JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

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brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

NRao wrote:not to burst your bubble:

Image




JK.

To the best of my knowledge ^^ was a lockheed proposal for a DARPA study to find out an optimal super cruising long range strike bomber. No Mach 2-3 stuff but a study that was concentrating on a penetrative bomber that went supersonic throughout its mission in enemy territory. It was just a study.

Actually, if you look at the points coming out of the ACC since 2012 or so, an actual aircraft that looks capable of doing what they are describing as Next generation/future breakthroughs is the Northrop Grumman rendering of a potential next generation fighter :

Image

http://www.dvice.com/archives/2011/08/t ... d_be_t.php

The Boeing and Lockheed designs are for USN submissions and would most likely be a "super Hornet" like upgrade compared to a proper ATF like Next generation effort with the sort of back end technology development required to bring this to reality. I would have thought that Lockheed would have proposed something that was more in line with the ABC program that they are working on, but the slick next generation fighter shown around in their renderings is quite unlikely if those capabilities (that the ACC has been talking about for a few years now) do get an emphasis in design. Whatever it is, we would begin to see activity in the budget soon. The F-22A (production version) first flew just 23-25 years post F-15A (production version) first flight, and the F-35A (production version) first flew exactly 30 years after the F-16 (production design) first flight. Even if you stretch this given that the F-35 acquisition could make up capability being lost through F-15's you would still want a CDR by say 2030 with a 2035 Induction into service, a full 30 years after the F-22A declared operational status.
brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

koti wrote:Canada's take on Rafale, EF and JSF
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articl ... ns-407025/
The problem with the argument is mainly that it tries to project what sort of missions they are likely to perform over the next 2-3 decades. Sure, if you want to hunt terrorists and do your basic air policing there isn't really much difference between the F-35 , the Rafale or even buying some used F-16's and upgrading them every now and then.

The problem then comes with projections. Do you buy something that is cutting edge now, and likely to be cutting edge through upgrades 3 decades from now, or do you buy something that is getting dated, has a very small customer base and therefore huge risk per capita on funding relevance.

Even if we assume that the long term financial impact of the JSF buy compared to say a typhoon or a rafale is 25-30%, it is more then made up through the increased security that is provided by having a program who's further development is subsidized by the 2500 F-35's the Pentagon is ordering. The rafale would do well to produce close to 200 for the french (the original producer)...

Another advantage of the F-35 to the Canadians is work share. The current work-share that is guaranteed, is from a numerical point of view larger than the entire Rafale production program. Canada is guaranteed production work proportionate to their investment in the program for the first 200 or so units produced. Beyond the 200, provided they order the F-35, they can further compete for the rest of the 3000+ projected orders. These orders are not a guarantee, but even if they win half of that work it makes a huge difference in the sort of direct funding that would go into their own aerospace industry over the next 2 to 3 decades.

Lastly, the JSF is a multi-decade program. So if the NATO missions set changes or takes a different route, all the Canadians have to do is follow up or piggy back on what the JSF partners are doing. If they invest in the Rafale or the Typhoon, they are essentially investing in a system that is unlikely to be in production a decade from now. Any change in strategic focus for them would mean a completely new program from an acquisition point of view, and given how messy these things are it would most likely be avoided if possible. As far as the JSF is concerned, there are already proposals for a Super LII for the FA-x program.

Bottom line is that they can re-coup a lot of the increased cost of procuring the F-35 by just pushing their orders back. If the batch costs stay on the trajectory they will cost between 80-85 million around 2018 orders (Recurring fly away)..So Canada could order lesser in the LRIP's and more in the Full scale production batches and chip away at the cost advantage of buying older generation aircraft. That will most likely happen, as has been recommended by the official committee of experts set up by the Canadian government to decide on the matter. Staying in the program makes perfect sense from an aerospace industry perspective in Canada. Industry there has made internal and government funded investments to position itself and becoming competitive for the work it wishes to compete for in the next 2 to three decades. The scenario from the aerospace industry pov, is to either support the most popular next generation aviation program around, or dump everything and acquire older gen aircraft and have those companies work out a new offset package, which may or may not be sustainable for decades to come.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by member_28476 »

The current work-share that is guaranteed

Absolutely not. And Dassault agreed to guarantee workshare and financial offsets contractually.

About costs, canadians do not share your opinion... 2014 eval of lifetime cost is 141 million C$ than 2013
brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

The current work-share that is guaranteed
According to the contract they signed the work-share has been negotiated as per the rules and regulations they have signed the contract under. Every nation competed for work for the LRIP stage of the program and the Canadian companies are currently getting the work thy bid for and secured (given that only a few of the LRIP slots are left now). So what I meant was that a vast majority of the Low rate initial production work has been WON or secured by the canadian suppliers. Till LRIP 7 this was around 600 million and it won't be a stretch to say that it would get closer to 750 million before the program transitions towards full rate of production. Given this close to 80% of the work that they were destined to compete for given their initial investment has already been consumed by the program and it is quite likely that most of the remaining would also be consumed by the time they decide on a fighter. So for that portion it is virtually a GUARANTEE in the sense that its "money in the bank" for Canadian industry. This would change when the next phase comes into the equation, however they have been preparing for that phase both the companies themselves and the industry at large since they signed up - So yes, the Canadians should have a very strong idea of how competitive their industry is and how work-share they can secure given they have been at it as an industry for the last decade or so.

So though it is not guaranteed, they have concluded LRIP 8 negotiations, which leaves 2 or 3 more LRIP blocks to go. The current deliveries are at 115 with 2 full LRIP blocks paid for and expect to be delivered in the coming 2 years. The real bidding war that is to begin is going to do so at the larger contracts, and that is what all the OEM's partnered have been preparing to compete for. That is also when each and every Industrial partner, big or small has to "ramp" to go from the current rate to a rate that is 3 times or greater. Of course the model there would be a competitive one, all companies have been preparing for that day.
And Dassault agreed to guarantee workshare and financial offsets contractually.
Which any company bidding would do if required. If the Canadians wish to hold a competition, have an offset requirement each and every OEM will meet that. However, when they chose to enter as a partner, they made the tradeoff that each and every nation did i.e. they chose to compete for workshare at different stages and as a result enjoy the fruits of potentially securing a very large portion of workshare compared to their own internal order. Britain for example spent 2 Billion as a partner and would acquire less than a 100 aircraft yet they could compete for a much larger percentage of the workshare compared to the proportion of their order.

Similarly, if the canadians decide to exit the program as a partner, delay the decision, launch a program to procure fighters and ask for an offset as part of the deal then lockheed would have to offer that offset. No OEM holds a financial advantage by providing an offset, each OEM working for this program has enough business on its books to offer an offset if required that would more than satisfy Canada. The problem is that Canada chose itself to become a partner on this project, and because of it can compete for work for the entire 3000 aircraft projected order (of course the work isn't guaranteed but the process is competitive) which their industry has been preparing to do since they joined.
About costs, canadians do not share your opinion... 2014 eval of lifetime cost is 141 million C$ than 2013
The lifetime cost is going to be damn impossible to gauge, just look at the revisions to the CAPE estimates that we discussed a few months back on this thread (Go back a dozen or so pages). Furthermore, the O&S cost for he F-35 is an estimate that itself has been all over the place since it is the least mature platform compared to the competition. This is all but natural - and expected. The Fleet stands at 25K hours or near about spread over three different variants with half of the order book having concurrency changes identified but not yet implemented (the latter half of the blocks had comparatively fewer concurrency changes). Given all that, it would take probably another 3-5 years at a bare minimum to come to a firm figure on O&S costs that have any meaningful use as a predictor against competition that has operational jets with tens of thousand of fleet hours, and in some cases hundreds of thousands of fleet hours of hard operational data. If you want to compete with even older systems, you would find more certainty. This is a risk that you enter into when you acquire an aircraft that is still in development. However, a decision that is delayed till 2016-2018 would give them a year+ of hard operational data from the Marine Corps or even the USAF to base their decision on. Most do expect this thing a fight over Boeing and Lockheed.

Personally, I see this as a delayed decision to procure the F-35, as per the original plan i.e. Canada exercises its options under its partnership status (No obligation to do this however, as the options are not binding for any partner). Having said that, the argument that Dassault or Boeing has a "killer" offset deal means little against the F-35. Lockheed can easily match anything, be it 100% offset, 200% offset or whatever given their aerospace portfolio and working with Canadian aerospace industry. Lockheed, Boeing and BaE can easily do this. For that, the Canadians would have to change course, give up their right to compete for program work as a partner and ask Lockheed to compete with a formal bid and be prepared to loose out on all the work they have been gearing to compete for since they joined the program. Most partners aren't looking to do that (in fact ZERO are), and for good reason. The process isn't designed to be disruptive. Competition exists to keep every industry partner honest, they aren't trying to stir the pot every few years and shuffle the work (that adds cost) so most industries know where they are competitive and how much work-share they can realistically win.

Canada's work-share (for which they would have to compete) was to be around 12 Billion dollars. Out of this so far into the program they have already contracted (i.e. won) around 600 million dollars worth of work before ordering even a single F-35. Of course they have to compete for all the remaining 11.4 Billion dollar work-share that was laid out for them, but they know exactly how competitive they are. There is nothing stopping them from getting out of this arrangement, signing an FMS or a Commercial deal for the F-35's and asking lockheed Martin for 100% offset for the amount of the deal or any other amount that they wish to secure. However, their industry has prepared long and hard, made internal investments and spent a lot of time preparing itself to be a supplier for the larger JSF program. Their contracted work already exceeds their contribution to the program by more than 2X. Getting out would mean that they would have to change course as an industry and prepare to absorb work for different programs given that no offset would be exactly the same work they have prepared to do for the JSF. Industry usually wants certainty, so I fully expect the more than 30 Canadian suppliers to lobby hard in favor of maintain the arrangement that currently stands.

Offsets in general are suited for those OEM's that do a lot of business and have a lot of production contracts from which they can spare business and use that as an offset for one program. None of the companies bidding here be it Dassault, Lockheed, Boeing, BaE, P&W, GE are small companies. All have a diverse portfolio of products and given say a 8 - 10 billion dollar deal, they would have absolutely no problem in providing the level of offset that Canada may wish to have. For the C-130 deal, lockheed bid with a 150% offset deal iirc.

BTW: Boeing is damn close to securing another 12 months of production, on the back of 15 additional growlers that were previously listed as "desired" but not funded by the USN under what has now become a post-sequester courtship with the lawmakers. This gives them further breathing room but I still doubt that they have much of a chance in Canada or anywhere else outside of more growler orders for the USN.
member_20292
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by member_20292 »

brar_w wrote:
mahadevbhu wrote:Brar_w,

Not that it's a bad thing, but you do work / have worked at Lockheed? It's a good place to work?
No, have you? If you'd bother to read some of the references I have posted for majority of my arguments, you'd find that I have tried to avoid posting "OEM origin" material as much as possible. I have stuck to posting things that the operators, tacticians and strategists working on the operator side are claiming. Only time one is forced to source from OEM material is when one is looking at OEM timelines such as annual milestones etc. Other than that, for more than 90% of the technical characteristics of the jet one can find it through sources that do not market or have a financial stake in the program.
Would love to work at lockheed but cant due to citizenship requirements.

Your posts are extremely informative, and useful. They do come across as though you had a professional interest in putting them on the internet, perhaps as a "review writer/educator" for the US def-mil complex in general. Not that it's a bad thing or proscribed - I'm sure a lot of employees of various orgs post here.
brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

They do come across as though you had a professional interest in putting them on the internet
I can assure you that the only interest in participating is to as a aerospace enthusiast, and that I have nothing to do with the defense industry. I will soon have a blog up (hopefully early next year) and have a few things I have ready pertaining to Electronic Warfare and the stealth R&D evolution (a topic well researched but not presented very well in my opinion by journos) that I would be posting about.
as a "review writer/educator" for the US def-mil complex in general.
Even on the www and the blogging world , there are plenty of folks who are far more informed on this matter than I am.

http://www.elementsofpower.blogspot.com ... mplex.html
brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

A tid bit (s): The Carbon Polymide fix for the P&W F-135, designed and paid for by P&W/UT went into flight testing on October 26th and Pratt would be introducing the results into later Lot 8 engines. The entire retrofit of the solution which are not very significant would be paid for by United Technologies, for all the 115 aircraft currently flying and those that are in production before the fix is fully tested and approved.

Furthermore, recently the F-22 and the F-35 flew first of many integration missions (pics posted by me earlier), it appears that the ACC would soon (perhaps for the 2016 budget cycle) issue RFI for fully integrating the two enterprises. As the matter is up to the ACC the process would be driven by the pilots and what they have to say about the best way to integrate the two aircraft. F-22/F-15C integration would begin around Q2 of 2015 when Boeing delivers the first pods for the F-15C upgrade. Apparently the eventual goal of these integration flights is to move from simple integration roadmap definition to full NIA/D3 activity in support of the ASBC as the IOC date of 2016 for the US Air force gets closer.
brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

This one is between Boeing and Lockheed with the latter being the overwhelming favorite. There may be twists and turns on their eventual accusation, but the only outside, freak chance is for Boeing and it would be a rather poor decision.

