LCA News and Discussions, 22-Oct-2013

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 16 Sep 2014 20:35

^^^ Gents, think of a very complicated new system you want to acquire and phase out an old system which primarily dictated your whole war philosophy. The LCA Mk 1 is like that to the Mig 21's.

Not just the war plans but pilots, ground crew and engineers will need to be trained and made ready. TETRA's will be set up and with the LCA MK I, IAF will settle in for the long haul. Here the OEM will be next door. Expect a lot of feedback, alterations, complaints, heart burns initially. We may not like it but any new system will see this kind of feedback.

The IAF is prudent in not placing too many orders before line pilots fly the machine. Please understand, Test Pilots are like those 'technologists' who will play with a new system but line pilots will mostly be like the 'late majority'. Of course, this will be a slightly more experimental 'late majority'.

There is no point pushing in a system in large numbers since we have an 'at home' build capability. The changes will come thick 'n fast once the line sqns begin their work. A significant part of the feedback will be from the maintenance crew, the people who will have to get the bird ready quickly. I say there is a need to focus on making the LCA succeed and it may not necessarily lie in the large initial order. Let us prepare for this deluge of feedback and be ready with a mechanism to handle it.

krishnan · Post by **krishnan** » 16 Sep 2014 20:51

few more here , some are old

http://ribhuv.wordpress.com/2014/09/11/ ... ian-skies/

Aditya_V · Post by **Aditya_V** » 16 Sep 2014 20:55

Is that an R-73E or soem other missile?

krishnan · Post by **krishnan** » 16 Sep 2014 21:03

looks dummy , but i am not sure

negi · Post by **negi** » 16 Sep 2014 21:19

It is R-73e, training rounds have black stripes on them.

member_26622 · Post by **member_26622** » 16 Sep 2014 21:30

^^^
Ordering 40 odd LCA MK1 and complaining about falling squadron strength simultaneously is not OK. IAF talks about facing off Pakistan and China simultaneously (more like Paki+UAE and China), and numbers will be key to hold back this onslaught.

We have to understand that the import lobby is not going to give up its most valuable jewel (IAF) so easily. 100 LCA MK1 will relieve pressure for emergency acquisition of french dames and russian natashas ! The planes are not same but numbers matter finally.

PratikDas · Post by **PratikDas** » 16 Sep 2014 22:40

negi wrote:It is R-73e, training rounds have black stripes on them.

It's a dummy.

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/media/AeroIndia2009/ashokramkumar/100_3428_001.JPG.html

srin · Post by **srin** » 16 Sep 2014 23:49

deejay wrote:^^^ Gents, think of a very complicated new system you want to acquire and phase out an old system which primarily dictated your whole war philosophy. The LCA Mk 1 is like that to the Mig 21's.

Not just the war plans but pilots, ground crew and engineers will need to be trained and made ready. TETRA's will be set up and with the LCA MK I, IAF will settle in for the long haul. Here the OEM will be next door. Expect a lot of feedback, alterations, complaints, heart burns initially. We may not like it but any new system will see this kind of feedback.

The IAF is prudent in not placing too many orders before line pilots fly the machine. Please understand, Test Pilots are like those 'technologists' who will play with a new system but line pilots will mostly be like the 'late majority'. Of course, this will be a slightly more experimental 'late majority'.

There is no point pushing in a system in large numbers since we have an 'at home' build capability. The changes will come thick 'n fast once the line sqns begin their work. A significant part of the feedback will be from the maintenance crew, the people who will have to get the bird ready quickly. I say there is a need to focus on making the LCA succeed and it may not necessarily lie in the large initial order. Let us prepare for this deluge of feedback and be ready with a mechanism to handle it.

That, Sir, ignores the realities of production. Manufacturing LCAs means that you need to build up facilities on some land, prepare a production layout, buy (in most cases, import) capital equipment and CNC machines, figure out the supply chain, prepare tenders for the component manufacturers, select the vendors (and hope they don't get stay order in court), place orders for the parts, get the parts, maintain an optimum inventory (too less - work stops, too much - too much working capital is tied down), assemble it, test it and then deliver. And in all of this, I haven't mentioned the labour.

So - the production batch size is influenced by all this. If IAF doesn't know how much it will order, then the entire supply chain will get affected. If you order in small batches, many suppliers may not be interested and you don't get good discounts and there is huge lead time to manufacture by the suppliers.

