Bharat Rakshak

I sincerely hope and pray that Gen.Bikram Singh will prove the naysayers wrong and will emerge as one of the best chiefs of the Indian Army.

THURSDAY, 31 MAY 2012

Army chief slams BEML on Tatra, awards it Rs 1,500-cr deal
by Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 31st May 12
The outgoing army chief, General V K Singh, claims he scuttled a Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML) bid to sell overpriced Tatra vehicles to the Indian Army. But, in February 2012, the army quietly signed a contract with BEML for an even larger and more controversial purchase: a $275-million (about Rs 1,500 crore) contract for 204 armoured recovery vehicles (ARVs).

Last week, the army chief declared in a television interview that he knew the WZT-3 ARV contract was a scam and BEML should be investigated in detail. He called the Tatra deal “a wake-up call for us to start examining other areas where things could have gone wrong”.

But in February, BEML was nominated, without bidding, for the lucrative order for additional WZT-3 ARVs. Disregarded entirely was the fact that in three previous contracts for a total of 352 WZT-3 ARVs (44 in 1999; 80 in 2002; and 228 in 2005), BEML had disregarded the contractual stipulation to indigenise the ARV. Instead, the Indian defence public sector undertaking (DPSU) imported fully built ARVs from a Polish company, Bumar, fitted cosmetic Indian components and supplied these to the army.
The WZT-3 ARVs are essentially T-72 tanks kitted for repair and recovery, rather than for fighting. Instead of a gun and turret, the T-72 is fitted with a heavy-duty crane, winch and repair equipment. This allows the ARV to travel cross-country with tank columns, repairing tanks that break down.

The purchase of these essential vehicles has been fraught with controversy. In 2003, Brigadier Inder Mohan Singh was a Deputy Director General in the Master General of Ordnance (MGO) Branch, which handles the procurement of “in-service equipment,” as the WZT-3 was since 1999. He has told Business Standard the tendering process was manipulated to ensure BEML emerged the lone bidder. The tender was sent out to only two PSUs, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd (BHEL) and BEML; only BEML bid. When Larsen & Toubro threw its hat in the ring, the defence ministry’s acquisitions chief ruled it out as an “unsolicited bid”. That left BEML, the single vendor, at liberty to dictate terms.

Top L&T officials verify this happened, though the company has declined to comment officially, since it had not been invited to bid.

Brig I M Singh says Ukraine then wrote in, offering their T-72 based ARV for trials. This was an attractive offer, since Ukraine was willing to use the T-72 chassis and running gear that India was already building near Chennai, while importing only the recovery gear. This, saysby Singh, would have made their ARV 30-40 per cent cheaper than the WZT-3. He put up an official proposal that the Ukrainian ARV be invited for trials, since this was a Rs 1,000-crore contract that should not go to a single bidder.

That idea was quickly shot down by the MGO himself, Lt General V K Jetley, whose brother, Colonel Virendar Jetley, had been employed by Bumar India, a joint venture between Bumar Poland and the New Delhi-based Chemon Group, headed by prominent Delhi cigar baron, Chetan Seth. “Within days, I was removed from the ARV cost negotiation committee,” says Brig Singh.
Chetan Seth, interviewed by Business Standard, confirms Col Virendar Jetley was his employee. However, he denies any influence was exercised.

Arms dealers have long sought a link with the MGO’s office, which controls a large chunk of the defence budget.

The owner of Vectra, Ravi Rishi, now under the CBI scanner in the Tatra case, employed two successive MGOs soon after they retired: Lt Gen R I S Kahlon, from the time he retired till his death last year; and Lt Gen S J S Saighal, who hit the limelight when Eurocopter, which employed his brother, Lt Gen H S Saighal, won a massive Indian contract for 197 light helicopters. The defence ministry overturned that decision after rivals protested.

With the contract for 228 WZT-3 signed in 2005, Bumar Poland began sending shiploads of ARVs to Mumbai. While BEML was supposed to indigenise these quickly, Brig I M Singh says BEML did absolutely no work on the ARVs.

