India Border Watch: Security and Operations

[pankajs]

Keran operation ends; now it’s gunsmoke and unanswered questions

Now, the red line drawn at Point 3260 has been erased at Shala Bhata. Burnt by Kargil, the National Democratic Alliance government was willing to risk war to make its point. Prime Minister Singh, Pakistan’s army knows, won’t reach for a howitzer if he can help it.

From the time he took office, Prime Minister Singh has been persuaded that the costs of even a limited war will outweigh its likely benefits. Large-scale retaliation, his advisors argue, comes with unforseeable risks of escalation–unacceptable in a nuclear environment, and deeply damaging to the economy. It will, the argument goes, play into the hands of hawks in Pakistan’s army, rallying the country’s people behind them. It will allow the army to rebuild its fences with the jihadists it is now fighting in Pakistan’s north-west. To avoid these outcomes, they argue, its well worth India absorbing a few body-blows.

Yet, doing nothing has ended up giving Pakistan’s army a free pass to ratchet up tensions–knowing there will be no price to pay. “India can’t decide whether the Pakistan army will choose war or peace,” says former Research and Analysis Wing chief Vikram Sood. “What we can do is make clear to them that the wrong decision will have serious costs they can’t afford.”

“That’s the message we’re not sending.”

[rohitvats]

Keran operation ends; now it’s gunsmoke and unanswered questions

Now, the red line drawn at Point 3260 has been erased at Shala Bhata. Burnt by Kargil, the National Democratic Alliance government was willing to risk war to make its point. Prime Minister Singh, Pakistan’s army knows, won’t reach for a howitzer if he can help it.

<SNIP>

Except for some points, I fully endorse this article.

I feel the incident has been downplayed - considering the timing and political 'sensitivities'.

And as I said, initiative and dominance along LOC is being ceded to Pakistan Army.

[rohitvats]

Saar air option could have been used but for the reluctance of our current political setup. They are afraid to even use Bofors. For them the easiest option is to throw more bodies at the problem. So what if more soldiers are put in harms way than required. Are they not paid to die for upholding such policies.

Air-option would require fixed targets - there were none in this case.

Similarly - artillery fire will also require targets - which in this case could have been PA posts supporting the terrorists. Difficult to use artillery against mobile targets like bunch of terrorists; further, there has to be artillery available to target the area of operation. We don't how arty is dispersed or placed to target this sector.

[negi]

"Wait and watch till 2014" was an expression used IIRC.

The way in which General V K Singh is being harassed and cornered by the GOI it is a clear signal to the current and future COAS that they need "do or die don't ask why" types at the helm, time will tell how long IA puts up with GOI's TSP appeasement politics.

[pankajs]

Air-option would require fixed targets - there were none in this case.

I was thinking if the area was confined to 800x400 sq mt or whatever the figure was, a few random bombs would have stirred things up and forced the terrorist to react. Perhaps our guys on the perimeter would then have been able to knock off a few more of the terrorist. Also, even if all of them escaped the red line drawn a decade ago would have been reinforced.

The rest of my post including the Arty portion was to highlight the current GOI's position.

Saar just read about FAE's the other day. Isn't such a bomb suitable when the enemy's exact position is unknown but the approx area and its perimeters are know? Perhaps at 10,000 ft they are ineffective.

[Philip]

That's the same point I made earlier,if the "box" was the size mentioned.The vermin's tails would've been on fire and there could've been some excellent sport for our chappies.But them we have such a bunch of wimps,my apologies to all wimps,they are far worse,in fact perhaps we have found a new species of anti-leaders ,who like toxic viruses,destroy their nations from within by their detrimental actions and inactions which favour our mortal enemies.With one eye on the elections and appeasement of minority votebanks,and another on the ig-Nobel p*ss prize,which from current trends seems to be ironically going the way of a Paki-the unfortunate girl who survived a horrendous Taliban terror shooting, our dearly beloved anti-leader,India's latter-day equivalent of Neville Chamberlain, has arguably sold the nation to the lowest bidder.Just as the Chinese waltz across the Himalayan borders, moving the LAC to where they desire,so too are their all-weather bum-chums the Pakis following their example on the LOC.

