Dr. Bharat Karnad: Guest Speaker at BRF NJ MEET Nov 13 2011

[ShauryaT]

Do you sincerely believe that TSP's angst against India and their consequent sponsorship of terrorism is really due to them feeling "threatened" by us?

Statecraft does not ask for absolute truths and zero contradictions. It asks the question what is possible in a given space and time. Co-option is one such possibility. I believe that.

"TSP will behave if India appears less threatening" is a line peddled by Washington on behalf of its munna. I am surprised there are takers for this in India.

There is truth to the fact that India has a threatening posture against TSP. If and when, this posture is reduced TSP will act more normally or not is something that we will have to manage.

[ShauryaT]

We need to first bring to justice all the criminals and perpetrators of all acts of terrorism that killed so many innocent life and devastated their family based in Pakistan to justice and hold them accountable , without fair justice there is no sense of fair end to it, first let them hand over all the criminals who have bled our people in all acts of terrorism , specially the known ones who stay there as official state guest and all the 26/11 masterminds.

Should most certainly be part of CBM's for TSP to deliver upon.

[RamaY]

TSP will behave if India appears less threatening" is a line peddled by Washington on behalf of its munna. I am surprised there are takers for this in India.

There is truth to the fact that India has a threatening posture against TSP. If and when, this posture is reduced TSP will act more normally or not is something that we will have to manage.

I disagree sir. If this is true, there is no need for TNT.

[ShauryaT]

Been listening to BK recordings, yet to complete the set.

I'm surprised that the proponents of Co-option strategy failed to notice that he mentions that as part of co-option, we need to let go of any desire to take back POK and NA.

His words were, let them keep their part of PoK, if we are to co-opt TSP.

Does not mean it gets converted to IB. It stays disputed.

[ShauryaT]

There is truth to the fact that India has a threatening posture against TSP. If and when, this posture is reduced TSP will act more normally or not is something that we will have to manage.

I disagree sir. If this is true, there is no need for TNT.

What do you disagree to and what is TNT?

[Klaus]

TNT- Two Nation Theory.

RamaYji, by extension of Dr Karnad's TSP sutra, shouldnt India take the initiative of divorcing TNT from Aaloo-Andey and Aman ki Asha moves.

IOW, he might have purposefully revealed half and kept the other half unsaid, for the jingo audience. OTOH, we might have seen glimpses of the other side if the audience was a WKK one (that of debunking TNT).

[shiv]

TNT- Two Nation Theory.

RamaYji, by extension of Dr Karnad's TSP sutra, shouldnt India take the initiative of divorcing TNT from Aaloo-Andey and Aman ki Asha moves.

IOW, he might have purposefully revealed half and kept the other half unsaid, for the jingo audience. OTOH, we might have seen glimpses of the other side if the audience was a WKK one (that of debunking TNT).

His talk at IISc was far less detailed about sucking up to TSP. He only said that Prithvis should be pulled back

[ParGha]

There is truth to the fact that India has a threatening posture against TSP. If and when, this posture is reduced TSP will act more normally or not is something that we will have to manage.

False. Pakistan has maintained a disproportionately threatening posture vis a vis India from the very beginning. In 1947 the British Indian Armed Forces were split on a 1:2 basis between United Pakistan and India; the population split had been 3:5, indicating a much higher militarized and threatening society (in W Pakistan) from the very beginning. Since then, the Pakistanis have striven to shrink the gap further to a mere 2:3 force ratios on the ground and in the air (even as their Area of Responsibility has shrunk with the Liberation of Bangladesh); only at the sea is India maintaining a force proportional to its size and requirements. In the meanwhile independent India has realized other commitments from which it has been previously shielded by the power of the Royal Navy.

You want to know what would be a threatening posture?

Try this: Full mechanization of all Plains Divisions with NBC survivable capability, Underground Delhis/Mumbais/Nowherepurs, redundant 1950s style vacuum-tube critical communication nodes, strict government controls over all conceivably strategic materials, small-arms factories in every state, complete overhaul of the NCC training from parade-ground toy-soldiering to guerrilla warfare cadres made compulsory for all university students, every district maintaining current registries of eligible draftees... beginning to get the picture? If you don't have the stomach to achieve this even against Pakistan, forget about China, because the Chinese were ready for each one of these, except possibly the complete mechanization of the ground forces (which they could never hope to achieve against an industrial behemoth like the Soviet Union; instead they were prepared to lose millions in a People's War).

[shiv]

There is truth to the fact that India has a threatening posture against TSP. If and when, this posture is reduced TSP will act more normally or not is something that we will have to manage.

False. Pakistan has maintained a disproportionately threatening posture vis a vis India from the very beginning. In 1947 the British Indian Armed Forces were split on a 1:2 basis between United Pakistan and India; the population split had been 3:5, indicating a much higher militarized and threatening society (in W Pakistan) from the very beginning. Since then, the Pakistanis have striven to shrink the gap further to a mere 2:3 force ratios on the ground and in the air (even as their Area of Responsibility has shrunk with the Liberation of Bangladesh); only at the sea is India maintaining a force proportional to its size and requirements. In the meanwhile independent India has realized other commitments from which it has been previously shielded by the power of the Royal Navy.

For Pakistan, the accusation that "India is threatening us" it itself a posture. The fact that this is posturing has been recognized (recently, by the US) and the following argument has been made:

"The Pakistan army controls all resources in Pakistan, causing Pakistan to slip out of control and the population to explode and eat shit at the same time. As long as the Pakistani army can claim to be threatened by India, they will continue to hog all resources and not allow Pakistan to develop normally. Hence it is necessary for india to appear less threatening to Pakistan"

This is a specious argument. What's in it for India?

[ParGha]

First the official political objectives are yet to be spelt out - officially there are none beyond not loosing territory, so a lot of these are to explore how a co-option template might work.

False. The political pre-conditions and post-conditions for the current military doctrine, Active Defense, has been carefully considered in the formulation of the doctrine. The political pre-condition is that India will not be the first one to strike a blow (hence Defense), and the political post-condition is that should be the last one to strike the blow (hence Active).

The armed forces have the following role to play in between, in a summary of Von Clausewitz: "... once political authorities commit military forces in pursuit of political aims, military forces must win something--else there will be no basis from which political authorities can bargain to win politically. Therefore, the purpose of military operations can not be simply to avert defeat--but rather it must be to win." Win what? Traditionally it has been to win material and morale advantages over the enemy. Which brings us to:

Why are you limiting the counter force to armored forces only? Air and other PGM assets can be part of the mix to thwart such an armored thrust, no? What I expect is our pivot corps will have enough armor (more than a brigade) and mobility with dedicated artillery to thwart ANY TSPA conventional venture. Also, BK did not say "do away with Strike Corps" he said consolidate into one and disburse the assets of the others are independent brigades. It is a structural reorg. Certainly not a reduction in fire power but a reduction of force structure. Also, why are you presuming that such a reorganization will be unilateral and without any reciprocal reduction from the TSPA?

As stated above, under current political requirements it is not sufficient to thwart the enemy's attacks -- the military must reverse the momentum of war, win material and morale advantages, and deliver these for political/economic settlements. Material Advantage: Not all the Air Power and Artillery in the world has captured one inch of enemy territory in war; for that you need Armor, Infantry and Engineers. Morale Advantage: Air Power and Artillery can destroy the attackers and maybe even their logistical lines, but to truly destroy the morale of the enemy as a whole you need visibility and presence -- the infantryman, when he emerges crazy and hungry out of the battlefield in his ragged and dirty camouflage, embodies military visibility and presence.

