Indian Naval History Thread

[Jamal K. Malik]

As we know, India has a very rich maritime or naval history dated back 2300 BC or more. Kanhoji Angre and Kunjali Marakkar were two notable naval chiefs of their period.The British Indian Navy was established by the British while India was a colony of Britain in 1830.The Navy has been involved in two wars with Pakistan. In Indo-Pakistani War of 1965,Indian navy involved mainly in patrolling of the coast, but it played a significant role in the attack of Karachi in the 1971 war. That attack was named the Operation Trident, which was launched on December 4. After this huge success of Operation Trident, it has been celebrated as Navy Day.


The President releases Naval History Book

[Jamal K. Malik]

http://www.naval-history.net
http://www.indiannavy.nic.in/history
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Indian_Navy
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/History.html

[SwamyG]

Chola Navy - Wikipedia article
Excerpt:

The term Chola Navy comprised the naval forces of the Chola Empire along with several other Naval-arms of the country . The Chola navy played a vital role in the expansion of the Chola Empire and conquests of the Ceylon islands, Sri Vijaya (present day Indonesia), Spread of Hinduism, Dravidian architecture and culture to the South east Asia. And in curbing the piracy in Southeast Asia in the 900CE. The Chola Admirals commanded much respect and prestige in the society.

The Navy grew both in size and status during the Medieval Cholas reign. The navy commanders also acted as diplomats in some instances. From 900CE to 1100CE, the navy had grown from a small backwater entity to that of a potent power projection and diplomatic symbol in all of Asia.But was gradually reduced in significance, due to the later-day conflicts with Chalukyas taking place mainly in the land.

[Aditya G]

x-post. on Soviet Navy ops in 1971

http://igorrgroup.blogspot.com/2009/12/ ... .html#more

...

Vladimir Kruglyakov, the former (1970-1975) Commander of the 10th Operative Battle Group (Pacific Fleet) remembes:



"I received the order from the Chief Commander 'To not allow access of the American Navy to the Indian military objects'.



- On the way of American Navy stood the Soviet cruisers, destroyers and atomic submarines equipped with anti-ship missiles.



Vladimir Kruglyakov, the former (1970-1975) Commander of the 10th Operative Battle Group (Pacific Fleet) remembers:



"We encircled them and I have targeted the 'Enterprise' by missiles. I have blocked them and didn’t allow enclosing to Karachi, nor to Chittagong or Dhaka".



On the Soviet ships then were only the missiles with limited to 300 km range. Thus, to be sure the rival is under the hindsight the Russian commanders have had to take the risk of maximal enclosing to the American fleet.



Vladimir Kruglyakov, the former (1970-1975) Commander of the 10th Operative Battle Group (Pacific Fleet) remembers:



"The Chief Commander has order me: 'Lift the subs when they (the Americans) appear!' – It was done to demonstrate, there are all the needed in Indian Ocean, including the nuclear submarines. I have lifted them, and they recognized it. Then, we intercepted the American communication. The commander of the Carrier Battle Group was then the counter-admiral Dimon Gordon. He sent the report to the 7th American Fleet Commander: 'Sir, we are too late. There are the Russian atomic submarines here, and a big collection of the battleships'.

...

[SwamyG]

Naval Warfare in ancient India By Prithwis Chandra Chakravarti
{The Indian Historical Quarterly, Vol.4, No.4 1930.12, pp.645-664}

[SwamyG]

KAN Sastri in his Introduction Chapter in his book "Foreign Notices of South India: From Megasthenes to Mahuan".

The Andhras are the earliest Indian line of kings definitely known to have developed a sea power and to have promoted maritime trade and also perhaps overseas colonisation. The attribute trisamudradhipati, lord of the three oceans, is applied to them by Bana in his Harsacarita, and there is mention in the Apocryphaof an Andrapolis as a port in Western India; lastly, numerous coins of this dynasty are known to bear the design of a double-masted ship figured on them.

He also adds in footnotes about mariners using birds for discovering the proximity of land.

[Ajit.C]

Now, no record of Navy sinking Pakistani submarine in 1971

NEW DELHI: The sinking of Pakistani submarine Ghazi in the 1971 Indo-Pak war may have been one of the high points of India's first-ever emphatic military victory but there are no records available with naval authorities on how the much-celebrated feat was pulled off.