“The Bumar ARVs did not even go to the BEML plant. When the ship from Poland reached Mumbai, we would send drivers to unload the ARVs. They would load the ARVs onto a train to Ordnance Depot, Kirkee, from where the frontline units would collect them,” says Brig Singh.
Chetan Seth admits the ARVs never went to BEML but claims some Indian parts would be fitted onto the ARVs in Ordnance Depot, Kirkee. “It took some time, but we indigenised drivers’ periscope sights; drivers’ adjustable seats; periscopes; and radios. We had a team of five Polish engineers in Kirkee,” avers Seth.

Approached for comments, BEML chief, V R S Natarajan, said he would respond in a press conference once the army chief retired. When pressed for answers, he asked for an emailed list of questions, to which he has not responded.

Meanwhile, another Chetan Seth company, Optic Electronics, was providing an illustration of how “indigenisation” worked in the WZT-3.

According to a senior Chetan Seth employee, Optic Electronics functioned from an SEZ in Noida, importing surplus parts from East Europe depots, touching these up, and then re-exporting them at a 500 per cent profit.

“Optic Electronics would import the day sights for each WZT-3 ARV for $5,500. These stained, often rusty, parts would be cleaned up and re-exported to Bumar Poland for around $25,000. These would then be fitted onto the WZT-3,” says the Seth employee on condition of anonymity.

Chetan Seth says he built day sights in partnership with a Polish company called PCO. He admits providing day sights for the WZT-3, but denies they were surplus parts from junkyards.

Ironically, the “indigenisation” of the WZT-3, which never crossed even 20 per cent, was being done through low-tech routes like ploughs, driver sights, towing ropes and seats, even as India was running a full T-72 tank manufacturing line at Heavy Vehicles Factory, Avadi, and building T-72 engines at the Engine Factory, Avadi.

Business Standard learned during a visit to Avadi last November that the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) had quoted a price of Rs 40-50 lakh per engine for the WZT-3, but BEML rejected this as too high. Consequently, Bumar continues to source the engine from East Europe. The OFB’s quote has also been rejected for the latest order for 204 WZT-3 ARVs, which bodes ill for any prospect of indigenisation.

The ministry of defence has not responded to an emailed request for comments.

Whistleblower major alleges fake encounter of 3 'terrorists' in Dimapur (Nagaland)

Damning if true.

In my view VKS was trying to unnerve a weak and paranoid government. .

Again, in my view, whatever the merits of his age argument, he has played divisive politics and challenged civilian authority for a deeply personal agenda. .

If as you say the government (personally I disagree -- MMS is not some petty ethnic lobbyist) or some army lobby plays minority card x, it does not entitle the serving army chief to play minority card y. .

He has also attended overtly political events in uniform, which also shows poor judgment. He is welcome to do as he likes once he has doffed his uniform, but there are limits to how far you can pursue a personal agenda as Army chief.

The issue is that two military formations undertook unusual mobilisation in the direction of Delhi, and that the government reacted by implementing certain protocols that are reserved for a potential military coup. There are the facts and are verifiable in principle. I have at least one paramilitary contact who has told me that the second event did occur. I choose to believe him.

In my view VKS was trying to unnerve a weak and paranoid government. Again, in my view, whatever the merits of his age argument, he has played divisive politics and challenged civilian authority for a deeply personal agenda. If as you say the government (personally I disagree -- MMS is not some petty ethnic lobbyist) or some army lobby plays minority card x, it does not entitle the serving army chief to play minority card y. He has also attended overtly political events in uniform, which also shows poor judgment. He is welcome to do as he likes once he has doffed his uniform, but there are limits to how far you can pursue a personal agenda as Army chief.

(1) I have heard from a number of army sources that he has played the communal card and that too in pursuit of personal goals. The army is not the terrain for caste battles to promote individual interests;
(2) Contrary to what everyone here and in the wider public believes there is I believe some truth to Shekhar Gupta's report of the non-coup; obviously it was not a real coup attempt (since there are other larger units in Delhi that would attempt that) but (a) the unit movements were highly unusual in that they were in the direction of Delhi and (b) the government did activate certain protocols that are put in place when it believes an armed takeover might be in the offing.