[ParGha]

-self-delete-

[sum]

^^ Only takeaway for me from this thread( and mainly from supposed super-hawk BK's thoughts) was that for all the laughing we do on about how US is such a fool and keeps getting suckered by Pak, the joke seems to be on us since even after 60 years of "direct action" by TSP on Desh and infinite examples of perfidy towards anything India has tried to do since 47, the powers that matter still believe that we are the aggressor towards TSP and that we must try and reassure the Poaks and wish away all the civilains killed all over India as "pinpricks not worth antagonizing Pak relations with"?

This is the last time i will ever laugh on a WKK( like MKB, Kuldip Nayar etc) as deluded guys when they start the usual == since even our super ghwaks and doves seem to think the same as any WKK out there!!!

[ramana]

Sum, WKKs would have achieved their goal! And mind benders have managed to paint super hawk == WKKs.

A similar course of action could be proposed by both. At the surface then they look same. What separates it is the thinking between the two. It needs discernement to separate the two.

[RajeshA]

When the Americans start pulling back from Afghanistan in 2014 and much of the Pushtun areas are left to their own devices, Pakistan is going to live through a moment of euphoria as the Pakistan-supported Good Taliban sweep into those areas and reclaim them.

But the Taliban this time would not be able to overrun the Northern Alliance. They can at the most conduct more terrorist attacks against them, most of which would be approved in Pakistan itself. But the Taliban would see that the Northern Alliance would have a strong Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police to contend with. They will see that the world would be far more willing to give them training and military support than was the case in the 90s. So at some point Taliban would have to find some detente with the Northern Alliance.

And that is when everything turns on its head for Pakistan. That is when the strategic depth Pakistan so much desires becomes the monster Pakistan so fears. At that point when the Taliban make peace with the Northern Alliance, many other countries would open a dialogue with them and give them financial support as well, including India. The Good Taliban is going to go out of Pakistan's control. The Pakjabi Jernails will be in no position to exert much control over the Taliban, and all Taliban would be Bad Taliban for Pakistan.

At that point it is very important that India has a strong military presence on our Western border, in fact a threatening menacing presence. Why?

Because we don't want Pakistan to be able to deploy its complete forces on its Western border and crush the Bad Taliban. We want a large part of their forces to remain bogged down on their eastern border.

It is only when TSPA feel the heat and squeeze from West and East, that it would try to make peace with one side.

Now many think here that Pakjabi Jernails would invariably make peace with the Pushtun Taliban, because of shared Islamism. But there is also the possibility that they make peace with India, because it would allow them to retain some of their own ethnic identity, a little culture they have left, and some opening to the rest of the world. Or would they rather see Pakjabis getting their heads chopped off with blunt knives?!

Peace with Pakistan should be made only when India can completely dictate the terms of that peace. That would be one such occasion.

Today however, should we go for peace, we will allow TSPA to implement their designs of strategic depth in Afghanistan. If they can avail of the majority of their forces in their West, as the stronger Army they can dictate the terms of the cooperation between the Pakjabi Jernails and the Taliban. If the the Pakjabi Army is weak in their West, then the Taliban can become autonomous and push back, changing the whole game!

So now is not the time for Pakistani "Co-option"! "Co-option" comes when you don't leave the other with any choice whatsoever!

[ramana]

We should discuss the memo affair in the managing TSP failure thread.

[SaiK]

I like the multi nation theory (MNT), in the sense it is easier to control and manage.

[ramana]

X-post...

Bji, we would like to hear your thoughts on Dr Bharat Karnad's recent speech, the audio and transcripts of which have been posted in multiple threads.

Klaus ji, another dear friend has also asked about this. I was absorbed in the Partition model.

I do not have the original transcript, but I am using the summaries of PratikDas. I will not comment on his military tech comments right now - which to say the least is "radioactive".

Briefly : I would summarize his positions strategically as :
(1) China is a greater threat than Pakistan. Do everything possible to keep Pak neutral while you deal with the China threat.
(2) Pak is not permanently toxic as a separate entity. It is possible to detoxify Pak at least to the extent that it loses its India-specific hatred. Further Pak can be used as a buffer to absorb Islamic shocks from further to the west.

This line of perception is not new. But we need to understand why this perspective, where from, and why now. I feel that it is a long term perception in the congrez core from before the Partition - where, the preservation of a strong centre based in the northern plains - especially around the beginning of the GV, is the first priority. That strong centre would preserve a basis of personal and associated network dominance over the primary demographic and economic strength and flows over most of India.

In this, the perception continues that in areas like Punjab and Bengal are troublesome and unruly regions best kept out of the "centre". Muslims cannot be trusted where they happen to be the majority, and should not be kept close to or inside the centre. At the same time an independent cultural identity based on the non-Muslim sectors of Sikh and Hindus gives away too much power to networks far from the centre - since these identities are spread around all over the country and distant subregions. Hence a small minority Muslim inside serves as an effective balancing tool to be encouraged to keep the basis of personal power strong as a claim of a mediator.

The utility of a "managed" Muslim population is too ingrained into this type of thinking. This leads to visualizing a Paki population with emasculated military - a good utility option. To be preserved outside and far from the comfort zone of the "centre", while serving as a useful check to other sources of threat. The military aspect of Islam is feared - but the hoped for herd-behaviour and retrogressive tendencies of the social theological organization is seen as useful. For the congrez mentality - Paki muslim populations should never be allowed to come into the "central fold", where they may threaten the base for personal power - both directly as well as mobilizing counter-Islamic reaction - making the mediator role irrelevant.

Focusing attention on China in a public way is a good way out - especially if no real war is intended. Nothing concrete will be said or even done in preparation for Tibet because, congrez never intended to do anything seriously about it. It always used the Tibetans as a kind of hostage for good Chinese behaviour - not always with success.

The main thrust of this thinking is about preserving and defending the base of personal power in the north-central plains between Punjab and Bihar. The periphery is all "troublesome" and needs to be kept on an uncertain animated suspension mode.

At the moment this public focus is to take away attention from the western borders - where the pre-Partition hesitation still holds, and is reflected in the hesitant explorations about KV. Because KV is predominantly Muslim and the rest of the region predominantly non-Muslim - congrez is secretly in a state of permanent vacillation and indecision. Just as it was about Punjab and Bengal. For very similar reasons about the lack of clarity and deeply hidden anxiety/distrust of the Muslim. Moreover they know that now is a good time to make this a public issue - to score many points at the same time. A kind of diplomatic overture to the west that India would be aligned to western interests vis-a-vis China and hence flexing muscle, to take the edge off criticism about the apparent weakness towards Paki Islamism, and finally to hang the threat of "nationalist sentiments" against domestic opposition.

What BK is doing perhaps unknowingly, is playing into this gameplan. He is in such a position that he can be "over-convinced" - too much of intel inputs can be carefully arranged to sway thinkings of experts in certain directions.

[rohitvats]

The Co-option Strategy

I guess, the BK meet has run contrary to the expectation of BRF jingoes. As someone who is considered as maximalist when it comes of nuclear posture of the country, his views on how to engage with Pakistan and the Co-option strategy is 180 degree opposite to the accepted wisdom on BRF. And, in my opinion it is completely flawed. I have provided some points earlier, but I elaborate on the topic in some detail below.

The Premise

The basic premise of the argument is that the behaviour of Pakistan towards India is guided by its fear of India. Fears of India trying to undo the partition or dismember Pakistan using overt and covert means. Of India becoming a regional and international power and consequently, Pakistan becoming a satellite state of India. 1971 is brought in as reference point to buttress the above argument or the Indian ‘perfidy’ in the J&K accession issue. This fear of India compels Pakistan to employ overt and covert means to undermine India and further the interests of Pakistan.