As a debate rages over a TOI report on the destruction of all records of the 1971 Bangladesh war at the Eastern Army Command headquarters in Kolkata, it transpires that naval authorities also destroyed records of the sinking of Ghazi.

The troubling finding has been thrown up by a trail of communications among the naval brass. Pakistani submarine PNS Ghazi, regarded as a major threat to India's plans to use its naval superiority, sank around midnight of December 3, 1971 off Visakhapatnam, killing all 92 on board in the initial days of the war between India and Pakistan. Indian Navy claims the submarine was destroyed by depth charges fired by its ship INS Rajput. Pakistani authorities say the submarine sank because of either an internal explosion or accidental blast of mines that the submarine itself was laying around Vizag harbour.

According to a set of naval communications made available to TOI by sources familiar with the Ghazi sinking, senior officers and those writing the official history of Navy exchanged a host of letters admitting to the fact that crucial documents of Ghazi were missing.

Immediately after Ghazi sank, Indian naval sailors had recovered several crucial documents and other items from the submarine, wreckage of which is still lying underwater off Vizag.

On June 22, 1998, Rear Admiral K Mohanrao, then chief of staff of Visakhapatnam-based Eastern Naval Command, told Vice Admiral G M Hiranandani, who was writing the official history of Navy, "All-out efforts were made to locate historical artifacts of Ghazi from various offices and organizations of this headquarters. However, regretfully, I was unable to lay my hands on many of the documents that I personally saw during my previous tenure."

Mohanrao went on to tell Hiranandani, "We are still continuing to search for old files and as and when they are located, I will send appropriate documents for your project." Mohanrao also refers to their inquiries with Commodore P S Bawa (retd), who worked with the Maritime Historical Society, to find out about the artifacts. Here also they drew a blank.

What Mohanrao's letter does not disclose is the letter written by Bawa himself in 1980. On December 20, 1980, Bawa, then a commander with the Maritime Historical Society, said, "In Virbahu, to my horror I found that all Gazi papers and signals were destroyed this year. Nothing is now available there." He was writing after a visit to Virbahu, the submarine centre at Vizag, where the documents, signals and other artifacts recovered from Ghazi were stored. His letter (MHS/23) was addressed to Vice Admiral M P Awati, the then chief of personnel at the naval headquarters.

Over the years, in the 1990s, as Vice Admiral Hiranandani sat down to write the official history of Navy, he made several efforts to get the Ghazi documents, records show. In one of his letters to the then chief of eastern naval command, Vice Admiral P S Das, he sought the track chart of the Ghazi, the official report of the diving operations on the Ghazi from December 1971 onwards and any other papers related to Ghazi. But none of it was available for the official historian of the Navy.

A retired Navy officer who saw action in 1971 said the destruction of the Ghazi papers and those of Army in Kolkata are all fitting into a larger trend, many of them suspected about Indian war history, of deliberate falsification in many instances. It is high time the real history of those past actions were revealed. "We have enough heroes," he said. "In the fog of war, many myths and false heroes may have been created and many honest ones left unsung," he admitted.

reported in Times of India. Josy Joseph, TNN, May 12, 2010, 02.51am IST

[David Siegel]

No, actually PNS Ghazi is still in service with PN that is why the papers are not existing at all. LoL!!!
See this particular reporter is a real showman kind of person always try to hog attention with such stupid articles. An year back it was the same person who raised issue of kickbacks on Barak-8 / MR SAM Deal and which led to political escalations.
Few days back he published an article telling 1971 war documents are missing. Who the hell told those are missing? Is it because he did not get an access to those? And even if we assume that those documents are missing what should be the follow up action. I believe Pakistan can now reach international court and tell there is no written proof of 1971 war—so existence of Bangladesh is void – ROFL and guess what, Josy will be doing the live coverage of those hearings from the court.

[pmund]

I agree. Who is there to say the files have been 'destroyed'? Has the MoD admitted this? Or the Army? Just because Mr Joseph was not given acsess to the files does not mean they have been burned. Absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence. This is a simple thumbrule in journalism. And the reporter even dragged the braveheart Gen Aurora's name into this murky business. Such articles, quoting unnamed 'sources' and 'officials', are easy to write from an armchair. It is naive to think that the Indian government would destroy the records of its greatest military victory. The military is very possessive of its historical records because it draws lessons from them. How can it destroy them?