A fully functional production line is a finely tuned and balanced system where even the smallest uncertainty or delay can mess things up. Quite surprising if IAF doesn't know this.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 17 Sep 2014 01:57

Import lobby and also, seems like, plenty of other interested parties. People who are not the least interested in the IAF or squadron strengths. What a waste of BR time!!!!

The IAF is prudent in not placing too many orders before line pilots fly the machine. Please understand, Test Pilots are like those 'technologists' who will play with a new system but line pilots will mostly be like the 'late majority'. Of course, this will be a slightly more experimental 'late majority'.

On the contrary.

Notwithstanding the lobby, it would benefit the IAF if each plane that the IAF receives is evaluated and the results sent back for incorporation into the next batch (within some expectations). Better to order 200 planes, with each batch being better than the other, than to order 20/40, wait for evaluation and then hope to order another 20.

This whole process has to be continuous.

RKumar · Post by **RKumar** » 17 Sep 2014 12:29

Mr. Tyagi where are SP-1 and SP-2? It is already second half of September?

I think it is a positive news that Chairman is not given infinite extensions ....

T Suvarna Raju to Succeed Tyagi as HAL Chairman

T Suvarna Raju (in picture) has been named as the next Chairman of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL). Currently the company’s Director (Design and Development), Raju was named by the Public Enterprises Selection Board (PESB), which conducted interviews in New Delhi on Monday. Raju will succeed Mr. R K Tyagi, who will superannuate by the end of January 2015.

....

Raju has been picked by the PESB after interviewing four other candidates -- S Subrahmanyam, MD (MiG Compelx, HAL), V M Chamola, Director (HR, HAL), Umesh Chandra, Executive Director (BEML) and Air Marshal R K Dhir (IAF).

Raju told Express on his arrival from Delhi past mid-night that his focus will be to turn HAL into an aerospace technology leader.“We need to quickly sink in with the changing times. Technology advancement is the key.”

kit · Post by **kit** » 17 Sep 2014 18:57

Just curious ., if all the money is made available for the LCA production how many can be made a year ..lets say the IAF order is for 10 squadron worth appxly 200 aircraft and wants all that asap ? Now higher rate of production would mean the line is going to stop earlier., lower rate of production would go on and be maintained for attrition and spares .. could some one enlighten upon this .. would HAL be making a profit on the LCA or would it mean higher unit costs ? ..also to keep in mind the LCA could run into teething troubles as it enters IAF service ..

srai · Post by **srai** » 17 Sep 2014 18:58

From ADA site:
No. of flights successfully completed by LCA - Tejas

2706th flight on 14 Sep

Code: Select all

Grounded -> TD1 : 233     TD2 : 305     PV1: 242      PV2: 222      
PV3: 387       PV5: 61
LSP1: 74      LSP2: 294     LSP5: 278
NP1: 25
Last Flown -> LSP3: 226     LSP4: 129     LSP7: 120     LSP8 : 110

kit · Post by **kit** » 17 Sep 2014 19:14

Also getting the LCAs in numbers would mean appxly 200-300 American F404/414 engines with parts and maintenance ..would there be any local support mechanisms..also would the Americans agree to servicing the engines and to what extent., in India ?

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 17 Sep 2014 19:36

^^^^

GE has a civilian program with MRO in India. GE does not have one for the military ones as yet, but should be open. GE military engines in use within India:

GE supplies F404IN20 engines for the Light
Combat Aircraft-Tejas Mk-1. In 2010, the
F414-INS6 engines were selected to power the
MKII version of the Light Combat Aircraft-Tejas.
GE’s CT7-8 engines power the Indian Air Force’s
VVIP squadron of AW101, while CFM56 engines
power the Indian Navy’s P-8I

If it is deemed a cost effective option then a MRO for military engines should be a no-brainer. But, a MRO is not a sanction-proof-ed means.

vina · Post by **vina** » 18 Sep 2014 08:28

Hmm. Naval LCA 2 is to do take off and landings from Goa shore based test facility next week . LCA Airforce version FOC by March 2015 , per Subhramanyam via Al-Hundi.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 18 Sep 2014 09:06

kit wrote:Also getting the LCAs in numbers would mean appxly 200-300 American F404/414 engines with parts and maintenance ..would there be any local support mechanisms..also would the Americans agree to servicing the engines and to what extent., in India ?

The F414s are to be license-built at Koraput. Stands to reason that infrastructure for domestic overhaul as well as spares production will also be set up.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 18 Sep 2014 09:13

More than dates alone, they need to provide the test points remaining. Otherwise, all the BS mongers have a field day coming up with cooked up stories about the program & platform & even those who understand the program challenges wonder what's going on with dates being pushed out a couple of the months each time.

