Bharat Rakshak

The weight of Chandrayaan-2, which will have five payloads on the orbiter (satellite) and two on rower, cannot exceed 40kg. Overall, Chandrayaan-2 spacecraft weighs about 2,650kg at lift-off. The orbiter weighs about 1,400kg and the lander’s weight is about 1,250kg.

Reality Check for Indian Astronauts
by Morris Jones
Sydney, Australia (SPX) Jan 05, 2012

The shoddy performance record of GSLV has not been suitably resolved by ISRO, India's space agency. GSLV could possibly evolve into a reliable launch system, but it will take a long time to do this.

India's decision to stretch out its plans for an indigenous astronaut launch to 2020 or beyond will probably disappoint some. It's a long way in the future, but the decision is an unavoidable reality check for India's space program.

India has been dabbling in the development of an indigenous space capsule for years, and proposed launching such a spacecraft atop its powerful Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV), currently the most powerful operational rocket in India.

The first launch was mooted for 2016 or soon afterwards.

The concept looked good on paper, but it overlooked a major problem. Put bluntly, the GSLV is unreliable as a satellite launcher, and is totally unsuitable for launching astronauts.

The shoddy performance record of GSLV has not been suitably resolved by ISRO, India's space agency. GSLV could possibly evolve into a reliable launch system, but it will take a long time to do this.

It will require more flights and evaluations. It will require an unbroken record of several successful launches. Until India can do this, GSLV should not be considered for astronaut launches.

India has also seemed unsure of its plans for co-operating with other nations. It is known that India had been exploring capsule development plans with a major US aerospace corporation.

In a previous article, this writer proposed that India should consider using a foreign launch vehicle with an Indian space capsule, as a means of avoiding the GSLV.

Recent government statements rule this out. India's astronaut launch system will be purely Indian. This will have its benefits, but it will also increase the complexity of the project.

Developing a crew capsule and a reliable rocket to launch it will take time. Giving the project another decade sounds realistic, assuming that the Indian government does not want to pump huge sums of money for a fast-track program.

Previously, the overall tone of discussions on India's astronaut program suggested disorganisation and uncertainty over its direction. It seemed to be more of a panicked reaction to China's success in human spaceflight than a carefully orchestrated project.

This new policy is merely a seed, and has yet to fully develop. But it's a move in the right direction. It remains to be seen if a realistic program can be designed and sustained in the decade to follow.

The shoddy performance record of GSLV has not been suitably resolved by ISRO, India's space agency. GSLV could possibly evolve into a reliable launch system, but it will take a long time to do this.

Russian-Indian Cooperation in Space
Mikhail Barabanov

Cooperation between India and Russia in the field of space has long been an important aspect of the partnership between Moscow and New Delhi. However, the contribution of Soviet and then Russian assistance to India’s drive to become an independent space power is not entirely clear and bears further exploration.

India’s Path to Space

India’s national space program dates to the formation of the Indian National Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) in 1962. India carried out its first launch of a U.S.-built Nike-Apache sounding rocket from the Thumba Range in November, 1963.1 In 1969, a full-scale space agency – the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) – was established, reporting to the Space Commission and the Department of Space of the Indian government since 1972. Gaining independent access to space had been the primary goal of India’s space program since its inception. To this end, ISRO led extensive efforts focused on the development of a self-sufficient space infrastructure, including launch vehicles and satellites.

India’s first step into space was assisted by the Soviet Union. On April 19, 1975 the first Indian-built scientific satellite Aryabhata (launch mass 360kg) was launched on a Soviet Kosmos-3M rocket from the Kapustin Yar range. Unfortunately, the satellite failed in orbit after several days of operation because of equipment defects. The second satelliteBhaskara1 for Earth observation also was launched from Kapustin Yar in 1979. That satellite experienced operational problems too, and was followed by the Bhaskara 2 in 1981. The first Indian communication and television broadcasting satellite APPLE was put into geostationary transfer orbit (GTO) by a French Ariane 3 launch vehicle from the Kourou launch site in Guiana, also in 1981.2