Our armed forces are expected not to open their mouths and inform the nation of the dangerous crisis on our borders,not to shoot at the Chinese,and not to do anything to endanger a "peace in our time" with Pak.It has taken 15 days for the vermin to have been exterminated,that is those who have not escaped.The truth will not be allowed to be told to us,with the true facts kept suppressed tighter than a ticks ars*hole.

[member_23455]

Keran operation ends; now it’s gunsmoke and unanswered questions

Nice to see Praveen Swami enjoy a brief run of respectability on BR. He might have won a few more brownie points had he attempted to do a forensic overlay of the timelines and the geographical sites.

Where exactly are these two OPs in relation to Shala Bhata?

When Shala Bhata is being referenced is this the famed "ghost village" or an area?

If 3/3 GR was late to the OPs, how come it was set up in ambush and initiated contact on Sep 23?

Did sector SOP say OPs had to be occupied 24 x 7 or did the on-scene commander make a tactical decision?

But at least the Kargil-mongering seems to have subsided...or has it?

[darshhan]

Keran infiltration attempt should not be seen in isolation. Pakis have been upping the ante for quite some time. Just check out some of the following incidents that have occurred this year.

1. Beheading of 2 Indian Soldiers earlier this year
2. Killing of 8 Indian soldiers in Srinagar in June
3. Killing of 5 Indian Soldiers on LOC in first week of August
4. Terrorist attack in Samba Cantt.( The Commanding officer of the unit was grievously injured. His second in command attained martyrdom.
Extremely High coincidence if it is)
5. Keran Infiltration attempt.
6. Murder of Two Indian Navy Sailors in Vishakhapatnam two days back.
7. Multiple Chinese intrusions in Ladakh including the 3 week standoff earlier this year.

Anti India forces are on a roll.

Indeed this is not Kargil. This is much serious. This is a coordinated effort to break Indian Army's will. This is about Pakis gaining psychological dominance more than just territory. From now Indian Army will be on backfoot if a robust message to Pakis is not given.

I do not have any knowledge whether India has any covert capabilities left in Pakistan. I am not very optimistic though. In the short term best recourse India has is the use of Special forces and Ghataks to inflict sharp damages to Paki army across the LOC. In medium to long term Bharat will have to reinstitute covert capabilities to act against Pakistan. The scope of the same should include.

a. Direct action against senior Pakistani Army and ISI officers.
b. Direct action against Pakistani Infrastructural nodes especially those resulting in cascading failure.
c. Unconventional Warfare efforts by utilising internal faultlines of Pakistan

[Eric Leiderman]

What about a salvo of rocket attacks , A battery of 6 vehicles could have taken care of this small area with the right kind of warheads.

[Eric Leiderman]

What about a salvo of rocket attacks , A battery of 6 vehicles could have taken care of this small area with the right kind of warheads.

[negi]

^ It's not a flat terrain and unguided rockets are not suited for such a barrage they are much better suited for deployment against large organized infantry/armoured formations in open.

[rohitvats]

Keran operation ends; now it’s gunsmoke and unanswered questions

Nice to see Praveen Swami enjoy a brief run of respectability on BR. He might have won a few more brownie points had he attempted to do a forensic overlay of the timelines and the geographical sites.

Where exactly are these two OPs in relation to Shala Bhata? When Shala Bhata is being referenced is this the famed "ghost village" or an area? If 3/3 GR was late to the OPs, how come it was set up in ambush and initiated contact on Sep 23? Did sector SOP say OPs had to be occupied 24 x 7 or did the on-scene commander make a tactical decision? But at least the Kargil-mongering seems to have subsided...or has it?

RajitO - I think the whole issue started with talk of capture of 'village' at some 9,000 feet height and militants staying back to fight the IA.

That 9,000 feet was taken at face value w/o getting into the realities of the geography in the region - the GE pics pasted here clearly shows that the village is at 7,000 feet height and close to nullah in the region. And IA maintains positions and posts on all the dominating ridges around it. Basically, inconsequential from military point of view - COAS Bikram Singh said the same thing in so many words.