It took an off hand comment at a seminar for the public to know that a huge number of change requests have been pushed for by the IAF since it joined the program late. Fine, mention that publicly, even if the classified portion (x weapon added) doesn't need to be detailed or skipped. Some interview to Rajya Sabha TV or a local TV channel isn't sufficient. High time they took a look at the media machinery deployed behind fighters WW & replicated it. Gripen team heavily pushed a NG OEW of 7.1T & now its 8T, but keeping the information flowing non stop in between means that one point alone doesn't define the program. The LCA on the other hand is defined by the Bedi types and that is a challenge.

Yagnasri · Post by **Yagnasri** » 18 Sep 2014 09:32

If local making etc is possible with GE with reasonable amount of spare part reserves etc the risk of Khan sanctions can be mitigated to some extant and large numbers of LCA can be made. But having Kaveri version of LCA is needed in long run.

Shrinivasan · Post by **Shrinivasan** » 18 Sep 2014 10:08

vina wrote:Hmm. Naval LCA 2 is to do take off and landings from Goa shore based test facility next week . LCA Airforce version FOC by March 2015 , per Subhramanyam via Al-Hundi.

http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/t ... 420196.ece
If the second LCA Navy prototype is going to operate out of the SBTF, it is indeed a great news... it should have already completed taxi trials (high speed and low speed). maybe even a maiden flight (which I think very very unlikely).

member_20317 · Post by **member_20317** » 18 Sep 2014 10:23

A guesstimate has been expressed on BRF earlier too that the MLU for LCA could be a Kaveri. Given its shorter legs the LCA can afford to not be truly stealthy so the only real MLU that the LCA can get is a kaveri.

An LCA is imminently usable in about 90% of all flying that a non-expeditionary defense force does and with refueling (tanker or buddy) it can give good enough endurance. Beside LCA can easily act as the base for all the technology leaps that we may desire. Long run version-ization of this aircraft is easily possible. You can even have a Gripenesque version if you really are hell bent on it which would be TFTA enough.

Right now probably the best message that can be sent out by the establishment is to signal and start negotiations towards signing of MoUs with the private industry to make the LCA. A version-isation of this craft will also enable the private industry to begin to learn how difficult it is to even assemble these crafts. Right now the private industry simply ties up with the foreign entities for offering display devices et al. This way the Reliances and Tatas and Godrejs and Samtels, will learn to stoop to the level of SMEs to be able to truly conquer. The idea of an LCA is cheap enough (mere 26-45 mil) to be able to give reasonable profits to all concerned.

This is where the vision thing come in. What does the Indian establishment thinks it can achieve with a platform (nearly ready platform)?

Pratyush · Post by **Pratyush** » 18 Sep 2014 10:25

Viv S wrote:
The F414s are to be license-built at Koraput. Stands to reason that infrastructure for domestic overhaul as well as spares production will also be set up.

When was this decided. Last I knew was that the 414 was to be picked up as an off the shelf purchase of 199 numbers.

suryag · Post by **suryag** » 18 Sep 2014 23:29

Shrinivasan wrote:
vina wrote:Hmm. Naval LCA 2 is to do take off and landings from Goa shore based test facility next week . LCA Airforce version FOC by March 2015 , per Subhramanyam via Al-Hundi.
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/t ... 420196.ece
If the second LCA Navy prototype is going to operate out of the SBTF, it is indeed a great news... it should have already completed taxi trials (high speed and low speed). maybe even a maiden flight (which I think very very unlikely).

Dumb Q, how can they get the second prototype to Goa if it is built in BLR? Did they reassemble it in Goa?

pragnya · Post by **pragnya** » 19 Sep 2014 08:14

Pratyush wrote:
Viv S wrote:
The F414s are to be license-built at Koraput. Stands to reason that infrastructure for domestic overhaul as well as spares production will also be set up.
When was this decided. Last I knew was that the 414 was to be picked up as an off the shelf purchase of 199 numbers.

GE Press release dt 1st Oct 2010.

isubodh · Post by **isubodh** » 19 Sep 2014 11:50

Dumb Q, how can they get the second prototype to Goa if it is built in BLR? Did they reassemble it in Goa?

http://www.kidport.com/reflib/science/s ... tle747.JPG this is also an option.

hanumadu · Post by **hanumadu** » 19 Sep 2014 13:03

suryag wrote: Dumb Q, how can they get the second prototype to Goa if it is built in BLR? Did they reassemble it in Goa?