Like I mentioned earlier in my previous post the production competition and the partner status is determined by Canada and not the JPO, US government, USAF or any other agency. If Canada thinks that it cannot compete for the 12 billion dollar work it has been selected to compete for, then by all accounts all that they have to do is withdraw as a partner, ask Lockheed to bid for an FMS or a commercial deal and offer an offset as per the RFP issues to them. They can get the usual offset deal that is based on the dollar amount of their order. Of course in that case their industry would no longer be contractually guaranteed to participate in the competition for business on the industrial program. Under such a pre-condition, there is absolutely nothing that Dassault can offer as an offset that Boeing, Lockheed or the Eurofighter consortium cannot match given that these OEM's have a large enough portfolio to fund 8-10 billion $ worth of offset work that is likely to be demanded. I am sure plenty of other industry partners would be more than happy to increase their contribution and make up for Canadian industry's loss of work. Canada can safely get out as a partner and still would have secured more than 2 X worth of industry work (compared to what they chipped into the program). They are however likely not leave and would most likely order the jet (competition or no competition) as a partner nation and through the JPO with the industrial network they put in place years ago. They have made the back end investments (they as in Canadian industry) and are prepared to reap the financial rewards over the next decades. Its not something that is very tough to comprehend, multi-national large projects are run this way. Only difference between this and some of the others is that this one has competition as an element and does not guarantee work-share to the sub-contractors at all cost. Of course industrial participation would begin years before you actually sign up. This is again the only way to do this and not some rope through which Canada has been tied into the project. The bet prospects for the Rafale and the typhoon in my opinion are in he middle eastern market where the US congress is not likely to allow the JPO to aggressively market the F-35 until the first IDF squadron is established. That gives a few years for Boeing, Dassault and others to push through deals and this is where BaE and Dassault have long established relationships.

The competition clause in the program is also, like I mentioned not put in place to be a disruptive force in the industrial production. They did not want to be like a Eurofighter program with rigid defined work-share percentages. Each partner chips in according to its contribution upfront and gets a set work-share for which it can compete. Competition is in place to keep the industry honest, efficient and keep a check on price. The same thing is being baked into the O&S contracts that are just now coming out. Competition however does not mean that if Canada competes for 12 billion worth of work, they may only end up securing 5 billion. The entire process has not been designed to be disruptive and most industry partners selected have been done after carefully looking at their roadmaps to ramp up and their ability to deliver on quality and cost.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by member_20292 »

brar_w wrote:
koti wrote:Canada's take on Rafale, EF and JSF
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articl ... ns-407025/
The problem with the argument is mainly that it tries to project what sort of missions they are likely to perform over the next 2-3 decades. Sure, if you want to hunt terrorists and do your basic air policing there isn't really much difference between the F-35 , the Rafale or even buying some used F-16's and upgrading them every now and then.

The problem then comes with projections. Do you buy something that is cutting edge now, and likely to be cutting edge through upgrades 3 decades from now, or do you buy something that is getting dated, has a very small customer base and therefore huge risk per capita on funding relevance.

Even if we assume that the long term financial impact of the JSF buy compared to say a typhoon or a rafale is 25-30%, it is more then made up through the increased security that is provided by having a program who's further development is subsidized by the 2500 F-35's the Pentagon is ordering. The rafale would do well to produce close to 200 for the french (the original producer)...

Another advantage of the F-35 to the Canadians is work share. The current work-share that is guaranteed, is from a numerical point of view larger than the entire Rafale production program. Canada is guaranteed production work proportionate to their investment in the program for the first 200 or so units produced. Beyond the 200, provided they order the F-35, they can further compete for the rest of the 3000+ projected orders. These orders are not a guarantee, but even if they win half of that work it makes a huge difference in the sort of direct funding that would go into their own aerospace industry over the next 2 to 3 decades.

Lastly, the JSF is a multi-decade program. So if the NATO missions set changes or takes a different route, all the Canadians have to do is follow up or piggy back on what the JSF partners are doing. If they invest in the Rafale or the Typhoon, they are essentially investing in a system that is unlikely to be in production a decade from now. Any change in strategic focus for them would mean a completely new program from an acquisition point of view, and given how messy these things are it would most likely be avoided if possible. As far as the JSF is concerned, there are already proposals for a Super LII for the FA-x program.

Bottom line is that they can re-coup a lot of the increased cost of procuring the F-35 by just pushing their orders back. If the batch costs stay on the trajectory they will cost between 80-85 million around 2018 orders (Recurring fly away)..So Canada could order lesser in the LRIP's and more in the Full scale production batches and chip away at the cost advantage of buying older generation aircraft. That will most likely happen, as has been recommended by the official committee of experts set up by the Canadian government to decide on the matter. Staying in the program makes perfect sense from an aerospace industry perspective in Canada. Industry there has made internal and government funded investments to position itself and becoming competitive for the work it wishes to compete for in the next 2 to three decades. The scenario from the aerospace industry pov, is to either support the most popular next generation aviation program around, or dump everything and acquire older gen aircraft and have those companies work out a new offset package, which may or may not be sustainable for decades to come.
And that's why we should also buy the JSF.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by vishvak »

As an aside, read the bottom message: link - it is a pointer to third last message: link.
The NATO block F-16A/B sale is virtually a repeat of the earlier F-104 strategy, Lockheed really learned from it`s successes! European partner Countries were not just buying and affordable allround good modern fighter for their airforces, they were just, once again, lighting the "fire" that would sustain their local (high tech & good jobs) aerospace industries for decades into the future. Armament compatibility is really a key aspect because as all hade learned in the Cold War if the situation ever heated up their own weapons stores would last only a number of days before new units broght in from the US caches located across the Atlantic were flown in.

And there is more: France, for instance, could never realistically expect to match such sort of operational (but in reality, economic!) advantage the US brought to the table...

The NATO countries that bought the F-5A/Bs (Norway & Spain) for instance new they were getting a second tier fighter, but also knew thay that was WHAT ALL THEY COULD AFFORD and what their local industries could build, nothing more then that.
Note that all recent air wars that were fought since the first Gulf War in 1991 have not NEEDED Stealth fighters to arrive at a favorable result for the winner. They are certainly "nice to haves" but no one can say in all truthfulness (like for instance the VERY relevant advent of Tomahawk cruise missiles!) that they were or still are indispensable or a prerequisite for aerial victory. The way I see it, the stealth aircraft's formost advantage is for the airforce that knows that they will be the ones STARTING the next war, the ability to count on the fact that you will always have the initiative. To be able to sneak with absolute discretion into the enemy's air defence environment well before their missiles start flying is a key motivator for stealth purchases.

Now in all sincerity how many countries you know that can justify this NEED for assured preemtion, besides the USA or the UK and France in a rather distant 2nd and 3rd place. I personally just don't see that many clients drooling for 200 million dollar (oops! Please excuse me, I meant to say "63 million dollar" ) a pop next generation fighter jet... For me the 4++ generation is here to stay.
It is one thing to be another NATO country, quite another to be joint development partner of 5th Gen fighter jet program.
brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

A rather poor way to put things (framework). Sure, stealth jets were not the key to win the previous wars. None of the previous wars were against any adversary that required them in great numbers. However, has NATO made a strategic decision not to be competitive against a near peer? Is it a part of their policy? The IAD trend both from a near peer and a lesser opponent would continue to favor stealth aircraft over non-stealth aircraft. Simply put, for a fighter decision that would have an impact on fast-jet fleets for 3-4 decades (as most tend to keep them that long through sustainment and followups) what sort of impact would survivability have on the overall decision making. Is a block 60 F-16 or Gripen as survivable in 2040, as it was in 2000's? In the end you aren't getting into a "stealth" race like a speed race etc, what you are essentially doing is maintaining your survivability that you have become used to with advanced F-16's, F-15's and other modern 4th generation aircraft into the future. Fighters take a long time to develop, and serve for a very long time. The F-16 production version first flew in the 70's and would be in service somewhere even in the 2030's if not later. Stealth is no longer a "nice to have" feature, but is something that is a necessary feature on all future products, and its just not the pentagon coming to the conclusion, its the Koreans, the Japanese, HAL/ADA, Russian, Chinese and Turkish OEM's as well. The entire plan is to keep the F-35 relevent over the decades. The F-16 was a great example of this, by 2004-05 they had delivered an F-16 varient with an AESA radar, an Active embedded Electronic warfare suite, 2nd generation IRST and updated mission computers that were at par or ahead of any western fighter operational by then. The industrial strength of the program allowed them to achieve this and remember what the UAE got was a lesser of the solutions General Dynamics/Lockheed presented to them. The original block was to be much more aggressive in performance and technology.
As a contrast the smaller programs are only now fielding AESA radars (rafale has about a dozen while the Typhoon is still testing their, and the Gripen would have something with the E varient around 2018 or so iirc). The F-16 has 3 on offer and had one in the air around early 2000's..

This was the main reason (If someone followed some key players from the USAF back in the early 2000's, like Wynn or Jumper, deptula etc) why the USAF chose to neglect overtures from the UAE and not develop the original F-16E which even some of the Eurofighter folks claimed “It would have killed us,” from an industrial perspective. The reason was quite simple, stealth was no longer considered a luxury but something that would be pivotal in ensuring survivability, and access and the way to tilt the balance in your own favor when your key enemies were designing complex A2AD elements. The JSF marked a shift from stealth as a silver_bullet force to a global force of stealth aircraft. The goal was and is to shrink the overall RCS of the fleet through the acquisition of 1000s of Stealth aircraft thereby complicating the A2AD designs of the opponent. The F-22 and F-35 are one layer of this, the LRS-B and the UCAV's are another. For many NATO countries, the F-35 is simply going to give them in the 2020-2050 time-period the same level of performance that the F-16 gave them earlier. These nations did not have to bear the brunt of the developmental costs, and would therefore only have to pay for a higher upfront cost (a portion of which they can push back through delayed acquisition- leveraging on the USAF and USN/USMC's own demand for 100+ fighters per year for fleet replacement) and O&S costs. The major advances in the F-35 come form BIG DATA, information gathering and SA buildups and the ability to process and share large volumes of data. This is enabled by stealth..Simply put the F-35 and F-22 are able to do a lot of the things they do because they CAN operate in the forward edge of battle-space (FEB) while the other aircrafts CANNOT. This is hugely important given the recent comments claiming that the USAF does not expect its E-3 fleet to operate 200nm from A2AD elements leaving the SA picture to be built up through distributed sensors and platforms such as the F-22, F-35, UCAV's and the future LRS-B.

In the end, large aerospace projects are very reliant on an industrial partnership and network. Every major OEM knows this be it Dassault, Eurofighter consortium, heck even SAAB is now forming partnerships with Brazilian industry and seeking ties with HAL as a "consultant" and what not. The US program has a huge domestic market, so for them making it international has a very easy component that a larger portion of the cost and ultimately "risk" would be borne by the pentagon. Thats a huge advantage from a marketing perspective given how many nations in europe post-cold war decided to pursue lower risk solutions.
It is one thing to be another NATO country, quite another to be joint development partner of 5th Gen fighter jet program.
From a Canadian perspective, their investment into the program was for an industrial reason. They secured more than 2X the work compared to the money they spent. They were never obligated to make purchases but their industry does have an opportunity to secure up to 12 billion $ worth of work which is going to be much larger then their purchase cost of the F-35.

The best way to get a feel of this is to actually study the way the USAF seeks to use the F-22 and F35 and the future aircraft destined to be integrated with them. We can talk specifics if you so desire.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by vishvak »

I am fine with 'talk'ing specifics, however mostly I will just read and use my comprehension skills. But that is about it I think.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by NRao »

A very interesting take:

A New, "Super" F-35 to Rule the U.S. Military?
Advanced derivatives of the tri-service Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter could replace the Air Force’s F-22 Raptor, Boeing F-15C Eagle and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, multiple sources told the National Interest. However, they added that the idea of replacing the high flying and fast Raptor with the slower and less agile F-35 was not well received by many within the Air Force.

“No doubt that the F-35 will be doing air dominance missions in the future,” one industry official said. “Especially with more internal air-to-air, and maybe a new engine.”

Both the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and the U.S. Navy (USN) have begun preliminary work on analysis of alternatives (AOA) for the sixth-generations of those aircraft. The Air Force effort, called the F-X, is aimed at recapitalizing its fleet of air superiority fighters while the Navy’s F/A-XX program is expected to produce a replacement for the Super Hornet. The Navy will start its formal AOA in 2015 while the Air Force’s analysis will start a little later—in about a year and a half from now.

The Air Force hopes to enter into a technology development phase in 2018.

While both the Navy and the Air Force are looking at many possible options to replace their jets, including modernized versions of current aircraft, new clean-sheet designs—manned and unmanned—and some other outside-the-box ideas, one of the major contenders to replace the F-22, F-15 and F/A-18E/F is a highly modified F-35.

“It will likely be one of the alternatives in the Analysis of Alternatives,” said a senior Air Force official.

The Navy, too, will likely consider a highly modified F-35 to fit its F/A-XX requirement, service officials confirmed. “We will both have to do it in order to baseline our capabilities and ensure the taxpayer and services are getting the best alternative,” the Air Force official said. “It's routine for us to look at whether or not existing systems or modifications to existing systems can fulfill our gaps.”

The Air Force official added that another alternative will be to modify and upgrade the tiny 186 aircraft-strong F-22 Raptor fleet. “Modifying the Raptor will be an option too,” he said. “I doubt either the F-22 or F-35 will ‘win.’”

The Air Force and Navy are adamant that their disparate mission requirements for the F-X and F/A-XX will mean that they will ultimately require separate solutions. “I would expect our requirements to be a lot different from the Navy’s,” Col. Tom Coglitore, who heads Air Combat Command’s Air Superiority Core Function Team and the F-X program, told the trade journal Aviation Week in its Oct. 13 issue. “Our system of systems would be more offensively minded and operate in more difficult and highly contested areas of operation than the areas the Navy will likely be operating in.”

Industry officials, however, are less certain that the Air Force and Navy will ultimately be able to afford separate platforms to replace their aging fleets. The most likely scenario is that budgetary realities will force the two services to develop a common platform. “USAF and Navy can ‘afford’ to have differences now, since everything is pre AoA. However, fiscal realities will force them to align technology and weapons investments,” the industry official said. “Their differences stem primarily from out-of-phase need dates, and different capability emphases.”

Given that defense spending does not look like it will increase in the near future—especially in the coming years when technologies for the F/A-XX and F-X will have to be developed—advanced versions of the F-35 might be the best option for the Air Force. “The USAF will need to factor F-35A—and ‘E’—into the air dominance equation,” the industry official said. “Especially when it’s loaded with next generation air-to-air missiles, and other technologies.”