I do not expect most people here to accept my argument since it is non-verifiable, but I am entitled to my own views. Logically, if I believe that the army chief is playing a communal card and that he (even if slightly) threatened the sanctity of civilian control of the military, then I can only conclude that he is guilty of poor judgment.

The issue is that two military formations undertook unusual mobilisation in the direction of Delhi, and that the government reacted by implementing certain protocols that are reserved for a potential military coup. There are the facts and are verifiable in principle.

Ethics, ethos and the new Chief

May 31, 2012
By S.K. Sinha

Lt. Gen. Bikram Singh takes over as the new Chief of the Indian Army on May 31, 2012, succeeding Gen. V.K. Singh. Both these officers were commissioned almost three decades after me in the Army.

I first met them when I was the governor of Jammu and Kashmir and found them doing well as divisional commanders in counter-insurgency operations. I was particularly impressed by Bikram Singh, who was commanding the same division which I had commanded 30 years earlier.

The last one year has been a dark patch in the history of the Indian Army. Gen. V.K. Singh’s tenure as Chief started with a blaze of a self-created controversy compounded by the shenanigans of a few others.

He has now said that the year of birth controversy was avoidable. His last week in office is ending with another controversy that smacks of personal vendetta. He has projected himself as a knight in shining armour, as a lone crusader against corruption casting aspersions all round.

Never before has any Chief in this country or any democracy in the world, filed a statutory complaint or gone to court. This lowered the dignity of that high office. Matters were compounded by the caste factor being brought in.

Members of Parliament of his caste sought the Prime Minister’s intervention in his favour and his brother-in-law organised a public rally in his support in Delhi. Instead of distancing himself from all this, he as a serving Chief went to unveil the statue of a former Prime Minister belonging to his caste.

All this sent a wrong message. Caste or communal considerations may play a role in politics but they have no place in the Army, where our officers and men have always maintained a totally national outlook. In the wake of the adverse verdict of the Supreme Court in March, it’s been a long, murky night of generals which has continued to his last days in office. The ethos and ethics of the Army have taken a tremendous beating, as well as the image of the Army.

Anyway let us now bury the past and let the Army bid farewell to Gen. V.K. Singh, wishing him happiness and prosperity in his post-Army life.

The new Chief faces a whole lot of challenges. He must restore the dignity of the high office of the Chief, and equally important, must revive the ethics and ethos of the Army. In a democracy, a Chief must unquestioningly accept the supremacy of the civil and must be totally loyal to the latter.

Civil stands for the political executive and not for civil servants. Subordination of the military to the civil should not mean subservience or servility. There may be occasions when a Chief may have serious differences with the government on policy matters of national importance. In that event, he must resign and not promote public controversy while still in service.

Napoleon’s advice about military operations is relevant: “Every General-in-Chief when given orders that he feels are wrong must represent and get them changed. If this is not done, then he must resign.”

Two past instances reflect the ethics and ethos of the Army. Gen. Thimayya had differences with
Krishna Menon, the defence minister. He tendered his resignation. Jawaharlal Nehru sent for him and urged him to withdraw his resignation in national interest, assuring him of resolving matters. Thimayya withdrew his resignation. He never went public on why he had resigned and, of course, did not go to court to seek justice. The other example pertains to my generation of officers in 1947.

New pay scales were introduced after Independence for both civil and military officers. Pre-Independence civil officers were allowed to retain their old, higher scales and the new scales applied to their post-Independence colleagues. In the case of Army officers, those serving from before Independence were also brought on the new scales.

This meant an overnight reduction of about 30 per cent in our salary. No one went to court seeking justice. We accepted the unfair decision with a stiff upper lip. The steep reduction in our salary coincided with operations in Kashmir. The unjustly treated officers fought loyally; some even making the supreme sacrifice.

A malicious rumour is doing the rounds that the new Chief is being brought in so that he can tow the government line on withdrawing troops from Siachen. I dismiss this out of hand. I am confident that Lt. Gen. Bikram Singh or any Army Chief will always tender his honest professional advice; not doing so will be betraying the nation. The government may take any decision it likes.

Ensuring high degree of war preparedness through expeditious acquisition of modern weapons, new raisings and improving defence infrastructure on a war footing, is an overriding requirement.