The argument advanced here is that India needs to be “seen” has less hostile to Pakistan, to reassure Pakistan that we mean no harm and work along with it towards regional peace. By “appearing” to be less threatening, it is argued that Pakistan will reciprocate and cease any and all such activities. In the BK recordings, it has also been mentioned that under this co-options strategy, we need to forget about Northern Areas and POK.

The Variables

There is a big sociological angle to the entire argument. This angle in turn drives the military and political angle and it is this very variable which is either being interpreted wrongly or being ignored altogether.

But first, let us explore the military angle.

The Military Angle

My argument is that no amount of restructuring can make India appear “less threatening” to PA. Period. Unless, of course, people want India to reduce the number of assets held. Which is a dangerous thing to do because, you’re basing your security on the good—will of the enemy and as General Kiyani once said, “We go by the capability and not the intentions of the enemy. For, intentions can change overnight”.

ParGha has already given an excellent summary of the proportion of forces maintained by us. For India’s three strike corps, PA has 2 strike corps. There is plan to raise another to match India’s three strike corps. I think the plan calls for raising one more for south Pakistan and ARS actually becoming ARC-Army Reserve Center. The new strike corps will take the mantle of Army Reserve South-ARS. On top of all this, they have already added mechanized divisions with their XXXI Corps and V Corps (Bahawalpur and Karachi, respectively) to counter our CSD. The reason I have written above is to bunk the myth that India has overwhelming advantage on Pakistan Army. We have advantages in certain pockets, as do they. The level of obsolescence in respective armies gives us certain advantage(s) - except in SP Artillery.

Strike Corps are formations unique to IA and PA - both the armies suffer from a lack of resources – resources which are considered normal in western armies. This deficiency meant that these resources – like SP Arty, tanks and IFVs – were concentrated in select formations and these got termed as Strike Corps. Each Strike Corps is centered on an Armored Divisions plus (I) Armored Bde. In case of PA, the it is in the process of mechanizing the infantry divisions which are running mates of their armored divisions. These formations are held in depth and are the prime offensive formations of both the armies.

Consequently, other Corps, knows as Holding Corps, are left with predominantly infantry assets with support arms and sprinkling of armored/mechanized assets. The holding Corps is expected to be the first line of defense, absorb the offensive from the other army, launch secondary attack in support of strike corps and guard the flanks of the strike corps.

Ever since Sundarji came up with “Dash to Indus” plan in 1987, the essence of land warfare has been time and space management in terms of deployment of Strike Corps. PA developed a counter doctrine of Riposte – it surmised that while geo-political environment would not allow for complete might of Indian Armed Forces to bear upon it, it had enough offensive potential to negate any gains made by Indian strike formations. Here, we need to understand an important factor – PA is less sensitive about losing real estate compared to us.

And this is what happened in Operation Parakaram – though by all means, the pace of India deployment had unnerved the PA. But we digress.

[rohitvats]

Part II

The reason I have the above background is because when one talks of reducing the number of Strike Corps, what one is actually saying is to spread the assets of the Strike Corps to Holding Corps – or, Pivot Corps as they are called now. Now, the cardinal principle of armor warfare is that you do not spread out your assets. By doing so, you reduce the efficacy of your assets. “The whole is more than the sum of parts” applies in toto to mechanized warfare. That is something we suffer even now – both due to lack of resources and operational requirements. So, going by number of armored regiment, we have enough to have 8xarmored divisions and 4xmechanized divisions. But all we have is 3xarmored divisions and no mechanized division.

So, it has been proposed that we go down this route of reducing the number of Strike Corps and spreading the assets. But here is the catch – if I split up the armored divisions, I can carve out 6 extra large (I) Armored Bdes – 3xArmored Regiments+2xMechanized Regiment each. If I spread these assets across Pivot Corps along with the (I) Armored Bdes of Strike Corps, each of these Pivot Corps can have either two large size (I) Armored Bdes (one Bde which is already organic to Pivot Corps) or coalesce them into an armored division. We can also move the artillery divisions of Strike Corps with Pivot Corps.

Seen from PA’s perspective, while IA may lack reserves under the above structure, it still has formidable offensive power. This combined with the planned induction of C4ISR assets, RAPIDization of Infantry formations, gunships, closer integration with air force, tactical missiles like Prahaar and Brahmos etc will make these formations tremendously powerful. After all, a rose by another name is a rose.

And we’re told that PA will reciprocate with its own measures. And maybe, they will do something similar. They will beef up their Pivot Corps through transfer of assets from their Reserves forward.

But, what does all this do? How does this alleviate the fears of the Pakistan Army? I mean, after all, everything we had earlier is still there and we will beef up the same with more assets – more AD Guns/Missiles, more powerful radars, JSTARS type assets, UAVs and satellite imagery and all that. So, how do we address the PA “concern”?

And there is another question – why propose all this now? What has happened to ground situation to warrant this action? There can be two ways in which PA feels their concerns can be adjusted. And in my opinion, both are driven by fear – fear of India actually doing justice to its armed forces commensurate with her economic might. The same are detailed below:

a)The CSD – Whatever naysayers say about CSD, it is going to stay. It is a philosophy of war fighting given the geo-political realities of the sub-continent. With each passing day, IA develops resources to implement the CSD. If the Army Plan 2000 had been implemented, we would have had resources for CSD and some more. But then, we had the lost decade of 90s. While the progress in terms of modernization and induction leaves much to be desired, rest assured, it is going on. So, we’re going to reach a stage where we deny PA its biggest trump card – shorter lines of communication. We also change the very paradigm of warfare and concept of defeat and victory. For PA to invest in countering CSD would require shit-loads of assets – they’re doing that but then, there is only so much you can do when you survive on borrowed money.

So, may be, PA feels “comfortable” to live with Indian Pivot Corps armed to teeth but with IA w/o reserves for follow-on action and exploitation. By moving its assets forward from ARN/ARS to Pivot Corps, it counters Indian build-up in terms of number, space and time. As I said earlier, PA can counter CSD in two ways – move assets forward from reserves or arm the Pivot Corps. The latter approach requires money which it does not have and while it can go for former approach unilaterally to blunt CSD and hoping for global intervention plus N-factor, it runs the danger of getting bludgeoned by Indian Strike Corps.

So, by asking for this less “threatening” posture from IA, what PA does is that it negates the economic superiority of India. Economic superiority which will manifest itself in form of CSD – and assets required to sustain CSD. It wants to pull India down to its level and define the playing field which after a long time is getting more and more favorable to India. Only Pivot Corps from both sides in any conflict w/o follow on forces in terms of strike reserves will actually look like “communal riots” with tanks. Both in terms of time and space, PA will manage us and we will have the same stalemate we used to have earlier. While one leg of CSD calls for quicker mobilization time, it also means that we can create asymmetry in terms force concentration when we go on assault. By agreeing to force restructuring under this point, we give away this option as well – simply because the force structures to begin with on PA side will match ours.

It also takes away the Indian options below the nuclear red—line. We play straight into Pakistan hands and to all its strength. While we are emasculated to exercise our options, PA retains all the aces and it is game set and match for us.

b)The other way to look at it if people are actually proposing to wind down the offensive potential of the Indian Army. After all, strike corps’ are what they are because of the assets and not some divine vardaan. Like I said earlier, even with distribution of assets and better equipment profile, IA will have serious offensive potential. The only way you can look less threatening is if you actually do away with your sword – the elements which provide the offensive potential to you.

But Why Quid-Pro Quo?

