Bharat Rakshak

What vertical S are you talking about ?

[img*]http://vayu-sena.indianmilitaryhistory.org/pix/Su-30MKI_intake_FOD_mesh.jpg[/img]

The picture shown above is a Su-30MKI's intake as seen from the front.

Its literally slam bang in the line of sight of a person peering into the intake. If any fighter needed a radar blocker, it is the Su-27 and its derivatives.

^^nothing to laugh about. We are going to have to address that somehow in the Super-30 upgrade.

You either has a Low RCS or you dont , there is no middle ground so even if Su-30MKI has all the radar blockers and RAM in the world , it wont lead you much far becuase it misses the crucial shape and most importantly it carries external payload which can even spoil the RCS of carefully crafted LO aircraft.

So all the fantasy of Low RCS for Super-30 , F-18 , Euro Bird etc are just good marketing stuff , in real combat they would be betrayed by too many things.

Its similar to a dark lady trying to look fair with a good make up , a good make up can just take you that far becuase the real thing is still dark.

What vertical S are you talking about ?

[img*]http://vayu-sena.indianmilitaryhistory.org/pix/Su-30MKI_intake_FOD_mesh.jpg[/img]

The picture shown above is a Su-30MKI's intake as seen from the front.

Its literally slam bang in the line of sight of a person peering into the intake. If any fighter needed a radar blocker, it is the Su-27 and its derivatives.

I don't agree with you here Austin. The Su-30MKI's RCS is one of its weaknesses and while it isn't possible to entirely redesign it to make it LO, the is some benefit to be gained from reducing its RCS further. If the radar blocker helps the Su-30MKI be detected say 10-15 NM later than it would be earlier, its an advantage. After all, compressor face is one of the biggest radar reflectors and possibly one of the big contributors to the MKI's RCS.

ITAE researchers had found materials that solved the dominant problem in the Sukhoi design: straight-through inlets to the compressor face, with no line-of-sight blockage. Rather than placing an absorber-treated blocker in front of the engine, as on the Super Hornet, ITAE developed a radar absorbent material (RAM) that could be applied to the first-stage compressor blades. The rest of the RAM suite included a metallic treated canopy and sprayed-on RAM coatings on the missiles.

why the tyre is flat? is it worn out? how safe is it to use such a grip-less tyre? or do they use such tyres purposefully

Can anyone post the flight safety article of the incident when the Su30 engine caught fire but pilots were able to land safely.

The pilots ensured the crashing jet would not cause casualties on the ground, said Lohegaon airbase chief, Air Commodore V R Chaudhari.

Added another senior officer, "The Sukhois have not been grounded...But yes, they will undergo some systematic technical checks now before they take to the skies again. The multi-role fighters have had a great safety track-record."

................

"There was no engine failure or `flame-out'. It seems the pilots lost the controls of the fighter, leaving them with no option but to undertake planned ejection," said an officer.

The main reason behind one of the two earlier Sukhoi crashes in 2009 was attributed to the FBW system (the other was due to "a fuel leak"), which led to summoning of Russian engineers to probe the crash and the entire Sukhoi fleet being grounded for three weeks.

Later, it emerged that one of the pilots had accidentally switched off the FBW system, located behind him in the cockpit, while trying to change the radar mode from one frequency to another.

"It was a combination of pilot error and a design flaw in the FBW system master-switch. Since then, all Sukhois have been modified to add a safety guard to prevent the accidental switching off of the FBW system," he said.

SagarAg Ji you need to report to Kavecomplex 72 for re-education by Bose mullah.

How on earth can IAF/HAL or their grandfather fix FBW for the MKI? Do they ahve the source code ? Even if they have it, do they know what was wrong ? Do they have the designer amongst them to debug? Do you think BRDs can fix FBW problems ?This is the problem with phoren maal. So please stop ranting about how IAF could have fixed it. Btw i remember reading somewhere that how the designer(Rosoboron/Sukhoi knaapo) tends to always blame the end user(or his cleanliness ) even when the fault is in the design. This also happened in the case of Jaguar(case of SDRE engineer Shri Jayaram fixing fluid leak) and was never acknowledged by BAC

not only was it not acknowledged, BAe applied the desi solutions to the worldwide fleet and refused any IP rights.

The crash of the Indian Air Force (IAF) Sukhoi-30 MKI aircraft on April 30 was caused by pilot error. StratPost has learned that the cause became clear within 3-4 days after the crash itself.
Sources have informed StratPost the crash occurred due to mishandling of the Flight Control System (FCS) by the pilot, which led to the crash. While some reports indicate the pilot to have inadvertently switched off the FCS altogether, other reports are also suggesting a second error in control was made after the FCS was switched off, which led to complete loss of control. Experts on this aircraft remark it to be quite possible for the pilot to have inadvertently overridden the FCS and then mishandled the control of the aircraft, leading to the crash.

The Court of Inquiry (CoI) that went into the crash found that the pilot, Wing Commander S. V. Munje, inadvertently switched-off the four switches that control the power supply to the computer. Switching-off the power not only cuts off the power supply to the computer, but is also irreversible. Switching them on does not ‘power on’ the all important unit.

The aircraft went into a forward bunt, lost control and crashed, killing Wing Commander P. S. Nara, an officer from the IAF’s Directorate of Air Staff Inspection (DASI).

During the flight, the aircraft is said to have experienced a technical glitch after a round of firing practice. The pilot, who was also under routine inspection by the DASI, is said to have then tried to switch-off the armament master switches, which are located just behind the pilot’s seat and in close proximity to the switches that control power to the flight control computer.

Though the CoI’s conclusion was that the crash occurred due to pilot error, a number of officials are questioning the placing of critical switches that are not to be used during in flight and only for power on when the aircraft is on theground in the cockpit and also, the inadequate in-built safety mechanisms like a wire lock or even a covering flap.