CDS, Tri-Services Issues & Integration Debate

[ShauryaT]

I am posting this book review here to highlight the key impediment that was and probably continues to be to the post of CDS....our political fears most probably led by the bureaucracy. It is these "coup proofing" measures such as making the defense secretary being responsible for the defense of India and not the services that continues to be at the heart of the matter.

At arm's length - ARMY AND NATION: THE MILITARY AND INDIAN DEMOCRACY SINCE INDEPENDENCE By Steven I. Wilkinson

Wilkinson also examines how successive governments responded to the requirements of military modernization. In the wake of the 1962 defeat against China, the Indian armed forces underwent a considerable expansion in size and equipment. But this period also witnessed the formation of paramilitary forces that indirectly served as a "hedge" against the army's increasing coercive capacity. Similarly, after Operation Bluestar, when some units of the army actually mutinied, the army was asked to experiment with mixed infantry battalions drawing on different ethnic groups. Concerns about handing the military overwhelming power also lie behind the political leadership's continuing reluctance to appoint a chief of defence staff, a single-point military advisor to the government.

Wilkinson notes that the measures to secure political control may have come at an operational cost by diminishing the military's voice in strategic matters. While this may be true today, it does not hold for the early years. In fact, in the first two decades after independence, the top military leadership displayed a sad lack of grasp of the higher management of war. This was largely due to the delayed Indianization of the officer corps under the British, which implied that top posts in the army were manned after independence by relatively junior officers.

One can quibble with Wilkinson about such matters. But this book is a major contribution to the study of the Indian army and the making of India's democracy. Everyone should read it.

[ShauryaT]

I am posting this here, as do not know, where else to post defense management/policy related articles.

Leave it to the generals - The Dhirendra Singh Committee makes a controversial recommendation

The committee of experts headed by former Home Secretary Dhirendra Singh, appointed to suggest amendments to the Defence Procurement Procedure 2013, submitted its report on July 23. It tried sneakily to legitimate the authority of the armed services to configure defence policy.

How is it that, with the advent of the Narendra Modi government, there has been so little substantive change in India’s foreign and military policies? The short answer is that political leaders don’t decide either the direction or content of policies; it is the “permanent secretariat”, comprising senior civil servants, diplomats,and the military brass, that configures policies according to its bureaucratic lights. That’s because the elected political leaders have little interest in these areas and no clear ideas or, as in the case of Modi, believe in an “empowered” bureaucracy to conduct the business of state. Hence, the implementers of policy in the Indian system by default end up shaping policy and its contents. This is particularly conspicuous in the national security sphere.

Deciding which country (China or Pakistan, for instance) constitutes the main threat is a manifestly political decision, as is the sort of war the armed services should prepare to fight — “limited aims, short duration” conflicts or “total war for victory” — which, in turn, will determine whether it is a “war of manoeuvre” that will be prosecuted or “war of annihilation”. This will require the military only to orient itself to the designated threat and alight on the appropriate plans to achieve the politically desired strategic aim. But this policymaking role has been expropriated by the armed services. It is an arrangement that is now sought to be formalised. Surprisingly, there’s no fuss about it.

The committee of experts headed by former Home Secretary Dhirendra Singh, appointed to suggest amendments to the Defence Procurement Procedure 2013, submitted its report on July 23. It tried sneakily to legitimate the authority of the armed services to configure defence policy. The intention to remove the political leadership from the defence policy loop is stated upfront.

In the first paragraph of its lead chapter, the report asserts “that whereas primacy has to be accorded to policymakers in strategic planning… the balance of advantage needs to shift to the armed forces in the matter of the choice of the characteristics of defence systems and equipment based on user preference and tactical and operational doctrines”. It doesn’t explain why this should be so. Further, “strategic planning” is dismissed as a mere accounting of “domestic compulsions (including resource allocations) and international relations”, and the “political executive” is turfed out of the business of defining and grading threats and imposing the parameters of war by subsuming these seminal tasks under the rubric, curiously, of military “modernisation”.

[ShauryaT]

Link to full report.

Committee of Experts for Amendment To DPP-2013
Including Formulation of Policy Framework presents its Report to the Government of India

[ShauryaT]

Taking just one recommendation of the above report to highlight something. What will be interesting to watch is in how much time does this one single recommendation, makes it into law and the codes of the finance ministry. Execution of these recommendations would make this government different from the rest. We will hope and watch.

Incentivise the Industry. The industry participating in ‘Make’ schemes of MoD
may be given tax incentives by way of categorizing their contribution (i.e.20% of the
development cost of the scheme) as being qualified for treatment as R&D expenditure.
Further, 300% weighted tax deduction of such development cost in Defence schemes
should be considered against 200% given by Department of Science &Technology.

[Aditya G]

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/new ... 427846.cms

India is working towards creating three new tri-Service organisations to handle the rapidly-expanding challenges in the crucial domains of space, cyberspace and clandestine warfare, which will be headed by two-star generals, in a synergised manner.

The ball will be set rolling by the creation of the Defence Cyber Agency (DCA), which will be followed by the Defence Space Agency (DSA) and the Special Operations Division (SOD), Times of India in a report said on Friday.


As per IAF chief Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, also the chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, these will be “interim arrangements” till the full-fledged Cyber, Aerospace and Special Operations Commands can take shape in the years ahead.

Sources say the plan is to “upgrade and expand” the existing Defence Information Assurance and Research Agency into the DCA. The DSA, in turn, will be created by pooling the resources of the three Services, along with finalisation of the Defence Space Roadmap 2030 to go beyond the already-identified thrust areas of intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, communication and navigation.

As for the SOD, while the Army, Navy and IAF will continue to retain their own special forces, “a new central pool” will also be established for joint command and control of unconventional warfare capabilities.

....

For reference, I am quoting a report from 2012 posted in Page-1 of this thread:

Indian armed forces mulling three joint commands

The brass of Army, Navy and IAF are "informally'' discussing the "contours'' of the cyber, aerospace and special operations commands, which will synergize efforts and assets of the three services in these "critical areas'',

sources said.

The prevalent view is that a three-star Army officer (Lt General) should head the Special Operations Command, while an equivalent rank from IAF (Air Marshal) can steer the Aerospace Command. The Cyber Command, in turn, will be headed by a Vice-Admiral from the Navy.

This means the commanders-in-chief of the three new commands will "not be rotated'' among the Army, Navy and IAF. India's two existing tri-Service commands - the Strategic Forces Command and the Andaman & Nicobar Command - as well as the integrated defence staff follow a "rotational'' policy at present.

"It will ensure the new command in question can be 'mothered' by a single Service on a continuous basis. The Army, after all, has domain expertise in special operations, IAF in aerospace and Navy in cyber and information technology. The commands will draw elements, assets and manpower from all the three services as well as the government below the three-stars,''

said a source.

