Indian Naval News & Discussion - 12 Oct 2013

[John]

Amur with Brahmos is still exists on paper, I am very skeptical about it as i have said earlier even the LA class could only be modified to carry only 12 TLAM in VLS tubes and they weight half as much 8 Brahmos in Universal VLS. How can much smaller diesel powered Amur carry much larger payload without significant performance and structural issues.

[Shalav]

John, is there any reason you assume the LA class limitation is a weight limitation rather than a design limitation? Just curious.

[Singha]

I dont think amur can take a so called VL plug, not with the already weak SSK style engines.
even the much bigger Soryu class does not feature vl tubes, instead they feature a enlarged torpedo room with 30 weapons, vs around 16 in Kilo.

nirbhay and klub fired from a bigger torpedo room is best bet.

[Austin]

I dont think amur can take a so called VL plug, not with the already weak SSK style engines.
even the much bigger Soryu class does not feature vl tubes, instead they feature a enlarged torpedo room with 30 weapons, vs around 16 in Kilo.

nirbhay and klub fired from a bigger torpedo room is best bet.

Having VLS tube on Amur has some drawback in terms of top speed and range ( snorkling/submerged ) there is a chart with/without the VLS tube and data from Rubin

http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-iKoKjs1Gzbk/U ... hMos-1.jpg

[Manish_Sharma]

I think it'll be a good idea to just order 1 amur sub with brahmos as russkies are claiming, anyway we are now short of 3 kilos, one lying opened up in the yard, 2 gone with accidents.

So navy can run it for couple of years, see how it performs in case it does well or even reasonably well with some niggling issue which navy thinks that can be solved, start negotiating for more numbers.

In case its a dud, its a dud and we've bought just one dud instead of whole fleet.

I think govt. has ample reasons to do a quick purchase like mms govt. did C-17 thing.

[Singha]

>> 2 gone with accidents.

which 2? I thought only sindhurakshak is written off and same sub faced battery compartment fire earlier.

which other kilo/u209 is lost?

[Austin]

One Kilo is in perpetual R&D at Vishakapatnam , considered write off by now. Effectively we lost 2 Kilos.

[Manish_Sharma]

>> 2 gone with accidents.

which 2? I thought only sindhurakshak is written off and same sub faced battery compartment fire earlier.

which other kilo/u209 is lost?

Isn't Sindhuratna also a writeoff also? Which had fire accident and Admiral Joshi had to resign after that.

[Austin]

No its not a write off they can fix that sub.

[John]

John, is there any reason you assume the LA class limitation is a weight limitation rather than a design limitation? Just curious.

Well my understanding with LA class and even the follow on Virgina Class could only be fitted with 12 TLAM because any additional cells would limit their capability in terms of speed, maneuverability and diving depth. I am just surprised how Amur can take VL plug that would more than double its payload it is like modifying it to carry 40 torpedoes. If it were that easy wouldn't other companies be cranking out 2000-2500 ton SSK with that payload.

[Rony]

Why India’s ‘Blue Water’ Ambitions Matter

[Manish_Sharma]

^^The links is not opening, could you copy the text here please?

[RKumar]

I think it'll be a good idea to just order 1 amur sub with brahmos as russkies are claiming, anyway we are now short of 3 kilos, one lying opened up in the yard, 2 gone with accidents.

So navy can run it for couple of years, see how it performs in case it does well or even reasonably well with some niggling issue which navy thinks that can be solved, start negotiating for more numbers.

In case its a dud, its a dud and we've bought just one dud instead of whole fleet.

I think govt. has ample reasons to do a quick purchase like mms govt. did C-17 thing.

Sirji how you will maintain this 1 sub ... every time you need to replace a spare part order it and personal from Russia. Sub will be spending more time in harbor then on the duty.

[Rony]

^^The links is not opening, could you copy the text here please?

Its opening for me

Overlooking China’s past objections, India, Japan and the United States are conducting joint naval war games this month in the Pacific Ocean, adjacent to the East China Sea. India’s decision to proceed with the trilateral exercise after five years of keeping Japan out, so as not to provoke China, indicates a new brand of maritime assertiveness. At the same time, both Indian and Chinese navies are actively building ‘blue water’ capabilities – an ability to carry out operations much farther than their territorial boundaries, across the deep oceans. As India juggles the dual imperative to simultaneously befriend and hedge against an economically and militarily rising China, the outcome of its blue water quest will influence the balance of power in Asia for years to come.

Why Develop ‘Blue Water’ Capabilities?

Almost unnoticed by the rest of the world, India has built one of the largest and most powerful navies in the world. However, there exist a number of drivers for further expanding its influence at sea.
New Delhi has been growing uneasy about Beijing’s perceived ‘String of Pearls’ strategy in the Indian Ocean. Some see this as encirclement by China’s strategic alliances and building of maritime facilities in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. With China developing its own blue water navy, India aims to not only secure its own territory but also be able to project power farther than its shores.