Guided by considerations of political prestige more than practical benefit, India entered into an agreement in March 1981 with the Soviet Union to place an Indian cosmonaut onboard a Soviet spacecraft. Squadron Leader Rakesh Sharma, the first (and still the only) Indian citizen in space, was aboard the launch of the Soyuz T-10 on April 3, 1984 from Baikonur. Together with Yuri Malyshev (Captain) and Guennadi Strekalov (Flight Engineer), Sharma successfully completed an almost eight-day mission onboard the Salyut-7 orbital station. In the interests of maintaining “political balance,” India made a similar arrangement in December 1984 with the United States to put an Indian astronaut on board a Space Shuttle, but the project was not implemented due to the Challenger accident that occurred a year later.

Launcher development in India centered initially on solid propellant engines because they are easier to develop and operate than liquid engines. India carried out the first launch of its SLV-3 (Satellite Launch Vehicle) four-stage solid rocket with a payload capacity of only 40kg in a 400km circular orbit in August 1979 from a new launch site built on Sriharicota Island in the Bay of Bengal (SHAR), recently named the Satish Dhawan Space Centre (SDSC). In its maiden flight, the rocket failed to deliver the small Rohini 1A satellite. It was not until July 18, 1980, when the SLV-3 successfully orbited another satellite, the Rohini 1B, that India joined the ranks of the space powers. After another two successful flights of the SLV 3, India focused on the development of ASLV (Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle), a five-stage version of the SLV capable of delivering a 150kg payload to the same orbit. The first two ASLV rockets with SROSS scientific satellites failed at launch. It was not until 1992 that an ASLV successfully orbited the SROSS Csatellite. Another successful launch was conducted in 1994.

Building on this experience, India embarked on the development of a fully capable space launch vehicle named PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle), possessing the capacity to put up to 3,500kg into a 400km low-Earth orbit, or over 1,000kg in a 900km sun-synchronous orbit. The four-stage PSLV had two solid stages (stages I & III) and two liquid propulsion stages (II & IV) using highly toxic storable propellants. Stage II was powered by the Vikas engine (thrust 74 tons), a modification of the Viking-4 engine (used onAriane 1-4 launch vehicles) developed by India under French license. A malfunction of the Vikas led to the failure of the first PSLV in September 1993. The next launch of a PSLV in October 1994 was successful. Since then, PSLVs have carried out six more flights (including 1 failure). In May 1999 and October 2001 each PSLV lofted three satellites, including some international ones, thus marking India’s presence on the international commercial launch market.3 Over the next few years, PSLV rockets are expected to launch Resourcesat and Risat satellites for Earth observation, Metsat weather satellites, an Astrosat observatory, and SRE (Spacecraft Recovery Experiment) small (500kg) recoverable capsules to validate reusable launcher technology. Furthermore, a PSLV is planned to launch the Chandrayaan 1 moon probe (525kg).4

Russian Propulsion for GSLV

In 1986, ISRO started its most ambitious Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) project aimed at developing a medium launcher with a geostationary transfer orbit (GTO) capacity of more than 2 tons (twice as much as the PSLV). Stages I & II of the three-stageGSLV Mk 1 version are powered by Vikas engines. The Vikas engines are also used in four strap-on boosters of the launch vehicle. A cryogenic upper stage (Stage III) would be a key element of the new launcher. Initial development of the upper stage and cryogenic engine was done by Indian specialists without foreign assistance, but to expedite the fulfillment of the GSLV program, India decided to acquire foreign technologies. The Soviet Glavkosmos beat other US and French companies to win a $120 million contract for the delivery of two upper-stage cryogenic KVD-1 engines to India in January 2001. The KVD-1, with a thrust of 7.5 tons and one-time ignition, was developed in the1960s for the Soviet N-1 moon rocket by the Chemical Machine-Building Design Bureau (KB KhimMash located in Korolev, Moscow region). The contract also provided for the transfer of engine manufacturing technology. The Khrunichev Design and Production Center (GKNPTs Khrunichev) was contracted to design the upper stage. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US pressured Yeltsin’s government to formally terminate the agreement in August 1993, citing an alleged violation of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It is interesting to note that at the same time, US companies were building a rocket propellant liquefaction plant in Mahendragiri, which was completed in 1992. US arguments that cryogenic engines could be used for missile production are highly doubtful, while the European Vikas really is fit for such a purpose.