[SandeepS]

I came across this email by an ex-IN offr to Capt Mulla's daughter in response to her article on the sinking of INS Khukri and the brave decision by Capt Mulla. It is worth a read and hence copying it in full:

“Dear Ameeta Mulla Wattal,

I am an ex- Indian naval officer who left the service honourably in 1994. I live in New Zealand, and work in Australia and New Zealand these days.

This email refers to an article you wrote some five years ago very poignantly, on your father the Late Captain Mulla, pondering why he chose to go down with his ship.

The article obviously struck a chord with many of your readers, and in the way of the internet, travelled the world before it entered my mail box a few days ago, via a social network maintained by the 42nd NDA and 51st IMA course.

I did not know your father personally, but I feel I have always known him and for what he stood for, all of my adult life. I missed the fighting in 1971 as I was cadet in the NDA at the time, and only passed out and joined a warship at sea in June 1972, six months after the war ended. In the event I became an Anti Submarine specialist and along the way, I ended up commanding three warships including INS Himgiri (also an anti submarine frigate, although a more modernised version of the original Khukri). I retired after 20 years, joined industry, and eventually moved across the Pacific and the Tasman Sea to New Zealand.

I only say this because it has some context to the comments I make below, on the decision by your father to go down with his ship. In doing so I hope to capture the circumstances (and perhaps the greater purpose) of why captains of warships in extreme circumstances, take such drastic actions that seem to lack purpose or reason (particularly to the public at large). I’m sure many naval officers of senior rank and certainly more qualified than me, may well have commented at length after reading your article. I just felt I might throw some light on a take that has largely been neglected. I know the pain never goes away and I apologise for any anguish I might give you in the process, but I do believe that Captain Mulla did something for the service that night, that has not been either understood or recognised, by both the navy, and the public at large. The Indian Navy of 1971 was a different beast from the one we have today. Little was known about Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) at the time. We commissioned our first submarine in 1968 in the then Soviet Union, and had barely begun operating a fledgling submarine arm by 1970. Pakistan by contrast, had been operating submarines since the early sixties. Ships like the Khukri and Kirpan supposedly specialised in ASW, formed the vanguard against the fight against Pakistani submarines. They had little in the way of operational experience against submarines, and even less knowledge about the ocean environment.

The physics of detection can be explained in simple non technical terms. The Khukri had sonar called the “Sonar 170” which was the best we had at the time. It had a maximum range (in laboratory conditions) of only 1500 yards. We knew little about the harsh nature of the environment underwater.

The seas in the tropical waters off India’s coastline are heated up in the morning and afternoons, raising surface temperatures to ambient levels. The worst effect is in the afternoons. The laws of physics then apply. They literally bend the sonar waves downwards, severely limiting detection range. Since deeper waters are ice cold, there is meeting point of the warm waters on the top and the cold waters below. This meeting point is called the “layer” where the sonar beam bounces off and is almost totally reflected upwards. There is very little penetration below the layer. These layers lie between 30 and 60 metres depth in tropical waters, and are exploited by expert submariners who are able to hide under it.

It took us another 15 years after the war, all which I was professionally involved with in one way or then other, to fully understand the nature of anti-submarine warfare, and to learn how to work with the physical limitations imposed by a hostile ocean underwater environment.

Submarines on the other hand are not as handicapped, as they do not need to transmit on their sonars to detect a ship. Their engines are silent. They can consequently listen out for a warship and even identify a type of ship and its signature from the sound of its engines. Skilled submariners hide beneath the layer and approach with stealth. They only transmit at the last possible moment when they need a final range to fire their torpedoes.

Warships at sea in 1971 (and Captain Mulla in particular) would have been more than aware of these limitations. They would have known two simple facts

(a) That a submarine at sea would have already detected a surface ship long before the ship had even reached any kind of detection range;

(b) That even if the warship did detect the submarine, it would be at the penultimate moment, when the submarine had already fired, (or was on the verge of firing) its torpedoes, giving the warship a few minutes at best, to take avoiding action, let alone counterattack.

