Bharat Rakshak

There are two dedicated threads fr this topic in which Manmohan Singh and his government or the witless gutless BJP have been cursed and can continue to be cursed. I am yet to see any BRFite who knows military issues say a word because the discussion is about political issues.

I am requesting that political blame should be kept out of this thread. I also request moderators - at least those among you who can remember how this forum came into being to take a modicum of interests in keeping issues separate.

People who have said that the Chinese incursion in Ladakh should simply have been wiped away by shooting the Chinese dead, or firing a Brahmos missile at them because it is an incursion into Indian territory are not wrong in suggesting one means of achieving an end result that they would like to see. But I believe what is left out from these solutions are the unknowns regarding what could pan out after this incursion is wiped out.

I will mention one possible consequence simply to set it aside as unlikely. That is the Chinese will simply have their men and tents wiped out, turn tail and go away and never come back. It would be a mistake to believe that this would be the ONLY end result of killing the Chinese More likely, the Chinese will respond with some aggression at a time and place of their choosing.

It is important to factor in the consequences of a decision to destroy those five tents. If that consequence is going to be more fighting, and revenge raids by China, it would be foolish not to be prepared to kick Chinese ass. For that the entire border would have to be beefed up. The issue might be localized, but the response cannot be localized. We have to prepare for all out war.

In the context of Pakistan we have had numerous discussions of how a "Cold Start" doctrine was devised to reduce the build up time of the armed forces from a slow month to a faster 1 week or a few days. What this means is that the standard time required for preparing for hot war against Pakistan has been at least one month. I would be surprised if it was anything less with China.

What I am trying to point out is that a simple violent response is all very well if we are already stocked up and ready for hot war. It takes several weeks of mobilization to get there. Any violent military response before that will simply put the ball in the Chinese court and allow them to justify their provocation by making their next step.

Any military response must be planned and deliberate and not reactive.

I specifically request a political blame game to be left out of this thread and specifically invite BRFites with some military knowledge to provide inputs if they wish. Please keep the political blame game out of this thread.

Thanks for starting this thread.

I am curious to know how the "more knowledgeable" respond with possible military strategies.

I would like to put a couple of questions to those wise men.

1. How can/do they separate military strategies from political strategies given the fact that indian armed forces swore their loyalty to the current political dispensation. I mean to ask what happens when the political side pulls the lever when military Strategy is half way down.

2. How/why they came up with a CSD that is aimed at only Pakistan and not any enemy of Bharat.

Thanks in advance.

I may be wrong pardon me in that case but first and foremost question is are we actually in position to take military action I mean where Chinese are right now they are connected to mainland via six lane road and we only through airlift capabilities they will deploy three divisions before we move a battalion there

1. Do we have option for a limited strike here without involving IAF
2. Should china choose to escalate this to arunchal or Sikkim how prepared are we for that

Parshuram, I can't answer the specifics and any answer I write are my views which may or may not be right.

The issue of whether India can or cannot face up to a military situation can be illustrated by an analogy.

In Bangalore we get water supply for 12 hours every 48 hours. Water is stored in a large tank and is adequate for about 6 people for 48 hours. If the number of people in a house is increased to 9, then there will be days when the tank runs dry a few hours before the next water supply period is due. If 12 people come to live in a house, the water will definitely not last for 48 hours.

So a localized conflict, low grade - India can fight indefinitely.

Outbreaks of aggression in 2 - 3 areas India can look after and see off

Continuous, all out war on all fronts would be made costly for China but whether we "come out on top" at the end of that cannot be predicted.

So technically, while preparing for conflict we have to be prepared for all outcomes, and steer the possibility of conflict in a way that results in a good outcome for us. A good outcome for India cannot be ruled out simply by looking at the size of the Chinese and Indian armed forces. If war comes it must come when we want it in the places that we want to fight it.

All aggressors start conflict at a time of their choosing at places where they feel they may have an advantage. It is important to ensure that they do not have it their way, but get kicked where they feel pain (elsewhere if necessary) and cannot enjoy the aggression they had planned at a time and place of their choosing

Sorry about this general non-answer but that is the best I can do.

I would like to add a couple of self-assertions by Indian military to the discussion.