As for the Kumaon Regiment battalion and 3/3 GR changeover - I think too much is being read into it. It is not as if posts/locations are left vacant or without surveillance; on the contrary, many a times double strength troops are located in a sector/posts as new troops come-in to relieve their fellow soldiers. It was exactly this double troop strength due to new troops coming during changeover in which blunted a major offensive in Siachen during Musharraf's time.

Having said that - all this to and fro movement and handing/taking over does create a temporary dip in alertness which the enemy thinks is the BEST option available to take chance(s) and push terrorists. Mind you, this is more a commentary on the alertness level of IA troops than otherwise.

Your other points about occupation/manning of OPs and SOP in this regard are valid - it is easy to raise questions than make effort to analyze them and seek answers.

PS also raised points (in TV discussion) about effectiveness of cordons and militants sneaking back + no bodies being found - One look at the terrain will tell you that no cordon can be full-proof unless someone's idea of cordon is man-to-man wall scouring every inch of territory.

But it seems PA did try something new in this case - I'm not able to put finger on exact point but have multiple thoughts. Please bear with me:

1. With changeover underway, 30-40 terrorists could have been thought of having better chance of fighting their way in. May be, PA was hoping for some gaps in surveillance, troop strength and patrolling+ambush points.

2. The above would hold true for attempt to pass through first round of defenses by troops guarding LOC BEFORE fence. The group could then split into sub-groups of 8-10 terrorists to sneak through at different points along the fence.

3. What we don't know is whether the above (point 2) happened with respect to main body splintering into sub-groups. News reports talk about multiple contact across 4-5 km front along fence - were these contacts by splinters of original group or different groups?

4. If these were from different groups trying to sneak in, then it would mean that main 30-40 strong group was meant to engage IA and create opportunity for other groups. This would further mean that main group maintained some sort of cohesiveness as a fighting body and when it realized that it cannot go past the FIRST layer of defense before fence, it retreated back into POK.

5. From interview of soldiers injured and general commentary over last couple of days, it seems Point 4 is what happened.

6. IA mobilized troops and created a cordon because it did not want the main group to splinter and go past FIRST layer of defense. The cordon forced them into a tighter area - and as the militants retreated, there were firefights with IA closing in.

7. Please note that news report spoke about no contact over last 3-4 days - the militants had time and initiative on their side and terrain is such that it will take time to position troops and create a viable cordon.

8. All this while, I think there was some attempt to control/dominate the Shala Bhatta area and occupy some OPs. I think IA reacted very strongly to this and short of using the big-guns, did everything to make it untenable.

Going ahead - PA may try to use strong body of terrorists to overwhelm the first line of defense and use the confusion created to sneak in militants in other areas.

[ramana]

I think Pakis occupying vacant posts near the border on Indian side of LOC is a Kargil type operation no matter what. Its creeping shifting of LOC by occupation.


One swallow does not hark the summer.

[jamwal]

One point that people should keep in mind is that the so called "village" in such a terrain is not exactly 12-15 or more houses in a flat, easily accessible area as most people think of a village.

It's not that clear from pictures, but the village in such places are just a bunch of 2-10 houses spread across 4-5 or more mountains. Most houses are not even in line of sight of each other. At this altitude of 2800 m to 3600 (notice the small white trees ? They grow at this altitude), there are lots of places where a terrorist or a group of them can hide and even if you can see them, it's very difficult to take them out with small weapons.

So when you read news reports that terrorists are holed up in a village and army is trying to flush them out, the image a normal person gets in head is very different from actual one. The terrorists are spread across a very wide uneven terrain with possible multiple points of egress and ingress. Amount of manpower required to conduct CI operations in such a terrain is much more than one thinks.

Air strikes, in case they are possible, don't make sense for hunting highly mobile Paki army/terrorists spread in such a terrain. It's like dropping 2-3 Rs 50 lakh bomb to kill a single terrorist and you can't be even half sure of getting him at all.

[member_23455]

RajitO - I think the whole issue started with talk of capture of 'village' at some 9,000 feet height and militants staying back to fight the IA.

That 9,000 feet was taken at face value w/o getting into the realities of the geography in the region - the GE pics pasted here clearly shows that the village is at 7,000 feet height and close to nullah in the region. And IA maintains positions and posts on all the dominating ridges around it. Basically, inconsequential from military point of view - COAS Bikram Singh said the same thing in so many words.

