Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

[chackojoseph]

Of course the Army has to see how to fit the tanks in its plans especially when it is not made as the main MBT to the increased cost of incorporating the new tank and redoing the eco-system of supporting the Arjun tank and the T-90/T-72s will be the primary MBT. Of course he will say that.

What I am trying to say is that MoD/GoI need to increase the budget of the IA if you want to see Arjuns as the main MBT in large numbers so the IA can create and maintain the necessary eco-system to support the Arjun tanks because if they don't, Arjuns become static pillboxes in very short order.

When I spoke to the tanker, he was telling me how maintenance intensive the tanks are and that without a good supporting infrastructure, the tank will quickly become useless. He said that we have no idea how parts hungry tanks can be. Maintenance is a vital, necessary, and crucial component of keeping a credible tank force.

So just coming up with the budget/money to buy the Arjun tanks and expect those tanks to work in the current eco-system is dreaming in la la land. You gotta create the eco-system and the IA leadership is not hearing the right words from GoI/MoD on creating that necessary eco-system so of course they got cold feet and surely, they didn't come out with support of the Arjun tanks because they are afraid that if they come out in support of the Arjun tanks without the required amount of money to maintain the tanks, the tanks become useless and the IA just wasted a lot of money and the infantry branch is now mightily pissed off because the money that they could have gotten is now gone and they cannot get their own weapon programmes which is equally important in their eyes as to the Arjun tanks such as helicopters, artillery, network technology, reconnaissance & communication systems, living quarters, training, etc.

So if you can get MoD/GoI to agree to an increase of the budget, I am very positive that you will see a change of attitude among the IA leadership overnight because it means that the IA can create the necessary eco-system to support the Arjun tanks and the tanks won't become useless in short order and be of strong utility. With the way the budget is, I am not surprised if the IA cannot support any more than 500 Arjun tanks because it means they only have to modify one depot and keep those Arjun tanks in two or three regiments that can be localized in one area. But it is another thing if you want the Arjun tanks to be supported all over the country which means overhauling/construction of depots & motor pools that can support Arjun all over the country and suddenly you are not just talking about one facility, but tens of facilities and a logistic system with its own warehouses and stores that can support Arjuns in all theaters.

That is what former COAS Gen. J.J. Singh meant when he said that the IA had to figure out to incorporate the tank in its forces. The IA has to figure out where the Arjuns can be stationed so that it can be supported and maintained in good facilities and be of good utility/use to the IA. As the saying goes, "Amateurs think tactics and equipment. Professionals think of logistics." In this case, most people on BR are not aware of the logistical issues that come with incorporating Arjuns.

I am not saying that IA has a good reason not to incorporate Arjuns. I am just explaining the point of view behind IA's thinking & attitude towards the Arjun tank and their reluctance to incorporate in large numbers. It would take a visionary and a man of great confidence and strength to force IA to embrace the Arjun because he has to persuade other branches of the IA to bite their tongues and accept that the armor branch would be getting a lot more money than other branches and persuade the MoD/GoI to loosen up its purse strings necessary to make this Arjun induction happen.

So, you are saying that Arrjun Tank was never meant to be the 'main' MBT? If so, i don't agree with you at all.

On budget, No there is no restriction if they want to induct Arjun with all the logistics.

On contrary, a short order will make Arjun Tank serviceable in future.

No, that's not what JJ meant. Since the Long term equipment plan is already in progress and based on T-90's, they have to see how Arjuns can be accommodated.

I think, we have discussed so much on the Arjun logistics. In fact, we have been discussing this right back from 2007 and I have an article on that Arjun MBT weight implications . One of the key points of the article is "The existing BWTA wagons have pay load capacity of 60+ tons." I suggest you read 7th para very carefully. Unlike what you think that T-72 infra is entirely unsuitable for Arjun tanks... Its only certain extra equipment and modifications that is needed. The budgets of 10's of billion dollars is more than exaggeration.

I totally disagree with the stated reasons on Army's reluctance to induct Arjun tanks.