But why is the above being even suggested? And why should we even look at it? What do I, as India, gain by any such Pakistan proposition and action. Let us look at it from different angles –

a)The economic impact – this whole military modernization thing is simply par for the course as far as India is concerned. For too long we’ve under spent on the services and it is only now that we’ve gotten into the high hear. From GDP percentage perspective, we’re doing the bare minimum and there are enough talks for raising this even further. So, there is no economic benefit that I derive from adjusting PA concern. It is they who are in shit-hole, not us. If anything, it now the time to drive home the point who the big dog is.

b)The military angle – we’re only now getting into position we’re we can overmatch the PA – PAF and PN are not even in consideration as far as I’m concerned. The status quo is being reversed slowly but surely. So, why should I give up my strength to adjust the fears of a weaker power? What am I going to get in return? On the contrary, we give up options to punish Pakistan for “accidents” that might be perpetrated by non-state actors. Plus, we give up options to take POK and Northern Areas. I have already explained that for us to mount effective pressure on POK/NA, we need to ensure that PA cannot carry out any hanky-panky in plains. By agreeing to PA proposal, we give the advantage to Pakistan. Again, why should I play as per rules of engagement set by Pakistan?

c)China concentration – People say that by making our peace with Pakistan, we can concentrate on China better. But how? There are two interrelated points here – (a) we China is one of the 3.5 friends of Pakistan and Pakistan needs China ever more. So, will Pakistan compromise on its relationships with China for peace with India? Will it evict China from POK/NA? I mean, we must be delusional to even think along these lines. We have enough resources to take on China, Pakistan irritant notwithstanding. On the contrary, India can move assets raised for China front towards Pakistan and screw its happiness a bit more.
So, there is neither economic nor military argument for us to adjust to PA concerns. So, why do it? Let us look at the political angle to it.

Political Angle – We’ve come to realize that there has been growth of multiple power centers in Pakistan. Over last decade, the Pakistan Army has had to cede space to the greener shade of holy warrior. I’m considering the mullahs as part of this greener shade of camp. It has been argues that by “looking” less threatening, we give more space to Pakistan Army and those elements which fall under the liberal definition. But then, have we not already seen the process of IRO – Islamic Reverse Osmosis - have started in Pakistan. Greener warriors are angry at the establishment for being, well, less green. And the establishment is working overtime to prove its credentials. Was not 26/11 an attempt to channel the pressure from greens and to prove the credentials?

It seems, the PA and associated cohorts are looking for India to decrease pressure on one of their flanks, so that they can concentrate on the other. But here is the dichotomy – whatever remains after the confrontation with greens will be more toxic than before and will turn on India with more vengeance. The basterds in the PA and establishment enjoyed their whisky when they let loose terrorism on India and now, when the chickens have come home to roost, they want us to help them out? Why?
No one can reverse the process of Islamization – unless, you consider nuking the place to kingdom come as an option. Can PA dismantle LeT or JeM? No, they can’t. So, what are we talking about here? As far as I can see, the Pakistanis are going to continue to explain away the terror strikes as “Accidents” by Non-State Actors while asking India to chop off its own sword and not retaliate in kind.

There is nothing in this co-options strategy.

[JE Menon]

>>"Gandhi was not a Hindu. Now we have to live up to Gandhian image of ourselves. Basically Christian.
Islam is as much Indian as Hinduism. Indian military officers are upset when I say that. We have organic links with Pakistan. We have ties with Pakistan of clothes and . There is no difference in India and Pakistan. It is a composite culture. If you go to Peshawar and all. In 1982. I K Gujral.

I was a smart enducated young guy. Pakistan is not a threat. Lets deal with them.
Indian made foreign liquor called Peter Scott. Hugely prized in Pakistan. 6 casks of Peter Scott. Accha Kholiye. Yeh kya hai. Peter Scott hai. Presentation ke liye. Brazen. I was a guest of the Govt of Pakistan. The liaison officer came from the Pakistani army. For medicinal purposes. Went to Peshawar. Completely used the Govt of Pakistan passport . Lets go everywhere. Khyber rifles mess. Rangers mess. Call your CO. Show enormous confidence they just don’t know what to do. The Mohammed Khan Afridi. King of Khyber Rifles. Silver of the Khyber rifles is awesome in captured silver. Flashed my passport. My CO is not there. I am here to see your famous silver. Samosa party. Tremendous Silver. All campaigns in Afghanistan. Famous greens hotel in Peshawar. "

This was part of of the BK talks transcript posted on the 2nd page of this thread. Was the above actually said? Can anybody who was there corroborate the above?

[rohitvats]

^^^Yes, I can corroborate on hearing eveything of above in the recordings posted on the first page.

- He wanted to see Khyber Rifles Officer's Mess as it is claimed (by him) to have largest silver collection after Probyn's Horse in IA. Just barged into the unit and asked to see the mess.

- On the Hinduism and MG front, he says that concept of ahimsa is alien to Hinduism. Was "co-opted" (there we go again) from Buddhism bu Adi Sankracharya when he went around reviving hinduism. Gives example of Ashoka in Kalinga as our (hinduism) earlier thought process when it came to warfare - that is, total annihilation. Says, talk about ahimsa only after you've vanquished your enemy.

My point - he talks more passionately about PA Officers than Indian.

[JE Menon]

I have downloaded from archan's link. Will listen tonight... Thought the above was part of "conversation" rather than his talk (if that was how the meeting was arranged).

[ParGha]

IF we accept BK's overarching strategic philosophy that Pakistan does not matter, China is the threat of the present century: then there are serious problems with the value of it. Because any way you game it, you end up with Game Over: China Wins. In fact, we on BRF come up with endless scenarios about a two-front war but we fail to see that from Beijing's perspective, it is better to fight a one-front war against India with the front being on the Pakistan border!

In this regards, India and China are in accord. Even from Indian perspective, a one-front winnable war with Pakistan is preferable to the civilizational-suicide of World War III with India in the fighting center. Count me out of the "we on BRF". To quote myself:

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 25#p890725
The primary focus will be on breaking this combine, from the begining to end. Since we don't know WHY they have combined, let us generally say conciliatory gestures, concessions and bribery of appropriate types can be tried on CH to leave PK in the lurch. When it escalates to a shooting war, the first focus will be on isolating a sizable PK formation (plus some) and completely annihilating it - not rendering it combat ineffective, simply totally destroying it. It serves two fold purpose: to tell the PKs that the nature of fighting India has changed, India may or may not win this war but sure as hell there won't be a PK left to feed on the carrion. The second purpose is to implicitly ask the CH if such warfare is acceptable to a nation under One Child Policy. Repeat as necessary.

China is NOT India's enemy, it is merely the latest in a long line of opportunists who come to exploit India's chronic laziness and irresolution in getting its house (the subcontinent) in order. It can, and will, be dissuaded once India gets its house in order.

Note that this paradox is not a new thing in the age of uberjihad and nuclear enabled terrorism (though these factors have compounded the difficulty.) Catch 72 has existed at least since the '65 war, when the GOI did not provide air support to 3 Jat which could otherwise have taken Lahore. Taking Lahore would have meant (again, per BK) a total unraveling and collapse of the Paki state, then newly under military domination. Evidently Sri Shastri's cabinet saw the continuing existence of a TSPA- dominated Pakistan as a more manageable evil than India having to absorb or be responsible for the corpse of Pakistan. Maybe they were even right.