The agreement with India was renegotiated, and Russia committed to deliver seven fully assembled KVD-1 engines. Nevertheless, the unilateral termination of the agreement by Russia had a significant negative impact on Russian-Indian relations and, from the Indian point of view, delayed the GSLV program by at least two years. Mr. U.R. Rao, Head of India’s space program at that time, said that “it was a serious blow and now we have to rely on ourselves”. Then Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao was cited as having said in a private meeting: “In that case, India will develop cryogenic motors on its own. Within several years our scientists will achieve that goal”.5 That, however, was merely a political statement: it is all but impossible from a technological point of view to develop a cryogenic engine from scratch in less than 15-20 years, especially one based on hydrogen, given that the boiling point of liquid hydrogen is -253 degrees C. Though India strived to proceed independently with the development of cryogenic upper stage and motor, in fact it had to rely on Russian support delivered through a team of Russian specialists lead by Leo Kiselev.6 Therefore, India decided to integrate all seven GSLV Mk I launchers with upper stages powered by Russian KVD-1 rocket motors and use the indigenous Indian engine in future versions of the GSLV Mk II.

On April 18, 2001 the GSLV Mk I made its inaugural flight with a Khrunichev-built cryogenic (KVD-1) upper stage, placing an Indian GSAT-1 communication satellite (1,500kg) into geostationary transfer orbit. Having launched another two GSLV rockets during 2003-2004, India became fully independent in launching its payloads into the critical geostationary orbit. The development of a GSLV Mk II version featuring indigenous CUS (Cryogenic Upper Stage) continues. The CUS would be powered by cryogenic propulsion developed in India on the basis of the KVD-1. Nevertheless, planning of the first launch for 2005 does not seem realistic. Therefore, India is very likely to power the GSLV with imported KVD-1 engines at least for the next few years. Also, the cost of one GSLV launch, due to its cryogenic stage, is currently very high – the first launch of a GSLV cost India about $300 million, compared to $15 million for a PSLV. 7 Though reductions to launch-costs to levels ranging from $35-45 million are foreseen in the future, the GSLV is not expected to capture any significant share of the commercial market because of its unconfirmed reliability and low production rate: not more than 1-2 launch vehicles per year, most of which would be reserved for Indian payloads. This will not allow the GSLV to compete with the highly reliable, mass-produced, low-cost Russian launchers, such as the Proton, Zenith or Soyuz.

Since 2002, ISRO has been working on the development of a more powerful vehicle dubbed the GSLV Mk III. The new launch vehicle, designed to launch up to 4 tons (6 tons in future) into GTO or more than 10 tons into lower orbits, would be quite different from the GSLV Mk I and Mk II versions built in a “tandem” configuration. Similar to the Titan IV or Ariane 5 launchers in appearance, the Mk III includes a liquid-core stage with two large, solid, strap-on boosters. It would have two Vikas engines in the core stage and an indigenously-developed cryogenic engine with a thrust of 9.5 tons derived from the KVD-1 in the upper stage.8 Other sources report that the upgrading of the engine from 7.5 to 9.5 tons is being done by Russian specialists. The first flight of the launcher is planned for 2009.

The payload capacity of the GSLV Mk III would be 10 tons in low-Earth orbit, compared to the 7-8 tons capacity of Russian Soyuz or the similar Chinese Shenzhou launchers. Such a capacity would enable the Indians to launch a manned spacecraft. India’s interest in manned flights may have been piqued by the recent flight of the first Chinese astronaut, since India and China have long rivaled each other for influence in South-East Asia. In December, 2003, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes spoke of the need for India to carry out a human space flight in order to demonstrate its national achievements in science and technology. ISRO Chairman Dr. Madhawan Nair acknowledged that while India can presently pursue human space flight only in the abstract, it will be done should the nation require it.9 Manned flights remain a distant goal for India’s space program that will require the kind of scientific and technological assistance that Russia supplied to China.