[NRao]

The big deal is the COST! Money does not grow on trees.

depends.

Apparently it grows ------- IF it is the T-90.......... http://www.defensenews.com/article/2014 ... estic-Help . Something a technically competent Russia did not do, then the same technically competent Russia did not allow it to be done India (IP!!!!!!!! what IP who knows, but IP) and then AFTER negotiations with a technically competent Russia, Russia allowed it to be done (IA got real lucky). That had to have a cost associated with it, technically competent Russia would not allow it to be done free, wonder what that cost. Then what about the cost of not having all these things in the first place, the cost of gadgets failing in heat, ............................... Money DID grow on trees.

And, the tree shrivels and dies............ if it is the Arjun.

Anyways, if you have figures let me know, how many billions, over what period of time, etc - be as specific as possible. And if you do not have number it is OK, but let me know that too.

Procurement and supply chain is progressing rather fast. I know there has been an attempt to rope in India on this matter, but have no idea where it stands.

[chackojoseph]

NRao,

In addition to IP shipy, the T-90 tanks were deliberately purchased without many addons to justify price against Arjun Tank, when faced with a choice to go with T-90 or Arjun. One should go back to the history to read what was the deal about.

[rohitvats]

^^^For all this talk about additional, and substantial money, being required to overhaul the entire logistic chain for large scale induction of Arjun tank - is there any documented, or even anecdotal, evidence of IA asking MOD for additional budget for Arjun induction? Did IA ever say that beyond X amount for inducting Y number of Arjun tanks, it needs +20, 30 or 50% additional funding?

Did IA ever work out the overall induction cost per tank for Arjun - taking into account MLC 70 BLT, other bridging equipment, ARV equipvement, training and all the zing bang? Or was this all too complicated and since T-90 was OK given the threat scenario and easier induction route, it was and is the preferred choice?

All this talk of logistics and all that hearsay...Did IA issue GSQR with requirement of commonality with older Vijayanta fleet?

[Sanku]

But I thought we wanted to give our army best equipment at whatever cost to win the war. But this logic will not work when equipment is local developed.

That must be the US army we are talking of, Indian armed forces are more like "we will fight with what we have"

Quote:
adequate


"that is your opinion". IA, with their current "paper" request does not *think* so.

NRao ji; it is entirely your opinion to suggest that a upgrade plan translates to lack of adequacy. IA's stated policy on T 90s as of now suggests adequacy.

Yes, IA does itself suggests inadequacy on other counts, such as overall ammunition stock, number of field artillery, tatra trucks even etc. But as far as T 90s for current threat perception goes, at no point of time as IA suggested inadequacy.

[Sanku]

Did IA issue GSQR with requirement of commonality with older Vijayanta fleet?

The world has changed completely from when GSQR was issued. That is one of the HUGE issues with such protracted development cycles. We can and should only talk about how things are now.

[vic]

Whenever ANY new equipment is inducted then logistical chain has to change.

[Pratyush]

^^^For all this talk about additional, and substantial money, being required to overhaul the entire logistic chain for large scale induction of Arjun tank - is there any documented, or even anecdotal, evidence of IA asking MOD for additional budget for Arjun induction? Did IA ever say that beyond X amount for inducting Y number of Arjun tanks, it needs +20, 30 or 50% additional funding?

Did IA ever work out the overall induction cost per tank for Arjun - taking into account MLC 70 BLT, other bridging equipment, ARV equipvement, training and all the zing bang? Or was this all too complicated and since T-90 was OK given the threat scenario and easier induction route, it was and is the preferred choice?

All this talk of logistics and all that hearsay...Did IA issue GSQR with requirement of commonality with older Vijayanta fleet?

You have asked a very relevant set of question. No sure if I can answer. But I recall reading something to the effect of how many extra fuel tankers will be required in order to support one additional rehiment for arjun, in the mid 90. In addition to the above the cost of rail transportation, would be rated on the basis of it being an oversized consignemt. Inviting an oversized consignment surcharge. Because of its dimensions.

