Military (not Political) responses to China's provocation

[NRao]

By "local" I mean that the events will not (IMHO of course) escalate beyond these areas - (it is a tactical in nature?). The decision did come from the capital, so from that PoV it is not "local".

However see my NEXT post please.

[NRao]

This is a May 1 article that I JUST picked up, so apologies if posters have already discussed this.

THIS - to me - has a greater bearing on the matter.

Indian airstrips bother Chinese ‘intruders’

The Chinese have demanded de-activation of two forward airstrips of the Indian Air Force in the region where their troops have crossed over and set up a tented camp in what India says is 19km inside its own territory.

Defence minister A.K. Antony today described the situation in Eastern Ladakh as “not one of our creation” but, he said, “we remain committed to a peaceful resolution of the situation, through military and diplomatic dialogue within the framework of the agreements for maintaining peace and tranquillity”.

The strategic import of the Chinese “intrusion” was discussed in high-level meetings of the security establishment today. Antony said at a scheduled Unified Commanders’ Conference of the military top brass that “there should not be any doubt that the country remains unanimous in its commitment to take every possible step, at all levels, to safeguard our interests”.

Antony said: “Our bilateral relations with China are, at times, bedeviled by border issues, particularly along the line of actual control.”

A defence ministry statement quoting him said: “The recent developments are no exception. Among the various initiatives to safeguard our border, the thrust has been on development of our border roads and advance landing grounds”.

The defence minister was later briefed by the National Security Advisor, Shiv Shankar Menon, who heads the China Study Group (CSG) and the chiefs of the army, the navy and the air force in a separate meeting.

In the deliberations within the military establishment, the import of the Chinese tented camp at Raki Nala near Indian posts there was a growing belief that Beijing’s troops had a grand design.

The Chinese military considers the re-activation of two advance landing grounds (ALGs) at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) and Fukche a threat because it increases the capability of faster deployment of Indian forces and in greater numbers.

None of the two airstrips can be used through the year for landing and take-offs by fixed-wing aircraft. But helicopters use them. DBO at nearly 16,500 feet is a remote post to which the road-link is tenuous at best.

But its strategic location gives Indian Air Force aircraft capability to take-off in the direction of both the Siachen Glacier – where Indian troops face the Pakistani army – and also towards the Karakoram and Aksai Chin, towards the Chinese forces.

DBO is 80km from Siachen. The location of DBO also allows the launching of platforms (such as unmanned aerial vehicles) to keep a watch on the Karakoram Pass, and the Khunjerab Pass through which the Karakoram highway runs between China and Pakistan.

China has huge investments in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistani Kashmir that India claims and their military engineers are known to be working there.

The re-activation of the DBO in May 2008 was a hush-hush affair by India.

“I remember that none of our families and the families of the crew could be told where we were heading and we talked about it only after returning to Chandigarh,” Air Marshal P.K. Barbora (retired) told The Telegraph this evening. He was the western air commander at the time (later retired as the vice-chief of Air Staff) and in the first fixed-wing aircraft, an Antonov 32, to land at the DBO in 43 years.

“I recall that the Chinese asked for a flag-meeting immediately and objected to the landing, but it was a political decision of the government to activate our forward landing grounds and we were executing it,” says Barbora.

In November that year, the IAF also re-activated Fukche, several hundred kilometres to the south east of the DBO. Unlike the DBO, Fukche has much better ground connections and is also at a lower altitude (about 14,000ft).

But, the aerial distance between Fukche and the Western Highway is less than 70km. With the Western Highway, China connects Xinjiang with Tibet in territory that India claims. A potential adversary’s airfield so close to the Western Highway increases China’s threat perceptions.

[vivek_ahuja]

This is that report I was referring to:

India Today article, May 02

Some snippets:

After the failed Brigadier-level meeting on Tuesday at Chashool, Indian side stepped up vigil in the area through Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) while its troops reported that supplies to the Chinese forces were being replenished through a convoy of trucks.

