Armoured Vehicles Discussion Thread - Jan 12, 2012

[Singha]

so by a chain of circumstances, our weakest tanks upg-T72 have to face the heaviest and best PLA tanks the Type99M2 and M3 in eastern ladakh and north sikkim for now and in future again only the T90 will be supplementing or replacing these.
and this supported by the non-upg BMP2 because no BMP2 upg with thermal, new missile, new add on armour has taken place just 'musings' about various proposals for 10 yrs.

does not a feeling warm fuzzy it give me - as master yoda would say. much movement in the Force...hard to see.

[Mihir]

So Avadhi is guilty for the T-72 overhaul being behind schedule? And here I was, thinking that MRO was the responsibility of the Army's base workshops.

<Everyone take cover! Incoming spin barrage!>

[Singha]

I have never in the last 15 yrs managed to get a handle on just how many T-72 were upg and with what.
there was one proj rhino
then there was another proj with polish "drawa" FCS that apparently failed - how many were upged I dont know

seems to be a whole spectrum of T72 ranging from never upgraded to those that have undergone upg at various times and levels.

[Pratyush]

It reminds me of the insistance of having an imported solution for the 155 MM. For 20 years they approached and were forced to blacklist every one. Before the IA would even ask for an imported solution.

I think that the I amust be placed in a similar situation with Tanks / APCs. Before they become open to the Idea of having a domestic solution.

[Austin]

AFAIK only the T-72CIA upgrade of 600 odd tanks took place the remaining upgrade were only on paper and never took off .

[Sanku]

there is scope for ~800 odd tanks.

For the love of God, I hope at least these two formations become complete Arjun equipped formations.

There is immediate scope for 800 tanks. Even at 100 tanks a year, that takes care of 8 years. Going forward, the T 72, despite up-gradation would not be able to hold on just simply due to age and wear and tear. Also we are assuming that the T 72 upgd program will deliver, almost certainly it would not, therefore T 72 replacements would easily provide for 500 more tanks gap.

[rohitvats]

there is scope for ~800 odd tanks.

For the love of God, I hope at least these two formations become complete Arjun equipped formations.

There is immediate scope for 800 tanks. Even at 100 tanks a year, that takes care of 8 years. Going forward, the T 72, despite up-gradation would not be able to hold on just simply due to age and wear and tear. Also we are assuming that the T 72 upgd program will deliver, almost certainly it would not, therefore T 72 replacements would easily provide for 500 more tanks gap.

Sorry - does not work that ways.

~800 number is the total tank holding by these formations - which now consist of 2 x Arjun Regiments and other equipped with T-55 and T-72. So, Arjun will replace these tanks. There is no further gap which can be used for pushing Arjun numbers.

[rohitvats]

Avadhi, at best, is only part of the problem.

As evidenced in the video (above) there are other contributing factors, including the corrupt Army. And the MoD. And the politicians. And a Russian component too.

Blaming Avadhi seems to have been based on a small set of data points and incomplete analysis.

AFAIK, overhauling of tanks is done at Avadi.

There can be two issues here - backlog because the installed capacity is not able to meet demand OR IA not able to decide up on the overhauling specifications. W/O these two aspects being clear, no point in finger-pointing.

[Sanku]

Sorry - does not work that ways.

~800 number is the total tank holding by these formations - which now consist of 2 x Arjun Regiments and other equipped with T-55 and T-72. So, Arjun will replace these tanks. There is no further gap which can be used for pushing Arjun numbers.

So what after T 72s? They will last for 10 years and then there phase out would be needed. As it is their upgd program is running slow, would the upgrd program be even deliver the numbers in time?

Do you disagree with that central premise? (genuine question, no rehterorical dialoguebaazi for debate)

[Sanku]

AFAIK, overhauling of tanks is done at Avadi.

There can be two issues here - backlog because the installed capacity is not able to meet demand OR IA not able to decide up on the overhauling specifications. W/O these two aspects being clear, no point in finger-pointing.

Rohit, I had already posted links before showing Avadi was running behind schedule, part of my exercise. It just that the issue has resurfaced.

This is not new news, it has been around since 1999. Can you believe it ? 1999

Direct CAG page - 1999

http://www.cag.gov.in/reports/defence/1 ... p6-p50.htm

Serious mismatch between the demand and capacity set up for overhaul would render large number of tanks unserviceable before they are overhauled. This coupled with tardy performance of Heavy Vehicles Factory Avadi in indigenous production of tanks has led to a situation where neither new nor overhauled tanks were made available in planned numbers, which has already affected the operational preparedness.

In 2006.

http://articles.economictimes.indiatime ... es-factory

Major slippages in production and overhaul schedules of the T-72M tanks by the Heavy Vehicles Factory, Avadi have left Army's elite armoured corp short of 272 upgraded T-72M main battle tanks, hitting its war preparadness.