The exact numbers elude me, as it was along time ago. But as far as the mid 90s. There was an appreciation of the costs involved in the introduction of the tank in the service.

Whether the Army had asked the MOD for the additional funding for the tanks is unknown to me.

[Manish_Sharma]

Of course the Army has to see how to fit the tanks in its plans especially when it is not made as the main MBT to the increased cost of incorporating the new tank and redoing the eco-system of supporting the Arjun tank and the T-90/T-72s will be the primary MBT. Of course he will say that.

What I am trying to say is that MoD/GoI need to increase the budget of the IA if you want to see Arjuns as the main MBT in large numbers so the IA can create and maintain the necessary eco-system to support the Arjun tanks because if they don't, Arjuns become static pillboxes in very short order.

When I spoke to the tanker, he was telling me how maintenance intensive the tanks are and that without a good supporting infrastructure, the tank will quickly become useless. He said that we have no idea how parts hungry tanks can be. Maintenance is a vital, necessary, and crucial component of keeping a credible tank force.

So just coming up with the budget/money to buy the Arjun tanks and expect those tanks to work in the current eco-system is dreaming in la la land.

But didn't the same kind of problems arose when IA switched from Vijayantas to T-72s. Those were poverty times still nation did it without much fuss.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vijayanta

The Vijayanta (en: "Victorious")[1] main battle tank was built in India based on a licensed design of the Vickers Mk.1. The Vijayanta was the first indigenous tank of the Indian Army. The prototype was completed in 1963 and the tank entered service in 1965. The first 90 vehicles were built by Vickers in the UK.[2] Production continued at the Heavy Vehicles Factory in Avadi until 1983 with 2,200 being built (other sources give much lower numbers: 1,600-1,800[3]). A number of the tank hulls were converted to other uses such as self-propelled guns after being withdrawn from service.[4] The Vijayanta has been supplanted by the T-72M1 in Indian service.

[Sanku]

But didn't the same kind of problems arose when IA switched from Vijayantas to T-72s. Those were poverty times still nation did it without much fuss.

That was the era of Rupee-Rouble trade where the babu's in Delhi and Moscow decided the mutual exchange rate and on top allowed for the money to be offset against trade of items like Shoes (from India) and lipsticks.

(I kid you not)

The massive inflow of arms was under the strategic friendship deal

[tushar_m]

Arjun MK II main battle tank may miss 2016 induction date

The Arjun MK II main battle tank (MBT) for the Indian Army may get delayed further than its pre-fixed 2016 induction date. Reason: Its Israeli Laser Homing Anti-Tank (LAHAT) guided missile has failed about 20 per cent of the times it was fired during last summer.

A key source in the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) said, the Israelis who customised the LAHAT (also a Hebrew word for ‘incandescence’) for firing from the 120 mm main gun of the Mark II variant, has gone back to the drawing boards for correcting the error.

The DRDO source said, ‘This has delayed the induction of the tank a bit, but then we are telling the army that since the platform, the tank, is ready they can take it up, with the missile getting mated later.’

The tank itself has undergone about 89 major and minor ‘improvements,’ and still have a few unsolved issues which are decidedly ‘minor’ like changing the position of a light bulb or so.
The range of the LAHAT pay-load is about three-and-a-half kilometres on the plains and about two-and-a-half kilometres in the deserts.

LAHAT was originally developed 1992 by Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI) for firing from their own Merkava MBT. With a diametre of about 105 mm, the anti-tank can be independently targeted or targeted through laser designation. The latter means an alternative platform can illuminate the target with the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) homing in on the laser spot.

Till now the army has ordered 124 Mark IIs, while the DRDO is still attempting to get the army raise the demand to 500, which the DRDO source said, would make the production line viable.

Though the improvements sought by the army has increased the weight of the tank – from about 45 tonnes to 67 tonnes. It can still pivot by 360 degrees while firing. The crew comfort is considered to be of a very high order, beating the T-90 Russian MBT hollow, sources say.