While Beijing grows its influence in the Indian Ocean that India sees as its backyard, New Delhi in turn targets a strong presence in the eastern South China Sea. Both countries aim to have presence in the strategically located Malacca Straits, where 40 percent of the world’s trade and more than 80 percent of China’s oil imports pass through.
While most of its wars have been fought on land and air, a strong navy with nuclear deployment capabilities gives India a much-needed strategic edge. As opposed to land and air, India is importantly at a relative locational advantage on the sea vis-à-vis China. The Economist argues that India’s naval advantage might allow it to impede oil traffic heading for China through the Malacca Straits.

Further, India and China are projected to be the largest sources of energy demand in the future, and domestic energy sources would be insufficient for both countries to meet their growing demand. India is expected to import 90 percent of its crude oil by 2030, and its coal imports are expected to more than double to 300 million tonnes by 2040. India needs to be able to protect the energy routes to bring these resources to its shores.

The tremors of China’s increasing claims in the South China Sea are already being felt across Asia, giving the Indian Navy more reason to beef up its fleet. While it might not be a primary player in the disputed waters, India would not want to be excluded from exploring assets in the resource-rich South China Sea or elsewhere as it scours far and wide for much-needed energy sources. Such fears are already starting to come true with China claiming control over the waters where an oil block was being explored by an Indian petroleum giant at Vietnam’s invitation earlier this year. In a rare assertion of maritime power, D.K. Joshi, former Indian Navy Chief Admiral, indicated last year that India is prepared to defend its interests in the South China Sea, though it does not expect to be in those waters too frequently.

A blue water navy would provide muscle for all these strategic imperatives, enhance regional power projection capabilities, more effectively protect India’s expanding energy and trade routes, and enable stronger defense and trade ties with other nations.

Why Does the Rest of the World Care?

There is a long list of nations keen on such partnerships with India. China’s deepening and persistent pattern of assertiveness in the South China Sea -- including the release of a map last month that claims ever-increasing areas stretching down to the coasts of Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines -- has set alarm bells ringing in a number of Southeast Asian countries. Incidentally, the same map claims control over India’s northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, practically throwing it together with the Southeast Asian countries in indignation. Countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia see increasing Chinese sea claims as a fundamental security and economic threat and would like India and other countries to step up and assume a stronger role in the region. In turn, India’s ‘Look East’ policy of the 1990s has drawn it closer to the very same countries. India now holds joint naval exercises with several of these countries, including in the South China Sea.

India and Japan are drawing closer and naval ties are the cornerstones of this strengthening defense relationship. In the first break from its self-imposed ban on defense exports since 1967, Japan is selling 15 amphibious aircrafts to India. Apart from the ongoing trilateral naval exercise with the United States, India and Japan will also carry out a bilateral exercise in the Pacific Ocean this year. India’s new pairing with Japan will surely have Beijing’s attention. Next year, India and Australia will start carrying out annual bilateral naval exercises.

Finally, the United States is keen to balance China by diverting an increasing share of its naval fleet to the Pacific Ocean under its so-called ‘Pivot to Asia’ policy. In light of its own shrinking defense budget, the United States realizes the difficulty in materializing its intentions of extending its own naval presence in the region. To overcome this constraint, a quadrilateral naval alliance of India, Japan, Australia and the United States has long been on Washington’s mind though the idea lost steam after China’s protests in 2007. A new rightwing government in New Delhi gives the United States the impetus to push ahead for India to take a larger role in the West Pacific Ocean.

India has been traditionally wary of forming strategic military alliances, preferring to play a solitary hand. This is particularly true when it comes to the tricky relationship with China, now India’s largest trade partner. Indian policymakers have been reluctant to get drawn into matters that do not directly concern the country’s national interests. India is also wary of being the junior partner in a possible regional alliance -- the country does not trust the United States to support it in a potential conflict, given its own complicated relationship with China and historically warm relationship with Pakistan. However, this reluctance is not preventing India from forging new partnerships at sea, which are much less noticeable but just as important strategically. Further, the new Indian government is putting its head together with its naval establishment to come up with a coordinated strategy for the Indian Ocean, including ‘capacity building’ of other countries in the Indian Ocean. These developments imply a rare tactical focus from a country often accused of having a weak strategic culture.

The Path to ‘Blue Water’ Power

India’s new Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the naval aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya in his first trip outside New Delhi since taking oath last month, in a move seen by many as signaling the importance his government places on defense might. Shortly afterwards, Arun Jaitley, India’s Defense and Finance Minister released the annual budget that showed a 12 percent increase in defense spending. According to IHS Jane’s estimates, India would become the fourth largest defense spender by 2020, only behind the United States, China and Russia.