-Ankit

Comparing the reports from 3 years, the following seem to have transpired:

1. Scaled down. Special operations division - and not command level unit.

2. Joint Cyber and Space organisations are 'agencies' and not military formations. There is some black in yellow lentils.

3. 'new pool' - again suspicious. It would have been simpler for the three forces to nominate and rotate out existing units from the SOD. We dont want armed forces to 'staff' this new organisation like they do for ARC and NSG. Their units, such as the soaring gideons, valiant vipers, MARCOs should nominate teams and rotate them out with others.

[rohitvats]

^^^Central pool looks more like allocating certain strength/manpower to the proposed SOD. This is the resource which the SOD can use directly at its own discretion. Something like IA allocating a 1 x Para (SF) battalion under SOD. Same for IAF and IN.

[Ankit Desai]

Since SOD will be unified command I would like to see best of best coming at it from services than just let's say a SF battalion from IA or a unit of Garuds from IAF or a unit Marcos from IN. And they should act as one unit, one uniform after joining SOD.

-Ankit

[JTull]

CDS in final stages of consultation, says Manohar Parrikar

NG Going ahead further with structural reforms in the way the ministry and the armed forces function, are you looking at some of the fundamental changes and reforms suggested by the Kargil Review Committee or the Naresh Chandra Committee?

RM: If you are referring to CDS or whatever name it’s to be called, it’s being actively looked into. As of now, it’s in the final stage of consultations. I think in the next few months, it should be on board.

NG: So the CDS will be basically looking at coordinating and getting the procurements of the three services together? What is the kind of role that is being envisaged?

RM: The role which has been envisaged has been worked out. So that while the three services remain more or less intact as it is, certain aspects will be handled by the CDS; basically coordinate the joint effort on procurement, so that the cost is reduced and the duplication and time lag, time period is reduced.

[wig]

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/sunday ... 13840.html
a clutch of informative articles on cds and joint commands appears in the tribune published from chandigarh

Should a war break out with China or Pakistan, multiple single Service operational Commands belonging to the Army, Navy and the Air Force will be pressed into service with none of their Command HQ located in the same city. Also, an operational Command of one Service will have overlapping geographical jurisdiction with more than one Command of another Service. And, there will not be a centre-point of tri-Service coordination.
For example, a full-fledged conventional war with Pakistan will ensure the involvement of seven different operational Commands: 4 Army Commands, 2 Air Force (IAF) Commands and one Navy Command. The Army will activate the Udhampur-based Northern Command (looking after J&K), the Chandimandir-based Western Command (mainly Punjab), Jaipur-based South Western Command (mainly Rajasthan, part Gujarat) and the Pune-based Southern Command (part Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa).
The IAF will likely activate its New Delhi-based Western Air Command, which incidentally with its area of responsibility spread across J&K, Punjab and part of Rajasthan, has jurisdiction of the equivalent of more than two Army Commands: Northern, Western and part of Southwestern. The second Command the IAF may activate is the Gandhinagar-based Southwestern Air Command (area of responsibility is part of Rajasthan, Gujarat and Maharashtra) while the Navy will engage its Mumbai-based Western Naval Command in the Arabian Sea.
Each of these will likely take instructions from respective Service chiefs and coordinate with their respective Operations directorate in the absence of both a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and a Joint Operations Directorate.
As is evident, none of the seven operational Commands are co-located which resultantly is expected to adversely impact on coordination in intelligence sharing, planning and execution in the fast-paced technology-intensive battlefield environment of the 21st century. Also, the number of Commands belonging to each service located along the India-Pakistan border differs; the geographical jurisdiction of various Commands of the three Services have little commonality, and in most cases, the Command of one Service either overlaps or is linked with two or more Commands of the other Service.
It will be a similar situation in the case of a war with China in which three Army Commands (Udhampur-based Northern Command, Lucknow-based Central and Kolkata-based Eastern) and three Air Force Commands (New Delhi-based Western, Allahabad-based Central and Shillong-based Eastern) will be engaged. In the high probability of a naval dimension to a future Sino-Indian war, also likely to be involved is the Navy's Vishakapatnam-based Eastern Command and the Port Blair-based Andaman and Nicobar Command, the latter being India's sole tri-Service Theatre Command, and whose commander-in-chief reports to the Chairman Chief of Staff Committee (COSC). In all, eight operational Commands will be involved.

Compare & contrast
Contrast the response to a Sino-Indian war with that of China, whose armed forces are structured across a total of just five joint theatre Commands. In the event of a conventional war with India, Beijing is expected to employ one theatre Command: the Chengdu-based Western Theatre Command. In case of a naval dimension, Beijing may employ the South China Fleet component of its Guangzhou-based Southern Theatre Command.
The system of individual Service operational Commands is a British legacy. India has only made either incremental or cosmetic changes since Independence. As a result, as of today the Indian armed forces are structured across a total 19 Commands, 17 of which are single service commands. (See box).
The other two are tri-Service Commands: the Andaman and Nicobar Command, a ‘geography-based’ Theatre Command established in October 2001 with headquarters in Port Blair, comprising a modest force level of an Army brigade, an IAF transport helicopter Unit, Naval patrol vessels and maritime reconnaissance aircraft and Coast Guard patrol vessels for the 572 island archipelago located about 1,200 km from the Indian mainland and barely 45 km and 180 km, respectively, from the southern tip of Myanmar’s Coco islands and the northern tip of Indonesia. They lie astride the western end of the Malacca Strait.
The second, the Strategic Forces Command (SFC), with HQ in New Delhi, is an ‘equipment-based’ Functional Command armed with nuclear missiles.

Least integrated
The Kargil Review Committee observed, "India is perhaps the only major democracy where the Armed Forces Headquarters is outside the apex governmental structure." In contrast to other major countries in the world, where the three Services are coordinated at the top under a CDS or equivalent, the three Services are not coordinated at the top and their respective Chiefs end up wearing three diverse hats: a 'staff hat' as the Chief of Staff, an 'operational hat' as the Commander-in-Chief and also a 'ceremonial hat'.
Around 70 countries, including major and medium military powers, have a Chief of Defence Staff or equivalent. India, with the world’s fourth largest armed forces, is the only country of its size that doesn’t have the CDS.
The three Services are notionally coordinated in the institution of Chairman COSC, which, however, is a rotational post held by the senior most Service Chief as a mere figurehead with no operational resources and no command authority. He is only a coordinator for most tasks which are administrative and that also by a democratic process of agreement. Considering this, it is unclear how the Chairman COSC will operationally handle the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) in the event of a major military operation if the Commander-in-Chief of the ANC belongs to a Service other than that of the Chairman.

