wide and flat. Given our tanks medium and deep fording capabilities, and the road head, (recall that NH1D has been widened to allow T72 movement and likely the Arjun), and given the obvious reality that the enemy cant bring down any armor down the glacier, the hypothetical enemy can occupy the glacier, but will be stopped right there.

Another idea you or perhaps someone else (I think even General Katoch) put forward is, that the Pakistanis and Chinese can get another land link. But what added advantage does this land link bring over and above the KKM highway? Even if their soldiers meet up here, what relative advantage do they gain over our forces in the Nubra? Their airforces can 'link up' around the PoK area anyway.

I get your point that to threaten the Shyok valley, the Pakistanis dont need to move up the valley, and in particular, can threaten Chalunka. Bottling up forces in the valley west of Chalunka. Now your position is, to protect Chalunka, you need Bahadur complex, to protect Bahadur complex, you need positions further north on the Saltoro ridge, and ad infinitum till you butt against the Gasherbrum massif. Perhaps there is a way to square this hole... but may be not.

Best regards,
Sudeep

[Supratik]

I guess here our perceptions differ. To me, if Siachen is as important as Delhi, so is Aksai Chin (even though its militarily indefensible), so is PoK and so are the border disputes in Arunachal.. Merely the fact that they are under adverse occupation should not change their importance. Why dont we take them back? If Delhi was under adverse occupation, we would not rest till its taken back. But we have only paid lip services to taking back AksaiChin/PoK/...

Secondly, I think while this maximalist position has a place in negotiation and arises from patriotism in the general populace, it will lead down a path of perpetual conflict and war. The other nation feels it has a claim, and in many cases is in possession of the land, to not negotiate will mean either cold or hot war.. with simmering insurgencies...

I don't think you are getting the message. In the 90s the same arguments were used by the same set of people to suggest why India should concede on Kashmir. There is a big racket (Leftist-Islamist-Western) which continues to suggest that India should concede this or that. A better way of defending Siachen is to push the boundary further West where the geography is less hostile rather than declaring a withdrawal. This should have been done many moons ago.

[eklavya]

sudeep,

I don't think you understand. Siachen is as important to defend as New Delhi. What India can bear to defend New Delhi, India can bear to defend Siachen.

I guess here our perceptions differ. To me, if Siachen is as important as Delhi, so is Aksai Chin (even though its militarily indefensible), so is PoK and so are the border disputes in Arunachal.. Merely the fact that they are under adverse occupation should not change their importance. Why dont we take them back? If Delhi was under adverse occupation, we would not rest till its taken back. But we have only paid lip services to taking back AksaiChin/PoK/...

Secondly, I think while this maximalist position has a place in negotiation and arises from patriotism in the general populace, it will lead down a path of perpetual conflict and war. The other nation feels it has a claim, and in many cases is in possession of the land, to not negotiate will mean either cold or hot war.. with simmering insurgencies...

sudeepj,

1) India's position over Aksai Chin is the same as the Chinese position over Arunachal Pradesh or Taiwan or the Pakistani position over J&K. When we are strong enough to recover Aksai Chin, we will.

2) India's position over PoK is governed by the Simla Treaty. We are committed to bilateral negotiations with Pakistan.

3) Under the Simla treaty, which Pakistan has also signed, Siachen is on India's side of the LoC. It is because the other nation is falsely making a claim over Siachen that compels India to use armed force to enforce India's rights over Siachen.

4) The only reason Pakistan is looking to negotiate over Siachen is because from a military perspective they are currently in a no-win position. If Pakistan thought it was strong enough to take Siachen by force, it would.

5) Pakistan's Army is committed to perpetual conflict and war against India, by any means, until they have wrested all of J&K from India, and indeed broken India into pieces. Siachen is not even 0.1% of what Pakistan wants from India.

6) History has fully proven that the Pakistan Army does not respect any treaty or commitment made by Pakistan or even its own national constitution. It would be an act of tremendous stupidity and gross negligence to believe or rely on any commitment made by the Pakistan Army. It is amply clear that an armed presence in Siachen is the only means of enforcing India's rights over Siachen.

7) To be absolutely clear, the only question of debate in India is how to defend Siachen, not whether to defend Siachen.

[sudeepj]

@ Rohit

Also see this picture from that same article by Harish Kapadia.



Indira Col is hardly inviting terrain! It looks almost like Antarctica to me! Lastly, all the 'passes' and cols are at 5800-6000 meters. At a similar elevation to the highest peak in North America, and higher than the highest in Africa, Australia, Europe and Antarctica.