The Indian Navy’s share of the defense budget has increased in the last decade, though in absolute terms it is still smaller than the army and air force. The acquisition of the Russia-made INS Vikramaditya last year takes the number of Indian Navy’s aircraft carriers up to two, the most owned by any Asian country. Admittedly, one of the two is an ageing aircraft carrier that is reaching the end of its service. However, India is building its first indigenous aircraft carrier to take its place, which is expected for induction by 2018. The country’s first indigenously built nuclear submarine is undergoing sea trials. Its induction would complete the country’s nuclear triad – the ability to launch nuclear weapons by land, air or sea. While India has a ‘No First Use’ policy, a nuclear submarine enhances its ‘second strike capabilities’. A sea-based nuclear deterrent would alter the region’s nuclear landscape in India’s favor.

India also intends to augment its naval fleet. The Indian Navy now has around 145 warships, but many are due for progressive retirement. A senior official of the Indian Navy stated last year that India intended to have a 200-ship navy in the next 10 years – an ambitious goal. The Navy’s approved shopping list runs into billions of dollars and includes deep sea rescue vessels, an indigenous anti-submarine craft program, Israeli air defense missiles, and anti-ship missiles from the United States amongst other planned acquisitions.

All is Not Rosy for India’s ‘Blue Water’ Ambitions

The country has an aging naval fleet and replacement is often fraught with major delays. For instance, the INS Vikramaditya was delayed by five years, and an Indian Comptroller and Auditor General report criticized the navy’s operational readiness, given 74 percent of its refits between 2005 and 2010 were completed with a total delay of more than 23 years. The Indian Navy is currently weak on submarine capabilities. Most of India’s defense equipment is imported (mostly from Russia) and the country needs to develop its indigenous manufacturing capabilities. The navy’s allocation in the defense budget would force it to make crucial tradeoffs between developing one capability versus the other. Added to this is the strategic disconnect between the defense forces and the Ministry of Defense. Cost effective and timely modernization would be critical to fully realize India’s blue water dreams. India has the allocated funds, locational advantage, time and the opportunity to form strategic alliances on its side. But it needs to avoid getting this agenda mired in bureaucracy, inefficiency and a lack of strategic focus. And as acknowledged by its policy thinkers, India does have a window of opportunity to forge ahead on building its naval capabilities while China is still preoccupied with the Pacific Ocean.

Just like the sea, naval maneuvers seem deceptively quiet for the most part, but in fact conceal deep underlying currents. The outcomes of India’s blue water quest will subtly but surely impact the region’s long-term strategic calculus.

Ritika Katyal is pursuing a Master’s Degree in Public Affairs at Princeton University.

[rohitvats]

Considering that the 30-year 24 Submarine program is running way behind schedule, does it not make sense to scrap the new RFP for 6 submarines and get the DCNS/French to make these 6 more Scorpene submarines in their yards? Or, at least make 'X' number of submarines in parallel with Indian dockyard till they're done with current order of 6 Scorpenes and have free capacity to build 6-X domestically? In my limited understanding of the subject, that is the shortest way to build the numbers and also ensure commonality across the entire fleet.

Also, with the way nuclear submarines are shaping up, does one expect the 12 remaining SSK (supposed to be in-house design and development) of 24 planned to see light of the day? There seems to be no clarity on this. Because if we're serious about it, then a domestic R&D effort needs to be in-place now so that over next 8-10 years, we've the blue-print for our own SSK in place.

[Gagan]

Naval Design Bureau, should sit down with the Russians, and L&T, design a P75-I sub and have L&T build a dozen conventional / AIP subs within the country, IMHO
All this nonsense of giving Mazgaon Docks or Hindustan Shipbuiliders in vizag or Cochin shipyards is a recipe for delays.
None of the sarkari shipyards deliver on time! Even building a simple hull, even with modular construction is an impossible undertaking for them.
Shipbuilding has to be privatized in India

[dinesh_kimar]

^ Daewoo and Hyundai have not been able to build the U-209 even though they are world's best and most efficient shipbuilder. They got all the technology for their submarine only after follow on orders for Type 214 were given to HDW. Some Aussie reports say that building a submarine is as complicated as building a spacecraft. Better to build DRDO 600-800 ton coastal sub and learn submarine building from that experience. For numbers buy Kilos, ASW Craft, etc.

[Singha]

as a learning exercise ok, but unfortunately of no use operationally. the world has moved on. the time to start such local learning projects with 'cloned' ideas from U209 was mid 80s. most of the early chinese sub efforts of that type....including their first Han SSN in early 70s....there was a long gap of 10+ yrs to iron out problems and create the 2nd Han.

[Gagan]

India has to start building subs en-masse. There has to be a locally designed conventional / AIP sub.
Private shipyards have to be given a bigger role in defense ship building. The timelines of the sarkari shipyards are too much! The Navy is getting ships built overseas because the desi sarkari shipyards can't deliver on time.

Its very sad.

[Gagan]

For example, what was the need to have the refueling ships built in Italy?
A desi shipyard could easily have built them, if technology was an issue, they could have had a tie up with just about anyone, but done it fast and quick in India.
My question is, as it is we import engines, sensors and weapons (even propellers by some sources) for naval ships.
Why then tolerate the delay by sarkari shipyards in building a simple hull and integrating everything? When everyone knows a private builder can do the same thing very quickly and most probably at a lower cost.
L&T is building nuclear subs for godssake! And building the hulls very quickly too.