The Navy, given the limitations of aircraft carriers and their increasing vulnerability to anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, might have to concede the high-end air superiority mission to the Air Force.

Arguably, the service already gave up that role with the demise of the Grumman F-14 Tomcat fleet and the cancellation of the Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter and A/F-X programs during the 1990s drawdown.

“The Navy may need to be content with ceding the uber-air dominance mission to the USAF due to the geometric constraints of their ‘mobile airbases,’” the industry official said.

A Lockheed Martin official would not provide any information on advanced F-35 derivatives that are currently in the works—but acknowledged that such projects are underway. “We cannot provide any details on either of these topics given their proprietary nature,” company spokeswoman Heather Kelso said.

Operational Air Force pilots with air superiority fighter experience were less than enthusiastic about the prospect of the F-35 replacing the Raptor or F-15. “I hope they get that we need to be well beyond the F-35 in the future and recycling a ramped up proposal isn't going to be good enough,” one senior officer said.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

So to begin we can go into how the F-35 fits into the Concept of Air operations in the future against a near pear adversary, how the designers and operators wish to use the E-3/JSTAR and what sort of complementary "integration" is projected to happen as a result of all of this coming together. The status quo with F-16 operators within NATO, the USAF is to use the E-3's, as a mothership providing SA through common comms and providing the sort of early warning, surveillance required to position both in the Air and for the ground formations (JSTARS). Well this is about to change significantly. The 21st century CONOPS does not envision either the E-3 or the JSTARS force to be survivable anywhere close to the FEB. The number most thrown around is 200nm or so. AWACS killer weapons would push this further especially when enemy stealth fast-jets would be able to exploit openings in your own defenses (gaps due to the shrinking sensor effect).

The current ACC efforts is to clearly define what operates inside the Forward Edge of the Battle-Space, what operates behind it, how those inside connects to one another, and how those outside connect to those inside sharing information for SA build up and targeting purpose. The first elements are concentrating in integrating the F-22 and F-15C , because this would the bulk contribution of the ACC both to the command and to NATO if and when required. The second phase is obviously F-22-F-35 and F-35-Legacy integration the former of which has just begun while the latter has been a work in progress for a while (Since the CNI requirements were written essentially). Then comes toe follow-on to the overall effort which is integrating the global stealth fleet. This is going to concentrate on the ADL (advanced data link) that is most likely going to come from the black world and specifically the LRS-B program. Those in the loop have referred to these efforts as ultimately leading to a "Tower of Babel concept" This is the prime difference between a force structure that is interoperable i.e a Typhoon or Gripen or Rafale that can talk to the F-35 using the lowest_denominator in the Link 16, vs a platform that is integrated with the F-35 (like another F-35 or a future F-22 upgrade) that can share a 100% of the SA through the MADL. Everything is seamless and because you are dealing with the same mission computing you have the same processes showing up to you. Unlike the F-16 , F-18 where you have different radars with different capability that for example lead to an evolution of tactics on how to use the Radar-AMRAAM combo in an actual battle (This is described in depth in the 50+ Page Tron/Electronoc Warfare White paper presented earlier in this thread). Ultimately they want to distribute the sensors and the weapons, so you need to have an integrated Electronic warfare structure where a smart stealthy UAV such as the RQ-180 (Who's existance USAF admitted just this year) armed with a very powerful Electronic warfare suite (passive) can send geolocated data to the F-35 that has the integration to use it directly for targeting. Or to further go into this, an F-35 operating along side a RQ-180 and using a combined passive suite to geolocate an aerial or a2g emitting threat. As your threats become more advanced (AESA, faster computing, DFRM etc) you need this sort of integration to control the Electro-Magnetic Spectrum.

Like I mentioned earlier, the F-22 and indeed the F-35 concept of operations is and I quote Sect. Wynn (retd.) " To be the last shooter in offensive enterprise and be the first shooter in the defensive enterprise. This is because, the assets in the FEB should be kept as "silent" or stealthy as possible to maintain their advantageous position of being inside the enemy's IAD being able to passively pick up a lot of information for targeting purposes. Secondly, you are limited in your magazine depth, 6 for the F-22, 4 for the F-35 (likely to be 6 in the future for the AMRAAM class and more for the SACM as per the graphics i posted in the international aviation thread sourced from F-16 website).

So under the CONOPS, future A2AD would be dealt with through integration and not having a mothership floating around "hand holding" platforms like in the past. NATO assets need to embrace this integration if possible and the best way for the smaller nations to do so is to procure the F-35, a complex multi-role fighter who's cost has been massively and almost exclusively (as a percentage of the total) been subsidized by the Pentagon. Here the advantage of say a 25-30% greater cost upfront is that you are fully invested and integrated with the USAF's investment to get this platform as integrated as possible with the overall high_end force and therefore need not make the investments that you may never be able to afford, or may not have the technical competence to pull off. Not only is the F-35 stealthy, relevant for future threats but it starts off as more capable, with a very high number of order form the Pentagon (2500) that is bound to keep it cutting edge just as it did with the F-16 that had delivered an AESA to a customer along with a host of other things now considered essential in a post-2010 environment in the early to mid 2000's.

So this is the advantage that an F-35 holds for a NATO customer that is looking at this for a 2020-2050 time-frame, and being able to do what it did with say the F-16's in the 90's into the future as part of the NATO mission that itself can change from High end to low end to high end back again. Most of these nations are looking at 30-100 F-35's and not investing in stealthy strike UCAV's and what not. For them one fast jet or strike platform is all they would contribute to NATO.
A very interesting take:

A New, "Super" F-35 to Rule the U.S. Military?
A Duper Lighting II is perfect for the USN, while grossly inadequate for the USAF. The USN wants a cheap way to replace Super Hornets in the 2030+ time-frame (perhaps later). The USAF wants an advanced 6th generation figther that no doubt would be designed for and by the ACC around the F-22 mission set. Using the F-35 advanced as a replacement for the ATF (or whatever capability is added on top of the ATF to get to the F-22 replacement) is like suggesting the F-16XL as an F-15C replacement for the ATF.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

^^ Just to follow up with References and some background information, since i did not have time to put them up earlier:

1) The "Tower of babel concept" and the integration of the tactical fleet both inside and outside of the FEB was succinctly described by the panelists (particularly Retired Sect (USAF) Wynn) in the 21st century warfare Combat Cloud panel talk held at the last Air Force Association symposium this September. Not sure whether the podcasts of these events are available to non-AFA subscribers but do google around and you may be able to find some information. I'll try to download the thing and try to upload on filieuploader or something if anyone is interested.

2) Phase I of the ACC pushed integration effort between the Raptor and the F-15C is taking place under the Project " Talon Hate" that would enable the F-15C's to open communication and data sharing channels with the F-22's using the LPI/LPD IFDL data link waveform. At the moment the F-22 can only listen to the F-15C through the Link 16 as the F-22 lacks the Link 16 transmit capability due to Stealth and Emcon. Adoption is going to begin in frontline units around June-July next year and while they are at it, Lockheed has also provided an IRST on the same TH pods for the F-15C's. The point is that the F-22, operating deep inside the FEB can translate SA to the legacy jets behind that may have to be the shooters or may have to plan a strategy to deal with threats coming there way.

3) The Next Phase i.e. linking up the F-35 to the F-22 began in the lab a few years ago with different solutions being developed by different OEM's responding to the ACC request. Lockheed's proposal that seems to be the front runner is called Project Missouri with the data links utilizing L band sensors in the wings of the F-22 and the F-35 to send tactical data without being detected (LPI/LPD). If and when the F-22 gets an MLU they would swap the Mission computers with those of the F-35's (as has been the plan) and would most likely then also install MADL. MADL is for tactical formations while the larger L band sensors would connect say a group of F-22's, operating at 50K feet on a CAP and the F-35's operating on mixed missions at 30K feet spread out over a wide area.

3) The Electronic Warfare/Tron warfare white paper has been previously posted just a few pages back but here it is again: http://sldinfo.com/flipbooks/21st%20Cen ... 20Warfare/

4) The existence of the RQ-180 was confirmed by Lt. Gen. Bob Otto, the point man for ISR on June 9th of this year ( unfortunately, the link I have is for subscribers of AFA only so I'll have to swallow a bitter pill and give you a David Axe link even though I go out my way to avoid most of his non-sense)..

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/the-ai ... 2453e109ff

5) The Original F-16E which the UAE would have funded into a F-16U would have been something with a brand new Delta Wing, more composite use and much better performance overall. The UAE were willing to put the hard cash down to develop it but wanted a guarantee that the USAF would sign on to a percentage of the total production for their own combat units. The USAF of course had war-gamed their own scenarios for the 21st century and had figured that legacy would not survive against a near peer. But since I quoted, here is what Sweetman claimed an Eurofighter Team member told him:

The UAE was ready to pay the development bill—the F-16U promised range that would get the aircraft well into Iran—but imposed one condition. The U.S. Air Force would have to buy one combat wing’s worth of F-16Us.

It was a show-stopper. The Air Force had decided that all its future fighters would be stealthy, and the project to replace the F-16 was folded into the Joint Strike Fighter program. The F-16U would be a distraction at best and a competitor at worst. Eventually, the UAE bought a simpler adaptation of the F-16.

Some years later, I was talking with some people on the Eurofighter Typhoon program and mentioned the UAE’s delta F-16. “It would have killed us,” one said.

Below is a graphic showing a potential U variant Viper. The advances tried and developed/tested for the F-16 at the various stages would have pretty much kept it at par or ahead ( par on capability, ahead on cost and affordability) of fighters like the typhoon, gripen and rafale if ever implemented. The thing had a working AESA before or at the same time as the F-22A, had an active embedded active warfare suite before many and had a very competent Passive suite a completely overhauled M2M interface etc. The advantage for the F-16U if it had replaced US and NATO F-16's would have been the huge volume that would have lowered the cost significantly and essentially scaled down on a lot of lesser western projects from an industrial size perspective.

Image

6) Other links on Big data, information dominance and the general CONOPS have been posted by myself over the last dozen or so pages including pilot views on the CONOPS and how they need to change given a significant shift in capability between legacy and 5th gen and given the changing nature of A2AD.

The biggest "hint" or rather a confirmation comes from The recently retired ACC boss and the at times outspoken Mike Hostage, who said that the current ranges, and even red-flag are grossly inadequate to challenge the information warfare capabilities of the F-35 and F-22. He led the investments into LVC adoption and integration and says quite openly that without this technology being adopted and incorporated in the training, one cannot train modern 5th generation F-35 pilots or challenge them against developing threats.

I don't think anyone can put it better then him, the SLD articles earlier have talked of this in-depth. Red Flag outside of Red Flag (3) is not going to be the most challenging for future generation of combat aircraft so while red flag and actual training would play a huge role in preparing future 5th generation pilots, the only real way to challenge the Man and the Machine with complex scenarios is going to be through the Virtual Construct especially when the goal is to overwhelm the fusion engines and make the pilots prioritize tasks. The physical ranges are grossly under-powered and technology now allows one to develop huge virtual red-force capability that through the construct can be transmitted to actual airborne assets. Just imagine, a Growler in the Air being fed RF data on a virtual Chinese radar set that it then has to develop tactics to neutralize. The thing shows up as Emissions on the actual combat sortie in the air, while the emission is being designed, manipulated on the ground through the virtual machine.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KCC-fqj ... =WL#t=1621
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by member_28714 »

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/new ... 892?page=2

Advanced derivatives of the tri-service Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter could replace the Air Force’s F-22 Raptor, Boeing F-15C Eagle and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, multiple sources told the National Interest. However, they added that the idea of replacing the high flying and fast Raptor with the slower and less agile F-35 was not well received by many within the Air Force.

“No doubt that the F-35 will be doing air dominance missions in the future,” one industry official said. “Especially with more internal air-to-air, and maybe a new engine.”

Both the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and the U.S. Navy (USN) have begun preliminary work on analysis of alternatives (AOA) for the sixth-generations of those aircraft. The Air Force effort, called the F-X, is aimed at recapitalizing its fleet of air superiority fighters while the Navy’s F/A-XX program is expected to produce a replacement for the Super Hornet. The Navy will start its formal AOA in 2015 while the Air Force’s analysis will start a little later—in about a year and a half from now.

The Air Force hopes to enter into a technology development phase in 2018.

While both the Navy and the Air Force are looking at many possible options to replace their jets, including modernized versions of current aircraft, new clean-sheet designs—manned and unmanned—and some other outside-the-box ideas, one of the major contenders to replace the F-22, F-15 and F/A-18E/F is a highly modified F-35.

“It will likely be one of the alternatives in the Analysis of Alternatives,” said a senior Air Force official.

The Navy, too, will likely consider a highly modified F-35 to fit its F/A-XX requirement, service officials confirmed. “We will both have to do it in order to baseline our capabilities and ensure the taxpayer and services are getting the best alternative,” the Air Force official said. “It's routine for us to look at whether or not existing systems or modifications to existing systems can fulfill our gaps.”


The Air Force official added that another alternative will be to modify and upgrade the tiny 186 aircraft-strong F-22 Raptor fleet. “Modifying the Raptor will be an option too,” he said. “I doubt either the F-22 or F-35 will ‘win.’”

The Air Force and Navy are adamant that their disparate mission requirements for the F-X and F/A-XX will mean that they will ultimately require separate solutions. “I would expect our requirements to be a lot different from the Navy’s,” Col. Tom Coglitore, who heads Air Combat Command’s Air Superiority Core Function Team and the F-X program, told the trade journal Aviation Week in its Oct. 13 issue. “Our system of systems would be more offensively minded and operate in more difficult and highly contested areas of operation than the areas the Navy will likely be operating in.”