[rohitvats]

Sudeepj,

I have seen all those pics; I have read HK's book on the Siachen Glacier and couple of more.

Indira Col is not a possible access route for mountaineers forget any army because of the overhang and sheer vertical cliff on the other side. In case you have access to Google Earth, then do this - zoom into the India Col section of the Siachen. Not difficult to find as the red line demarcating de-facto boundary between India and Shaksgam Valley runs along the Indira Ridge marked on the map/pic shown in my post above. Now, rotate the view (topmost icon with "N" marked on it) and you can see the southern face of entire ridge/face from Chinese side. Move the view to east and you'll see a glacier spread between India and Shaksgam Valley.

Look at the location where cursor is centered here:http://wikimapia.org/#lat=35.4710306&lo ... 11&l=0&m=h

This will show you the access to Siachen from Shaksgam Valley. East of this location is the Sub-Sector North (SSN) or Daulet Beg Oldi - our last holdout on Aksai Chin. The cursor on the map is centered on KK Pass.

http://wikimapia.org/#lat=35.5112837&lo ... ram%20Pass

Now consider this - can PLA roll down the linkage between Shaksgam Valley and outflank and isolate our SSN?

If you want to understand the lay of the land and gradient, choose Google Terrain from Map Type link at top of the Wikimapia. It will show the gradient. Now, coming to the height part - the height is relative to the valley floor.

I'll come to the military aspect of geography later.

[Kanishka]

The responsibility for the protection of India's territorial integrity lies with the Indian Armed Forces.
If the Indian Army have decided to remain in Siachen and/or are opposed to any deal with Pakistan on the issue it will
not be without valid reasons.
Some of the issues regarding Siachen may be in public domain while others may be too sensitive to be debated publicly.
Such decisions should be left to the Indian Army and Indian army alone and the nation should trust their judgement.

It is laughable when some armchair general with very little knowledge (on the subject) and questionable agenda continues in the same vain as he started.

Good entertainment though.

[nachiket]

nachiket ji,
in my post citing Prakash Katoch, he refers to Gyong La being occupied by backstabbing by Pakis after formal agreement.

Thanks. I guess wiki is wrong then. Won't be the first time.

[rohitvats]

In continuation to my post immediately before this one, please see the image below:



You can see the DBO Complex towards east and KK Pass. The narrow wide strip just east of the blue marker is location of our ALG in the area. This is our Sub-Sector North (SSN).

I'm quoting the below passage from the book by Harish Kapadia (Siachen Glacier:The Battle for the Roses). IMO, there cannot be any better explanation of the geography of the area. As I said earlier, he has been up and down the glacier.

With provision for only nine days, they quickly climbed up to the head of the Teram Shehr glacier to a col (He is talking about an Italian expedition in 1930). This col was a pass between Siachen and Rimo Glacier, which would link the Siachen to Aksai Chin, and especially to the Karakoram Pass trade route. He named it 'Col Italia or Passo Italia' in recognition of the contribution made by Italian travelers and scientists to the knowledge of Karakoram. This name has stayed on the map. Descending easily to the east, he reached the Karakoram trade route where Hashmatllah Khan was waiting with ponies and provisions.

The next party to reach this pass was my Indo-French expedition in the year 2000, 70 years later. Approaching from Depsang plateau, we reached this col from the east and saw the mountains of Siachen in front of us. Further west was Baltistan (across Bilafond La); to the south, Rimo peaks and to the north were the Shaksgam Valley Peaks. I returned to this pass as part of Indo-Japanese expedition, which made the long traverse along Shyok, to cross Col Italia and descend via the Teram Shehr glacier. Ours was a group of more than 30 people and we faced no technical difficulties except deep crevasses across the route. This was the only corssing of the pass in reverse direction, after Professor Dainelli's. With this high altitude crossing, Professor Dainelli had conclusively shown that entire Karakoram range could be traversed if the weather was right. Who knows with the development of modern technology this route could become a viable route, linking the western Balti Valleys (Pakistan), to Karakoram trail (India) and Central Asia (China). This was a crucial discovery.

Shyok river originates at the confluence of South and Central Rimo Glaciers.

[vishvak]

^^^This issue has come up after the talks started on bhaichara going past the stage of no talks after 26/11 multiple murderous attacks on Mumbai by paki trained & armed ghuspeThya (घुसपेठ्या) terrorists.