An interesting tidbit into the mindset at play on the front-lines:

Nearly 40 PLA personnel are stationed in five tents in the area which is 70 KMs South of Burtse of DBO sector and a banner reads "You are in Chinese territory".

-Vivek

[vivek_ahuja]

THIS - to me - has a greater bearing on the matter.

The Chinese have demanded de-activation of two forward airstrips of the Indian Air Force in the region where their troops have crossed over and set up a tented camp in what India says is 19km inside its own territory.

Fair enough. So you are of the opinion that the issue about the two ALGs is not a red herring?

I am still of the belief that this whole issue about the ALGs is in fact a deception tool especially since they have been reactivated a long time ago and have existed since the last war fifty years ago. [Loud thinking: perhaps the Chushul battle is still lingering in their mindset?]

Anyway, I believe this entire issue is based more on red flagging the border disputes. Why and why-now are unknowns to me thus far.

-Vivek

[Rudradev]

To all those who are suggesting a "heat up insurrection in Tibet/Xinjiang" or "ally with Vietnam/ASEAN/Japan" type solution here: with all due respect, this is not the thread for it. This thread is to discuss what's realistically possible in an immediate future that is already unfolding with the Chinese incursion, and must rely on what military/political/economic assets we already have in place right now, period. Bringing up all that other stuff is like debating which brand of fire extinguisher we should have bought, when the flames are already coming out of the top floor window.

Acharya Rudradev ji,

Why did you leave out our navy? With (or without) help of Vietman, we can go beyond Singapore and strike at their bases in south China sea. India has wisely invested in P8-Poseidon which will tackle the vast junky fleet of Chinese subs. The exact status of Arihant is not known as there is too much fog (it is good this way) over that project. But assuming arihant (and submarine launched sagarika et al) have undergone tests along with operational Chakra, our navy will be the true force multiplier in the conflict with China.

Out of three forces, I have most faith on Indian Navy. the disruption of PRC-EU route from Singapore-Aden-Suez.. Destruction of Gwadar and other pearls (like hambantota and others) as priority along with stopping all their oil supply through singapore, is in our hand. We have Andamans. Indian Ocean belongs to Hindu, even if he does not claim it yet. We can blockade everything that goes east from Indian ocean and then strike in their bases in south China sea, as and when it is possible.

Atri gurudev, you are entirely correct in noting that the IN is potentially a huge force-multiplier for us in all-out war against China. It can hammer the hell out of the PLAN if it comes to that.

However, let us game this from the Chinese side. If I am Beijing, what will I do if India deploys IN to blockade the Straits of Malacca and prevent West Asian oil supplies from getting to China?

Here is what I know:

1) PLAN is no match for IN. They can sink my subs, surface craft, even my ACC... leading to huge H&D losses which I cannot afford if I want to keep bullying the South China Sea littoral states. So, I will not even try to engage IN at Malacca with the PLAN.

2) However, there are many things to my advantage. One is the very fact that India will bear huge expenses maintaining an IN deployment at Malacca. Every day they will be spending crores in fuel, supplies, maintenance etc. if the deployment is large enough to be credible. This is money that they cannot use elsewhere as I increase pressure on them with missile strikes on infrastructure etc.

3) In addition, it is diverting IN assets away from being able to menace Karachi as thoroughly as India normally does during India-Pakistan conflicts. This may embolden Pakistan to get more actively involved on my side by opening a second front against India.

4) I have, as things stand, far greater international economic and diplomatic clout than India. Scores of economically significant nations across the world have made massive investments in China, and their businesses rely hugely on my manufacturing output. What if I come out and say: "sorry friends, I cannot fulfill your orders because I don't have the energy supplies. Please make the Pirate Indian Navy abandon their unlawful blockade of the Malacca strait, and restore the legal freedom of maritime trade, if you want our fruitful and profitable business relationship to continue unhindered."