No such paradox; you are inducing self-paralysis through over-analysis. In fact in 1965, Premier Chou En-Lai did recommend Gen Ayub Khan to continue fighting an indefinite Maoist People's War (which the Chinese could have fast supported with first-hand experience {Japanese Occupation of China in WWII and the Chinese Civil War}, and expertise in materials and tactics for such warfare); Gen Ayub Khan flat out refused to fight such a war, and instead chose to sue for peace at Tashkent Conference. The Pakistanis know Pakistanis better than most people, and know how fickle is faith without fear (ask Airavat for historic explanation). The decision to end the war in 1965 was driven by the need to keep it a winnable one-front war (which India did win). To again quote myself:

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 65#p890765

India, in fact, did use this strategy {of sama on one side and danda on the other} in 1965 (a war, according to Jung Chang, that was incited by Mao as a two front war that GOI deftly deflected).

[rohitvats]

^^^Excellent post. Thanks.

[Kakkaji]

Because of India's sheer size, the Pakistanis consider it a threat. Therefore, India should break itself into several small pieces as a CBM to reassure the Pakistanis.

[RamaY]

Rohitvatsji,

I do not think the problem is with the strategy, but the underlying premises itself.

Once we remove the military threat to Pakistan, the pakis will find another red line to cry. They can and will say that a growing Indian economy is a threat to Paki way of living (because it lures mango-abduls toward worldly desires) and so on. This will inspire our WKKs to suggest that we pay for paki growth as well, after all they look, live, eat and dress like us only.

The problem, IMO, is that the WKK brigade thinks that Pakis are our family members (even BK mentioned the family relationships across borders). And it is akin to one successful member of the family paying for another family member's livelihood and all other expenses.

The problem with this strategy is that the lazy brother will never try to become successful as long as he is given nice stipend every month, even after he has his own family, children etc.

I tried to finance my own brother's business thinking in these lines. I even challenged myself that I would pump >1L per month as long as it takes. I did so for 5-6 years before realizing that my brother stopped following up his customers for payments, started gambling and racing etc., why should he care, he is gonna get new investment every 1st? He even mortgaged/sold the land I put on his name (because I wasn't in india for registration) 3 times first two times I cleared the loan for him (to buy my own land thrice).

He became responsible only when I stopped giving him even a single rupee and any concession in any matter. the same will be Paki behavior.

Like ParGha said, we should destroy a section of Pakis in precision strikes every time they do something Paki. And strengthen CSD so he doesn't even think of any suicidal attempts.

[ShauryaT]

Hatred and mistrust of TSP does not require a lot of imagination or digging in for facts from an Indian stand point. Just like complete hope and confidence on TSP cannot be the basis of a future strategy, so can mistrust play the opposite role of a complete paralysis.

The question here is, what is the Indian objective? If the objective is to have a security architecture for the region and the time frame is what will work with TSP in the short term (10-20 years), who's gains can be transferred to the next generation to manage the medium and long term. co-option is one such method, which involves a negotiated half way house, where not all issues are settled, however allows for some forward movement towards normalcy.

What we need on this thread are realistic alternatives, by those who shoot down co-option. Alternatives that achieve this goal of normalcy, to the degree possible.

Let me post an article, to show why a security architecture is essential to take this entire region forward. It has nothing to do with the issue at hand, however, without a resolution or a way forward towards normalcy, some of these things will be debated even 20 years from today and we shall have failed our progeny.
Shyam Saran: Building Bridges in South Asia

One reason why regional connectivity fails to materialise is that each member country, including India, treats transit through its own territory as political leverage or a bargaining chip to be used against its neighbour. Pakistan will not permit India access through its territory to Afghanistan; Bangladesh is averse to allowing transit to India for access to the north-east and even Nepal is reluctant to give India transit to China, though it is covered in the Indo-Nepal treaty on trade and transit. Each believes this is a potent bargaining counter against India. However, the largest transit country in South Asia is India and its approach is no better. It, too, suffers from the “transit is power” syndrome. It will not allow transit to Pakistan or Bangladesh for facilitating Pakistan-Bangladesh trade. It allows Nepal to use only the congested road and rail corridor to Kolkata. Each country believes that this leverage through access denied is a potent political weapon. Unless this mindset changes, repeated summit declarations exhorting connectivity will keep orbiting in the realm of pious declarations and only limited progress on a bilateral basis will be possible.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP> Let me post an article, to show why a security architecture is essential to take this entire region forward. It has nothing to do with the issue at hand, however, without a resolution or a way forward towards normalcy, some of these things will be debated even 20 years from today and we shall have failed our progeny.<SNIP>

ST, we would have failed our coming generation(s) still more if we leave them defenseless against the islamic terrorism emanating from Pakistan. By all means, trade with Pakistan; if possible, give concessions within acceptable limits. But no compromise on security.Simple as that.Period. All these years, it is we who have been subjected to attacks - from state and "non-state" actors. So, it is we, who need to be assured by Pakistan about its willingness to walk down the peace path. Can they dismantle LeT or JeM or HM? Can they give up supporting militancy in Kashmir? Or supporting Khalistani militants? For god's sake, these are the men who perpetrated 26/11 on us. What Co-option BS are we talking about? What do I get in return? Nothing. There is nothing Pakistan Army or anyone else can promise and deliver which will make our lives easier. The socio-political environment is simply not going to allow them to do it. So, thanks but no thanks. Co-options only allows Pukes to walk away without having paid for all they have done and still retaining the ability to do so in future.

To trade, you don't need security architecture - especially one, where we stand to loose. Please trade by all means. Allow transit of goods or FDI. But than does not require to lower my guard just because some d1ck-head said sweet nothings into the ears of so called strategic thinkers.

[ShauryaT]

Personally, I have written off SAARC as anything useful, until the key India-TSP issues are resolved. India can and should do what it can bilaterally and with sub groupings, like in the east, but without a deal with Pakistan, land access to CAR and in fact the entire Asian land mass will be cut off. All this while China continues to build voracious links with the Asian land mass.

Will Cooperative Security Work in South Asia?

SAARC provides a forum for discussing these problems and indeed many of these problems have been discussed there. But no credible action plan exists. Although SAARC has been around since 1983, the progress in regional cooperation has been excruciatingly slow. But there are signs of activity. The 17th SAARC summit, held in Addu, Maldives in November 2011, came up with some significant initiatives which might potentially address the human security challenges of the region by strengthening regional cooperation in critical areas.
....

Some key features of the cooperative security approach are as follows:

Globalisation has led to contradictory trends of integration of finances and trade but also fragmentation of communities and societies as a result of which the danger of state failure has heightened. The existential threat of climate change has given rise to many new security worries. No country is in a position to resolve these security problems by itself. It will require the cooperation of others.

Cooperative security depends upon mutual trust, transparency, attention to global norms and eschewing zero-sum approach to security. It requires a broader look at the concept of national interest.

Dialogue, transparency, information sharing, capacity building, confidence building measures and asymmetric reciprocity are at the heart of the cooperative security approach.

Institution building is important for the success of the cooperative security approach. Institutional platforms are required at the national, regional and international levels. At the same time, broad participation of governmental, non-governmental and civil society stakeholders in these institutions is important. Track-2 dialogues serve a useful purpose in this regard.

...

The summit declaration highlighted a number of issues with significant potential for regional cooperation. These include:

Reduction in Sensitive Lists as well as early resolution of non-tariff barriers, harmonizing standards and customs procedures.

Ensuring greater flow of financial capital and intra-regional long-term investment.

To conclude the Regional Railways Agreement, the Motor Vehicles Agreement, etc. before the next Session of the Council of Ministers.

To complete the preparatory work on the Indian Ocean Cargo and Passenger Ferry Service.

To implement the Thimpu Statement on Climate Change.

To expedite the work on Inter-governmental Framework Agreement for Energy Cooperation, the Regional Power Exchange Concept, SAARC Market for Electricity.