Simultaneously, there should be no compromise in combating corruption. Prompt and exemplary action must be taken to root out this menace.

To achieve these goals, the Army Chief should regularly be interacting directly with the Prime Minister and the defence minister. The political executives must ensure that the civil servants do not act as a barrier between them and the Army Chief. Service Chiefs must function as Chiefs of Staff and not as heads of department attached to the ministry.

Pending restructuring of higher defence organisation, committee system of joint functioning as recommended by Lord Ismay in 1947, should be revived.

Relying solely on file-based decision making must be given up. We have the most irrational higher defence organisation in the world with stifling bureaucratic stranglehold.

The recent controversies have shown how deep-rooted distrust and antagonism is between Army officers and civil servants in the ministry of defence. They need to work as a team pursuing a common goal.

The sooner our higher defence mechanism starts working on the same lines as in the UK and other democracies the better. Appointment of Chief of Defence Staff and meaningful integration of services headquarters with the ministry of defence, are immediate imperatives. Recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee were cleverly derailed by the bureaucrats.

There is little hope that the ongoing Naresh Chandra Committee, headed by a former defence secretary, from which former Army Chief has been kept out while including former Navy and Air Chiefs, does not inspire confidence.

The new Army Chief should give top priority to rectifying the grave infirmities in defence functioning, enlisting the support of the Prime Minister and the defence minister.

Gen. Bikram Singh has to lead and inspire our one million-plus Army by his personal example. Heavy responsibility rests on his shoulders. From what I have known of him, I am sanguine that he will be successful in carrying his daunting responsibilities.

The author, a retired lieutenant-general, was Vice-Chief of Army Staff and has served as governor of Assam and Jammu and Kashmir

On the weekend prior to demitting office, General V K Singh, using the media, publicly firebombed the government one last time as Chief of Army Staff (COAS). Separately interviewed by the main television channels intent on wringing the last few drops of sensationalism out of the situation, he gave notice that the government can expect more criticism in the future. Actually, a retired VK may prove a bigger thorn in the Congress coalition government’s side. In the know of everything that’s afoot in the army, and all the decisions in the pipeline, VK can be expected to hold his successor’s, the defence ministry’s, and the government’s feet to the fire. Several of VK’s immediate predecessors, it was known in army circles, were susceptible to corruption — the reason why his elevation two years back was welcomed by great many upright serving and retired officers. This, of course, raises the question: How is it that persons with soiled reputations get effortlessly promoted in the army, even as genuinely capable officers have their careers sidelined? The explanation is that a motivated army chief can play havoc with the promotion boards — throw out the grain, keep the chaff. I mean, how does a Tejinder Singh, the conduit for filthy lucre as alleged by VK, become director-general, Defence Intelligence Agency, for god’s sake?

One issue, however, remains unanswered: Why did VK approach the Supreme Court to ‘restore’ his honour, rather than asking for an adjudication on his age? By making his personal ‘honour’ the principal legal concern, VK afforded the court which was wary of getting sucked into this controversy the escape route of getting the government to withdraw the offending document that reiterated the wrong age. It is no use for him to now claim that the judges were leaning in the direction “the wind was blowing”. He undermined his own chances and voided the possibility of a ruling on whether or not, for government service purposes, the school-board exam certificate is the only proof.

The in-coming COAS, General Bikram Singh, doesn’t have the soldierly credentials of VK and, during his tenure, will be operating under a cloud, his every decision under the microscope. He will be like the teacher’s pet appointed class monitor on the basis of connections, not merit. In Bikram’s case, the ‘succession plan’ crafted by General J J Singh, ignobly furthered by his successor, Deepak Kapoor, involved in the Adarsh housing scam, and diligently propelled by the government, will hang round his neck like the dead albatross on the ancient mariner.
Despite burning its fingers, this government is apparently convinced that pre-selection is a good thing and the next man in has already been so anointed. Except, by putting the present GOC, III Corps, Lieutenant General Dalbir Singh Suhag’s promotion as army commander on hold, VK has presented Bikram with a dilemma. He countermands VK’s rules-wise correct show-cause notice to Suhag, as desired by many in the government, and he further besmirches his reputation. Or, he lets the order stand, derails the next stage of the succession plan of an army command for Suhag, and courts enmity of the very people who helped him reach the top. Bikram’s strength of character, or lack of it, will soon become evident.