1. IA is ready and equipped to face any challenge/order that is given by the political masters / nation.
2. IA is prepared to face a two-front war. All our preparations and exercises are done/planned keeping this in mind.

For the purposes of this post, I will assume that the Manmohan Singh administration is not completely packed with traitors from top to bottom; difficult as it is to ignore a proven and incontrovertible political reality, here goes.

A few things to consider:

1) 3:1 ratio. This is a magic number that was thrown around by many "experts" during Parakram, after 26/11 and so on. The idea is that, to make consequential territorial gains, the attacker has to create and sustain a 3:1 advantage in firepower, manpower etc. (including force-multipliers) along a substantial section of the border. This will enable the attacker to grind down the border by attrition.

So my point is: what is true for Pakistan with respect to India, must be true for India with respect to China also no? PLA is not going to make any consequential territorial gains unless they can build up and maintain a 3:1 force advantage at chosen points along the ICB (India-China Border.) If the IA can hold down this ratio to 3:2 or even 2:1, PLA can't make significant inroads.

We know that PLA has a far better infrastructure to rely on for deployment. Yet, I find it difficult to believe the IA's logistics are so incompetent as to be unable to prevent the buildup and maintenance of such a huge ratio at any point along the border.

So ideally, at the first rung of the escalation ladder, we have Indian and Chinese troops deployed in all theatres of activity but with the Chinese never enjoying the 3:1 ratio at any point. Artillery and rocket duels take place, skirmishes occur, but PLA cannot get anywhere. IA can hold most territory, and regain whatever is lost in isolated Chinese thrusts.

2) The second rung of the escalation ladder involves what may need to be done in order to prevent PLA from gaining and maintaining a 3:1 advantage at any point along the LAC/ICB. A major force-multiplier for the IA is the IAF. Two major disadvantages for the PLA are (a) long supply lines vulnerable to interdiction, that must be held open if they have any hope of maintaining 3:1 advantage on the LAC/ICB. (b) high-altitude airfields in Tibet decrease the payload of flights that have to take off so far above sea level.

So the key question is: can India prevent China from enjoying 3:1 advantage along the border, WITHOUT using the IAF to hit logistical nuclei and arteries deep inside Chengdu MR? Can we fight a "purely defensive" air war, as in Kargil, never crossing the LAC/ICB to any significant extent, and yet prevent PLA from achieving 3:1 advantage?

I ask this because, if we do use IAF in this manner we are giving an opening for China to escalate to its own second rung of the escalation ladder. This is the use of thousands MRBMs deployed in Tibet to hit a large swath of military, logistics, economic and possibly civilian targets all across north and northeast India. At this point we start taking economic hits at a higher order of magnitude than what would be required to merely sustain the IA presence along the LAC/ICB.

It is my assessment... based only on what I have read in BRF, mainly... that even at this second level of escalation, PLA in general would not be able to build up a 3:1 advantage at many points along the LAC/ICB. However, given severe infrastructural damage that their missile strikes will be able to inflict, they MAY be able to achieve a 3:1 advantage at one or very few select points along the LAC/ICB, from where they will launch the next level of escalation in the hope of ending the war in their favour.

3) The third level of escalation will probably be represented by a swift, massive Chinese offensive to seize a substantial chunk of Indian territory, such as a city (Tawang, Leh, Gangtok, or Itanagar most likely... deeper targets such as Gauhati or Siliguri possibly) and end the war on their terms. I believe the PLA might attempt to recapitulate the Russian victory over Georgia (2008) where, once the Russians and their allied militias had seized the city of Tskhinvali, it was all over but the hand-wringing and Georgia virtually had to give up any claims to Abkhazia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia-Georgia_war

Of course, India is not Georgia, but the morale shock of losing a high-profile target like a city, combined with the increasing economic stress of (a) deployment maintenance (b) losses to Chinese missiles across N/NE India might destroy the Indian will to continue the fight and force the GOI to sue for peace on China's terms.

