What other options do the Americans have? And I don't have any doubts on the F-35 being the next F-16 in volume
I have mentioned the options a couple of times but some of them are as follows:-
* F-22 Raptor ror F/A-22: - The F-22 raptor program was not gutted out like the F-14, but every tooling, manual, even video tapes of the production process were nicely preserved in an air conditioned facility in California just in case production may need to be revived (Where they still exist, till this day). The USAF boss at the time even advised the producers (all the way down) to absorb as many workers into other projects as possible so as to not loose the expertise. Furthermore, a study was commissioned for future reference that calculated exactly what the costs and timelines would be to revive production based on different numbers. All this cost money, and was carried out as a hedge
*F-16 E/F : - Not talking about the UAE bird but the proper F-16E/F as envisioned in its earlier days. Something that took from the F-16XL and paired it with the F-16 Block 60, 61 innards and brought it up to the current standard (Latest generation avionics). They tried every possible thing with the F-16 to get it to be better, they tested MATV quite well and got it to do things in the AOA that surely got Sprey to pop an artery..In the end, they decided against all those advances including a brand new wing, F-22 "class" avionics, new engines, Multi Axis TVC and what not.
* F-18E/F: - More Super Hornets instead of just more Growlers (An aircraft that the F-35C will never replace due to that mission falling upon the FA-XX fighter). Boeing has presented a very neat and cost affective plan to keep the F-18E/F going for the next decade, changes include engine improvements, stealth coatings, internal weapons pod, a brand new cockpit similar to that of the F-35 etc Boeing and NASA have also tried to put TVC on the F-18 family and that could be a legitimate option (not that it would help much)
* F-15E : - Production line is ongoing and orders have come from the ROKAF, Singpore and Saudi Arabia. The Silent eagle upgrade combines FBW (already in SA birds), new radar, stealth pods and an integrated EW suite. Even on the F-15 front DARPA, NASA and the USAF tried a lot of stuff that could have gone into the upgrades. Things like Thrust vectoring, Canards etc. Again traded off for the F-35.
The problem with that list is that that the F-35 A, and C are better at almost all overall comparisons with any one platform mentioned above. The Alpha and Charlie have better points in affordability, sustainability, performance, lethality, survivability and force integration and are an overall purchase then any single one or a combination of 2 or 3 mentioned above. The B has no substitute among the list.
What the pilots seem to be saying actually supports that! The warplanners and the ones responsible for charting out future readiness actually openly talk about the enormous advantages of having fleet wide commonality in avionics, sensors (not just similar gen sensors but same exact sensors) and the tactical ability to learn best practices for LCC management through the eyes what the others are doing. The Marines have led from the front, with their maintenance and LCC changes now being incorporated int he USAF and the USN as well. I have posted the article that talks about this in-depth. Not only is the F-35 superior as an overall system compared to any one or a combination of the fighters above, it brings an element of integration that would almost never would be possible with 2 or three stand alone fighters - as one can see how much capability gap exists in certain areas between the USAF and USN because one service did not bother to incorporate technology due to a cost trade off (PGM for USN and weapons modernization (missiles) for the USAF). This all goes away now that everything is developed for everyone.
in spite of all the problems of compacting everything into a common airframe
Problems of compacting? I don't see any problem with that. Care to elaborate? My thesis (not literally) on the F-35 is still a WIP but if I were to narrow down on one problem with the program I would characterize it as an extension of the F-22 program in that the developers were slow to adapt to the emergence of a new paradigm in combat aircraft design, that of software just as their counterparts back in the day were late to adapt to the change in the strict performance and tolerance limits on "jet engines" precision tooling that heralded the jet age etc (we can go on and on discussing examples of how new changes in the aviation world were disruptive).
Software is very much now a vital new component in combat aircraft design, as much as shaping, aerodynamics, materials etc are. In fact those costs and timelines are largely fixed whereas software continues to be a very variable commodity and would remain so in modeling for at least another generation before very smart folks figure out how to account for it and manage it just as they got on top of the other things in aviation. The challenges associated with the development can largely be clubbed under the greater "software" category as it enables the sort of interactions that are required for the sensors as a group to perform way higher then their individual capabilities summed together. In fact, software is very close to bandwidth, and the entire idea that the moment you get on top of things (as in supple of bandwidth to the warfighter equals demand) they begin to ask even more than before. Then comes the problem of "distrust" between the operator and the political class, which resulted in the USAF completely doing away with the Kelly's trusted interpretation of Pareto's famous work and asking for capability upfront that they feared would be slowly eroded if asked as incremental improvements. This is an institutional problem, that wasn't exaggerated in any way by doing a joint system. If at all doing so probably challenged them to do things differently given the scale.
The culturual shift required to factor in is going to always be slow for an organization the size of the Pentagon. They know of the problem, and have since started working with DARPA a lot earlier to get software right. The problem with the F-22 and F-35 was not that the software was too complicated to work out, it was a budgeting issue where neither the Vendor (Lockheed, Northrop etc) nor the operator (Pentagon, USAF, USN, USMC etc) could model how long it would take to develop and debug the sort of software required to run some of the stuff they wanted to do with the avionics architecture. They learnt pretty hard that software does not scale like some other parameters. Ultimately, Lockheed lost money, DOD lost some money through the delays but that has absolutely nothing to do with this being a joint program. Any other fighter that would progressed from the F-22, be it a Naval fighter or a CTOL fighter would have run into the same institutional trouble that usually accompanies a first_in_class product. I can speak of experience on how some of these companies are changing..Lockheed for example has been and still is great at analytics and running data. They however went into the F-22 and F-35 programs thinking that they could get contractors to come in for a few years and deal with the software buildup that would happen with time. They got burnt, and incipiently neither DARPA, the DOD or anyone else saw that this was going to be problematic.