Parallel campaigns
Since Independence, war plans and procurement of equipment have been based on single Service appreciation and have involved overlaying the application of the other Service. Hence plans have been based more on creating a feeling of 'mutual cooperation' rather than based on a jointly appreciated integrated course of action. Be it strategic or tactical doctrines, training, equipment, procurement or logistics, each Service tends to operate almost in isolation.
The debate in India to appoint a CDS and create joint Services Commands dates back several decades. Politicians, bureaucrats and the armed forces continue to talk even though successive military engagements by India have exposed deficiencies.
The Sino-Indian War of 1962 was a disaster as has been recorded by several informed authors, including the still classified Henderson Brooks Report which was posted on the Internet in 2014 by Neville Maxwell, an Australian journalist and author of 'India's China War', a book that revealed the incompetence of India's key political and Army leadership of that time. It was also a war in which India did not utilise its air power and kept its fighter aircraft grounded despite the latter having the potential to make a difference considering that vintage Chinese aircraft had severe restrictions on payload capacity owing to their air bases being located on altitudes higher than 10,000 feet.
The 1965 India-Pak war was a case of utter lack of coordination between the Army and IAF, which again has been recorded in the Official War History and also several books authored by retired defence officers and other writers. The Army saw the role of the IAF more as an air artillery and lack of coordination led to IAF fighters killing Indian soldiers in friendly fire. The 1971 India-Pakistan War appeared relatively better coordinated. Even so, while speaking at the Defence Services Staff College soon after the 1971 War, Field Marshal Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji Manekshaw, who led the Army to victory, tellingly remarked that the area Commands in India were dysfunctional and needed to be reduced to joint Commands which would operate under a CDS.

Recent conflicts
During the 1987-89 IPKF or Indian Peace Keeping Operations (named Operation Pawan) in Sri Lanka, an Overall Force Commander (OFC) from the Army was appointment with component commanders subordinated to him from the Eastern Naval Command and the Southern Air Command. However, this worked in theory more than in practice. For, the Navy and IAF Commanders-in-Chief (C-in-C) responsible for providing forces declined to delegate command and instead got the component commanders designated as liaison officers with no role other than act as a via-media in the headquarters of the OFC and the C-in-C. In
As for the 1999 Kargil War, the differences between the Army and the IAF are well known. In one of its report, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence has noted that it was lack of synergy which caused difficulties to the armed forces.
Successive governments in India, irrespective of their political leaning, have rarely been pro-active in making changes in India's defence management system. Changes have been the consequences of disastrous events and surprises. And even then, the reforms have been reactive and marked more by incrementalism than radical reforms and initiatives to deal with threats.

Cosmetic changes
It took India's defeat in the 1962 War to make the government embark on modernising the armed forces which included raising 10 Army Mountain Divisions. Some incremental changes in India's defence management system have followed after the 1999 Kargil War. Drawbacks within the Army during the large scale mobilisation of troops after the December 2001 terror attack on Parliament led the Army to embark on a Cold Start Doctrine. In 2008, soon after the 26/11 terror attacks by Pakistani terrorists in Mumbai, embarrassing revelations of chinks in India's coastal security led the government to place the Coast Guard under the operational command of the Navy.
The 1980s witnessed some major acquisitions and modernisation — some as a pro-active measure and some as reaction to Pakistan's acquisitions.
The 1980s also witnessed the Indian armed forces embarking on unprecedented 'Out of Area' tri-service missions — Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka (1987-89) and Operation Cactus in the Maldives (1988). Towards the end of the decade, the Army was fighting an intensive proxy war with Pakistan in J&K after having earlier engaged in Operation Bluestar (1984, Amritsar).
India has increased its military ties with the US, Western Europe, nations in Southeast and East Asia and the Middle East. The country has also participaed in UN peace support operations. Clearly, the role of the Indian armed forces has expanded to new realms requiring a hard look at existing structures.

Recommendations
No Indian government has ever conducted a strategic defence review. The only exercise was the report prepared by the Kargil Review Committee commissioned soon after the 1999 Kargil War. The findings of the committee, which essentially studied the sequence of events and made recommendations for the future, was tabled in Parliament in February 2000. It led the government to constitute a Group of Ministers (GoM) Committee in April 2000 to examine the changes that needed to be made in the national security structure. The GoM Committee in turn constituted four Task Forces, each of which examined Defence Management, Border Management, Internal Security and Intelligence Reforms.
Among the recommendations made by the GoM were three key proposals: (i) Integration of the Services both with each other and with the Ministry of Defence (MoD); (ii) creation of a CDS as a single point military advice to the civil political executive; and (iii) creation of Joint Operational Commands.
The government ended up taking measures that were either cosmetic or incomplete. On integrating the Services with the MoD, the government did so with word play by introducing the nomenclature 'Integrated Headquarters of the Army" (and likewise for the Navy and the IAF). Thus the only integration lay in the word 'integrated' — a cosmetic measure, whereas what the recommendation suggested was appointment of officers from the Services to the MoD.
Then again, instead of appointing a CDS, the government took the half measure of creating a Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff or HQ IDS in October 2001. This is being headed by a Chief of Integrated Staff (CIS), a three star general, as an interim measure until a CDS was nominated pursuant to the Cabinet Committee on Security partially approving the GoM Committee recommendation. The HQ IDS works as a tri-Service secretariat to a non-existent CDS which remains elusive in the absence of any subsequent decision by three successive union governments formed since the report's preparation.
As for the third recommendation of making Joint Operation Commands, the government simply upgraded the Navy's Fortress Andaman and Nicobar (FORTAN), established in 1976, to the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) with a full-fledged C-in-C to be headed by a Lieutenant General equivalent belonging to either of the three Services and reporting to the Chairman COSC. Thus, although a Theatre Command was created, it did not involve any major addition of resources; only a change in nomenclature with its C-in-C reporting to the Chairman COSC instead of to the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command as was being done in the past.
However, several years later the ANC has still not been fully integrated according to a report prepared by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence and it still remains dependent on the Eastern Naval Command for vessels and other weapon platforms and systems.