At this point India has very few options. There is no chance of seizing a Chinese city of comparable size; we are simply not equipped to mount a drive to Lhasa even at the opening stages of a war let alone after having exhausted ourselves to the point where PRC has taken an Indian city.

i) We can dig in and hang on, hemorrhaging wealth, for a sustained war of attrition and covert ops to unseat the Chinese from the city they grab. Even an "asymmetric" war so to speak.

ii) We can attempt to expand our airstrikes to Chinese cities within range. Lanzhou, Chengdu, Kunming possibly though not likely. However, if there has been a significant air war by this point in the game, we may not have the assets to sustain any such campaign.

iii) We can gamble very high stakes, and try to make a credible show of escalating to nuclear exchange if the Chinese don't vacate whatever city they have captured.

Most likely we will do none of these, but sue for peace on very humiliating terms.

4) It is therefore of utmost importance that the Chinese never manage to grab and hold on to any substantial chunk of Indian territory, especially a city, for any significant amount of time. In terms of a time scale I don't think India would be prepared to fight this war for longer than a month, possibly two.

However, China will begin to look less indefatigable, more vulnerable, the longer the war goes on and no significant gains can be claimed. Consider the China-Vietnam conflict http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Vietnamese_War The Chinese were able to capture the heights of Lang Son, virtually surrounding the capital of Hanoi. Their aim was to try and force the Viets to draw in VA units that were then deployed in Cambodia, where they were maintaining security after having deposed a pro-Beijing dictatorship.

The Viets saw through the Chinese plan after the Russians shared satellite data with them regarding the PLA deployment. They did not come out and fight any major engagements with the PLA, but used guerilla tactics very effectively, killing over 70,000 Chinese. Meanwhile the deployment in Cambodia was kept intact, and major conventional units (upto 300,000 VA troops) concentrated for the defense of Hanoi rather than trying to take back the Lang Son heights. PLA was hurting from the guerilla hits, and realized they did not have the strength to ensure a victory in Hanoi without humiliating losses... so they declared "lesson has been taught, road to Hanoi is open", turned tail and left.

The reinforcement of cities and towns will be critical, more so than the prevention of wilderness land grabs by the PLA. We should not spread ourselves thin trying to defend every square inch of wilderness terrain (like the TSPA in Bangladesh) but ensure that the Chinese never take a populated area; meanwhile, guerilla tactics can be used to unsettle Chinese deployments on wilderness terrain within Indian territory.

The question is not just how to make the war more costly for China, but how to dig in for a long fight that will be least costly to ourselves. IF we can dig in and hang on, time is definitely on our side; and if we do it without overt escalation on anticipated rungs of the ladder, using asymmetric warfare wherever possible, China will find itself in a position where it can either escalate to a new order of conflict (large-scale missile/air strikes on Indian cities, etc.) that risks nuclear exchange, or it has to pull up stakes and go home. Loss of face will mount every day that it sits on Indian territory taking losses while not making any significant gain.

This is the point that we must push the Chinese to.

5) At the present time I don't think there will be major conventional involvement from Pakistan, simply because the US is in Afghanistan and (for their own interests) will GUBO the Pakis into avoiding any significant conventional misadventure.

However, there is no doubt the Pakis will do everything they can to give China asymmetric warfare support (upto and including Kargil-type grabs if they can.) They will activate all their proxies in J&K to create chaos in the IA's rear, sow FUD, disrupt supply lines such as the Srinagar-Leh highway etc. This will be no more than a headache for us to deal with in the larger scheme of things, but we should anticipate that it will be there.

^^^
That magic ratio of 3:1 is for plains. In mountains, depending on altitude in which you are planning to fight, it changes to anywhere from 6:1 to 12:1.

^^^ I think the above ratios assume that the attacker is at lower altitude and the the defender on the mountains. Not quite the case along the LAC/ICB, where dispensation of troops is at more or less equal altitude, plus India's rear-theater infrastructure is at lower altitude than China's (which has implications for vulnerability plus things like air mission payload.) So 3:1 is probably a safe assumption.

India can strike (by flying over Burma, Vietnam & Thailand) at several southern chinese cities / targets using Su30MKI (after mid air refuel) using brahmos or direct munitions

Burma, Vietnam & Thailand being friendly would help. But the other escalation would be that of a chinese attack against these nations. At that point India would need to help these countries to get out of Chinese invasion

Why we forget 1967 when India made a point with China with a Machine Gun?