While India directly imported 1,118 tanks, another 1,380 were to be assembled here and delivered to the Army by end of March '02.

But even up to March '05, the state-owned factory, had delivered only 1,108, leaving a shortfall of 272 tanks.

To add to the woes of the Army, the Avadi tank factory is also lagging in upgradation of the tanks — installing night fighting capability on them and arming them with beyond visual range engaging surface to surface missiles.

Pulling up the government for the lapses, the CAG said it would take another ten years to clear the backlog, as the existing capacity was inadequate.

"A similar position obtains in respect of overhaul of T-72M tank engines at the engine factory, Avadi", CAG said.

On shortfall in production, the report said with reference to targets fixed for production of T-72 tanks, slippages ranged between 20 to almost 100 per cent anually and even production of Infantry combat vehicles and engines was also far short of targets.

So AVADI has had a long history of excellent screw ups. The 1999 CAG report, the 2006 report 2012 CAG report, whatever, its all the same story.

[Sanku]

It reminds me of the insistance of having an imported solution for the 155 MM. For 20 years they approached and were forced to blacklist every one. Before the IA would even ask for an imported solution.

I think that the I amust be placed in a similar situation with Tanks / APCs. Before they become open to the Idea of having a domestic solution.

Well the domestic "solution" is based on a modification of ToT 25-30 years back, of an import and even that is not inducted, just a plan on paper.

On that note -- Why not wish for another 62? That should wake people up, primarily those in charge of making Indian products who are in deep slumber but do not want IA to either import or ask their for products because wars are noisy and disturb the comfortable sleep they are in?

Not to mention a strong IA would jeopardize the musharia's with pakis. So its win win for all (except IA) if IA gets no guns no tanks, no working rifles.

[Sanku]

BTW this "not enough orders " is a old old hat too

from the 99 report posted above --

General Manager Heavy Vehicles Factory Avadi attributed the shortfall in planned overhaul of tanks to deficient manpower and erratic feeding pattern of tanks by Army. This contention is without basis since the factory overhauled only 70 tanks and issued only 47 out of them to Army upto March 1998 against handing over of 109 tanks by Army. Supply of more tanks would have only blocked space in the factory. The contention about deficient manpower being the reason for poor performance ignores the glaring inefficiency of overhaul of a mere four and three tanks during 1995-96 and 1996-97 despite availability of at least 259 industrial staff for overhaul project.

Lets crawl before telling folks they could beat Milkha Singh if some one onlee brought them a ticket to olympics.

[rohitvats]

Sorry - does not work that ways.

~800 number is the total tank holding by these formations - which now consist of 2 x Arjun Regiments and other equipped with T-55 and T-72. So, Arjun will replace these tanks. There is no further gap which can be used for pushing Arjun numbers.

So what after T 72s? They will last for 10 years and then there phase out would be needed. As it is their upgd program is running slow, would the upgrd program be even deliver the numbers in time?

Do you disagree with that central premise? (genuine question, no rehterorical dialoguebaazi for debate)

Good question.

The number of T-90 ordered till date is more or less the same as required to equip armored regiments of formations listed by me in previous post. Now, IA can do two things -

1. Equip the formations listed earlier completely with T-90 tanks. Till this happens, Combat Improved Ajeya (CIA) along with older T-72 continue to soldier on. This way, regiments under 10 Corps and 12 Corps will change over to Arjun as they give-up/retire their T-72 and T-55 tanks

2. After equipping Armored Divisions with T-90, spread around T-90 to other formations and use a mix and match of T-90/T-72. This includes the 12 and 10 Corps as well. Makes sense to have a high-low combination. However, this means that as and when T-72 retire, the formations will have regiments with T-90 and Arjun at the same time. Not good from logistic POV.

For Point 1 to happen, the retiring of T-72/T-55-->Introduction of Arjun Mk1A and Mk2 -->Production of Arjun Mk1A and Mk2 has to be in sync. Which is a tall order in itself.

And indication of Point 1 (IMO) is equipping armored bde of 12 RAPID with Arjun tanks. In due course of time, both the regiments of RAPID can be Arjun equipped. OK from logistic POV as well.

[rohitvats]

AFAIK, overhauling of tanks is done at Avadi.

There can be two issues here - backlog because the installed capacity is not able to meet demand OR IA not able to decide up on the overhauling specifications. W/O these two aspects being clear, no point in finger-pointing.

Rohit, I had already posted links before showing Avadi was running behind schedule, part of my exercise. It just that the issue has resurfaced.

<SNIP>

I'm quite aware of the screw-ups by Avadi.

QC remains a major concern - to the extent that IA is willing to incur addition cost by not placing orders for T-90 tanks before the first lot (of 300 tanks) is shaken down and QC established.

