JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

[Viv S]

Can we buy from China then? it would be cost effective and then improve upon it??

Sure.

[brar_w]

That they are struggling to deliver the jets on time (missing delivery dates) is not an opinion but a matter of record. That the ramp up is widely believed to be a challenge is also well recognized by those that have the chance to comment on the entire program from time to time.

The rest is just be being cautious. Let Lockheed demonstrate that they can begin to deliver the jets on time, and continue to do so while they built up the production rate. Let them hit 2X in 3 years, on time before we think of adding 34 jets to another significant growth (2x to 3x in 2 years) chart.

[chaanakya]

Can we buy from China then? it would be cost effective and then improve upon it??

Sure.

Well then it is settled. Amicably

[Viv S]

That they are struggling to deliver the jets on time (missing delivery dates) is not an opinion but a matter of record. That the ramp up is widely believed to be a challenge is also well recognized by those that have the chance to comment on the entire program from time to time.

That they missed deadlines earlier is a fact. That they met deadlines last year is a fact. That they'll miss deadlines in the coming years is an opinion.

The rest is just be being cautious. Let Lockheed demonstrate that they can begin to deliver the jets on time, and continue to do so while they built up the production rate. Let them hit 2X in 3 years, on time before we think of adding 34 jets to another significant growth (2x to 3x in 2 years) chart.

As far as the current debate is concerned,point is India can get them in the same timeframe. The path taken by the DoD and JPO to make that happen is a different matter.

[Viv S]

Well then it is settled. Amicably

Absolutely.

[brar_w]

That they missed deadlines earlier is a fact. That they met deadlines last year is a fact

They missed the contractual delivery dates for each and every jet last year. Since production started they haven't delivered an F-35 on the contracted date. They did manage to squeeze in all the jets that they intended to produce in 2014, but the delivery is actually measured in terms of what they are contracted to deliver (specific dates as to when the jet goes into assembly, how it meets milestones while in assembly and when it rolls out and when it is ultimately delivered to the customer and is accepted at the check out) and not " just get us X by the year end" - While this is of some value, the actual measurement is more precise when it comes to meeting delivery dates, and they go down to TOS (production) levels for LHM (Line Health Management) purposes. The JPO has actually a very similar process to Commercial Airliner deliveries and production tracking with bi-monthly reviews of each and every jet on the line that LMA must send to the JPO and QC measures that must be recorded a few times a week (lost parts, parts used, parts shelved, count errors, re-tooling, shifts/aircraft etc etc). The Program is very much interested in how the jet is produced, and how the production "train" tracks to the schedule that the program has built for each and every jet (when the parts come form the suppliers, how that is recorded, how concurrency changes are conducted, how faulty parts are rectified etc) so the claim " we can work overtime, cut down vacation days and squeeze a delivery right before christmas" isn't the specific "health" they are looking for. Hence, they keep pushing the suppliers (ultimately LMA and P&W) to meet the schedule that the Program has set out for them and until now (its been what 4 years) they haven't yet met the schedule.

Even how much time each jet spends on each station is tracked and has a penalty, and reward associated with it. Lockheed claims that the First Aircraft (F-35) to meet contractual delivery schedule could be one of the jets in 2015. Lets wait and see if the curves merge in 2015 or not. They better because there is significant ramp up scheduled for the next 3 blocks and Lockheed must eat into the gap before it picks up the pace.



All these comparisons, benchmarking and milestones are critically important because this is what the JPO, Customers, GAO etc use to see how healthy the program is, how ambitious the ramp is and whether the risk built into it is manageable etc. This is also there so that stresses in the production chain can be identified and dealt with in a timely manner as the program ramps up - and in determining whether it can successfully ramp, and if so how much room to grow exists. This is independent of what the OEM may promise or propose as a growth roadmap.

I'll say again, SDD software is a fairly well understood problem. The real challenge with this program is the RAMP rates and ramping up the supplier train in a smooth manner - This will be a source of many headaches in the coming few years.

That they'll miss deadlines in the coming years is an opinion.

I never said that they'll miss deadlines as a whole but there surely will be delays in delivery as we can see even now with a relatively modest production (every other) rate.

I said if they manage to get there it would be a huge accomplishment as the challenge is quite REAL and well recognized. Put that down as an opinion, and lets re-visit the entire "HEALTH OF THE RAMP EFFORT" debate when we actually get to the bridge. Let them demonstrate a capability to successfully manage a sizable and challenging ramp rate before piling more aircraft delivery slots into the system.

The JPO is going to be well aware of the overly ambitious aerospace ramp efforts of the 90's and early to mid 2000's and so are Lockheed. Hitting Ramp targets on a program this scale (We are talking about wide body production rates if not more) is a huge challenge and they will not be foolish to go and start promising additional delivery slots without meeting some of these ramp targets first. They are obviously not going to print a document saying this for obvious reason (because no one has asked for this )

[brar_w]

[Austin]

Norwegian F16 pilot comparing AA capabilities between F35 and F16 ( via mp.net )

Pierre Spey and other critics have pointed out that the F-35 is not as fast or maneuverable as modern Russian fighter. In a previous section I argued that the performance of the F-16 at air display is theoretical and not available in a war situation. Combat aircraft like the F-16 carries the load outside. This reduces the practical range, speed, maneuverability and maximum altitude.

With the F-35, we get more of all this, compared to what we are used to today. To discover how much more was a positive surprise for me. With a full war load F-35 effortlessly operates 10,000 to 15,000 feet higher than our F-16 can, without using afterburner. The cruisespeed is 50 to 80 knots higher. In the F-16, I must use afterburner to get high speed before a missile shot.

"Combat radius" for the F-35 is between 30% and 70% longer than we get to F-16.

In daily training between our F-16, and in meeting with our allies, we experience in practice what radar signature and electronic cm means. Our old F-16 is "slim" on radar and are detected late, compared to other modern fighter aircraft. We also notice the effect of external load; the heaviest loaded planes are detected at the furthest distance because the external load increases radar signature. I therefore claim that it is unrealistic to assume that two fighter discovers each other simultaneously, although the sensors basically are equally good. The effect of radar signature and electronic cm are great.

My point with this post was to show that many variables affect the outcome of the dogfight. The situation is rarely black and white. One of the most diffuse might be the skill of the individual pilot. I am often surprised when I read cocksure posts in newspapers and comment fields. Common to many such posts is a "digital" interpretation of performance data. A speed XY, B rate YY = A is best, period.

Full post in norwegian
http://blogg.regjeringen.no/kampfly/201 ... #more-1050

[TSJones]

If a plane must be able to perform amazing aerial displays of maneuverability and utmost speed then the pilot is in a lot of danger and a heap of potential trouble. The pilot does NOT want to get into that situation if he can help it in a dog fight. Does the pilot want superior aerial position in a dog fight? Absolutely. But the pilot can achieve that result not through a single magic maneuver but through a combination of a clean air frame, extremely small RCS, enhanced coordinated weaponry and aerial "awareness" given by superior electronics. It does help to also have some maneuverability and speed and I think the F-35 has it. It's not a slow guppy the way it has been made out to be. Is it top most in speed and gymnastics? Well, no, but it's a combination of factors that makes the F-35 deadly.

[Singha]

With a full war load F-35 effortlessly operates 10,000 to 15,000 feet higher than our F-16 can, without using afterburner. The cruisespeed is 50 to 80 knots higher. In the F-16, I must use afterburner to get high speed before a missile shot.
"Combat radius" for the F-35 is between 30% and 70% longer than we get to F-16.
---

to me the first line itself is the game changer right there against older fighters. the no need to use afterburners and much higher combat radius are icing on cake. it looks like fat frog but I guess the internal weapons and massive reserve power & fuel efficiency of the engine help.

I think it should be able to out accelerate any old fighter carrying external weapons also in a contest to see who reaches 0 -> mach1.5 faster.

as the "king" of fighter engines, fighter radars and EW gear the US has the unquestioned pole position in delivering results.

[Austin]

They are comparing it to F-16 , comparing to more modern 4th Gen Peers like EF , Su-35 , Gripen or Rafale would be interesting.

I remember US has DACT/BFM with Eurofighter with F-22 but both are tight lipped about the result.

[Viv S]

They are comparing it to F-16 , comparing to more modern 4th Gen Peers like EF , Su-35 , Gripen or Rafale would be interesting.

Aerodynamically it was designed to have the acceleration of the F-16 and high AoA performance of the F-18. Although, in a combat configuration, it wouldn't be a slouch vs the Eurocanards either.

I remember US has DACT/BFM with Eurofighter with F-22 but both are tight lipped about the result.

I wouldn't call them tight lipped exactly. The Germans were rather public with their claims of giving better than they got, with the Americans responding by saying they remembered it differently. In any case, the salient point is the EFs were slicked off (no pylons, no weapons) while the F-22s could have packed in as many as 8 missiles with minimal loss in performance.

[brar_w]

They are comparing it to F-16 , comparing to more modern 4th Gen Peers like EF , Su-35 , Gripen or Rafale would be interesting

They are comparing the aircraft they fly to the aircraft they are going to fly. And if you want to compare the F-35 to other comparable medium, multi role fighter the best aircraft to compare it to would be the Super Hornet, F-16 Block 50/52/60, Dassault Rafale, Mig-29/35 and now the Typhoon etc Basically aircraft that are multi role (giving the Typhoon the benefit of the doubt now that they are finally adding stuff to it) and in the 20-30K pounds empty range (Cutting the Super Hornet some slack and using the F-35A as an example, since it is the most widely produced F-35). The F-22A, Su-35, and PAKFA are all 40,000 Pounds or over so really in the "heavy" class. We can compare provided we use comparable data to measure (very hard to find). Do keep in mind that the F-16 block 60 when minimally loaded without many bombs, missiles or EFT's will give any of those above mentioned medium fighters a run for their money in things like Transonic acceleration and sustained turning. The thing is a rocket when clean when it comes to zipping through the Transonic regime even when compared to an aircraft like the Raptor. A clean F-16C will most likely be very comparable to the F-22A (combat configured) in getting to say mach 1.3 or so. Its HOT ROD performance however takes a considerable hit when it begins to be configured as a MEDIUM SIZED combat aircraft. The current Operator-Realities demand this configuration from the F-16 and its primary user has absolutely NO USE for it in its LWF configuration.

As the video mentions, the F-35 takes the two best qualities of the F-16 (acceleration) and F-18 (High AOA and low speed handling). The F-35 will likely be inferior to the F-16 at lower than 15K feet (even the Typhoon struggles against the Viper at those altitudes) and at par or superior to it above 20K feet. It should be superior to the Super Hornet in most regimes both slow and fast.

One has to remember that the F-35 carries STEALTH all the time. Stealth aircraft need larger internal payloads and larger internal fuel. So the F-35A has 18,500 odd pounds of fuel (more than 3X the internal fuel of the F-16 and more than 70% compared to the Rafale for example) and the F-35C has 20,000 pounds of internal fuel. You would not need that much fuel for a lot many missions. So if you look at the KPPs for the F-35A for example it carries 4000 pounds of Bombs (actually more since the 2000 pounders come with some added weight for pylons) and 2 missiles along with between 9000 and 10,000 pounds of fuel. If you want to compare for purely A2A missions you have to subtract some 4000 pounds from the F-35A and load it with mission relevant fuel and then you will see how it runs circles around the aircraft it replaces.

Comparing the F-35 to the F-22A (the best supercruise performer currently operational) you will find that as per the KPP's, the F-35 gets from Mach .8 to Mach 1.2 in 55 seconds * with a 2 x 2000 lb bomb + 2x Aim-120C + 9000 - 10000 pounds of fuel load. The F-22A with 6 x Aim-120C + 2 X Aim9 load gets to around mach 1.5 in the same time-frame with 9000 pounds of internal.

Now if one were to shed the 4000+ pounds of bombs and add a couple of more missiles internally you will probably improve on the acceleration of the F-35 by a fairly decent amount (basic physics). So in the same timeframe it would not be an unreasonable thing to claim that the F-22 does around .2 to .25 mach (around 15-20%) better when compared to the F-35 with internal missiles only.

As you can see the F-35 trades some performance for both affordability and outright range when compared to the brute in the RAPTOR. But when both aircraft loaded with 9000 lb of fuel, the F-35 will go farther or loiter longer than the F-22A. Where the F-22A obviously begins to widen the gap is when you talk about Mach 1.5+ perfmrnace with the raptor being a mach 1.76 super cruiser. But then again, the raptor trades range in order to get that level of performance (not to mention affordability). The increased range and loiter requirement comes due to the "multi-role" burden because typical Air to Ground missions require that, when compared to the A2A mission that assumes at most a 10 Minute combat engagement. The F-35 is a multi-role aircraft, while the F-22A has been designed with a "Not a pound for Air to Ground" mentality. The F-135 differs from the F-119 (on which it is based) in that it is really designed to provide the F-35 with the sort of loiter required for missions such as CAS..