As for the Kumaon Regiment battalion and 3/3 GR changeover - I think too much is being read into it. It is not as if posts/locations are left vacant or without surveillance; on the contrary, many a times double strength troops are located in a sector/posts as new troops come-in to relieve their fellow soldiers. It was exactly this double troop strength due to new troops coming during changeover in which blunted a major offensive in Siachen during Musharraf's time.

Having said that - all this to and fro movement and handing/taking over does create a temporary dip in alertness which the enemy thinks is the BEST option available to take chance(s) and push terrorists. Mind you, this is more a commentary on the alertness level of IA troops than otherwise.

Your other points about occupation/manning of OPs and SOP in this regard are valid - it is easy to raise questions than make effort to analyze them and seek answers.

PS also raised points (in TV discussion) about effectiveness of cordons and militants sneaking back + no bodies being found - One look at the terrain will tell you that no cordon can be full-proof unless someone's idea of cordon is man-to-man wall scouring every inch of territory.

But it seems PA did try something new in this case - I'm not able to put finger on exact point but have multiple thoughts. Please bear with me:

1. With changeover underway, 30-40 terrorists could have been thought of having better chance of fighting their way in. May be, PA was hoping for some gaps in surveillance, troop strength and patrolling+ambush points.

2. The above would hold true for attempt to pass through first round of defenses by troops guarding LOC BEFORE fence. The group could then split into sub-groups of 8-10 terrorists to sneak through at different points along the fence.

3. What we don't know is whether the above (point 2) happened with respect to main body splintering into sub-groups. News reports talk about multiple contact across 4-5 km front along fence - were these contacts by splinters of original group or different groups?

4. If these were from different groups trying to sneak in, then it would mean that main 30-40 strong group was meant to engage IA and create opportunity for other groups. This would further mean that main group maintained some sort of cohesiveness as a fighting body and when it realized that it cannot go past the FIRST layer of defense before fence, it retreated back into POK.

5. From interview of soldiers injured and general commentary over last couple of days, it seems Point 4 is what happened.

6. IA mobilized troops and created a cordon because it did not want the main group to splinter and go past FIRST layer of defense. The cordon forced them into a tighter area - and as the militants retreated, there were firefights with IA closing in.

7. Please note that news report spoke about no contact over last 3-4 days - the militants had time and initiative on their side and terrain is such that it will take time to position troops and create a viable cordon.

8. All this while, I think there was some attempt to control/dominate the Shala Bhatta area and occupy some OPs. I think IA reacted very strongly to this and short of using the big-guns, did everything to make it untenable.

Going ahead - PA may try to use strong body of terrorists to overwhelm the first line of defense and use the confusion created to sneak in militants in other areas.

rohitvats, a good summary - and this thread can hopefully continue to track additional information as it seeps out to come up with some sort of objective analysis.

In the TV discussion you reference, PS chimed in agreement once Lt. Gen Dhillon pointed out that while 30-40 may be massive given recent history, 100+ groups were not uncommon when the Kashmir problem was at its peak in mid-late 90s.

The splintering of the main body after the initial contact may actually answer a lot of questions - why contacts developed across a wide front, why there was so much confusion, and why it took so long to contain.

Also, the comparatively low casualty count on both sides tends to indicate that there was not too much "stand your ground" fighting, but a series of intermittent moving contacts, which can well give the impression of one long engagement. Why would a bunch of jehadis who are so willing to attain jannat otherwise, elect to live and fight another day? Is it because the main objective was getting to the hinterland, and they were not prepped to die in this particular fight?

[manjgu]

the thing which is still a mystery to me is how much of LC is covered with things like TI, NV cameras, devices..and how effective they are? a 30-40 strong group should have been tracked for long as movement is slow in mountains or did they suddenly appear out of no where ? or the reaction time was very less? the injured soldier said they saw 30/40 terrorists...was it visually/eye or thru some kind of scope/device? if he saw then visually what time was it ..early mornng / late evening??? we will remain ignorant of many things but there is no doubting that indian statecraft has failed in coming up with a response. weakness attracts aggression..!!