This will bring a lot of otherwise neutral nations into the conflict on my side, at least in economic/diplomatic terms. Nations from EU to MERCOSUR, including even potential Indian allies like Japan and South Korea, will clamour for India to lift the blockade. Some of them may even impose economic sanctions on India, raising the costs of war even higher for her. Many of the world's corporate interests will also align against India, bringing pressure for the blockade to be lifted.

5) Here is my ace card. The international petroleum trade still functions on the basis of the Ibn Saud-Roosevelt agreement made in 1945. Essentially, the terms of this agreement are that (a) a powerful bloc of West Asian oil exporting countries will conduct international oil trade only in USD currency; this gives the US enormous strategic control over domestic oil prices and international oil supplies. (b) In return, the US (primarily the USN) will guarantee the security of all oil exports from these West Asian countries, so that they can make handsome profits in an uninterrupted manner.

It was to impress the US' capability to keep up its end of the bargain on Ibn Saud, that Roosevelt met the monarch on the heavy cruiser USS Quincy. It is also the reason why the US got involved in the Tanker War against Iran during the Iran-Iraq conflict.

So knowing this, what happens if I send a communique to KSA, Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and other West Asian oil exporting countries: "You are unable to deliver to me the oil shipments that I have paid for. As your largest consumer of oil I demand you take whatever steps are needed to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil to me. Otherwise, bhaad may jaao, lines of credit cancel."

West Asian oil exporting countries will throw a fit. Those which operate under the aegis of the Saud-Roosevelt agreement and its successors, will demand the US immediately do something about this. Together, the West Asian oil exporters and the US can make life hell for India as long as the IN keeps up the Malacca blockade... economic sanctions, oil sanctions and potentially far worse.

So if we see a China-bound, West Asian-flagged tanker fleet heading for the Malacca straits with an escort of US Navy warships... what is IN going to do? Are they going to fight the USN to keep up the blockade? Or are they going to weigh anchors and sail home in humiliation, after having blown all the vast sums of money needed to put together the blockade mission and keep it going up to that point?

Thus, for many reasons, I submit that the use of IN to impose a strategic blockade on China is one fraught with many risks. Fighting the PLAN itself is by far the least of these risks... the Chinese have far more effective countermeasures they can use.

[NRao]

Vivek,

I do not know.

Need some time to think it through and actually read up. I seem to be behind the curve.

l8r.

[Manish_Sharma]

Posting a little history of 1962 by Acharya ji, in case it gives a little insight to what lizard is doing NOW:

