Indian Missiles and Munitions Discussion

[pankajs]

Saar you correct that we cant base everything on bunker busters, but that's where their effective defense against our missile lies. If we can't hide and they can, we will be subjected to heavy loss, even with ABM, it will be tough if your opponent has number superiority if not in quality. Having some counter measure to dig out would not harm us in our response.

On that I will go with Singha saar i.e Have TEL/RailCar/SSBN based nuclear missile. Have them dispersed all about the county (Away from Cities), and Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean. Above all have sufficient warheads, enough to give real meaning to the word 'unacceptable'.

[Kanson]

U.S. Alters Non-Nuclear Prompt-Strike Plan

If the enemy suspects that "boost-glide" thing is intended for taking out nuclear missile silos/TEL, will they not launch rather than loose them? Does it matter if the incoming payload is nuclear or conventional? Does it matter if the incoming missiles are not ballistic and therefore not counted under new START?

Treaty means give and take. If that is what they want they will find the modalities. For example, They may restrict the no. of launches in a time frame so it won't appear as an all out strike on Russian missile silos. Revisiting the negotiated treaty is cumbersome. By having a non ballistic profile and by accepting to some restrictions they may have their way. Anyway, JMT. BTW, already people raised the concern you highlighted here and you can see several discussion on that, if you are interested.

[Kanson]

Further, the entire debate amounts to arguing the modalities of a particular doctrine without bothering to ask what purpose it serves. Everything follows from the basic goal - effective deterrence against PRC. What do they fear losing most, and what do we have the most ability to credibly target ?

I'm getting the sense that you have not understood my points and we are talking in circular fashion as seen from the above statement.

For the record, I'm not arguing, not even questioning the current doctrine which holds the deterrence. I'm very happy with whatever doctrine if it can hold the deterrence. My entire argument is focused on actions *after* deterrence failure. In that, some of the points of my argument are 1. How a scalable N war can be waged. 2. How to stop the situation deteriorating further. 3. Advantages of using CounterForce either alone or with CounterValue response.

I particularly insisted, I'm not replicating the CounterForce strategy floated during Cold War. And consistent with the goals of GoI in describing those actions.

from Wiki, "Indian National Security Advisor Shri Shivshankar Menon further signaled a significant shift from "no first use" to "no first use against non-nuclear weapon states" in a speech on the occasion of Golden Jubilee celebrations of National Defence College in New Delhi on October 21, 2010."

Further from that speech,

In sum, there is an Indian way, an Indian view and an Indian practice in the use and role of force. We do not claim that it is better or worse than any other way that other nations adopt. It is a result of our own history and experience, and we feel it best suited to our goals and situation. And it too is evolving, both consciously and unconsciously, as is the world around us. It is time now to consciously build our own concepts and strategic thinking, adapted to today’s realities and India’s environment, including on the role of force.

To tell you from official line that nothing is stagnant; everything is evolving in accordance to today's reality.

Kanson: a counterforce doctrine against China is and will remain a nonstarter. They do not talk about the size or dispersal of their arsenal. Even the US has no clue about it. They are not party to any arms limitation treaty with any deterrent adversary. Their land based doctrine under the 2AC uses a widely dispersed (by some accounts 5000km long) tunnel system that enables them to protect their arsenal from a first strike. It was originally intended to protect them from Soviet megaton payloads. The accuracy or numbers of our arsenal do nothing against this - we don't know what to hit, where and how many.

I couldn't agree with anything that you say is peculiar to China. Is China alone doesn't reveal the size and dispersal of its arsenal? Can you point to a single official document on what our Credible Minimum Deterrence means and what is the size of our arsenal?

Is China alone having such tunnels? Russia, US, Israel, NoKo, even our neighbor Pak do have elaborate tunnel complex systems. if we believe BK, even we have some rudimentary tunnel systems for Strategic missiles. There is no need to single out China here. If we have to come to that level, we must develop ways to deal with that. If there is a will, you can always find a way.

"we don't know what to hit" : Oh, C'mon, If individuals like SoC of keypub forum can do so much IMINT with just GoogleMap and GoogleEarth and then there was a fine gentleman in this forum who shared Google Images of several Pak mil bases having underground complex and possible entrances to such complex, what a prof team of MI can do. Imagine what GoI can do. And ponder what if like minded countries pool their resources for that intel?

There's either option CF - spend ruinous amounts of money on a vast, accurate arsenal that can take out a large number of military targets that we don't know where they are or how many there are.

hmm....you have just argued in the subsequent post to have superior ABM system to defeat sophisticated Chinese BM. You say CF spending is ruinous amount of money. Do you know how much it will cost to procure and maintain a decent ABM system? How many missiles needed to protect a single city? And how many and how much supportive systems are needed to field an effective ABM system. You don't have to believe me. As per Russians, it takes only a fraction of cost for developing such sophisticated BM like Topol-M to defeat such elaborate ABM system. So to destroy adversary's BM, to be effective in cost wise as well, both CounterForce and ABM can be used combinedly.