China can also use Pakistani airspace to launch airstrikes over heart of our country and not to forget logistic support they will get will be not available to us from anyone of our friendlies

1. Sir with due respect I disagree well had that been the case we would have attacked . I will not blame political setup here they are not simply turning blind and saying we will not attack come what may
There is element of losing more then gaining due to better infrastructure on Chinese side at this particular side and I am not sure that either side of thinking of full scale war where norms are different
Hostilities if incurred have more chance to be localised then escalating in full scale war

2.Being prepared in concept and being ready materialistically to face two fronts are two different things . We have not even mobilised our army in exercise over two fronts forget about war time mobilisation

A covert operation where goal should be making Chinese platoon surrender alive rather then sending coffins back home will keep temperatures in control

Symontk,

First we should disabuse ourselves of this notion that any other country is going to help. We have to be completely ready with a plan to fight this war on our own, with what we have right now.

Now there is the bigger question of how, in doctrinal terms, IAF can be deployed in a conflict such as this in the immediate future. Broadly there are two strategies.

1) Use IAF to support IA with CAS, and close-to-border (<2 or 300 km) interdiction missions ONLY. More or less the "Kargil approach" of a mostly defensive air war.
2) Fight an all-out war for air dominance over Chengdu MR so that we can carry out deep strike interdiction missions on all Chinese logistic nodes across Tibet. Air dominance is a prerequisite to make those skies safe for Su30s, refuellers and what not to fly in so that we can stage BrahMos attacks on Chinese cities in any kind of sustained or relevant manner.

(2) is good fun to think about for those who follow Possible Indian Military Scenarios and are fired up by dreams of Aero India and so on. But what does it really mean?

If our war objective is to prevent the Chinese from ever acquiring 3:1 advantage on ICB, or taking and holding any significant piece of Indian territory (such as a city) then what is the best way? I don't know, that's why I'm asking.

(2) is a long-shot approach, IMHO, given my limited knowledge. It presupposes many things. First of all, China can redeploy massive ADS assets in Chengdu MR very rapidly to counter any deep-strike missions. If we fight an offensive air war over their turf we have to deal with this in addition to the PLAAF. So at the end of the day, even if we achieve air superiority or air dominance over Chengdu MR, how many IAF assets will survive to capitalize on that with a meaningful capacity to conduct BrahMos strikes on Chinese cities?

What will all this cost in terms of equipment, fuel, ordinance, lives? Is it worth it, if finally we can only fire one-two BrahMos at a couple of Chinese cities per day (nuisance value) as against the Chinese capabilities to hit our own cities with missiles? Is it worth it, given that we still have to sustain an indefinite ground war along ICB, respond rapidly wherever the Chinese seem capable of breaking out, and watch our Pakistan flank at the same time?

Which brings us to the second thing. Fighting a major air war over Chengdu MR is an escalation. China can (IMHO will) escalate with MRBM strikes on Indian cities and logistical nodes/arteries. China has at least 1500 such missiles in Tibet. They can launch 50 missiles a day for a whole month at targets from Uttarakhand to Arunachal Pradesh; is it worth escalating to the point where they do this, so that our Su30s (however many remain following attrition) can launch a few BrahMos at southern Chinese cities per day in exchange? Will those kinds of mosquito bites hurt the Chinese economic capacity to sustain a war? Given that the Chinese MRBMs will hit all our N/NE Indian AF bases again and again, will we be able to keep up any kind of meaningful strategic offensive by air even if we achieve air dominance over Chengdu MR?

Maybe they will... maybe I'm wrong, maybe air dominance over Chengdu will give us a decisive edge needed to win the war outright. I don't know. But one thing I do know.

We have to keep our eye on the money. We don't have a lot of it to finance a long-running conventional war. High-risk strategies like trying to achieve air dominance over Chengdu MR will make us lose money at a faster rate than lower-risk strategies like using the IAF only in support of IA along the ICB. Unless there is a HUGE gain to be made by achieving that goal, it is not one we can even afford to pursue.