[wig]

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/sunday ... 13849.html
Stuck in turf wars, red-tape & inertia

What prevents the government from taking a decision to create the post of a Chief of Defence Staff and reorganise the three Services into joint Commands, especially when high-powered committees, including the Group of Ministers Committee comprising the Union ministers of Home, Defence, External Affairs and Finance along with the National Security Advisor, have recommended the same?
A combination of turf wars, ignorance about defence issues, suspicion of the armed forces and resistance against changing the status quo are the major reasons. Politicians are largely ignorant, indifferent or suspicious of the armed forces. Defence and security has never been a top priority for them during times of peace. Owing to military coups in Pakistan and Bangladesh and the role of the military in other neighbouring countries such as Myanmar and China, large sections of the political class have also been uncomfortable about vesting too much power with the armed forces and creating a centre point of authority.
'Generalist' bureaucrats, who consider themselves 'superior' to the Services, have traditionally always been suspicious of and inimical towards according too much power to the armed forces.
On their part, the armed forces have been plagued with turf wars with hardly any Service Chief in harness wishing to deprive himself of his operational command and preside over his own disinvestment. Of the three Services, the Navy, which constitutes five per cent of India's armed forces, has been consistent in its support for the creation of a CDS and joint Commands.
In contrast, the IAF, which constitutes 10 per cent of the armed forces, has been the most resistant since it believes in the primacy of 'indivisible air power' and in centralising its assets for effective use during war time. As a result, it does not want to parcel out its assets to Theatre Commands. Already, for example, against a sanctioned strength of 42 fighter squadrons, the IAF's current squadron strength has fallen to 33 and is expected to only fall further in the years ahead.
The Army, which constitutes the bulk (85 per cent) of the armed forces, is divided into two camps with one section in favour and the other arguing that Theatre Commands are unsuited for India considering its sustained involvement in border skirmishes and low intensity conflict. Besides, they feel that such joint operational Commands are only suited for power projection, something which India does not stand for.
At a more macro level, India's inability to take such bold decisions is hampered by strategic culture which, according to Bratton, is one of 'restraint', a 'Continentalist view of security issues', a 'reluctance to formally articulate strategic policies', a 'secretive bureaucracy' that is hesitant to declassify archival material related to security issues and 'a strong separation between civilian and military leaders that hinders adequate civil-military dialogue'.

Reform or Perish
India's security challenges span the full spectrum of conflict from nuclear to sub conventional - unresolved territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, armed violence in Jammu and Kashmir and some of the north eastern states and terrorism in urban parts of the country sponsored by both state (mainly Pakistan) and non-state actors.
With the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs, the nature of warfare is itself changing. Future battlefields are likely to be vastly different. These are expected to be non-linear, digitised, highly mobile and transparent. Force multipliers will play a crucial role in determining the outcome of conflicts and the use of surveillance, cyber warfare, space and robotics will need to be better exploited.
Thus modern warfare demands unified commands and also an organisation fully responsible for operational control which should be able to determine the type of equipment required for all three Services, the type and scale of operations envisaged and the tactics to be employed. The long ranges of weapon systems in possession with all three Services will require optimal and efficient use. This further adds to the need for a unified structure to create an interoperable integrated environment.
There is a difference between an integrated response and a joint response. An integrated response is more focused, cohesive and involves optimum utilization of responses. In a joint response, the scope for friction between services is high. In the current system, each Service plans and caters for its own logistics back up for operations. This leads to considerable duplication, long inventories and waste of resources.

Go for a shakeup
Reforms in the defence management structure will have to be enforced top down as has been done in the United States. Following World War-II, US President Harry Truman had observed: "We must never fight another war the way we fought the last two. I have a feeling that if the Army and Navy had fought our enemies as hard as they fought each other, the war would have ended much earlier". Based on their experience, the defence reforms in the US have been continuously evolving with the passage of the National Security Act 1947, the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 and the land mark Goldwater Nichols Act, 1986 which created the current system.
In the United Kingdom a CDS was thrust on the military by the government after 18 years of bickering and dissensions amongst the Services. The UK is otherwise the first country to have a chiefs of staff committee dating back to 1923. In addition to a CDS, the UK has a Permanent Joint Headquarters commanded by a Chief of Joint Operations Command. More recently, in February this year, China restructured its armed forces into five region-centric Theatre Commands.
The structure of the Indian armed forces resembles a dinosaur which is becoming less relevant and practical in modern times. There is a need to rise above Service-specific loyalties and turf battles and create a CDS along with integrated Command structures. The current Service-specific approach is potentially divisive and delays responses to emerging situations in a rapidly moving current-day battlefield. It is also more expensive.
But for that the political executive first needs to pro-actively educate itself on defence and security issues and accept that it needs to reform the way both the higher defence management and the armed forces are structured. India cannot afford being yet again caught by surprise and then having to scrape its way out. There is need to reform and restructure or risk becoming inefficient and eventually irrelevant.

[wig]

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/sunday ... 13896.html
the concluding part of the articles has

Models for restructuring commands

IT is imperative that the government appoint a Joint Services Chief in the form of a Chief of Defence Staff as a principal military advisor to the government; restructure the armed forces into joint Commands; and also restructure the Ministry of Defence (MoD) by appointing officers of the armed forces into the ministry.
Clearly, there is an urgent need for joint policy and operational planning, for coordinated responses to the vast spectrum of India's security challenges, and for optimising on resources which include expensive weapon systems with greater lethal firepower and range. As a regional power, the armed forces also need to be better positioned to engage in power projection and handle out of area contingencies.



For this, India needs to disband the 17 single-service Commands and reorganise them into a mix of integrated Theatre Commands and integrated Functional Commands that could be bi-service and tri-service depending on their operational jurisdiction. A start has already been made by creating a Theatre Command after upgrading the Fortress Andaman and Nicobar or FORTAN into the Andaman and Nicobar Command and establishing the Strategic Forces Command, an equipment-based Functional Command. But this is not enough. All Theatre and Functional Commands would report to the CDS. There is much debate whether the CDS in India should be a four star or a five star general and whether he should don a uniform different from that of the other three Services.



In addition the Theatre/Regional Commands, the government could consider raising an Out of Area Contingency Command (OOAC). The evacuation of Indians during the two Gulf Wars, Lebanon and Libya; the increased involved in UN Peace Support Operations, patrolling of the Malacca Strait and in the Indian Ocean by Indian warships and operations such as Cactus in the Maldives are some examples.



There is little doubt that India's area of interest extends from the eastern coast of Africa in the West to Sumatra in the east and the Indian Ocean in the south. India cannot ignore Chinese forays in the Indian Ocean along with its increasing influence in the Ocean's littoral states. Considering that military power is a key parameter for a country that wishes to assume a major role at the global level, India needs to think and plan big if it has to someday act big. But more than being a global player, India's size, location and security concerns require a major restructuring of its armed forces.




Theatre Command



Option-I

How the Theatre / Regional Commands can be structured:

Western Theatre Command: This could either be a bi-Service operational Command after merging the Army's Northern, Western and South Western Command and integrating them with a merged Western Air Command and the Southwestern Air Command. Or, it could be a tri-Service Command after adding the Navy's Western Command

Eastern Theatre: This could either be a bi-Service operational Command after merging the Army's Central and Eastern Command and integrating them with the IAF's merged Central and Eastern Command. Or, it could be a tri-Service Command after adding the Navy's Eastern Command.