To resolve the operational issues related to the SAARC Food Bank.

To initiate work towards combating maritime piracy in the region.

To direct the finalization of the work on the elaboration of the SAARC Regional Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution.

To undertake a comprehensive review of all matters relating to SAARC’s engagement with Observers, including the question of dialogue partnership.

[ShauryaT]

ST, we would have failed our coming generation(s) still more if we leave them defenseless against the islamic terrorism emanating from Pakistan.

Take it from me, I know this better than most, at a personal level. However, doing nothing as TSP has been judged to be the scum of earth does not do a thing to turn the tide of Islamic terrorism, who's chief victims are in our region - not in western lands.

>>By all means, trade with Pakistan; if possible, give concessions within acceptable limits. But no compromise on security.Simple as that.Period.

I do not think our security is being compromised by adjusting our doctrine - if we have no intent to destroy TSP as a state or TSP forces, while a certain understanding is in place. A security architecture and some level of normalcy is a pre-condition for trade to blossom.

>>All these years, it is we who have been subjected to attacks - from state and "non-state" actors. So, it is we, who need to be assured by Pakistan about its willingness to walk down the peace path. Can they dismantle LeT or JeM or HM? Can they give up supporting militancy in Kashmir? Or supporting Khalistani militants? For god's sake, these are the men who perpetrated 26/11 on us. What Co-option BS are we talking about? What do I get in return? Nothing.

Many of the above should be TSP's and TSPA's part of the bargain, otherwise it is pointless. Austin said something similar in a post above and I agreed that this is something that they will have to come through in large measure.

>>There is nothing Pakistan Army or anyone else can promise and deliver which will make our lives easier. The socio-political environment is simply not going to allow them to do it. So, thanks but no thanks. Co-options only allows Pukes to walk away without having paid for all they have done and still retaining the ability to do so in future.

If the belief is the PA can deliver nothing then there is nothing to talk about. It still has the question open, what is our objective then and how do we go about it?

A socio-political environment is a result of certain political realities that develops through the passage of time and deliberate policies, that succeed. Some are amenable and some are not. What do you think is not amenable (given space and time and ofcourse effort and resources) that will continue to be absolute impediments towards normalcy?

>>To trade, you don't need security architecture - especially one, where we stand to loose. Please trade by all means. Allow transit of goods or FDI. But than does not require to lower my guard just because some d1ck-head said sweet nothings into the ears of so called strategic thinkers.

Rohitvats: I do not know, what you do have against "analysts" (who come in various shades). They are a much needed non-governmental and non partisan source on issues and is a healthy component of a mature democratic setup. I believe in the adage "Caveat Civis". It will be a sad day, if only "official" sources are to be believed. National security is way too important to be left to governments and its wings alone.

I also feel you are pre-judging the calibrated steps that go into making an understanding of co-option work. Pakistan is deeply aware of Indian suspicions. My fears do not stem from mistrust of Pakistanis, which is known and hence a plan to ensure compliance can be framed or at least attempted. My fears stem from the weaknesses in our own institutions to isolate national security from partisan politics (because they matter little to electoral politics) and a way for these matters to be institutionalized through bodies, that can span governments. Asking the armed forces to carry this burden of security policies on their shoulders alone without any support and calibration from the political end is a huge disservice to the forces. Building a CSD with no plausible political objective is one such policy flaw.

Anyways, I have said enough on what I wanted to.

[ramana]

Its like building super duper intel agency like raw without telling it what we plan to do with the data. No wonder we have failures. They are failures of the policy makers passed on to the agency. What is known as Type 3 errors.

n 1974, Ian Mitroff and Tom Featheringham extended Kimball's category, arguing that "one of the most important determinants of a problem's solution is how that problem has been represented or formulated in the first place".

They defined type III errors as either "the error ... of having solved the wrong problem ... when one should have solved the right problem" or "the error ... [of] choosing the wrong problem representation ... when one should have ... chosen the right problem representation"

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_I_and_type_II_errors

[ParGha]

Like ParGha said, we should destroy a section of Pakis in precision strikes every time they do something Paki.

Just to be clear, I did not say anything about "precision strikes"; cluster munitions, HE artillery, fuel-air mix "dumb" bombs and flood-waters can destroy a massed and isolated formation quite well. And I also didn't say anything about "every time they do something"; the Parliament Attacks, the Kaluchak Attacks, the Mumbai Attacks, even any attacks two orders of magnitude higher I would suck up and patiently wait/prepare for many months (indeed I would want to) for the right time/conditions to counter-attack.

[Bharath.Subramanyam]

x post

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 6#p1198486

Also long back I remember Dr. Bharat Karnard writing (many years ago) that Indian Muslims will stop/prevent Indian Army from punishing Pakistan for its acts.

I don't know why Dr BK came to this conclusion.

[shiv]

Pakistan is deeply aware of Indian suspicions. My fears do not stem from mistrust of Pakistanis, which is known and hence a plan to ensure compliance can be framed or at least attempted. My fears stem from the weaknesses in our own institutions to isolate national security from partisan politics (because they matter little to electoral politics) and a way for these matters to be institutionalized through bodies, that can span governments. Asking the armed forces to carry this burden of security policies on their shoulders alone without any support and calibration from the political end is a huge disservice to the forces. Building a CSD with no plausible political objective is one such policy flaw.

Shaurya there is a little twist in your post that perpetuates a common BRF myth. That myth is that the government's political apparatus is disconnected from the security apparatus. That is simply not true.

This discussion about CSD is almost being made out to be an "army plan" which government politics has no use for, suggesting a kind of army-politics divide a la Pakistan. That is not true. CSD cannot have been developed without government backing and the Pakistanis know that very well. CSD itself achieved the political objective of scaring the Pakistan military who went as far as to react to it publicly. It was not simply a Chankian plan that some army officer came up with while the dhotis and babus stood by kissing Pakistanis at the border.

Clearly there is an internal debate within India in the government, among analysts as well as on BRF as to what can be done with Pakistan. One side of the story is what Karnad is pushing. That side of the story is that CSD does not have any clear objective. As you have seen from information posted here, that is a debatable allegation. Karnad clearly represents a partisan view in many subjects - he has his own views and there is nothing wrong in that. It is Ok to agree or disagree with him. Karnad chooses where and whom he wants to support. To that extent he is no more than any of us making up our minds based on facts as seen by us.

[ParGha]

The question here is, what is the Indian objective? If the objective is to have a security architecture for the region and the time frame is what will work with TSP in the short term (10-20 years), who's gains can be transferred to the next generation to manage the medium and long term. co-option is one such method, which involves a negotiated half way house, where not all issues are settled, however allows for some forward movement towards normalcy. What we need on this thread are realistic alternatives, by those who shoot down co-option. Alternatives that achieve this goal of normalcy, to the degree possible.

Sorry, in military/security affairs 5 years is long-term; revolutions happen within a 5 year period. Think about these 5 year periods: 1960-1965 (Goa, Defeat by China, Massive Expansion & Modernization, Victory in 1965), 1986-1991 (Ex Brasstacks, Fall of Soviet Union, Nuclear Weaponization of Pakistan), 1996-2001 (Pak on the Offensive in J&K and A'stan, Shakti and Kargil, 9/11 and Pak on the Run).

Historically speaking, we humans just suck at making predictions, especially those depending on factors beyond our control. Nothing to be ashamed of, we just have to accept it with humility and try to build capabilities for the long-term. Arm, Watch & Wait is a perfectly good non-strategy in a period of transition like the current period (ISAF draw-down in Afghanistan).