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 8#p1452418

1962

Chronology of Key Events
March 14, 1899 - Sir Claude McDonald proposed an Aksai Chin
boundary
1914 - McMahon Line declared as boundary in NEFA
1947 - India becomes a republic separate from Great Britain
1949 - Communists form new government, People's Republic of
China
October, 1950 - Chinese assert authority over Tibet
April, 1954 - India and China sign "Five Principles of Peace-
ful Coexistence"
December, 1954 - Tribesmen discontent in Tibet leads to in-
creased Chinese military presence in Tibet
March, 1956 - China begins construction of a military high-
way to link Sinkiang and Tibet
September 1957 - India first learns of the Chinese highway
in "India's territory"
March, 1959 - rebel fighting in Tibet heightens, with rebels
crossing into NEFA to get supplies and weapons
August, 1959 - first clashes between Chinese and Indian bor-
der guards
1960 - unproductive diplomatic exchanges, but no clashes
1961 - Nehru sends troops and border patrols into disputed
frontier areas to establish outposts; skirmishes
increased in late 1961
December, 1961 - India invades and takes Portugese Goa
July, 1962 - Skirmishes in Aksai Chin
August 4, 1962 - China accuses India of advancing even north
of the McMahon Line
August, 1962 - Chinese logistic and manpower buildup along
the frontier
September, 1962 - isolated skirmishes along the disputed bor-
der
October 5, 1962 - India forms special Border Command under
General Kaul
October 10, 1962 - first heavy fighting, at Tseng-Jong in NEFA
October 20, 1962 - Chinese launch a massive assault across the
Namka Chu River in NEFA
October 20-21, 1962 - Chinese launch simultaneous attacks in
Aksai Chin, successful against Galwan Valley and Chip
Chap Valley posts
October 23, 1962 - Chinese overrun all posts down to Tawang in
NEFA
October 24-25, 1962 - Chinese probing attacks at Walong, in
eastern NEFA
Late October, 1962 - lull in fighting; unproductive diplomatic
efforts at compromise fail; numerous changes in command
in NEFA Indian units
November 14, 1962 - Nehru's birthday - Indians launch an attack
on Chinese north of Walong
November 15, 1962 - the Indian offensive fails
November 16, 1962 - Chinese troops overrun Walong
November 17, 1962 - Chinese attack Indians on Bailey Trail in
NEFA; a Chinese attack at Se La, NEFA, is repulsed;
Chinese begin a simultaneous attack on Chushul in Aksai
Chin
November 18, 1962 - Chinese successful at Chushul; no Indian
force remains in Aksai Chin; Indian forces are forced to
withdraw from Se La; Chinese forces attack Bomdi La
November 19, 1962 - Chinese attack Chaku, last Indian forces
in NEFA, successfully; Chou En-Lai gives ceasefire dictum
to Indian official in Peking
November 20, 1962 - Chou publicly announces ceasefire; India
requesting U. S. military aid, but ceasefire ends need
for U. S. intervention
November 21, 1962 - Ceasefire goes into effect
December 1, 1962 - both sides' troops withdraw 20 kilometers
from new boundary lines; repatriation of prisoners starts

[Samay]

Deleted by moderator

[Manish_Sharma]

^^Samay this is OT for this thread,

thread name is:
Post subject: Re: Military (not Political) responses to China's provocatio

[Altair]

Crazy BR log!
No plan survives the first bullet of a war. If the plan is not crazy enough it is not worth talking about. Please come out with crazy ideas to scare the chinese. Before you click Submit, Read and if what you typed does not scare you please click Cancel and move on.

[member_23694]

escalate the situation, add more and more troops in that area. Had enough of this test of patience and i would like to see who is interested to go to war. This fear of going to war and being peace loving nation is what is making others take advantage of us. Ab to Maldive bhi baat nahi sunta
And this is not war mongering , but the question of self respect and being assertive in the region. Period.

[Pranav]

I would say increase presence in the area and set up camps to the rear (east) of the Chinese camp. Start crowding their camp. Keep a large number of Prahaar or similar tactical missiles handy. It would have been nice to have guided artillery shells (exaclibur type), capable of getting coordinates directly from UAVs, but I suppose we don't have that capability.

[abhijitm]

So the stand off has now ended. Now prepare for the eventual conflict like situation or war in worst case in next 2-3 years. This is just a beginning. We must learn the lesson and start the preparation NOW!

[adityadange]

http://www.deccanherald.com/photos/big/ ... 161905.jpg

[jamwal]

What I don't understand that Tibet isn't even proper Chinese territory and India declared it's own area near Chinese occupied Indian territory as no-man's land. I can't understand how to explain this boolsheet

[vishvak]

Make DBO a RnD center for high altitude warfare for machines and defense personnel. Make it more liveable with temperature controlled facilities and build up for major base. Put defenses all around especially at higher level to take height advantage. Lessons learnt in glaciers could be very helpful.

[vivek_ahuja]

Here's an idea of how the terrain looked on the Chinese side near DBO...