Many people wonder if VK’s actions have ‘politicised’ the army. In a citizen army, the average officer and jawan alike is socially conscious and politically aware. However, army discipline and tight-lipped, straight-backed demeanour are usually mistaken for political naivete by politicians and civil servants. It is the use by the latter two of their own more elastic morality and ethics in dealing with the military and when deciding on national security matters that poses the greatest danger to the republic.

The Congress has a track record of destroying institutions by playing favourites. Indira Gandhi undermined the integrity of the Indian Administrative Service during Emergency from which the IAS has not recovered. Constitutional rights were suspended and a ‘committed bureaucracy’ obtained by choosing select babus for certain posts. These babus bent rules and did her bidding. Up until then, promotions were generally on merit, and postings of civil servants were as per vacancy, and the entire process was managed by the chief secretaries in the states and the cabinet secretary at the Centre. It was too useful an innovation, however, for subsequent non-Congress governments to give up, except they were less brazen about it than the Congress.

Unfortunately, during Emergency some favour-seekers among flag-rank officers, disregarding a military officer’s code of conduct, visited persons believed close to Sanjay Gandhi. That era is long gone, but uniformed officers still seek politicians’ help in promotions and postings, albeit more discreetly these days. However, if pre-selecting favourites for the top posts in the three Armed Services becomes the new norm, there’s nothing to stop the venal politician-bureaucrat nexus from auctioning off these posts to officers who promise the most returns, in the manner Delhi Police and other state police reportedly do when filling positions in ‘lucrative’ police thanas. See where this is going?
The frightening thing to consider is that the Congress government is now insinuating practices it has perfected elsewhere in government in its dealings with the military. Hoisting chosen persons into choice slots is one such practice. The motivation is not hard to fathom. With thousands of billions of dollars worth of hardware purchases in the pipeline, if you apply the 15 per cent standard, revealed by the Confederation of Indian Industry’s then top honcho, Tarun Das, in the Nira Radia tapes, that amounts to how much by way of commission/cut to the politicians? Do the math. In the event, it is good business to appoint your own chaps to manipulate the field tests, the weapons short list, and the terms from foreign suppliers.

The fact is the Armed Forces being a microcosm of Indian society, most of the societal ills have been steadily seeping into the military for a while now. Like all things bad their progress has been rapid.

Bharat Karnad is professor at Centre for Policy Research and blogs at www.bharatkarnad.com

More brain dead journalism:
i) How on earth is it VK Singh's fault that Antony did not launch a CBI inquiry?
ii) What is wrong with some of these old chaps? Like Kadiyan?

http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/left-right-centre/is-general-vk-singh-a-crusader-or-bull-in-a-china-shop/234211

my theory is that VKS took a stand against a corrupt practice or system and then that system fought back and discredited him
that tells me that the rot is quite deep

A conversation recently with a friend well in the know of matters in Delhi/MOD says that Gen.VKS upset the coterie within the IA,a powerful lobby from a particular state,who have engineered the "line of succession" within the IA for a long time.This LOS also encourages and cements the corruption within the system.Gen. VKS would not play ball,so the established system hit back at him.He went "AWOL" as it were,taking his case to the media-as an army chief is not expected to do and displayed the can of worms and true state of affairs within the IA for the benefit of nation,thus brutally embarrassing the govt./DM in the process .They are past masters at the art of sweeping dirt under the table,taking a "Nelsonian eye" to corruption and like Pontius Pilate,washing their hands when facing critical issues,so that the system survives and their "clean" image may be upheld .

Thanks for your reply. I'm afraid you haven't presented any facts or figures that corroborate your views about the Chief.

Please explain which "overtly political events" he attended.

Its not only Gen VK Singh who has said the movement was very normal.

Any number of retired officers who have commanded these units, attest publicly that such movements are very regular and esp during the time frame mentioned.

MoD has said the same

Antony and Babu's have also said the same.

So its not only Gen VKS over Shekar Gupta, It is entire Indian setup over Shekar Gupta.