Industry officials, however, are less certain that the Air Force and Navy will ultimately be able to afford separate platforms to replace their aging fleets. The most likely scenario is that budgetary realities will force the two services to develop a common platform. “USAF and Navy can ‘afford’ to have differences now, since everything is pre AoA. However, fiscal realities will force them to align technology and weapons investments,” the industry official said. “Their differences stem primarily from out-of-phase need dates, and different capability emphases.”

Given that defense spending does not look like it will increase in the near future—especially in the coming years when technologies for the F/A-XX and F-X will have to be developed—advanced versions of the F-35 might be the best option for the Air Force. “The USAF will need to factor F-35A—and ‘E’—into the air dominance equation,” the industry official said. “Especially when it’s loaded with next generation air-to-air missiles, and other technologies.”

The Navy, given the limitations of aircraft carriers and their increasing vulnerability to anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, might have to concede the high-end air superiority mission to the Air Force.

Arguably, the service already gave up that role with the demise of the Grumman F-14 Tomcat fleet and the cancellation of the Naval Advanced Tactical Fighter and A/F-X programs during the 1990s drawdown.

“The Navy may need to be content with ceding the uber-air dominance mission to the USAF due to the geometric constraints of their ‘mobile airbases,’” the industry official said.

A Lockheed Martin official would not provide any information on advanced F-35 derivatives that are currently in the works—but acknowledged that such projects are underway. “We cannot provide any details on either of these topics given their proprietary nature,” company spokeswoman Heather Kelso said.

Operational Air Force pilots with air superiority fighter experience were less than enthusiastic about the prospect of the F-35 replacing the Raptor or F-15. “I hope they get that we need to be well beyond the F-35 in the future and recycling a ramped up proposal isn't going to be good enough,” one senior officer said.


Another added that it was physically impossible for the F-35 to match, much less replace, the F-22. “F-35s will never be able to sit at the table with F-22s in the realm of air-to-air and SEAD/DEAD [suppression of enemy air defenses/destruction of enemy air defenses],” the senior Air Force pilot said. “Doesn't have the performance, doesn't have the payload, doesn't have the stealth.”

Another highly experienced F-22 pilot was equally unenthused about the prospect of an advanced F-35 derivative—even if that new variant was equipped with an advanced adaptive cycle engine. “That would be a really bad idea unless they finally got enough thrust with two engines!!” the pilot said. “It is an underpowered airplane from what I hear from my bros flying the jet. But, we have leveraged our tactical aviation future on this aircraft, so I guess we have to like it...”
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

^^ This article is posted just a few posts above your post

As I explained earlier, it is nearly impossible to have the F-35 take over the F-22A mission set, unless that mission set itself changes. The F-35 in a different avatar is nearly perfect for the F-18E/F mission set given the strike and EA/EW role the Navy wishes to use the F-18E/F in the future. If the USN can morph itself to Bob Work's plans for the UCLASS then a modified F-35 looks even more impressive for the Super Hornet replacement in the post 2030 environment. When the ATF designs were laid out to the operator it was for a requirement that required them to go high, go fast and have a limited number of mission sets in an eastern european context. Your tradeoff was payload flexibility, interoperability and range and therefore Pratt and GE were tasked with the bypass ratios that they delivered. On the F-35, the requirements were payload flexibility, range over speed and performance at the 30-40 K range. Of course the F-35 is still a competent A2A platform due to its information assimilation, stealth, sensor fusion but its A2A in today's context is comparable to what an F-16 delivers as opposed to what an F-15C delivers (thats by design). Its a multi-role, swing role, omni role type fighter that can switch quickly from one mission set to the other and has the capability to do multiple mission sets with a degree of capability.

The Article by Majumdar does not name a single source as opposed to no less than the man in charge of all USAF tactical fighter aircraft's claiming on multiple occasions that the F-35 is much stealthier to the F-22, but Dave shows quite clearly how the F-35 is built around a different need. Its like Asking GD/LMA to morph the F-16 into an aircraft that would eventually replace the F15C's and be a substitute for the F-22A. Its not going to happen, just as even things like the M2K or the Rafale cannot meet the F-22 requirement. Like the F-16, the operators would build tactics and capability to use the sort of advantages that come with the JSF and as such it would offer great utility compared to single_mission focused aircraft. Its a fleet commander's dream given how easily it can swing from dropping bombs as a CAS platform to forming WAN and LAN's at 40K feet operating with other F-35's, LRS-B's and F-22's.

The USN has pretty much outsourced the A2 AD Air Dominance Mission to the USAF and as such would most likely not look at the high_high mission set on a carrier. They would stick to offensive strike and EA/EW while using NIFFCCA for fleet defense and using the USAF to grant them access to a certain point/region. As such they would most likely not want to spend a whole lot of money maturing things like Variable Cycle Engines, Directed Energy Weapons and what not.

Had they been in that business they would have had this (NATF) ;) instead of the Rhino. Ultimately the USN knows that they can afford to spend less on breakthrough technologies for fighter jets (or other air to air platforms) because the USAF has their back and is making those investments for future products. They know that they would have things like the F-22, F-35, LRS-B, RQ180's, B-2's etc to go into A2AD and deal with it.




On a more serious note, this (below) article sheds a better light on the entire process of next generation. While it is the purpose of any ANALYSIS of ALTERNATIVE to look at bringing the current options to fulfill future mission-sets (thats the entire point of going through this bureaucratic process) using a modified F-35 as an F-22 replacement is quite unlikely unless a dedicated F-22 mission aircraft goes unmanned.

What's Next: USAF Lays Groundwork To Replace Fighter, Tanker Fleets
WASHINGTON — As US Air Force leaders gather this week outside of Washington, they bring a warning: Potential adversaries are spending big on technology, and the US can’t afford to fall behind.

Much of the focus of the Air Force Association conference will be on a series of recapitalization programs that will get underway in the next few years. But even as the Air Force tries to inject new systems into its fleet, it has its eyes on the horizon and what could be the next wave of recapitalization programs.

The most notable is the program known as “F-X”, “next-generation air dominance” or, much to the chagrin of the service, “sixth-generation fighter.” This would be the replacement for the F-22 and provide air dominance for the 2030s, 2040s and 2050s.

“It’s not a big money driver at the moment, but it’s really important for the future of the Air Force and I personally am going to spend a lot of my energy on it,” said William LaPlante, Air Force undersecretary for acquisition. The program is also a priority for Gen. Mark Welsh, Air Force chief of staff, and Pentagon acquisition head Frank Kendall, he added.

Air Force critics are quick to point out that the F-35 joint strike fighter, a fifth-generation jet, is still in the early stages of production — and still struggling with development and testing challenges. Why, then, should the Air Force be spending funds to develop a new fighter?

Col. Tom Coglitore, Air Superiority Core Function Team chief at Air Combat Command, said the timetable actually lines up with the development of other air dominance fighters, such as the F-15 and F-22.

“We’re at that point that we need to be thinking about replacement for capabilities we have today, because 15-20 years from now the F-22 will be 30 years old,” he said. And unlike their bomber cousins, which have notoriously long lifespans, “these platforms are sometimes pulling 8 or 9 Gs a couple times a day. We stress the heck out of them.”

The Air Force wants to complete its analysis of alternatives and begin Milestone A, the first real step in an acquisition program, in the early fiscal 2018 time frame, Coglitore said.

That’s an “aggressive” schedule, warned Mark Gunzinger, a retired Air Force colonel and now a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

“I think that is pretty optimistic,” he said, considering that significant questions remain about what the next-generation system might look like — and whether it would be a “fighter” at all.

“There needs to be a great deal of work to assess how a family of capabilities could create an air dominance environment that will enable ISR/strike platforms to penetrate and operate effectively in contested areas,” Gunzinger said.

The Air Force is at least open to the idea of not following the traditional fighter mold.

“We’re not presupposing that this is a 9 G aircraft and manned with two tails, two engines and a gun,” Coglitore added. “It could be an unmanned platform that only flies around at 2 to 3 Gs, perhaps. It’s whatever will take us to achieve the capability to fill that gap we see out in the future.”


LaPlante said he is “very interested” in incorporating autonomy into the program, but emphasized the service needs to think hard about distance.

“We have to remember the world is the world and we can’t predict where we may have to put these things, particularly because of basing. We’re going to have to think about how to have air dominance globally,” he said.

“So what technologies do people bring up? It’s hypersonic, it’s variants of new engine technologies like the adaptive engines we’ve got, new directed energy type weapons, those are the classic ones folks talk about.”

The timetable for directed energy weapons is still “the great unknown,” Coglitore said.

“There are a lot of things to solve, but if you look around the world, lasers have made significant progress over the last decade or two,” he added. “Whether it’s mature or effective enough is something that we will need to determine.”

Directed energy weapons have been identified as a service technological research priority, but if it is going to reach its potential, it needs to have a steady funding stream, Gunzinger said.

“There are things that can be done to operationalize directed energy weapons in the near term — it’s no longer a pipe dream,” Gunzinger said. “The directed energy timetable for some weapons may now be driven more by the lack of resources rather than technological maturity.”

Coglitore’s team is also exploring incorporating open architectures, which he called “the wave of the future.” Coglitore brought up a hypothetical of a system similar to an iPhone that can be upgraded through downloadable apps without the need for hardware replacement.


In the end, the advances being made and promised through the ADVENT, AETD, and AETP programs (The first is virtually finished with the third one yet to start) would force them to re-visit combat aircraft designs in light of the capability that propulsion would enable. Any modified F-35 that accounts for the fact that the propulsion has matured to a point where the bypass ratio can be controlled mid-flight would be so highly modified if required to fully utilize this capability that it would form a cost/risk perspective would be like a clean sheet design.Much of the delays and cost overruns for the JSF were due to its innards and STOVL requirement, none of which are a major concern for the F-X so they can go and ask for a clean sheet design that utilizes a lot of sensors and software and fusion engine from the JSF program and then spirals it into a full fledged modern fighter.

http://www.gereports.com/post/78469596586/the-superjet

To put things in proper context, there were prototype 5th generations fighter's (YF22 and YF23) flying with Prototype Variable Cycle Engines (YF-120) in the early 90's. the USN would require a strike aircraft that replaces the Strike and Anti-Shipping surface warfare mission of the E/F, and takes over the Growler mission set. The EA/EW mission itself would evolve due to embedded sensors. Based on this even the current F-35C with minimal modifications can take over a lot of the mission sets and a 2030 upgrade can easily address other mission sets. Until and unless the USN demands an NATF type capability, there is really no need for them to look at a clean sheet design.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by Cosmo_R »

The "highly modified version of the F-35" is likely replay the Hornet vs. Super Hornet video. They both look similar except they are two different planes and so will the 'Super Lightning' :) and it will probably have two engines :).

This will enable everyone to say it's not a new program.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by Cosmo_R »

The GEreports superjet engine reminds of the Miller Light beer commercial (the one with Swedish bikini ski team): "More taste AND less filling"
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

It will be highly unlikely to see the Next version of the F-35 incorporate twins. The Follow-ups to the ADVENT program (AETD and AETP) are seeking to develop the prototype engine in the 45,000 pound class and this is likely to be the bulk of the next generation propulsion investments being pushed through by AFRL and other organizations. The future engine available is likely to have 10-20% greater thrust than the F-135 and would be a adaptive variable cycle engine allowing greater gains in performance and endurance. The complications associated with designing a radical upgrade the likes of which would warrant a twin solution would most likely make ti worthwhile to start with a fresh clean sheet design since producing airframes is the least of the costing headaches.
AETP is aimed at finding mature engine technologies that will feed into an engineering and manufacturing development program, according to Pentagon documents. The eventual goal is to design, build and test a 45,000lb-thrust-class fighter engine
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articl ... er-403255/
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by Cosmo_R »

brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

brar_w wrote:Here is an interesting piece of information from a British instructor on the F-22 (that lacks an IRST or anything similar to a EOTS or DAS even a podded solution)..

His credentials : Group Captain Paul Godfrey, OBE , has extensive experience of a range of combat aircraft through Harrier, F-16 and Typhoon.A Harrier weapons instructor, he was the first non-US national to fly the F-16 CJ operationally in the SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence) role whilst on exchange with the USAF and has spent the last 10 years in the Typhoon program with two flying tours including 4th/5th generation fighter training with the F-22.


This is what he has to say:
Godfrey has been involved with Typhoon training with the F-22.

Based on that experience, Godfrey commented

The F-22 has unprecedented situational awareness.

And working with Typhoon, the F-22 enhanced our survivability and augmented our lethality.

The F-22 functions is a significant Situational Awareness (SA) gap filler for the operation of a fourth generation aircraft.”

He underscored that, as good as the F-22 is, the enhanced fusion engine and advanced combat systems of the F-35 are a significant force for overall defence transformation.

“Indeed, the impact of the F-35 will be felt on the total UK defence force; not just on the RAF. It is a force multiplier, and can be used to help transform our combat forces, to do what you have called force insertion.”

Godfrey emphasized that managing the force mix was an essential part of introducing the F-35 into the UK service.

We will be using 4th and 5th generation aircraft for a long time in what we believe will be an incredibly potent force mix;

And on the Queen Elizabeth carriers will be mixing rotorcraft with fast jets and other combat capabilities as well to further enhance our power projection capabilities.
Question: How will F-35 work with Typhoon?
Group Captain Paul Godfrey: The F-35 has unprecedented situational awareness and ability to provide information dominance.

It can handle the 360-degree battlespace and manage the gaps which the Typhoon may not see.

It is also a question of the ability to manage information, which the F-35 excels in doing.

The F-35 is designed to be able to show the pilot situational awareness in a large single display, which is essentially the single version of the truth, if you like.

Clearly, other aircraft have different displays that show you what’s out there, and a certain level of fusion, but there are always gaps; I think it’s key that we use the F-35 to fill those gaps.