-Vivek

[rohitvats]

From Orbat.Com

Part-1

For those who like to know these things, the entire East Ladakh Line of Actual Control with China is under 3 Infantry Division at Leh. The division was hastily raised in 1962, and took over two brigades. One brigade, 114, was raised in 1959 when the East Ladakh crisis first erupted, with two battalions of locally raised troops, the Jammu & Kashmir Militia. Later, two regular army battalions were inducted. 70 Brigade arrived as a reinforcement after the war began. Later, 163 Brigade was pulled from the Pakistan border and given to 3 Division as division reserve. Still later, 121 (Independent ) Infantry Brigade was raised at Kargil, and put under the division’s command. At some point after 1963, the East Ladakh LAC was bifurcated between 22 Sector north of the Changchemo River, with 114 Brigade at Chushul and 70 Brigade at the southern end of the line at Demchok. 22 Sector has at least two subsectors, with Sub Sector North being responsible for DBO possibly down to the Galwan River.

· Strictly speaking, our intrepid South Asia correspondent Mandeep Bajwa should be telling you all this, as he knows much more about the independent Indian Army’s history that the Editor. The above is to Editor’s best recollection, but likely he’s made errors as he was always more concerned with orbats than history. Still is. But Mandeep is mad at Editor for some reason (he won’t explain why) and refuses to answer emails and chat requests. Please twitter him @MandeepBajwa and tell him to get with the program.


· Okay. In 1971 163 Brigade was withdrawn to Foxtrot Sector in the Punjab for the forthcoming Pakistan War, and it was not replaced because it was appraised there was no longer a China threat. In 1984, 102 (Independent) Brigade was raised at Thoise for the Siachin sector facing Pakistan, and 121 Brigade went under the newly raised 28 Division at Nimu. 102 Brigade was put under 3 Division.

· In 1999, on account of the Kargil War, 70 Brigade went to 8 Division, a formation brought in for the Kashmir Counter Insurgency from Eastern Command and stationed in Kashmir. 28 Division, minus 121 Brigade, went to Kupwara in the Kashmir Valley for the CI. So when the Kargil thing blew up, for operational reasons it was decided not to shift 28 Division back; instead 8 Division took over. Editor believes that 114 Brigade was also withdrawn for a time, leaving the China front denuded of regular troops. Anyway, 114 Brigade came back, and now, 14 years after leaving Demchok, 70 Brigade has come up. So you can see how seriously India was taking Chinese incursions. I.e., not at all seriously.

· To show how urgently India reacted to the threats in the decade 2001-2010, after opening DBO airfield not a single An-32 flight took place. Sub Sector North continued to be protected by outposts of the Indo Tibet Border Police, a high-altitude mountain warfare force raised after 1962 for patrolling the China border with Ladakh, Himachal, and Utter Pradesh. After the 1962 War, a new locally recruited force was raised, the Ladakh Scouts. These used to operate in companies, but after their steller performance in 1999 Kargil, they were given the status of a regular regiment and have, Editor thinks, six battalions. Sub Sector North is protected by 5 Ladakh Scouts, but till the other day this was not forward deployed. The rest of 22 Sector consists, as far as we know, by an infantry battalion, a Ladakh Scouts battalion, and a heavy mortar battery (12 x 120mm mortars), now for some peculiar reason called a heavy mortar regiment.

· After the Operation Trident fuss in 1986-87, India stationed a tank regiment and a mechanized battalion at Leh, under 3 Division; these became part of Corps troops when XIV Corps (Leh) was raised after the Kargil War. After the 2000s Chinese intrusions, India decided to sanction an armored brigade for Ladakh, which is now being raised, slowly. A T-90 tank regiment has gone to Leh and presumably it, plus the mechanized battalion, will form the nucleus of the new independent armored brigade, which will be under HQ XIV Corps as far as we know. India also okayed the raising of an infantry independent brigade group for the middle part of the Ladakh LAC with China. Something is happening, but we don’t know what since Mandeep is unavailable. Our assumption is that this will be based around Changchemo.


