Karan M wrote:Everything that typifies the current dysfunctional state of the US MIC may be found in this one program.
http://www.wired.com/2013/01/littoral-combat-ship/
Navy’s $670 Million Fighting Ship Is ‘Not Expected to Be Survivable,’ Pentagon Says
Pretty much nothing works.
Ah, the Little Crappy Ship. It's a white elephant, but a million times better than what they originally tried to build – a glorified FAC-M known as "Streetfighter". The basic idea was to cram 8 AShMs into a 300-ton vessel capable of doing 60 knots. That's the equivalent of building a Sopwith Camel size aircraft capable of carrying a dozen BVR AAMs and flying at Mach 3.
After the whole Streetfighter concept died a natural death, the geniuses who conceptualised it came with with the LCS; a "multirole" replacement for the missile boat, FAC, minesweeper, ASW corvette, amphibious ship, and everything in between. Hell, the bright spark that conceived of the LCS/Streetfighter even imagined putting a squadron of F-35s and a handful of SH-60s on it. Go figure.
The main problem with the LCS stems from its size. A small vessel cannot defend itself effectively (which is in keeping with the design's premise that ships are indefensible against modern missiles anyway, so you would rather have a large number of small ships), it lacks the seakeeping qualities of larger vessels, it carries fewer weapons, the electronics have to be put in sub-optimal locations because of the restricted space, and so on and so forth. All these shortcomings are only amplified by the magic pill that is "modularisation". You can't just modularise mission-specific weapon and sensor fits in a warship. Each mission really requires a platform tailored to it. Air defence requires a powerful radar, a highly capable comms suite/datalink, and a magazine that can carry a significant number of missiles. The first two need to be positioned to mitigate the effects of electronic interference – a tough challenge at the best of times. ASW, on the other hand, requires the ability to carry more than one helicopter, a powerful sonar, and a hull designed to minimise flow noise. The combat management hardware and software of the two bear very few similarities. Both are eminently doable; the problem arises when you try to build one small vessel to support both mission types with 'modules' that can be swapped out quickly. The requirements are so different that you end up making great compromises and build a ship that is neither here nor there.
In the end, the 'modules' turned out to be so expensive that there simply weren't enough to go around. What that means is that each vessel will basically be equipped with one module onlee; and the "swap stuff out and plug new stuff in" dreams aren't going to come to fruition. Ultimately, the US Navy ended up with a glorified frigate that works great in theory but breaks down at the drop of a hat (where have we heard that story before?)
And then there's the speed. I'm not sure if anyone has really explained for what the USN intends to do with a ship that can travel at 40+ knots. The most sensible answer yet has come from the USS Freedom's first captain. He said he could use the massive wake created by the high speed to topple and sink pirate skiffs. Nobody was sure if he was serious or joking.
When you have a boondoggle on your hands that makes the Zumwalt look good, you know you've got problems.