Surviving Nuclear War

[Shankar]

SOON after the Pokhran-II tests on 11 May 1998, the scientists of the two organisations concerned_ the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Defense R&D Organisation (DRDO)_ had jointly evaluated the success of the two tests_ the fission device (A – bomb) and the fusion device (H - bomb).
While former device performed perfectly, including creating a crater of the expected size, the fusion device failed on many counts_ very low yield, no crater etc.
International monitoring centres also recorded low intensity of shock waves, resulting in low yield estimates_ estimates that were more in consonance with the DRDO numbers. This was discussed among the BARC and DRDO scientists involved_ and resulted in a dispute between them.
A detailed report submitted by DRDO to the Government fully corroborated its original assessment ,viz. ,that, while the fission device worked successfully as expected, the fusion device did not.
The recent revelations by K Santhanam, who was in charge of all of DRDO’s activities at the site, testifies to this. By all accounts_ geological, radiochemical as well as seismic - it is now quite clear that the fusion device yielded a very low value of explosive power.
The articles by K Santhanam and Ashok Parthasarathi in `The Hindu’
(September 17 , 2009) and P K Iyengar in `Outlook’ (October 26, 2009) go into considerable technical detail and present a credible case, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the H – bomb tested on May 11, 1998 failed.
These findings are extremely serious for the security of the nation, particularly in the context of our pronouncement of being a nuclear weapon power, along with our enunciated doctrine of ‘no first use’ and our ‘unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing’. They strike at the root of our weaponisation capability and compromise our strategy of Credible Minimum Nuclear Deterrence.
``Soon after the Pokhran-II tests, the then government almost succumbed to the western pressure to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) backing off only at the last moment due to an outcry in the country against doing so. The refusal of the US Senate to ratify the CTBT then released the pressure on the government. The renewed pressure from Obama on us in recent months to sign the CTBT is causing the issue of our signing the CTBT to be raised again. We strongly urge the present government to remain firm in its opposition to our doing so as the Prime Minister has publicly assured the nation more than once in recent months.’’ Obama has actually gone further than trying to secure universal adherence to the CTBT, and secured a UN Security Council Resolution urging such adherence to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) also. Not signing the highly discriminatory NPT has been an article of faith of all our governments – irrespective of hues – since the Treaty was drawn up in 1968. The present government, we strongly urge again, should continue that policy steadfastly, despite whatever threats and blandishments are applied to it. Even the slightest succumbing would convert our ‘voluntary moratorium’ into an involuntary, permanent, cessation of nuclear weapon testing and so forever deny us our legitimate place in the great powers’ league.
The international political and diplomatic aspects as set out in the previous para apart, the grave situation we are in regarding our Thermonuclear (H-bomb) Capability.
It demands resolute, speedy and comprehensive corrective action.
We are well aware of the nature, sources and scales of nuclear threats the nation faces. To meet that threat effectively, an indepth analysis of our real capabilities in terms of: Command & control systems, nuclear weapon delivery systems and the types, character and numbers of nuclear weapons needing to constitute our nuclear arsenal and the keeping of that arsenal up-to-date, is essential - indeed acutely pressing.
To address these issues and take well informed competent and speedy decisions instead of depending entirely on the existing bureaucracy, administrative, military and scientific, it is essential to have the involvement, on a continuing basis, of a wide variety of opinions and assessments from scientists, strategic analysts and defense & diplomatic personnel with a deep understanding of the many complex issues involved, including the technologies needed to be developed, and the minimum timescale in which this can be achieved.
While secrecy is crucial, an open mind and willingness to learn are equally important. We therefore, strongly urge the government to immediately set up a high-level, independent, broad- Based Panel of Experts to define and monitor the implementation, on a continuing b sis, of an effective course of action, in the realm of thermonuclear weapons, so central to our national security.
All of us have worked on different aspects of this problem with a sound understanding of the harsh ground realities and the immense magnitude of what is at stake. It is now for the government to take the call – and without losing a minute more – as its counterparts in our adversaries have and are continuing to do so.