I still think our ace cards will be specops units like the SFF. Preventing the Chinese from achieving 3:1 ratio, and stinging them with losses wherever possible, increases the costs of prosecuting a war along ICB to them while maintaining lower costs for us (enabling us to sustain the conflict much longer.) Even if we CAN achieve air dominance over Chengdu theoretically, the balance sheet may not make it worthwhile. Using Su30s in lightning raids against PLAAF assets, PLA logistics nodes and combat encampments may have dramatic effect, but a situation where we can capitalize on air dominance to inflict significant strategic pain on the Chinese seems too far-fetched to consider.

Who has forgotten? Are you talking of Nathu La? What was the point made then? What were the Chinese trying to do and what lesson did they need to learn, at that time? Is that the same point we want to make now? Is a machine gun a relevant tool to make this point now?

A little expansion please, give us something real to think about rather than a one-line piece of rhetoric.

I wanted to point out that even a fire fight can remain localized. Though one should be fully prepared. Also in your aforesaid scenario, you have to take into account that Indian SF and SFF would be hitting Chinese infrastructure for smooth troop movement like bridges, roads, railines which can have devastating effect when logistical lines are long like with China.

due to logistical advantage, unless IAF is deployed in non-kargilish deep attack mode, we cannot fight a war and expect to come out on top.

this obviously has to be approved at highest level and planned for. ie. suppose we launch a police action, kill the sniffer dogs, round up the 40 and put them in a gunny sack for transport to delhi and handover to red cross, PLA might launch a regimental attack on exposed areas like DBO or elsewhere....if we want to hold on to territory or take back what was lost to creeping invasion over the years...IAF will need to be totally freed up and allowed to attack as deep is it wants to.

commitment must be total. dont enter the ring if you are prepared only for a kargil type fight.

The Chinese didn't have to fight their way into Indian territory. The Military had a range of options (like cutting off their supply lines) which would involve no fighting to expel them. But the fact of the matter is that not only did they not act on any of these options actually stopped patrolling the area behind them i.e. they retreated, ceding the territory (perhaps permanently) to them. With each passing day their position gets stronger and ours gets weaker. So the possibility of a military response also keeps diminishing. I think we should come to terms with reality and ponder the reason for such pusillanimous behaviour by the Politico-Military leadership.-
-Does the Political leadership want to avoid conflict at all costs(including loss of sovereign territory) for what ever reason?
-Does the Military leadership have no confidence in their capability to do what is required?
-Does the Political leadership have no confidence on the Military's ability?

You guys have got to start using your Chankyian forebrains. This is not a football game where everyone wears their favorite colors. Start thinking Paki-wise. Hire the locals to plant IEDs on all the trails surrounding the incursion. That way the locals know where the IEDs are and can avoid them. That's what they do to us in Afganistan. Nobody comes out and actively tries to shoot it out with us unless they are wearing Afghanistan police uniforms or something like that. Be touble makers in *their* supporting territory. Give the locals crude rockets that thay can easily carry on their backs so they can use them in ambushes. Have you seen the crude weaponry the Chinese hand out? You do it also. It's cheap.Let the Chinese have a taste of some their "People's War" tactics. Get mean and *smart* goddamn it!

Gunny TSJ

Acharya Rudradev ji,

Why did you leave out our navy? With (or without) help of Vietman, we can go beyond Singapore and strike at their bases in south China sea. India has wisely invested in P8-Poseidon which will tackle the vast junky fleet of Chinese subs. The exact status of Arihant is not known as there is too much fog (it is good this way) over that project. But assuming arihant (and submarine launched sagarika et al) have undergone tests along with operational Chakra, our navy will be the true force multiplier in the conflict with China.

Out of three forces, I have most faith on Indian Navy. the disruption of PRC-EU route from Singapore-Aden-Suez.. Destruction of Gwadar and other pearls (like hambantota and others) as priority along with stopping all their oil supply through singapore, is in our hand. We have Andamans. Indian Ocean belongs to Hindu, even if he does not claim it yet. We can blockade everything that goes east from Indian ocean and then strike in their bases in south China sea, as and when it is possible.

Rudradev ji,



I think that is the war we should choose!

All the routes into China from the South, West and North should be used to smuggle in weapons to all ethnic groups willing to fight China, especially Uyghurs and Tibetans. Indians soldiers too should get embedded into these groups.

The war needs to be expanded to all of China and all military posts should be attacked.