The Pak submarine that sank the Khukri used its environment to maximum advantage. In hind sight and over the years, we developed better sonars and better tactics. We employed dedicated ASW aircraft with sonobuoys and magnetic detectors, helicopter with dunking sonars, and yes we spent a lot of time learning the harsh facts of the ocean environment we were forced to operate in.

This is the context in which ships put to sea in 1971, against an adversary who was well versed in using submarines to maximum advantage. Our own ASW ships had little in the way of riposte or as much experience we would have liked to have had before the war of fighting submarines.

In the event every sailor at sea recognises a moment of truth, when all of his training and skills are put to the ultimate test. It is the moment when the ship beats to quarters and goes into action against an enemy in sight, or an enemy that has been detected.

Khukri and Kirpan were operating in submarine infested waters. The ship would have gone to “action stations” against a submarine many times over, in the days and nights preceding the sinking of the Khukri, sometimes for genuine reasons, sometimes for false alarms. All of this would have exhausted the crew and formed the “fog of war” that hindsight experts, armchair generals/ admirals and the public at large never quite get.

Each time the crew of the Khukri beat to quarters and battened down for action, a clarion call would have been broadcast on its tannoy “Hands to action stations _ assume first degree anti-submarine readiness – assume damage control state one condition Zulu”. The crew of the Khukri would have known fully level, that they were going against a committed enemy, and that the dice were loaded against them. Each of them would have been wondering whether they were going to come out of the action alive or dead. This is an age old fear that men have, and then learn to conquer, when they go to sea and to war. It is the nature of the beast. The army and the air force face similar issues, which they deal with in their own inimitable way. The people most at risk on board the Khukri that night would have been its technical departments; engineering and electrical officers and sailors, closed up at action stations in the bowels of the ship three and four decks below the waterline, keeping the engines and the machinery running, so that their captain could fight. Each of them knew if a torpedo were to hit, it would do so well above where they were located, and that the chances of them surviving would be a lot less than those sailors who were fortunate to be located on the upper decks, and above the waterline. It takes a special kind of motivation to get these men to go down into the bowels of a fighting ship whilst in action against a submarine. They do so each time out of a sense of duty that the ship cannot fight without them and mostly because they recognise that one single unspoken truth… That their captain will not forsake them; that their captain will not leave them behind. That is the crux of the why, and the reason why captains at sea honour this unspoken agreement. Captain Mulla would have known that many of his boys were trapped (but yet alive) in the bowels of his ship when it went down, in the few minutes after the torpedoes hit. He tried to help as many as he could, but I suspect he could not bring himself to save himself, whilst his boys were dying down below. That he chose to go down is a personal decision, perhaps even a moral decision; but it was a decision that set a standard that will save lives in future actions. It forced all of us who came after him, and who were privileged to command men in peace and war, to recognise that undeniable and unspoken bond between fighting men … that you fight your ship against an enemy (or the ocean in a storm), with what you have, and to the best of your ability, and that come what may, you never forsake your troops or leave a man under your command, behind you. What Captain Mulla did that fateful day has had an enormous and positive impact on the service he loved and on the men who continue to serve it to this day. It reminds every one of us chosen to command of the qualities of leadership needed under duress, and of the ultimate responsibility we have to the families of the men we command; “You never forsake your men – You never leave a man behind”.

I know that this hardly helps when trying to explain all of this to the family of a captain who makes the ultimate sacrifice. Nor does it assuage the grief of a young girl trying to understand why her father chose to voluntarily die, rather than save himself. For a fledgling service post independent India trying to forge its own traditions independent of the Royal Indian Navy of yore, the impact was enormous. It was one of the many actions in the 1971 war that made us equal partners with the Army and Air force in the defence of independent India.

I am reminded of the last few stanzas of Ronald Hopwood’s classic poem “Our Fathers” that I quote below:

“When we’ve raced the seagulls,

run submerged across the Bay,

When we’ve tapped a conversation

fifteen hundred miles away,

When the gyros spin superbly,

when we’ve done away with coals,

And the tanks are full of fuel,

and the targets full of holes,

When the margin’s full of safety,

when the weakest in the fleet

Is a Hyper-Super-Dreadnought,

when the squadrons are complete,

Let us pause awhile and ponder,

in the light of days gone by,

With their strange old ships and weapons,

what our Fathers did, and why.