[Philip]

3 years ago an IDR feature on our armoured ambitions predicted a huge delay because of the huge number of projects on hand at HVF.We seem to suffer from the problem of mastering speedy production,whether it is tanks,aircraft,etc.barring the LCH and its derivatives-a solid success,being churned out in ever increasing numbers,the backlog of upgrades of T-72s,incremental improvements and production of T-90s and Arjun production and development of Mk-2 appear to too much for HVF to chew upon.Why the GOI/MOD have not thought of another facility for some of the work like upgrades beats me.I am sure that BEML could do the job,just look at what one facility at Palghat (Kerala) produces:

Palakkad Complex Kerala State - Defence Products Manufacturing

BEML - Tatra Trucks 12x12, 10x10,8x8, 6x6, 4x4 & Variants
Pontoon Bridge System
Ground Support Vehicles for Guided Missile Programme
Heavy, Medium and Light Recovery Vehicles
50T Trailer for Tank Transportation
Mil Rail Coaches and Mil Wagons
Apart from the above, Railway parts and aggregates are planned for manufacture

PS:This reminds me of a significant fact not mentioned on BR thus far.It was AKA who saw to it that the Palghat plant was set up in his native Kerala,specifically to manufacture a certain tainted "Tatra" truck series !

[pragnya]

...

~800 number is the total tank holding by these formations - which now consist of 2 x Arjun Regiments and other equipped with T-55 and T-72. So, Arjun will replace these tanks. There is no further gap which can be used for pushing Arjun numbers.

some snippets from the article mentioned below.

JAISALMER: The Army with the help of a team of Russian scientists are performing summer trials for the modified version of Russian tank T-72 in Jaisalmer's Lathi Field Firing Range. The summer trials will continue for one week. By the end of 12th Five Year plan, some armoured regiments will replace the T-72 with T-90 tanks. The rest of armoured regiments having T-72 tanks will undergo major modification such as introduction of an upgraded 1000 BHP engine and thermal imaging fire control system, said a defence laboratory official based at Jodhpur.

regards the bolded part, are the russians involved in the T-72 upgrade? or are they involved in a supervisory role in trials?

Defence spokesman Col S D Goswami said: "At present the main stay in terms of the number of India's armoured regiments is the T-72 tanks followed by T-55 tanks. The T-90 and Arjun provide the cutting edge. However, by the end of the 11th plan, all T-55 tanks will be replaced by T-90 tanks.

that surely kills your 800 arjun tank dream as replacement for T-55s and T-72s.

june 2011 TOI article on T-72 upg

ps : i am not well versed with orbat etc.. may be you can decipher the article better.

[Sanku]

Hmm I didnt see this earlier, so replying to it quite late:

either developed the competency inhouse,

I.e. photochor the design like the Chinese do ? Unless any domestic entity builds the competence to replace *any* part of the product themselves, they're going to have to turn to the country it was imported from.

Well the comparison with China is wrong on many counts
1) I did not say that -- so you are attacking a strawman. Quite unneccessary.
2) Unlike China, we have purchased the blueprints too and in many cases possess the right to develop and or modify if we chose (and if we can)
3) You yourself say, develop competence to build parts of product. Well that is precisely what ToT is supposed to enable by cutting short the development cycle.

There are many examples of Indian changes in a imported product:

1) In 1970s-80s, Hunters were obsolete everywhere, but we were still using it, that led to the spare parts issue of severity which simply outstrips anything we had. India made do with intelligent replacements, in fact took it to Ajeet from Hunter.

2) When in 90s the Mig 29s were hurting because of lack of support as Russia was in a mess, Indians (AF mostly) did a great job in finding alternatives.

I can quote other such examples. In case of T 72 India owns most of the tech through purchase, it is entirely legal, and expected that they modify it and use it to their advantage. Even the T 72 upgrd program was largely of Indian design.

Let us look at the Bofors example, now after 25 years, DRDO says that they can indeed take the blueprints and take it to the next step.

So I am afraid your point of view is not well supported.

or acquired it through purchase.

Which is what India already does when it comes to significant MRO of any Russian product, repeatedly leaving us at the mercy of any action the Russians choose. If the product is sufficiently old (e.g. MiG-21s or T-72s), the Russians will simply make a deal, use our money to figure out what they long forgot or lost blueprints for themselves.

And so the second option has to be done if the first can not be done. Second best option but then the only option. Cant do it is not a option.

This is not a legal restriction though, mostly lack of competence.

Blaming HVF or any other domestic entity for being unable to conduct independent MRO work on a product they at most helped assemble under license, is a poor argument.

Well I have posted snippets, and can post pages and pages of CAGs observation on sheer mismangement on part of Avadi why overhauls are delayed. All they offer are excuses blaming Russians, Indian Army and everything else under the sun but for the real reason. Which is that they slept on the job.

Their 'figuring it out' involves breaking the terms of their license.

No Sir, it doesn't. Please refer to examples above.