The whole of Western, Northern and Southern China should become a single huge Afghanistan for Chinese forces.

We should look at this invasion not as a threat, but as an opportunity to bring Afghanistan to China. In fact India should become the first country to now accept the East Turkestan Government-in-Exile as the legitimate government of China. Same thing with Tibet.

There is no reason to be pussy-footing about it anymore! Let's be open about it. They shed the "first blood" of Bharat Mata. Now we are going to bleed the Chinese dry!

probably a naive question , why cant the Chinese incursion be outflanked by another Indian army post inside the perceived Indian territorial border ? ..so that their position might be 'contained? Supplies might need to be air dropped ! ..or why not new posts along similar places in the border ? where the *deleted* have (not yet) come in and might be problematic if they do ??

Also would china have the will to escalate a war against India since they have more to lose., much like India versus Pakistan ?! If so let India fight a localized war and give a bloody nose to them , just to show a point ! This could be a god sent opportunity to correct a mistake and a defeat that is still fresh in India s mind Also a vote gathering exercise and PR for the ruling party for next elections .. and for the Indian general who manages to do this well less said the better !

The response is simple and well known and already done once. In 1986 Sumdrong Cho by Sunderji - Surround the soldiers by a division(around 10000-15000 soldiers) with artillery (airlifted if needed) and if possible tanks. Some tents should be less than 10m from their tents.

I dont even know why we are discussing this from a military perspective. The military solution is known to all and I dont think it needs to be even discussed.

So in my view, this thread should be closed with extreme prejudice. IB4TL.

My option of hitting southern china is in case of a full scale war and not for 5 tents

As the things are going, there is a high possibility of a full scale war. The Chinese high level visit is remniscent of Zhou Enlai's visit and I believe he is going to deliver a tough message (albiet a small one, but quite bitter). Its all 1962 redux

Even in case of full scale war, there is little work for IAF. Lets not expect swarms of AF from chinese side. We have only very few smart weapons (if we can rig NAG to SU30MKI it would be great as it can destroy artillery with pinpoint accuracy)

Rest of the IAF would be idle

About the threat of Chinese attacks via pakistan, I would say its a god given oppurtunity to nail Pakistan and US

Let me be the spoiler in this thread. In the local area, sector, our game is over, even before it has started.

Gen: VP Malik is on record, that we do not have access to the area by road. So, it is mules and air. China can move in a division to the area by the time we move a battalion. This is the difference infrastructure makes. So, if India builds up in the area only, then we are already on the back foot and simply will not be able to mount a military level challenge.

Having said that the eviction of the Chinese presence from the area is non-negotiable. Its access to KKP is too obvious. Although, I do not think the Chinese really need that from a military or a geo-strategic stand point, it is quite clear that India is being tested. They have chosen the area well. Indian Army has to rise to the challenge and not be cowed by bureaucracy. If they fail or the nation fails, we will hold these scars for 2-3 generations, until avenged. I do not want to live with one more scar on my psyche. Can my nation rise?

I will repeat here again, they have gamed for Sumdurong Chu, let us surprise them, by not playing to the same script. Sumdurong Chu was also supplied by Mules but it was a different time and a different China.

Atri ji: Threatening to block IOR access, is tantamount to full scale war, which has to be avoided, even assuming we can pull it off - which will be faced with global pressure. Also, a few sunk ships for Chinese occupation is not a good exchange. One is temporary, the other is permanent.

India can increase its military footprints in Vietnam, also we can provide military supplies to Myanmar to help fight Chinese supported rebels.

Its time for India to leave its passive support for Tibet, we can help them start an uprising in Tibet.

The idea of a military response, my dear friends is to scare the $hit out of entire south asia of how crazy we are. Once we do it people will have second thoughts before making any military or tactical moves. I also do believe this is a god presented opportunity to make a mark in the region. Once we beat the crap out of our yellow neighbors in the god forsaken snow country we will be the talk of town.
It will also ensure pakistan will not be making any new moves against us for atleast a decade.