Then if still we dare to argue that

we’re just as good as they,

We can seek the God of Battles

on our knees, and humbly pray

That the work we leave behind us,

when our earthly race is run,

May be half as well completed

as our Fathers’ work was done”.

My wife Sharon and I wish you and your family a great Christmas and a happy and prosperous New Year 2011. If you or your family do visit New Zealand do look us up.

Allan Rodrigues

Director NE”

[ramana]

X-Posted...
We need to look at the institutional culture of the three services to understand where they are today. In particular I would like to look at the relations between British officers and the Indian officers before Independence in the three services to see how the insitituions developed.

[sumesh]

@ ramana sir,

wrt to your comment about Indian Navy i can say that most of the Institutional culture followed has been handed over by HMS Navy.
we even follow the DEF stan ( formerly NES) i.e. British Naval Standards for naval ship building.

[svinayak]

@ ramana sir,

wrt to your comment about Indian Navy i can say that most of the Institutional culture followed has been handed over by HMS Navy.
we even follow the DEF stan ( formerly NES) i.e. British Naval Standards for naval ship building.

We are interested in the psychological makeup and organizational behaviour and the org memory during the pre independence era

[Aditya G]

http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/cc62 ... istan-Navy

....1999 ..... Also—the
lone Indian carrier, INS Viraat, being in refit—trials of the use of a containership
deck as a platform for Sea Harrier aircraft were carried out in Goa....

Is this confirmed?

[Aditya G]

[url=http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/story ... 42612.html]

.... The CBMS, drawn up after an Indian warship captain fired at a Pakistani maritime reconnaissance aircraft, mandated that warships of both sides stay three nautical miles (six km) away from each other. ...

Any more details of this incident?

[Aditya G]

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/Pers ... rdees.html

SHAURYA CHAKRA 1977 CDR N RADHAKRISHNAN

Any details on this award? It seems at the time he was attached to Cabinet Secretariat and the award was for a "national security operation"

[rajanb]

1971 Sinking of the PNS Ghazi - Fact or Fiction?

This was narrated to me by a late senior chaiwallah who was in Vizag during 1971.

The PNS Ghazi, a submarine leased, from the US,by the Pakistani Navy, and refitted in Turkey, after the 1965 war, was sent to the Bay of Bengal, in what some PN records state was almost a suicide mission. Considering that there were no facilities available in earstwhile East Pakistan. Its orders were to inflict maximum damage on the IN and in particular sink the INS Vikrant, which had been sent to the Bay of Bengal to provide support in the Eastern theatre during 1971.

The PNS Ghazi was sighted off Sri Lanka prior to, a few days before the evening of the 3rd December 71, when the war started.

The INS Rajput was tasked the role of being the hunter-killer and proceeded along the coast of Vizag. In the wee hours of that fateful morning of 3rd December, the INS Rajput struck pay dirt. Its sonar having detected the PNS Ghazi, in our territorial waters. the reason why the PNS Ghazi did not attack the INS Rajput was because, as our intel had discovered, the attack on India was to start the evening of that day!

A signal went posthaste to Naval HQ in Delhi relaying the situ and seeking advice on course of action and since it was in territorial waters to atteack immediately.. The response was a terse order not to lose track of the PNS Ghazi, to ensure that the the rest of the fleet were on full alert and that further orders in this matter which would be issued had to be carried out with immediate and telling effect.

The strategy was to keep fooling the Pakistanis into believing that their attack later, was a surprise. In fact, records show that IG was out of New Delhi and so was the then Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram, in another location. A dispersed cabinet. With Y B Chavan in Mumbai.

The INS Rajput played cat and mouse with the PNS Ghazi. And as the first shots were fired by Pakistan in its pre-emptive attack on Indian airbases the INS Rajput recieved the signal ordering it to "Attack and Sink". With excitement and tension running high during the last few hours, the INS Rajput unleashed its depth charges with destructive effect.

There were immediate signs of an oil slick and also a few life jackets floating in the water.

On asking, if their were other items which would float, coming to the surface. The wry reply was "Many, but later."

"So it was a confirmed kill? I asked.

"Yes" was the terse reply.