Signatories to the statement


# P K Iyengar, former Chairman Atomic Energy Commission, Director BARC and a key architect of the Pokhran I nuclear test of May 18, 1974 and internationally acknowledged as India’s top nuclear weapons expert;

# A N Prasad, former Director, BARC and Member (R&D) of the Atomic Energy Commission, a Senior Adviser on nuclear weapons to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna for many years and a key member of our original weapons grade plutonium extraction technology development dating back to 1960;

# A Gopalakrishnan, former key expert in our Advanced Technology Vehicle
(ATV) project, which developed the nuclear submarine Arihant and former Chairman, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board,

# C K Mathew, former head, Radio Chemistry Division, BARC and Director Chemistry Group, Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam; Jaipal Mittal, Raja Ramana Fellow and former Director, Chemistry Group, BARC,

# A D Damodaran, former Director, Special Materials Plant, Nuclear Fuel Complex and former Director, Regional Research Laboratory, Thiruvananthapuram,

# S R Valluri, former Director, National Aerospace Laboratory and first Director General of the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), the organisation specially set up to design and develop the Light Combat Aircraft – Tejas;

# Capt S Prabhala, Indian Navy former Chairman & Managing Director Bharat Electronics Ltd.;

# Rear Admiral J J Baxi, former Director, Weapons and Electronics Systems Organisation, Ministry of Defense and Chairman & Managing Director Bharat Electronics Ltd., and

# Brigadier M R Narayanan former Director, Army Radio Engineering Network, Ministry of Defense; K S Jayaraman, formerly Nuclear Physics Division, BARC, Science Correspondent of the PTI for many years, Science Correspondent for South Asia for leading international journal ‘Nature’ and President Indian Science Writers Association.

http://tinyurl.com/yehvpyp

[SaiK]

The programme Dr. Khan seeded has grown into an extraordinary nuclear weapons greenhouse: Pakistan now has the fastest-growing arsenal in the world, with 90-110 warheads, up from 65-80 in 2008 and ahead of India’s 60-100. It has refused to sign the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, which seeks to cap global weapons stockpiles.

Even the capacity to obliterate India’s cities, evidently, hasn’t addressed the existential anxieties Pakistan felt back in 1962. The production of warheads in the nuclear greenhouse is suggestive of the existence of a strategic paranoia at the heart of the Pakistan military’s thinking — a pathology that will, if unaddressed, have huge consequences for India.

...

Brian Cloughey, a sympathetic historian of the Pakistan army, has suggested that if “India’s two armour-heavy mechanized infantry strike corps managed to penetrate to the line joining Gujranwala-Multan-Sukkur and to the outskirts of Hyderabad in the south, then it is likely Pakistan would have to accept defeat or employ nuclear weapons.”

..

In a 2010 paper, A.H. Nayyar and Zia Mian argued that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would be of little use if “Indian armed forces had prepared for a nuclear attack and were able to rapidly disperse.” In addition, using tactical weapons even on Pakistan’s own soil could provoke retaliation — something India’s Cabinet made clear, in a 2003 statement, it would be prepared to do.

..

The nuclear greenhouse will cool down only when Pakistan makes peace with its place in the world. Its strategic fears are unlikely to be stilled even by progress on Siachen or Kashmir: no soldier will be moved to give up his gun by shows of benevolence by adversaries he believes have malign aims.

Pakistan’s relationship with India and with the world will be shaped by the struggle now under way to shape the country’s relationship with itself — a contestation that has pitted democrats against an alliance of ultra-nationalists and Islamists with an intensity never seen before.

It is imperative that India continue to do what it can to secure progress in its relationship with Pakistan. It is just as important, though, to remain aware that détente, until this epic struggle is settled, will stand on a firmament more closely resembling quicksand than bedrock.
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/pa ... epage=true

[RamaY]

http://www.topappreviews101.com/nuke-ef ... 12782.html