[Austin]

Considering that the 30-year 24 Submarine program is running way behind schedule, does it not make sense to scrap the new RFP for 6 submarines and get the DCNS/French to make these 6 more Scorpene submarines in their yards? Or, at least make 'X' number of submarines in parallel with Indian dockyard till they're done with current order of 6 Scorpenes and have free capacity to build 6-X domestically? In my limited understanding of the subject, that is the shortest way to build the numbers and also ensure commonality across the entire fleet.

That would be the right approach build 6 Scorpene another 6 with DRDO AIP and then with DRDO/NDB/DCN build a larger version of Scorpene like the Spanish has done with S-80.

That would streamline the production , have the best commonality possible and most indiginous system.

But the problem is within IN Submarine Arm there are those who have grown up on Western Submarine and then there are those who on Russian one ......so they prefer to get both types into service trying to put across pluses of both type....its more of a lobby thing within the Navy thats pushing for such approach.

Hence the Idea of 6 West , 6 Eastern and 12 Indian Design for 24 SSK program was proposed which is quite lunatic approach ....considering countries in West and even Russia are building new submarine based on Block model of the same design with each block adding new capability retaining most commonality.

Although I do not know how much of the sanction thing comes into Navys minds because I recollect when HDW scandal broke the U-209 was prematurely terminated and during 1999 post sanction our HDW fleet faced issue with availability and spares ...same with Sea King etc.

Also, with the way nuclear submarines are shaping up, does one expect the 12 remaining SSK (supposed to be in-house design and development) of 24 planned to see light of the day? There seems to be no clarity on this. Because if we're serious about it, then a domestic R&D effort needs to be in-place now so that over next 8-10 years, we've the blue-print for our own SSK in place.

Nuclear submarine takes time to build and we are just learning on that , SSK specially with AIP has a key role to play as we have 3 Oceans to manage and we need a large fleet of SSK i.e 24 and 4-5 SSN fleet.

More ever there is revolution happening in AIP front with advanced Diesel based AIP which is safer then the Fuel Cell Hydrogen/Oxygen one coming in being and Lithium Ion batteries replace the conventional ones greatly improving endurance matching the SSN.

[Philip]

The obsession with AIP subs is for navies which do not have the nuclear boat option.The only true AIP sub is a nuclear boat. It can go on patrol for 3 month periods,unlike a max of 45-60 days max for an AIP boat.Some N-boats have even done 100 day patrols.Plus their weapon load is often more than double that of a conventional boat. AIP systems too vary and are very complex.While we do need a certain qty. of conventional AIP subs for littoral warfare,which too are sometimes very expensive (Scorpenes),the "bang for the buck" factor is heavily loaded in favour of N-boats which can even employ UUVs for surveillance,etc. of waters closer to the enemy's coastline,principal bases. The second line of SSGNs must be established soon parallel to that of the ATVs. Kilos and Amurs are the most cost-effective interim solutions to the IN's sub replacement and augmentation crisis.

[Rien]

That would be the right approach build 6 Scorpene another 6 with DRDO AIP and then with DRDO/NDB/DCN build a larger version of Scorpene like the Spanish has done with S-80.

That would streamline the production , have the best commonality possible and most indiginous system.

I also agree. That's a sane sensible approach that satisfies what we want in the shortest time. Now to make sure that the MoD acts on this. Do you think writing letter will work? Modi setup an India gov website, we can post there and if we can get enough signatures the MoD will probably take a look.

Nuclear submarine takes time to build and we are just learning on that , SSK specially with AIP has a key role to play as we have 3 Oceans to manage and we need a large fleet of SSK i.e 24 and 4-5 SSN fleet.

More ever there is revolution happening in AIP front with advanced Diesel based AIP which is safer then the Fuel Cell Hydrogen/Oxygen one coming in being and Lithium Ion batteries replace the conventional ones greatly improving endurance matching the SSN.

We can take a parallel approach. Build those conventional subs in the meantime and get started on designing more nuclear boats. It would be best to an all nuclear IN. The aircraft carriers and destroyers as well as the subs. The only thing conventional should be the small patrol boats, but everything bigger than 1000 tons should be running on nuclear.

Indian reactors, thorium fuel, and the navy will be able to go around the entire world at a very fast pace. An all nuclear navy can even challenge China in the South China sea, and allow us to give Vietnam, Indonesia and Japan a strong alternative to the US.

Bharat as a superpower doesn't have to stay a fantasy.

[uddu]

The past few years we are seeing some sea changes in Indian ship building. Both the private players and PSU's are upgrading and improving on areas. Newer technology for construction, ships that are good in quality and firepower, stealth. Seeing the Construction of P15B progressing well, one could say that the ship will be ready to be delivered faster than the usual 9 years it takes to build ships of that size. They are targeting the ship to be ready for commissioning in 4-5 years.