As demonstrated with the Typhoon/F-22 synergies, we will be able to get closer to the threat with the F-35 and to enhance the probability of kill for the entire combat air fleet.


http://www.sldinfo.com/the-royal-navy-a ... h-carrier/
More from Group Captain Paul Godfrey fromJanes360
"When the F-35 comes into service it will bring the combat mass plus its unique capabilities," said AVM Waterfall. "It's going to be able to go in and perform the air superiority role, defensive counter-air and also it will have capability in the suppression of enemy air defences [SEAD] role."
Gp Capt Godfrey said the huge advantage of the F-35 is its flexibility. "You have that 'day one' entry capability dependent on the threat. However, 'day one' could also be close air support in a non-threatening environment or overwatch of a NEO [non-combatant evacuation operation]. 'Day one' means all sorts of different things and this aeroplane can do it all. All the things we've been trying to get good at over the years are the baseline with this aircraft," he said.

"I think the primary issue is mission data. I would genuinely put the UK as world leaders in mission data manipulation for the Typhoon. This is a mission-data-fed aeroplane. Clearly Typhoon is as well, but not on the scale of the F-35. For us to be able to do what we need to, to operate the way the UK wants to operate, is huge, which is why the up-front investment has gone in to allow us that freedom of action."

The F-35 on Final Approach
The huge, hyper-complex F-35 strike fighter program, rightfully described as the Pentagon's most expensive—and most capable—fighter aircraft project ever, is only seven months away from its most critical milestone and acid test: operational service.

The program is tightly focused on giving the Marine Corps everything needed to declare initial operational capability with the F-35B variant by July 1, 2015. The list of essentials includes 10 identical aircraft with the 2B version of software, trained pilots and maintainers, an adequate stock of spare parts, and mission computers fully loaded with combat-relevant data. There's a countdown calendar in the program office's conference room, marking days to Marine Corps IOC, and for the Air Force's, 13 months later.

"As you can see, we measure it by the day," F-35 Program Executive Officer Lt. Gen. Christopher C. Bogdan said at a late October press conference. The July 1 goal is still in force, he said, even as he acknowledged "we've got to work …really, really hard" to make it.

Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor on the F-35, with BAE Systems and Northrop Grumman as principal subcontractors.

A problem with the Pratt & Whitney engine, causing an F-35 to burn in June at Eglin AFB, Fla., and causing a series of groundings and flight restrictions, "put us behind … about 45 to 50 days," he observed. Flight tests can be made up, but that puts pressure on certifying the full combat envelope before July. Another challenge is the mission data files. As Bogdan explained, "We populate the brains of the airplane with all kinds of information about the threat data and about the [geographical] area" in which the F-35 is expected to operate. That data loading is done by Air Combat Command, and it's trying to do it for the Marine Corps and the Air Force at the same time. The work is done at Eglin, the only "factory" loading those files right now. More such programming centers are being set up, but the mission data represents a "risk" to IOC, Bogdan admitted.

"We have a throughput problem," he said.

Still, even with these pressures, "there's no way in the world" that Marine Corps IOC will be late by months.

"We're talking weeks, here" on "a program that's been years late" in the past, Bogdan pointed out. And "I see nothing in front of me" that indicates the IOC will slip past the "threshold" date—the no-fail, must-happen deadline—of late 2015.

At the Air Force Association's Air & Space Conference in September, Bogdan said Air Force IOC is "in even better shape" than that of the Marine Corps because there's a further year to hit the necessary marks. He assessed Air Force IOC in August 2016 as "low risk, quite frankly."

By late October, however, he'd become "very worried."

The Maintainer Challenge

In developing beddown plans, the program office told the Air Force "you have to have about 1,100 maintainers" to declare IOC, Bogdan explained. However, USAF had planned to bring about 800 of those from the A-10 program. It takes far less time to convert an "experienced" maintainer from one aircraft type to another than it does to train a new maintainer.

"So here's where the problem comes in," Bogdan explained. If Congress doesn't allow the A-10 to be retired, a far greater proportion of F-35 maintainers will be inexperienced airmen, and "it's going to take me longer" to train them. The difference could be nine to 12 months. The program office was working with the Air Force on a solution, but didn't have any answers yet.

Maintainers and flight test schedules have little to do with the F-35's technical capabilities, however, and in his AFA speech, Bogdan said technical issues are being systematically retired, even as new ones emerge.

Software, he said, remains a chronic challenge, but code-writers still have some schedule cushion. Fixes have been determined for the engine problem. Parts supply is a major headache and the logistics system is still being figured out, but a whole raft of previous headline-grabbing problems—including a jittery helmet display, a tailhook redesign, a fuel dump issue, and certification for flight in thunderstorms—are all effectively resolved.

Costs continue to fall. Bogdan has predicted the fifth generation F-35's unit cost, by 2019, will be comparable to that of fourth generation fighters.

The F-35 project is enormous by any standard. It will produce at least 3,243 aircraft to meet the needs of three US military services and at least 11 foreign countries, with three variants replacing nearly a dozen other types. Besides the airplane itself, it involves a simulation and training system; depots and field maintenance; creation of a "global sustainment" enterprise with foreign companies and support facilities; tactics development; and more.

Since he took over as program manager two years ago, Bogdan said he's worked to ensure the myriad elements are "moving in the same direction" with a holistic approach—something not done early in the project. Consequently, progress has not been "as fast as we would really like," but "any time we try and fix one thing on the program, we've got to make sure all the other pieces and parts are moving together in a synchronized kind of way, so that when we do deliver a weapon system, it's all ready to go."

Bogdan has also pushed to balance the risk borne by contractors and the government. Contractors have stepped up to accept responsibility for deficiencies and bear the cost of correcting them, he said.

More than 100 F-35s are flying at eight locations—Edwards AFB, Calif.; Eglin; Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth, Texas, location; Luke AFB, Ariz.; MCAS Beaufort, S.C.; MCAS Yuma, Ariz.; NAS Patuxent River, Md.; and Nellis AFB, Nev.—with two depots established and a final assembly and checkout facility in Italy now active. There will be 22 or more operating locations within five years. Basic F-35 training has been underway at Eglin for more than two years. Marine and British pilot training for the F-35B is in progress at MCAS Beaufort. The international F-35A training center at Luke has received the first nine of an expected 144 aircraft.

The F-35A version to be used by USAF is a conventional takeoff and landing airplane. It's the simplest of the three, with the lowest cost, though it alone carries an internal gun. USAF has never wavered from its requirement for 1,763 of these fighters.

The F-35B is the short takeoff and vertical landing model. The most complex, it employs a "lift fan" behind the cockpit as well as a series of air inlet doors, wing vents, and a downward-rotating main exhaust, all to enable vertical flight and hover. It will be first to achieve IOC because of the urgency of replacing the AV-8B—and because the B model got extra attention early in the program when it was overweight and suffered from other problems, since resolved.

The Navy version is the F-35C, with larger wings and control surfaces to give it extra range and controllability for aircraft carrier landings. The Marine Corps will buy 340 F-35Bs and the Navy 340 F-35Cs. The first F-35C landed on a carrier in November.

The development partners—Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey—together have a requirement for 612 airplanes. Israel, Japan, and South Korea have ordered 101 airplanes collectively under foreign military sales, a number likely to increase. Singapore is also a participant, but has not yet ordered any aircraft. Including the partners, Lockheed Martin forecasts an international market of 1,500 aircraft or more.

Air Force acquisition executive William A. LaPlante, in his own AFA speech, said the F-35 has been "remarkably stable in the last year and a half." He offered a succinct program summary: "IOC for the Air Force is two years away. Challenges are ALIS [Autonomic Logistics Information System], availability/reliability, keeping the parts moving. 3I software still needs to be finished, but it looks like it's still on track. 3F software somewhere between zero and five months behind. There, I just gave you the F-35 status."

Although there will certainly be more things found in flight test, Bogdan said there are two main things that F-35 stakeholders should watch closely: software and rework.

Some 10 million lines of code support the F-35 and its logistics system. The software is delivered to the fleet in blocks, each of which builds on the last and adds more capability. When one is being delivered, the next is being developed or flight-tested; there are various subreleases within each block.

The Software Problem

The 2B block, which will equip the first operational Marine Corps jets, uses all the flight test-vetted flight control software, along with capability for basic weapons—such as the AIM-120 AMRAAM, laser guided bombs, and Joint Direct Attack Munitions, or JDAMs—plus more sensor modes and data links.

The 3I block will include some new capabilities, but will be hosted on new, faster processing hardware. The 3F block—the end-state software for all the services' first operational F-35s—will add even more sensor fusion, more sensor modes, and a greater variety of weapons. Air Force IOC will be declared with 3I software. 3F is to be ready in 2017, months before Navy IOC in 2018, but all versions will eventually get it. Some 99 percent of all F-35 software has already been written, and 90 percent is in some level of testing. Requirements for a Block 4 version are being discussed.

"You always hear that our software's been delayed. True statement," Bogdan said in his AFA speech. However, "we built some margin into our plans," so there would be cushion between the due date and the must-have date.

"We built six months of margin into that plan from the very start." He said, "We're not at the point where we've moved any major milestones on the program."

However in an interview, Bogdan admitted that the 3F software is, "no kidding, two months behind in flight test," meaning that all the margin has been used up—and then some. Moreover, "I'm carrying four months more of risk downstream." He thinks those months could be recovered, but software remains one of the "big schedule drivers … that worry me."

Rework is another. "Every lot of airplanes we deliver … is different [from] the one before it," Bogdan explained, because flight test is ongoing, and as new issues crop up, they must be corrected. The production line is adjusted accordingly, but aircraft already delivered to the field must be modified to keep them current with the latest configuration. An "awful lot of airplanes" must be modified "at different times, for different things," and Bogdan called this effort to attain a common configuration "a monster."

The problem is parts. "We are stressing the supply chain … to do three things at once: produce parts for … production, produce parts for current sustainment of airplanes in the field, and produce parts for kits for modifications." From the same supplier, that can mean three different versions of the same part.

"We really didn't take a disciplined, systematic approach to the mod program until last year," Bogdan admitted, because the program was focused on "pumping airplanes out." Setting hard IOC dates forced the program to confront the mod issue.

The Marine Corps needs "58 different modifications to those 10 airplanes" to achieve IOC on time. They are grouped in three depot-level activities and "one or two field-level activities." Rather than take the time to send all the airplanes through depot, field teams have been dispatched to make the changes wherever the airplanes are.

There's room for guarded optimism because more suppliers are coming on line. "The way Lockheed structured this was, as the ramp rate went up, that's when the industrial participation for partner countries started to kick in," Bogdan explained. This year the program is set to produce 43 airplanes; next year, 57 in Lot 9; and in Lot 10, 74. "So between now and three years from now, we'll [nearly] double production," and after that the rate goes to 117 a year. More production means more parts being generated and more suppliers.

The numbers matter quite a bit. Bogdan said that holding quantities intact—high volume—accounts for 80 percent of the unit cost of the airplane. "If you built the perfect production line and wrung out all the inefficiencies in it, you'd save only 20 cents on the dollar," he said. Still, on a program now valued at about $800 billion, including 53 years' worth of support, that's a big deal. Everything possible is being done to push costs down.

After an F-35 executive steering committee meeting in June, Pentagon acquisition, technology, and logistics chief Frank Kendall said the program would seek to stabilize the ramp rate—at risk in the US due to the likely return of sequester in Fiscal 2016—by finding ways to fill in with foreign buys if the US defers some of its F-35 purchases.

Typically at maturity, a program will seek permission from Congress to enter "multiyear" status—a commitment to buy a certain number over a given period beyond the usual two-year budget cycle. With more certainty about what they'll be building, contractors can hire and train a more efficient number of people and order materials in more efficient quantities. It always saves money.

The F-35 isn't considered mature enough for a multiyear contract yet, however, so the program seeks to bring in partner production early, for those air services that already have approval from their governments to buy their share of F-35s.

"Bunch that together, contract for it one time, and then reap those savings," Bogdan explained. The supply chain, he said, "is thirsting for this. They want it really bad, because they'll have years of known production now where they can invest and drive costs down." For Lockheed Martin, "it's good … because they know what's coming instead of year by year by year of guessing. For me, [it's fewer] contracting actions, and the savings are there to be had." Foreign partners will buy on the same contract as the US government, with "a separate set of terms and conditions for that block of airplanes."

Bogdan wants to get the F-35 flyaway unit cost down to about $85 million—in 2010 dollars—by 2019. As part of that effort, he's entered a deal with the contractors called "Blueprint for Affordability." Under it, the builders invest about $170 million in materials, processes, or parts changes to reduce costs.

Lockheed Martin F-35 program manager Lorraine M. Martin, briefing reporters in September about the initiative, said it "saves the government approximately $1.8 billion by 2019" and will reduce the cost of each F-35 by about $10 million.


Some 66 such projects are underway. They include changes to the way the canopy is made; the old method had repeatability problems and rework created waste. For an investment of $342,000, there will be savings of $31.5 million, Martin said. Other projects include robotic painting, producing rudder parts with less touch labor and weight, and virtual testing. The projects are the most surefire among hundreds suggested by the major suppliers.

Stealthier than a Raptor

The contractors will get their money back out of the savings generated.

"Here's the part I like the best," Bogdan said. When the government and Lockheed Martin agree to a project, "I get to book that savings before it ever happens," meaning the expected cost reduction is included in the first production lot after the project is approved.

"When I go in to negotiate Lot 9, right off the negotiated price comes … the return on investment savings for that initiative, whether it happens or not." In order to get paid back, "Lockheed needs to make it happen" and so has a strong incentive to make the improvement pay off quickly. Down the road, Lockheed Martin's lower costs turn to profit, while the government reaps the savings for every lot thereafter.

The cost of the F-35 will be the least of the Pentagon's problems, however, if the airplane doesn't perform as needed.

Gen. Gilmary Michael Hostage III, then head of Air Combat Command, said at AFA's September conference that the F-35 "has drawn a lot of criticism" for some of the sacrifices USAF has had to make to pay for it. However, "it is my professional judgment that recapitalizing our aging legacy fleet with a fifth generation capability is a national imperative," he declared.