Would your same logic of rushing to defence of Shri BS not apply to your explicit accusations (not implicit) against VKS or "unknown" ideological colored glasses get in your way

For ex i hav heard from number of sources that VKS was most secular person in army.. N more over where did this communalism came from??? Even Shukla accused him of playing caste card… So can u explain how the hell did he play communal card which your so many sources told u about..

Let's invert the logic (do try to follow...): explain to me the circumstances under which VKS, MMS and AKA would ever confirm Shekhar Gupta's story? Their actions would be the same whether the story were true or false so you cannot infer truth/falsehood from their actions.

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deeply secular person (not sure how you can be the "most secular person in army" -- are all others less secular?) but if he plays a caste card (mobilising Rajput MPs) when the chips are down then it is still improper. And please feel free to explain why casteism is not communalism.

Actually don't. Time to end this discussion.

Good aim -- but misfire. The COAS selection procedure is strictly seniority based which leaves no room for manipulation and therefore sanku's entire rant that the government was politicising the army was baseless. Not sure how ambiguity over one appointment means that deep politicisation is setting in.

Is this correct?

I am asking, not being sarcastic. Don’t know much on such issues. I had heard that there were other Generals more Senior then Gen Bikram Singh.

The political event I am referring to is the RK Anand book launch -- a rather poor choice for an anti-corruption crusader. .

The COAS selection procedure is strictly seniority based which leaves no room for manipulation .

2.10. The present saga has its origin when General Joginder Jaswant Singh (Hereinafter Gen. J J Singh) assumed command of the Indian Army as COAS on 01.02.2005.


A Maratha Light Infantry officer, General JJ Singh was the first ever Sikh to rise to the top spot in the Army.


2.11. The background in which this needs to be appreciated is, in the preceding months, as General NC Vij’s tenure at the helm was coming to an end, there had been a fair amount of ‘langar talk’ in the Army that General JJ Singh would be superseded by General Shamsher Mehta, an Armoured Corps officer. Though the Government of India by and large always followed the ‘seniority’ principle in selecting service chiefs (the only exception being General AS Vaidya who had been elevated over Lt General SK Sinha in 1983) there had been enough uncertainty resulting in the Shri Gurudwara Prabhandak Committee (hereinafter the SGPC) issuing a strongly worded statement which was published in a few newspapers in favour of General JJ Singh taking over as the first ever ‘Sikh’ chief. Said statement came in for heavy criticism and nothing more was heard of it again, but by General JJ Singh’s own admission, that there would have been a blood bath on the streets if he had been superseded.


The Petitioners assume that the SGPC’s statement probably had little or no bearing on the Appointment Committee which at that time was headed by the Present Hon’ble Prime Minister, Dr Man Mohan Singh. Yet the fact remains that for the first time in Independent India, the communal cards were played at the highest level in the Army.


General JJ Singh within few months of taking charge initiated some thing called “look down policy” which was intended to give a clear idea to the officer above the rank of Brigadier who was still climbing the command pyramid to as to what the “line of succession” would or could be and to work out his own list, where based on various permutations and combinations, the next three/four chiefs could be predicted.


The only list that mattered was General JJ Singh’s own prepared list, for as the Chief of the Indian army.


2.12. It was well known that Gen. J J Singh was to be succeeded by General Gen. Deepak Kapoor, but his successor was to depend on the Promotion Boards which were to be held in future and especially towards the end of 2005 to decide as to which officers were to be cleared for the Lieutenant General Rank.


For the Line of Succession to succeed, General JJ Singh tweaked the events to clear the way for his immediate choice after General VK Singh.


At that point of time, Lt. General Bikram Singh was no where in the list of contenders, and there were other officers ahead of him, but were required to be ‘eliminated’ by General JJ Singh himself itself with a bit of deft maneuvering.

A list was prepared, nick-named ‘Op MOSES’ which implied that the Chief would pave the path for Lt. General Bikram Singh, for him to become the COAS in 2012. Like a family tree in reverse, Op MOSES listed potential threats that needed to be neutralized.