* There was an 8 second addition to the KPP, so the F-35A takes a bit longer to get to mach 1.2, or you could look at it as that it gets to say mach 1.15 in 55 seconds but that is tactically a very insignificant difference and with he 5% propulsion advancement being tested by the Navy it is fairly safe to assume that that performance will be added relatively shortly to the program.

It has been claimed here before that the F-35 "could have been" a Mini F-22 (requirements can go to hell ) if it weren't for the commonality requirements. With the level of performance delivered i.e close to mach 1.3 in the same time the Raptor gets to say mach 1.5 or mach 1.52 it essentially acts as a MINI F-22. The F-35 could have gotten even better performance but you would have had to relax the range requirement (hence choose a bypass ratio closer to the F-119) and gone without the internal payload requirement (no 2000 lb bomb carriage capability) or kept both and cancelled the affordability challenge and gone in for 2 engines and all the logistical and "transport" bill that comes with lugging extra engines around the world. The top speed (mach 1.6) is a trade off for PRICE as they calculated both the "cost to supercruise" and the cost to reach mach 1.8 or mach 2.0 early on and deemed it too much of a sacrifice. Individual academic assessment by US officers (publication) have pegged that cost per jet to be as much as 60 Million per jet. But the bottom line still is that the F-35A reaches its top speed with a full internal load, including 2 very large 2000 pound bombs, while in a similar fuel state, and weapons load the aircraft that the F-35A replaces would struggle to even go supersonic for any decent amount of time let alone mach 1.6.

The problem begins when folks demand that a combat configured F-35 (which it almost always is given its internal bays and large internal fuel carriage) must have -

- The Acceleration of a Clean F-16C (which the F-22A would do well to match)
- The AOA performance of the F-22A
- Supercruise of an F-22A
- The Range of an F-15E flying the H-H-L mission
- and the Loiter of the A-10

Oh and keep the cost under that of the Raptor Please

Not realizing how absurd all this is and what the cost would be to get all of this (Not to mention that it would be next to impossible to still get all of this in even if you had 40 years to develop a fighter). They also do not mention that no fighter at the moment in this category has all those features combined and for some very good reason! They may as well start demanding that the US develop the City Destroyer

With a full war load F-35 effortlessly operates 10,000 to 15,000 feet higher than our F-16 can, without using afterburner. The cruisespeed is 50 to 80 knots higher. In the F-16, I must use afterburner to get high speed before a missile shot.
"Combat radius" for the F-35 is between 30% and 70% longer than we get to F-16.
---

to me the first line itself is the game changer right there against older fighters. the no need to use afterburners and much higher combat radius are icing on cake. it looks like fat frog but I guess the internal weapons and massive reserve power & fuel efficiency of the engine help.

I think it should be able to out accelerate any old fighter carrying external weapons also in a contest to see who reaches 0 -> mach1.5 faster.

as the "king" of fighter engines, fighter radars and EW gear the US has the unquestioned pole position in delivering results.

The F-35 has been designed around the mission set that the aircraft such as the F-16, F/A-18 perform for their respective users. The mission is a lot different from when say the F-16 was designed, and the F/A-18 has grown to become something that is a lot different from the design that was proposed for the LWF requirement. The F-35 responds to the realities of greater range, greater/range payload and the best way to survive against double digit SAM's, and all other threats (YES including VHF/UHF radars) that are likely to come up against future tactical aircrafts.

The performance requirements have obviously changed due to the changing in weapons, the amount of SA currently possible and the sort of cooperative engagements that it is capable of. It is likely to be at par or slightly below the F-16 in sustained performance (again it bridges the gap rather quickly when you start to consider ""REAL WORLD" mission demands such as those for range/payload and TOS) but will be miles ahead of it in high AOA performance ( 50 degree limiter with 100+ degrees AOA performance demonstrated during testing). Compared to the F-18E/F (Super Hornet) it is going to be faster, with better turn performance in all regimes of combat (Low and Slow or High and Fast). Yet it does that while taking and building up on some of the best features of the F-22A. Features such as Stealth (which has been claimed by top Brass at the Air Combat Command - to be superior to that on the F-22A) and Sensor Fusion (Many times more code than the F-22A and F-18E/F - the most modern US designed aircraft atm). All in all the attempt is/was to bring in a collection of features that would considerably enhance the mission capability of the large Multi-Role fighter force in the USAF, and NATO allies and that was/is the ultimate goal of the program - How Best to replace the F-16's and F/A-18's and what sort of capability should those aircraft (that replace the legacy fleet) possess.

[Philip]

From the Dutch JSF news site.

http://www.jsfnieuws.nl/

F-35 design problems: list of high priority modifications………..
Gepubliceerd door JSFNieuws.nl onder Aanschaf JSF, Ontwikkeling JSF

Do you want to know the plain truth about the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter?
Don’t you like believing F-35 crtitcal journalists?
Do you prefer optimistic US generals?
Or the industry public relations machine?
Or do you like the honey-sweet words of the politicians, with their own agenda?

Read from the REAL world, a summary of the inconvenient truth about the F35 Joint Strike Fighter design problems. An official US Department of Defense document (5 Mb download, see page 215-230) is telling you the real story in an overview of about 230 high-priority modifications………… How many pages is the list of low-priority (design) problems?
And what about Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2016? And the taxpayers in Australia, The Netherlands, Norway, Italy, UK, are they paying the modifications of their AirForces F-35s?

Planned Modification costs US Air Force onl during FY2014-Fy2019:
- Modification of in-service F-35A CTOL aircraft USAF: US$ 1.389.368 million (1.39 billion)
Total delivered F-35As USAF about 100 units, this means modification costs amount US$ 13 million/aircraft.

The list in the orginal US DOD document:

Description:

This effort (MN-F3516) funds retrofits due to concurrency changes to correct deficiencies discovered after DD-250 of the last aircraft in a given Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) lot. This includes modifications required to extend aircraft service life currently limited by low-life parts, and relieve capability limitations driven by concurrency of production with development. The concurrency funding line will procure the highest priority modifications from the Tri-Service Modification Prioritization List, as soon as they become supportable from an engineering, production, and installation standpoint. The list is vetted by the Services and Partners every 6 months to ensure the list accurately reflects existing requirements as well as emerging issues. Per-kit costs will vary for each modification being implemented, and in some cases will also vary for aircraft from different LRIP lots to implement an individual modification. For FY16, the highest priority modifications will directly support USAF IOC, Block 3i, and tactics development. The following modifications will be the highest priorities for accomplishment throughout the F-35A CTOL fleet using funds from this Budget Activity.

TI Number Mod CR Title
TI-0000-1089 CR-021694 LRIP 3 Aux Air Inlet (AAI) Door Install
TI-0000-1324 CR-022656 Structural Cracking of Aft MLG Door Drive Link U-Joint
TI-0000-0116 CR-011738B Full Qualified Clutch Cooling Fan
TI-0000-0367 CR-014114C Engine Trailer Adapter Kit - FS556 Interface, J27006/J27007
TI-0000-0121 CR-014289B Lift Fan Exhaust/Inboard Weapon Bay Door Interference
TI-0000-0396 CR-014289C WBDD Limit Life, ECU
TI-0000-0655 CR-014819D EO DAS Center Fuselage Vibration Testing
TI-0000-0373 CR-015026B Aux Air Inlet Lock Actuation Mechanism
TI-0000-0423 CR-016270C Bleed Air System Ducting Design
TI-0000-0099 CR-017502 J75503 Wrap Around Adapter Set
TI-0000-0683 CR-017534&B Rev-HT Bearing Issues
TI-0000-0463 CR-017913B Support-Fairing, Mid, LH/RH
TI-0000-0058 CR-018274 Back-Up Radio Tray Clearance
TI-0000-0968 CR-018524 Material Removal Allowance for IPP Blocker and Screen
TI-0000-0027 CR-018524A IPP Exhaust (STOVL)
TI-0000-0138 CR-018564B Wingtip Light Improvement For FAA Compliance
TI-0000-0825 CR-022768D LEF Improvements
TI-0000-0031 CR-018835 Nose Wheel Steering (NWS) Motor
TI-0000-0015 CR-018836 Stress Failure of Hydraulic Tube Support Bracket
TI-0000-0063 CR-018838A Bootstrap Accumulator Redesign
TI-0000-0045 CR-019003 CTOL/STOVL MLG SDD & LRIP Part Number Rolls
TI-0000-0056 CR-019004B IPP Controller Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0057 CR-019005 STOVL GO3 Control Valve Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0117 CR-019107 CTOL Trestle Inst Cotter Pin
TI-0000-0165 CR-019135B R3 Float Valve with Mechanical Thread Locking
TI-0000-0231 CR-019340B PTMS EHA Cooling Orifices - CTOL & STOVL
TI-0000-0101 CR-023102A Lift Fan Inlet Door Full Qualification Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0245 CR-019469C Antenna Switch Unit
TI-0000-0264 CR-019516A PTMS Controller
TI-0000-0124 CR-019533 Controller, Motor Pump Qual Failure (GMMP)
TI-0000-0561 CR-019683E STOVL FS 496 Bulkhead Trunnion
TI-0000-0280 CR-019841 Cockpit Panels Pushbutton Switch Simultaneity
TI-0000-0398 CR-019930C Arresting Hook Aft Door Spring Damper Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0375 CR-019979 STOVL IRCM Doors Bushing to Lug Interference
TI-0000-0208 CR-020003A CTOL Arresting Gear Push Rods
TI-0000-0424 CR-020066A Firewall Shutoff Valve Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0477 CR-020097A CTOL EHAS Panels
TI-0000-0875 CR-020189 CV Main Landing Gear Retract Actuator
TI-0000-0130 CR-020289 Emergency Control Valve Qual Failure
TI-0000-0575 CR-020289A ULF & 3BSD Emergency Control Valve
TI-0000-0608 CR-020396D Fwd Upper Engine Mount (CTOL)
TI-0000-0456 CR-020396D Bulkhead - FS 450
TI-0000-0457 CR-020396D Bulkhead - FS 472
TI-0000-0458 CR-020396D Bulkhead - FS 518 (Upper)
TI-0000-0460 CR-020396D Bulkhead - FS 556
TI-0000-0432 CR-020397A Short Life - CTOL Wing Forward Root Rib
TI-0000-0602 CR-020398A Brake Control Unit (BCU)
TI-0000-0538 CR-020593 EHA Flaperon Support Equipment Locations
TI-0000-0363 CR-020636A TRS Component Changes from Qual Test Failures
TI-0000-0412 CR-020680B Wing Lighting Controller Salt Fog Failure
TI-0000-0331 CR-020725 WBDDS RGAs Limited Life - Change Request Approval
TI-0000-0654 CR-020726A IDMS Connector Ref Des Swap
TI-0000-0673 CR-020743B Ordnance Quick Latch System (OQLS) Clip Lock
TI-0000-0137 CR-020793 Pump, Motor GND Maint Qual Failure
TI-0000-0132 CR-020907B Valve, Mechanical Sequence - T Qual Failure
TI-0000-0811 CR-021167A 2WSH54239: CV Rear Spar
TI-0000-0810 CR-021168 2WSH64241: CV Frame
TI-0000-0817 CR-021170 2WSH44162: CV RH Tail Hook Longeron
TI-0000-0631 CR-021180 Countermeasures Doors & NNMSB/WSESRB Concerns
TI-0000-0263 CR-021181 Power Panel 1, 2, 3
TI-0000-0544 CR-021194 Limited Life STOVL Mid Fairing Longeron
TI-0000-0558 CR-021194 Short Life Parts: Keel Beam RH
TI-0000-0559 CR-021194 Short Life Parts: NLG Drag Brace Ftg
TI-0000-0566 CR-021194 Short Life Parts: Support, Otbd, FS 502.65 LH/RH
TI-0000-0617 CR-021194 Limited Life STOVL STA 3/9 Aft Rib
TI-0000-0545 CR-021217 Limited Life STOVL Nacelle Vent Inlet
TI-0000-0564 CR-021217 STOVL Forward Root Rib (L6/U6)
TI-0000-0808 CR-021259 Weapons Bay Door Uplock Sealing
TI-0000-0098 CR-022768D CTOL Nose Landing Gear
TI-0000-0910 CR-021395A PCD EU Cooling Rework
TI-0000-0607 CR-021434 Limited Life CTOL STA 3/9 Aft Rib
TI-0000-0135 CR-021459B Engine Driven Pump Life Limit
TI-0000-0895 CR-021557A Arm Disable Current Leakage Path Correction
TI-0000-0848 CR-021621 2CSH20930 Splice, Fuel Floor/Root Rib, FS 402, RHS/LHS
TI-0000-0377 CR-021694 Aux Air Inlet Door Redesign
TI-0000-0845 CR-021891 CV VT Aft Moment Fitting Life Limited Structures Part
TI-0000-0626 CR-021905A SMSFRIU SDD/LRIP Arm Disable Input
TI-0000-0998 CR-021915B CTOL and CV Refuel System Mod
TI-0000-0897 CR-022058 Roll Control Nozzle Door Redesign
TI-0000-0495 CR-022105F OBIGGS & Pressure/Vent Changes for Lightning Protection
TI-0000-0133 CR-022196A Filter Module, Pressure Qual Failure
TI-0000-1011 CR-022226A L-Band Pre-Selector (LBPS) Calibration for Mode 5
TI-0000-0802 CR-022695 CTOL Main Landing Gear