PS Uncle Wiki's rendering of the sinking of the PNS Ghazi differs in timing as well as mentions "mysterious disappearance" but admits to a plausible reason that the depth charges set of the torpedoes in the PNS Ghazi.

There is a lot of controversy surrounding the PNS Ghazi, and in my opinion, just to protect Unkil's H&D. Surprisng, because the Russians also shred it to bits later in the Bay of Bengal when a Russian "atomic submarine" surfaced in full view of the USS Enterprise!

[Aditya_V]

PNS Ghazi was not on a sucide mission, it had a huge range and was the most advanced Submarine in the war. The Pakis thought they had perfect intelligence that the Vikrant was in Vizag. PNS Ghazi did not detect Rajput until when it was on the surface and had to dive in a hurry. There was no question of any holding back on the paki Sub's part.

[rajanb]

PNS Ghazi was not on a sucide mission, it had a huge range and was the most advanced Submarine in the war. The Pakis thought they had perfect intelligence that the Vikrant was in Vizag. PNS Ghazi did not detect Rajput until when it was on the surface and had to dive in a hurry. There was no question of any holding back on the paki Sub's part.

Aditya. What my chaiwallah told me. Considering he was privy to the signals.

[akimalik]

PNS Ghazi did not detect Rajput until when it was on the surface and had to dive in a hurry.

How do we know Ghazi was on the surface? If it were on the surface, wouldn't Rajput have been able to engage it with guns?
If Ghazi was on the surface, how could Rajput get a SONAR contact for Ghazi?

[Nikhil T]

Late Captain Mulla's wife in an interview

What a noble lady! Very nice video.

[Nick_S]

PNS Ghazi did not detect Rajput until when it was on the surface and had to dive in a hurry.

How do we know Ghazi was on the surface? If it were on the surface, wouldn't Rajput have been able to engage it with guns?
If Ghazi was on the surface, how could Rajput get a SONAR contact for Ghazi?

Do wiki Sonar. In short sonar is supposed to listen for all noise being transmitted. Doesnt matter if its on surface or underwater, noise gets picked up as long as the engines or propellers are running.

[AdityaM]

Are old posts added for a purpose here or some error?

[akimalik]

Do wiki Sonar.

Why don't you read up on the effects of scattering due to surface waves?

Seniors (by knowledge) may please comment on how feasible it is to track Submarines on the Surface using SONARs by surface vessels. I have my doubts regarding this.

We were dealing with a Submarine on the surface which was well aware of the imperative in remaining undetected. If Rajput was using passive sonar to locate Ghazi, I guess Ghazi would have detected Rajput first. If Rajput was pinging, Ghazi would again have heard Rajput even earlier.

Does anyone have an idea of the sea-state and weather at the time of the incident? That would also be helpful in understanding what was possible and what wasn't.

edited once: Quote reference corrected.

[Nikhil T]

Do wiki Sonar.

Why don't you read up on the effects of scattering due to surface waves?

Akimalik sahab, you should quote Nick_S, not me ....

[akimalik]

@ Nikhil_T: My sincerest apologies.

[Nick_S]

Lol.

[Yogi_G]

Just wondering, what chance would the osa class boats have had against the 7th fleet carrier in the 1971 near naval conforntation between India and Unkil? Considering that each of this boat had 4 styx missiles would a formation of about 5-6 such boats be able to bring down a carrier using saturation tactics given that anti-missile tech was not that advanced in those days? I know that the boats would not have been able to get near to the carrier given the support ships in most cases but assuming this is not the case and if somehow these ships had gotten through what would have happened?

[tsarkar]

They lacked range, and their towing arrangement stood no chance against US Air Cover. The Osas ran out their engine hours in the Karachi raid.

We made other arrangements, INS Khanderi was stalking the 7th fleet...

[Austin]

Wonder if the Foxtrot would ever be able to keep up with the 7th Fleet and how close did it got to the carrier itself ?

I read the Soviet Submarine was there in the waters and they was a bigger threat , read in memoir of a soviet submariner that the SSGN were shadowing USN CBG and were within missile firing range if that was ever required.

[nachiket]

Wouldn't a single submarine of any type be extremely vulnerable against a CBG (even a 70's CBG) considering the number of escorts in the group plus ASW helos from the carrier itself?

[Aditya G]

Was the operation to capture this ship worth it? Did it divert the nausena from shelling Karachi?