The delay at the moment is happening at the decision making phase. Example can be P17A. The delay from Planning to order placing phase need to be removed. The number of ships also need to be increased from the present 4 to around 8 to 10 and if two shipyards building one single design, then the numbers must atleast be in the range of 6+6 that's 12.

[Manish_Sharma]

Build those conventional subs in the meantime and get started on designing more nuclear boats. It would be best to an all nuclear IN. The aircraft carriers and destroyers as well as the subs. The only thing conventional should be the small patrol boats, but everything bigger than 1000 tons should be running on nuclear.

Indian reactors, thorium fuel, and the navy will be able to go around the entire world at a very fast pace. An all nuclear navy can even challenge China in the South China sea, and allow us to give Vietnam, Indonesia and Japan a strong alternative to the US.

It seems too crazy and fantastic but still makes sense. Since we import most of the diesel and pay in foreign exchange, even if nuclear run destroyers, frigates, carriers and cruiser are more expensive the money will still go into our own country.

[Philip]

When will the first Scorpenes arrive? 2016 at the earliest,with one every year after.They will be qualitatively obsolete when they arrive (non-AIP in comparison to Pak's Agostas ,which have been operational for several years and other ASEAN and Dar East subs mostly German AIP U-boats) and their costs for non-AIP boats are hideously expensive, almost $600M a boat .The Scorpene programme is the IN's equivalent of the Rafale,exceptionally expensive,excpt here,the Rafale is at least a very capable bird while the Scorpene has had few takers with the Spanish equiv. reportedly with serious design flaws.

Instead of pursuing the Scorpene which cannot carry BMos anyway,only Exocet,is far too small for true blue-water ops,the second line for SSGNs must be started.Here we don't have to pay massive fees in royalties as the basic ATV/Arihant design is flexible enough to be modified into an SSN/SSGN.See how the US used its Ohio SSBNs as SSGNs,carrying a massive arsenal of Tomahawks,etc.These SSN/SSGNs apart from anti-sub ops,will be able to multi-task,supporting carrier task forces,protecting our SSBNs,launching LR cruise at land targets and in forward presence ops of surveillance and interdiction of enemy forces attempting to break into the IOR. No conventional AIP sub can perform as well.If the IN has true blue water ambitions,it should build a nuclear navy indigenously as far as possible.Russian Akula subs are on offer which we must acquire for the interim until our own second N-sub coms on stream.In the interim,a few Kilo or Amur subs which are half the cost of a Scorpene and Klub capable,should be fast tracked to replace lost/inoperable subs and maintain the IN's sub capability.

[Manish_Sharma]

After 1st 2 scorpions arrive the rest will start coming very fast and also the deal is for 12 scorpions 6 + option for 6 more, so by the time these 6 are done a very fast momentum would have built up, it'd be stupid to let that go waste and not make 6 more. With 340 day a year availablity these 12 subs will be more than sufficient for the coastal areas, while the 75i needs to be scrapped. Gone are the days of Kilos which were only available 60-70 days a year. So these 12 scorpenes will be equivalent of 60 kilos just due to their low maintenance and high availability.

While all the rest 18 should be Arihants for blue water capabilities.

The mistake of not constructing Shishumars should not be repeated.

[KiranM]

After 1st 2 scorpions arrive the rest will start coming very fast and also the deal is for 12 scorpions 6 + option for 6 more, so by the time these 6 are done a very fast momentum would have built up, it'd be stupid to let that go waste and not make 6 more. With 340 day a year availablity these 12 subs will be more than sufficient for the coastal areas, while the 75i needs to be scrapped. Gone are the days of Kilos which were only available 60-70 days a year. So these 12 scorpenes will be equivalent of 60 kilos just due to their low maintenance and high availability.

While all the rest 18 should be Arihants for blue water capabilities.

The mistake of not constructing Shishumars should not be repeated.

You are not taking into account the human limitations for 1 set of crew to be bottled up in same submarine for throughout the year. The norm is for SSK patrol to last for 4-6 weeks with rotation of crew. Between each patrols there will be some level of repair & replenishment required if not overhaul. So between patrols, an SSK will be in harbour for 2-4 weeks and longer in case of overhaul or major repairs.
For SSNs the patrol duration lasts longer to up to 6-8 weeks by virtue of the boat being larger to carry more replenishment and few spare crew members. So numbers do matter in a way and needs to be accounted for before making sweeping statements like 'N' of Type A = 'M' of Type B.

[KiranM]

Build those conventional subs in the meantime and get started on designing more nuclear boats. It would be best to an all nuclear IN. The aircraft carriers and destroyers as well as the subs. The only thing conventional should be the small patrol boats, but everything bigger than 1000 tons should be running on nuclear.

Indian reactors, thorium fuel, and the navy will be able to go around the entire world at a very fast pace. An all nuclear navy can even challenge China in the South China sea, and allow us to give Vietnam, Indonesia and Japan a strong alternative to the US.