[williams]

While the shadow of Kargil is still haunting the physic of the our Rakshaks, I felt a few positive things from this operation that I would like to share. I do agree that it could have been better and as usual South block Babu Neta combine criminally failed to be accountable to the nation. The positives I see scanning the maps is the overall border mgmt infrastructure has improved hundred fold from the days of Kargil ops. IA took the time and made sure that causalities are minimal on our side. I also like that it was good PR for IA to let media speak to the wounded men. Hopefully some of youth in the country can feel inspired by the morale and courage of these men. From the Paki POV I think we have send the message across that it is not going to be easy to infiltrate no matter the tactics they use.The more they show their thuggish behavior, the more the position of candle kissers in our side is weakening. So from a tactical point of view, we have a upper hand in along the Paki border. It is high time we start building similar infrastructure on the eastern side.

All that said, I think strategically we are completely off the track. We need bring the fear of hell for the Paki top brass who are playing this kind of cat and mouse game. Thugs do not understand diplomacy. IA should think of escalating a bit more than just reacting to these games. May be we should think of limited punitive strikes deeper into their territory.. IA can also think of Israeli style special ops to eliminate the command level assets. We can continue to have Chai biskoot sessions on the side. That should be our strategy.

[rohitvats]

One point that people should keep in mind is that the so called "village" in such a terrain is not exactly 12-15 or more houses in a flat, easily accessible area as most people think of a village.

<SNIP>

To add to what jamwal has written, this is the village under discussion for you:

http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=34.66 ... 9&z=17&m=h

It can be seen that it is situated at slight elevation to a nullah and when you zoom out, you can clearly see ridges all around - the ones on north and southern side are dominated by IA. Western side is open to POK.

[member_23455]

the thing which is still a mystery to me is how much of LC is covered with things like TI, NV cameras, devices..and how effective they are? a 30-40 strong group should have been tracked for long as movement is slow in mountains or did they suddenly appear out of no where ? or the reaction time was very less? the injured soldier said they saw 30/40 terrorists...was it visually/eye or thru some kind of scope/device? if he saw then visually what time was it ..early mornng / late evening??? we will remain ignorant of many things but there is no doubting that indian statecraft has failed in coming up with a response. weakness attracts aggression..!!

The 3/3 GR guy who was interviewed said 10:30 PM or so IIRC and between his and another account contact developed between 25-100 metres. Combination of night and foliage will cause problems, and equipment constraints are a fact of life.

Which is why the army has a layered defense. Evidence till now suggests they were engaged by the very first tier in the defense.

What definitely upset the equation is the 30-40 number, which the army has not seen in a long time...hence all the discussion.

Statecraft is a discussion for another thread, but do try and analyze field craft of the jehadis as well. At some point they decided to take the faster and easier route of a nullah, and chose to break cover. Not smart.

[rohitvats]

the thing which is still a mystery to me is how much of LC is covered with things like TI, NV cameras, devices..and how effective they are? a 30-40 strong group should have been tracked for long as movement is slow in mountains or did they suddenly appear out of no where ? or the reaction time was very less? the injured soldier said they saw 30/40 terrorists...was it visually/eye or thru some kind of scope/device? if he saw then visually what time was it ..early mornng / late evening??? we will remain ignorant of many things but there is no doubting that indian statecraft has failed in coming up with a response. weakness attracts aggression..!!

The militants were tracked in real time - the day Samba incident happened, news channels were also carrying reports and visuals of large body of militants tracked in Keran sector. There was IR footage from possibly UAV showing movement of terrorists.

IMO, the most plausible chronology of events can be as follows:

- IA was tracking the movement and accordingly prepared reception parties at appropriate locations.

- Initial contact(s) were of the longest duration and most intense; this is when IA suffered casualties. Militants would have also suffered casualties during this phase when they were ambushed/surprised.

- This round of operations was led by 3/3 GR; news items spoke of this unit being in forefront of developments when reports first came in.

- The above point also means that militants never managed to get past the FIRST layer of defense and did not come in too deep.

- As one of the ingress routes was along the nullah next to Salla Bhatta village, retreating terrorists under pursuit could have taken up defensive positions in the general area; this could be the reason name of the village came up in first place and impression went out that village is being held by terrorists.