Alternately we can implement option CV,

There is no 'Alternatively'. By default even if a rogue hopeless country acquires N weapon capability it going to be CounterValue response. Pure ConterValue response results in doomsday scenario. Once you initiate a CounterValue response, controlling the outcome is very difficult and results in utter destruction. Pls try to use the game theory to see possible outcomes. War itself is an irrational outcome. So there is no rationality in N warfare. Once you step on the CounterValue pedestal, point of return is bleak. And if that happens, if will after further destruction. Say, if you start a CounterValue response to Pak's usage of nuke on a division of IA, at the point of ending the war, if suppose that happens, your destruction will be much more than before the N war. It makes no sense of why you started the war. No need to listen my words, you just ask any Army personnel or educated members of this forum in that area, what is needed to control the outcome of a war? and to keep the control in your grasp? Same logic applies in N war too. You may see my reason why I insist on CounterForce.

where we build a smaller number of accurate, maneuverable single and MIRV payload based ICBMs and IRBMs that we can credibly use to state 'no matter what you do to us, you will lose all your top N big cities.' From everything we've seen of Agni-IV and Agni-V technology and capability, we've been implicitly pursuing the latter approach.

hmm....let me ask you purely from common sense perspective and let's leave all these N related doctrine and policies aside for a while.

you say you want to have smaller missile force. And with that you want to say with Bravado,"No matter what you do to us," to China which you accept has superior missile force than India and not revealing all that they got?

China is improving its military capabilities continuously. How long you think, they are going to believe in your Bravado, ie., "Not matter what you do to us". Once they think they have sufficient capabilities to overwhelm you, do you think they are going to sit idle? Will they not test us, like they continuously probe our strength on the border areas, whether that Bravado is true? If suppose that happens, what will you do? The same "No matter what you do to us" speech and receive a punishing & crippling blow that destroys most of the smaller missile force that you envisage in the name of retaliating 'unacceptably' with smaller second strike ? Where is unacceptable retaliation is possible if their first strike is so overwhelming becoz of their superior missile force, it destroys all of your country? Even if you are retaliating, what you gain after that? What if China's ABM can overcome our already small arsenal?

Lets go to the next level, what if your adversary is completely irrational. Do that Bravado, ""No matter what you do to us," stops them in their tracks? I term that as bravado, becoz that is all deterrence is all about. Once your adversary dismisses your bravado, we must be in a position to move to a different gear to neutralize enemy's actions and I think CounterForce is one such tool to do that.

Point I'm trying to say, and touched by Shivshankar Menon is that we should be prepared for all eventualities.

I'm talking so much about this statement 'no matter what you do to us, you will lose all your top N big cities', becoz such posture is getting obsolete and going to be obsolete in near future, becoz of developments happening around.

[Cosmo_R]

JMT on the Indian NFU posture:

"A recent concern has broken out amongst some analysts that India has shifted its nuclear doctrine away from no first use. The publicly released summary of India’s 2003 official nuclear doctrine pledged “no first use” of nuclear weapons and an additional negative security assurance of “non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.”1 On 21 October 2010, India’s National Security Advisor, Shivshankar Menon, gave a speech to the National Defence College in which the text employs the formulation that India’s nuclear doctrine emphasizes “no first use against non-nuclear weapons states.”

http://www.idsa.in/node/6932/2404

1. 'Non use' versus 'no first use' is very different in diplomatese
2. 'Non nuclear weapons states' under NPT means PRC can be hit first because it is a NWS
3. TSP has nuclear weapons and is a de facto NWS so the NFU does not apply

In short, sufficient ambiguity (which is what deterrence is all about) re PRC and TSP. Some may also recall that at one point ABV/LKA (??) said (paraphrase): " We are not going to wait until their bombs land to retaliate.." . I remember Steve Cohen went ballistic (:)) about this 'change' in NFU.

[Varoon Shekhar]

A probably naive question, and I think I asked this before- and don't remember the answer . We all know that China/North Korea have helped Pakistan in a big way with missile development, probably shipping entire missiles to be quickly assembled. Sometimes perhaps transferring the entire pre-assembled missile.

What has prevented China from giving Pakistan satellite launch capability? They could covertly send a large SLV , have the Pakistanis assemble it, then launch it, allowing the Pakistanis to claim it is locally developed. Are they more concerned with the global reaction to that, than to simply missiles?