Various sources have reported that Russian industrial enterprises have assisted India in the construction of GSLV launching facilities on Sriharikota Range. Also, in 1977, the Soviet Union helped ISRO build an experimental laser-based optical Satellite Tracking & Ranging Station (STARS) near Kavalur.10

Collaboration between Russia and India in satellite projects

After the Soviet Union launched the first Indian satellites, further cooperation with Moscow in this field was limited. India was able to build two major national satellite systems, including the geostationary Insat (Indian National Satellite) system for communication, television broadcasting, and meteorology and the IRS (Indian Remote Satellite) low-orbit system for remote sensing using mainly western technologies. The first four Insat 1 series satellites were built in the U.S. in the 1980s. Another five Insat 2 and three Insat 3 satellites were built in India with assistance from the West. All Insat satellites were launched on French launchers of the Ariane family.

Backed by strong governmental support, IRS has become one of the world,s most extensive and fastest-developing remote sensing systems. System operation is coordinated by a National Natural Resources Management System committee. A total of 13 IRS satellites have been launched to date. Satellites are equipped mostly with payloads manufactured in France and Germany. The first three IRS 1 satellites were launched from the Baikonur space center on Russian Vostok (2 satellites) and Molniya (1 satellite) rockets from 1988-1995, while other IRS were launched by Indian launch vehicles. IRS data are sold by India on the international market. In 2000, India’s sales of commercial satellite imagery amounted to about 20% of the world total.11 IRS data are received at three centers in Russia (Moscow, Irkutsk, and Kurgan) and are then distributed commercially.12

Other Indian satellite systems, such as GSAT (communication), SROSS (science), TES (reconnaissance), Risat (observation), METSAT and Megha Tropiques (weather), and Astrosat (astronomy) were built by India either indigenously, or in cooperation with foreign, chiefly West European, countries. Broad Indo-European cooperation in the field of space culminated in India’s formal accession to the Galileo program in November, 2003. India’s participation in this navigation satellite system has been estimated at ?300 million.13

At the same time, Russia experienced serious problems making the GLONASS global navigation system fully operational. Over the last few years Russia has actively solicited participation in the program from various countries, first of all the fast growing space powers China and India. After many years of unsuccessful negotiations, China finally decided in 2004 to join Galileo. Negotiations with India gave more promising results. In July 2004, ISRO Head Modhawan Nair and Russian space agency (Roskosmos) Head Anatoly Perminov signed a protocol on Indian participation in the GLONASS system. This was followed by the signing of a number of intergovernmental agreements during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India in December 2004. The agreements provided not only for the joint development of a new generation of navigation satellites and user sets, but also the launch of several GLONASS satellites by Indian launch vehicles.14 This represents the first such concession in Russia’s space-faring history: no Russian or Soviet satellite has ever been launched from a foreign rocket. Meanwhile, Russian launch vehicles of all classes are available in abundance. The reasons for India’s decision are not known. It may be India’s intention to prevent dependence on the West in matters related to the military application of navigation satellite systems, including their use for aiming modern precision weapon systems. Nor is it clear how India’s involvement will affect GLONASS and its military and commercial applications with respect to its US (GPS) and European (Galileo) competitors.