- After the first contact and attendant firefight, the militants did splinter but more for sneaking back than going ahead into the valley.

- This is when the IA moved in more troops to set up the cordon to mop up the splinter groups which can scattered around. This would have also ensured that terrorists did not sneak into the valley.

- I think the distance covered by militants was not too great - that is why after initial contact(s), they retreated back and during the process received some bit of firing support from PA posts as well. This could also be the reason why no bodies were found. They were required to be carried back a 'short' distance back into POK.

- News item like militants being forced into small area (800 x 400) gave impression that militants were holed up in defensive positions and holding ground. I don't know what was the context of this statement - It could simply mean that except for this area, IA had covered all other area.

- But one thing is for sure: Around 60%-70% of the militants managed to get back - and this would have happened in first couple of days of contacts.

[pankajs]

Rohitvats saar and others: Check this out; provides Detailed terrain map

http://www.maphill.com/pakistan/jammu-a ... rrain-map/

[vaibhav.n]

Rohitvats saar and others: Check this out; provides Detailed terrain map

http://www.maphill.com/pakistan/jammu-a ... rrain-map/

My kinda map easy to use...almost as good as 1:50k!!

Trail the Kupwara-Tregram Road cross Sadhna Top, the ridgelines north of Tanghdar should be the area of ops. Pakistan looks to hold the imposing feature with those twin spurs. Rohit is this correct, looks similar to the GE images?

[manjgu]

rohitvats... if we have the capability to monitor the movement in real time, and we were monitoring them ( and we knew they were coming in) then surely we have the capability to track their movement out to paki side of LC? as a lay person not sure how effective are these monitoring devices or do we have them on a 24*7 basis? i mean can it detect a body being dragged or popped on shoulder and being carried off??

[Lalmohan]

manjgu, look at the pictures of the terrain - steep hills, gullies, rocks, dense vegetation. there are lots of places to hide - all within a relatively small area. line of sight difficult in most instances. tracking and surveillance very very difficult - unless someone on foot is following and can keep eyes and ears on the infiltrators.

i am sure that the difficulty of the terrain was a major factor in the TSPA chosing this point for infiltration

[manjgu]

quite agree...

[rohitvats]

My kinda map easy to use...almost as good as 1:50k!!

Trail the Kupwara-Tregram Road cross Sadhna Top, the ridgelines north of Tanghdar should be the area of ops. Pakistan looks to hold the imposing feature with those twin spurs. Rohit is this correct, looks similar to the GE images?

Thanks for the inputs on areas which need to be tracked - I will spend some time studying the terrain. Interestingly, from military stand-point, I think the Gurez sector is considered more important - it being the back door into the valley and provides access to northern areas via Astore.

As for the map - it is the same map being used by Wikimapia - even Wikimapia has a terrain feature - go to EXTRAS under the LOGIN tab .

[member_23455]

Lt. Gen Hasnain's analysis

Logical, incisive, lucid...no wonder he never gets called to a panel discussion on TV.

[sum]

^^ Comment for the same article:

dear general,
what u r saying is exactly what u would have done as the corps cdr. however sir ,the issue is not an armchair assessment of the event. what is the need of hour is to satisfy the soldier on ground and the country men at large why it should not happen and what all can be done what is not being done,.
I was company commander at shalo batho ( the village lies abandoned on paki side). this post was to be held under command of a substantive major strictly as per threat assesments of BAT actions. in the yr 2000 two BAT actions happened on either flank of shalo bahtho.
the deployment was very thin ,the going tough ,the weather...well...and the post was routinely pounded with great respect by pakis....was a hell hole....never slept at night in this post..read through the night with guard commander coming every 40 mins to pump in air in petromax. that was the routine...
what can we do
1. use uavs even though not optimally effective.
2.increase hhtis
3.lay motion detectors.

from: vikramjeetsingh
Posted on: Oct 9, 2013 at 09:34 IST

[Lalmohan]

its the kishenganga/neelam road that is the worry for the paquis... they are looking to increase movement along that route in the coming months and need to give it additional cover

[vaibhav.n]

My kinda map easy to use...almost as good as 1:50k!!