Is it that if Pakistan obtains satellite launch capability, they(the Pakistanis) would then start behaving like a serious country, and start competing in the launching business? Which is against the interest of both China and certain old type colonial/cold war thinkers in the West? Missiles- which are essentially India specific, designed to either force India into a mutual restraint regime with Pakistan alone, or alternatively, pressure India to make concessions on Kashmir- are okay with the 'world'. But not satellite launchers, which then conceivably become competition for a whole slew of countries.

The other possibility is that Pakistan itself has no wish to become a serious country, that it is quite content to simply be forever reactive and opposed to India, as long as India continues in its present configuration.

[Suraj]

Kanson: It's fair to say we're probably debating very different issues here I cannot possibly address all the various theoretical permutations - I mentioned the specific case of why CF against PRC will not work, and why a irrational CV posture is on the lines of our actions so far. If you disagree, that's fine.

PS: please don't equate the verbal characterization of a game theory situation as some personal emotional response, i.e. 'your bravado' for example. I've not made the debate personal, and would appreciate the same.

[akashganga]

Is it only me or is there anybody else who thinks that a 100 kg 20 kt dirty plutonium FBF embeded in a 200 kgs of further exotic casing material, mounted on top of an air launched Brahmos will be able to punch through about 30 meters of earth and a further 2-3 meters of concrete to eventually blast a cavern about 30 meter radius.

And yes i do believe i am being too conservative with this. And also that this is just to much of a bother. Christmas in Shanghai is much better.

Let us assume that we have such a warhead and that it effective in smashing into the Chinese tunnels, etc. Have we identified all the tunnels, all their entrances? Have we identified all the launch site outside the tunnels? You are hoping for a fighters/bombers with a couple of brahmos, at each and every launch site at about the same time. Do we have sufficient number of fighters/bombers with sufficient range? Will all of them make it through the heavy air defense?

Otherwise we are just setting our country for a smash. Even if one tunnel entrance is left intact, assuming most of them are connected and movement inside the tunnels are unhindered, we have setup our own cities and our people for a deadly diwali.

I see that almost all discussions in this forum focusing on China and there is justification for this. If you go back in time China had excellent relation with India for thousands of years until middle of the 20th century. China at best has limited object of containing India's influence. If you study history India's real enemies have been arab islamists who have been attacking us for the last 1400 years and british/european imperialists who occupied us centuries back. Both these groups tried to destroy the very fabric of India which is indian spiritual traditions or sanatana dharma which make us as a single nation. The real benefit of these missiles is no more physical attacks by these groups who get their inspiration to wipe out indian civilisation from their abrahamic traditions.

[ramana]

Spinster/Umrao John reminded me that the very same people who are in GOI were derisive of George Fernandes when he said China was a threat to justify the POKII explosions. How the wheel turns!

Also SSM when asked about the change in the doctrine said no one except KS and the folks on a not to be named forum caught on to it! That is the value of his statements.

[ShyamSP]

Let us assume that we have such a warhead and that it effective in smashing into the Chinese tunnels, etc. Have we identified all the tunnels, all their entrances? Have we identified all the launch site outside the tunnels? You are hoping for a fighters/bombers with a couple of brahmos, at each and every launch site at about the same time. Do we have sufficient number of fighters/bombers with sufficient range? Will all of them make it through the heavy air defense?

Otherwise we are just setting our country for a smash. Even if one tunnel entrance is left intact, assuming most of them are connected and movement inside the tunnels are unhindered, we have setup our own cities and our people for a deadly diwali.

I see that almost all discussions in this forum focusing on China and there is justification for this. If you go back in time China had excellent relation with India for thousands of years until middle of the 20th century. China at best has limited object of containing India's influence. If you study history India's real enemies have been arab islamists who have been attacking us for the last 1400 years and british/european imperialists who occupied us centuries back. Both these groups tried to destroy the very fabric of India which is indian spiritual traditions or sanatana dharma which make us as a single nation. The real benefit of these missiles is no more physical attacks by these groups who get their inspiration to wipe out indian civilisation from their abrahamic traditions.

Constable Singh wanted British to rule and Arab (indirectly) to have first claim on India resources. They are not enemies for Indian government.

In terms of weapons, India should match and exceed China who is enemy number one according Indian government.
At least 10K missile range and heavy war heads launchable from trains and submarines will teach China a lesson.

[shiv]

What has prevented China from giving Pakistan satellite launch capability? They could covertly send a large SLV , have the Pakistanis assemble it, then launch it, allowing the Pakistanis to claim it is locally developed. Are they more concerned with the global reaction to that, than to simply missiles?

Is it that if Pakistan obtains satellite launch capability, they(the Pakistanis) would then start behaving like a serious country, and start competing in the launching business? Which is against the interest of both China and certain old type colonial/cold war thinkers in the West? Missiles- which are essentially India specific, designed to either force India into a mutual restraint regime with Pakistan alone, or alternatively, pressure India to make concessions on Kashmir- are okay with the 'world'. But not satellite launchers, which then conceivably become competition for a whole slew of countries.