If you want "realistic alternatives", there are lots of threads in the Strategic Issues Forum... Why not hash it out there and bring the relevant "alternatives" back here if you seek historic legitimacy and wish to implement military measures? So far the "co-option" suggestions are failing completely; they don't stand up to historic scrutiny, and they commit the cardinal sin of suggesting discarding existing capabilities (the Strike Corps) in a period of extreme uncertainty.

[PratikDas]

I also didn't say anything about "every time they do something"; the Parliament Attacks, the Kaluchak Attacks, the Mumbai Attacks, even any attacks two orders of magnitude higher I would suck up and patiently wait/prepare for many months (indeed I would want to) for the right time/conditions to counter-attack.

Waiting is a mistake. Waiting encourages the super powers and WKK types to portray subsequent Indian action as aggression, not retaliation.

When was the last time India retaliated? We have already declared our nuclear capability as a retaliatory strength, one which we're very unlikely to use. So, if conventional retaliation is leashed as well then what is our perceived strength? We are benign.

If there is a scale for retaliatory urgency, Israel is on one side of the scale representing immediate action and China is on the other side of the scale representing cold, methodical strength buildup leading to intimidation.

India is not even on this scale because we have had no runs on the board since 1971. This isn't because we don't have the strength. This is because all we do is wait. Wait for what, exactly?

[RamaY]

Like ParGha said, we should destroy a section of Pakis in precision strikes every time they do something Paki.

Just to be clear, I did not say anything about "precision strikes"; cluster munitions, HE artillery, fuel-air mix "dumb" bombs and flood-waters can destroy a massed and isolated formation quite well. And I also didn't say anything about "every time they do something"; the Parliament Attacks, the Kaluchak Attacks, the Mumbai Attacks, even any attacks two orders of magnitude higher I would suck up and patiently wait/prepare for many months (indeed I would want to) for the right time/conditions to counter-attack.

The whole purpose of Rajya/State is to be in well-prepared state all the time. Opportunities and threats will not wait for the preparation process. That is the issue. The state is failed as soon as it fails to respond to a threat or an opportunity.

Let us not talk about what we have and what we did not for the past 60 years. There is no level of preparedness that is sufficient. What is the guarantee that a $100t economy results in state preparedness?..

[Rudradev]

IF we accept BK's overarching strategic philosophy that Pakistan does not matter, China is the threat of the present century: then there are serious problems with the value of it. Because any way you game it, you end up with Game Over: China Wins. In fact, we on BRF come up with endless scenarios about a two-front war but we fail to see that from Beijing's perspective, it is better to fight a one-front war against India with the front being on the Pakistan border!

In this regards, India and China are in accord. Even from Indian perspective, a one-front winnable war with Pakistan is preferable to the civilizational-suicide of World War III with India in the fighting center.

Surely you don't expect civilizational suicide and/or offering up one's own territory as the primary battleground, to be high on the list of any nation's strategic imperatives. The point is that China is able to fight India and win without firing a shot on the India-China border, because any India-Pakistan conflict benefits China to some finite and calculable extent while costing them nothing. India does not have that capability with respect to China at this time; though between arming Vietnam, beefing up our presence in the Andamans and of course building up a meaningful nuclear deterrent against China, a balance can be achieved.

China is NOT India's enemy, it is merely the latest in a long line of opportunists who come to exploit India's chronic laziness and irresolution in getting its house (the subcontinent) in order. It can, and will, be dissuaded once India gets its house in order.

I don't disagree with this assertion, except that I can't see any difference between "enemy" and "one who seeks to take advantage of us to exploit our economic/territorial resources." Nations don't become enemies of each other for any other reason than that; ideological differences may be the basis for enmity, but ultimately it has to do with the ideology being a driver for territorial and economic depradation. If Pakistan had no designs on Indian lands, wombs and treasure... why would they be an enemy, however Islamic they might be? It is the fact that Islam authorizes depradation that turns them from something merely distasteful into a threat.

There is no question India needs to get the subcontinent in order, the question is how to proceed.

The primary focus will be on breaking this combine, from the begining to end. Since we don't know WHY they have combined, let us generally say conciliatory gestures, concessions and bribery of appropriate types can be tried on CH to leave PK in the lurch. When it escalates to a shooting war, the first focus will be on isolating a sizable PK formation (plus some) and completely annihilating it - not rendering it combat ineffective, simply totally destroying it. It serves two fold purpose: to tell the PKs that the nature of fighting India has changed, India may or may not win this war but sure as hell there won't be a PK left to feed on the carrion. The second purpose is to implicitly ask the CH if such warfare is acceptable to a nation under One Child Policy. Repeat as necessary.

Not really sure how this is supposed to work. It may be convenient to talk about "isolation" but where on the great rolling plain across the IB is this lone sitting duck of a Pakistani formation supposed to present itself ? Isolating and destroying Pakistani formations in the mountains has not been of any use; we did exactly that in Kargil and what did it solve? The TSPA simply refused to admit ownership of the 4,000 corpses they left behind, and suffered no political consequences for the destruction (because domestically, they are completely teflon-coated with respect to their dismal war record against India).

Meanwhile, what conciliatory gestures and bribes are going to satisfy a PRC that has already made a political decision to go to war... other than a walk-over for their war aims?

I think we need to be a little more clear about this two-front business. A two-front war can happen in one of two ways:

A) Chinese taking advantage of an India-Pakistan conflict to quickly seize territory, most likely in Arunachal Pradesh, and then immediately offering peace terms.
B ) Pakistan taking advantage of an India-China conflict to attempt a grab for Kashmir.

Other scenarios may exist but I can't see that any are realistically likely.

In the first instance, China will act only if it has weighed all the pros and cons and decided that, in order to achieve its territorial goal,an India-Pakistan conflict at a given time is the best and only opportunity it is likely to have. So far, China has never arrived at such a conclusion during any India-Pakistan war. We cannot count on this being the case in future India-Pakistan wars; so it is necessary to build up force levels to an extent that dissuades and deters Beijing completely from even contemplating such adventurism.

The biggest aspect of this is that our 20kT weapons will not deter a China that has far greater numbers of MT weapons... once it has made the decision to prosecute a war for territory against India. An equally large arsenal of MT weapons, and of delivery systems that will assure Beijing and Shanghai of the same fate that will meet Delhi or Bangalore, is the only insurance against this. Otherwise, any scenario of conventional war with China has to be gamed against the backdrop of overwhelming disparities in the mindgame of nuclear deterrence.

In terms of deterring a Chinese military adventure that Beijing calibrates to remain below the nuclear threshold (of course Beijing can attempt something like this, we have planned a CSD against a nuclear-armed state haven't we?) there are other needs that must be met. More mountain divisions and airbases, better infrastructure along the entire India-China border, the capacity to menace Chinese shipping from the A&N and possibly to pen the PLAN into Hainan from Nha Trang. China has to realize that any attempt to seize Indian territory by imposing a "calibrated" military conflict, is doomed to a level of escalation that will cost Beijing more than it ever cares to pay... even if there are no nukes exchanged.

So in both these respects, regarding Scenario A (deterring China from launching any level of military adventure in the event of an India-Pakistan conflict) I think Dr. Karnad's recommendations are right on the money.

Now to the other scenario: Pakistan taking advantage of an India-China conflict to seize Indian territory by military action. I do not think Pakistan is likely to be deterred merely by India's nuclear arsenal in this situation; they have calculated before (and rightly) that invading a nuclear armed India will not provoke New Delhi into invoking a nuclear redline.