I can speak till around 2010'ish when they were pretty much still growing the number of software engineers by 30-40% per annum. It is very difficult to guarantee a timeline and consistency of work when you have to grow so rapidly . If you look what all the big 3 have done is they have essentially now started working and thinking like a software company, and are on the lookout for acquiring full fledged software companies (Alton Remig spoke of this just a few months back). No doubt in the future they would be better off at tackling large software projects that will keep on getting more and more complex but as a position" for the Long Range Strike Bomber I know certainly Boeing and Northrop have added a lot to their software development portfolio. Lockheed was forced to do so through their F-22 and F-35 troubles. Another BIG area of concern is attracting talent. Currently they are looking at the lower end IT crowd for recruitment. Only their analytical and big data projects attract the brightest minds. At the lower ranks this is not a big concern, but a management level position, especially when you want to run decent sized teams (critical) it is getting hard for the Lockheeds to atract compared to other businesses that also attract software engineers (I am not even getting into the google's and apple's of the world). The software folks do not see this is as a company that will propel them vertically so they see the ceiling as rather fixed. There is also a matter of budgeting, their profits (defense contractors) are capped, while private software companies are fiercely competitive even outside of California.
Alton Remig in fact was very open about this, he said that you get a half a dozen skunks in the room and given them a 6 month project for an advanced combat aircraft and they'll deliver on a prototype that will eventually meet 8 out of 10 KPP's without any significant post-testing design change. But software doesn't work that way YET. You can't say that I had X number of sensors and Y number of software lines to write for the F-22 and I'll need This much for the F-35 because X1 is a multiple of X and Y1 is a multiple of Y. The complexity apparently adds a dimension that they cannot scale up from development of a previous example they worked on. This apparently is the weakest link in modeling (and this isn't OEM specific or organization specific) and therefore there have been and will continue to be programs that take a hit because someone somewhere grossly underestimated the complexity of delivering all this capability by so and so date. Over time they get a pretty good idea of how its done..
The role of air dominance was thrusted upon the F-35 very late into the development cycle when the F-22 production was discontinued. The F-35's airframe was not designed for this.
That is quite incorrect. It wasn't that they said " Oh we'll do xyz mission with the F-22 and we'll just do strike with the F-35" and then Catastrophe happened and the f-22's were cut and they still carried on. The mission set is a continuation of the F-16 and F-18 Mission set, both of which have an air superiority component as part of their multi role capability. For the Marines the F-35B on one part replaces their primary AIR SUPERIORITY fighter. The Air Combat Command of the USAF always intended to have a mix F-35's and F-22's as part of its AEF from the very get go. This was before the contract was awarded and vendor down selected. The importance to the OEM's of this was significant, they recruited direct retirees from the ACC to a point that the person who could be called one of the architects of the entire Avionics package including the HMD , EODAS and the ICP architecture was in fact a very senior fighter pilot at the ACC before going private. His last job incidently for the USAF was to write a basic set of requirements of how to integrate the Next generation fighter (which became the JSF) into the Air Combat Command, alongside the F-15's and F-22's that it intended to operate for many years.
Frankly, because it got so many brickbats for not exceeding its predecessors kinematically, the criticism took on a life of their own and its performance issues have ended up being exaggerated quite a bit. There are just two major issues with the aircraft AFAIK - sustained G-limit and transonic acceleration. Both important downsides I'll concede (though its high AoA performance is still superb; 50 deg limit vs 32 deg for the Rafale).
And those have been discussed in-depth, coupled with actual pilot quotes that the F-35A is superior to the F-16 in most performance measures especially where the F-16 shines (acceleration) and once you start piling a realistic fuel load the performance goes down really fast. The rafale is not a stealth fighter, as such the F-35 would enjoy kinematic freedom all the way till the detection range. Thats one gap that non-stealth aircraft will find very tough to narrow down especially when you have the best passive suite onboard a fighter to maintain EMCON. Get up close and you are forced to deal with the EODAS+EMD combination and no one is going to be very happy to face that no matter what he is flying.
Like I mentioned a couple of pages ago
(through a PDF of strike fighter comparison) the F-35 has been designed for a mission set (be it strike, CAP, CAS etc) where the F-16 really performs poorly due to it being a light fighter bulked up to act as a medium-long range fighter. Pile in tanks, weapons and other things (jammers, pods etc) and you don't have Boyd's shining zippy fighter that can compete with the best in hot rod acceleration or sustained turn performance. The F-35 on the other hand, has been designed for a mission range that falls in between of the Block50 F-16 and the F-15E and in some instances, and under some parameters the F-35A_clean outranges the F-15E clean. Again, look at the profiles the F-16, rafale etc have been flying in Africa and the Middle East, they don't fight clean whereas the F-35 will since they have enough internal range as per the requirement to not even bother integrating EFT's to it for now. So any comparison with sustained performance has to keep in mind that the affect of a "mission requirement" will be significantly greater on the F-16 and Rafale than it would be on the F-35. For the F-35 it would just be a weight difference, for them it would be a lot more weight and a lot lot more drag with tanks and weapons.