At this stage it would be pertinent to bring it to the notice that, for anyone to be in the line of becoming the COAS, the three Promotion Boards, pertaining to the Promotion of an officer as Brigadier, Major General and Lt. General is important, as the Person who would have maximum period of Residuary Services left would become the contender for the Post of COAS, and the Senior One amongst them at the time of retiring COAS, would if the Seniority Principle is adhered to would become the COAS. The functioning, appointment, duties and promotions are regulated by the Defence Services Regulations, 1986.


2.13. There might have been many other who would have been sacrificed in the unethical and immoral game plan laid down by Gen. J J Singh, but some of them heading the list of contenders were Brigadier Padam Budhwar and MM Chaudhary, followed by Major Generals Shujan Chatterjee, AK Singh, Ravi Arora and VK Singh.


2.14. While all the others had to be ‘fixed’ by manipulating their Brigadier to Major General Boards or by other delaying tactics that allowed Lt. Gen. Bikram Singh to overtake them, in the over all scheme of things it was also imperative that Gen. VK Singh becomes the Chief, but only till 2012, so that Lt. Gen. Bikram Singh, succeeds him.


2.15. The Result for the Promotion Board held in October, 2004 for the Promotion of Officer from Brigadier to Major General was declassified on 21.02.2005. Apart from other Officers the name of Brig. Ravi Arora and Brig. Bikram Singh, were considered.


2.16. But, to ensure that the Line of Succession works out well at the end, Brig. Ravi Arora despite being a Gold Medallist on commissioning and the senior-most in the batch was not empanelled but the Brig. Bikram Singh was. Aggrieved with the aforesaid empanelment Brig. Ravi Arora filed a Non- Statutory Complaint on 05.03.2005.


There were other non-statutory and statutory complaints filed.


The intention was to delay his promotion as much that, by the time he is empanelled to be the Lt. Gen, he should not be left with Sufficient Residuary Services to be considered for the Post of COAS.


While the other complaints were disposed of within 17 days, Brig. Ravi Arora’s complaint was deliberately not.


Unless the things are looked backward in the time, keeping in view the “Line of Succession” Gen J.J. Singh had made, his move could not be questioned, the same being apparently a malafide and arbitrary.


2.17. While Brig. Ravi Arora’s Complaint was still pending, within 38 days of declassification of the Previous Promotion Board, Gen. JJ Singh held a ‘fast track’ promotion board on 01.04.2005, in which amongst others, one of his own staff Brig. Chetinder Singh, whose complaint was disposed of for the purpose, was considered and cleared for promotion, whereas Brig. Ravi Arora’s was not even considered.


The said board was irregular, unusual and discriminatory to others, since 60 days are provided to represent against the results and as per MOD Policy, the non-statutory complaints should be decided in three months, and thus previous list could not be said to be final till the time all the complaint made against the same is disposed off after due consideration.


2.18. That the Promotions from Brigadier to Major General Rank is vacancy based, so not disposing off all the Complaints filed simultaneously, and granting promotion to some even before the expiry of the period for representation and disposal as per policy is apparently malafide and arbitrary exercise of authority, to favour few.


Soon after the aforesaid Promotion Board, Brig. Ravi Arora’s non-statutory complaint was rejected.

Against the aforesaid rejection Brig. Ravi Arora filed a Statutory Complaint on 21.05.2005, the said Complaint was vehemently opposed by Gen. J.J. Singh, to ensure that its disposal takes as long as possible, which as per plan took about 12 months against the mandatory six months for disposal.


The reason doing so was to ensure that he should not have the requisite residual service for promotion and appoint as Corps Commander or Army Commander later.


2.19. A Promotion Board for promotion of officers from the rank of Major General to Lieutenant General was held on 30.09.2005. In which Gen. V K Singh was considered.


The results for the aforesaid board held, was declassified on 15.04.2006.


Before all the Promotion Boards held, Gen V K Singh’s Date of Birth, as produced by the AG Branch and the MS Branch was 10th May, 1951. The same was intentionally not touched.


For “Op MOSES” to succeed, it was imperative for Gen. V K Singh to be sent into a tail-spin. The timing was critical – to have created the age issue before his Lieutenant General Board would have meant that VK Singh would not be the chief, thereby knocking out Bikram Singh which would have been counter productive.