TI-0000-0703 CR-022515A Roll Post Door Actuator Life Limitation
TI-0000-1101 CR-022647A GMMP Controller EEE outage
TI-0000-1092 CR-022666 Landing Taxi Light Redesign
TI-0000-0119 CR-022736 MWARS Replacement
TI-0000-0866 TBD Production Ejection Seat (-0023) TI-0000-1099 CR-022841B ATQA Mounting Bolt Interface
TI-0000-0064 CR-022872 Counter Measures Door Control Valve on AF:6
TI-0000-0158 CR-022877 WBDD Flexible Cable Re-design
TI-0000-0191 CR-024623 270V BCCU
TI-0000-0574 CR-023121B/D Electronics Units Modifications
TI-0000-1485 CR-023282CA F1 Feed Tank Gasket
TI-0000-1540 CR-023332A CV Rudder Hinge 2
TI-0000-1372 CR-023355D EW Block-2 DRFM Module Firmware Issue
TI-0000-1652 CR-023599 Rudder Slider Hinge Wear
TI-0000-1654 CR-023712 CV Right Hand (RH) Center Fuselage Avionics Bay Floor
TI-0000-2548 CR-023712 CV Center Fuselage FS 402 Outboard Joint Limited Life
TI-0000-2551 CR-024031 L-Band Power Amplifier (LBPA) Update for LINK-16
TI-0000-1709 CR-024114 Carrier Variant Marker Beacon Antenna
TI-0000-2513 CR-024153 CV IPP Shear Web Limited Life
TI-0000-1207 CR-024162 Vehicle Management Computer (VMC) Electrical Connection Issue
TI-0000-0441 CR-20773A CTOL FS 594 Centre Arch Low Life
TI-0000-1549 CR-023540A Firmware Update for AMS Cartridge Reset SPAR
TI-0000-0405 CR-23769 EDU Random Vibration Failures
TI-0000-0702 CR-24090 CV Fwd Arresting Gear Door Actuator Life Limitation
TI-0000-2554 CR-24872 J84001 Fiber Optic Inspection Set Extension Handle DR?s
TI-0000-0122 TBD 28V Battery and Charger Changes
TI-0000-0129 TBD MLG Control Valve Part Number Roll
TI-0000-0709 CR-022768D HT EHA Block Change for LRIP 4
TI-0000-0282 TBD Update to Audio Control Electronics (ACE) Unit
TI-0000-0469 TBD Composite BOS 2ZCH42000-0002 Assemblies
TI-0000-0583 TBD CTOL/STOVL Rudder EHA Design Change
TI-0000-0906 TBD NLG Lug Inspection and Support Stiffener
TI-0000-1097 CR-022972 Ball Joint Salt Fog Failure
TI-0000-0913 TBD LEFAS PDU Resolver and Rotor Shaft Seal Life
TI-0000-1113 CR-024000 AESG Power Connector Rating (Generator)
TI-0000-1256 TBD CV Nose Landing Gear Drag Brace Door Cracking
TI-0000-1396 TBD HTCA with End Gland Material Issue
TI-0000-0336 CR-024982 Panoramic Cockpit Display (PCD) Major Variances - DU
TI-0000-0343 CR-024982 Panoramic Cockpit Display (PCD) Major Variances - EU
TI-0000-0480 CR-025000 ICC Qual Issues
TI-0000-2784 TBD CNI 3A & 3B Integrated Backplane Assembly (IBA) Upgrades
TI-0000-0221 TBD DAS Refuel Lights Lenses
TI-0000-0406 CR-025271 Ordnance Hoist System (OHS) Hoist
TI-0000-1102 CR-022481B BH-1 Weapons Bay Doors
TI-0000-1472 TBD Gun Port Door Threads in Bearing Issue
TI-0000-0329 CR-021982 Refueling Bay and Nozzle Clash LRIP 1-3 Modification
TI-0000-0781 CR-023432 3BSM NBD - Assembly Changes
TI-0000-1446 TBD CV Fuel Dump
TI-0000-0908 CR-023802 STOVL Fuel Dump (CCDD LRIP2-051)
TI-0000-1000 CR-022481 Inboard Weapon Bay Door Flipper Door Design Change
TI-0000-1060 CR-022121 Final Finishes
TI-0000-1078 CR-025006 AF1 Nacelle Insulation
TI-0000-0180 TBD CTOL Fuel Floor Tooling Holes - Bay 207 to Gun Bay
TI-0000-0787 CR-024068 HMDS Path Forward
TI-0000-1048 CR-023982 Panoramic Cockpit Display-Electronic Unit (PCD-EU)
TI-0000-1062 TBD CV Main Landing Gear
TI-0000-1063 TBD CV Nose Landing Gear
TI-0000-0284 TBD STOVL Canopy frame
TI-0000-0316 TBD CTOL FS 496 Bulkhead Trunnion
TI-0000-0321 TBD Lift Fan Exhaust Door Aft Uplock Hook Failure
TI-0000-0467 TBD Fuel Floor - FS496-556, LH
TI-0000-0468 TBD Fuel Floor - FS496-556, RH
TI-0000-0486 TBD Short Life - STOVL Inner Wing FS518 Lower Bulkhead
TI-0000-0543 TBD Path Forward for Outboard Rib at Station 2 and 10
TI-0000-0556 TBD STOVL Short Life Parts: Aft Mid Keel
TI-0000-0638 TBD STOVL BL 0.0 Web Fwd Upper Engine Mount Support
TI-0000-0813 TBD CV Life Limited Structures Part - LH/RH Pylon Sta 3 Aft Rib
TI-0000-0815 TBD 2WSH24212 CV FWD Upper Engine Mount
TI-0000-0816 TBD 2WSH34496 - CV FS 496 Blkhd Station 6
TI-0000-1440 TBD STOVL Thrust Mount Shear Webs
TI-0000-0723 TBD EOTS PBS Startup Timeline
TI-0000-0055 CR-019070 IPP Bay Vent Fan Electrical Bond
TI-0000-0281 CR-020226 Hoist Point Cover FIP Proposal
TI-0000-1023 CR-022936 Roll Nozzle and Duct Bay - BALD Sensors redesign
TI-0000-0193 CR-021921B EW Gain State Control Logic Error
TI-0000-1365 CR-022721A Cat Launch Shock Exceeds INS PBS
TI-0000-0448 TBD Add -0007 ASSCA/-0006 ATQA To Aircraft TVE
TI-0000-0842 TBD 2ESH10095 CV HT Rib 5 Life Limited Structures Part
TI-0000-0976 TBD BF6 and BF8 RCS ATP
TI-0000-0819 TBD Liquid Cooling System Cart - Facility AC Power Interface
TI-0000-1134 TBD Cabin Pressure Tester
TI-0000-1198 TBD HT Heating
TI-0000-0361 CR-023382 Vertical Tail 575 Fitting
TI-0000-0386 CR-025191 Fuel System Major Variance for LRIP 1-Signal Amplifier
TI-0000-0516 CR-022972 AAR Probe Weak Link Adaptor Re-design
TI-0000-0576 CR-020289A Refuel Probe/Tailhook Emergency Control Valve
TI-0000-0578 CR-020289A Aux Inlet Door Emergency Control Valve
TI-0000-1082 TBD Power Panel 1 & 2 Random Vibration Failures
TI-0000-1203 CR-021217 Life Limited 402 Frame
TI-0000-1289 CR022737 US16E Ejection Seat/MWARS Retrofit Configuration Proposal
TI-0000-1421 TBD STOVL Main Landing Gear
TI-0000-1422 CR-021388A STOVL Nose Landing Gear
TI-0000-1483 TBD Power Panel 3 Random Vibration Failures - Second Failure
TI-0000-1486 CR-023838 STOVL FS 503 Frame/IPP Shear Web Durability Test Failure
TI-0000-1515 CR-024000 ESG Service Life (Generator) -0003
TI-0000-1551 TBD 28V Battery Full Qualification
TI-0000-1589 CR-023300 Hydraulic System Single Point Failure
TI-0000-1786 CR-023729 FS-402 Frame (TIN-075)
TI-0000-1857 TBD 2GHH42033 Time Delay Valve - Fully Qualified Part
TI-0000-2467 CR-025204 CTOL FS 503 Frame Limited Life
TI-0000-2468 CR-025204 CTOL IPP Shear Web Limited Life Discovery
TI-0000-2641 CR-024341 STOVL - Short Shank Condition, Engine Access Panel
TI-0000-2674 CR-24794 Cracking of Bifurcation Seam Treatment
TI-0000-2892 CR-025079 BF5 IRCM Hinge to Drive Link Clash
TI-0000-1552 TBD 28V BCCU Lightning Compliance
TI-0000-2682 TBD AR Probe Light
TI-0000-0884 CR-024000 AESG - Material & Workmanship
TI-0000-1142 TBD Missionized Gun System Jumper Panel Hoses and Drain Seal
TI-0000-1796 CR-025271 Ordnance Hoist System (OHS) Motor
TI-0000-2506 TBD Gun Port Blast Mislocation
TI-0000-2546 TBD Weapon bay light departing aircraft during flight
TI-0000-2833 TBD Gun System Muzzle and Purge Door Time Out
TI-0000-0387 CR-016910 Fuel System Major Variance for LRIP 1 - Dive Rate Performance
TI-0000-1161 CR-22656 STOVL Aft MLG Door Cracking
TI-0000-1518 CR-024193 PAO Cooling Orifices In Center Fuselage Cold Liquid Loop
TI-0000-1783 TBD Canopy Boot Cracking
TI-0000-2633 CR-024265 Flaperon Blade Seal Buckling
TI-0000-2672 TBD Radome Shroud Gapping/Trimming
TI-0000-2909 CR-025167 IPP Bay High Flow Air Duct Separation
TI-0000-2931 TBD CV NLG Drag Brace Cylinder and Steering Motor
TI-0000-0236 CR-019412 FPS Fire and Bleed Leak Controller (FBLC) Redesign
TI-0000-0260 CR-016633C Canopy Actuation System
TI-0000-0738 CR-025142 Modified Fuel Dump Valve (T28a)
TI-0000-0772 TBD PTMS Turbomachine/ACCM Cable Interface Changes
TI-0000-0327 TBD STOVL High Sea State Fuel Stowage - Rev B to CR-016712A
TI-0000-0737 TBD IPP Purge Issue Due to Low Fuel Shutdown
TI-0000-1650 CR-022737 MWARS for Production Seat
TI-0000-1653 CR-23490 Ground Maintainance Valve Deletion to Prevent PAO in Cockpit
TI-0000-2416 TBD CV Drag Strut - Alt Gear Extension
TI-0000-2450 CR-023901 Bleed Air Sensor Fitting Galling
TI-0000-2635 TBD CV NLG Interference Problems - OBOGs routing
TI-0000-2725 CR-024162 Vehicle Management Computer (VMC)
TI-0000-2834 CR-024904 Boarding Ladder Cracks
TI-0000-2889 TBD WBDDS Supplier Disclosure on Lower Breakaway Torque
TI-0000-0771 CR-16464B Install Battery into CNI Rack 3A and 3B
TI-0000-0945 TBD CTOL Audio Control Electronics (ACE) In-Flight Refueling
TI-0000-1056 CR-016660C RADAR 1A & 1B Racks -0002 Cut-in
TI-0000-2818 CR-025046 EOTS LoS Pointing Angle
TI-0000-1093 CR-023616 CV Arresting Gear
TI-0000-0358 TBD Production Ejection Seat (-0021)
TI-0000-0514 TBD Lift Fan Inlet Maintenance Fix
TI-0000-0579 TBD Auto Pilot
TI-0000-1520 TBD CV Nose Landing Gear Aircraft Integration
TI-0000-1761 TBD HT EHA Solenoid Valve (SOV) Qual Test Failure
TI-9999-0655 TBD EO DAS Center Fuselage Vibration Testing
TI-0000-0730 TBD CV Rudder EHA
TI-0000-0833 CR-021053 Short Shank Condition on Engine Inspection Panels
TI-0000-1122 TBD LEFAS Foldbox Lug Cracking
TI-0000-1192 TBD CTOL Thrust Mount Shear Web
TI-0000-1494 TBD PTMS Turbomachine Configuration to Correct Qualification Failures
TI-0000-1499 TBD FS 472 Bulkhead Crack BH-1
TI-0000-1541 TBD CV HT LOWER SKIN BOLTS SD-2013-010
TI-0000-1649 TBD CV LEFAS Asymmetry Brake Lug Cracking
TI-0000-1655 CR-024025 STOVL RH and LH Rear Spar Lower Flange Fatigue Cracks
TI-0000-2423 TBD CV Lower FS 518 Design Change
TI-0000-2448 CR-023966A CV Thrust Mount Shear Web - Service Life
TI-0000-2670 TBD Durability Findings 2013 - Bulkhead FS 496
TI-0000-2813 TBD Durability Findings - FS 450, 472, 556, 518 Lower and IRCM Fitting
TI-0000-2814 TBD Durability Findings 2013 - FS 575 Center Arch Frame
TI-0000-1104 TBD CTOL Ventilation Leakage from Bay 207L
TI-0000-0992 CR-013553 Outboard Vertical Tail Seal Redesign
TI-0000-0904 CR-021759 Backup Radio Guide Pin Misalignment
TI-0000-1053 CR-022138 Fire Suppression Bottle Low Clearance
TI-0000-2675 TBD Roll Nozzle Bay - BALD Sensors - Supplier Disclosure
TI-0000-2921 CR-025116 Gun Vent Door Unpainted Brackets
TI-0000-0485 TBD J12003 Ejection Seat Stand Design Issues
TI-0000-0660 TBD J26007 LF Driveshaft
TI-0000-0799 TBD Canopy Sling
TI-0000-1337 TBD DR 1-2076141 Tool Boxes not within weight standards
TI-0000-1338 TBD DR 1-2565051 Tool Set Shipboard FOD Hazard
TI-0000-1629 TBD Deployable Mission Rehearsal Trainer #1
TI-0000-1658 TBD Changes to Support Turning on AMC’s Algorithms in ALIS
TI-0000-2440 TBD J26035 Adapter, Drive Shaft Compression Galling issue
TI-0000-2699 CR-023093C Fibre Channel Switch Design Issues -0005
TI-0000-2797 TBD SE Weight Label and Forklift Provisions
TI-0000-2954 TBD STOVL NLG EEE Failure
TI-0000-1408 TBD AEL, Aft Sector
TI-0000-2865 TBD TR2 - SP-SPIO Issue
TI-7777-0004 CR-013644D MLG Strut Redesign
TI-7777-0007 CR-015718A OBOGS Plenum HEPA Filter Provisioning
TI-7777-0010 CR-016660B Radar Harness Redesign
TI-7777-0024 CR-018697 Gun Gas Purge & Gun Port Door Actuators
TI-7777-0031 CR-018544 Brake Control Electronic Unit Update
TI-7777-0042 CR-018487A Return Fuel Cooler HX Coating
TI-7777-0057 CR-018378 Nacelle Fan - Full Qualified Configuration
TI-7777-0077 CR-009382B Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) Rack Strut
TI-7777-0081 CR-014768E 270V BCCU Change
TI-7777-0083 TBD EHAS/LEFAS -0011 EU & Rack Config Update
TI-7777-0084 CR-016708A ACCM Filter Pin
TI-7777-0085 CR-016758A Replacement of Door Actuator Lock Assemblies
TI-7777-0087 CR-016909A Flaperon EHA Pump Design Change
TI-7777-0089 CR-017095 Avionics Bay Environmental Seal Change
TI-7777-0093 CR-017505 Flow Sensor EMI/Vibration
TI-7777-0095 CR-017773 Manual Drive Unit
TI-7777-0097 CR-017937A IEU Lightning Compliance
TI-7777-0098 TBD CTOL Structure Redesign for Updated Gun Loads
TI-7777-0101 CR-15956A NLG Down Lock Actuator
TI-7777-0102 CR-016633C Canopy Actuation System
TI-7777-0106 CR-016912 WBD Fwd Uplock Roller Bracket