Lobbying for more urgent imports just guarantees that the status quo will remain unchanged well into the distant future. Getting around that involves biting the bullet now and making the painful transition toward domestic products,

The status quo remains unchanged because those expected to make domestic arms do not. Blocking imports will only ensure that IA does not have sufficient arms.

What does "biting the bullet" mean anyway, when T 90s import decision was made in 1999, T 72s were 25 years old. Even today, the direct imports and knocked down kits have barely kept 900 or so front line tanks. The rest of 2500 or so tanks are 30+ years old.

Anything less, and we may as well disband the armor fleet.

PS: knock off the constant bolding of entire sentences. I'm not the first person who sees that as yelling, when done in practically every post in this thread.

Is that a Mod hat on or a fellow poster? In case of Mod hat on, best not to take a position in the debate and then ask for those taking a different position to express themselves in ways they see fit. IMVHO etc etc.

[Surya]

2) When in 90s the Mig 29s were hurting because of lack of support as Russia was in a mess, Indians (AF mostly) did a great job in finding alternatives.

No they did not

there were not too many options (we scrounged and got somethings for the other Migs)

We suffered. this one will remain etched in memory for a long time

Cannot say more than that

[Suraj]

Please reread my previous post - it does not state that imported products cannot be improved locally. It's neither cheap nor straightforward. Technology transfer doesn't literally translate to the ability to duplicate every part of a product, or even put together one largely identical, with non-OEM components for every wear and tear item. As the apocryphal, oft-quoted statement by the Russian engineer goes, 'what is technology ? I am technology'. Maintaining legacy equipment, or for that matter, even computer code, is not as straightforward as doing so with homegrown designs.

No Sir, it doesn't. Please refer to examples above.

Something else done in other projects is not sufficient proof. Can they reverse engineer / duplicate / implement non-OEM replacements for *everything* ? Gearbox ? Engine ? Barrel ? FCS ? You're saying it's permissible and doable to replace the engines through openly bid tenders, say with MTU ones, and transmissions with ZF/Getrag ? Without the Russians retaliating ?

CAG is an auditing watchdog. I'll take their claims on numbers well, but technical details ? Not really. Does CAG also do audits of cost overruns on the Russian end ? Or else, do you have reports from their version of CAG, assuming they have an independent one ?

In the absence of cost auditing of Russian work in as much detail as the audits into our PSUs, it's not particularly unbiased to be overly critical of our entities - they face far greater criticism *and* far lower capital support than the substantially higher hard currency payments made to Russia to buy or fix things. And subsequently they're excoriated for not using those peanuts they get, efficiently.

Since you seem intent on apportioning blame, in the interest of treating each party on the same footing, let's start with having the same level of critical cost audit data from both options - domestic and Russian.

Is that a Mod hat on or a fellow poster? In case of Mod hat on, best not to take a position in the debate and then ask for those taking a different position to express themselves in ways they see fit. IMVHO etc etc.

Mod hat on. While I appreciate the feedback, you're not particularly qualified to comment. A review of your user record is startling - I had to scroll through a few screenwidths, and shows multiple bans and 3 warnings per ban instance, in addition to more informal user notes about your behavior by multiple mods. I don't have anything personal against you, but I do have an interest in keeping this thread on track - your user notes show you clearly have a history in multiple hot threads, including this one.

[Sanku]

^^^ CAG reviews all cost overruns, domestic as well as through imports, you can find their strictures on cases where cost overruns or poorly framed contracts gave away advantage to the exporter and hurt India.

So that information is there should you want to bring it up.

On the Mod note> Yes, I am aware of my posting track record on BRF and discussions on the same with mods as well.

[amit]

^^^ CAG reviews all cost overruns, domestic as well as through imports, you can find their strictures on cases where cost overruns or poorly framed contracts gave away advantage to the exporter and hurt India.

This is correct.

An example:

http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes ... kramaditya

Russia, for instance, has delayed giving `full ToT' for India's plan to indigenously manufacture 1,000 T-90S tanks. This despite India first importing 310 of these tanks for over Rs 3,625 crore in a February 2001 contract, and then signing another Rs 4,900 crore contract in November 2007 to import 347 more tanks.

The point is we are getting jacked by the Russians and we are making a mess at production at HVF. So what's the solution?

IMO perpetual dependence on Russian imports (or imports from other countries) is not the solution. Rather we should bite the bullet and fix production problems, not only at HVF but at other production facilities. We should also get the private industry involved.

As the single customer which gets to decide on what is built (GSQRs) the Army can't act like a customer whose has come to an arms bazaar with a bag full of money to pick and choose what it likes the best. It needs to get it's hands dirty at Avadi with the Arjun tank. It can't act like a disinterested customer. The fact remains that the GSQRs were fixed by the Army which resulted in the weight issues. And it mandated a set of improvements in the MK2 which resulted in an increase in weight.