Other cooperation agreements negotiated in the field of satellites include the development of remote sensing payloads and satellite electric propulsion systems. Also, the cooperation program was amended with projects on moon observation and setup of a “sun observatory” to study solar X-band radiation.15 ISRO’s Physical Research Laboratory has extensive experience cooperating with Russian research organizations in the field of space research experiments.16

observatory, and SRE (Spacecraft Recovery Experiment) small (500kg) recoverable capsules to validate reusable launcher technology. Furthermore, a PSLV is planned to launch the Chandrayaan 1moon probe (525kg).4

Russian Propulsion for GSLV

In 1986, ISRO started its most ambitious Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) project aimed at developing a medium launcher with a geostationary transfer orbit (GTO) capacity of more than 2 tons (twice as much as the PSLV). Stages I & II of the three-stage GSLV Mk 1 version are powered by Vikas engines. The Vikas engines are also used in four strap-on boosters of the launch vehicle. A cryogenic upper stage (Stage III) would be a key element of the new launcher. Initial development of the upper stage and cryogenic engine was done by Indian specialists without foreign assistance, but to expedite the fulfillment of the GSLV program, India decided to acquire foreign technologies. The Soviet Glavkosmos beat other US and French companies to win a $120 million contract for the delivery of two upper-stage cryogenic KVD-1 engines to India in January 2001. The KVD-1, with a thrust of 7.5 tons and one-time ignition, was developed in the1960s for the Soviet N-1 moon rocket by the Chemical Machine-Building Design Bureau (KB KhimMash located in Korolev, Moscow region). The contract also provided for the transfer of engine manufacturing technology. The Khrunichev Design and Production Center (GKNPTs Khrunichev) was contracted to design the upper stage. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US pressured Yeltsin’s government to formally terminate the agreement in August 1993, citing an alleged violation of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). It is interesting to note that at the same time, US companies were building a rocket propellant liquefaction plant in Mahendragiri, which was completed in 1992. US arguments that cryogenic engines could be used for missile production are highly doubtful, while the European Vikas really is fit for such a purpose.

The agreement with India was renegotiated, and Russia committed to deliver seven fully assembled KVD-1engines. Nevertheless, the unilateral termination of the agreement by Russia had a significant negative impact on Russian-Indian relations and, from the Indian point of view, delayed the GSLV program by at least two years. Mr. U.R. Rao, Head of India’s space program at that time, said that “it was a serious blow and now we have to rely on ourselves”. Then Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao was cited as having said in a private meeting: “In that case, India will develop cryogenic motors on its own. Within several years our scientists will achieve that goal”.5 That, however, was merely a political statement: it is all but impossible from a technological point of view to develop a cryogenic engine from scratch in less than 15-20 years, especially one based on hydrogen, given that the boiling point of liquid hydrogen is -253 degrees C. Though India strived to proceed independently with the development of cryogenic upper stage and motor, in fact it had to rely on Russian support delivered through a team of Russian specialists lead by Leo Kiselev.6 Therefore, India decided to integrate all seven GSLV Mk I launchers with upper stages powered by Russian KVD-1 rocket motors and use the indigenous Indian engine in future versions of the GSLV Mk II.

On April 18, 2001 the GSLV Mk Imade its inaugural flight with a Khrunichev-built cryogenic (KVD-1) upper stage, placing an Indian GSAT-1 communication satellite (1,500kg) into geostationary transfer orbit. Having launched another two GSLV rockets during 2003-2004, India became fully independent in launching its payloads into the critical geostationary orbit. The development of a GSLV Mk II version featuring indigenous CUS (Cryogenic Upper Stage) continues. The CUS would be powered by cryogenic propulsion developed in India on the basis of the KVD-1. Nevertheless, planning of the first launch for 2005 does not seem realistic. Therefore, India is very likely to power the GSLV with imported KVD-1 engines at least for the next few years. Also, the cost of one GSLV launch, due to its cryogenic stage, is currently very high – the first launch of a GSLV cost India about $300 million, compared to $15 million for a PSLV. 7 Though reductions to launch-costs to levels ranging from $35-45 million are foreseen in the future, the GSLV is not expected to capture any significant share of the commercial market because of its unconfirmed reliability and low production rate: not more than 1-2 launch vehicles per year, most of which would be reserved for Indian payloads. This will not allow the GSLV to compete with the highly reliable, mass-produced, low-cost Russian launchers, such as the Proton, Zenith or Soyuz.