The other possibility is that Pakistan itself has no wish to become a serious country, that it is quite content to simply be forever reactive and opposed to India, as long as India continues in its present configuration.

There is a chicken or egg situation here. For Pakistan to become a "serious" country there has to be some internal resource separable from bullshit that can be used to make it that way.

More to the point, missiles are like a one night stand. Fire and forget. Satellites are like a marriage - needing continuing commitment, support and physical infrastructure which all cost much more in resources and commitment than a fire and forget Ding Dong. If you don't have all that there is no use launching a satellite.

[shiv]

If you study history India's real enemies have been arab islamists who have been attacking us for the last 1400 years and british/european imperialists who occupied us centuries back.

Better drop the subject buddy. You are yourself spouting a warped version of history. There is a lot more detail and India does not look as weak and helpless as you make it appear, nor is Arabia as powerful as you claim and for that period of time.

You are swallowing up a lot of history and vomiting out a mash of half digested data. In the wrong thread to boot.

[arun]

Deleted

[ramana]

Lets stick to thread topic please. There are other threads to debate other issues.

[member_20317]

At least 10K missile range and heavy war heads launchable from trains and submarines will teach China a lesson.

On a more serious note the how would an aerospike affect the throw weight of Tessy?

[ramana]

Not much. Aerospike is for first stage flight where there is more aero resistance.

[ramana]

Can pure quartz transform light energy say as laser into electrical energy?

I know that quartz can transform mechanical energy into electric and vice versa as piezo-electric effect.

[member_20317]

Not much. Aerospike is for first stage flight where there is more aero resistance.

Thanks ramana ji, also one more question, are these aerospikes retractable, rather are these afixed on a permanent basis?

[PratikDas]

Can pure quartz transform light energy say as laser into electrical energy?

I know that quartz can transform mechanical energy into electric and vice versa as piezo-electric effect.

Carbon nanotubes can.

[member_20317]

Can pure quartz transform light energy say as laser into electrical energy?

I know that quartz can transform mechanical energy into electric and vice versa as piezo-electric effect.

Carbon nanotubes can.

Nako bhai, I think ramana ji wants to see some kind of ionization effect from lasers.

[PratikDas]

self deleted

[Suraj]

arun: reposting something that's already been deleted as a cleanup effort on this thread by multiple moderators, is not a good idea. Please discuss it in the TSP thread - as another poster stated, it's for their own domestic consumption.

[sarabpal.s]

Molesting a piece of **** of an article is an unenviable challenge. China concluded that India doesn't have the accuracy for missiles of range greater than 5000 km? Seriously? This when the guidance system's accuracy is 0.001 degrees per hour. And Agni V only took 20 minutes to reach its destination. How many countries have the balls to declare their system's accuracy like that? Quite frankly that PoS of an article is for Pakistani internal consumption only, and the pun is intended.

They are trying get more details of A5 by rumors and misinformation.

[chackojoseph]

Ukraine may sell India R-27 Missile with new infrared seekers

[KiranM]

I remember reading in newspaper a few years back that India has changed its posture from NFU to use against any nation (nuclear/ non-nuclear) that uses a WMD (biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological) against Indian assets civilian or military.

Somehow Shiv Shankar Menon's statement partly contradicts above.

Also, for folks talking about response to nuclear attack can have a look at Sum of All Fears. It more or less outlines the options and the irrational thoughts of human mind in a nuclear shadow. (I agree it is very Clancyish, but atleast better than Humphrey Hawksley).

I believe India's planners keep following points in mind:
1) Not to outspend on nuclear assets alone at the cost of conventional deterrence, internal security or overall development.
2) Not to outspend on ABM alone at the cost of nuclear & conventional deterrence, internal security or overall development.
3) Build sufficient nuclear assets spread over a triad to keep it survivable.
4) Build a credible ABM to protect against Nuclear attack. This will start with terminal defence to protect the assets in NCR and other important cities (though the atmospheric/ above atmospheric detonation can affect the people in these cities). As we have more money and the technology matures ABM will shift to mid course defence.

Keeping above factors in mind and deriving a suitable cost-benefit ratio we will develop options to field Counter Value and limited Counter Force, with latter also based upon conventional weaponry (when we have sufficient numbers of PAKFA and Su-30 MKI guess what they will be doing most). In our own Indic way, we will not clearly advertise our posture as CF or CV. But display through a host of conventional and non-conventional weaponry the ability to do either. And also use either as the situation demands.

[mody]

Whats the need for new R-27 missiles? None of the western airforces use these types of missiles. The AIM-7 sparrow is being replaced almost entirely by the AIM-120 AMRAAM. When we have the R-77s, also ported for use with MiG-29s, along with MiG-21 BISON, and Su-30, why are we buying a huge number of R-27s again?