Maybe there is some grand design at play here. However, for normal folks who follow this issue its hard to understand it. If Arjun withers away, we would still be importing out MBTs 20-30 years from now. The irony is that even Pakistan has a local MBT which it seems pretty happy with. I wonder if the Army realises the irony of this.

PS: I'm not saying that the Army compromises itself by ditching foreign stuff. But there should be a clear and demonstrable support for the Arjun. The "Oh it's a overweight dabba" mentality IMO has to go.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP> Rather we should bite the bullet and fix production problems, not only at HVF but at other production facilities. We should also get the private industry involved.

As the single customer which gets to decide on what is built (GSQRs) the Army can't act like a customer whose has come to an arms bazaar with a bag full of money to pick and choose what it likes the best. It needs to get it's hands dirty at Avadi with the Arjun tank. It can't act like a disinterested customer. <SNIP>

amit - it is neither army's mandate nor the job to fix production and quality issues at Avadi or any other PSU. Nor does it have any expertise to offer in this regard.

This is job of the MOD to ensure that production capacity is in line with the expected numbers to be inducted and overhauled. And for PSU to ensure that they get their act together.

For all the faults of IA with respect to Arjun, QC is not their doing. In fact, so weary is IA of QC issues with Avadi that it had delayed giving further orders for T-90 before shaking down the first lot of 300 odd tanks which rolled out of Avadi. I think I've mentioned this before. From what I hear, rejection rate for T-90 due to QC issues is pretty high.

[amit]

Nelson it not the Army's job. But it can't run away from the issues. If need be it has to pressure MoD or whoever it needs to shake up to improve things. Keeping the MK1 line idle for two or three years is not the way to do it. Neither is showing an interest in buying the latest iteration of the tin can the way forward. IMVHO.

Can you show one empirical example of the Army's long term commitment to Arjun?

As the single customer it needs to show, IMO, a bigger commitment.

[k prasad]

Can you show one empirical example of the Army's long term commitment to Arjun?

A little Chaiwallah outside Army Bhavan reports that DGMF just ordered 10 sets of "Mahabharat" DVDs. I think that shows a lot of commitment

Sorry, just too tired of the whole Arjun saga, so i'm now left with wisps of gallows humour.

[amit]

^^^^^



Does that mean Arjun's Rath is the blueprint for our FMBT? You know the one that needs a four man crew but be under 50 tons.

[Sanku]

The point is we are getting jacked by the Russians and we are making a mess at production at HVF. So what's the solution?
.

You misrepresent, the issues with Russians get sorted out, at most takes a little money, but products come and cost is still reasonable. In any case I dont care what the Russians do, they are not the root of the problem, they are its manifestation.

The root of the problem is that -- Avadi is mess, had been a mess and refuses to change.

The solution is to fix Avadi, the question is how, I would say a whole scale movement of personnel is in order.

[Sanku]

Nelson it not the Army's job. But it can't run away from the issues. If need be it has to pressure MoD or whoever it needs to shake up to improve things. Keeping the MK1 line idle for two or three years is not the way to do it. Neither is showing an interest in buying the latest iteration of the tin can the way forward. IMVHO.

Can you show one empirical example of the Army's long term commitment to Arjun?

As the single customer it needs to show, IMO, a bigger commitment.

Army has shown more than enough committement, it has dedicated a whole regiment, placed orders far before the product was ready. Kept testing various iterations even when they did not work. Persisted for nearly 30 years.

What else is needed? There are enough orders, there is support in terms of testing.

Press MoD that Avadi does not do its job? That from IA forms part of all CAG reports across the spectrum, T 72, T 90, Arjun.

What else can IA do?

More orders? Before the previous order is remotely met? That is clearly untenable.

Barring more orders which is not a solution, no one has a single specific suggestion on what IA should have done.

[Suraj]

I've never understood the repeated 'its not the army's job to help fix Arjun issues' arguments. Who wrote the GSQR ? Who asks for the T90 ? Who speaks up when either tank comes up short ? The Army or the MoD ? Didn't the Navy's own OS Dawson spearhead the push for Karwar ? Is that exceptional, restricted to the Navy, or both ? Is the argument one of MoD vs Army division of responsibility, Army vs Navy hands-on attitude, or something else ?

[NRao]

The arguments will go on - as long as the IA has an alternative.

That there were no options in the early 2000s is well documented. That is fine.

As we post now, there are really no issues. The Arjun has been proved to be better. Any procedural issues can be resolved if there is a will within the entire establishment. Remove the T-90 and see what happens. I would expect the entire system to self correct - more capacity + better QC.

However, as long as the crutch remains the IA will always use it. Once because the option still does not exist (even now they can make that statement) and then because of bridges and then because of supply chain/logistics.

(As an aside: logistics - moving forward - should not really matter - if they adopt modern methods. Most issues have been resolved for huge amount of real-time changes.)

[nachiket]

What else is needed? There are enough orders, there is support in terms of testing.