Since 2002, ISRO has been working on the development of a more powerful vehicle dubbed the GSLV Mk III. The new launch vehicle, designed to launch up to 4 tons (6 tons in future) into GTO or more than 10 tons into lower orbits, would be quite different from the GSLV Mk I and Mk II versions built in a “tandem” configuration. Similar to the Titan IV or Ariane 5 launchers in appearance, the Mk III includes a liquid-core stage with two large, solid, strap-on boosters. It would have two Vikas engines in the core stage and an indigenously-developed cryogenic engine with a thrust of 9.5 tons derived from the KVD-1 in the upper stage.8 Other sources report that the upgrading of the engine from 7.5 to 9.5 tons is being done by Russian specialists. The first flight of the launcher is planned for 2009.

The payload capacity of the GSLV Mk III would be 10 tons in low-Earth orbit, compared to the 7-8 tons capacity

Conclusions

At first glance, the role of the USSR and then Russia in the development of India’s space program is not large and doesn’t correspond to the high levels of cooperation attained by the two countries in other fields such as arms sales. Obviously, the Soviet Union helped India with some important political demonstrations, including the first launch of an Indian satellite and the flight of the first Indian cosmonaut. However, the direct impact of Soviet space technologies on India’s principal space programs does not appear to have been terribly important, unless one factors in the training of Indian technical specialists at Soviet universities and colleges. The only exception seems to be Russia’s assistance in developing the most powerful Indian GSLV launch vehicle, where the supply of Russian cryogenic engines can be reckoned as the key and critical element for the whole program. This has helped India to find a substantially simpler, easier, and cheaper solution to ensure guaranteed access to geostationary orbit with heavy satellites, thus accomplishing a priority political, economical, and military task.

Aside from the recent agreement on the joint operation of GLONASS, there is no current Russian or legacy Soviet involvement in Indian satellite projects. In this field, India actively collaborates with western companies, which is explained in part by Russia’s lag in satellite technology. Moreover, Indian achievements in this field are impressive. India’s Laboratory for Electro-Optic Systems (LEOS) is developing satellite electronics and gyros and offers its products to the Russian and CIS space industries.17 Nevertheless, Russia cannot access modern satellite technologies through India, first of all because most of the electronic components of Indian-built satellites are produced in the USA or Europe.18 Therefore, science and technology cooperation between Russia and India can only be realized in the form of “Russian technologies for Indian money”.

That said, the future of cooperation between Russia and India depends entirely on the latter. Obviously, India is not merely working on a range of space programs, but is committed rather to creating a fully capable space industry backed with indigenous science and schools of technology. Therefore, foreign assistance will only be used when it helps to advance the implementation of a project. Examples include acquisition of technologies relating to rocket elements, the development of which would require much time and resources, such as the European Viking-4 or the Russian KVD-1 liquid rocket engines for Indian PSLV and GSLV launchers. Independent development of those elements would have taken India dozens of years with uncertain results. (In this respect it enough to consider the history of launch vehicle development in Japan). Therefore, if India decides to build a more powerful launcher or, for political reasons, leans towards human space flight, Russian cooperation will definitely be required. Otherwise, there is very little chance for the further development of Indo-Russian cooperation.

We should note that Russia could learn from Indian experience in the field of managing and targeting space activities. With a space budget of about $450 million and only 13 spacecraft (compared to Russia’s space budget of around $600 million and approximately 100 satellites), India has captured about 20% of the space imagery market, and earnings from commercial imagery and satellite communication services amount to $100 million a year. India’s space program is oriented to applications such as meteorology, telemedicine, and distant education (which is important for a country with an illiterate population of 350 million), and serves national interests. Can the same be said of Russia? What practical tasks is its much larger space fleet accomplishing? It is shameful to admit, but Russia, stretched in eleven time zones, has no weather satellites – the nation that was a founder of remote sensing technology now buys satellite images received from Indian IRS satellites. By the way, Russia has developed a cryogenic upper stage for rockets currently produced in India, while their Russian analog exists only in the form of blueprints.