Trail the Kupwara-Tregram Road cross Sadhna Top, the ridgelines north of Tanghdar should be the area of ops. Pakistan looks to hold the imposing feature with those twin spurs. Rohit is this correct, looks similar to the GE images?

Thanks for the inputs on areas which need to be tracked - I will spend some time studying the terrain. Interestingly, from military stand-point, I think the Gurez sector is considered more important - it being the back door into the valley and provides access to northern areas via Astore.

As for the map - it is the same map being used by Wikimapia - even Wikimapia has a terrain feature - go to EXTRAS under the LOGIN tab .

Thanks, Didn't know about the features on Wikimapia.

From a generic POV, Gurez is very important strategically for IA as well as the PA. Additionally, 28 Div holds top notch dominating positions there in addition to the fact that the IA is the lifeline for the local populace results in very good HUMINT.

However, having crossed the Neelam, having glaciers on your flanks and permanent snowline in the higher reaches does no favour to the Atankwadis. Downstream you have 19 Div with Reception Parties.

For the PA, Rattu in Astore, is their focal point for the entire Northern Areas.

I must admire you have loads of patience to actually go through and do a terrain analysis for the rest of us.

[Philip]

Today it was 40 terrorists/Pakis,tomorrow 400 or even 4000 at various locations simultaneously.Once the Afghan imbroglio has settled to Pak's advantage,thanks to the US a willing partner,there will be a huge number of jihadis that it will turn towards Kashmir.Pak is increasing its military activity against India since it thinks that its huge arsenal of N-weapons,which is growing steadily,provides it an insurance against any Indian pro-active military counter. Pak's N-doctrine which was posted in another thread shows that it is deluding itself dangerously that India will not respond firmly ,taking its cue from the meek ,spineless manner in which we are dealing with Chinese intrusions.The aggressive attitude and mentality of Paki guests on our TV shows where they blatantly say in effect that we must choose between "Kashmir or terrorism",indicates the coming conflict ahead.

It is past time for the GOI and the armed forces to draw up ,more aggressive methods of dealing with future acts of aggression along the LOC so that the Pakis are brought to heel and given a rude awakening to reality.

[SBajwa]

I feel the incident has been downplayed - considering the timing and political 'sensitivities'.

According to Omar Abdullah's statement today this incident has been "overplayed" by the media and army.

http://www.rediff.com/news/report/keran ... 131009.htm

Keran incursion was nothing, the media hyped the story'
October 09, 2013 16:59 IST

'Some people chose to describe it as the Pakistan army's permanent presence, as if it's another Kargil. The reports were highly exaggerated.' Rediff.com's Sheela Bhatt, who is travelling with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on his two-nation trip to Brunei and Indonesia, reports.

In a scathing attack on television news channels for hyping up the incursion in the Keran sector of Kupwara district in Jammu and Kashmir on September 24 by some 30 to 40 terrorists, a senior government official said, "It has always been clear that some people choose to make a story out of nothing very much."
Click here!

While dismissing the event as routine, he went to the extent of saying that, "This for me is the dog chasing the tail, frankly."

While criticising the television hype given to the incursion at the western border, he said, "It was an intrusion. Some people chose to describe it as (the Pakistan army's) permanent presence, as if it's another Kargil. The reports were highly exaggerated."

"Some infiltrators tried to get in. They came through broken ground, they were detected, and they were stopped. There was a fire-fight. They pulled back, they tried again. It was in a different area where the operation took place."

"If you see the distance from where they came in and where the encounter took place (in Shalbhatti village)," the official said, "it was some 20 kilometres away from the border. It was contained. There was no occupation of territory as in Kargil. The Indian Army carried out a 14-day operation to flush out terrorists."

He regretted that military events like this are not well-handled where the media can get information at a fixed time every day. Indirectly, he criticised the erratic manner in which senior army officers leaked information about the incident.

Mincing no words, the official said, "Part of the problem is some people got too excited (after the intrusion took place). They made the huge story out of it and didn't know how to climb off the tree."

"No firing has taken place for the last four days, but the story is still alive! This for me is the dog chasing the tail, frankly. The fact is, it was an intrusion and it was contained."

The official accepted that the intruders were supported by the Pakistan army.