Hostage caused a stir in late spring when, in press interviews, he said the F-35 would be stealthier than the F-22, its larger USAF stablemate. Conventional wisdom had pegged the F-22, with its angled, vectored-thrust engines, as a stealthier machine than the F-35. Hostage also said the F-35 would be unbeatable when employed in numbers, which is why the full buy of aircraft is "so critical."


"I would say that General Hostage … is accurate in his statement about the simple stealthiness of the F-35 [with regard] to other airplanes," Bogdan said in the interview. The statement was accurate for radar cross section, as measured in decibels, and range of detectability, he said, and he scoffed at the notion that anyone can tell how stealthy an aircraft is just by looking at it. <----- Clearly he hasn't visited internet forums :rotfl:

The comment about the effectiveness of F-35s together "has less to do with stealthiness and more to do with overall survivability," he said.

"We are going to ask the F-35 to do things that no other airplane—fourth gen or otherwise—is going to be able to do in the future," he stated. For some of those missions, "it would be much better to do it with more than one F-35."

Besides their stealthiness, the F-35s share information and can perform electronic warfare, electronic attack, and cyber missions.

"When you put two F-35s in the battlespace, … they become even more survivable when they do it together," Bogdan asserted. With two or more, "the sum of the parts is greater than the whole," especially when the aircraft are teaming up "from different parts of the airspace, on the same targets. It becomes quite effective."
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by SaiK »


I liked the clean grab and lift up by the tailhook.
brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

This should put the earlier interpretation of the Luke report to rest. As I said in a rebuttal to that, the Marines were trying to find ways of upping the sortie generation rates in very hot conditions so as to lower turn around times. The aircraft without any of the painted trucks or tents still meets the KPP's. It is a function of how to improve and as such a doctrine and SOP concern.

Hot fuel not an issue for F-35, Pratt, Air Force say

Remember, the Aircraft office, the Customers within the US DOD, the foreign partners are promised an aircraft that meets the KPP's set (revised) in 2010, and as such none of this was tinkered with for the fuel. If a service, a nation wishes to improve any single element of its performance be it range (New engines for example), stealth (new coatings for example) or sortie generation rates then they can do so.
brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

Cosmo_R wrote:
Malayappan wrote:Rafale deal deadlock

Interesting Author name! :-) He has had to add a 'Rao' to stay different!
^^^"The answer to both is that India is not allowed to buy the F-35. The Russian PAK-FA far off in the future is the only way India will get stealth aircraft, so for now it has to settle for improving the BVR capability, so it needs the Rafale because the Rafale has a good radar and weaponry to match. "

Obama and Ash Carter would like nothing better than to make a quick sale of 60 F-35s. LM will rush to build a second line in India if given half a chance. There's a lot of fear that UK, Italy, Spain and others will not be able to exercise full options. Japan, Singapore, SOKO and Oz all will 'hope' for interoperability and for economies of scale.

And of course, our friends the Israelis can sense the potential for their 'upgrades'.

I don't know where that article in NITI is headed. All directions apparently.


@ Cosmo, for the JSF program the ultimate numbers acquired is less important than the speed. If the Italians decide to buy less overall as opposed to scaling back their program or pegging it with their economic recovery etc, they would also loose out. Nearly all of their ultimate F-35's would be assembled in Cameri. With Britain, its a long term acquisition program. As long as Britain does not develop a STOVL fighter they are going to have only the Beach as an option for fixed winged ops from their 2 carriers, carriers that are expected to last a minimum of 50 years. Furthermore, their contribution of a mere 2 Billion dollars has resulted in a 13-15% work-share on ALL F-35B's (More than 500) and still a significant work-share on non-beach variants as well. The Typhoon program may no longer be viable post 2020 and the cost to re-introduce it, or maintain the line well into the 2020's is going to be very costly without a lot of support from partners that at the moment aren't very optimistic about spending billions to keep the thing churning for decades to come. As the internal developmental effort shifts to UCAV's and first generation stealth unmanned they would end up with just one fighter as a viable investment to maintain the force structure. Spain also has one important decision to make. If they want the carrier, then they have to go for the Beach as well. From a program's perspective the more important thing is the ramp up, and as long as the US orders that are the bulk "subsidizers" of the ramp up remain solid they really do not need a new customer between 2015 and 2020. As far as the Pentagon's support for the program, well 2014-2016 is a sequester period and despite of that not only did the Pentagon get from the Congress all the F-35's it wanted, but the congress on top of that added a couple of Charlie variants that were not requested for that year.

When I say they do not need a customer, I mean that they as in LMA really have no incentive to open the floodgates of TOT and sell a lot of IP to gain 50-100 orders at the moment. At best they would offer a deal at par with Japan, South Korea etc, and you cold get a FACO like deal. Even the Russians are going to eventually dilute participation on some pretext or the other. There are only a few 5th generation programs at the moment that are open to participation so unless their economy does not recover over the next 2-3 years they would play hard ball.

BTW, Japan and South Korea got a significant level of offset* given that LMA held a lot of leverage given that they were the only 5th gen competitive fighter around.

P.S - For the F-35 to F-35 between partners its about Integration and not interoperability. A Rafale is interoperable with the F-35, but its not fully integrated to the new combat enterprise. All versions of the F-35 bring full mission capability, mission system, cover the same waveforms and share the same threat libraries and upgrades. If the USN decides to integrate something, all non C users get to benefit from that. If the USMC develops systems or processes to improve Sortie rates everyone gains that advantage etc. The ultimate integration comes from the mission computers..As mentioned by the RAF group commander, the F-35 is a mission data driven aircraft, much more than even the Typhoon.

*South Korea Offset ( Source : Jane's Defence Industry, Briefing: South Korea negotiates F-35 offset package, 2014-04-04 SUBSCRIPTION)

While Schnaible did not disclose any details about Lockheed Martin's offset proposal, the US corporation had previously revealed to IHS Jane's that its F-35 offset package is wide-ranging in nature. The package originally offered to South Korea included the ownership and use of a Lockheed Martin military communications satellite - including all necessary control equipment and training - as well as Lockheed Martin's design assistance and technical data transfer to support the KFX development programme.
Lockheed Martin also offered industrial participation. This included the localised manufacture and assembly of the F-35's centre-wing box and horizontal and vertical tails, as well as opportunities related to the F-35's Pratt & Whitney F135 engine.
It is not clear, however, if this proposal will be acceptable to DAPA. An official from DAPA told IHS Jane's that the procurement agency is "looking at several options", including Lockheed Martin's involvement in the KFX programme, but did not elaborate. In the past, the South Korean government has made clear its preference for "state-of-the-art technologies" in defence offset programmes and is certain, in the case of F-35, to want to channel such technologies into the KFX aircraft: a programme, like the F-35, that features low-observable 'stealth' technologies.
To this end, news reports in Seoul suggest that DAPA has requested Lockheed Martin pay 20% of the KFX development costs - estimated at around USD2 billion -payable through the transfer of advanced technologies via offset. South Korea's offset guidelines - which were rewritten over the past eight months and republished by DAPA in March - outline a requirement for offset returns of at least 50% of the value of defence contracts worth more than USD10 million, although DAPA retains discretion to increase this amount on a case-by-case basis. South Korea's purchase of 40 F-35 aircraft is estimated to be worth about USD6.8 billion.

Under the updated offset policy DAPA has prioritised as "Class A" offset returns that include the transfer of "core" defence technologies, the manufacturing and export of parts and components, and joint research and development programmes. Two of these provisions have clear links to South Korea's KFX programme and are certain to be pursued by DAPA in its offset talks with Lockheed Martin.
According to the updated guidelines, Class B - or secondary priorities - include the upgrade of existing weapons systems, the transfer of technologies to enable "depot level maintenance", and the export of non-military supplies. Class C, D, and E priorities include logistics support, foreign direct investment, overseas maintenance work, and the provision of "other" technologies that contribute to South Korea's national interests.
DAPA officials explained to IHS Jane's on 3 April that the updated guidelines provide clarity to previous revisions of the policy, although there are only a few procedural differences between the new guidelines and the 2012-13 version. "The guidelines have been rewritten to provide foreign contractors with a better understanding of what we require, and this is intended help build local capability," said one official.
Another official went on to outline the new features of the 2014 offset update. These include the requirement for non-military exports to be recommended and approved by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy and the Administrator of Small and Medium Business Administration and the ability to discharge offset through logistics support (with both provisions included in Article 13). Another new feature is the Article 16 provision, which allocates a multiplier of "up to 1.5" for facilitating exports from small- and medium-sized local enterprises.



Japan ( Source: Jane's Defence Industry, Japan, US close to signing deal on F-35 workshare
, 2012-Nov-06 SUBSCRIPTION)
Japan agreed in December 2011 to purchase four F-35As, with deliveries from 2016, and plans to eventually acquire 42 aircraft. While initial F-35As are likely to be built by prime contractors in the United States, the Japan MoD expects aircraft scheduled to be purchased from Fiscal Year 2013 (FY13) to be constructed in collaboration with Japanese industry.
"With regards to the F-35As that are to be procured after FY13, it is planned that the ministry will procure aircraft manufactured through participation of domestic industries," the MoD spokesman said.
"In collaboration with domestic industries, the ministry is now discussing with the US government and US industries [matters related to the] time required to manufacture each component, the time and cost required to launch [the] manufacturing [process], and which components will be manufactured besides [activities undertaken as part of the] final assembly and checkout [FACO] of the aircraft. The ministry intends to reach a conclusion by the end of this year," the spokesman added.
The workshare will involve three Japanese companies - Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), IHI Corporation, and Mitsubishi Electric - manufacturing about 40% of the F-35A, with anticipated involvement in about 300 components.
MHI will manufacture parts of the airframe, IHI Corporation will assemble the engine, and Mitsubishi Electric will participate in the production of electronic components. The US government and Lockheed Martin have also agreed to allow the three companies to manufacture and complete FACO of the main wing, tail surface, and aft fuselage.

The MoD said that the Japanese companies' participation in the F-35 programme is regarded as key part of an evolving longer-term strategy to sustain and further develop the industrial capabilities of local industry. "The F-35A, as a fifth-generation fighter, introduces different technologies from previous fighters," the spokesman said. "It is important for the development of [the Japanese] defence industry that domestic industries can acquire such technologies through participating in the manufacture [of the aircraft]."
The MoD spokesman's reference to modern military aerospace technologies is notable in that some of the technical expertise acquired through the F-35A manufacturing programme is expected to benefit Japanese industries in their indigenous development of the Advanced Technology Demonstrator-X (ATD-X) aircraft, which is being undertaken by MHI in partnership with the MoD's Technical Research and Development Institute.
This first test flight of the ATD-X, which has been designed to be a stealthy air-superiority fighter, is scheduled to take place in FY16.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

More tidbits from the Janes Defense article dated 12/10/14 Learning to fly: UK F-35 training ramps up by Jamie Hunter
"We're in a really good place now in the F-35 community in terms of relative priority because we are in right from the 'get go'," said AVM Waterfall. "In the UK we've got 25,000 jobs directly related to the JSF and there's a 15% UK stake in every aircraft."
The UK now has three completed aircraft in the United States (BK1, 2 and 3), AVM Waterfall said, adding, "I've [also] recently signed the bulkhead of the fourth (BK4) and we've just contracted for four more." These four additional aircraft are part of Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) batch 8, recently agreed with Lockheed Martin.
Under the terms of this deal Lockheed Martin will produce 43 F-35s beginning in 2016, comprised of 19 F-35As for the US Air Force (USAF), six F-35Bs for the USMC and four F-35Cs for the US Navy (USN). Additionally, it includes 14 aircraft for international customers, including the four F-35Bs for the UK. The total value of LRIP 8 is USD4.7 billion, which includes advanced procurement funding. However, it broadly puts the respective variants' unit costs at USD94.8 million for the F-35A, USD102 million for the F-35B and USD115.7 million for the F-35C, with these costs excluding the engine.
AVM Waterfall commented: "LRIP 8 is 3.6% lower than the previous buys, so already the cost is coming down, and that's still at the low rate. We can commit into the programme at this cost because we know the eventual buy at the full-production rate is going to be significantly cheaper."
That strong transatlantic bond has enabled RN pilots to form exchange programmes flying US Navy F/A-18 Hornets to maintain the embarked carrier core skills as the UK sets its sights on the future Queen Elizabeth-class (QEC) carriers, while other exchange programmes with USMC Harriers enable a core of STOVL pilots to further seed the future embarked UK F-35B operations.
"The US Navy and Marine Corps have very kindly enabled us to maintain a level of embarked skill both on the F/A-18 and the AV-8B as well as Sqn Ldr Nichols on the F-35 to keep that skill alive," AVM Waterfall explained. "What we want to try and do is be able to offer to the US some reciprocal arrangements. In the RAF we are looking at a range of opportunities from rotary- to fixed-wing, fast-jet training, where we can get more marine corps personnel ingrained on top of what is our normal exchange programme. As the RN maintains strong links with the USN, so the RAF Typhoon [community] has worked symbiotically with the USAF F-22 Raptors. We have that strength of relationship and exchanges with the USAF in key areas that are [also] looking heavily into the F-35A. We will need to use our F-35Bs how [the USAF] use their F-35As because it's a stealth platform and it's going to be our 'day one' entry capability."
The Typhoon is reaching a level of maturity with Phase 1 Enhancements from 1 April 2015 on Tranche 2 with Litening III and Paveway IV capability. According to AVM Waterfall this is very much complementary with the Tornado and aimed at using the sum of their parts or individually. "By 2019, [however], the time is right to retire the Tornados and bring a more modern aircraft into the inventory and that is F-35," he said.
Addressing comments about the F-35's agility, AVM Waterfall said that, while the F-35A and F-35C are capable, the F-35B is very close. "This appears to have become a major talking point amongst detractors; it is irrelevant," he said. "The fact that it hasn't got the Raptor's close-in thrust vectoring is irrelevant. What it has got is sensor fusion that is far greater than any of that. Our trick is going to be how to learn how to use it in a real paradigm shift with this air capability.
"With the Lightning II we know what we want to do with it right from the start. We can't do more because it's already doing everything. What we're not going to have is an aircraft that comes to the UK that won't be able to be used because it's not going to be capable. We've got six months between coming to the UK and our IOC, which is December 31, 2018."
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In regards to the F-35 ++ Being posted by a fellow member above:

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What gets most talked about is the ADVENT, AETD and AETP (to a lesser extent the VCAT) and how propulsion goals are quite aggressive even above the F-119/135 achievements. However INVENT is an equally important effort both for upgrading and keeping the F-22 and F-35 "relevant" and for the future tactical aircraft on design. The Spiral 1 goals for the F-22 and F-35 are without any change towards a Variable Cycle Engine. And since we were discussing how Boeing is soon going to face prospects of no longer having an active fighter line, they seem to have the R&D and S&T lead and AFRL has absolutely no problems in allowing Boeing to actually take the lead and re-do the F35's or F22's mission systems in the future.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

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Philip
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by Philip »

Dutch JSF date of induction,2019.Dutch JSFs will therefore cost a shade over $125M apiece. This is a definitive fig. given.

http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2 ... -2019.php/
First JSF fighter jets will arrive in the Netherlands in 2019
December 16, 2014

The first JSF jet fighter aircraft will arrive in the Netherlands in 2019, ministers have told MPs. The Netherlands will buy eight aircraft a year from 2019, taking the total to 37.