[Aditya_V]

Pure speculation onlee.

But given ,that Pakis have Aim 120 C5/c7. the R-27's have much higher ranges than r-77 and Aim120. SO with the missile having an active IR seeker, the r-27 can be fired first and host aircraft will turn back once the missile is say 25km from the target.

[member_22872]

A probably naive question, and I think I asked this before- and don't

just my opinion adding to what Shiv ji already said. I think that TSP seriously lacks the man power and technology to launch satellites. Our own program had very humble beginnings as you know. Whole the satellite launching business needs mastering of propulsion, astrodynamics, communication, dynamics and control etc. if a country depends on comparatively simple technologies like missiles on other countries, one can imagine what is the standard of their aerospace program is in. I read somewhere that we tested sounding rockets atleast 250 times. Satellite launch requires lot of additional infra as Shiv ji said, you have to build the technologies gradually through a gradual learning curve. I think pakis are still years away from launching one by themselves. You need to have manpower and industry in place to absorb the tech, so even if PRC is ready to give, TSP lacks the resources to absorb it.

[Varoon Shekhar]

"Satellites are like a marriage - needing continuing commitment, support and physical infrastructure which all cost much more in resources and commitment than a fire and forget Ding Dong. If you don't have all that there is no use launching a satellite."

Makes sense- the resources and infrastructure needed to sustain a serious and viable space programme, are more than for missiles.

On a somewhat related note, why do the UK and UK net denizens, not raise the issue of Pakistan using British aid for their missile programme? Is it again, because Pakistan is not seen as either a serious country or a competitor. If they see India as advanced in its space programme, why would they not see Pakistan as 'advanced' in their missile programme. After the recent Indian Agni test, there were some rumblings about British aid going into that effort; why would the same concerns not surface for Pakistan? It must be because they see the true nature of the one over the other; India is serious, sophisticated, deep, long term and global. Pakistan is frivolous, mendacious, reactive/reactionary and superficial.

[member_22872]

"Satellites are like a marriage - needing continuing commitment, support and physical infrastructure which all cost much more in resources and commitment than a fire and forget Ding Dong. If you don't have all that there is no use launching a satellite."

Makes sense- the resources and infrastructure needed to sustain a serious and viable space programme, are more than for missiles.

On a somewhat related note, why do the UK and UK net denizens, not raise the issue of Pakistan using British aid for their missile programme? Is it again, because Pakistan is not seen as either a serious country or a competitor. If they see India as advanced in its space programme, why would they not see Pakistan as 'advanced' in their missile programme. After the recent Indian Agni test, there were some rumblings about British aid going into that effort; why would the same concerns not surface for Pakistan? It must be because they see the true nature of the one over the other; India is serious, sophisticated, deep, long term and global. Pakistan is frivolous, mendacious, reactive/reactionary and superficial.

Varoon, I think they need TSP's missiles. They know i'ts missiles are India centric and that they have are PRC/NOKO based. Brits always favoured TSP over India. Even in great game perspective TSP's role and its existence is for their benefit. It's missile smuggling and program hence never bothered US and UK. So why should they even bother about it's nefarious activities? if they really bothered will they even let TSP smuggle nuke tech and missiles?

[gakakkad]

varoon ,you made my day .. I had a hearty laugh .. Pakees launching satellite ? and competing with other countries ?

Anyway designing , fabricating ,launching ,maintaining of satellites needs a different kind of manpower than the one that tsp possess .. IMHO optimistically put , TSP can aspire to assemble a communication satellite and have it launched by somali space agency by the year 2100 ...

[Varoon Shekhar]

You're right venug. Perhaps Indians/PIO's need to get on those British message boards and expose the attitudes. Watch the UK posters say, 'we're not praising the Pak missiles, but if India gives up its missiles, the Paks will do the same. '

But then, they are still left with the Indian space programme.

[Varoon Shekhar]

gakakkad, your're right, it was a _very_ naive question and scenario posed! By the way, here's another (f)article that should produce either humour or scorn or both. Why should there be no surprise that Praful Bidwai wrote it?
http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/s ... 120427.htm

[ramana]

ravi-g, They have a telescoping tube with self locking feature. So not retractable.

[member_22872]

Varoon ji, I think there is no point correcting posters, how many can we correct? it is best if we can change the policy makers thinking, which I wont think is possible or is very difficult and will take time, policy makers thought process is based on what is good for their country anyway. But netizens, I dont think we can influence them much and also there is no point wasting our energy educating them. They will know the truth when they will know the truth. Just my thoughts.