More orders? Before the previous order is remotely met? That is clearly untenable.

Did you read the report about the production line of the Mk1 being idle for 2 years ?

[Sanku]

I've never understood the repeated 'its not the army's job to help fix Arjun issues' arguments. Who wrote the GSQR ? Who asks for the T90 ? Who speaks up when either tank comes up short ? The Army or the MoD ? Didn't the Navy's own OS Dawson spearhead the push for Karwar ? Is that exceptional, restricted to the Navy, or both ? Is the argument one of MoD vs Army division of responsibility, Army vs Navy hands-on attitude, or something else ?

Suraj a quick recap

1) Navy structure is different than IA or IAF, Navy owns a number of R&D units, plus Navy officers head ship yards etc. This is historical, Navy was given control over the civilian part of Mil-Ind sector early in India history. The control of these is directly with Navy, under Navy hierarchy.

2) Strictly speaking, writing a GSQR and fulfilling a GSQR are two widely different items. When writing a GSQR IA only puts forth its view on a operation platform they are likely to need. The GSQR then goes to MoD, which along with a team from DRDO vets the GSQR for its practicality and decides on make vs buy. The fulfillment of GSQR is a engineering task which is given to DRDO after they sign on.

At this point of time, the control passes on from IA/IAF hands, into the hands of Civvies, viz MoD and through them DRDO/OFBs.

The way to look at it is the services are user writing a specification document, and MoD is responsible for its fulfillment if it agrees with that.

In fact even for Navy, the part of user raising requirements and MoD agreeing is common, its just that fulfillment also goes into the hands of Navy once more in many cases.

Further more the example of Karwar may not be appropriate in this context, Karwar is naval station, thus is fully owned by IN, a comparison could be with Panagarh for IAF, or development of chandimandir.

The issue boils down to ownership of responsibilities.

[Sanku]

What else is needed? There are enough orders, there is support in terms of testing.

More orders? Before the previous order is remotely met? That is clearly untenable.

Did you read the report about the production line of the Mk1 being idle for 2 years ?

This was discussed in previous pages, the plan was that Arjun Mk 1 run would be completed in 2012.

2013 Arjun Mk II run was supposed to start.

Thus no down time, if the plan, could be adhered to. This meant that Mk II would clear all its milestones in 2012 tests. 40 Mk II were supposed to be delivered in 2014-15 timeframe.

The problem (for us on BRF) is no one knows what happened in 2012, i.e. we know there were tests, we dont know what happened in those tests.

[Sanku]

However, as long as the crutch remains the IA will always use it. Once because the option still does not exist (even now they can make that statement) and then because of bridges and then because of supply chain/logistics.
)

That is really presumptuous to say, and also flies in face of available evidence. Wherever there has been a ready Indian product IA has worked with it.

[rohitvats]

Nelson it not the Army's job. But it can't run away from the issues. If need be it has to pressure MoD or whoever it needs to shake up to improve things. Keeping the MK1 line idle for two or three years is not the way to do it. Neither is showing an interest in buying the latest iteration of the tin can the way forward. IMVHO.

Can you show one empirical example of the Army's long term commitment to Arjun?

As the single customer it needs to show, IMO, a bigger commitment.

First - It is rohitvats.

Second - you're preaching to the choir here about Army's intransigence with respect to the Arjun program. I know about the Arjun program and then some more. So, rest easy on that.

Third - Don't simply jump and start attacking the keyboard...read what I had written. I was referring only to the QC issue prevalent in all the DPSU and gave example of Avadi with respect to T-90 tank.

Read CAG Reports on QC related issues with respect to various DPSU in the country. From faulty ammunition worth hundred of crores which was not accepted by IA to exploding tank ammunition in gun barrel of tanks to Jaguar being lost (along with pilot) because of faulty fuse mechanism...there is a long list. And no one loses his shirt in these DPSU when these things happen. The main reason IMO for the Services pushing for private sector role in defense manufacturing is because they anticipate better performance from these companies.

Let me quote you a small example - IA was forced to buy Milan-2T ATGM from BDL by diluting its GSQR. And why did it dilute the GSQR? Because even after around 3-4 years of supposed development, BDL was not able to come up with the missile which could meet the specs. And funny bit is that IA had closed the requirement itself when BDL 'promised' to come back with right missile. When it failed the second time and IA decided not to procure the missile at all, BDL Union protested to MOD that material bought in advance for the manufacture of missile would go waste if IA did not order the missile. So sure was the BDL of its sale that it bought raw material before the user had trialed the missile. And this is the same BDL which has been manufacturing Milan ATGM for decades now.

This is the influence IA/Services have on MOD/DPSU.