Going through the reports, it looks like after paki solders were buried alive, suddenly India is considered as the aggressor, for which == is necessary to avoid pakis from crying foul regardless of multiple terrorist attacks on Mumbai city, == also only at position Siachen controlled by India.

What a way to turn the tables post multiple place terrorist attacks! This does look like going back to usual crying pakis needing to be placated by India situation. Has some people, meaning most favored nation pakis or any superpower or some domestic interests, fooled our babus to get the babus around to this? Now even 26/11 has become just another issue on table while anything else that can make India look like aggressor continue by the side.

This is just beginning of discussions, it is better to remind pakis of terrorism continuously unless pakis end terrorism.

Am I missing something here? Or our babus can go back to the line 'pakis are also terrorised and India must entertain the sense of entitlement'?

Siachen is strategic, why bother with Siachen? How about more == by smashing terrorism from pakistan?

My 2 khota sikka.

[Hari Seldon]

Not sure if posted already but coming INdia Today cover shows a desi trooper in Siachen with the cover story headline: "Blood politics in Siachen" and the byline:"Can the prime minister gift away what the Army has won?"

Pls see indiatoday.in for the cover photo.

[Amber G.]

I saw this, I hope this is useful
from

I would greatly appreciate it if someone could please tell Sudeep I have responded here.

Dear Sudeep,

I am one of the authors of the paper you refer to. I am responsible for the actual text of the piece and I apologise for the confusing manner in which the text is presented. I was in a hurry to finish the paper and I took short cuts I should not have. I should have been more explicit in spelling things out in greater detail.

The thread on Col. Pavan Nair's suggestion generated so much information about the Saltoro War, it overwhelmed all of us. When I was collating the article, I didn't know what should/should not be in the public domain. So I used my judgement and I left things out. That is why it sounds like the people who made the suggestions didn't know what they were talking about.

The reality is quite different. Threats are all to easy to effect in the mountains there.

>> The threat to Dzingrulma.

It is a one hour helicopter flight from Ghyari to Dzingrulma. It should be possible to transport a small artillery piece, munition and a platoon of troops to secure a toehold at Dzingrulma. I estimate 2 MI-17 helos will be needed, I think they have something like 4 available between Skardu and Gilgit.

That might not sound so bad - but it would make life pretty bad for the folks in Sasoma.

>> Threat to Chalunkha and interdiction of Pakistani moves in the Shyok valley.

There are large PA artillery positions Piun and Syari in the Shyok valley. These are approximately 2-3 Km from Turtuk and about 5-7 km from Chalunkha.

All that is needed to make trouble at Chalunkha is to secure a height from which the target can be sighted. This can be accomplished via an infiltration through the valley running north of Chalunkha.

In order to achieve this infiltration one would have to take a helicopter from the PA artillery base in Chulung and simply fly by the Bahadur complex and plant oneself on one of the mountains overlooking Chalunkha.

So if one has to protect Chalunkha from an artillery barrage from the Shyok valley, you have to maintain pressure on the potential launch pad at Chulung and that means keeping the Pakistan Army on its toes in Chulung complex and the Gyong La sector.

Post 1999. the people in India have been looking very differently at the border - from the perspective of the attacker (as opposed to the defender). If the attacker is willing to sacrifice a few troops as the Pakistanis were in Kargil, then everything is possible - it is simply a question of time and money.

Given the high state of preparedness in the Goma BHQ, it is possible to carry out these kinds of operations with little overhead in terms of time and money. And detection of this sort of thing is not easy - even with monitoring.

>> Keeping Khardung La and Saser la interference free.

This I am afraid is even more complicated.

Keeping the passes "interference" free is a lot harder than it sounds, because there are many ways to do it and the initiative rests with the attacker at all times. The defender is completely reliant on knowledge of the attackers intentions and it becomes very touch and go.

At the time the article was written the Pakistanis had to rely on older howitzers at Chulung, Piun and Siari. Today they are inducting the Panter systems with ranges comparable to the Bofors in the IA armory.

While it is not clear from the present situation that the Panter system is capable of operating in the high altitude environment - if any of those Panter pieces is moved proximate to Saltoro, I would personally be inclined to recommend re-initiation of hostilities and sustained artillery barrages on all PA positions in the region.

***
BTW SudeepJ, I think you are doing a very good job on the forum. It is important to ask questions like what you are asking - even if people don't like what you are saying - it will make them think clearly about what is really importan

[kittoo]

Not sure if posted already but coming INdia Today cover shows a desi trooper in Siachen with the cover story headline: "Blood politics in Siachen" and the byline:"Can the prime minister gift away what the Army has won?"