In this situation it is an absolute requirement that India maintain a conventional posture on the Western border capable of ripping the TSPA a new one. In this regard I still think Dr. Karnad is wrong, when he speaks of reducing our threat posture against Pakistan; as long as there is a chance of Pakistani military adventurism against India the overwhelming conventional presence has to be sitting on their borders, and if they feel threatened, tough $hit. They SHOULD feel threatened! They have to feel threatened. Nothing else will convince them to refrain from making a grab for Indian territory if a hot war erupts between India and China.

EVEN if we accept Dr. Karnad's thesis that TSPA eventually favours co-option... they will want to ensure co-option on their terms, not as a disadvantaged supplicant. To this end they will want to secure as many political and territorial bargaining chips as possible (at India's expense) so that they can come before India as more of an "equal" when discussing the terms of "co-option." Co-option for the Pakistani means domination, Mughal Empire, disproportionately advantaged separate Islamic electorate... all the stuff Jinnah mooted before opting for partition.

This is NOT a maximalist stance for the Pakis, it is a minimalist stance... the maximalist Zaid Hamid vision is pure fire-and-sword conversion of the entire subcontinent to Islam. All this is too starkly ingrained in their national culture for us to change it merely by adopting a "non-threatening military stance." No, I think the strike corps and CSD should stay exactly where they are, for this reason.

BUT the strike corps and CSD are NOT going to be the tool for getting India's subcontinental house in order... only to deter aggressive action by Pakistan. If we try to use them in an offensive or punitive capacity, we run up against the Pakistan Paradox, as I mentioned in my earlier post. I do not buy the possibility of isolating and destroying one TSPA formation and the Pakis learning any valuable lesson from it; moreoever, whatever we destroy, China and the 3.5 friends will gladly replenish. So even if it were technically possible, I don't see what the strategic advantage would be.

No such paradox; you are inducing self-paralysis through over-analysis. In fact in 1965, Premier Chou En-Lai did recommend Gen Ayub Khan to continue fighting an indefinite Maoist People's War (which the Chinese could have fast supported with first-hand experience {Japanese Occupation of China in WWII and the Chinese Civil War}, and expertise in materials and tactics for such warfare); Gen Ayub Khan flat out refused to fight such a war, and instead chose to sue for peace at Tashkent Conference. The Pakistanis know Pakistanis better than most people, and know how fickle is faith without fear (ask Airavat for historic explanation). The decision to end the war in 1965 was driven by the need to keep it a winnable one-front war (which India did win).

Sorry. Your saying there is "no such paradox", without explaining what fallacies are there in the paradox as I have outlined it, amounts to nothing more than wishful thinking on your part.

The paradox is not over-analytical at all; if anything, it is flawed in the other direction of being too simplistic and reductivist. Let me re-state it again, and please try to criticize it on its own specific demerits rather than getting upset because it is something you would rather not hear.

1) Pakistan Army is the ultimate source of all central authority in Pakistan.
2) Pakistan Army derives this authority by creating and sustaining a Pakistani state, population and national culture which defines itself as anti-India and "not India."
3) Destroying the Pakistan Army leaves India with an untenable, unmanageable, chaotic situation of Pakistani state collapse... where India loses and China wins, across all scenarios.
4) Not destroying the Pakistan Army leaves India with a neighbour that defines itself as anti-India and "not India", and for whom finding ways to harm India is a state policy.

If we do not destroy the Pakistan Army, we concede control of Pakistan to the one institution whose very survival depends on being anti-India. If we destroy the Pakistan Army, we remove the only institution which can possibly prevent a Pakistani collapse that would be disastrous to India.

India's victory in 1965, as you have outlined, is simply further evidence that this paradox exists. India's achievement on that occasion amounted to thwarting Pakistani territorial aggression and restoring the SQAB... and that is exactly what we did. It was a military victory but in strategic terms, a tacit admission that the Pakistan paradox exists.

What if we had not responded to Ayub suing for peace at Tashkent, but pressed on into Lahore? Whether the Pakistanis had collapsed in surrender or continued to fight a "people's war"... or both, with some factions going one way and some the other... India was completely unprepared to handle either outcome. We could deflate Grand Slam and invest Lahore but at the end of the day we gave away even the Haji Pir pass... why?

6 years later, after an even more resounding military victory, we did not even push for a formalized LoC=IB at Simla. Again, why? Is it because as we like to believe, Bhutto was a sly old fox and Indira Gandhi was an innocent babe in the woods to trust him? I mean, seriously? Indira Gandhi, who toured the entire world to establish diplomatic credibility for the '71 war, and called Nixon's USS Enterprise bluff without even blinking? As masterful a powerbroker as India has ever produced... do we believe she was simply hoodwinked by a defeated Bhutto?

Nonsense. It harks back to the 1948 order to 108 brigade to abandon the offensive on Muzzaffarabad and turn north for Kargil... to the decision to pull back from the outskirts of Lahore in 1965. And it finds another echo in the considered decision of the Rajiv Gandhi administration not to press ahead with Brasstacks; and yet again in the decision of Vajpayee not to open another front or salami-slice into the Northern Areas during Kargil... and yet even again, in the decision of the NDA regime not to follow through with the aar-paar-ki-ladai promised during Parakram.

EVERY regime in Indian history has done this, despite our military capacity to beat the tar out of the Pakistan army every damn time. Many, many people have trained themselves to think it is because Indian governments are "cowards" or "too peaceful" or "too sickular" or "too bhola-bhala" or "too WKK".... LOL!

It's nothing to do with any of those things. For my money, it's because of the Pakistan Paradox. It's because, to paraphrase Colonel Jessup... We WANT the Pakistan Army on that wall! We NEED the Pakistan Army on that wall! Because if we climb over that wall and take possession of the house on the other side... guess who gets to clean the toilets

To sum up, my position is that

BK is RIGHT on China, on the need to test and develop a large arsenal of MT nukes, on the need to cultivate Vietnam, on the need to establish a much more robust military posture on the Indo-China border.

BK is WRONG on the need to reduce our "threatening posture" vis a vis Pakistan... they SHOULD feel threatened, otherwise they will attempt a misadventure the moment China attacks India.

BUT, the conventional posture vis a vis Pakistan... at current or even stronger levels... serves no other purpose than deterring a Paki attack. It is great for beating Pakistan Army to a pulp, but useless at achieving a strategic victory over Pakistan when employed in an offensive or punitive role... because the Pakistan Paradox exists.

On the existence of a Pakistan Paradox, and successive Governments of India recognizing its existence when formulating policy over the decades... BK (though he does not call it by that name) is RIGHT again.

[ParGha]

Waiting is a mistake. Waiting encourages the super powers and WKK types to portray subsequent Indian action as aggression, not retaliation. ... This isn't because we don't have the strength. This is because all we do is wait. Wait for what, exactly?

If you cannot dominate the political narrative and keep alive the causus belli for a few months, it does mean that you don't have the strength. Build up that strength first.

Wait for the next winter (snows to block the mountain passes, cool the plains), wait to prepare the civilians, wait to buy extra stocks, wait to fatigue the enemy, wait to boost troops' morale with early pay-raises and short leaves, wait to identify and track enemy targets, wait to encourage dissent/disaffection in the enemy, wait to train sympathetic/useful assets in enemy lands... there are hundreds of season/time specific tasks that need to be carried out just before a successful campaign. Certain preparations are season/time specific; they have to be done just before the campaign starts. For instance, if you train and inject your assets too early, the enemy counter-intel and security forces will simply roll them up; if you wait too late, the assets won't have enough training to be effective.

[vic]

I think we should massively reduce our military posture against Pakistan while "super duper massively" increasing our moral and diplomatic support for various freedom fighter groups in Pakistan