Indian C-17 Globemaster III Transport Aircraft Carrying LCA Tejas MK 1 Tejas

Indranil · Post by **Indranil** » 19 Sep 2014 21:42

suryag wrote:Dumb Q, how can they get the second prototype to Goa if it is built in BLR? Did they reassemble it in Goa?

I don't think it is a dumb question at all. I would be very surprised if they fly NP-1 straightaway at Goa. I pretty sure that they will be test fly at least once in BLR and then fly it to Goa.

Indranil · Post by **Indranil** » 19 Sep 2014 23:36

^^^ Thank you. I meant to write NP-2. I don't think they need to transport NP-2. They will just fly it there!

member_28722 · Post by **member_28722** » 19 Sep 2014 23:51

I think folks may expect plane to actually fly there always ... rocket can't do that

Victor · Post by **Victor** » 19 Sep 2014 23:53

Isn't that a Naval LCA being loaded into the C-17?

Indranil · Post by **Indranil** » 20 Sep 2014 01:14

That is TD-1 for R-day parade.

srai · Post by **srai** » 20 Sep 2014 09:30

Karan M wrote:More than dates alone, they need to provide the test points remaining. Otherwise, all the BS mongers have a field day coming up with cooked up stories about the program & platform & even those who understand the program challenges wonder what's going on with dates being pushed out a couple of the months each time.

It took an off hand comment at a seminar for the public to know that a huge number of change requests have been pushed for by the IAF since it joined the program late. Fine, mention that publicly, even if the classified portion (x weapon added) doesn't need to be detailed or skipped. Some interview to Rajya Sabha TV or a local TV channel isn't sufficient. High time they took a look at the media machinery deployed behind fighters WW & replicated it. Gripen team heavily pushed a NG OEW of 7.1T & now its 8T, but keeping the information flowing non stop in between means that one point alone doesn't define the program. The LCA on the other hand is defined by the Bedi types and that is a challenge.

I think that has more to do with the IAF policy than ADA not wanting to disclose more.

Vayu-StratPost Air Power Roundtable V

...
More importantly, I think DRDO and the public sector spend more time on publicity events – on non-events. I said, stop all that. You know you have a pre-IOC, you have an IOC, you have a huge celebration – you actually keep announcing things – ‘we are the fourth country to achieve this’, ‘we are the fifth country to achieve this’ or ‘we are the third country to achieve this’ – where is the final product? Where is it going to see the operational utility? How about questioning that? Where are the timelines? Where is the cost accountability?

– Air Marshal (retd) M Matheswaran.

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 20 Sep 2014 12:04

^^^ srai ji, wonderful to know the level of control IAF has over ADA. Air Marshal (retd) M Matheswaran says something and it becomes a policy for ADA to follow. What you are impying is that IAF folks say something, ADA makes it a part of their SOP.

IMVHO, this is the prism where reason refracts to take a 'pro' or 'anti' view towards the user or the developer and bypasses the straight line view of 'where the problem' lies. Where the problem lies is not in the IAF or DRDO but on how 'we' Indians fail in project management - intra agency or inter agency. We lay a lot of stress on the quality of our scientists or our pilots or our soldiers and we never discuss our deplorable 'management' record. Not just on BRF but the same attitude is elsewhere too. The whole Vayu StartPost discussions were replete with examples of this. None of the speakers discussed on how to take programmes forward - together. The whole exercise was one big finger pointing on the 'entity' not in the room. It is my view that while individuals will continue to have problems, mechanisms under which such individuals can come together and work for the 'common' cause is important and needs to be developed. The IN has one such mechanism but it may not be the mechanism which we need to thrust on the IAF-HAL-DRDO (ADA/GTRE). A key component in this management mash-up is the MOD which controls the vision, inter agency communication and most importantly the purse strings for all the other entities.

I think, respected Air Marshal in that Vayu StratPost round table showed everything that is wrong with IAF's decision makers. Not once did he have a good word to say about HAL, LCA, ADA etc and he kept finger pointing. About his own decisions on the MMRCA, he could not coherently justify the 30T limit when earlier he claimed that Light, Heavy and Medium are not relevant anymore. Says SU 30's are heavies and costly to operate and then how does one justify the Rafale which is super expensive to buy. By pointing out things like - 'they open a panel and can't put it back' they are saying the exact things these guys have been criticized for, on BRF. A new indigenous system for the IAF will need to be adopted and absorbed 'top down' and not the other way.