Pls see indiatoday.in for the cover photo.

The article excerpt is here-

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/demi ... 87337.html

[Viv S]

Look at the arguments Eurasia Review hosts from Dipankar Bannerjee :
http://www.eurasiareview.com/26042012-r ... -analysis/

Note the stirrings of why India should not appear "unprincipled".

The next highlighted lines should make the arguments and their motivations obvious.

Why would you want to start questioning the motivations of everyone who doesn't agree with you? It reflects poorly on the forum. I, for example, agree completely on every argument made in the Eurasia Review article, is my patriotism in question now as well?


Fact is, we went into Siachen not because of any strategic significance it had, but to deny what was legally no-man's land, to Pakistan which had decided easier accessibility equaled ownership. Its been a long expensive and bloody struggle but they've been disabused of that notion. India's position has always been demilitarization with authentication of the AGPL. As long as the latter part is adhered to, the govt should absolutely go ahead with the plan to demilitarize the region.

Coming to the issue to trust, there are two schools of thought. First is that the Pakistani establishment is incapable of reason, rational thought and cannot learn from its mistakes. Its certainly not an unpopular view here. The other opinion is they've learned (the hard way) that resorting to force is a losing proposition viz. India and that it wouldn't be foolish enough to occupy region who's ownership its repudiated in writing, which has no strategic benefit and which will bleed it in terms of men and material at a time when both are needed elsewhere.

Even if an agreement is signed next year, the troop withdrawal will still happen as a gradual, phased and very much reversible process. If a demilitarization is agreed to next year, it can be scheduled to conclude a decade from now. The govts get the benefit of a CBM without having to take immediate substantive action on ground.

[Jarita]

^^^ Nambla believes that young boy-man relationships are fine - so by your logic one should sit and listen to that too.
Your logic is a bunch of unadultrated BS that can be extended to all unacceptables. A nations sovereignity is one of them.
Such bizarre confusion. And yes, your patriotism is not just questionable but the lack of it is evident as is the lack of a logical argument (logic is not just a bunch of words).

[brihaspati]

Look at the arguments Eurasia Review hosts from Dipankar Bannerjee :
http://www.eurasiareview.com/26042012-r ... -analysis/

Note the stirrings of why India should not appear "unprincipled".

The next highlighted lines should make the arguments and their motivations obvious.

Why would you want to start questioning the motivations of everyone who doesn't agree with you? It reflects poorly on the forum. I, for example, agree completely on every argument made in the Eurasia Review article, is my patriotism in question now as well?


Fact is, we went into Siachen not because of any strategic significance it had, but to deny what was legally no-man's land, to Pakistan which had decided easier accessibility equaled ownership. Its been a long expensive and bloody struggle but they've been disabused of that notion. India's position has always been demilitarization with authentication of the AGPL. As long as the latter part is adhered to, the govt should absolutely go ahead with the plan to demilitarize the region.

Coming to the issue to trust, there are two schools of thought. First is that the Pakistani establishment is incapable of reason, rational thought and cannot learn from its mistakes. Its certainly not an unpopular view here. The other opinion is they've learned (the hard way) that resorting to force is a losing proposition viz. India and that it wouldn't be foolish enough to occupy region who's ownership its repudiated in writing, which has no strategic benefit and which will bleed it in terms of men and material at a time when both are needed elsewhere.

Even if an agreement is signed next year, the troop withdrawal will still happen as a gradual, phased and very much reversible process. If a demilitarization is agreed to next year, it can be scheduled to conclude a decade from now. The govts get the benefit of a CBM without having to take immediate substantive action on ground.

Oh no you can agree with whatever you want. I can agree to disagree with your agreement, can't I? Ultimately, yes, the GOI will take the call - and if the parliament can be convinced, withdrawal will be endorsed.

Not withdrawing is not going to worsen the situation against India with respect to territorial claims. Withdrawing, on the other hand - can in the future lead to all the aspects of territorial losses to China and Pak, and the permanent loss of the POK to India. This loss may or may not happen, but it just might happen. Yes even with holding onto the glacier and the ridge - thsi loss may come about as a result of defeat in military action.

But a negotiated, legally frameworked staged withdrawal and demilitarization is a first step towards giving up legal claims to the territory. If at the end of the pocess we have third party intervention under international supervision and a formal division of the state, it means we lose the POK permanently and we never have hopes of getting the part ceded by Pak to China - back. Once things get internationally legally recognized, it will become extremely difficult to reverse.