Milestone/Development Status
DEVELOPMENT STATUS/MAJOR DEVELOPMENT MILESTONES For the F-35 program, the discovery of new concurrency changes phases out with the completion of SDD.

[brar_w]

From the Dutch JSF news site.

Its a list of modifications. Modifications are a part and parcel of developmental testing. The latter is a period where you test out the aircraft and make changes. The cost of the retrofit process on the first aircraft (basically till LRIP 9/10) is estimated at less than 1% of the overall cost of the JSF program, as was shared with you many months ago. The F-35 follows a less ambitious concurrency model than the F-16. Even though the model was less ambitious to the F-16, it was further watered down when close to 250 aircraft were moved to outside the SDD phase in the production plans established around the baseline. Even if those production plans were not watered down the concurrency cost would have still been less than 1% of the overall program development and acquisition cost.

Edit: To add to the earlier point on the F-16 vs F-35 comparison, members here must keep in mind what the F-16 design philosophy was. It was to put a massive engine, on the smallest possible fighter body. This means a fairly low Internal fuel, small airframe, light weight and a big engine. So yes a clean F-16 is going to be a ROCKET given its thrust to weight ratio and design. It still is going to have relevant acceleration and is likely going to be right at the top of the pile of western aircraft when its given its best configuration (Basically nothing but a couple of missiles and internal fuel).

Mount 2 Wingtip Sidewinders and keep the fuel really low (Like at or below 40% internal without tanks) and watch the F-16C make Mach .8 to Mach 1.2 in 32-35 seconds. It does so because Widmer and Hillaker designed it do be like that i.e a high thrust to weight ratio...

However like most LWF's, the F-16 suffers a HUGE penalty when you start to operate it as a MEDIUM class fighter. Its internal fuel is insufficient for most missions, it needs to carry medium to large sized bombs. It needs to carry a targeting Pod. Add CFT's, pods, or EFT's and medium-large payloads and you will see a lot of that performance disappear. This is a configuration the F-35 is designed to fight in because it can't pile stuff on externally due to stealth. Having said all this, its not like the F-16 is a SLOUCH compared to its competitors when it comes to transonic acceleration and sustained turning..As has been reported there are flight regimes where it is superior to the Typhoon a fighter designed decades later.

[Philip]

"Jack of all trades master of none".Therefore,going by the cited experience of decreasing a fighter's performance when tasked with multiple roles,like the F-16,should there be more than one type for a service,air force,navy,for example? One can understand the virtues of the JSF ,or any stealth fighter in an air superiority stealth mode with only internally carried missiles,but hang ordnance onto it ...?
Does one have to then increase the size of internal weapons bays,add stealth pods for underwing ordnance, to retain the multi-role capability.Here too there are limitations of bay size with LR stand-off missiles like BMos,etc. The answer is to perhaps develop manned/unmanned stealth bombers with much larger internal payloads to do the hard work supported by stealth fighters.

[brar_w]

"Jack of all trades master of none".

Its called a "Multi Role" Fighter. Plenty of other such fighters exist out there.

One can understand the virtues of the JSF ,or any stealth fighter in an air superiority stealth mode with only internally carried missiles,but hang ordnance onto it ...?
Does one have to then increase the size of internal weapons bays,add stealth pods for underwing ordnance, to retain the multi-role capability

It has a flexible weapons bay. 4 Air to Air Missiles, that is upgradable to 6 in the future, 2 very large bombs or 8 SDB' II's. Stand Off Missiles can already be incorporated internally (JSOW, JSM, SOM-J for starters but there is no reason not to keep on developing weapons if there is a requirement for them). The US does not have a Brahmos like weapon and the Hypersonic weapons in development (HSSW) are being sized for the bomber payloads with external carriage on the F-35. Yet, with stand-off range you would hope that you would not need stealth when deploying them - but the point still is that you could easily develop hypersonic weapons for internal carriage, its just that there isn't a requirement for such yet with its primary operator due to availability of other assets. Same applies to an Anti-Radiation Weapon. The USAF does not need one yet for the F-35 and they are happy to wait for a time when they replace the AMRAAM and HARM with a common missile. The USN on the other hand does need one and are developing one in the ARRGM-ER.

Manned unmanned teaming is of course the future, but its going to take time to develop as a high_end cooperative engagement strategy. The J-UCAS program that pretty much concluded yesterday (or whatever it was called once it concluded) tested cooperative Unmanned (Yes, two stealthy, autonomous unmanned vehicles pairing) target destruction in SEAD scenarios close to a decade ago so it isn't an area that isn't properly understood. In fact there isn't going to be a thing in the European UCAS programs that the J-UCAS hasn't done earlier (SEAD cooperation, manned-unmanned flying, dropping bombs on targets, landing on a carrier, air to air refueling and autonomous flight including autonomous carrier landings). Yet the US needs to develop the capability until it is deployable against a near peer adversary that can shoot your satellites out of the sky, jam your data links and take over your networks. For some operators a "Libya" like scenario is the only realistic war situation that they may plan for for that the Avenger with its impressive payload, range, moderate stealth and a 50,000 feet ceiling (with 18 hour endurance) is more than plenty!

[Singha]

f-16 is one of few single engine fighters of that era which can fly vertically and gain speed while doing so.

the corresponding russian attempt Mig23-MF was a fairly pathetic bird in all respects. a half asleep f-16 pilot would run rings around it. even the IAF got rid of it asap once it got the Mig29A. and the Mig29 at the fag end of its life is finally nearing the multirole capability of the F-solah in the 29K,35 and 29upg avatar. its drawback continues to remain a less sophisticated engine vs western rivals.

when paired with awacs and amraam, the paki F-16s are going to be a vicious problem, esp as our aa12 underperforms and is considered unreliable and the aa10 is a fairly elderly weapon. i think the pakis have not got the JHMCS because they did not get the aim9X....else in a turning fight which the f-16 excels due to good STR, this combo gives it even more of a edge vs india strike a/c like jaguars, mirages, mig29upg and su30s laden with heavy payloads.

we need to get more awacs and put the astra mk1 into service to cover our backs...also develop the AAD/Shourya into ULSAM that can drive away the paki awacs from the combat zones and degrade their coverage and time on station...this will make the f-solahs easier to evade, ambush and manage.

[Philip]

A crucial point with stand-off weaponry is the cost. Missiles are expensive,far more than dumb bombs with "smart" kits.In the current Yemen campaign,reports indicate that inventories require rapid replenishing and the Gulf nations,Saudis,etc. are all clamouring for new supplies of munitions,etc. from the West.their main suppliers. I remember that even in the GWs,US cruise misssiles were being used up much faster than expected and production had to be ramped up considerably.How many nations can afford expending PGMs,smart munitions like the US is questionable. Missile inventories of India and Pak are bound to have limitations.
I think that even our hypersonic missile supposedly under development ,Kalaam's dream,is supposed to be reusable. Hyper BMos ,no idea. Whether UCAVs will be more cost-effective in delivering ordnance rather than manned fighters for specified targets needs to be carefully studied to find the right mix.

[brar_w]

You have PGMs now that Can get you 100 km on a fixed target and 70 odd km on a MOVING target..they are your bulk weapons and the f35 van carry 8 internally in addition to a pair of missiles...A 100+ Km SDB I, costs $40,000, many times less than a missile.