2.20. The moment Gen V K Singh was cleared for promotion as Lieutenant General, at Gen. JJ Singh’s behest, the then MS fired off the first missile.


Lt General Richard Khare in a letter dated 03.05.2006, for the first time wrote to the then Lt. General VK Singh, that there is a discrepancy in his DOB in the Army List and the same is to be resolved.


At that time it could hardly have been any thing else but the reflecting of a correction. It was also conveyed to Gen VK Singh that the matter would be resolved after going through the records. However, he was told to reflect his date of birth as 1950 for the vague reason that he cannot change his age from what was reflected in UPSC application form and resultantly shown as such in Army List. The desired letter having been obtained from the unsuspecting Gen VK Singh, Op MOSES was now in full swing.


2.21.It is an admitted fact that although initially the Date of Birth of Gen. V K Singh was inadvertently shown as 1950 in the UPSC form, but the error was then only got corrected, i.e. even before he joined the National Defence Academy in 1966, and thereafter his DOB everywhere had been recorded and reflected as 1951 only. Even at the Indian Military Academy, where he was asked to fill up his form as per the original UPSC form, the correction was noted and the IMA records sent to the Adjudant General’s branch reflected 1951. On commissioning into the Army, his year of birth was listed as 1951. Even in the MS branch since his first commissioning as 2nd Lieutenant till he was promoted as Lieutenant General, his DOB has been 1951. All records in the AGs branch had the D.O.B. as 1951, and other than the Army List (which had failed to reflect the correction from the original UPSC form and was based on data forwarded by the MS branch without the requisite verification or checks) everything else listed his age as 1951. The said Army List considered to be fraught with errors and without any utility, had more or less been discontinued since 1990.


2.22. Gen. JJ Singh was simultaneously working out on his plan to exterminate other from the race, from amongst Lt. Gen. Bikram’s contemporaries. MM Chaudhary and Padam Budhwar had already been passed over from the Major General rank after deliberately playing havoc with their promotional boards. The promotion of Brig. Ravi Arora, Gold Medallist, was already delayed to allow the favoured candidate to surge ahead.


2.23. The Review Promotion Board (SB No. 1 Review) was held on 25.07.2006. MS Branch record will show that Gen. Arora has a better chance over others, but in furtherance of other plan, in the said Review Board he was not approved intentionally. If he were, then the chances of Lt. Gen. Bikram Singh coming into the so-called succession chain would not have arisen. It is believed that the board was held specifically for the purpose of rejecting Brig. Ravi Arora’s Candidature.


The Ministry of Defence had raised objection about holding the board, as the previous Review board was yet to be confirmed by MoD.


Review No 1 SB was illegal as it has long been held that Army HQ cannot hold any selection board for a particular rank unless the previous board for the same rank is finalized. The same was clearly done with the ill motive by then the COAS, with the intention to pave path for Bikram Singh and to exclude Brig. Ravi Arora from the competition.


Moreover, if the Review Promotion Board would have been held after all the complaints received within the stipulated time would have been decided, then it was possible that Brig Chetinder Singh may not have got a vacancy, due to merit and vacancy.


Since Gen. Arora did not represent against Result of the aforesaid illegal Board, thus he was relegated to the next batch.


2.24. Without there being any new material or confidential report coming on record, a Promotional Board was held again on 07.11.2006 (presided by Gen. J J Singh), which approved Brig. Ravi Arora for empanelment as Major General, but by then he was excluded from the succession chain.

Major General Ashok Mehta ("cashiered") : this man was forced to leave the Army after he was found to have committed a grave offence. Most BR members know the crime for which Mehta was shown the door. It is a serious moral and ethical crime in the lexicon of the armed forces

> can someone PM me these details?

Amitabh wrote:
The COAS selection procedure is strictly seniority based which leaves no room for manipulation .

Just plain wrong; it is very vulnerable to manipulation. Brigadier Ravi Arora was passed over by General JJ Singh to clear the way for BS to be appointed COAS. Read all about it:

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/pil-a ... h/942512/0

Very good question, Peter.

Kadiyan is a non-starter. He loves seeing his mug on the idiot box and mouthing utter rubbish. He is a complete give-away.