Leaving territory when needed for better consolidation of defensible territory has always been part of military strategy, but it does not automatically mean giving up the claim. When this leaving becomes part of a legally negotiated procedure - it becomes infinitely more difficult to reverse.

Dipankar Bannerjee's article was quoted deliberately to attract the shade of opinion that favours the "giving up" in a way that pushes the possibility of return of POK further away. I said I wanted people to hear and see the voices and the logic in favour of this policy. There are lots of things that can be taken apart with his views, but I did not go into it. We need to better understand the mindset and the thinking pattern that is driving this campaign.

Those who want to "withdraw" will keep on changing their arguments or abuses as they are deconstructed or countered. But their fundamental objective of withdrawal will never change - and they will seek to support it regardless of what counterarguments are provided. The same goes for those who are against withdrawal. Which shows that both sides are arguing from deeper ideological positions and concrete issues on ground are only tools to cover this inner motivation. The anti-withdrawals are perhaps more naive and are giving out their ideological motivations clearly - its our land, don't trust Pakis, etc. The pro-withdrawalists are better at hiding this - but the very way the different concrete points have been first raised by them and then quietly dropped or changed on this thread while keeping the demand for withdrawal constant, shows that it is an underlying ideological position that is driving the demand.

AmberG garu's blog link provided an interesting insight : a comment has its hackles raised because he thinks that someone who according to the commenter, abused an ex-IA person [in reality the posts exist from the time to show who abused whom] is now quoting "right and left" from IA persons - and he asks "what gives"? I can understand why he has a problem with quotes from IA personnel that go against withdrawal. Exposure of selectiveness has nothing to do with individual differences of opinion with an ex-IA person.

As far as I can see over the last few pages - only two IA person's views have been quoted, that go against pro-withdrawalists views. The reason they were quoted was very clearly stated, - to counter the selective quotation from ex-IA personnel apparently favouring withdrawal. The pro-withdrawalist mindset works this way - and the very selection of only those IA personnel whose words could be used to lend wind to pro-withdrawal campaign wile ignoring or not quoting contrary opinion from the same IA - shows that it is not about concrete on-ground situations. The situations or issues are merely being used as tool for something that is not being spoken out and is a motivational issue.

[Jarita]

^^^ But why waste time and energy arguing with such people. They simply need to be exposed.

[Viv S]

^^^ Nambla believes that young boy-man relationships are fine - so by your logic one should sit and listen to that too.

Right. Supporting India's long standing position on demilitarization subject to authentication is akin to supporting paedophilia.

Your logic is a bunch of unadultrated BS that can be extended to all unacceptables. A nations sovereignity is one of them.
Such bizarre confusion. And yes, your patriotism is not just questionable but the lack of it is evident as is the lack of a logical argument (logic is not just a bunch of words).

And of course its so much more convenient to personally attack an individual than engage in a reasoned debate.

[Jarita]

^^^ Attacking a nations sovereignity is akin to personal attacks.
Showing cute symbols does not make your stand valid. The real issue is not demilitarization but supporting the whole argument at this juncture and supporting a t^&l like Dipankar Gupta.
Enough said - time wasted

[Viv S]

Oh no you can agree with whatever you want. I can agree to disagree with your agreement, can't I? Ultimately, yes, the GOI will take the call - and if the parliament can be convinced, withdrawal will be endorsed.

Disagree with it by all means. But recognize that someone can have that opinion without his motivations being questionable.

Dipankar Bannerjee's article was quoted deliberately to attract the shade of opinion that favours the "giving up" in a way that pushes the possibility of return of POK further away. I said I wanted people to hear and see the voices and the logic in favour of this policy. There are lots of things that can be taken apart with his views, but I did not go into it. We need to better understand the mindset and the thinking pattern that is driving this campaign.

I believe we've come to a fundamental disagreement. If physically holding on to Siachen is a stepping stone to capturing or gaining POK by other means, sure your argument is valid. Which brings us to the larger question - do you think we will someday in the future capture POK? The nationalist NDA govt with all the provocation in the world instructed the IA not violate the LoC in 1999 (let alone start an offensive in Gilgit-Baltistan). The 'treacherous' UPA certainly will do nothing of the sort. So what course of events play out with India gaining POK as a result, but without experimenting with nuclear red lines?