Now the DRDO claims it is for the army to make up its whether it wishes to field it by 2016 or wait for the LAHAT to come online fully, before it accepts the ready for deployment MBT.

[chackojoseph]

I have mentioned it to a lot of folks on forum that IA will do this when elections come. Now next govt will come and the whole argument will begin again and it will delay.

[sum]

The DRDO source said, ‘This has delayed the induction of the tank a bit, but then we are telling the army that since the platform, the tank, is ready they can take it up, with the missile getting mated later.’

Guess IA is not really into this logic when it comes to desi stuff?

The Arjun MK II main battle tank (MBT) for the Indian Army may get delayed further than its pre-fixed 2016 induction date. Reason: Its Israeli Laser Homing Anti-Tank (LAHAT) guided missile has failed about 20 per cent of the times it was fired during last summer.

Wonder what were failure rates of all the other gizmos imported till now during their trials?

[NRao]

The DRDO source said, ‘This has delayed the induction of the tank a bit, but then we are telling the army that since the platform, the tank, is ready they can take it up, with the missile getting mated later.’

Guess IA is not really into this logic when it comes to desi stuff?

That is part of the bigger problem. They accept a T-90 that fails and they now have asked and allocated $250+ million to improve a tank that the Russians did not provide for or were reluctant to provide for or did not want to provide for, but cannot accept an Indian tank that is fully operational by their own definition.

On the topic of "paper" and "inadequacy": $250+ million have been asked by the IA and the MoD has approved it, so this is neither "on paper" and shows the inadequacy of the T-90.

The Arjun MK II main battle tank (MBT) for the Indian Army may get delayed further than its pre-fixed 2016 induction date. Reason: Its Israeli Laser Homing Anti-Tank (LAHAT) guided missile has failed about 20 per cent of the times it was fired during last summer.

Wonder what were failure rates of all the other gizmos imported till now during their trials?

As CJ stated (umpteen times) these are tactics to kill the Arjun. IF it were a Russian product it would have been absorbed without an engine by now.

[putnanja]

Wasn't there a problem with the konkurs on T-90s too? If my memory serves me right, for the first few years after T-90s induction, it couldn't fire any missiles either. I recall seeing a CAG report to that effect too.

[NRao]

it is entirely your opinion to suggest that a upgrade plan translates to lack of adequacy. IA's stated policy on T 90s as of now suggests adequacy.

Hmmmm.......

Bhai Saheb, we are talking US $250+ million here. IF the T-90, per a stated policy (I have not seen one, but will grant that), is adequate, then reallocate the $250+ million to the Arjun. And, frame that policy - we can pay for that frame. Simple.

It is the request for allocation for the upgrade and the approval to spend funds that grow on trees that formulates this policy. It is there in black-n-white. Or, in hard, cold cash. Nothing to do with me.

[Pratyush]

What nonesense is this. Is missile firing from the gun such a big deal. That the whole tank program will be delayed because of that. Also, in the Indian context can the misile be used to the full range, which makes having the missile worth while.

Wasnt the DRDO designing CLGM for the Mk2. Which was tested some time ago. Should not the Arjun accepted as is with the addition of the missile at a later date.

PS I am opposed to any tank fired guided missle, unless it is fire and forget. Which at the moment dosenot exist as a production item. IIRC.

[Cybaru]

The DRDO source said, ‘This has delayed the induction of the tank a bit, but then we are telling the army that since the platform, the tank, is ready they can take it up, with the missile getting mated later.’

Guess IA is not really into this logic when it comes to desi stuff?

The Arjun MK II main battle tank (MBT) for the Indian Army may get delayed further than its pre-fixed 2016 induction date. Reason: Its Israeli Laser Homing Anti-Tank (LAHAT) guided missile has failed about 20 per cent of the times it was fired during last summer.

Wonder what were failure rates of all the other gizmos imported till now during their trials?