Finally, it is noteworthy that Abdul Kalam, the engineer who was Project Director for the SLV-3 in 1973, is the President of India today.

1 Rohini Sounding Rockets (RSR) // Jane’s Space Directory, 2003.

2 Indian Science Satellite Program Series // Jane’s Space Directory, 2003.

3 Prilukova L. India’s Space Activity // http://www.space.com.ua; Jane’s Space Directory, 2003.

4 Cherny I. Powerful rockets for the near future // Space News, #1, 2004.

5 India has consolidated on space // Vremya novostey, 19.06.2003.

6 Ibid

7 Afanasiev I., Kucheyko A. METSAT-1 in GEO // Space News, #11, 2002.

8 Cherny I. Powerful rockets for the near future // Space News, #1, 2004.

9 RIA “Novosti”, 17.12.2003.

10 ISTRAC-IRSO Telemetry Tracking and Command network // Jane’s Space Directory, 2003. Jane’s Space Directory, 2003.

12 Also marketed by ITTs ‘ScanEx’// http://www.scanex.ru.

13 India joins Galileo // RBK, 01.12.2003.

14 Roskosmos Head A. Perminov. Internet briefing // http://www.federalspace.ru, 16.12.2005

15 Russian GLONASS satellites to be launched on Indian rockets // Izvestiya, 19.07.2004.

16 Physical Research Laboratory (PRL) // Jane’s Space Directory, 2003.

17 Laboratory for Electro-Optic Systems (LEOS) // Jane’s Space Directory, 2003.

18 Cherny I. Indian Space Program: Ambitions and Reality // Space News, #3, 2004.

………….Sources said that a Horton Spheres System (along with wind tunnels), which creates vacuum enabling calibration of the launchers, has been installed at the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre (VSSC).

The System, manufactured by a Bangalore-based firm, comprises three Horton Spheres each with a diameter of 16.3 metre and 2,200 cubic metre capacity.

It has two parallel pumping trains, each with two mechanical booster pumps with a pumping speed of 30,000 cubic metre per hour, backed successively by booster pumps of 14,000 cubic metre per hour and 7,000 cubic metre per hour and finally by three rotary piston pumps, each with a pumping speed of 1,325 cubic metre per hour.

Added to this, a complete range of measurement and control instrumentation as well as vacuum valves are part of the system, which boasts of six large capacity heat exchangers to ensure cooling of the high temperature exhaust air from the booster pump.

“High pressures are created from one side of the tunnel and low pressures operate from the other side in vacuum, creating Mach numbers between 4 to14,” sources said, adding that these are the kind of machs encountered by launch vehicles while leaving or entering the earth’s atmosphere. ……………….

Deccan Herald

lists out all foreign satellites launched by ISRO, so far

New Delhi: Taking action in the controversial Antrix-Devas deal, the government has barred former ISRO chief G Madhavan Nair and three other eminent space scientists from holding any government jobs.

The government’s unprecedented action against former ISRO chief G Madhavan Nair and three of his colleagues for their alleged — and as yet unknown — role in the allocation of S-band frequencies for radio waves to a private company has been criticised by some of the biggest names in the Indian science establishment.

Too harsh, said Anil Kakodkar, former chairman of Department of Atomic Energy. Shocking news, said C N R Rao, head of the Scientific Advisory Council to the Prime Minister (SAC-PM). Extremely painful, said R A Mashelkar, the celebrated former head of CSIR and another member of SAC-PM. Way too harsh, and probably arising out of ill-will, said noted scientist and academician Prof Yashpal.

Nair and three colleagues — A Bhaskarnarayana, former Scientific Secretary in ISRO; K R Sridharmurthi, former managing director of Antrix which is the marketing arm of ISRO; and K N Shankara, former director in ISRO Satellite Centre — were banned from taking any government position, either now or in future, apparently because of their role in a 2005 agreement between Antrix Corporation and Bangalore-based Devas Multimedia. This ban order was first reported by The Indian Express.