Those who want to "withdraw" will keep on changing their arguments or abuses as they are deconstructed or countered. But their fundamental objective of withdrawal will never change - and they will seek to support it regardless of what counterarguments are provided. The same goes for those who are against withdrawal. Which shows that both sides are arguing from deeper ideological positions and concrete issues on ground are only tools to cover this inner motivation. The anti-withdrawals are perhaps more naive and are giving out their ideological motivations clearly - its our land, don't trust Pakis, etc. The pro-withdrawalists are better at hiding this - but the very way the different concrete points have been first raised by them and then quietly dropped or changed on this thread while keeping the demand for withdrawal constant, shows that it is an underlying ideological position that is driving the demand.

What 'changing' arguments have been placed? The govt is simply carrying on with what has always been its position i.e. authentication of the AGPL and a withdrawal thereafter.

As far as I can see over the last few pages - only two IA person's views have been quoted, that go against pro-withdrawalists views. The reason they were quoted was very clearly stated, - to counter the selective quotation from ex-IA personnel apparently favouring withdrawal. The pro-withdrawalist mindset works this way - and the very selection of only those IA personnel whose words could be used to lend wind to pro-withdrawal campaign wile ignoring or not quoting contrary opinion from the same IA - shows that it is not about concrete on-ground situations. The situations or issues are merely being used as tool for something that is not being spoken out and is a motivational issue.

That's someone else's argument, not mine. I don't believe the IA's opinion is sacrosanct even in matters of national security. This is as much a foreign policy decision and the IA may well be less involved in the bigger picture.

[Viv S]

^^^ Attacking a nations sovereignity is akin to personal attacks.
Showing cute symbols does not make your stand valid. The real issue is not demilitarization but supporting the whole argument at this juncture and supporting a t^&l like Dipankar Gupta.
Enough said - time wasted

Ja, mein Fuhrer!

[Supratik]

@Viv S

Siachen is part of the state of J&K which acceded to the Indian Union. No country gives up territory that its own voluntarily. We can think of things like how to make it cost-effective particularly in terms of soldier deaths. Exactly what are these CBMs going to achieve has not been explained. If the pro-withdrawalists can explain what benefits these CBMs are going to get us apart from MMS H&D then we can understand better. To me the only thing to consider regarding Siachen is how to reduce the mortality rates of our soldiers.

[Viv S]

@Viv S

Siachen is part of the state of J&K which acceded to the Indian Union. No country gives up territory that its own voluntarily. We can think of things like how to make it cost-effective particularly in terms of soldier deaths. Exactly what are these CBMs going to achieve has not been explained. If the pro-withdrawalists can explain what benefits these CBMs are going to get us apart from MMS H&D then we can understand better. To me the only thing to consider regarding Siachen is how to reduce the mortality rates of our soldiers.

Its not a simple question, has to do with the bigger picture and should ideally be debated on a different dedicated thread.

Here's one possibility which peaceniks are probably looking at -

Agreement on Siachen within five years (actual act taking place over a decade).
Agreement on Kashmir within ten years (partial autonomy - free movement of people and goods, accompanying fanfare)
FTA and Open borders within fifteen years
Common currency union within twenty years (including Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka)
EU type common parliament within twenty five years (incl. some degree of military union)

Naive? Maybe. Time will tell. If not, compromising on sovereignty is certainly not an option, but at the same time having troops in a certain uninhabited region indefinitely doesn't help establish sovereignty.

[abhijitm]

Those who want to "withdraw" will keep on changing their arguments or abuses as they are deconstructed or countered. But their fundamental objective of withdrawal will never change - and they will seek to support it regardless of what counterarguments are provided. The same goes for those who are against withdrawal. Which shows that both sides are arguing from deeper ideological positions and concrete issues on ground are only tools to cover this inner motivation. The anti-withdrawals are perhaps more naive and are giving out their ideological motivations clearly - its our land, don't trust Pakis, etc. The pro-withdrawalists are better at hiding this - but the very way the different concrete points have been first raised by them and then quietly dropped or changed on this thread while keeping the demand for withdrawal constant, shows that it is an underlying ideological position that is driving the demand.

Well said. +1. And that's why I wanted to understand the inner motivation which is driving this argument of 'withdrawal', that too like 'now, right now'!

[Jarita]

I think Brihaspati succeeded in his atempt. The good fridayers are out

[Manish_Sharma]

Not withdrawing is not going to worsen the situation against India with respect to territorial claims. Withdrawing, on the other hand - can in the future lead to all the aspects of territorial losses to China and Pak, and the permanent loss of the POK to India. This loss may or may not happen, but it just might happen. Yes even with holding onto the glacier and the ridge - thsi loss may come about as a result of defeat in military action.