The first of the jet fighters will be stationed at the airforce base in Leeuwarden. Later, the base at Volkel will also be equipped to take them. The JSF is replacing the current fleet of ageing F-16 jets.

Most of the JSFs will be used for training purposes and to defend Dutch air space. Just four will be available for military missions abroad, the cabinet said in its 51-page briefing.

The cost of the 37 planes is put at €4.6bn, while operating costs will run at ‘a maximum’ €285m a year.

In the briefing, the cabinet says the noise nuisance which will be caused by the jets is ‘acceptable’. This had been an important point for coalition partner PvdA to approve the purchase, broadcaster Nos points out.

In particular, when JSFs are based at Volkel, most of their night flights will be made elsewhere, the cabinet said.

Dutch industry has so far earned €1bn from its role in the development of the JSF but this could mount up to €9bn, the cabinet briefing said.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

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They are all basing the cost projections form the same data that I have presented. As long as you are dealing with "just the aircraft, and engine" you are all going to arrive at the same cost structure. Its up to any analyst to look at recurring flying away or total fly away for example as each carries different components of the the fighter. If a nation has a smaller purchase, the total "Out-the-door" cost per fighter would be higher because things such as Simulators, support equipment, system, sub-systems would cover a larger per capita cost than say another customer that orders 100 or so. The F-35 Simulators aren't cheap, they are the most advanced ever made and have full mission software instead of emulators as is/was the practice elsewhere.

Furthermore, the Dutch already have two F-35A's delivered to them and from what I recall would have another 2-8 in the last few remaining LRIP's (9 and 10) so the cost for all 37 would include some that are produced in the early-mid LRIP's, and a few in the later LRIP blocks. The main reduction in cost beyond the 3-4% per block would come during the ramp up. As mentioned earlier in this thread, the original plan for the F-35/JSF program was to ramp with through doubling production in LRIP's every other year. With time, this has been slightly reduced but despite of that, every other block does see a sizable increase in production rates. That next bump would come in the LRIP9 which is going to be sealed as a contract later this year (2015) for deliveries in 2017, spilling over perhaps to 2018. The 80-85 Million target that the JPO, Frank Kendall and Marillyn Hewson are aggressively pursuing is for contracts that are negotiated around 2017-2018 i.e. the full rate of production blocks that would not only coincide with the learning curve efficiencies, would introduce the full "war on cost" practices but more importantly introduces economies of scale envisioned during the design of the F-35/JSF production process. "learning curve" and efficiencies only go a set distance in reducing cost, and as Lockheed and partners have shown they have squeezed a lot of the cost out. From LRIP 1 to LRIP 6 (that got delivered this year) they have delivered aircraft that are more than 50% lower cost and this is largely attributed to the learning curve and small increases in ramp rates. You can perhaps squeeze out another 10-12 % in the remaining 2 LRIP (5-6% has already been achieved between LRIP 5 and LRIP 8 ) blocks given that concurrency changes would be far fewer now than was the case in the past (Concurrency breaks the rhythm of the line as you need to make unscheduled changes to the production process based on what you find out in testing) but the major thrust would still come form the ramp rates. When the program was conceived economies of scale was a major driver in design. You could reach a level of stealth (greater than F-22's) through fiber mat and other advances, a level of integrated avionics (many times the software and sensors of the F22) because your cost that results from complexity would be subsidized with a huge block order coupled with high production rates - because you had produced the F-16's at a huge rate and would therefore need to replace them at a huge rate as well.

The Current plan that has successfully survived the Sequester unscathed calls for 74 F-35's to be produced in Lot 10 (Currently Lockheed will deliver LRIP 7 jets in 2015 and has negotiated a fixed contract for Lot 8 jets) and 100+ to be produced in Lot 11.
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

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The Navy, given the limitations of aircraft carriers and their increasing vulnerability to anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles, might have to concede the high-end air superiority mission to the Air Force.
The USN would do well to seriously consider another air-dominance carrier fighter for the role to complement the JSF. I wonder why no carrier variant of the F-22 was considered. It may be worthwhile looking at that generic design to see what could be done modifying it for carrier ops if poss. That would certainly complicate the PRC's gameplan as an "F-22" type aboard USN carriers would not have limitations of range that constrain island based USAF Raptors .
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

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The USN would do well to seriously consider another air-dominance carrier fighter for the role to complement the JSF.
They have thought a lot about this. The last time they thought of this was the time of the F-14D discussion. Their rationale is that its the USAF's job to invest in the most cutting edge aerial stuff, and that the role of the carrier is to push offensive ops. Their strategy calls for NIFFCA being the line of defense coupled with the "networked" assets. You, yourself on many occasions have referred to the CNO talking about being payload centric and not system centric and as such things like " SM6 is my wing man" type concepts have evolved. Furthermore their collaboration with the USAF is leading to a concept where they know the threat and how it would evolve in their area of interest. For example, they know that the F-22 is in operation, F-35 will be available in the 1000+ and the LRS-B/B-2 combo would be fielded beginning 2025 or so (B-2 fleet will see a massive 10 Billion USD mission system and stealth upgrade). Given that they most likely have war-gamed the affect of this offensive capability on the adversaries ability to launch strike aircraft towards its CBG and from how far they can launch. As long as the adversary does not field some crazy long range, very fast, very high flying very stealthy fighters that can stay back of the combined USAF, USN and allied offensive ability and still attack the carrier they are well covered by multi-role fighters that up the offensive punch of the CAW. The F-14 was tasked with shooting down heavily loaded bombers that might take down the carrier, that threat is no longer there. They also have NIFFCCA, SM6 (A 200nm weapon) and a heck of a lot of ISR in the pipeline in order to avoid surprises. In the future they are going to expand NIFFCCA and bring DEW's and EMRG into the equation. In fact just this week they have given a 2018 timeline to field prototype sensors to provide cues to the railgun, and the weapon would be on board a JHSV this year for field testing. What the USN needs is the F-35C, and a low-medium cost replacement for the F-18E/F that has the legs and computing to do some of the advanced electromagnetic spectrum missions that they need for their portion of the shared EW requirement.

Remember, a zippy F-22 like aircraft alone does not guarantee much protection. The USN has invested a lot of money in the AN/APY-9 and the E-2D in general and from what i recall it is the only AEW aircraft to field an UHF AESA and solved the challenges associated with operating in that spectrum/freq. Clearly they chose UHF to fill holes in the stealthy cruise missile and small UAV penetration type of tactics. Furthermore, the E_2D along with he Growler (of which they would have 5 per carrier soon) would be the heavy NODES of NIFCCA with the Super Hornet and F-35C (blk 4) being the forward deployed nodes. Add to that some very capable weapons in the Aim-120C7 and D (All enhanced to be prepared against latest DFRM tactics) and the upcoming blk II (in production) and BLK III 9X that when coupled with the F-35C's EODAS and EOTS and the F-18E/F's IRST-21 would give them an IR domain data-linked BVR weapon. All this contributes to air-superiority rather directly so its not like they have totally neglected it but for cost, practicality they have chosen to go multi-role and until some emerging threat really forces them to rethink this they needn't waste the time or money to spend billions incorporating USAF's research into a very expensive platform for a specialized role (which the f-22 is). The USN knows from experience that the "art" of defending a forward deployed carrier or a ship is in having a very comprehensive ISR coverage. I can extend my SM6 through block upgrade from a 200nm bomber shooter to a 250 nm bomber shooter, but I need to have precise early warning, and subsequent targeting data to reach those ranges. Hence the disproportionate investment in unmanned ISR, from stand off high loiter assets to carrier borne stealthy UCLASS that can maintain 24 hour orbits over areas of interest and stay for longer through IFR. The objective is to form SM6 rings around a carrier for protection and through control of the Electro Magnetic and Cyber domains force the shooter to get closer by denying a high probability of success (soft kill) if engaged from outer reaches of the weapons_systems envelope.

A large portion is spent on ships and developing cutting edge technology such as DEW's, EMRG's and the underwater domain. The Air is the USAFs task and it would always be their investment domain to secure as much investment for the future regardless of how they feel. In the end, the success of Admirals is determined by how many ships their fleet has and not how much of the air to air mission they are able to independently execute without the USAF. This again highlights Clarence Kelly Johnson's 15th rule that never explicitly written down on paper but widely attributed to him ;)

Starve before doing business with the damned Navy. They don't know what the hell they want and will drive you up a wall before they break either your heart or a more exposed part of your anatomy.
I wonder why no carrier variant of the F-22 was considered.
Of course it was considered. Both Lockheed and Northrop spent close to 100 million of their own money to get their proposals to be carrier compatible as designs in the ATF stage. But at the time the USN wanted the A-12, a strike aircraft because beyond the Soviet threat they saw the role of the CAW as pushing the offensive operations from Day-1. The F-35C was something they were kind of forced to take because someone, somewhere probably thought that they could do forever with the F-18C and F-18E/F/G combination. But like so many of their programs once the "tribe" is won over by performance they become the kit's biggest fans. When the F-18E/F was being developed the F-14 "tribe" hated it, said an icon was being replaced by a pig. Now that the entire force structure knows only the Rhino, they are going to have to work at integrating the Charlie into the CAW. The best thing that can happen to them is that they pursue a Super Lightning II for a F-18E/F replacement. Incremental programs have traditionally been very successful acquisition programs for them, while transformational steps have been horrible. The service simply does not like to take big leaps or risks in the Aerial domain. They resisted the UCLASS requirement and still continue to resist a more capable vehicle to a point where the debate with the pentagon is causing a few months delay in releasing the last rounds of RFP's before they make a down-select. Even the messages on the next generation propulsion programs under the VAATE program run by AFRL (ADVENT, AETD, AETP etc) are that they would step back and let the USAF fund these and they claim " we are not that bullish on Variable cycle engines". The fact is even with the NG engines that to get working prototypes up to a TRL 6 (Technology readiness level) will take Billions, and already the USAF has spent upwards of 3 billion on creating the successor to the F-119 and F-135 families. By 2020 they would spend another 1-2 billion through the AETD and AETP. Only then would the technology be mature enough to be offered for the next generation fighters. The Navy wouldn't make those investments and they really shouldn't since they have other priorities.

Watch this:



Also read this:

http://thanlont.blogspot.com/2011/04/na ... nough.html

Post Cold war there is really no need or justification for the USN to invest billions into acquiring a stand alone fleet of very expensive, cutting edge air to air fighter and thereby reducing their offensive footprint at a time they really need to up it. The UCLASS and the rise of carrier unmanned aviation is going to play a very important role and they would do well in investing in the platform over the next decade or more in terms of developing better and more capable variants.

So while the USN Top brass may be drooling over this at the moment



They would most likely end up with something like this (fan art) to replace the Rhino

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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by NRao »

Air Force identifies nickel-free material for F-35 aircraft systems
Nickel-based materials are used in several components of today’s fighter aircraft; however, working with these materials can be dangerous for installers and requires special handling procedures.

Through a Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contract with the Air Force, Triton Systems, Inc., located in Massachusetts, developed a nickel-free material technology that is positioned for transition to several F-35 Joint Strike Fighter applications. Transition of this technology is anticipated to save $550 million across the aircraft’s lifecycle.

“Identifying environmentally benign and more affordable alternatives to nickel will provide significant benefits across the Air Force,” said Maj. George Woodworth, an Air Force Research Laboratory researcher. “Implementation of Triton’s non-nickel-based material system will significantly reduce sustainment costs and eliminate the risk of exposure for factory workers, military maintainers and depot workers.”
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

According to Kalsow, each fitting presents its own unique challenges.

“We have to fit a helmet to an asymmetrical human head so the optics package on the display visor is within two millimeters of exact center of each of the pupils,” he explained.

The process takes approximately four hours per helmet and involves two contact days with each pilot. On the first contact day, precise measurements are taken of the pilot’s head, including a 3D head scan and the use of a pupilometer to measure the distance between the pupils. Once Kalsow and Breuer have the measurements and the helmet components – most of which are produced at our company’s facility in Wilsonville, Oregon – they begin assembling the helmet. This process includes custom-milling each helmet liner so the helmet fits the individual’s head comfortably and maintains its stability under high gravity (G) maneuvers.