“We are talking about highly reputed people. I am trying to gather more information and let us see whether it needs to be taken up at the SAC-PM level,” said C N R Rao.

Said Mashelkar: “I have zero knowledge of this case, apart from what I have read in The Indian Express but this order is puzzling. Such an action has been taken for the first time ever, especially with distinguished scientists like them.”

Yashpal said the matter needed to be handled better. “Maybe a decision has been taken which is later not thought to be very wise. But still the action seems way too harsh, probably arising out of ill will,” he said.

Kakodkar also wondered about the fallout. “I think for the country to mark a major progress in the field of technology... out of the box ideas must be welcomed and then we must be ready to implement them. The entire working has to be such...For development of completely new technology, there is need to create new partnerships in technology as well. After this (government decision to debar four scientists), we only hope that the efforts to pursue new ideas and new technology are allowed to persist”, he said.

IIM Ahmedabad professor Anil Kumar Gupta, who works extensively on promoting indigenous technologies, said he was amazed. “This is the same Madhavan Nair who you gave Padma Bhushan and Padma Vibhushan. Are we to believe that these people who have done the nation proud were actually corrupt? I am willing to believe that some mistakes could have been made. Hang them if they have but at least give them an opportunity to defend themselves,” he said.

The agreement .... could not have been finalised without the knowledge of the Prime Minister’s Office, because the then Minister of State for Science and Technology Prithviraj Chavan was also a Minister in the PMO.

It, therefore, stands to reason that a number of senior officials from the PMO would have been in the know of the deal, since they will have vetted it and finally given it clearance. That Mr Madhavan, being the chairman of ISRO at that point of time, may have played a lead role in seeing the agreement through is not being contested. What remains contestable is the clean chit that the Government seems to have given to the officials of the PMO.

28 Jan, 2012, 11.14AM IST, Surojit Gupta,TNN
NEW DELHI: Former Isro chief G Madhavan Nair, who has been barred from any government work for his alleged lapse in the Antrix-Devas deal, on Friday voluntarily stepped down from the post of chairman of the board of governors of the upcoming Indian Institute of Technology, Patna.

The government decided to bar Nair and three other ex-Isro scientists from any government work for their alleged lapses in the Antrix-Devas deal.

"I came here to say goodbye. I am voluntarily stepping down. This college is very close to my heart and it's my moral responsibility to give them the message. I have nothing to do with the government. It has hurt me very badly. I have not been told anything by the government so far," the top space scientist told TOI on phone from Patna.

Sources said Nair refused to chair the meeting of the board but was persuaded to stay on as he was associated with the planning for the college for a long time. Nair said he had filed an application under the RTI Act and had sought the two inquiry committee reports.

"I am sure the government will not refuse it. After studying the reports , we will take appropriate action. It's a question of my prestige and it has to be restored ," he said. "We do not know what were the terms of the committees, what are their recommendations .

We do not know what processes they followed to secure such an unilateral decision from the government," he added. In February 2011, the UPA government scrapped the controversial contract between Antrix Corporation and Bangalore-based Devas Multimedia for the lease of space segment in S-band. The government had said it could not grant S-band spectrum to anyone including Antrix due to strategic reasons.

The controversy over the deal surfaced at a time when the government was battling corruption charges over the allocation of 2G spectrum. The government promptly appointed two committees - one headed by former cabinet secretary B K Chaturvedi and another by former central vigilance commissioner Pratyush Sinha - to probe lapses in the deal.

Nair said the Chaturvedi panel allowed them to present their case but the Sinha panel only sent a questionnaire, suggesting that they were denied the right to be heard. "We answered all the questions and sent it to them but we have not received any reply," the ex-Isro chief said, adding that government's decision to bar him from official work was against the process of natural justice.

Devas Multimedia has moved the International Court of Arbitration to settle the issue but Antrix has not responded favourably to the arbitration . The SC is expected to hear Antrix's petition on the issue early in February.

The ICA has appointed a three-member panel to go ahead with the arbitration proceedings. Former CJI A S Anand has been appointed as one of the members of the arbitration panel.