But a negotiated, legally frameworked staged withdrawal and demilitarization is a first step towards giving up legal claims to the territory. If at the end of the pocess we have third party intervention under international supervision and a formal division of the state, it means we lose the POK permanently and we never have hopes of getting the part ceded by Pak to China - back. Once things get internationally legally recognized, it will become extremely difficult to reverse.

Leaving territory when needed for better consolidation of defensible territory has always been part of military strategy, but it does not automatically mean giving up the claim. When this leaving becomes part of a legally negotiated procedure - it becomes infinitely more difficult to reverse.

Dipankar Bannerjee's article was quoted deliberately to attract the shade of opinion that favours the "giving up" in a way that pushes the possibility of return of POK further away. I said I wanted people to hear and see the voices and the logic in favour of this policy. There are lots of things that can be taken apart with his views, but I did not go into it. We need to better understand the mindset and the thinking pattern that is driving this campaign.

Brihaspati ji these are the points I understood from your post. I have tried to put them in simple points for my 'fazebook' account to make people understand. Please see if they are correct or I should add something. Sorry for putting them in simpleton way as most of my friends have 'simple data entry operator' level of mind just like me:

1. Porki position on Kashmir has been to involve US or third party in the matter, while we have been very much against the third party involvement.

2. By negotiating withdrawal under some UN or international treaty will do exactly that. In a way this is a porki move to internationalise the Kashmir issue.

3. If we negotiate withdrawal in this way it will be back gate entry for third party entrance in the issue.

4. Negotiating withdrawal from Siachin would be in a way accepting 'pak occupied kashmir' to 'pakistani kashmir' and 'chini kashmir'.

5. In next all out war situation if we move via Siachin as a strategy then we might be accused of breaking this 'withdrawal treaty' and would limit our options. In other way giving advantage to pork-panda combo.

Those who want to "withdraw" will keep on changing their arguments or abuses as they are deconstructed or countered. But their fundamental objective of withdrawal will never change - and they will seek to support it regardless of what counterarguments are provided. The same goes for those who are against withdrawal. Which shows that both sides are arguing from deeper ideological positions and concrete issues on ground are only tools to cover this inner motivation. The anti-withdrawals are perhaps more naive and are giving out their ideological motivations clearly - its our land, don't trust Pakis, etc. The pro-withdrawalists are better at hiding this - but the very way the different concrete points have been first raised by them and then quietly dropped or changed on this thread while keeping the demand for withdrawal constant, shows that it is an underlying ideological position that is driving the demand.

This part I didn't understand, I mean aren't the points of Rohit Vats like 'Gyong La' occupied by porkis after agreement between both armies to withdraw if spread and advertised around going to help build case for not withdrawing? How would they help 'anti-withdrawl' group and their handlers? (I'm not disagreeing, just want to understand).

[ShauryaT]

I have a simple question. Why has the IA asked for an AGPL? Is it because TSP cannot be trusted?

[Supratik]

Its not a simple question, has to do with the bigger picture and should ideally be debated on a different dedicated thread.

Here's one possibility which peaceniks are probably looking at -

Agreement on Siachen within five years (actual act taking place over a decade).
Agreement on Kashmir within ten years (partial autonomy - free movement of people and goods, accompanying fanfare)
FTA and Open borders within fifteen years
Common currency union within twenty years (including Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka)
EU type common parliament within twenty five years (incl. some degree of military union)

Naive? Maybe. Time will tell. If not, compromising on sovereignty is certainly not an option, but at the same time having troops in a certain uninhabited region indefinitely doesn't help establish sovereignty.

I would beg to differ with this view. Unless Pakistani society undergoes fundamental changes these are pipe dreams no matter how much the leftists and their Western mentors push it. The antagonism between the Indic system and the Islamist system is fundamental. It is likely having a common parliament and common currency of USSR and USA. I don't think withdrawing from Siachen based on wishful thinking is a good idea.

[brihaspati]

Those who want to "withdraw" will keep on changing their arguments or abuses as they are deconstructed or countered. But their fundamental objective of withdrawal will never change - and they will seek to support it regardless of what counterarguments are provided. The same goes for those who are against withdrawal. Which shows that both sides are arguing from deeper ideological positions and concrete issues on ground are only tools to cover this inner motivation. The anti-withdrawals are perhaps more naive and are giving out their ideological motivations clearly - its our land, don't trust Pakis, etc. The pro-withdrawalists are better at hiding this - but the very way the different concrete points have been first raised by them and then quietly dropped or changed on this thread while keeping the demand for withdrawal constant, shows that it is an underlying ideological position that is driving the demand.