Admiral (retd) Arun Prakash says at the beginning of the round table for the need of IAF owning indigenous programmes but none of our good Air Marshals take him on. This is how bad we are at management. The problems are being deflected on to the other guys and no solutions are being worked on. Unfortunately, this happens from all sides.

srai ji, if some of these guys are saying things and ADA is making it their policy, ADA is worst off than the IAF. It is a sad commentary on the 'top leadership' that IAF has seen over the last 10 - 15 years. I am sure the lack of information is not some IAF policy. Also, it does not benefit the LCA in anyway in trying to blame 'one party' and alienating it from the programme. Let us at least agree to hold all involved parties collectively responsible for this 03 decade long story of development. As long as we take sides, the messing (missing) management will continue to get away and create problems.

Ranjani Brow · Post by **Ranjani Brow** » 22 Sep 2014 14:33

vina · Post by **vina** » 22 Sep 2014 14:57

Why do I get the feeling that the Naval LCAs , seem better area ruled and more pleasing to the eye than the air force versions?

Yagnasri · Post by **Yagnasri** » 22 Sep 2014 15:43

vina wrote:Why do I get the feeling that the Naval LCAs , seem better area ruled and more pleasing to the eye than the air force versions?

I do get the same feeling. But the need to see the carrier deck clearly must have resulted in this shape. Gurus can confirm.

PratikDas · Post by **PratikDas** » 22 Sep 2014 23:32

KHN-T 3001 = Kota Harinarayana Navy - Trainer 3001?

member_28108 · Post by **member_28108** » 22 Sep 2014 23:47

PratikDas wrote:KHN-T 3001 = Kota Harinarayana Navy - Trainer 3001?

Yes All LCA have been numbered KH by ADA team in his honour

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 23 Sep 2014 14:43

deejay wrote:^^^ srai ji, wonderful to know the level of control IAF has over ADA. Air Marshal (retd) M Matheswaran says something and it becomes a policy for ADA to follow. What you are impying is that IAF folks say something, ADA makes it a part of their SOP.

Its darned if you do, and darned if you don't. Some Folks will simultaneously block any PR outreach by the ADA types to attract kids/prospective folks to join the org, and also later cynically comment about how the org is having attrition. To answer your question in specific, yes, the labs are paranoid about user perception and this comes because they are very dependent on them for orders. PSUs are a different kettle of fish. MOD has their "back" so far and one way or the other, they will license manufacture everything, so they are less "dependent" (which leads to another huge set of problems wherein they dont innovate or even take user seriously - OFB being a perfect example).

IMVHO, this is the prism where reason refracts to take a 'pro' or 'anti' view towards the user or the developer and bypasses the straight line view of 'where the problem' lies. Where the problem lies is not in the IAF or DRDO but on how 'we' Indians fail in project management - intra agency or inter agency. We lay a lot of stress on the quality of our scientists or our pilots or our soldiers and we never discuss our deplorable 'management' record. Not just on BRF but the same attitude is elsewhere too. The whole Vayu StartPost discussions were replete with examples of this. None of the speakers discussed on how to take programmes forward - together. The whole exercise was one big finger pointing on the 'entity' not in the room. It is my view that while individuals will continue to have problems, mechanisms under which such individuals can come together and work for the 'common' cause is important and needs to be developed. The IN has one such mechanism but it may not be the mechanism which we need to thrust on the IAF-HAL-DRDO (ADA/GTRE). A key component in this management mash-up is the MOD which controls the vision, inter agency communication and most importantly the purse strings for all the other entities.

I think, respected Air Marshal in that Vayu StratPost round table showed everything that is wrong with IAF's decision makers. Not once did he have a good word to say about HAL, LCA, ADA etc and he kept finger pointing. About his own decisions on the MMRCA, he could not coherently justify the 30T limit when earlier he claimed that Light, Heavy and Medium are not relevant anymore. Says SU 30's are heavies and costly to operate and then how does one justify the Rafale which is super expensive to buy. By pointing out things like - 'they open a panel and can't put it back' they are saying the exact things these guys have been criticized for, on BRF. A new indigenous system for the IAF will need to be adopted and absorbed 'top down' and not the other way.