[member_28782]

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ ... ble-by-gao

F-35 Engines From United Technologies Called Unreliable

by Anthony Capaccio
2:30 PM IST
April 27, 2015

F-35 engines from United Technologies Corp. are proving so unreliable that U.S. plans to increase production of the fighter jet may be slowed, according to congressional auditors.
Data from flight tests evaluated by the Government Accountability Office show the reliability of engines from the company’s Pratt & Whitney unit is “very poor (less than half of what it should be) and has limited” progress for the F-35, the costliest U.S. weapons system, the watchdog agency said in a report sent to lawmakers this month.
The GAO cited the need to make design changes to the engines and then retrofit planes already built, along with continuing flaws in the plane’s software, in a report that warned the Defense Department’s “procurement plan may not be affordable.” The military plans to spend $391.1 billion for a fleet of 2,443 planes from prime contractor Lockheed Martin Corp.
The Pentagon’s inspector general issued a separate report Monday criticizing management of the engine program. It identified 61 “noncomformities” with Defense Department requirements and policies and called for the Pentagon office in charge of the F-35 to establish new quality goals and provide more oversight.
As of late December, engines on the Marine Corps’ complex version of the F-35, designed for short takeoffs and vertical landings, flew about 47 hours between failures caused by engine design issues instead of the 90 hours planned for this point, according to GAO officials. Air Force and Navy model engines flew about 25 hours between failures instead of the 120 hours planned.
Pratt & Whitney provided the data “underpinning the engine reliability percentages in our report,” Michael Sullivan, a GAO director for acquisition who oversees its F-35 work, said in an e-mail.
Company’s Response
Matthew Bates, a spokesman for Pratt & Whitney, said in an e-mail that the GAO “incorrectly assessed engine reliability, as it did not account for new designs that have been validated and are being incorporated.”
The Marine Corps model’s reliability “is at 71 percent of where it is expected to be” and “has made consistent improvement progress” since 2013, Bates said. He said the Air Force model’s engine “is at 147 percent of where it is expected at this point.”
The agency “has confused engine spec reliability and aircraft spec reliability, which are measured differently,” he said. “While the report lists some propulsion concerns,” the Pentagon has “validated our reliability performance.”
Sullivan of the GAO said Pratt & Whitney’s figures “include design changes that are validated and are now being incorporated into the engine, but have not yet been demonstrated through flight testing.”
‘Solutions Developed’
The Pentagon and Pratt & Whitney have funded initiatives since 2010 to improve engine reliability, Joe DellaVedova, a spokesman for the Defense Department’s F-35 program office, said in an e-mail. “Solutions have been developed and validated” and have already been incorporated, he said.
While the fixes will provide the desired reliability for the Air Force and Navy versions, the Marine Corps’ F-35 “is projected to be slightly below specification requirements,” he said. The contractor and the program office are “adding reliability redesign projects,” he said.
Pratt & Whitney, the sole provider of F-35 engines, also has faced criticism from Pentagon officials for failing to reduce prices quickly enough and for lapses in quality.
The reliability issue may be reviewed by lawmakers as they weigh the Pentagon’s request for $1.2 billion to buy engines next year, up from $873 million this year, with annual funding rising to $2 billion by 2020.
‘Independent Look’
Congress so far has approved at least $17 billion of a planned $67 billion for F-35 engines, with purchases to increase to 57 engines next year, from 38 this year, and 92 in 2020.
A House Armed Services Committee panel last week directed “an independent look at the engine program to make sure it is on the right track,” its chairman, Republican Representative Michael Turner of Ohio, said. The language is in the draft of the fiscal 2016 defense authorization bill that the full committee is scheduled to act on Wednesday.
Citing the GAO findings and the inspector general’s review, Pratt & Whitney invited reporters to a briefing scheduled for Monday with Bennett Croswell, its president for military engines.

[brar_w]

The problem with the GAO reports are that they attempt to do a "snapshot" analysis of the program just as they would do on an established program. While this is important in a routine system, that is operational it has its drawbacks when dealing with a system in development that still has 3 full years of development still to go.

If the JPO or the customers wanted to achieve higher reliability they could do it NOW. How? They could begin to add, concurrency changes right at the time they are identified. They could also begin a more aggressive the retrofit plans to rectify the rubbing that caused last years fire. But the problem with that is that the JPO and ultimately the individual customers want to make all the changes in the most cost-effective way that does not impact the annual budgets of the program. Sure I can keep sending my aircraft to the depots as soon as I identify a fix for change, but they do not do it this way. They wait till a pre-specified time-frame and incorporate many fixes at the same time, this way the entire concurrency cost of the JSF program (Cost to the US and partner developers) is expected to be around $1.7 Billion dollars (Or less than 0.5% of the overall cost of the acquisition and development phase of the program). GAO doesn't understand this, hence they will always oppose what the program, or the operators say.

The point still remains that from a propulsion point of view, this program has been the most uneventful single engined program that the US has ever done. 30,000+ sorties and just once class A incident and not a single reported Engine out divert in the entire program history.

GAO, DOT&E and the CAPE do what they have to do, but there reports are taken for what they are. I am yet to see a single new program that the GAO likes because at times its not about the program but the way the Pentagon does things. As you can see even in this article, the GAO has problems that the solutions have been approved by the pentagon, but since they haven't been fully flight tested they (GAO) aren't going to report on them. Well that is a difference between their approach and that of the Pentagon. The Pentagon runs models, does its analysis and approves something and has it go into testing. GAO lacks the authority to do so, and therefore do not evaluate the "soft" features that went into that decision. So this isn't as much a performance review on the P&W Engine as much as it is GAO taking an exception to the Pentagon's approach of developing fixes, and incorporating them into the production train.

This has obviously happened before, in systems that have run perfectly at IOC and post it. Ultimately, those that do decide on the purse strings have a fairly accurate assessment of how much to value these reports and they usually balance them up with what their own civilian leadership, and Services say about each area. Meanwhile, the GAO reports on the F-35 have been far more positive over the last 2 years than at any point. In fact, at times surprisingly positive in certain areas!

See this point from P&W -

The Marine Corps model’s reliability “is at 71 percent of where it is expected to be” and “has made consistent improvement progress” since 2013, Bates said. He said the Air Force model’s engine “is at 147 percent of where it is expected at this point.”
The agency “has confused engine spec reliability and aircraft spec reliability, which are measured differently,” he said. “While the report lists some propulsion concerns,” the Pentagon has “validated our reliability performance.”

What an OEM does is design and built the engine, partner up with the JPO for testing, run cycles, and then move it to the aircraft and start gathering data as the sorties build up. Once they identified areas where there are improvements required, or desired they then design fixes, work arounds and get them approved from the Pentagon/JPO. Once that happens, it is up to the pentagon/JPO to design a cost-effective way to test those fixes and then the best way to retrofit them back on the aircrafts already produced.

From the OEM's perspective all they can do is present a solution and get it approved from the folks that are paying them (customers). They do not answer to the GAO or expect to receive orders on how to do things from them. They simply do as is told. Having dealt with both internal and external auditors at work, I can tell you that they often have issues with your management and the way it expects you to do things. This is fine, but in the case of the GAO, their tiff is usually taking exception to what the Pentagon does and the moment they start to take positions that are similar to that of the Pentagon they loose all purpose. Most auditors around the world are like that - there entire purpose of existence is to take an exception to how things are done. This is fine, because the ultimate arbitrator is the elected leadership that controls the purse strings, and they are usually wise enough to know the difference!

[Mort Walker]

^^^The GAO audits all US federal agencies for spending and they don't care if the program is in development or production. It is taxpayer money that an agency is spending. They tell it like they see it even though they may have a myopic view of any program. The OEM is governed by contract rules, regulations and laws. The OEM objective is to stay within terms of the contract, but many contracts are subject to termination by the agency and the GAO can force an agency to terminate a contract to an OEM should the GAO get pissed off should they see the OEM not meeting contract requirements in a timely manner.

In India, the Comptroller Auditor General (CAG) works very much like the GAO.

[brar_w]

I know how it works having read each and every GAO (and other) report for the program and others over the last 10-15 years or so. .

But there views and reports are not taken at face value, but balanced with what the civilian leadership, services running the program and the operators have to say. This is how they work. GAO can continue to use metrics that do not have any bearing on the contractor, or its relationship with the program-office. If they do not like how the concurrency changes are being incorporated, thats not P&W's fault. Its a difference between how they wish to see things and how the JPO wishes to run things. JPO takes the decision based on its core-committee that includes all three US customers, and international partners. If the JPO models that the engine reliability would be X% after the changes are incorporated, it will continue to stand by that even though it decides that those changes would only be gradually incorporated into the test-fleet and the concurrency jets at a specified time. They base their data on their own modeling. The GAO's attitude is to book the metrics when they are fully incorporated into the fleet. They do not look at the ITT fleet running with the changes, but the overall fleet that may not get those changes for another 24-36 months because that is precisely how it has been scheduled.

There has yet to be a system that the GAO has liked, but that is fine. Its the auditor, if there reports were to matter beyond a certain degree then there would be no major weapons system development in the US. There is a reason why there reports are weighed into the decision making process along with reports from DOT&E, Program office, customer driven planning. Those in charge of the purse strings do not give them a free run. If the GAO dislikes the way the services run a process, they blame the OEM and fault the program. This is how its always been. They along with other auditors have continuously over-estimated the cost of both the concurrency and the program in general. The LCC of the program has been revised down by some 300 Billion dollars over the last 5 years, based purely on operational cost revisions (over 55 years).

The OEM is governed by contract rules, regulations and laws.

Yes, and there has been no violation of any in this case. As per the concurrency agreement the JPO signed with Lockheed and P&W during LRIP5 all identified concurrency changes would be split 50:50 between the OEM and JPO and all new concurrency changes would be borne 100% by the OEM. In this case all the cost to design, and implement the changes on the F135 have been borne by P&W/UT and those that are not covered under the contract borne by the customers and included in the overall $1.7 Billion dollar concurrency bill (which itself is less than half a percent of the Research, development and acquisition cost) for the entire PROGRAM (not just the engine but one that covers all production retrofits form LRIP 1 to LRIP .

Also, Mission reliability is something that is a constant target as development progresses. Some numbers will be higher as is the case with the CTOL version where it is at 147% of where they expected them to be, and some will be lower like the STOVL variant. There is a reason why advanced aerospace development programs aren't FIXED COST when it comes to RDT&E even though the JSF program has not requested a single extra dollar since it was baselined following the SWAT for the Beach. Not only that, if one looks at the F-22A and the F-16 programs neither had FIXED PRICE contracts beginning at such early on in the production process for such technically challenging programs. The F-35 shifted to a fixed price (minus concurrency of course) contract in LRIP 5 and the current production batch is the second LRIP to be produced under a fixed price contract. The engine contracts are fixed price as well now. Only thing that is not FIXED price, is the research portion of the program but even that hasn't exceeded the budget for the last 4-5 years.

The Program head does not really count propulsion as any challenge and mission availability for the F-135 has been very good. 30,000+ sorties aren't enough to draw a good M&S data set (even though GAO, DOTE and CAPE keep on doing it at half that maturity) but so far a 90+% mission availability for a 43,000 Lb thrust engine is quite good. Of course MA is spare_Pipe driven but unlike the rest of the aircraft a shortage of spare supplies does not seem to be bothering the engine much. Also, fatigue testing for both the frame and engine runs have resulted in some excellent results for both the CTOL/CV airframes and engines.

Compared to the turbulent propulsion development for the F-15 and F-16 families, the F-22 and F-35 have had a rather smooth development in both the F-119 and the F-135. The few issues that they have had, they have fixed in the design phase in a matter of months. Keep in mind that the OEM can only design a fix, how that is tested and how RAPIDLY it is put into the fleet depends upon the depot ability of the individual customers. None of the fixes P&W has designed involve bringing the engines back to the factory. The changes are set to be taken care at the depot level with two, eight hour sessions. Of course where the OEM can show initiative is by bringing rapidly these changes into its own production process for new engines, and this is precisely where the concurrency changes contract kicks in. The faster P&W brings the changes into its own production factory, the more money they'll make because otherwise they would have to (at their own expense) retrofit the changes at the fleet.

[Mort Walker]

Deleted.

[Mort Walker]

I know how it works having read each and every GAO (and other) report for the program and others over the last 10-15 years or so. .

Then you need to take a step back and look at the program objectively instead of accepting what NG and the JPO say as gospel. In my experience, I would be talking to the Chief Master Sergeants who maintain aircraft, and are on the F-35 program, to see what they have to say instead of USAF brass.

But there views and reports are not taken at face value, but balanced with what the civilian leadership, services running the program and the operators have to say. This is how they work. GAO can continue to use metrics that do not have any bearing on the contractor, or its relationship with the program-office. If they do not like how the concurrency changes are being incorporated, thats not P&W's fault. Its a difference between how they wish to see things and how the JPO wishes to run things. JPO takes the decision based on its core-committee that includes all three US customers, and international partners. If the JPO models that the engine reliability would be X% after the changes are incorporated, it will continue to stand by that even though it decides that those changes would only be gradually incorporated into the test-fleet and the concurrency jets at a specified time. They base their data on their own modeling. The GAO's attitude is to book the metrics when they are fully incorporated into the fleet. They do not look at the ITT fleet running with the changes, but the overall fleet that may not get those changes for another 24-36 months because that is precisely how it has been scheduled.