This part I didn't understand, I mean aren't the points of Rohit Vats like 'Gyong La' occupied by porkis after agreement between both armies to withdraw if spread and advertised around going to help build case for not withdrawing? How would they help 'anti-withdrawl' group and their handlers? (I'm not disagreeing, just want to understand).

RohitVats and others who are arguing with concrete counterpoints are doing it sincerely from their knowledge and experience. But if you carefully follow the debate after what they post - the withdrawalists are brushing it away as "need to trust" issue. The speculation being forwarded is that why should we not believe that Pakis may have had a genuine change of heart?

Rohitvats's argument about the precedence from Paki army in betraying trust will be countered by the two following speculations passed off as surety:

(1) things have changed from the Paki betraying days [either situation - war-weariness, or supposed realization of futility of war, or a genuine rethink]
(2) India has a stronger economic and military potential [not necessarily current superiority - since Pak has to be seen bracketed with current PRC, and as shivji opines - even with USA] which alone should allow India to feel confident to go into demilitarization - because the claim is that India will have the capacity to retaliate and roll back Pakis from any encroachment.

As for (1) - Paki behaviour in the western front of their own does not speak of any realization. Pakistani political military apparatus shows every sign of inner instability, and hence factional intent may supercede any currently expressed intent. This will go OT and another huge chain of arguments about the reality of the pakistani state apparatus on which we are supposed to put our trust.

As for (2) In the world of military realpolitik - illegal military occupation of another's territory after breaking agreements or treaties and understandings - by force, becomes fait accompli if the power doing it is strong enough militarily, or is so strongly connected to an existing sooper-power that the only force in the world capable of stopping or punishing this occupation decides to be indifferent or not intervene. China got by in 1962 through this - using the anti-Soviet positioning and thereby US-UK hesitation.

I was referring to "withdrawalists" arguments as quoted posted on the thread.

[ShauryaT]

A few more questions. What was India's claimed line or the "cartographic expression" line north of NJ9842, pre 1984?

Are there ANY validating references to the fairly new statement by Lt. General Prakash Katoch (retd), that Pakistan violated an agreement on Gyong La in 1987? This is a pass that always was in Pakistani control as 19 Kumaon Column, could not reach there in time on foot, due to an avalanche?

Added: Also, There is an intriguing piece, mentioned by the General that TSP has leased portions of NA to China. What is the likely veracity of this report?

[Viv S]

I would beg to differ with this view. Unless Pakistani society undergoes fundamental changes these are pipe dreams no matter how much the leftists and their Western mentors push it. The antagonism between the Indic system and the Islamist system is fundamental. It is likely having a common parliament and common currency of USSR and USA. I don't think withdrawing from Siachen based on wishful thinking is a good idea.

One of the things I often had to impress upon my friends when I was abroad was that there are very few stereotypes one can make about India or Indians. There is no Indian accent and there is no pan-Indian language. Yet its our Indian identity that has thrives in this myriad of cultures. Like India, Pakistan is not a monolithic state. Unlike India, there are three factors that distinctly unite it - religious nationalism, occasional military rule and an opposition to a threat from India.

The country swayed from moderate liberalism (under Ayub) to severe conservatism (under Zia) and is slowly but surely drifting away from religious nationalism. Not least because dozens are dying every week bringing the violence away from their TV screens and into their living rooms. For every nutty Zaid Hamid you have a Nadeem Paracha and for every Hamid Gul you have a Najam Sethi. Worried about Islamic fundamentalism, well they can keep trying to poison the waters of the ocean. Its not Indian tanks or fighter aircraft or nuclear weapons that drives their religious fundamentalists mad. Of course not, they're all means to martyrdom. What really gets their blood boiling is Bollywood, Star TV, Roadies, Kaun Banega Crorepati, Ekta Kapoor, IPL cricket and other 'corrupting influences'. JNU types infuriate you? Get a quota for Pakistanis in its admission ASAP. Is POK anti-India? Wait till the local economy depends on Indian tourists. Sindhis collaborating with Punjabis to oppose Indian inroads? Wait till its domestic trade with Gujarat outgrows that with Punjab. Open the floodgates and see which way the river flows.

Well this is mostly off-topic, but if you're interested we could discuss it on a more appropriate thread.

[ShauryaT]

^^ Good points Viv S. Just like war is an extension of politics, so is peace!