“Our helmet liner must stand up to the pressure of high G manuevers so the optics package remains aligned with the pilot’s field of view,” Kalsow noted. When the helmet is assembled, the pilot comes in for a fitting during the second contact day. It’s at this time that the optics package is aligned to the pilot’s pupils and the display visor is custom contoured – a process that must be done precisely so the pilot has a single focused image at infinity....

...The team addressed each of the Big 5 technical issues utilizing the Lean ElectronicsSM 8-Step Problem Solving Process. The team also leveraged experts from throughout the Rockwell Collins enterprise and ESA to assist in resolving the technical problems.

Our engineers in Warrenton, Virginia, who work on unmanned aircraft system flight controls, were called on to validate software algorithms to solve the readability problem known as jitter — a symptom of the aircraft shake generated during a high G turn. Knowledge from engineers in our Head Down Display Center in Cedar Rapids was used to fix the display contrast issues. Expertise from our Advanced Technology Center was leveraged to take on the complex math to resolve the alignment problem relating to the accuracy of the targeting information displayed on the visor...."
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http://issuu.com/rockwellcollinshorizon ... 19issue2/1
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

NRao
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by NRao »

brar_w,

Your posts invariably have the extra "//url" (in red below):
brar_w wrote:http://aviationweek.com/defense/j-10b-f ... ice-debuts//url]J-10B, F-35 Nearing In-Service Debuts
J-10B, F-35 Nearing In-Service Debuts
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

NRao wrote:brar_w,

Your posts invariably have the extra "//url" (in red below):
brar_w wrote:http://aviationweek.com/defense/j-10b-f ... ice-debuts//url]J-10B, F-35 Nearing In-Service Debuts
J-10B, F-35 Nearing In-Service Debuts

Thanks for pointing it out, i was wondering why the heck this has been happening :)
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

Post by brar_w »

Latest Daily Beast Jibe on the F-35. Was wondering when they would come out with a Pogo/Sprey/Sweetmann/Axe driven story given the recent successes on the ship and the fact that they are just months away now from declaring a soft IOC.

New U.S. Stealth Jet Can’t Fire Its Gun Until 2019

F-35 programme office defends gun and sensor

Rebuttals on the ' spin '

- The author decides to wake up one fine morning and report (rather mis-report) a fact that has been publicly known since 2010, when the program's time-lines were restructured (and point after which it has met or exceeded every time-line). The schedule was agreed upon by the three services and partner nations. The agreement clearly stated that the USMC would declare Initial Operations Capability (IOC - where the I stands for initial) with block 2B software which essentially gives them the AMRAAM the JDAM and the Laser guided bomb, 15 of the 32 radar modes, limited EODAS and EOTS capability and the HMD. The USAF would follow them a year later with block 3I which is an interim block 3 configuration which has the same weapons cleared but upgrades the jets computers (Missions computers or ICP's) to the standard required to sustain block 3F and Block 4 software blocks. Starting 2017 Block 3F would begin delivered as standard and this would include full weapons carriage, full radar modes, full EOTS and EODAS capability and EW ability along with the full spectrum of Gen III helmet. The 3F would/should finish testing around mid to end of 2018 and that is when the USN is looking to declare IOC after factoring in 6-8 months of actually standing up a squadron. The soft IOC decision was taken post the 2010 restructuring of the program and as most agreed at the time - Makes a lot of sense. There is no point waiting till full 3F capability when you can unshackle yourself from testing protocols and limits and let the tacticians fully use the aircraft and develop tactics, strategies and give valuable feedback. It also gives a strong time-line for the services to develop maintenance protocols, train technicians, mechanics and deliver a logistical chain to deploy the aircraft. The USN is not doing this because their aircraft is the least mature from a testing perspective and that they won't have DTII done up before 2015-2016 so can't really send an F-35C on a carrier before 2017 anyhow (The marines on the other hand operate much more from air-bases than ships).

Coming to the Gun - The author decides not to talk any specifics but mis-report again on the issue citing unnamed sources and officials. The facts as publicly declared four years ago are that the gun package is to be delivered (package includes the software that supports the gun - this is important since the F-35 lacks a HUD) Around February 2017 with LRIP 9 jets (just google block 3F LRIP 9). These jets would go from the facilities at fort-worth where they are being manufactured straight into the hands of "front line" combat coded pilots. These jets would carry the latest block 3F software. The software however, would still be in testing but this is concurrent delivery to testing just as combat pilots now have 2b with the recent delivered jets. The testing process of the gun itself would see it being fired THIS YEAR. The author tries to circumvent this fact by stating a notional date of 2019 for the gun to be fired in combat. For this to be true the USAF has to be in active war to actually need to use the gun in the 2017-2019 period, and secondly, disallow combat coded jets that carry the software 3f starting early 2017 to not go to war or use the features enabled by the software. This is in direct conflict to what has been said, and also in conflict with actions of the past where systems were sent to war during OT&E if they were deemed critical to mission success (Global hawk is a perfect example, the entire Missile Defense shield is another example).

All that I have mentioned above is verifiable by just spending 10 minutes on Google. In fact most of this has been posted by myself or others in this very thread. The situation for the current IOC is that the Marines IOC between July 2015 (aim) and December 2015 (threshold), and deploy to Japan in Q2 or Q3 of 2016 to gain experience that such a deployment provides (they would still be working on the optimal strategy on how to employ his weapons system). The USAF IOC's between July and December 2016 and doesn't deploy outside of Alaska for a year or two iirc. The Block 3F configuration would become the standard or the baseline delivery configuration starting Late Jan or Early Feb. of 2017 (there goes the 3-5 years argument) and all F-35's being delivered in 2017 would have the software, the hardware to fire the gun if required (Between 40 and 50 would be delivered in 2017). The Software would still be in the OT&E phase till 2018 but if required these combat coded aircraft can be sent out to war and they won't first go to the depot and get their software downgraded. The physical testing of the gun in the AIR actually starts later this year. The delay had nothing to do with the F-35 but with certifying the new round. The software required is unique since the F-35 lacks a HUD and the helmet symbology had to stabilize before any meaningful testing could be performed on the gun integration. the Jitter problem was largely settled for good with the gen III helmet last year.

The next point the tabloid article makes is that the gun carries too few rounds? Really? Lets compare the F-35's gun's rounds to other fighters around the world granted that the tradeoff of gun types has been approved by the end-user so the benefit of a single barrel to a gatling doesn't really apply since it was an active user choice.

F-35A Rounds 182
Rafale Rounds 125
Typhoon Rounds 150 (iirc)
Mig-29 Rounds 100-150
Su-30 Rounds 150 Rounds

So it wasn't just the JSF designers (or more appropriately those in the "services" that asked for such capability) that thought that 150-200 is the right amount, a lot of the others had rounds in the same range as well. Perhaps they are all wrong as per the tabloid? The author most likely wanted to take a poke at the JSF for replacing the A-10 given it has "just" a fraction of rounds. The author must be delusional if he thinks that a platform designed to be survivable till the 2050 (granted, through upgrades) would spend a majority of its CAS mission strafing away against a peer adversary. Taking a 100 Million + jet down below to use the cannon for CAS against a capable enemy would be a shore shot way of being the first fighter pilot to be demoted to squadron janitorial tasks if he/she survives the experience and lives to tell the tale. This particular point is currently the favourite of the Axe's and the general Anti F-35 brigade. They are trying their level best to some how draw a parallel between the USAF's request for early termination of the A-10 in order to protect cuts from the F-35. These guys are trying to draw the debate towards the fact that the USAF thinks (wrongly as per them) that the F-35 can replace the A-10. While if one reads (or watches) testimony of USAF leadership, they are on record of claiming that the A-10 retirement is a sequester issue where they are being forced to choose between a loss in future capability vs a loss in immediate capability in the short term. As the departing ACC boss General Mike Hostage opined right before his retirement, he says that every scenario that they run has shown the advantage of taking a calculated hit in present-readiness in order to protect long term strategic investments. This isn't about whether the F-35 can do what the A-10 can potentially do if deployed to say Syria, but about the F-35 being the SEAD, CAS and multi-role backbone of the entire USAF, USMC and USMC structure in the 2020-2050 time-frame.

Then the Author tries to compare the EOTS sensor to the latest pods and finds deficiencies in that the EOTS lacks ROVER (rather the F-35), cannot send video through Link-16 in HD (or any) to troops on the ground. Clearly none at the Beast have been project managers or done anything worthwhile running large team based projects other than "deadlines" on sensational stories. Thinks to keep in mind:

- The EOTS is very much a pod. Although enclosed in a Sapphire covered stealthy enclosure, it essentially is a pod. It is a fully integrated Line replaceable Unit, meaning that you need to open up the covering and remove it and strap on a new EOTS-NG sensor and job done. It isn't like an essential component embedded into the aircraft which is going to be damn hard to remove or replace. Secondly, much of the advances in CAS and other integration work (referred to as 3rd generation changes to sensors) took place from lessons learnt, or due to urgent needs requirements in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. The JSF requirements were frozen much before that, and as any prudent PM would tell you, you deliver what you have frozen first and then move on to upping the capability unless you want to be locked up in a perpetual science project for the rest of your project life. The Legacy fleets with their non-stealthy pods were not restricted so could field enhancements rapidly as and when required. So yes, the EOTS is limited in its functionality and has not kept up with advances since its design was frozen but this is by design. The requirements called for better than the standard performance, both for A2G, and full functionality in the A2A aspect as an integrated IRST. The main effort has been to MATE the sensor with the EODAS, the mission computers and the CNI suite. None of this can be performed by the super-advanced 3rd generation pods flying on legacy at the moment. The F-35's architecture is different in that the radar is just an aperture, the back end is essentially the mission computer that ties everything together (a departure from traditional radars as seen on other fighters). This level of integration is lacking in the F-16 or F-15's carrying better pods at the moment. Having said that, all that is left is to integrate these features into the F-35 post baseline delivery. Its really not hard to do, but you need time. Integration on new projects takes time because you are essentially creating something from scratch. This was evident when Dassault delivered an excellent Rafale to the customer, that sent it to war in Afghanistan without a Self-designating POD, which even 20 year old fighters carried at the time. It was not a failure on Dassault, but a consequences of juggling a 100 different integration priorities and working on timeline and fixed requirements that legacy fleets did not have to abide by. The Block 3F configuration is the base for the F-35 not the final product. It is akin to the F-16 having a baseline where all it could do was launch an Aim-9 missile and use its gun. Folks in France didn't commit suicide in shame for not having a pod ready for Afghanistan, they went about their schedule and integrated one and later upgraded to a more capable one. This is what competent project managers do i.e. deliver on a frozen, promised capability and then tackle additional capability through upgrades.

I bet one of the big reasons to keep the LRS-B in the black was to avoid this sort of tabloid journalism. On one end punk journalism is attacking the F-35 for being too ambitious, and requiring a lot of capability upfront rather than a spiral (a claim that actually has some merit to it - since they could have done what the F-22 did i.e Basic A2A first, then Full A2A, then Basic A2G and so on) and on the other end they are being hammered for not doing everything out at once. The bottom line is that the services agreed to a soft IOC because they wanted to send out the jet to frontline combat coded pilots and beginning gathering data on operational usage without being restricted to testing protocols. This would pay rich dividends when they write requirements for block 4F and Block 5 capability as they would have years of experience (compared to international customers) of hard data to base their requirements on.

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A good result on the Engine:


AEDC experiences record-breaking accelerated mission test
11/5/2014 - ARNOLD AIR FORCE BASE, TENN. -- A highly successful accelerated mission test (AMT) of Pratt & Whitney's F135 conventional take-off and landing/carrier variant (CTOL/CV) engine was recently completed in the Sea Level 3 test cell (SL-3) at AEDC.

A Total Accumulated Cycle (TAC) count of 2,600, with record TAC accumulation of 80-90 per day was accomplished during the AMT of this F135 engine, found in versions of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter used by the U.S. Air Force and Navy.

"One reason this test was significant is that it was the first 2,600 TAC Accelerated Mis-sion Test on the F135 engine at AEDC," said John Kelly, AEDC F135 test manager. "Previ-ously these AMTs have been done at the Pratt & Whitney facility in West Palm Beach, Fla."

Test results provided integrated aircraft thermal load simulation, as well as led to the re-activation of special test equipment for the F135 that hasn't been used in several years.

Additionally, record test time efficiency of 98 percent was achieved for the test.

Testing was originally scheduled over a period of four months but wrapped up earlier than anticipated.

"The test occurred without any issues at all," Kelly said. "Usually in any test you encoun-ter issues that cause a delay. But with this test we beat our optimistic estimate for comple-tion by a month."

Crew members worked 24-hour operations, five days a week, occasionally even working around-the-clock six days a week. Coordination with test support activities occurred, allow-ing for the 24-hour coverage.

Record test pace was set while running concurrent operations at other AEDC facilities. Test cell SL-2 was testing the F119 engine for 16 to 18 hours a day and the F101 engine was testing around-the-clock in test cell C-1.

AEDC skilled workers supported user maintenance during the test by providing oil sample collection, engine oil servicing, chip detector removal and inspection, and borescope plug removal and inspection.

"This is notable because in the past we haven't been as involved in the maintenance side," Kelly said.

Rapid project preparation, test cell conversion and engine installation was another factor that helped in completing the AMT within such a short time frame.

The F135 AMT was also a work share between AEDC and Pratt & Whitney teams.

Jeff Albro, the JSF Program Office test and evaluation manager for the F135 engine, stated that AEDC project managers and engineers ensured the customer's requirements for the test were met.

"Everyone who comes to the test site with a company is on travel, and the less people that they need to have here is money saved for the customer," he said.

According to Albro, the test team tried new ways to meet schedule and come under budget, both of which it did successfully.

He added that this project was one of the best he's had the opportunity to be a part of, and as the customer, he was pleased.

"The test was spectacular," he said. "We've never had an AMT come off without a hitch like this one did."
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brar_w
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Re: JSF,"turkey or talisman"?

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