India is probably slowly building up to a new division HQ for North Ladakh, leaving 3 Division for South Ladakh. With these new raisings you cannot have a single division HQ controlling the entire 440-km or so Ladakh frontier. Is a third brigade being provided to bring 3 Division to strength? Don’t know – Mandeep will know, but he may not be free to speak, as the information is not released to the public. Sub Sector North also needs to become a separate sector, and the rest of 22 Sector put under a new brigade HQ with a third battalion added. Then 102 Brigade, DBO subsector, the new brigade in lieu of 22 Sector, and the new independent brigade could become part of a new division. But what the Indian Army needs and the bureaucrats agree to are two different things.

Part 2

Last Friday we detailed Indian deployments in Ladakh, current and planned. On China’s side the situation is quite simple. The Lanzhou Military Region has two army corps, one of which has been reduced to three independent brigades. The Xinjiang Military District has an unusually large number of independent formations, giving the MR 1 armored, 3 motorized or mechanized, and 1 infantry division, plus seven infantry, mechanized or motorized, and armored brigades.

· There is no particular reason why today these seven division equivalents cannot be deployed against India in Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttarakhand. Personally, we have doubts about the efficiency of these troops, who have spent decades in (relatively) comfortable garrisons, have no experience in mountain warfare, and except a few senior generals have never heard a shot fired in battle. But none of this matters, because China does not intend to fight India in the high mountains as in 1962.

· Primarily it counts on Indian political cowardice to forestall any aggressive action on India’s part. But should that fail, the Chinese plan to let India comes down from their mountains to the plains of the plateau, and crush them there using light and medium armor. Not a bad strategy given they lose very little if they lose their high altitude outposts, because their mountain positions are shallow.

· To reiterate, in Ladakh we had postulated that soon there will be the equivalent of two infantry divisions and an armored brigade. It may appear on the surface of it that India is outnumbered three-to-one and in a very bad situation. At least the political types and Ministry of External Affairs, who are always holding out olive branches to the Chinese, would like Indians to believe that. Impressing on the nation its weakness reduces domestic pressure to take a hard line, and lets people believe “well, we have no choice but to compromise”. Naturally, Indians who cannot remember what happened yesterday and have zero interest in tomorrow, don’t ask why after 50-years and after the creation of the world’s largest mountain warfare force this should be so. No one who operates in a western frame of logic can explain anything India and Indians do.

· In reality there is no 3-1 superiority for China because if we are talking of the Xinjiang theater, India can, without difficulty, reinforce Ladakh-Himachal-Uttarkhand with additional divisions to quickly bring itself up to parity in the theatre.

· To problem is, what then? China is not about to launch a full-scale attack on India. The Chinese are arrogant and run their mouths like sewing machines, but they are not fools. They will get nowhere with an attack because their troops will have to dismount and slog it out in the mountains, where they will be at tremendous disadvantage. India is not about to attack China because of the lack of political will.

· But, readers will object, aren’t you forgetting the highly unfavorable Indian logistical situation. So we can push additional divisions into the Ladakh-Himachal-Uttarakhand sectors, but how are we going to support an offensive? The days are gone when an Indian mountain division needed just 200-tons of supplies a day. Back in those days a Chinese division got by with 50 or less because their divisions had little artillery (in the mountains) and few vehicles. Ah yes, simpler times – Editor gets quite nostalgic. Now the division artillery alone would need 200-tons/day in the attack. Moreover, how is India going to get artillery and vehicles to the mountain passes and across down to the Tibet plateau when roads are lacking?

· And what about an even greater problem: India has almost no east-west interconnectivity because of the mountains. Every sector has deployments like the open fingers of a hand, each finger proceeding up a steep, narrow valley, but the fingers cannot switch forces between them. For the Chinese that is no problem because they are on the plateau and have an excellent east-west main trunk road, plus other roads.

[Rahul Shukla]

92-Pages, PDF.

ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013
Prepared by: Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States of America