So why punish arjun Mk-2 ? For lahat failing ?

[chackojoseph]

In 2007, I did this story

Delay in induction of the new Arjun tanks averted

AK Antony really took them to laundry and got it approved. I will really miss the AKA, Palama Raju (and defence secretary R K Mathur) team for indigenisation.

[Sanku]

AK Antony really took them to laundry and got it approved. I will really miss the AKA, Palama Raju (and defence secretary R K Mathur) team for indigenisation.

Thank heavens, that the apology for Def Min failed to stop T 90 under the guise of supporting Arjun, otherwise, the Armor would also be helplessly denuded as other parts of Indian armed forces.

As I said before, T 90s are one of the few pieces of modern equipment the IA has, thank heavens for that.

[Sanku]

it is entirely your opinion to suggest that a upgrade plan translates to lack of adequacy. IA's stated policy on T 90s as of now suggests adequacy.

Hmmmm.......

Bhai Saheb, we are talking US $250+ million here. IF the T-90, per a stated policy (I have not seen one, but will grant that), is adequate, then reallocate the $250+ million to the Arjun. And, frame that policy - we can pay for that frame. Simple.
.

NRao-ji; as I have noted many times before, I am never sure if the idea is to induct Arjun or make sure that IA does not even have T 90s. Because saying a current tank fleet should not be updated and kept up to scratch in future is frankly not something which is good for IA.

We can say that Arjun should be inducted, but actively propagating a view that a plan to keep the current tank fleet adequate EVEN in future should not be done beats me.

[Hitesh]

Rohitvats, Chackojoseph, and NRao,

To truly appreciate the cost of what the cost of an Arjun tank program means, I ran into an colleague of mine who I knew served in the US Army during the 80s for a decade as an infantry officer who had tanks as part of his company and later served as a master logistician and acquisition expert. This is his qualification:

I was an Infantry officer who commanded M113 and M2 units but I usually had an M1 platoon attached and was task organized to an M1 battalion.

More importantly I was the S4 for a brigade as we underwent M1/M2 fielding and saw all of this come to us. Since 1989 I have worked in Army acquisition, first as an officer and then as a government civilian and I just received my /5 year service award from the Acquisition Corps. I have an MBA in Acquisition Logistics and am Level 3 certified in Acquisition Logistics and Level 2 in Program Management so I kind of have a clue about the cost of the Abram tank program.

I mentioned to him about the debate on BR regarding the cost of the Arjun tanks versus the T-90 tank programme and he agreed with my assessment and not only that, the assessments of the the IA tank gunner and several IA officers I interacted several years ago. This is what he had to commented on the costs of the Abrams tank and the various things that goes into the ecosystem in supporting the Abram tank program.

You and the IA tankers are correct in your assessment. Converting from the M60 to the M1 cost us tens of $billions in 1980s prices…but that is not a bad thing. It provided a much more capable force. But that came at a cost. But here are some of the other things which had to be purchased or paid for:

Keep in mind this all applies not just to the active Army but also to our National Guard.

- All of the spare parts in the inventory from unit motor pools up through the national level depots had to be swapped out. As a unit was converted its M60 spares were redistributed amongst the remaining M60 force. Each tank battalion and supporting supply warehouse (1 per brigade) had those parts swapped out.
- All special tools and test equipment for all maintenance activities had to exchanged.
- The fleet of M911/M746/M747 Heavy Equipment Transporters had to be replaced by the M1070/M1000 series
- The previous family of ammunition and fuel vehicles (5 tons and GOERs) had to be replaced by the HEMTT family. And then we needed HEMMT wreckers to replace the 5 ton wreckers to take care of the HEMTTs.
- The same rules for spare parts now applied for these support vehicles as for the base tanks.
- All of the M88 series recovery vehicles had to be upgraded with bigger engines and transmissions.
- The Army had to procure a fleet of 3 axle flatbed rail cars to move the M1s by train….and that included for the Bundesbahn (the West German Rail Company at the time).
- Hundreds of bridges in Germany and Korea had to be strengthened to handle the increased weight
- Range complexes worldwide had to be modified.
- Initially the same 105mm ammo for the M68 was common between the 2 tanks but eventually new ammunition had to be procured for the 120mm gun.
- All training materials across the Army had to be updated and new simulators built.