The GAO, like you said it, takes a snapshot of the program sort of like a report card. It isn't up to the JPO or Pentagon civilian bureaucracy to define which metrics the GAO uses, but rather an over all to see where money went and what the result is. It is an obligation to the taxpayer. If the OEM, in this case P&W, has a good relationship with the JPO, that too can be problematic because personal or professional relationships can cloud meeting specific contract requirements. P&W may in fact be the best for this contract, but it does not relieve them from delivery of production engines on a timely basis.

There has yet to be a system that the GAO has liked, but that is fine. Its the auditor, if there reports were to matter beyond a certain degree then there would be no major weapons system development in the US. There is a reason why there reports are weighed into the decision making process along with reports from DOT&E, Program office, customer driven planning. Those in charge of the purse strings do not give them a free run. If the GAO dislikes the way the services run a process, they blame the OEM and fault the program. This is how its always been. They along with other auditors have continuously over-estimated the cost of both the concurrency and the program in general. The LCC of the program has been revised down by some 300 Billion dollars over the last 5 years, based purely on operational cost revisions (over 55 years).

This is not true. The GAO says it like it is from an expenditure point of view. If P&W doesn't like what the GAO has to say, it can certainly protest it and in the past many companies have sustained their protest. The problem is, those who are in charge of the purse strings are too close to the contractor. Eisenhower in 1960 said, This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence -- economic, political, even spiritual -- is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.
As you know, LCC is not considered by the GAO because Congress allocates funds annually. Once funds are allocated and contracts awarded, they are done so with LCC incorporated. Any modern 4.5-5 gen combat aircraft would have been a considerably LCC savings. When you're given a budget of hundreds of billions of Dollars, you might as well get a Cadillac is the view of the JPO, Pentagon and defense contractors.

Yes, and there has been no violation of any in this case. As per the concurrency agreement the JPO signed with Lockheed and P&W during LRIP5 all identified concurrency changes would be split 50:50 between the OEM and JPO and all new concurrency changes would be borne 100% by the OEM. In this case all the cost to design, and implement the changes on the F135 have been borne by P&W/UT and those that are not covered under the contract borne by the customers and included in the overall $1.7 Billion dollar concurrency bill (which itself is less than half a percent of the Research, development and acquisition cost) for the entire PROGRAM (not just the engine but one that covers all production retrofits form LRIP 1 to LRIP .

There is no allegation of violation of contract, but rather of P&W not being able to meet requirements in a timely manner. Unfortunately, GE wasn't kept as a backup for engine design and production, but that would have raised costs even more. Engineering changes in production is quite common for weapon systems and there are no additional charges if the contractor has to do those in order to meet contract requirements. The costs are built in with the risks.

Also, Mission reliability is something that is a constant target as development progresses. Some numbers will be higher as is the case with the CTOL version where it is at 147% of where they expected them to be, and some will be lower like the STOVL variant. There is a reason why advanced aerospace development programs aren't FIXED COST when it comes to RDT&E even though the JSF program has not requested a single extra dollar since it was baselined following the SWAT for the Beach. Not only that, if one looks at the F-22A and the F-16 programs neither had FIXED PRICE contracts beginning at such early on in the production process for such technically challenging programs. The F-35 shifted to a fixed price (minus concurrency of course) contract in LRIP 5 and the current production batch is the second LRIP to be produced under a fixed price contract. The engine contracts are fixed price as well now. Only thing that is not FIXED price, is the research portion of the program but even that hasn't exceeded the budget for the last 4-5 years.

Which is the reason why the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is now advocating Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contracts. For R&D a separate contract is awarded prior to production and requires competent technical evaluators in the Pentagon, which nowadays are contracted out. The JSF program hasn't asked for more money since it has sucked up nearly $400 billion. LM and its subs are enjoying their days in the sun. Hopefully the same mistakes won't be done on the LRS-B program when awarded to NG this summer.

The Program head does not really count propulsion as any challenge and mission availability for the F-135 has been very good. 30,000+ sorties aren't enough to draw a good M&S data set (even though GAO, DOTE and CAPE keep on doing it at half that maturity) but so far a 90+% mission availability for a 43,000 Lb thrust engine is quite good. Of course MA is spare_Pipe driven but unlike the rest of the aircraft a shortage of spare supplies does not seem to be bothering the engine much. Also, fatigue testing for both the frame and engine runs have resulted in some excellent results for both the CTOL/CV airframes and engines.

Last year payment to P&W and LM was withheld for not meeting reliability. It may not happen this time, but rest assured P&W is pulling out all of the stops by getting its Congressmen and Senators all fired up to defend it.

Compared to the turbulent propulsion development for the F-15 and F-16 families, the F-22 and F-35 have had a rather smooth development in both the F-119 and the F-135. The few issues that they have had, they have fixed in the design phase in a matter of months. Keep in mind that the OEM can only design a fix, how that is tested and how RAPIDLY it is put into the fleet depends upon the depot ability of the individual customers. None of the fixes P&W has designed involve bringing the engines back to the factory. The changes are set to be taken care at the depot level with two, eight hour sessions. Of course where the OEM can show initiative is by bringing rapidly these changes into its own production process for new engines, and this is precisely where the concurrency changes contract kicks in. The faster P&W brings the changes into its own production factory, the more money they'll make because otherwise they would have to (at their own expense) retrofit the changes at the fleet.

Depot level repair is still an additional cost to the O&M budget of the USAF and USN. It also adversely affects work load requirements at Hill or Warner Robins AFB which reduces overall operational readiness. The services have historically been short on O&M funds as seen during the sequester in 2013.

[brar_w]

Then you need to take a step back and look at the program objectively instead of accepting what NG and the JPO say as gospel

I read every report published on the program. The JPO position, the DOT&E report , the GAO and the IG report. One has to read all of them because some reports only talk about what is going on in the program at the moment, the GAO and DOT&E reports actually give a snapshot of the program from 5-6 months ago, while any person interested in actually following what is happening needs to know how the program is tracking to its eventual goal of winding up the SDD phase by 2018. That is the ultimate point of the entire exercise: to Finish developmental testing by 2018.

I would be talking to the Chief Master Sergeants who maintain aircraft, and are on the F-35 program, to see what they have to say instead of USAF brass.

Cool, let us know what they have to say

It isn't up to the JPO or Pentagon civilian bureaucracy to define which metrics the GAO uses, but rather an over all to see where money went and what the result is. It is an obligation to the taxpayer. If the OEM, in this case P&W, has a good relationship with the JPO, that too can be problematic because personal or professional relationships can cloud meeting specific contract requirements. P&W may in fact be the best for this contract, but it does not relieve them from delivery of production engines on a timely basis

It isn't about having a good relationship, or having a poor relationship. It is about being ORDERED to do something and doing it. Pratt is/was responsible for designing the fix out of their own budget. They did it. The fix has been presented to the JPO and customers for approval. The JPO has laid out a plan on how best to apply the fix. P&W is working on getting the fix into its own production process so that they do not have to splurge out the cash to retrofit the engines because the concurrency changes are their expense as per the contracts signed post SDD. The JPO and the customers (including the international customers) are well within their legal right to come up with a plan, to implement the concurrency changes.

It is akin to saying that the JSF still has a "lightning problem" in the reports, even though the fix has been developed, tested and has been implemented on some jets that have flown in lightning and have had no issues. Yet, the JPO is well within its right to control the pace of how the changes are incorporated into the fleet because they are looking at clubbing most concurrency work into 1 or 2 depot stops so that the cost is minimized. Each F35 will go tot he depot prior to IOC to get all required changes. They aren't going to do it one at a time just to please the GAO.

As you know, LCC is not considered by the GAO because Congress allocates funds annually. Once funds are allocated and contracts awarded, they are done so with LCC incorporated. Any modern 4.5-5 gen combat aircraft would have been a considerably LCC savings. When you're given a budget of hundreds of billions of Dollars, you might as well get a Cadillac is the view of the JPO, Pentagon and defense contractors

Lets back off for a second. The GAO does mention Life Cycle Costing. The CAPE has also been doing LCC estimates for a long time even though there is insufficient data out there to develop a meaningful data set, and the fact that they have all along grossly overestimated the fuel burn and flying patterns for some of the versions of the jet. They have revised LCC cost estimates (revised them down) significantly over the years, and they are likely to do so again. The entire program is 30,000+ flying hours, and you do not get a stable PHM, stable software or even stable costing data until you have significantly more fleet time. There are folks that did this for a living over at the F16 forum who will vouch for that. The reason is simple, as mentioned earlier they overestimated the fuel cost over 55 years, they also are using data that is currently coming from much of a fleet that does not have a working ALIS, does not have all concurrency changes incorporated and is therefore not being operated, or maintained in an optimal fashion or as designed.

Which is the reason why the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is now advocating Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contracts.

FFP's are only going to be awarded once the production and design has matured significantly to allow for them. In the F-35 they reached the number in LRIP5, and if you look at the original plan they reached Fixed price contracts a couple of hundred aircraft prior to what was planned.

For R&D a separate contract is awarded prior to production and requires competent technical evaluators in the Pentagon, which nowadays are contracted out

R&D contracts, for this program and many others are given out concurrently to production. The F-35 is still in RDT&E phase, and will be in it till 2018 when the SDD phase formally concludes. This year the DOD between the USAF and USN will spend around $130 Million a month on RDT&E for the JSF.

The JSF program hasn't asked for more money since it has sucked up nearly $400 billion.

The JSF program has not sucked up nearly $400 Billion. $398 Billion or so is the TOTAL ESTIMATED COST to the US for the design, development, testing, and acquisition of 2443 F-35 A's, B's and C's (1776 CTOL and 600+ CV and STOVL) for the USAF, USMC and the USN. That cost would be finally paid in about 2038 when the last F-35 is delivered.

EDIT: The Acquisition and development cost is around 391 Billion ($326.9 Billion for the development and acquisition of 2443 Airframes and $64.3 for the development and acquisition of 2443+spare engines). Estimates are revised annually but it is pretty safe to say that they'll continue to hover between the 390 and 395 Billion dollar mark.

The media is loose with the way it reports all this. It has been reported as the 400 Billion fighter, and some even extend 55 years of Sustainment, upgrades, fuel cost and $ Inflation (including estimating fuel costs in till 2055) and call and factor that in to the overall cost of the JSF. This is one notch above the sort of "lopsided reporting" that happened during the F-16 program. At least back then there were some attempts that were made by some of the more famous publications to report the fact that the 50% increase in the NTE Cost of the first 600 Units was because a majority of those 600 units were getting "specs" and capability addition, yet it was called the Lawndart, the most expensive fighter of its era, unsustainable program and what not. The point remains relevant now as it did back then - No one has spent $391 Billion on the JSF program YET. That is the current estimate on what ALL the cost to develop and acquire the aircraft would be by 2038. In the same breadth that some reporters use $400 Billion dollar tagline, they say that they will never acquire 2400 odd aircraft yet they do not go back and revise the $400 billion estimate. If you do not buy 2400, you do not spend $391 Billion

LM and its subs are enjoying their days in the sun. Hopefully the same mistakes won't be done on the LRS-B program when awarded to NG this summer

As Bogdan says, its "winners profit", yet they have had a 14% reduction in profit this past quarter. Lockheed doesn't make 3000+ JSF's unless it gets the cost down to around $80 Million per aircraft and the BPA is trying to do just that i.e. get the acquisition cost to a point where it is at par with some of the competing 4.5 generation aircraft and within 20% of the cost of US 4th generation aircraft.

As far as the LRS-B is concerned, don't think its NG's to loose but that too isn't a FIXED PRICE contract either (has been announced that it isnt). No one will compete if it is. Once the design is developed, and is mature enough they will most likely shift to some sort of a Fixed Price contract for the latter production batches.

Depot level repair is still an additional cost to the O&M budget of the USAF and USN. It also adversely affects work load requirements at Hill or Warner Robins AFB which reduces overall operational readiness. The services have historically been short on O&M funds as seen during the sequester in 2013

Ignoring that it had nothing to do with what I wrote, but I can say is that how and when concurrency changes are conducted at the depot, is entirely up to the services and the JPO. They have chosen to do them in blocks right before IOC. That is that they best way they have come up with. P&W, LMA or the GAO can't really do anything about it.