Southern Theatre or Indian Ocean Theatre: This can be formed after integrating the Army, Navy and IAF's respective Southern Commands

Central Theatre: Both to serve as a reserve and to handle Out Of Area Contingencies/asymmetric warfare



Option-II

Northern Theatre: A bi-Service Army, IAF Command catering for China and Nepal.

Western Theatre: A tri-Service Command catering for Pakistan, Afghanistan and beyond.

Eastern Theatre: A tri-Service Command catering for China, Nepal, Bangladesh, South East Asia.

Southern Theatre: A bi-Service Command comprising the Navy and the IAF with a limited Army component catering for Sri Lanka, Littoral Africa and the Middle East.

Out of Area Contingency Command: For asymmetric warfare and to serve as a reserve.

[ramana]

In 1999 I wrote
WhaT Next? Way to a credible deterrent.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/archives/ ... index.html

Unfortunately forum update does not have links to BRM.


http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/archives/ ... amana.html

Joint operations

It is essential to integrate the services and the ministry of defense. The Defense Secretary should be in charge of administration and budgetary process etc. In other words a purely administrative capacity. The Chief of Defense staff should be selected and appointed on basis of merit and should be the point of contact for passing on the strike authorization to the strike force command. It is also necessary to ensure that the services operate in a joint manner.

In the Northern and eastern sectors, theater commands combining Army and Air Force units should be set-up. The theater commander can be from Army or Air Force. The headquarters need not be in the same location. This way there is dispersion of command assets. In the southwest and southern sectors there could be tri-service theater commands led by competent officers from any of the services. As a start, a joint theater warfare/command school should be setup in the National Defense College, by combining the existing elements from the different service establishments, which are now scattered all over in isolation.

[Aditya G]

Theatre commands remain a pipe dream, and one could argue that they do not make sense for us anyways.

It will be a great achievement if we can raise the Tri-service SOD - it will be single biggest piece of military reform since ANC was raised.

I think a tri-service expeditionary force can be raised easily as well, with 50 (I) Para Bde as its core. Our amphib strike force is already tri-service since it is based in ANC.

[wig]

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation ... 22609.html
MoD defers call on fixed COSC chief

The Ministry of Defence has for now deferred a decision on having a permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) to coordinate all issues between the three Services and the ministry.
At present, the senior-most among the three Chiefs — of the Army, IAF and Navy — also holds the post of COSC Chairman in addition to his regular duties. He notionally coordinates the issues on behalf of the three Services.
Sources have confirmed that various aspects of having an additional officer at that level are still under study. “It will take another six months to examine his role, status and duties,” a source said. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar is studying various aspects related to the creation of the new post.
The Naresh Chandra task force, set up by the UPA government in 2011, on higher defence reforms had in its report in 2012 suggested a four-star officer as a permanent chairman of the COSC, who will be equal in rank of the three Chiefs.
Sources said the government was planning a permanent chairman for COSC having two-year tenure with equal rank and protocol as the Chiefs of the three Services. The chiefs, because of their retirement age of 62 instead of 60 years, have a tenure that is usually longer than two years.
One thinking in the government is that the COSC should be headed by the “first among equals within the Chiefs”. This would entail appointment of the senior-most General as the permanent chairman of the COSC in the armed forces bound by hierarchy.
He will be the boss of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), which is presently headed by a Lt General-rank officer in rotation among the three Services.
The government’s thinking is that a permanent COSC Chairman, backed by a strong administrative structure, will have ample time to focus on tri-Services’ issues and would be better placed to coordinate between the Army, Navy and Air Force.
The officer will be responsible for all military acquisition processes, Strategic Forces Command, cyber command and on promoting “jointmanship” within the forces.
A single-point military adviser’s post in the form of Chief of Defence Staff was proposed by K Subrahmanyam-led Kargil Review Committee set up by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government after the Kargil war.

[jayasimha]

http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/commen ... 21965.html


For unified command
By Maj-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)
As we continue to ignore the imperatives of unity of command, an important principle of war, we
may end up paying a heavy price for our failure to fully integrate our defence forces.
The Narendra Modi government may have finally decided to create the post of a Chief of Defence
Staff (CDS). A four-star officer, with a two-year fixed tenure would be the sole military adviser to
the government. However, a single point of advice to the government is only one aspect in the
conduct of the national defence paradigm. This proposal misses out on the more relevant aspect of
the CDS system.
Recently, the Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar made a telling observation, when he said, “There
is no integration mechanism that exists between the three services and there is a lot of infighting
amongst them. I will recommend a mechanism for the creation of the post of CDS. Force
integration and overlap will also save money.” Of course, he would not know that force integration
can come about only and only when CDS in its full spectrum is brought in, where service chiefs
have only staff functions and theatre commands function directly under the CDS.
One may overlook naivety on issues of national security, but ignorance of the imperatives of
integrating various components and unity of command during operations, in a given theatre, with
overall control of operations with the CDS is missed by many from the defence fraternity as well.
Coordinating, synergising and meshing together the logistic and combat potential of the two or
three wings of the defence forces in a given theatre, as applicable, is an important aspect. The goal
is to serve common operational demands and purpose through joint planning and unity of
command.
All along there has been much opposition against the adoption of the CDS system in its full form.
The political executive continues to be frightened by the bureaucracy of a mirage of a military
takeover of the country: once the CDS system is brought in. The service chiefs' unwillingness to be
consigned to only staff functions and their propensity for turf battles and bureaucracy's penchant for
pitching one service against the other to foster discord militates against the adoption of the CDS in
its full play.
At one point, the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, wanted to make Field Marshal Sam
Manekshaw the CDS, but opposition came from the then air chief and the defence secretary.
Unfortunately, the opposition to this proposal with egging on by the bureaucracy, has mainly come
5
from the IAF because the core and kernel of the CDS system in its full spectrum has been escaping
it. The CDS system will also be able to evolve a mechanism to acquire compatible equipment,
complimentary weapon systems for integrated deployment of combat elements, suitable for a
particular theatre of operation. It will also reduce the need for over a dozen and a half present set of
commands ( C-in-Cs ) to six to eight theatre commands.
In the Indian context the possibility of a two-front war looms large. The complexities of a two-front
war which haunted the German General Staff for well over half a century across two World Wars,
are not easy to comprehend and resolve. These would certainly be outside the existing systems of
Indian defence establishment to cope with. It involves the need to evolve a joint strategy, judicious
distribution of resources between the two fronts in line with the overall strategic plans and unity of
command in each theatre.
As we continue to ignore the imperatives of unity of command, an important principle of war, we
may end up paying a heavy price for our failure to fully integrate our defence forces.
An examination and analysis of the causes of India's 18 major defeats from Alexander’s invasion to
the Battle of Plassey, reveals a ponderous and pedestrian system of higher defence management,
that runs like a warp thread in the management and conduct of battles by India.
This was articulated by Sir Jadunath Sarcar, the eminent historian who chronicled military tactics
and sieges. On the unity of command, one may quote General Albertvon Wellestein, in Great
Captains Unveiled by B.H. Liddle Hart. on the conduct of battle, “Never will I accept a divided
command — no not even were God Himself to be my colleague in office. I must command alone or
not at all.” This unity of command is, therefore, the very essence of the principle of war.