Add to all of this the Army had to pay for all of this for itself and the Marine Corps (by US law, the led service on a common weapons program bears the initial developmental costs.)

Rule of thumb in procurement is the total cost of a weapon system is a formula of 30 + 70. That is 30% of the cost is to procure the actual item the remaining 70% of the cost is the support items as well as the maintenance and operations of that item over its life cycle.

But he said that the IA tankers were wrong about the cost of the M-1 tank program. He said it was not tens of billions of dollars, but the actual cost was, wait for it…….., 3.75 Trillion dollars in today price if you calculate the entire program’s cost from inception to today.

I was stunned to hear that. This is what he said:

I think the total outlay for the M1 and all is on the order $3.75 Trillion from 1975 to today.

I was flabbergasted and asked him if he was sure of the price because based on the rough formula he gave me. I asked him: “$3.75 trillion dollars?!!!! You mean todays price, right? I had no idea it was that high. I thought it would be like around 240-250 billion dollars total, considering the price was only $7m per tank (today price) and US produced over 9000 tanks and that would translate into $60 billion dollars and multiply it by 4, it would be nearly $250 billion.”

This is what he said:

That figure was one I heard in an acquisition class for continuing level education requirements I was in last year. It was lecture material and was in my notes.

The 3.75 Trillion was for all the various items I listed....not just the tanks themselves. You cannot draw a straight line cost for the vehicle. You have factor it all into the cost to include the costs to rebuild to M1A1 and M1A2 standards etc. You even factor in the salary of the guy who sits in a depot and repairs the broken engine today.

So you have it, a firsthand account on the cost of the Abrams tank program. So based on this, I am very confident in my assessment in why the IA brass was very worried about the Arjun tank program and its costs involved and probably decided to stick with T-90 once they knew that the GoI/MoD would not support this cost of the outlay required to create the supporting eco-system for the Arjun tank.

[NRao]

Thanks for that note, nothing new there, and I still stand by: What is the big deal?

More later.

[Misraji]

@Hitesh:
Sounds feasible. Hopefully there will be some numbers on the Net to prove-disprove your personal correspondence.
And while your post has an honest ring to it, I am unsure whether the powers-that-be were thinking the same.

An argument against your post is that the army has never once said that it required more funds for Arjun.
It played tricks through-out the 2000s delaying the project while ordering T-90s in numbers.
When its bull$hit was called out, there were the famous BMW-vs-Maruti remark, and then T-90 got thrashed in comparative.

Now its, T-90-costs-same-as-Arjun but we-dont-have-enuf-money-for-infrastructure.
Every year there is a new set of rationalizations to this debate.

--Ashish.

[srai]

...

You and the IA tankers are correct in your assessment. Converting from the M60 to the M1 cost us tens of $billions in 1980s prices…but that is not a bad thing. It provided a much more capable force. But that came at a cost. But here are some of the other things which had to be purchased or paid for:

Keep in mind this all applies not just to the active Army but also to our National Guard.

- All of the spare parts in the inventory from unit motor pools up through the national level depots had to be swapped out. As a unit was converted its M60 spares were redistributed amongst the remaining M60 force. Each tank battalion and supporting supply warehouse (1 per brigade) had those parts swapped out.
- All special tools and test equipment for all maintenance activities had to exchanged.
- The fleet of M911/M746/M747 Heavy Equipment Transporters had to be replaced by the M1070/M1000 series
- The previous family of ammunition and fuel vehicles (5 tons and GOERs) had to be replaced by the HEMTT family. And then we needed HEMMT wreckers to replace the 5 ton wreckers to take care of the HEMTTs.
- The same rules for spare parts now applied for these support vehicles as for the base tanks.
- All of the M88 series recovery vehicles had to be upgraded with bigger engines and transmissions.
- The Army had to procure a fleet of 3 axle flatbed rail cars to move the M1s by train….and that included for the Bundesbahn (the West German Rail Company at the time).
- Hundreds of bridges in Germany and Korea had to be strengthened to handle the increased weight
- Range complexes worldwide had to be modified.
- Initially the same 105mm ammo for the M68 was common between the 2 tanks but eventually new ammunition had to be procured for the 120mm gun.
- All training materials across the Army had to be updated and new simulators built.