It seems too crazy and fantastic but still makes sense. Since we import most of the diesel and pay in foreign exchange, even if nuclear run destroyers, frigates, carriers and cruiser are more expensive the money will still go into our own country.

All such grand dreams need to be backed up by logic and feasibility.

Let us forget for a moment the huge capital investment required to build such a nuclear fleet. Only US and FSU have built non-carrier nuke powered ships, and only for cruisers (> 10,000 tons) and ice-breakers (to cut through the arctic ice which conventional ice breakers do not have power to break ice greater than 3m thick). Ever wondered why? Because it is a huge feat to downsize nuclear reactors within the volume and structural needs of a ship. Lowest displacement for a nuclear powered vessels were the 1st generation submarines (>3000 tons).
Downsizing is also a function of safety features which in case of meltdown the submerged subs had option to rapidly flood the compartment. Not so for surface ships.

People need to do some research before grandstanding like the parts in bold. You can start with: http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/non-p ... red-ships/

[abhik]

The Scorpenes are currently planned to come in the intervals of 9 months, it was 12 months earlier. So if the first one comes in 2016, all six of the first batch should be delivered before or in 2020.

[Viv S]

When will the first Scorpenes arrive? 2016 at the earliest,with one every year after.They will be qualitatively obsolete when they arrive (non-AIP in comparison to Pak's Agostas ,which have been operational for several years and other ASEAN and Dar East subs mostly German AIP U-boats) and their costs for non-AIP boats are hideously expensive, almost $600M a boat .

Where is the looming threat in the IOR that needs an urgent augmentation of SSKs? Non AIP subs are hardly obsolete. Half the Scorpenes will have AIP. And AIP is critical for the PN that needs to remain submerged longer, not for the IN that will have superiority in the air and on the surface in the IOR.

The Scorpene programme is the IN's equivalent of the Rafale,exceptionally expensive,excpt here,the Rafale is at least a very capable bird while the Scorpene has had few takers with the Spanish equiv. reportedly with serious design flaws.

There is a very crucial difference - the Rafale deal exists only on paper. The infrastructure for Scorpene production has already been created on ground. An Indian shipyard is already in a position to build and deliver a new batch of submarines. Had there been a Kilo production line in India, the best option would then have been more Kilo orders.

As far cost goes, the Amur (or Kilo for that matter) is not hugely cheaper once non-recurring investment into the Scorpene production is removed from the equation. The money on the other hand, all goes into Russian pockets.

On the issue of orders, FYI the Spanish are building submarines based on their own domestic Navantia design. Please don't confuse it with the Malaysian Scorpene order. Also, with most of its recent exports having been to captive Russian markets; PRC, Vietnam, Algeria, Iran, the Kilo's export record isn't particularly inspiring either.

[deejay]

Where is the looming threat in the IOR that needs an urgent augmentation of SSKs? Non AIP subs are hardly obsolete. Half the Scorpenes will have AIP. And AIP is critical for the PN that needs to remain submerged longer, not for the IN that will have superiority in the air and on the surface in the IOR.

There was no looming threat in '65, '99, '02 and '08. In '02 & '08 we could not even react. In '99 we reacted late. In '08 they came by sea to wage war against us. There never will be the looming threat with more than 06 months warning, in fact it will be lesser. This looming threat will not happen because the enemy is opportunistic. The Western enemy is opportunistic because it thinks we are laid back. Even with 06 months warning, will we be able to get all the wares we want to cater for the 'looming threat'.

I am not espousing imports or US or Western or Russian wares here. I am cautioning against the attitude of 'no looming threat'. Be prepared, 'coz the neighbour on the east certainly is. Those border crossings are intentional and not some innocent mistake. I am afraid a lot of us who haven't been close the borders for some time forget how real the threat is. The Army or a version of it is practically deployed all year round in many border states.

So does the 'on land' situation need to be factored in by the Navy? The naval strategists will answer best but I remember something about what A T Mahan wrote about the Indian Ocean.

The PN vs. IN capability should and will be asymmetric in all spheres heavily loaded in IN's favour.

[Viv S]

I am not espousing imports or US or Western or Russian wares here. I am cautioning against the attitude of 'no looming threat'. Be prepared, 'coz the neighbour on the east certainly is. Those border crossings are intentional and not some innocent mistake. I am afraid a lot of us who haven't been close the borders for some time forget how real the threat is. The Army or a version of it is practically deployed all year round in many border states.

No 'looming threat' referred to the threat from a surface fleet in the IOR, not the need for military or naval preparedness altogether.

Over the long term, the PLAN will inevitable achieve the capability to push past the Malacca/Sunda straits. Might even forward deploy a fleet at Gwadar or someplace. But over the short term (i.e. the next few years) the IN's focus has to be on anti submarine warfare (PN Agostas, PLAN Kilos & Yuans), and anti-access capability (plus Pak blockade/'policing' of civilian traffic in IOR).

No one, least of all me, is discounting the threat from China.