[pankajs]

Lots of nuggets.
India has all the building blocks for an anti-satellite capability

Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister Dr Vijay Kumar Saraswat sat down for a detailed interview with Senior Editor Sandeep Unnithan

Q: Why is the Agni-V different from the previous Agni missiles?
VKS: Agni-V is a completely new missile system. It is a 21st-century missile because of the technologies used and a game changer because of its strategic deterrence value. The missile went from drawing board to launch pad in just over three years. The government sanctioned the Agni-V project in December 2008. We began design work on it in April 2009. The missile was on the launch pad on March 14, 2012 and launched five days later.

Q: What are the new technologies that the DRDO has developed for this missile?
VKS: Agni-V has taken us to a new level of technological maturity. This missile is entirely different from the Agni 3 and 4. The second and third stage booster of the missile are made entirely of composites. The third stage is a new booster that we developed. It is the lowest end of the tapered cone that ends with the warhead. That itself, in terms of composites, is a breakthrough. The navigation system is highly accurate. Don't forget that this missile travels at over Mach 20 in its terminal stage. Both the ring laser gyros (a device that measures the orientation of the missile and helps in inertial navigation) and the accelerometer (which measures the missile's rate of acceleration) are indigenously developed as part of the indigenous ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme. We also proved redundancies of our new onboard navigation system. A backup navigation system that was less accurate but more robust was put in place. This navigation system was supported by a unique fault tolerance software that we installed in the missile. The re-entry nose cone that contains the warhead had to be completely redesigned with new material and resins. This is because when the missile re-enters the atmosphere, it is hurtling towards the ground at over 20 times the speed of sound. Friction on the nose cone causes temperatures in excess of 2000 degrees centigrade. This system had to be proved on the ground and that was a major technological development for us.

We are also working on a canister-launched system for the Agni-V. We have designed a canister that can eject the 50-tonne missile 50 metres in the air and fire the first stage. The canister will allow us to store the missile for ten years with no maintenance. The missile will be carried on railcars and on a 12x12 road-mobile truck. Carrying the missile on a road-mobile launcher is better because it is more flexible, you just need some level ground to launch it. The first launch of the A5 was from a railcar, we hope it will subsequently be fired from road-mobile launchers.

Q: Costs and production of the Agni-V? There is a concern that you will not be able to produce more than one or two missiles a year.
VKS: The A5 costs approximately Rs 50 crore per missile. We will need two more tests before starting serial production after two years. The DRDO is working with production agencies for this. All I can tell you is that we will produce more than just 1 or 2 missiles a year.

Q: What were the challenges posed in tracking such a long-range missile?
VKS: The Agni-V required a different range deployment. The range of over 5,000 km meant the missile would land north of Antartica. That meant the ships tracking the launch would have to sail nearly a fortnight before the launch window. We had a slight difficulty in that all our tracking systems are ship and shore-based. We don't have airborne sensors. We needed three ships to track the launch: two near the splashdown and one to track the mid-course correction. The ships are due to return on April 30 or, 11 days after the missile test. We have a highly integrated tracking range comprising 15 sensors, seven radars and seven telemetry systems. They did an admirable job of tracking the missile flight in real time.

Q: Does DRDO have the capability of destroying satellites in space?
VKS: Today, India has all the building blocks for an anti-satellite system in place.

We don't want to weaponise space but the building blocks should be in place. Because you may come to a time when you may need it. Today, I can say that all the building blocks (for an ASAT weapon) are in place. A little fine tuning may be required but we will do that electronically. We will not do a physical test (actual destruction of a satellite) because of the risk of space debris affecting other satellites.

Q: How did you develop these ASAT capabilities?
VKS: There are a few essential parameters in intercepting satellites. You should have the ability to track an orbiting satellite in space, launch a missile towards it and finally have a kill vehicle that actually homes in to physically destroy it.

We have a Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) used in the Ballistic Missile Defence Programme that has a range of over 600 km. We will increase the range to 1,400 km allowing us to track satellites in orbit.

It is far more difficult to intercept ballistic missiles than it is to intercept satellites. Satellites follow a predictive path. Once you track a satellite, you will know its path.

In the BMD project, we track and intercept a 0.1 square meter target over 1,000 km away. A satellite is ten times larger-over 1 meter wide.

We have the communication systems in place, again developed for the BMD project. The first-stage booster developed for the Agni-V can inject a warhead 600 km into space. We also have a kill vehicle developed for the BMD project. The kill vehicle actually homes in onto an incoming missile. We have the Infra-Red and Radar frequency seekers on the kill vehicle that accurately guide it to its target.

Q: At what phase of development is the BMD programme?
VKS: Phase-1 of the BMD programme will be completed by 2013. In this, we will intercept Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles with a range of 2,000 km. The second phase will be completed by 2016. In this, we will be able to intercept intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) with ranges over 5,000 km. Phase-1 has two missile interceptors called the PAD and the AAD. This year, we will be testing a new interceptor missile called the PDV. This missile will replace the PAD. Two missiles, the AD1 and the AD2 will be tested by the end of 2013 under Phase 2 of the BMD.