Add to all of this the Army had to pay for all of this for itself and the Marine Corps (by US law, the led service on a common weapons program bears the initial developmental costs.)

Rule of thumb in procurement is the total cost of a weapon system is a formula of 30 + 70. That is 30% of the cost is to procure the actual item the remaining 70% of the cost is the support items as well as the maintenance and operations of that item over its life cycle.

But he said that the IA tankers were wrong about the cost of the M-1 tank program. He said it was not tens of billions of dollars, but the actual cost was, wait for it…….., 3.75 Trillion dollars in today price if you calculate the entire program’s cost from inception to today.

I was stunned to hear that. This is what he said:

I think the total outlay for the M1 and all is on the order $3.75 Trillion from 1975 to today.

...

If you look at the bolded part, US army had to spend on building foreign infrastructure to support M1 because the US military has a global deployment/presence. I would think a significant portion of that $3.75 trillion would have gone into that (and coming from its "budget"). Does he have a breakdown on the costs by his list of associated costs?

Also, $3.75 trillion from 1975 to today means 40 year cost distribution. If we were to average out the cost spread, it would come to around $100 millions/year. Initial period expenditure would be higher.

When applying to the IA, the GoI (probably transportation, railways and home ministries) would be footing the infrastructure (roads, tracks, bridges) bills. Haven't the NH projects added the 70t capacity on all it's bridges and roads? Likewise, new flatbed was designed for Arjun MBT and I would assume the rail bridges would support its load.

Coming to the border areas, the IA would need to upgrade it's bridging systems to 70t load ones. All the new ones being acquired, like the Sarvata, are rated at MLC-70 capacity.

[NRao]

it would come to around $100 millions/year

I think it should be billion. But, your point that the cost is distributed is true.

Hitesh,

I would suggest that you do a rough calc in terms of %ages between India and US, although even that is actually apples and oranges.

And, what did the support system for the T-90 cost? despite it having 60% in common with teh T-72? Do we know that?

Also, I was googling and came across that India spend 5000 crores on T-72 upgrades. A back of the env calc seems me to afford close to 300 Arjuns. So, going by what your buddy stated "but that is not a bad thing. It provided a much more capable force", what is your opinion? I would prefer 300 brand news Arjuns than to upgrade T-72 for sure, and, perhaps even consider not upgrading T-90s and taking that money and using it for Arjun "eco system".

How about the new request to upgrade the T-90? That has to have a brand new "eco system", as you call it. If the T-90 has no A/C, that is a new stuff. What about the rest of the components in the upgrade? All that "eco system" is brand new.

So, that figure of 60% commonality with the T-72 suddenly has to reduce for sure. Has *anyone* brought that up? where is that money coming from? Trees?

All this can be sorted out if we had proper figures. "Assessment", "Billions", etc really does not add to a discussion - adds direction perhaps, not much else.

There is a cost to do something and then there is cost for not doing it too. I am suggesting that going with Arjun - in the longer run - is FAR better. Now, I am trying to get some figures to back my suggestion.

[chackojoseph]

Hitesh,

Since there is no cost account available for such projects in India, its difficult to say how much it cost to convert and sustain T-90.

The T-72 and T-90 logistics commonality is 60% as per open sources.