[Austin]

Indian Navy commissions new VLF facility in Tamil Nadu

The Indian Navy (IN) inaugurated a new very low frequency (VLF) transmitting station on 31 July at INS Kattaboman, near Tirunelvelli in Tamil Nadu, boosting its ability to communicate continuously with operationally deployed ships and submerged submarines.

The new facility accompanies the navy's existing VLF station, which has been in operation for the last 24 years.

Sporting the highest mast structures in India, the new station strengthens the current infrastructure, enhancing its reach, redundancy, and operational capabilities.

Constructed by private defence contractor Larsen & Toubro (L&T) under the navy's Project Amber, the VLF station was approved by the Indian Ministry of Defence's Long Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) and the IN's Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (MCCP) 2007-22.

[maitya]

X-posted from the Su-30 thread ...

New Brahmos Chief Sudhir Kumar Mishra two part interview
Part-1 Part-2

... Apart from this, we are going to develop the BrahMos-Mini as well. So BrahMos-Mini can be launched from a torpedo tube. We are planning, we are designing to do it from the torpedo tube. So it can be used there also as a standard weapon in all kind of submarines and users have to make up their mind what kind of weapon system they are looking for and we are telling the users that this is the weapon on the table, kindly have it. So RFP is not yet released...

Now this is what I call a game-changer ... not sure why DRDO seems to drag its feet on this. Also where is the pressure from IN for this to expedite it? What is holding this back?

[Austin]

Yes it would be a game changer , with ability to fire from 533 mm TT and virtually all our submarine can fire Brahmos-M without any modification needed.

But any TT fired missile comes at the cost of lower Torpedo carried by submarine its a tradeoff , The IN upgraded Kilo carry 5 Klub missile and 13-14 Torpedoes.

[Singha]

13-14 torps is a good number for small subs whose patrol duration is at most 1 month. enough for a good battle or two.

[Austin]

^^ With right AIP that figure will double for over all endurance ( 60 days ) at sea and 3-4 times more for submerged endurance ( 30 days )

[Philip]

It is not just the AIP factor,a non-AIP Kilo,latest avatar can patrol for 45 days,quite adequate for littoral sub warfare dealing with Pak and IOR duties.However,the Scorpene's weaponry is by Kilo stds. primitive.It carries only the sub-sonic Exocet,whereas the Kilos carry the mach 3.0 terminal homing warhead Klub missile,which the USN itself says will be extremely difficult to shoot down .It also comes in (non-AIP) at $600M! Twice the cost of a Kilo which is larger,double-hulled much stronger,and which can also carry the Shkval rocket torpedo and the anti-sub Klub missile too.The torpedoes for the Scorpenes have yet to be finalised .Given MDL's great track record,it certainly will be a record if it can deliver all the Scorpenes by 2020.Just wait for the next announcement about "delays". OK,giving it some slack,and granted that by 2020/21 we will have all 6 Scorpenes in the water,they will be a decade late in technology and will carry what contemporary weaponry? As for AIP,which system has the IN chosen? The DRDO is supposedly developing its own AIP fuel cell system,but no success announced as yet,and the efficiency of MESMA vs a fuel cell vs the Stirling system is still under debate. Even the German U-boats do not carry any anti-ship missiles,Exocet or sub-Harpoon the only possibilities.

Once sub-launched BMos-M arrives,we already have developed the sub-launched current version,they will add immense potency to the Russian origin subs in the inventory as the other western subs in the inventory may not be able to carry them under the JV agreement,or technically difficult,the Scorpene being a much smaller sub than even the Kilo.

The exorbitant cost factor alone should rule out further Scorpene construction unless MDL can prove that it can lower the costs for a further few,and given the increased requirements for the P-75I,the IN is looking for a larger more capable sub design.


The hard facts are that both these boats are too small for the IN's blue-water requirements to meet the combined Sino-Paki challenge,which combined will number over 80+ N-boats and conventional subs. These subs were designed with European requirements in mind,where the European seas like the Baltic,Meditt,N.Sea,are far smaller than the major oceans of the world.It is why the French,British and Americans also build N-boats ,both SSBNs and attack subs for their blue water ops.,leaving the smaller conventional boats for littoral warfare.

As I've been saying,why should we keep on building dated conventional subs costing billions,when we have the capability to build infinitely more capable SSN/SSGNs at home in a parallel line along with the ATV? One N-boat will be more than twice as capable as any conventional AIP boat with a 100 day patrol time,high speed to reach the operational zone,and armed with a cocktail of around 30-40 weapons,missiles,TTs,UUVs,etc.,depending upon the size.The offer of a second Akula must be fast tracked along with acquiring for the interim a few Kilos or the reported offer/desire of the IN to lease two Amurs.