[rohitvats]

I've never understood the repeated 'its not the army's job to help fix Arjun issues' arguments. Who wrote the GSQR ? Who asks for the T90 ? Who speaks up when either tank comes up short ? The Army or the MoD ? Didn't the Navy's own OS Dawson spearhead the push for Karwar ? Is that exceptional, restricted to the Navy, or both ? Is the argument one of MoD vs Army division of responsibility, Army vs Navy hands-on attitude, or something else ?

If the above post is with respect to what I had written about Avadi and T-90 QC issue - then you need to read the post again. I've not mentioned anything about Arjun and Avadi and QC in the post.

Everything to do with specifications of the tank and its subsequent employment and deployment is the responsibility of the army. But the production of the tank and its attendant QC issues are not the job of the army. Nor can it add anything to it. Mind you, ordering tanks on time so that vendors downstream can be given orders and ensure timely delivery is a different matter all-together.

And BTW, of all the myriad reasons given by IA for not ordering Arjun tanks, QC has not be sited. So far. And thank God for that.

As for Karwar and such bases - at least you hear about them in news. IA has expanded many of its cantonments close to the border and even set-up new ammunition depots. If you've enough time to waste on a weekend, do scan through the GE and look for cantonments in areas like Jaisalmer close to the border. GE has updated the satellite data some time back. So, IA does all these stuff w/o much fanfare.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP> As we post now, there are really no issues. The Arjun has been proved to be better. Any procedural issues can be resolved if there is a will within the entire establishment. Remove the T-90 and see what happens. I would expect the entire system to self correct - more capacity + better QC.

However, as long as the crutch remains the IA will always use it. Once because the option still does not exist (even now they can make that statement) and then because of bridges and then because of supply chain/logistics.<SNIP>

As I just wrote earlier, QC has not been quoted as an issue TILL NOW by the IA. My comment was in general sense with respect to DPSU and QC issue. This aspect is well documented. IA is facing QC issues with T-90 tanks as well with a high rejection rate for the fist lot that came out of Avadi.

IA needs to order Arjun first to face QC issues with respect to Arjun.

[Sanku]

As I just wrote earlier, QC has not been quoted as an issue TILL NOW by the IA

IA needs to order Arjun first to face QC issues with respect to Arjun.

I would beg to differ, 124 tanks order is enough to judge QC, and in fact the QC issues were the ones that lead to various observation in AUCRT.

[rohitvats]

As I just wrote earlier, QC has not been quoted as an issue TILL NOW by the IA

IA needs to order Arjun first to face QC issues with respect to Arjun.

I would beg to differ, 124 tanks order is enough to judge QC, and in fact the QC issues were the ones that lead to various observation in AUCRT.

Oh! please, not this nonsense again. Don't equate QC and AUCRT.

Systems are meant to fail in AUCRT and except for the Renk gearbox issue (which itself is dubious) no one has ever pointed out to Arjun subs-systems not meeting laid down performance specs during AUCRT.

QC issues have not stopped IA from ordering more T-90 tanks. Inspite of the initial hiccups, 300 T-90 have rolled out of Avadi. And so will the balance T-90. IA cannot site QC issues and ask MOD to order T-90 tanks in CKD/SKD format from Russia. No one will accept such preposterous demands.

[Philip]

Let me quote you a small example - IA was forced to buy Milan-2T ATGM from BDL by diluting its GSQR. And why did it dilute the GSQR? Because even after around 3-4 years of supposed development, BDL was not able to come up with the missile which could meet the specs. And funny bit is that IA had closed the requirement itself when BDL 'promised' to come back with right missile. When it failed the second time and IA decided not to procure the missile at all, BDL Union protested to MOD that material bought in advance for the manufacture of missile would go waste if IA did not order the missile. So sure was the BDL of its sale that it bought raw material before the user had trialed the missile. And this is the same BDL which has been manufacturing Milan ATGM for decades now.

Rohit,surely,raw material,components,etc., are ordered enough for the batch/no. approved with a small extra % for rejects? If the service in Q and the MOD/PSU know the qty. required,how is it that a PSU can order at will without higher approval? With the other examples of poor quality/faulty ammo,etc.,it appears that the Mins. of Def. Prod. present and past have been on holiday along with the babus,of which a staggering amount are abroad on "higher studies" and other yarns.

[NRao]

May 25, 2009 :: Army gets its first armoured regiment of MBT Arjun

* 12 prototypes were developed during 1983 to 1990
* 15 pre-production vehicles were developed during 1990 to 1995
* Army placed an indent for the full compliment of 124 nos. of MBT Arjun in Mar 2000
* first pilot batch of production tanks was handed over to Army on 7th August 2004
* next batch of nine tanks were handed over by Sep 2007
* Army carried out the Accelerated Usage Cum Reliability Trials (AUCRT) in 5 phases on two tanks from Nov 2007 to Aug 2008
* next batch of 17 tanks were handed over to Army by 3rd March 2009

History of sorts was made today as the Indian Army proudly equipped itself with the first Armoured Regiment of indigenously built Main Battle Tank, Arjun. The development marks the fruition of 35 years of research in self-reliance by dedicated Indian scientists against all odds.