We are uncertain on how much is the commonality factor between T-72 logistics and Arjun Tank Logistics. My estimate based on the article I had written, it should be approx 30 - 50%. Combine it with the cost of cheaper Arjun and T-90, then the entire cost of re equipment with Arjun Tank vs T-90 is not much or is not drastic. Arjun is a much more capable tank, and cost benefit analysis should also favour Arjun Tank.

Arjun variants like catapult and others are anyway arriving. Now Army will have two lines for logistics.

[member_27862]

Guys, just wondering...is there any other tank development in the pipeline ....something not based on a Arjun mod, but beyond that...

[alexis]

^^
It is a question of priorities... We never had thought through on how to sustain a war effort through several months. Indigenous products are absolutely necessary to sustain a war unless you have some superpower backing you. We dont have that kind of support and hence we have to indigenise everything like China. The consequent costs will have to be borne by the country and the tax payers.

[RKumar]

Guys, just wondering...is there any other tank development in the pipeline ....something not based on a Arjun mod, but beyond that...

yeah ...DRDO is developing laser, BM, conventional unguided & guided, LGB firing flying tank whose weight is equal to Aladdin´s flying carpet.

[Yagnasri]

There is no Tank development under way in US and Western Europe to my knowledge. Makarva may be having more advanced versions under development we do not know. East has many under development.

[chackojoseph]

Guys, just wondering...is there any other tank development in the pipeline ....something not based on a Arjun mod, but beyond that...

FMBT.

[nelson]

Wrong thread, but in the context of current discussion

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 569909.cms

Army has lot of funds, may be it will order few thousand Alladin's flying carpets next.

[Kersi D]

Guys, just wondering...is there any other tank development in the pipeline ....something not based on a Arjun mod, but beyond that...

yeah ...DRDO is developing laser, BM, conventional unguided & guided, LGB firing flying tank whose weight is equal to Aladdin´s flying carpet.

And DRDO is developing based on IA's requirements.

And then DRDO announces that it has made some progress

AND THEN.......................

And then Rodina announces that it has T xyz which can do all that. It is ALMOST ready

And India has to shell out just a few billion $$$$ so that they can complete the "development" of this tank

And soon IA orders T xyz

[NRao]

It is the season for mangoes. 66.000 of them.

India, Russia to sign deal for anti-tank ammunition

[srai]

it would come to around $100 millions/year

I think it should be billion. But, your point that the cost is distributed is true.

...

You are right. My bad calculation

$100 billion/year average for 40 years sounds bit far fetched even for the US Army to fund M1 "infrastructure". IMO, $3.7 trillion figure has been way over calculated. I would like to see the breakdown of cost expenditure.

[NRao]

Well, $100 billion for M1 is not too far fetched - for a few years. After all they pumped $45 billion within year or two to replace the humvee and now they are discarding the same vehicles. And, that 100 billion is across the world, unlike India that has to build within a much smaller geographic area.

What could seem too much is the total over the years: $3.XX trillion.

BTW, a T-90 solution in NE is perhaps a good one. And, imagine they are buying some 300 or so for that area AND the supply chain for that region that has none.

What I am very curious about is why they did not take the T-90s from the western front to the NE and replace them with Arjuns.

Now they are buying 66,000 Mango rounds - with that dreaded ToT to boot. The recent articles do not seem to provide a cost, but here is dated article:

Russia Pitches for Production Facility in India as Ammunition Contracts worth $ 1 Billion Get Underway

where did this money come from? Sad.

Money is there. For sure.

Not for the Arjun is the point.

[sunilUpa]

This deal has been in the works for last 2 years...
http://www.thehindu.com/news/internatio ... 585881.ece

[Karan M]

It is the season for mangoes. 66.000 of them.

India, Russia to sign deal for anti-tank ammunition

And this darn round is long in the tooth as a result we have to import much more expensive missiles to future proof our tank firepower. Win win for Russia.

[Karan M]

This deal has been in the works for last 2 years...
http://www.thehindu.com/news/internatio ... 585881.ece

The one advantage is responsibility squarely rests with the JV bypassing (hopefully) the OFB.