Now coming to military response we can proceed as follows.
We give a 24 hour deadline for PLA soldiers to leave. This will ensure we are giving diplomacy a chance.
This will also give CCS coordinate IAF,IA Spl Forces to prepare for limited war.
Once the deadline is done we fire a single Brahmos cruise missile on the tents and end the scenario.
IF China escalates to other sectors we escalate the stakes by mobilizing the Agni Missile regiments. We declare to the world we will finish the war in 30 Minutes NOT a day or week or month. As a demonstration we fire a single Agni from Andaman Islands to Ladakh.

People take India for granted because we are predictable. Lets show we are not

Jones, there are no locals in the Aksai Chin area where the Chinese are coming from for hundreds of kilometers. The locals are all on our side in the area. Every local in the area is behind India for that matter, in ours and their side for that matter.

ShauryaT ji,

The escalation level two and three, said by Rudradevacharya, is full-scale war.. We should not wait to bring out our best asset for too long. Else it would be 1962 where we did not bring in IAF...

No, you neeednt do that. Simply capture one of china owned tankers on charges of drugs.

I think the IA should not be blamed as it is a political decision to find a diplomatic solution. I agree with the view that the best strategy is to put up a few tents inside disputed area where we hold some supply line advantages and then wait to see who blinks first.

And this was not gamed earlier? All military options require something else, a set of b@ll$. You cannot grow them and the current government does not have that. Gen. Sundarji already identified what can be done. The option is there for India to take.

There are a few steps before this becomes a war or even a local skirmish. The first thing the GOI should have done is announce a blockade with an ultimatum to leave. This was a time sensitive action, because it would have prevented the stocking of supplies. By dragging this out for nearly 3 weeks, they have probably stocked up for several months. If we had acted within the first couple of days, by now, their soldiers would be starving. The Chinese had gambled on the fact that any Indian response would be slow & hence they would have time to replenish.

The ball would have then been in China's court. Instead, the ball is now in India's court to go to the 2nd level in escalation, rather than the 1st. A blockade, by itself now wouldnt work. So, we are forced to go to the blockade + forcible eviction route.

Options right now:

a) Surround the tents with a numerically larger force with greater firepower

b) Announce a blockade & an evacuation deadline. Make it clear that we are not interested in bloodshed but only a peaceful evacuation

c) Block all future supply trucks

d) Airlift bulldozers (I am not sure of the feasibility of this). I hope we can do this by hook or crook

e) Once the deadline is passed, order Chinese troops to vacate their tents, while we bulldoze them and their supplies

Dare them to fire the first shot

All in the realm of speculation, let me add my two cents:

It could also be that the armed forces have already been asked about what can be done to create a stronger Indian military position relative to the Chinese in the DBO sector and the answer has been hesitant or a flat out "No options on short notice". And the Chinese know this all too well.

Fact is, the Chinese never take ANY decisions without having completely thought things through. You can always count on them for doing this. They did this between 1952 and 1961 when the original road building was taking place along this sector. Their patrols were reconnoitering the entire sector of the Aksai Chin east of Kongka La in the central sectors and DBO in the northern sectors. The point of all this was determining Indian responses, military and political. The same applies for intelligence gathering as well.

Now granted that I am unaware of the inner workings of the GOI wheels. And in all honesty GOI may indeed be doing a dhoti shivering act when it comes to the Chinese. But that is not the point and this is not the thread for it.

So let's just consider what we know, and please feel free to add/correct anything I might have missed out or reported incorrectly:

Item 1:



When I read this I was surprised to say the least. At first I thought this may be because ground based supplies were considered enough to meet the Army's demand and there really was no need for IAF resupply missions. But this is not true in the utmost sense. DBO is air maintained. The problem is that the Indian force in the region at the moment of the Chinese incursion simply could not have been large enough. Else the Chinese wouldn't have intruded (or would have been intercepted much earlier) and also because you would have need that airstrip operational to maintain those troops on the ground.

Note that ITBP posts still are for some reason the main day-to-day force there. Only when the situation escalated that the Ladakh Scout unit was deployed. (Please correct if I am incorrect in assuming this).

Item 2:



The fact that this is even being considered a threat shows how exposed and thinly defended our positions there are. It could also be media hyperbole, so I am taking this with a grain of salt. Again, our only source of information is the media so that kind of reduces the fidelity of any assumptions we make here.



So what exactly is our force reconstitution abilities at this point?