[ShauryaT]

Is there any thinking articulated on what are the theater commands that may come into being with a CDS post? Apart from joint commands such as cyber, space, SFC and intelligence, is there any thought to how do the three naval, six army, and five air force commands coexist or merge into the theater commands? Will there be another hierarchy of theater commands that will subsume the force commands they liaise with?

Some thoughts on the theater commands for India can be:

1. Western
2. Northern
3. Eastern
4. Far Eastern
5. IOR

Not all these commands have equal weightage, as they shall change based on threats and opportunities. The Northern command has some fungibility to meet threats from either Pakistan or China with most of our heavy weight fighters and bombers in it. Eastern command has very little naval assets but has the SSBN. A&N to become the Far Eastern Command with SSN's. IOR for west Asia and Africa. Thoughts?

[malushahi]

Time for (appointing) a CDS has come, says Air Chief

NG – I understand. And that brings me to the question of integration of all the three services and question of Chief of the Defence Staff. Since you have been perhaps the longest serving Chairman Chief of Staff Committee, what is the view – not only your personal view but of course what is the government thinking about, do you think it is essential?

ACM – I think every idea has its time and regarding the CDS – the time is right for implementing the CDS scheme. So many committees and task forces have been made and studies have been carried out in the past. Each and every committee or task force, especially the Naresh Chandra task force and CTF have recommended that India needs a CDS – a single point military advisor to the government following the pattern of so many developed countries all over the world. They are following the system and I think we can adapt the good; we can replicate the good things about the CDS system. We need not copy it entirely from any country because our circumstances, our ethos, our threat perception and our requirements will not be same as the others. Therefore we will adapt it to our requirements, but the time for CDS has come. I think we all need to have it and I think government is working on it and a lot of efforts are being made to finalise it. But if you have a CDS, there is a need for a proper structure. You must have a good organisation to support the CDS. The integration of the HQ IDS – that is the wing that works under the CDS, the tri Service organisation – should totally be integrated with Ministry of Defence; only then will it be productive, only then will it be effective.

[srin]

As an armchair general joint chief, I worry about ability of a general to direct air defence or to plan a naval strike. While I'm sure that the top brass will have lot of staff officers across services, my feeling is that a commander earns respect of rank and file if they he is "one of them". So, I'm not sure if having a tri-service command or having a 5-star CDS ("one ring to rule them all") would be very effective.

[Aditya G]

As an armchair general joint chief, I worry about ability of a general to direct air defence or to plan a naval strike. While I'm sure that the top brass will have lot of staff officers across services, my feeling is that a commander earns respect of rank and file if they he is "one of them". So, I'm not sure if having a tri-service command or having a 5-star CDS ("one ring to rule them all") would be very effective.

The integration will be an higher levels.

The C-in-C of an integrated command will have an IAF officer reporting to him for air defence.

[Aditya G]

X-post

Why has the army chief not been appointed yet? - From Rediff ( it also talks in details about appointment of a tri-service chief; posting part of it below - Read full Article for details)

If the government had followed tradition, Lieutenant General Praveen Bakshi, currently commanding the Eastern Army from Fort William in Kolkata, would have been named two months ago to succeed the present army chief, General Dalbir Singh Suhag, who is scheduled to retire on December 31.

General Bakshi is the senior-most amongst the qualified generals; and the government has traditionally named its incoming army, navy and air force three months ahead of time, to facilitate a smooth handover. But with just 23 days to go for General Suhag's retirement, and no successor named, the New Delhi grapevine is abuzz with speculation that the government is finalising the appointment of a tri-service chief, along with the next army chief.

There are three ways this could be done.

The least disruptive measure, and therefore the least transformative, would be creating a four-star 'permanent chairman chiefs of staff' (PCCOS), as proposed in 2013 by the Naresh Chandra Committee.

The government's second option is to appoint a five-star rank commander termed the 'chief of defence staff' (CDS), who would be the direct boss of all three service chiefs and the single point military advisor to the political leadership.

The third option, which would be the most transformative, is a root-and-branch restructuring of the entire military command structure, to impose tri-service jointmanship not just at the apex of the hierarchy, but also on the combat force --- the so-called theatre commands.

Now, the government has just three weeks to decide whether to deliver.

[Aditya G]

Gen Hasnain;

http://swarajyamag.com/defence/will-the ... ence-staff

I hate to believe rumours, but when they are discussed quite openly and by very knowledgeable people, I don't mind joining in with informed guess work and some analysis. Currently, the hottest potato is the information that the government is going to make the long awaited announcement on the appointment of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). This should excite a lot of people. If it happens, the NDA government would have delivered on its manifesto and created quite a ripple before the upcoming assembly elections. The issues, which the public must get to know about the decision, if finally taken are quite a few. Just like people, who still approach me to explain what one rank one pension (OROP) is all about, there are many who will want to know the ifs and buts of CDS.

Firstly, it is a good 17 years after the Kargil Review Committee headed by K Subramaniam made the recommendation that India would finally have a CDS, something most modern armed forces adopted many years ago. However, is it really necessary to have one? Absolutely yes, in the opinion of almost every military professional.

The military subset of national security, as one of its main components, has become so complex today that no single service can claim primacy. The ground or continental, maritime and air/space dimensions now also have the cyber domain thrown in. With transformation and the revolution in military affairs ongoing for many years, the necessity to convert all military operations to the 'joint' format is a compulsion. Joint here essentially means that single service can no longer fight their individual wars and only assist other services as a secondary effort. All planning must take place jointly, placing all resources in the basket and exploiting them optimally for the common national goal. Doctrinal guidance for this must be joint too, as much as the training needed to back it. Single service glory hunting will then not be possible. It may sound mundane to our civilian brethren, but it is a truism that in spite of being aware of the necessity to optimally plan and deploy all resources each service first looks at its own domain.