Q: What about cruise missile defence?
VKS: That is a whole new ballgame because it calls for an entirely new set of missiles and radars. My team is presently studying CMD. We are looking at it as a possible next programme after finishing the BMD programme.

Q: The DRDO has made breakthroughs in the K-series missiles for the nuclear submarine project. Why didn't you use a land-based variant of this missile?
VKS: The technologies involved in both missiles are different. An underwater missile has to deal with the pressure of a10 metre column of water above it. Hence the configuration of the missile is different. It is heavier, the structure is different. Unlike the Agni missile, this missile carries a lot of dead weight.

Q: When will the indigenous nuclear submarine INS Arihant be commissioned?
VKS: The submarine will test all its systems this year.

Q: Field trials of the Arjun Mark 2 ?
VKS: We have the first test of the Arjun Mark 2 in June, this year. We have given the army 80 per cent of the changes in Mark 2. There are 126 more Arjuns being built, in addition to the 126 delivered to the army. We are confident of getting another order of 350 Arjun mark 2 tanks.

Q: What stage is the Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT) project at?
VKS: We are holding discussions with the army for this. We will finalise the specifications of the tank in six to eight months. We are looking at industrial partners for this. We want new technologies for weapons, mobility and signatures for the FMBT. We have to decide on the type of armour to use for it, whether active or passive. The FMBT will be a tank complimentary to the Arjun. It will not replace it. Each tank has its own theatre. The T-90 MBT (used by the Indian army) has its theatre, the Arjun has its own theatre.

Q: When will the Long Range Surface-to-Air Missile (LR-SAM) be tested ?
VKS: The first successful trial of the LR-SAM was in 2010. After this we decided on a complete change of configuration. We will have another test of the modified missile in Israel in June 2012. The missile system has already been integrated into the first P15A warship (the INS Kolkata, being built at Mazagon Docks Ltd, Mumbai).

[SaiK]

I think pakis have come from one-one launch to match only when there is huge range gap like A5 did. A MIRV launch would make pakis to launch as many shaheens or mujaheed missiles and expend their exchequer. Now, strategies can be played ball for ball, but they can't however do one-one anymore.

They have realized it, but have no face to tell.

[pankajs]