We need at least 30-36 subs with 1/3rd of the fleet being N-boats,SSBNs and SSGNs.
The P-75I design could contain a combination of the best from both east and west.NHPPs,a new combat system,improved sonars and a host of lethal weaponry.The US and Russia are the world's leaders in sub-tech.With the latest Russian Borei and Yasen SSBNs and SSGNs being built in large number,the qualitative gap is very close. Only the Russians are willing to give us cutting edge N-sub tech which we should acquire asap for local N-boat construction as we have been doing with the ATV..

[Philip]

New report.

Russia becomes world leader in the supply of naval armaments
August 8, 2014 Dmitriy Litovkin, specially for RIR
Around 400 Russian built ships and submarines are already in service with the armed forces of 27 countries around the world.

First serial submarine of project 636 for Black Sea Fleet launched in St Petersburg
Russia to lay down 4th Yasen-class nuclear submarine on June 19
Russian submarines armed with new lethal ballistic missile

Russia becomes world leader in the supply of naval armaments
India has approached Russia regarding the sale of two of Russia’s newest Amur class submarines (photo). Source: Press Photo

Even as India has delayed announcing the results of a tender to supply the Indian Navy with non-nuclear submarines, Delhi has approached Moscow regarding the sale of two of Russia’s newest Amur class submarines. Defence News noted this was done to circumvent a strict requirement of Indian law that any military procurement be conducted solely on the basis of a tender. According to the British website, India would only be able to take this step if she needed to procure such technology at very short notice.

Russia is helping the Indian Navy

The Indian Navy is planning to procure six new submarines under Project 75I. The programme to supply these vessels has for a number of reasons fallen more than four years behind schedule. It is envisaged that the first of six submarines will be accepted into service this year. According to Indian expert and retired Captain Shyam Kumar Singh, the delays with Project 75I coupled with delays in delivery of the Scorpène submarines have led to a reduction in the Indian Navy’s submarine fleet to an almost critical level.

Russia's top-secret nuclear submarine comes into service

In Captain Singh’s opinion, it is this shortage that has led to the start of direct talks with Russia. He believes that even if a tender were announced in the near future, it would take more than 10 years for the first of these submarines to be delivered. That is to say by that time not only would the submarines have been manufactured to obsolete specifications, but they would be fitted with ineffective naval weapons systems. In this case Russia is the only country capable not only of supplying submarines quickly, but of taking into account the customer’s requirements for the latest weaponry within the context of their own armed forces.

The importance of modularity

In recent years Moscow has emerged among the global leaders in terms of supplying naval military technology and occupies 27 percent of the global market. According to President Vladimir Putin, the share of naval technology in the export portfolio of the state corporation Rosoboronexport is 15 percent. The order portfolio for the supply of Russian armament reached $50 billion. Around 400 Russian built ships and submarines are in service with the armed forces of 27 countries around the world.

The popularity of Russian naval military technology lies in its comparatively low cost and its extremely high combat effectiveness says Ruslan Pukhov, Head of the Centre for Political Research (TsentrAST). Apart from that Russia is currently implementing a large-scale programme to modernise its own fleet. Billions of roubles have been invested in modernising production, as a result of which Russian yards have not only increased the rate at which military vessels are launched, but their quality has also improved considerably.

Another significant aspect to the shipbuilding programme is that Russian Design Bureaus are offering both Russian naval personnel and those from overseas, ships and submarines manufactured according to a modular principle. These ‘modules’ are like ‘Lego’ building blocks with which a customer can put a military vessel together independently according to their specific requirements, integrating the weapons systems into its design.

Optional extras

Large anti-submarine vessels such as the 11356, 11541 and the Gepard 3.9 (cheetah) designs, as well as the 20382 Tigr (tiger) corvettes, for which the hull and superstructure are manufactured using ‘stealth’ technology, as well as the small 12300 Skorpion (scorpion) and 20970 Katran (dogfish) missile launches serve as examples of this. They are completely different vessels in terms of displacement, class and also in the combat roles that they perform. They may however have weapons systems in common.

This is also the case when it comes to the state of the art Russian anti-ship cruise missiles, the Klub-S for submarines and Klub-N for surface ships. There is also a Klub-M a coastal version of this missile, which apart from anything else can be hidden in an everyday ship container.
This means that any dry cargo ship can be turned into a military strike vessel.

The Klub missile systems are designed to strike surface ships, submarines and coastal assets under intensive fire and radio-electronic interference. They include the ZM-54E cruise missiles with a detachable supersonic warhead, which is capable of developing a speed of Mach 3.0 in its final stage, and overcome the air defence systems on practically any surface vessel. Another example is the 91RE1 system, which delivers a high-speed self-guiding torpedo with a range of 40-50 km designed to strike any submarine. The ZM-14E cruise missile designed to strike ground targets is capable of destroying any coastal assets within its range.

The Klub-S system is fitted to Russia’s newest Amur class submarines. At the behest of the customer the vessel can be fitted with the more powerful Russo-Indian BrahMos cruise missiles. The ‘modularity’ or as the automobile manufacturer would say optional extras in the design of a ship allow even a nation of modest means to procure a vessel, which is capable of posing a serious threat even to a larger and more powerful carrier force.