"It goes without saying that nothing like this happens without the Pakistan army being involved. Defence Minister A K Antony has said so in Parliament too. It's not a new thing."
Sheela Bhatt in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei

[Lalmohan]

as pak goes further down the abyss, the only kause will be the kore one and they would rather rip out their own jaguar veins than do any nation building (two or otherwise) - i am afraid we are in for more of the same. also, diverting bad talibs towards the loc is better than having them fester in cantt. areas

[vishvak]

Who is this senior government official and why is he not explaining what is done to punish pakis who are supporting this. A government official should be serving people not doing scathing attacks, not mincing words - doing all this at cost of public money.

The educated and qualified official should also explain how part of the problem is reports of intrusions and what and who else are part of the problem when pakis aren't punished repeatedly for supporting terror.

How does he justify his high-fi job profile by his words and no actions against pakis supporting terror.

[ramana]

The anonymouse senior govt official should intorspect. the media came to know from other govt sources and its not like they had independent channels of observation. He probably belongs to the Munich faction of the PMO.


If he was so sure about himself and the facts how about letting the people know who he is?
Now that the Army has cleared the intrusion out of the village Shala Bhato, incidentally rhymes with Sheela Bhatt, he now downplays the attack.

What prevented him from talking to Sheela Bhatt earlier and correct the picture being painted if it was untrue?

Obviously brave after the attack was repulsed!

[SBajwa]

another point is that why is PM on constant tours these days from America to Brunei and Indonesia! Is staying in Delhi now that elections are approaching too hot to handle?

[KJo]

another point is that why is PM on constant tours these days from America to Brunei and Indonesia! Is staying in Delhi now that elections are approaching too hot to handle?

Maybe Soniaji sent him away so that focus can be on Yuvraj Ragul Gandhi.

[vishvak]

SoniaG is quick on all political-baaji so how will porkie Army be punished for repeated fence cutting, rabid-dogs launching, cover firing, load-ammo/gunfire jihard.

[VinodTK]

Infiltration bid: Keran mystery deepens, no bodies, weapons traced

Mystery surrounding the 15-day long gun battle in Shala Bhato in J-K’s Keran sector is only deepening with reports now emerging that not only were dead bodies of the infiltrators not found, but the Indian army has not recovered a single weapon from the encounter site.
:
:
Lt Gen Gurmit Singh, Corps Commander, 15 Corps — under whose operational area Keran falls — confirmed to HT that their prolonged searches for over six days have failed to bear results. “Eight search teams comprising 150 soldiers conducted searches over six days but it appears that they (the terrorists) were able to take bodies and material back,’’ he said in his first interview after the operation was called off on Oct 8.
Search parties including specialised forces and sniffer dogs were pressed into service along 3 km of frontage along the LoC. Singh admitted he was under considerable pressure to produce the bodies he said had been sighted by his troops. He had made this assertion in a press conference in Srinagar on Oct 2.

The question is where did the weapons and the bodies go. Singh says the arms haul made in the adjoining areas of Gujjardur and Fateh Gali was probably taken from the Shala Bhato area. As for bodies, he says, “In principle, I don’t like to claim bodies until I have them in my hand but my troops have confirmed they had seen dead bodies of the terrorists,’’ Singh said, adding, “I even asked them if they had taken photographs and they said, ‘Sir, there was heavy firing, how could we take pictures?’’

It is evident that the battle entered into its 15th day, before it was finally called off, only because of the desperate search for weapons and bodies. Lt. Singh confirmed that the last exchange of fire between his troops and the infiltrators took place on the afternoon of Oct 2. Between Oct 3 and 9, the search teams scoured the dense jungles and ravines looking for fresh graves and areas that had been recently dug up but found nothing.

He said at least 30 to 40 armed terrorists opened heavy fire on Indian posts in Shala Bhato on the precise day the 3/3 Gurkha Regiment took charge on September 24. What is worrying is that the Pakistani army had exact information of the date on which a new army unit had taken charge in the Keran sector.

Equally worrying is the fact that the terrorists managed to come into Indian territory, hold the Indian army down for at least eight, if not 15 days, and then leave without a trace.

[ramana]

Was there an intrusion at all?