Bharat Karnad on the Agony
India’s missile bamboozle

There has been needless confusion and obfuscation about the Agni-V missile test-fired on April 19. First was the delay in the launch by some 11 hours. For a missile touted as “all weather”, a bit of lightning shouldn’t have frightened off the DRDO brass. More likely, the reason was last minute jitters about a missile whose launch had been turned into a media circus.
What is less comprehensible was the persistent description in the media, no doubt at the DRDO’s prompting, of the Agni-V as an “Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile” (ICBM) when, given its stated range of around 5,000 kms, Dr V. Saraswat, DRDO boss and scientific adviser to the defence minister, identified it correctly for television cameras as an Inter-mediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). The first hint of Agni-V’s ICBM status was dropped by the minister of state for science, Ashwini Kumar, when he referred to the missile re-entering the atmosphere at “24.4 times the speed of sound”. Depending on the altitude, this works out to roughly 7.2 to 7.7 kms per second as terminal velocity, making it unquestionably an ICBM , compared to 6.2 to 6.5 kms per second re-entry speed of Agni-IV , which is IRBM performance. Obviously, Agni-V was fired in a high-parabolic trajectory to depress the distance it travelled, which may be why Chinese military sources have claimed that Agni-V’s 8,000-km range is being covered up.{Here BK gets it wrong. AV was on a depressed trajectory. A4 was on a lofted trajectory.. Details...does not matter that much...the idea is correct.} The Agni has to have a minimum range of 10,000 kms to be considered an ICBM. But why did the DRDO not publicise the missile’s full capability?
The reason was to mollify the Manmohan Singh government that has always been fearful of spooking the US. Washington has insisted that India restrict its missile capacity to cover China without tripping into the ICBM range lest that leads to India being perceived as a threat, resulting in American counter-measures. While the Bharatiya Janata Party-led NDA government’s minister for external affairs (MEA), Jaswant Singh, denies he had cut any deal during his 19 rounds of “strategic dialogue” with Strobe Talbott, former US President Bill Clinton’s deputy secretary of state, in early 2000 to cap Indian missile capability at the IRBM level, the Congress coalition government has adhered to this restriction, which is reflected in the DRDO’s programmatic thrust.
Indeed, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s reluctance to offend Washington was stretched to a point where he reportedly kept delaying the approval of the first test of Agni-V until defence minister A.K. Antony put his foot down around mid-2011, and compelled Dr Singh to approve the launch. The government tried to soften any negative reaction by scheduling foreign secretary Ranjan Mathai’s speech extolling India’s spotless nuclear and missile technology non-proliferation record at an MEA-sponsored seminar on the same day as the missile test.
The DRDO’s fear of the government disallowing sustained testing of critical strategic technologies, backed by an equally nagging apprehension about reduction of funds for strategic technology development, is why the DRDO resorted to over-the-top publicity. The DRDO’s strategy was to thwart moves by the government to curtail activity in the missile field by creating huge public support for Agni-V and follow-on ICBM. It resembles the decision by nuclear scientists to simultaneously trigger three devices (which produced mixed, suboptimal results) on May 11, 1998, because of the fear that under foreign pressure the government would terminate testing after the very first explosion if a series of separate single underground tests had been resorted to.
The hullabaloo over the untested MIRV (Multiple Independently Re-targetable Vehicles) technology, enabling one missile to engage three to eight different targets that Agni-V is configured to carry, was also for the same reason. So much public hype about the MIRV technology, awaiting government permission to test for the last eight-odd years, means that Dr Singh cannot now stop its testing in the second launch of Agni-V.
The other stellar attributes of the Indian IRBM not talked about, but worth mentioning, are the chip-embedded guidance system and the servo-mechanisms for thrust control to permit mid-flight manoeuvring.
Were the Indian government strategic-minded, which it is not, it would push through an accelerated programme of testing and induction into service of Agni-V and, in parallel, quickly develop and test-fire over Antarctica a genuine ICBM by replacing the first stage made of steel on the IRBM with lightweight composites to accommodate more fuel. What an ICBM does is allow Chinese targets to be hit from virtually anywhere, thereby immeasurably enlarging the space for manoeuvre by Indian firing platforms outside Chinese satellite coverage. Further, the production rate of Agni-IVs and Agni-Vs needs rapid ramping up to keep pace with even a minor adversary — Pakistan.
The success of Agni-V, however, highlights the danger that I have been warning about for many years, namely, very advanced and accurate long-range missiles married to untested and unproven thermonuclear warheads that, without further physical testing of fusion and boosted-fission weapons designs, could prove to be duds. That will be a devastating denouement for the Indian strategic deterrent — accurate delivery but fizzled impact. Even so, with a proven IRBM, India has reached deterrence parity with China in the sense of being able to reach the most distant Chinese targets.
The MEA should capitalise on the interest generated by Agni-V to explore an Indian role as the “net security provider” that countries in Southeast Asia would welcome and Washington has been urging Delhi to play. Our dilly-dallying on the sale of the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile led Indonesia to buy a variant directly from Russia. Vietnam, which also seeks Brahmos, is unlikely to wait around either. Unless India treats Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and other Asean members as the first tier of India’s defence and missile-arms them on a priority basis, national security will remain grievously impaired. New Delhi emphasising non-proliferation norms at the expense of the country’s geopolitical interests is tragically short-sighted, given that the brownie points it wins cannot compensate for China transferring nuclear missile technology to Pakistan, or insinuating itself into the military affairs of Burma, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Maldives, to disadvantage India.{Exactly what I had said about our being the bishma pitamaha of the world to earn plaudits from the gora sahibs at the expense of the security of our country.}
The MEA should not squander the chance to pursue substantive cooperative security measures with the United States and countries on China’s periphery beyond anti-piracy patrols and joint military exercises by, for a start, discussing and preparing for contingency scenarios.

The writer is a professor at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

[ramana]

Good summary overall. Will comment later.

[harbans]

Now, strategies can be played ball for ball, but they can't however do one-one anymore.

The mileage that Paki's gained from == is massive. POK 2 was an attempt to break the mileage that Paki's get from the ==. The important thing to realize that from the mileage Paki's gained, they got respectability, a way to convince dumb folks that India was in someway an aggressor which in return led to deals and financing of the terror infrastructure, instability in Kashmir, Afghanistan and spurt in terrorist activities all over. The motivation for the == was always credibility to maintain that thrust. The West and the rest would always have been better if India was allowed it's natural strategic space to breathe out. That angle though understood in the deeper recesses of our mindsets has not been well explained. The result also manifests in a large internal lobby that buy the == BS. Where we should be squashing Paki perfidy, we end up in Aman ka tamasha's. With the natural major difference being exposed, India should encourage Pak=BD, Pak-Afghan equations.

[harbans]

There has been needless confusion and obfuscation about the Agni-V missile test-fired on April 19. First was the delay in the launch by some 11 hours. For a missile touted as “all weather”, a bit of lightning shouldn’t have frightened off the DRDO brass.

I think BK should have known the delay was not because the missile was not all weather, but the weather at the tracking end for ships could affect the telemetry observations and the recording of missile performance parameters at it's terminal stage.