'Madhumati', a Pakistani cargo vessel, which had been renamed 'Adamant Manila' to hoodwink the Indian Navy, was seized by units of the Western Naval Command, brought to Bombay and anchored in Victoria Docks on December 14, 1971. Image Id : 117793
Credit : (Source: The Times Of India Group)
© BCCL
Photograph Date: : 14/12/1971 (tentative)
Formats : JPG
File size : 0.61 MB
Dimension : 1813 px x 2426 px
Print Size : 25 inch x 33 inch
Resolution : 72 dpi

[Aditya G]

I would like to know more about the history and equipment of Indian Navy coastal artillery?

All I know is that a certain 505 Naval Coast Battery (TA) was a unit of the Army, which was later transferred to the navy.

[Aditya G]

http://indianmilitaryhistory.org/navy/I ... essels.pdf

This piece details the progression of India Navy's minor war vessels starting with SDBs to today's WJFACs.

SDBs were not perfect naval vessels - but Navy's persistence and patience with these classes has paid off. What is quite heartening is the evolution of the design with continuous improvement. Infact, Car Nicobar represents the 3rd generartion of IPVs.

1st generation: SDB Mk 2/3
2nd Generation: Trinkat/Bangaram
3rd Generation: Car Nicobar

Practically the class is under mass production with both IN and ICG purchasing large numbers.

Moreover, these types of vessels have served in Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles.

[Aditya G]

History buffs; what are the known instances of Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) by the Indian Navy?

[Aditya G]

History buffs; what are the known instances of Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) by the Indian Navy?

Well then ...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1961_India ... ion_of_Goa

...

The storming of Anjidiv Island

The Indian Naval Command assigned the task of securing the island of Anjidiv to the INS Trishul and the INS Mysore. Under covering fire from the ships, Indian marines under the command of Lt. Arun Auditto stormed the island at 14:25 on 18 December, and engaged the Portuguese defenders. The Portuguese ceased fire, and raised a white flag, thus luring the Indian marines out of their cover, before opening fire again, killing 7 marines and wounding 19. Among the casualties were two officers. The Portuguese defences were eventually overrun after fierce shelling from the Indian ships offshore. The island was secured by the Indians at 1400 on the next day.

...

[ramana]

Claude Arpi in Pioneer Aug 29, 2013

....
On the subject of opacity; I want to make a prophesy: We shall never know what has happened to submarine INS Sidhurakshak. A few years ago, when Sandeep Unnithan of India Today magazine sought some information on the sinking of INS Khukri in December 1971, the Central Information Commission recommend that the Indian Navy (and the Indian Armed Forces) “build up their storehouse of information for disclosure at the appropriate time for the benefit of the students of India’s defence and to enhance the people’s trust in the armed forces’ undoubted capacity to ensure national security.” The requested files on INS Khurkri, however, remained ‘secret’ and South Block ignored the CIC’s recommendations. It is a great pity. A nation can and should learn from history.

....

INS Khukri mystery still haunts us.

[Aditya G]

Read in full ...

http://articles.economictimes.indiatime ... -iit-delhi

...

The story goes that in 1970, Stanford Prof. Thomas Kailath, a brilliant and influential systems theorist who is himself a Pune-native, visited IIT Delhi to lecture on non-linear estimation. Inspired by Kailath's lectures, Paul went on to make fundamental advances in the area much to the Indian Navy's benefit. In 1971, after the war with Pakistan exposed shortcomings of the Navy's (British origin) sonars leading to the loss of a Naval ship, Paul led a successful project to redesign the sonar adding many new signal processing concepts. Three years later the new technology was widely deployed in the fleet.

''The (Indian) Navy is enormously proud of Paul's many achievements and will remain always indebted for his landmark development of the APSOH sonar,'' Retired Admiral R. H. Tahiliani, former Chief of the Naval Staff, told the Marconi Society on the occasion of the award to Paul.

In fact, Paul's work enabled India to overcome the military export restrictions imposed by the west. In an ironic twist, the Navy allowed him to go to Stanford on a two-year sabbatical, joining his mentor Tom Kailath. He returned to India in 1986 and served as the founding director for three major labs - CAIR (Center for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics), CDAC (Center for Development of Advanced Computing) and CRL (Central Research Labs of Bharat Electronics).