So the problem boils down to having information and choosing to not use it as per your own SOP's. P&W develops fixes, presents them to the authorities that have contracted it to do the same (and develop the engine). The modeling runs the fixes and then the authorities decide whether they are moving ahead with them or not. When they do, they begin testing out those fixes. The JPO is only interested in how that testing is going, and whether the issues raised have been addressed or not. If they see a positive coming out of it they begin to draw implementation plans for the fixes. That is what they are doing now. GAO can take the position that it won't account for those fixes until they have seen 100% of the testing results, or until majority of the fleet has had them installed. That is a perfectly legitimate position to take but then those that ultimately decide do so by weighing that against what they hear from the folks on the ground, the people in charge of the ITT fleet, the JPO, the USMC point man for the program etc etc etc. The GAO report presents just one side of the argument, that is quite useless by itself as it only tells us what was wrong with the program in say September 2014. It doesn't say what was being done to rectify those wrongs, and how it has progressed in the 7-8 months since then.

In reality however, the Pre-Trenching fix had begun to be installed in the ITT fleet towards the end of the last year. GAO would most likely have concluded its report by that time. Coming back to April of 2015, all the ITT aircraft have had the pre trenching fix installed except the one that was at Mckinley assigned with climatic testing which should get the fix as soon as it is available to do so.

The bottom line is that, one can read all the reports, listen to all the positions (JPO, CSAF, CNO, USMC Comm. etc) and come to a conclusion. At the moment the program is challenged largely on 4 fronts -

1) Software delays - They built margins in at the Baseline, for the moment 2b and 3i margins are holding. In fact, 2b is likely to IOC within a week of the desired time-frame and a full 5 months before the threshold. Even the remaining MADL patches are expected a full 3 months before the threshold. 3I should not be challenged since it has the same software code as the 2b. Its IOC will likely be within weeks from the desired time-frame. The biggest delay in IOC is actually the capacity to have enough maintainers for the USAF and some depot capacity issues with the USMC. Neither are expected to be major hurdles but are nonetheless long term issues that the services have to deal with.

3F is challenged, and it looks like they may go over the designed margins by a couple of months (2-4) if they are unable to pull back the delay over the next 2-3 years. Worst case they are delayed in getting 3F developed, debugged, and certfieid by 6 months . The 2018 date will still hold, its just that you'd be pushing into Q4.

2) Production Ramp - This is something that is a very REAL challenge (see my earlier posts on the matter). A modern 5 generation aircraft isn't like churning out mass F-16's or F/A-18's and the ramp up, although shifts 300-400 aircraft to the right is still quite ambitious. Lockheed and Pratt&W may run into some significant issues as they ramp up the production by 2-3 times. This is something that would be seriously monitored by everyone and followed closely as it has an impact on delivery dates (with penalties and rewards built in) and the overall cost-redution effort under the blueprint.

3) Acquisition and LCC: Acquisition cost graphs look very good, but they need to reduce the CTOL cost from $108 Million (URF) to $85 Million (22%) as they ramp up the production from 30-40 aircraft per annum to 100+ per annum. LCC cost is another matter as they have to finally begun delivering complete systems and have them perform as designed in order to look at gauging the proper cost, the proper training procedures and how best to allocate the resources. LVC is obviously going to factor in big time here and this is a long term issue that everyone has now begun to seriously address..

4) ALIS: The PHM on the F-35 program was always overly ambitious in scope and what was expected from it. ALIS Block 2 would/should be better but I would guess that they'll take another 5 years or so to get this to perform as they intended it. Most of the LCC savings designed into the system work when ALIS performs as expected. Good news on that front is that they are treating ALIS as a weapons system now as opposed to a logistical system and are likely allocation significantly more resources to it.

The engine availability has been good and what they have found in testing will obviously be incorporated back into the design (Hence the testing). While GAO does not deal with historical developmental projects one doesn't need to be as narrow minded as their mandate. One can compare the F-119/F-135 development with that of the legacy projects in the past. As mentioned earlier, the F-135 and the F-35 has not had a SINGLE flight incident, and not a SINGLE divert due to an engine in more than 30,000 hours of flying. It was an issue last year but fast forward to April 2015, the interim fix has already been implemented on the ITT and the final fix is going to be submitted to the JPO in the next 6 weeks or so. The next engine block that improves performance has already begun to be developed by P&W for the uSN (5% performance improvements) and they are already looking at the future for further performance boost in block4, and block 5. No one is really loosing sleep over the F135 and as we'll learn over the next 12-15 months this issue is going to fade away just as others such as TAIL HOOK, LIGHTNING PROTECTION, FLYING AT NIGHT..HMD have largely faded away. The major issues mentioned above, will persist for another 3-4 years as they are serious and not something that you can do overnight. The JPO has also decided (or actually ordered to) not ask for any additional RDT&E funding over and above what was allocated in long term planning so its not like they can double up on their software teams.

I think you misunderstood me regarding my position on the GAO. Auditing is very good. Transparent auditing is extremely important and neccesarry and the procedures currently in place for this program (and others) are among the most transparent in the world. Having said that, GAO reports as mentioned earlier provide just a snapshot, they can do a 20 page report stating all sorts of things, drawing all sorts of conclusions and in the 4 lines under recommendations mention " GAO is not making recommendations today". What they report may or may not be relevant to the current state of the program, or how it is going to progress over the next 3 years while in the SDD phase. They slipped in the TAIL HOOK issue into 2 reports and regarded that as a significant issue. Yet the folks on the ground, designed, ground tested and implemented the solution within 14 months of discovering the problem and went 124 of 124 traps aboard the CVN with ZERO bolters. As mentioned earlier, its there job to report on issues and not to report on what is being done about those issues - those points are for the developers from both the industry and the civilian and military leadership leading the project to state, lay out and explain. There are some legitimate areas of CONCERN that the GAO highlights, production ramp up and software are most certainly those. But much like the tail-hook issue they also report on areas that have no significant bearing on the overall health of the system or the ultimate goal to conclude the SDD phase in time. The engine issue is likely going to be in that category as the next 12-15 months will most certanly show !

[UlanBatori]

US to scrap JSF program: Military want to buy Indian LCA instead. Cite continuing poor reliability of engine, 75 years after Whittle blew up his engine.

GAO, Pentagon Investigators Find Issues With F-35 Engine Program.
The Washington Post (4/27, Davenport) reports that an audit performed earlier this month by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) determined that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter’s engine has “very poor” reliability and “a long way to go to achieve” its goals. The Pentagon’s internal investigators just released another report that discovered 61 violations in the program’s management by Pratt & Whitney (Blue-Ribbon Judeeshyal Commishun time onlee!). The Pentagon office managing the F-35 disagreed with some of the findings, saying that some of the recommended corrective measures are “unnecessary” and would add to the program’s cost and timeline. The GAO, meanwhile, determined that “improving engine reliability will likely require additional design changes and retrofits.” According to the article, the GAO predicted there would be an increase in “the literature of criticism” as the program continues.

Bloomberg News (4/27, Capaccio) notes that Michael Sullivan, “a GAO director for acquisition who oversees its F-35 work,” said that the data Pratt & Whitney provided the agency included “validated” design changes that have yet to be tested during flights. According to the article, the issue of the engine could be reviewed by Congress, which is examining whether to increase the amount to spend on the engine.

The Wall Street Journal (4/28, Cameron, Subscription Publication) reports that the company claims that reliability issues have already been addressed and that supplier oversight is being added to increase reliability and quality control. The article adds that changes will take two years to implement and that the engine is set to be Pratt’s main growth driver moving forward, but that the company is largely immune to sanctions because no remaining engine option remains*

(UBCN adds: *: That is because Kaveri Engine was scrapped by Modi in protest about his being denied vija. Unfortunately this post would be deleted if posted in the Kaveri dhaga)

Speaking of Program costs: from Wikipedia:

Program cost
Rupees 3 lakh 33,000 CRORES for development, 16 LAKH 44,300 CRORES for procurement, 37 LAKH 17,000 CRORE for operations & sustainment in 2012. And now the cost is ESCALATING!!!

[brar_w]

^^ Design issues are EXPECTED to be found in testing. The RDT&E phase of the program concludes only in 2018. It would be unusual to find areas where design changes are required post that but at the moment, it is the job of the testers to find areas where they need rework, sanction that re-work and incorporate the changes back to the system. There is a reason why you have to fly thousands of sorties in order to test systems.

changes will take two years to implement

The Pace is determined by the users. The USMC gets the pre-trenching on its first 12-15 aircraft around May (2015) and will have them IOC with those changes. Each unit that becomes operational will begin to get the changes incorporated prior to becoming operational. Same thing with the F-35A and the USAF, they get concurrency changes prior to IOC as per their plan. Technically, you could develop a system where the engine fixes are installed first and do so over the entire fleet. Will it be the smart thing to do? NOPE, because you want to club concurrency changes and do most of the work in the most cost effective fashion. So the 2 years isn't that long because it doesn't take 2 years to do the work, its going to take 2 years to bring about the changes because that is how the system has been designed. Meanwhile, in those 2 years about as many F-35's would be delivered on in production as currently flying and most of those would have the fixes installed from he beginning.

[UlanBatori]

But look at the numbers: Fifty six lakh CRORES of rupees. Even by the scale of the desi Coal, Eye-Tee and Bofors scams put together, that is mind-boggling. How many years have they been developing it. AT LEAST since 1985, IMO (don't ask y, just look in Aerospace America's predecessor/ AVLeaks), so that is

And a dud where the engine blows up or the compressor blades rub and cause fires. And these are companies and military services that have over sau saal exbereinj of designing, building, procuring and operating over 100,000 combat aircraft, hain?

Useful to store that.

Plus... for all those herrows here who see Private Enterprise as the Ultimate Solution for defence development..

India has maybe 10 crore taxpayers? 1 crore taxpayers? So average tax bill to develop something like this is between Rs. 5.6 lakh per taxpayer and 56 lakh per taxpayer. For one safed haathi.

[brar_w]

But look at the numbers: Fifty six lakh CRORES of rupees. Even by the scale of the desi Coal, Eye-Tee and Bofors scams put together, that is mind-boggling

The number is 391 Billion for 2400 5th generation fighters. This number includes DEVELOPMENT, TESTING and Acquisition of both the CTOL, CV and STOVL version. Comparatively the French on Rafale has till date have spent some $65 Billion dollars for how many units exactly? 100? 120? You can take the acquisition and development amounts spent by the Europeans on their 4.5 generation aircraft, or how much the IAF is spending to acquire them and 5th generation aircraft. The JSF development and acquisition phase is extremely economical compared to many other projects out there. We are talking about a 2400+ Aircraft fleet here...

How much would 2400+ Su-50's cost? What about Rafales? How much would that program cost the French had they intended on procuring 2400 fighters instead of 180-200? What if the Typhoon production plans extended to 2400 aircraft?

How many years have they been developing it. AT LEAST since 1985

Are you serious? the SDD contract for the JSF was awarded in 2001. Thats when 90+% of your development actually takes place. Even the X plane on which the JSF is based flew in 2000 and that aircraft was only to mature the design-proposal. it was not a full fledged prototype for the JSF. That was the first aircraft to roll out much later, with a state that reflected the design submission that was approved by the program. Even the YF-22 flew, in 1990 and that too, much like the X-35 was not a full fledged reflection of the design ultimately submitted but a mere risk_reduction effort. As per the current time-line, the JSF will reach IOC 14 to 15 years from SDD Award (14 for the Marines, 15 for the USAF) and this is pretty much SIMILAR to what the F-22A did (1991 to 2005) and very similar to other efforts such as Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon etc. The only problem was that they wanted to significantly shave off that time originally, which got added back. They overestimated the speed with which they could reach design milestones, and complete testing. They also underestimated the complexity of the program. Once the time was added back at the baseline, the F-35 basically accomplishes its requirement for IOC in about the same time as 5th and advanced 4.5 generation aircraft before it (provided that those advanced 4.5 generation aircraft are not upgrades like the Super Hornet).

What were they developing exactly in 1985?

And a dud where the engine blows up or the compressor blades rub and cause fires. And these are companies and military services that have over sau saal exbereinj of designing, building, procuring and operating over 100,000 combat aircraft, hain?

No matter how much experience you have in advanced aerospace, you cannot escape developmental issues. Heck this is a reason why the testing parameters, and test points are added with each subsequent advanced project. The F-35 has significantly more test points compared to the F-18E/F, and so does the F-22A.