What is the rate at which we can bring units in to tilt the military situation in our favor? Can we maintain those troops there? How will we do that?

More importantly, what is the infrastructure on the Chinese side? Can they bring in more units and hardware and at a faster rate than we can? If so, by what means can we claim to "throw them out", as it were?

If the answers to all of these questions is in our favor, then we can point the finger solely at the GOI for inaction and appeasement. If not, then we have bigger problems at hand.

Now perhaps Rohitvats can comment more on the Indian units that can be brought in, but let me put some comments on the PLA side of the matter:

a) For all their bluster, the PLA has its own problems out there. They don't have nearly enough infrastructure to support a forward deployed army on short notice. So you can forget about the 21st Group Army and other units sweeping down over our isolated posts there. Not going to happen.
b) The ground infrastructure is much superior on their side than ours. This has as much to do with terrain as much as Beijing's (and PLA's) determination to maintain a solid presence out there. They can maintain a large force opposite our ITBP post and the airstrip without breaking their back. Ground convoys reach very deep into their frontline positions in Ladakh, which is more than what I can say about the DBO sector from our side.
c) All this stuff about their Rapid Reaction Forces etc is pure bluster. Yes, they CAN bring in some units down there for show and tell, and have enough firepower to be dangerous if opposed only by the Ladakh Scouts and the ITBP (Note that the arrival of the Indian airborne units will change the equations here)
d) None of the above points will come into play anytime soon. The Chinese have enough men and supplies out there to make their point for quite some time.

Anyway, to give you guys an idea of the size of the region in dispute, here's what the maps in 1950 said about Ladakh:



Anyway, my two cents within the stockpile of cents here.

Tell you what:

Lets start by first increasing our footprint on our own borders. Then we can go about doing it elsewhere. How about that?

Point is, which of these countries will even take you seriously after what is going on within our own borders in Ladakh? Why will they jump on the Indian bandwagon when that wagon is missing three of its wheels and the driver is drunk at the wheel?

-Vivek

+ 1000
Everybody knows India is soft and full of hot air when it comes to its own defense.
Right from Maldevis to ASEAN SAARC to Bdesh know what we say what we actually do.

Comedy Central it is.


First thing first blue blooded Americans need increase their knowledge of geography beyond corpus Christie then advise locals in yeti lands

Is that directed at my poor soul?

Based on what I have read in the news reports:

In the third flag meeting - called by India - China wanted India to "take down security structures in Fukche and Chumar in Ladakh without offering reciprocal commitments."

Here is my thinking:

1) They will make a decision to withdraw only after India "take down security structures in Fukche and Chumar" - does not mean that they will certainly withdraw, but, more than likely they will
2) (This point of what they will do if India were to "take down" is a nice point to game)
3) The fact that they have prepared to supply their intruding troops using helos seems to me that they plan to be there for the real long haul - perhaps even through winter
4) There was one report (posted above) where it stated that they actually had intruded in either 2 or 3 other spots and withdrew when things started to escalate. IF that is true then it should mean that the even is local - though very well though through


5) It is really no use escalating this event beyond what it is (IF the news reports are correct).
6) Things like obtaining a base in 'Nam and perhaps supporting Burma/Myanmar are strategic decisions. This even seems to me more like a tactical one

7) The structures that India built seems to be at the center of the issue set - nothing more, nothing less.

Just picked up:

Sore with China, govt may call off Khurshid’s trip

Well, so much for my talk/post, if true, they just escalated and it is no longer a "local" event.

Wasn't there a report that said they were also reinforcing their positions using vehicle convoys now, in addition to the helicopters?

I will try and dig it up.

I guess we should probably discuss what the definition of "local" is in this context.

I mean, nothing on the PLA side so far has suggested anything short of direct action from Beijing. If that is indeed the case, how can the word "local" be applied to this scenario?

Perhaps the local PLA unit was given orders to probe the issue "locally" and determine the Indian response. That way, if the Indian response was overwhelming, no harm - no foul, everybody pulls back to their original lines and status-quo is enforced. If, as it has turned out, the "local" push turns out to reveal the rot inside the Indian governance and mindset, turn the local event into something more "strategic".

Is that what is happening here now?

-Vivek