This is not peculiar to India, it happens everywhere in the world. The US Armed Forces, the world's most advanced, had major problems in this regard. Narrow service loyalties kept coming in the way of joint operations. Fed up of the inability of the men in uniform resolving this issue, the US legislature in 1987 passed the famous Goldwater-Nichols Act, which was initiated under former president Ronald Reagan. This Act legislated the creation of joint structures and organisations, the classic theatre command system. The position of the then already strengthened Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff received a further impetus. The US system is an extremely advanced one, where the service chiefs are responsible only for training, procurement and partially non-operational logistics, besides being in touch with the government. The theatres comprise a mix of all components of the four services (the US has the Marine Corps as the fourth Arm) with the necessary resources, under the command of the theatre commander also known as the combatant commander, who reports directly to the Secretary Defence – not to be confused with the Defence Secretary as in India who is a bureaucrat. The Secretary Defence is the Defence Minister of the US. The theatre commanders through him report to the US President, who is the working Supreme Commander.

The CDS system known under different avatars around the world also has a national stamp based upon each country's own military experience. It is interesting to see the Pakistan model, which I learn came into being in General Zia ul Haq's time. Pakistan's armed forces have been comfortable with the creation of the post of General Number One primarily because it is a toothless appointment, the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC). Jointness between the three services may exist notionally or even marginally, but Pakistan has placed its nuclear weaponry and its safety under his control and he reports directly to the prime minister. His powers otherwise are restricted. This appointment does not become a single window for reference with the government on matters military. Anyway Pakistan's model is just too unique because it's army and its chief, who is officially virtually General Number Two, has an out of proportion power in guiding and deciding security policies for Pakistan. It's just worth keeping in mind as one end of the spectrum of models which we in India could refer.

In 2001, as an interim acceptance of the Kargil Review Committee recommendations, the Government of India created the HQ Integrated Defence Staff or HQ IDS. Planning, procurement, doctrine, intelligence, training and even joint operations came under its purview but service specific issues in the same realms continued to dominate the organisational narrative. The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) raised in 2001 virtually functions under the NSA. The Strategic Forces Command (SFC), also established in 2001, which is the controlling establishment for nuclear weapon assets of India, remains virtually outside the ambit of the joint staff and has also passed into the hands of the NSA. An experiment with theatrisation was commenced with the raising of the Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC). Recently, at the behest of the former naval chief, the command of ANC, which was always rotational between the three services, has now been given permanently to the Indian Navy. The nature of threats to the ANC area of responsibility probably dictated the decision. Many appear to disagree with the command of a theatre being exercised by a single service. However, there is precedent in the form of the Pacific Command of the US which is commanded by a four-star naval officer. Personally, I do believe the navy has the better expertise to exercise command control under perhaps a later time when the joint intellect is a certainty.

The problem is that from 2001 to 2016 is a long period to experiment and not act in the true and honest interest of jointness. There is much speculation that the inordinately long time may yet have prolonged to allow the bureaucratic control over the resources which must actually come legitimately under the new CDS, when appointed. The Indian jointness model will also be unique. Unlike the individual service chiefs having little or no operational responsibility in the US, the Indian service chiefs will continue to exercise operational control right into the foreseeable future. I do not also foresee any further regional theatrisation taking place in the Indian context for quite some time. Not for any other reason, but simply because it needs a degree of intellectual engagement preceding any executive directions. There has to be conceptual clarity before a transformative formulation of a holistically new application of a concept or simply execution of operational responsibility is carried out.

In effect the CDS in my opinion, besides being the head of the HQ IDS must be responsible for all aspects except single service operations. However, in the interim stage training and logistics will remain Service specific. Eventually, common policies on personnel management must emerge. We cannot have such management differences as residual ages for Commanders in Chief being different for Army, Navy and the Air Force and that is just the tip of the iceberg.

There is much speculation about the personalities who are likely to don the mantel of the first appointment of CDS. In 2001 the then Army Chief magnanimously offered it to the IAF as a goodwill gesture. However, as the largest service with the most complex responsibility the Army appears to be the right place to start with, not necessarily because it is my service. The name being spoken of is that of Lt Gen Praveen Bakshi, currently GOC-in-C Eastern Command. Purely my personal opinion, the officer has the right gravitas to carry off the appointment as the first CDS near perfectly. He has the intellectual bent and the necessary experience to wear this cap and take responsibility which will need deft handling.

All that is left to do now is the shouting and the celebration for the final decision on the creation of the CDS. Much, however, will depend on the political-military-bureaucratic triangular control to establish the right balance for the functioning of this appointment. On that an essay at a later date.

[Rakesh]

Names of new Army and Air Chiefs after winter session
http://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/ ... er-session

My take from the above article --> Lt Gen Bakshi might be the first CDS, with Lt Gen Bipin Rawat as the next COAS. Air Marshal Dhanoa will become the next Air Chief.

Air Marshal B S Dhanoa


Air Marshal S B Deo with his son, Sqn Ldr Karan Deo @ No.20 Squadron, Vimanagar AFS, Pune


Lt Gen Praveen Bakshi


Lt Gen Bipin Rawat

[Deans]

I believe theatre commands are some distance away and their utility is debatable. However, the problem is that the multiple single service commands we have is wasteful of manpower (of our officer corps which is already facing a shortage) & causes duplication of effort. Fewer commands, far from detracting from our security goals, might bring more focus.
Can we, for e.g. look at the following way to rationalise:

1. The Army: No South West, Central or training Command.
2. The Navy: No Southern command
3. Air Force: No Northern, Central, South West or training command. Its Eastern command is entirely China oriented, while
its Western command handles Pakistan.

Army and Air force reserve units (incl. any UN deployments) come from their respective Southern commands which are retained.

4. The CDS, headed by a 4 star general:
Handles all staff functions common to the 3 services and any offensive element common to the 3 services i.e.

Staff functions:
- Logistics (incl. all 3 logistics arms of the army and the supply wings of the Navy and Air force)
- Medical Corps
- Education
- Training (e.g. all training academies)
- Intelligence
- Space and cyber warfare
- Military engineering services
- JAG & Military Police
- Defense Security corps
- Audit
- Pay & accounts.

Offensive capability:
- Special forces (across the 3 services)
- Andaman & Nicobar command (headed by someone from an arm other than the CDS)
- Rapid reaction force ( a para brigade, a Para SF unit, IAF transports and a Naval squadron).

Among the para military, the various arms can be divided into :
1. Border security forces - Merge the BSF with the SSB (Nepal border) & ITBP
2. Internal security: Merge the CRPF, Assam Rifles & CISF

Internal security units alternate between (for e.g) Riot control, Anti Naxal / insurgency operations and static security (performed by the CISF),
while the BSF focus on border security, infiltration, smuggling and counter insurgency only in J&K.

Comments ?

[deejay]

Deans Sir, Great Points.