But by 1991, according to the now familiar narrative, bureaucratic battles began to take their toll, and with the consent of the Indian Navy, he returned to the US and Stanford University. ''His departure for Stanford University was a major loss for our country and the circumstances that led to his move may explain why we have so few Nobel Laureates from India,'' Admiral Tahiliani said.

...

[ramana]

About a year ago I met Prf Kailath at a desi get together and told him about BRF etc. He asked me to come over to Stan Madrassa and meet his chela who was away on a visit.
Have to take him up on it.


Paulraj is a leader in SMART antennas.

Adm's younger bro is also known.

[Aditya G]

Not many know that our first ever amphib operation post independence was in Junagadh.

"Exercise Peace" - From the book "under two ensigns"

The Navy was responsible for the landing of troops and equipment on the Kathiawar Coast and
the planning and control of the Landing operation6
was entrusted to Commodore M.H. St. L. Nott,
DSO, CBE, RN(Special List) who was formerly with the Royal Indian Navy and who was serving
as the Chief of Staff at Naval Headquarters, New Delhi. The naval force, comprising three
frigates {Kistna, Cauvery and Jumna), three fleet minesweepers (Konkan, Madras and Rohilkhand),
three landing craft (tanks) (LCTs 1310, 1358 and 1360) and one motor launch (ML 420) was
placed under the command of Commander R.D. Katari (later Chief of the Naval Staff), who was
also the Commanding Officer of HMIS Kistna. The other two frigates, HMIS Cauvery and
HMIS Jumna, were respectively under the command of Lieutenant Commander R. Sawhny and
Lieutenant Commander B.A. Samson (later Flag Officer Commanding, Indian Fleet). A small
mobile communication link, which was established ashore to provide a communication link
between the naval force and the overall commander at Rajkot was under Lieutenant N. Krishnan
(later Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Naval Command).
The naval force7
was to land three columns of troops designated'Namcol' (after Major Nambiar,
the Commander of the troops) 'Ratcol' (after Major Ratan) and 'Jaffcol' (after Jaffarabad). In
order to straddle Junagadh geographically, it was decided to land the columns with arms,
equipment and armour at Porbandar, Jaffarabad and Mangrol on the Kathiawar Coast. The navj^
force was also required to provide necessary logistic support to the troops from seaward. An air
force unit also stood by but was not called upon to play any role.
Before, however, the landing could be effected, it was essential to carry out the hydrographic
survey of the beach and choose a beach-head with an appropriate gradient for facilitating
landing operation. The job was entrusted to HMIS Jumna (NOPIN ONE); Lieutenant K.L.
Kulkarni (later Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Naval Command), Executive Officer
of the ship along with two other officers and some sailors carried out beach gradient (using

sextant and tide pole) in the area; they laid transits to facilitate the entry and beaching of LCTs.
The main phase8
'Exercise Peace' was launched with NOPIN TWO which involved the landing
of 14 Army officers, 251 Indian Other Ranks, three tanks and 13 vehicles at Porbandar. This
was successfully accomplished on October 5, 1947. The naval force for the operation
consisted of two frigates—HMIS Kistna and Cauvery, two minesweepers HMIS Konkan and
Madras, three Landing Craft (Tanks)—LCTs 1310, 1358 and 1360 and one motor launch ML
420.
The second phase was the landing of a military force consisting of six officers, 93 Other
Ranks and four vehicles at Jaffarabad and this was accomplished on October 17, 1947, with
HMIS Kistna, Jumna and Konkan and LCTs 1358 and 1360 taking part.
The third phase of NOPIN TWO necessitated the landing of a military
force consisting of eight officers, 152 Other Ranks, three tanks and eight
- vehicles at Mangrol and this was successfully accomplished on November
I, 1947. The ships that participated were HMIS Kistna, Cauvery, Konkan
and Rohilkhand and motor launch ML 420.
The naval personnel stayed on until a civil administration was set up in the State. This
coincided with another significant event, the restoration of the original gates of the famous
Somnath temple at Prabhas Patan, Veraval by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. The officers and men
of the RIN were guests of honour at the restoration ceremony at which a decision to
reconstruct the temple and to restore it to its original splendour, was taken. It was indeed an
act of historic justice!