No one really expects even the most experienced ENGINE MAKERS to sail through advanced projects without any hicups or re-design requirements. If someone does expect that, its an issue with the expectations and them being far from reality.

Also note and compare the F-119/F-135 development to similar program attempts previously. This time it has been much smoother. The Only Class A incident happened on the ground and so far no other engine problem has occurred and the current data is based on 30,000+ hours of flying (many time more on the bench). All you need to do is go back and see the GEW I, and look at the engine issues that plagued the F-15 and F-16. You test the aircraft, stress it on the ground and in the air, push the structure to 100+% of design loads and do all sort of testing. Issues are expected, and the reason that they exceed operational demands is so that they can model for the future at which point the design stresses and/or fails. The Engine pre-trench fix has been installed into the test fleet, a larger fix is going to be approved in late June and that will be end of all this. No one expects this issue to escalate as the current flight time, plus the bench time they have on the F-135 is SIGNIFICANT. Also note that the F-135 is based on the F-119, that has a had a decade of operational experience. You'll find issues in development, and you'll rectify them and this is precisely the purpose of the RDT&E phase.

It is well established that you need at least 200,000 flight hours on the fleet before you begin to have reliable maintainability and reliability data and milestones. That number is expected to be achieved in 2020.

The GAO report was based till the end of Q3 of 2014. Since then they have integrated the PT fix on the ITT fleet and are finishing up the designs for the fleet wide fix that will be incorporated on the aircrafts that IOC in July of this year.

Also note, that there have been multiple additions/improvements to the F-135 as the design has been refined through "lessons learnt" in testing. Not all of those changes are incorporated into the fleet as they are developed/designed. That is a PROGRAM OFFICE decision and you deal with those issues that you haven't yet addressed. If you have reliability improvements but they only exist on NEW aircraft and not on those that have already been produced you don't loose sleep over that because you have a plan to get those changes in prior to IOC (The current concurrency plan). The Engine reliability testing will continue till 2020.

If someone magically gets so experienced in design that they will never have to find faults, and fix them then there would be no reason to have the T&E (In RDT&E) phase to begin with. Mankind, hast gotten that advanced yet and its unlikely that we will ever reach that point.

Also do note from P&W's position on the 61 issues reported by the IG -

Pratt was at pains today to note that the IG report was about “P&W’s quality system and F135 contractual adherence, not an audit of F135 product quality.” During a meeting with reporters today, the company said it would fix all but one of the 61 problems by July. The last issue would be fixed by the end of 2015.

This has been the story with many of these reports that get blown out of proportion. They are written towards the end of the year, based on data that is best from late Q3 of the year, and they are released around Q1 (end) of the next year. Once all the dust settles most of the issues are well on their way to being addressed. In this case, they'll address all but ONE of the issues a full whopping 3 months from the report release.

Plus... for all those herrows here who see Private Enterprise as the Ultimate Solution for defence development..

What difference does the PRIVATE management make here?

India has maybe 10 crore taxpayers? 1 crore taxpayers? So average tax bill to develop something like this is between Rs. 5.6 lakh per taxpayer and 56 lakh per taxpayer. For one safed haathi.

I don't even know what this means? What exactly are you talking about?

Speaking of Program costs: from Wikipedia:

Program cost
Rupees 3 lakh 33,000 CRORES for development, 16 LAKH 44,300 CRORES for procurement, 37 LAKH 17,000 CRORE for operations & sustainment in 2012. And now the cost is ESCALATING!!!

First of all, you have to take costs in dollars. The Rupee cost has no bearing on those developing it since none of the salaries are paid in INR and none of the raw-materials are procured in INR. The salary, labor rates are all different in different countries so you cant take the INR cost for what it is.

The Point still holds, The $391 Billion cost includes all DEVELOPMENT and ACQUISITION for 2400+ Fifth generation fighters. As I said, you can compare this number to the costs others have paid for their 4.5 generation fleets and per capita it is extremely competitive, and this for a system that is designing 3 unique versions which the development cost reflects.

The LRIP 1 to LRIP 8 cost for the program are crystal clear. What has also been released is the cost curve at the moment which uses costing data for LRIP 1 to LRIP 6, and estimates beyond that to FP1. LRIP 7 and 8 on that cost curve have already met or exceeded expectations on cost-reductions. The overall cost of the jet is reducing per year due to reduction in the touch labor both for the engine and the airframe/subsystems and due to other production efficiencies being developed and incorporated into the production process. You can go a dozen or so pages back on this thread, and I have posted graph showing the reduction in cost yoy. The bulk of the cost reduction is expected to be realized when the production ramp ups. They are looking to boost production by around 3 X before the end of the decade, and expect to reduce the cost per CTOL jet by approximately 22% because of that.

[TSJones]

Plus... for all those herrows here who see Private Enterprise as the Ultimate Solution for defence development.

Say what?

[Mort Walker]

^^^What is obliquely being referred to is that the defense contractor can not be exclusively relied upon for IRAD for new technologies as it is inherently expensive. Think of the Apollo Program where there was a significant mix of public, academic, and contracted spending for IRAD which was a success story.

Today, US DoD large procurement of major weapon systems is a costly affair because of what Ike pointed out in 1960. This is fine, according to the public and politicians, as the rest of the world's air forces combined can not defeat USAF & USN air power, but you get to the point where the expenditure is so high, the Dollar figures become mind boggling. Again, not an issue as US debt is in its own currency and foreign bond holders will always think of it as a safe bet for the next hundred plus years. Only problem is, the rest of us don't want our retirement savings to become devalued.

[brar_w]

What is obliquely being referred to is that the defense contractor can not be exclusively relied upon for IRAD for new technologies as it is inherently expensive

Which they aren't at the moment.

[Mort Walker]

What is obliquely being referred to is that the defense contractor can not be exclusively relied upon for IRAD for new technologies as it is inherently expensive

Which they aren't at the moment.

Procurement in the last two decades points to the opposite. After 9/11 it has become only worse.

[brar_w]

Procurement in the last two decades points to the opposite. After 9/11 it has become only worse

I do not understand what you are saying. In the earlier post (which I quoted) you mentioned developing new technology and IRAD. Here you are talking about procurement. You said, that he was referring to much of the research taking place through IRAD. Where is this the case?

hat the defense contractor can not be exclusively relied upon for IRAD for new technologies as it is inherently expensive

Who relies on the defense contractor's IRAD for new technology development? IRAD is a tool the defense contractors use to mature their own capability, in hope of developing a competitive edge when it comes to actually competing for future work. The work is usually in areas where there is a high likelihood of having a program of record in the near to medium term. All other development activity of high end technology whether for a program or for the sake of "developing a capability" is funded by the government. This is true for private defense firms around the globe, be it Dassault in France, SAAB in Sweden, KAI in South Korea, BaE and Airbus in Europe or IAI in Israel. Post Sequester, IRAD has become tricky as many future programs have unknown futures and you do not know how your strategic investments will pan out. Some firms have done better IRAD job than others. Raytheon has hit it big with Gallium Nitride and their investments after loosing to Northrop for fighter AESA radars. That has paid off big time since getting certified for TR7 for them was nearly a year head of their competitors. Their AMDR, and NGJ win can be directly attributed to those investments. Others have made bets as well, for the last 10 years or so Lockheed has continued to pump its own money into hypersonics, inward turning inlets and other highly specialized high speed areas (Mach 5 propulsion from a TurboRamjet, advanced materials for hyerpsonics etc) and have culminated in buying one of two hypersonic tunnels in the US. Boeing have made similar investments, and this should make these two firms competitive on the HSSW contracts that are being awarded next year. If those contracts do not work out, or fizzle out they would be left with a lot of IRAD that has no direct bearing on their bottom line. Thats a gamble companies take with IRAD but @ 3-5% of their revenue its worth it. Boeing has made considerable investments in stealth, to a point where some hints have been made in the media that they may be ahead of both Lockheed and Northrop due to classified internal projects and demonstrations to the DOD.

No one relies on IRAD for any sort of strategic development and research. All research and development is funded by the DOD and allied organizations (DOE for example in some cases).

[UlanBatori]

What were they developing exactly in 1985?

In those dins it was called A-STOVL. For the rest, to quote the immortal words of "The Duke":
If Ah tell ya Ah'm gonna haveta kill ya

Also, I find the hope for 2400 GOTUS purchases to be rather (never mind). Exports to Brunei and Saudi Arabia may account for a few, esp. by the time the Saudi Air Force is reduced to cinders by the Houthis. Though VSTOL operation in a sandy desert should make interesting flow visualization and crash reports.

BTW, if the $85M/unit cost of the F-35 is based on 2400 units, the real per unit cost is going to be something very interesting. I note that F-22 is stuck at 195, at which point per unit cost is ****ONLY*** $180M each.

Figure on a factor of 3 for foreign sales, and the Indian tax base should be enough to buy 1 or 2 of these once the baksheesh is all taken care of. Then the GOTUS will "sell" 40 to Pakistan using US taxpayers' money, no the proceeds from selling the 2 to India

Incidentally, are the engine issues the only major issues identified, I wonder....

[UlanBatori]

The Rupee cost has no bearing on those developing it since none of the salaries are paid in INR and none of the raw-materials are procured in INR. The salary, labor rates are all different in different countries so you cant take the INR cost for what it is.

Not quite. The relevance of JSF to BRF is that it is one option that India may consider purchasing. Surely the promise of STOVL attracts ppl. It is ideally suited for Indian Road Conditions, and no will complain if they do a full-thrust vertical takeoff from one of the National Highways because the potholes and rubble and melted tar splattered all over will be indistinguishable from the rest.

So the relevance is entirely in Indian Rupees because that is what will be converted to the dollars of that time at - what? 63 to the dollar today? 75 tomorrow if they keep buying such things from abroad? And the relevant comparison is to the alternative of making do with Indian-developed weapons systems.

Besides, India needs to seriously look at exporting aircraft, at which point, the LCA looks like an excellent Joint Services weapon platform/system for the US DOD. With a better engine..

[brar_w]

In those dins it was called A-STOVL. For the rest, to quote the immortal words of "The Duke":
If Ah tell ya Ah'm gonna haveta kill ya

The ASTOVL program has no real bearing on the F-35/JSF program. It was a study designed to test out the feasability of having a joint US UK, supersonic replacement for the Harrier. The study concluded that they were not there yet and submitted a roadmap of advancing technologies to "get there". The JSF program started with the JSF program as by the time the JAST studies were conducted they had not narrowed down on things like, size, payload, range or the amount of stealth.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began a program in 1983 to begin looking at the technologies available to design and manufacture a follow-on supersonic replace for the AV-8 Harrier. The program, known as ASTOVL, would eventually lead become a joint U.S.-U.K. collaboration. In 1987 the results of the ASTOVL program made clear that the technologies available were not yet advanced enough to generate a replacement that the U.S. and U.K. would have been satisfied with. At this time, DARPA secretly approached the Lockheed Skunk Works in the hopes that they would be able to develop an aircraft like they had hoped would have appeared from the first phase of ASTOVL. Lockheed told DARPA that they had some ideas that could be matured and that, if they were successful would meet the goals that DARPA was trying to achieve. At the same time, DARPA continued with ASTOVL Phase II as a cover for the covert work being done at the Skunk Works.

So the JSF did not begin in 1985, more than 90% of the development work on this project was begun post SDD award in 2001. You can study how to do things, and who best to design things all you want but in order to build things you need contract awards and funding allocated. That happened post LMA/NG victory in 2001.

If you go back into the program I have posted a Paper from the father of the JSF STOVL propulsion system, in addition to his detailed presentation on how the design came to reality.

Also, I find the hope for 2400 GOTUS purchases to be rather (never mind).

You can continue to believe which ever number is more realistic. Just note however, that if they do not buy 2400 aircraft, they won't spend $391 Billion. So anyone cant have it both ways, i.e. continue to call this a $400 Billion dollar program (Or converting that to INR) and then also continue to claim that they won't build the number that allows them to replace the minimum number of F-16's, A-10's, F/A-18's and Harriers that they want.

Exports to Brunei and Saudi Arabia may account for a few, esp. by the time the Saudi Air Force is reduced to cinders by the Houthis. Though VSTOL operation in a sandy desert should make interesting flow visualization and crash reports

OK. When do you expect Brunei to get the aircraft?

[UlanBatori]

Oh, THANKS! So educated I feel, now. Yep. The A-STOVL had NOTHING at all to do with JSF. Just happens to be also supersonic, Sometimes VL intentionally, seldom VTO. But that is all pure coincidence. Lockheed was certainly NOT working on anything like this in 1985. I see that now!