One correction - IAF does not have Northern Command but a smaller AOC (J&K) under Western Command. (it is a puzzle to me as to why WAC is located in Delhi just like Air HQ)

I would request that for some better opinions you may consider mailing or tweeting links directly to Gen Hasnain etc. Just a thought!

[Deans]

Deejay, You are quite right, there is a AOC (J&K) not a Northern command, for the IAF. My point really is that the structure can be simplified
so that Pakistan is handled by just 1 command. Among the major air forces of the world, we have a highest Manpower: Aircraft ratio (which will
be the case even when we have our budgeted number of squadrons) and possibly the highest wage bill as a percentage of the total budget.
Cutting excess administrative flab is one way out.

[ShauryaT]

Deans: Much of what you are proposing is already part of the IDS reporting to a COSC. The design intent is to promote unity of command across forces. Things like Air & Space, Cyber & Special Ops commands in an Indian context have some natural leads at this time with IAF, IN & IA respectively. The A&N is supposed to be joint, has never worked and is indeed now to be led by IN.

Unity of command is essential. I will just bring one data point to highlight the issue. During Op. Pawan, which was enacted quite hastily, the infamous Gen K. Sunderji who's claim to fame was mobility managed to organize and land 10,000 air dropped troops into Jaffna. It took another two weeks to get all the equipment over engaging the services of civilian airlines in the mix and the forces on the ground did not have adequate fire power and intelligence during this time. In all of this, simple things like naval guns of the types of INS Mysore were not used. I have wondered why. The net result was not pretty with substantial losses of our men in the initial days.

The infamous IAF-IA disconnect over Kargil is a well documented case. Without unity of command, budgets, and a single point of military advice, the CDS will remain a sub par post. I hope the Government does not fall for the Naresh Chandra committee recommended 4 star officer and instead puts in a new 5 star officer post, with a mandate to restructure higher defense management for Indian conditions.

[Aditya G]

For now, it will be quite an achievement if the PCCOSC can at least be created with ANC, Special Ops, IDS and SFC given to him. With time reform may allow that to expand but that might happen once we get over this bureaucratic hill.

[ManuJ]

If the govt. makes the mistake of going with the safe option of 4-star CDS and no theater commands, it is going to be very hard to upgrade the CDS and change the commands at a later date.
If we are serious about moving our military command structure out of its 20th century mindset, we have to do the right thing from the onset.
It doesn't all have to be done in one shot, the govt. can come up with a fixed time-table of say 5 years in which things progressively fall into place.

Three things that are extremely important imho to reform the military command structure:
- integration of military headquarters and defence ministry (no CDS can work effectively if overruled and undermined by civilian bureaucrats)
- single-point military advisor (shed the 'too powerful/threat to civil govt.' mindset on the civil side as well as the 'need to maintain the dignity of the Chief' thinking on the military side)
- theater commands (true jointsmanship, removal of redundant and duplicate structures and resources)

[vaibhav.n]

Couple of Points;

1. In the IA structure, operational commands are actually Field Army HQ's. One of the reasons GoC-in-C are more commonly referred to as Army Commanders. They control multiple Corps across a large AoR. We cannot revert to a highly centralised Paki system which places junior Corps Commanders at the mercy of a distant AHQ. These HQ's also have troops directly reporting to it. Theatre Commands are still many decades away imo.

2. We also have to consider the fact that we still operate on the British military staff system, when all this time most militaries have for decades now adopted a continental staff system. India still lacks joint-training institutions, those that are present are at the Junior Staff College. Unlike others, we do not have a dedicated joint staff which is common between all services. Officers are expected to come in at intervals and imbibe an entirely different staff doctrine.

3. It is important to understand why a CDS is opposed by the civil bureaucracy. As all services fight for the same set of capital outlays, MoD mandarins exercise massive jurisdiction to move procurement plans based on their own arbitrary sense. A CDS would take perspective plans from all services and bring decision making capability back to the services. The IAS led DG (Acquisitions) would then only handle cases passed on to them by a CDS which would act as a massive filter. The IAS lobby also fears that a CDS would be by appointment senior to the Cabinet Secretary, wield enormous influence and possibly become political appointees.

[Rakesh]

I hope vaibhav, point no 3 becomes a reality and the CDS gives a middle finger to the IAS. Someone needs to put them in their place. I long for the day - wishful thinking - when a CDS orders the IAS around.

Eh You? Do This, Do That

[Rakesh]

Have Cleared Names of New Army and Air Chiefs, Announcement Soon: Manohar Parrikar
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ ... r-4429921/

“I don’t see any reason why it has to be two months ahead… they are out of the top people in the forces. The Defence Ministry has cleared the names. It has to be approved by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet,” Parrikar said.

[Rakesh]

Who Will Succeed General Dalbir Singh As The Next Indian Army Chief?
http://topyaps.com/indian-army-chief

Unlike the Army, succession in the Indian Air Force appears to be much clearer. Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha is due for retirement this month. Vice Chief of Air Staff Air Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa is the most likely successor.

[Rakesh]

Names of new Army and Air Chiefs after winter session
http://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/ ... er-session

My take from the above article --> Lt Gen Bakshi might be the first CDS, with Lt Gen Bipin Rawat as the next COAS. Air Marshal Dhanoa will become the next Air Chief.

FWIW, I predicted two out of three...if the third guess comes true, I am opening a Kingfisher

Lt Gen Bipin Rawat Named Next Army Chief
http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/lt-gen-b ... ef-1638999

[Rakesh]

If Lt Gen Praveen Bakshi does not become CDS, he may resign...

[dinesha]

Bipin Rawat in new Army Chief, now is the deck clear for the Praveen Bakshi to be CDS?

[Rakesh]

If Gen Praveen Bakshi does not become CDS, then Admiral Lanba will become Chairman, Chiefs of Staffs Committee. He will be the senior most chief after ACM Raha and General Suhag retire on 31 Dec 2016.

[Marten]

Why would Gen Bakshi not be given COAS if he were not to be CDS? Another of these succession planning things under MP would be quite difficult to digest. So the logical answer is CDS = Gen Bakshi.

[Rakesh]

The announcement has not been made yet. So it is anyone's guess. But then again to make Gen Bakshi CDS, when Admiral Lanba is senior to him, may not go down well.

But I got my bottle opener ready...the Kingfisher is chillin

[Rakesh]

An article from two decades ago...but worth a read in light of the COAS supersession (unless a CDS announcement is in the works).

Creating a Stir
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/s.k. ... 29513.html

Another one from 1993...

Controversial Rise
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/indi ... 02705.html

[ShauryaT]

I am just glad that a Government has made its choice and not just left it to some joining date. We should all welcome the fact that a CHOICE was made.