16 tanks (Cumulative 45 Arjun tanks) were handed over to Lt.Gen.D.Bhardwaj, DGMF, towards formation of the 1st Arjun regiment by Shri S.Chandrasekar, Addl. DGOF (AV) and flagged-off by Dr.A.Sivathanu PIllai, Chief Controller, Research & Development & Distinguished Scientist, DRDO at a function in Avadi today. MBT Arjun is the state-of-art main battle tank designed and developed by Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment(CVRDE), Avadi along with other DRDO and industrial partners. MBT Arjun is provided with excellent mobility, superior fire power and protection and the features are quite comparable to contemporary world tanks. The Kanchan Armour, Hydro-pneumatic suspension, Armament system, Integrated Fire Detection & Suppression System, system engineering and system integration of complex weapon platforms are some of the significant indigenous technologies of Arjun, developed by DRDO labs. Initially 12 prototypes were developed during 1983 to 1990 and they were subjected to field trials of more than 20,000 kms and 1100 rounds. Based on user feedback 15 pre-production vehicles were developed during 1990 to 1995 and they were subjected to field trials of more than 70,000 kms and 8000 rounds. After the satisfactory trials, army placed an indent initially for 15 limited series production in Nov 1997 and cumulatively 124 in Mar 2000. The development of Arjun was carried out in a number of stages and evaluation through extensive field trials. After satisfactory performance, Army placed an indent for the full compliment of 124 nos. of MBT Arjun in Mar 2000.

As there was a long gap from the R&D phase to production phase from 1993 to 2000, problems related to re-establishing production lines and vendor sources and resolving overseas issues like technology denial in view of Pokhran testing, change over and mergers of OEMS for the critical items, delayed initial commencement of production. In order to meet the production requirement, additional infrastructure facilities and machine tools were established at HVF, Avadi and Ordnance Factory, Medak. However, the first pilot batch of production tanks was handed over to Army on 7th August 2004 in the presence of the then Defence Minister Shri. Pranab Mukherjee. During subsequent production, Army insisted upon the demonstration of medium fording capabilities of MBT Arjun. Both CVRDE and HVF, continuously worked on war footing, to meet the stringent requirement of medium fording to a height of 2.1m in water with preparation time of 30 minutes as retro-fitment solution and demonstrated successfully to Defence Minister Shri A.K.Antony and other dignitaries on 2nd July 2007. Subsequently, the production tanks were incorporated with all medium fording modifications and the next batch of nine tanks were handed over by Sep 2007.

Meanwhile, Army carried out the Accelerated Usage Cum Reliability Trials (AUCRT) in 5 phases on two tanks from Nov 2007 to Aug 2008 covering more than 8000 km and 800 rounds of firing in each tank. AUCRT is required for assessing the spares requirement for the entire life of the tank besides evaluation of reliability of tank. Each phase consists of 1000kms run and 100EFC (Approx. 160 rounds of APFSDS and HESH – Primary and secondary rounds) over a temperature range of -5 to 500C. One of the main issues during AUCRT trials was the failure of the bearings of Transmission of M/s RENK, Germany, due to rise in lub oil temperature. However, this was immediately solved by modifying the software during AUCRT itself and the efficacy of the software was proved for more than 4000kms. However a comprehensive solution of modifying the bearing assembly by providing a special coating was carried out to take care of the temperature problem and the retrofitment of bearing assembly being carried out in all the tanks.

The outcome of AUCRT trials raised the confidence levels of the users over the reliability and endurance of MBT Arjun and they confirmed that the overall performance of the MBT Arjun during the stringent AUCRT trials was satisfactory and cleared the production tanks with minor modifications suggested during AUCRT, for induction. Both CVRDE and HVF along with DGQA agencies worked out methodologies to introduce all AUCRT modifications within shortest time frame and the next batch of 17 tanks were handed over to Army by 3rd March 2009.

As suggested by Army after AUCRT trials, Arjun tanks were subjected to rigorous trials and assessment by a third party audit (an internationally reputed tank manufacturer). After the extensive evaluation, the reputed tank manufacturer confirmed that the MBT Arjun is an excellent tank with very good mobility and fire power characteristics suitable for Indian desert. They also added inputs such as quality auditing, production procedures and refined calibration procedures for further enhancing the performance of MBT Arjun. DRDO, will be incorporating all these inputs in the next regiment of 62 tanks for handing over to Army before Mar 2010 as desired by the Army.

The regiment of 45 tanks will be subjected to a conversion training and field practice for a period of 3 months. Thereafter, the Army is planning to conduct a comparative trial with T 90 tanks in Oct/Nov 2009 to assess the operational deployment role of the tanks. The present batch of 124 tanks will be delivered by Mar 2010.

Veerendra/Rajendra
(Release ID :48844)