Admiral (retd) Arun Prakash says at the beginning of the round table for the need of IAF owning indigenous programmes but none of our good Air Marshals take him on. This is how bad we are at management. The problems are being deflected on to the other guys and no solutions are being worked on. Unfortunately, this happens from all sides.

srai ji, if some of these guys are saying things and ADA is making it their policy, ADA is worst off than the IAF. It is a sad commentary on the 'top leadership' that IAF has seen over the last 10 - 15 years. I am sure the lack of information is not some IAF policy. Also, it does not benefit the LCA in anyway in trying to blame 'one party' and alienating it from the programme. Let us at least agree to hold all involved parties collectively responsible for this 03 decade long story of development. As long as we take sides, the messing (missing) management will continue to get away and create problems.

The Navy guys were the only one talking sense. And Shukla may be called a lifafa by many but he was clearly not out to scupper the program for other programs benefits. The panel statement man misses even the impact of the sanctions post 1998 when the program was struggling for even actuators.

Agree its depressing overall and finger pointing is SOP. Matheswaran even implies he submitted a report to have the LCA closed off in one of the vids, without clearly indicating IAF support for future Marks while saying thats what is needed and then says original point of Rafale was to get TOT but now its unlikely to happen and we need it anyway. And he was to be made chairman of HAL by the IAF. He keeps implying program closures if necessary etc - where would anyone have any trust in this gentleman helming national programs which have to be seen through no matter, what? The Navy folks come across as completely different.

Lets just say some of the other folks in that video make no bones about their dislike of the LCA (saying light fighters etc) and plug Gripen etc in the same breath when not in such conferences etc. "Stop MK2 in a year, look out of the box".

The MMRCA rationale as given in the videos above made no coherent statement to me either. Only real reason let slip was IAF wanted supplier diversity. But at this cost? Did the IAF even do an analysis of how much it would cost to get the Su-30 fleet to say 90% full ops readiness, build up huge spares reserves + munitions reserves at lower cost /timeframe than buying the Rafale.

Re:LCA
The true blame lies with the MOD, for first letting the IAF not join the LCA program and stand outside, second for not monitoring the program and coming up with realistic support estimates and having Fin Min deliver them concomitantly and third, for not holding the developer-manufacturer accountable etc for the constant slip in timelines and the user for constant scope creep. All should have been brought onto a single board, all are responsible and finger pointing mitigated if not avoided if hard decisions were taken as and when required without developers worrying that IAF will use the media to discredit the program if Kaveri is dropped, without the IAF worrying that there will be no LCA if the Kaveri is continued with severe issues dogging its development etc.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 23 Sep 2014 22:01

@Karan M - Which youngsters are the labs and DPSU acquiring by making claims on timeline(s) and not fulfilling them? And it seems, missing deadlines is par for the course here.

As for blaming the MOD - the blame on LCA equally lies with scientific community for making choices which dragged the project and exposed it to vagaries like sanctions post 1998. Would LCA flown earlier if Dassault offer had been taken? The Air HQ was forthright in their appreciation of the projected goals and timelines as simply beyond the means of the nation. Did those scientists not know about the industrial capability of the nation to produce such a complex machine? We talk of iterative development in case of Arjun but wanted to build a formula car from day 1.

Coming to Navy - well, Navy controls one aspect of their requirement value chain - Ship Design - and works around it. But most of the major components that go onto that system are imported. If Indian MIL-IND complex had wherewithal to develop a SAM, Surface Attack Missile, Main gun and radars on the ship - most of the problems of army and to some extent the AF would've been solved.

But while Navy managed with Russian anti-ship missile till Brahmos came on board and even had land attack missile, IA had nothing. Same is the case with Radars. Or Akash SAM. Or Tube Artillery. Fact is, transformation in the Navy does not stop if DRDO does not deliver. It does in case of IA and IAF. Has the Navy worked on DRDO on land attack or anti-ship missile? Or the main gun for the ships? DRDO practically developed the entire chain of Radars on it's own.

While it is nobody's case that IA and IAF need to pull their pants up when it comes to working with DRDO, fact is, the scientific community needs to be more realistic in it's assessment. And not make pies in the sky.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 27 Sep 2014 17:36

Rohit you missed the point. Folks are driven by perception. PR events are hence essential to motivate folks. Hence Mathesawarans comments about stopping the rare event to commemorate a milestone are hence a challenge. Does a small event stop the overall program? Next, his attitude, both at the round table and off it BTW speaks for itself. We often see constant comments about attrition in R&D from the very folks who then claim the agencies in question should not even advertise any positivity. This sort of overreach is harmful.

Next, the scientific community was desperate post the HF24 fiasco where the IAF washed its hands of the program. This desperation shows up in the one program for everything, high risk program management style adopted for multiple programs. This because TD ie budgeting was linked to mission mode programs and hence everything went along at once. For instance the FBW development could have been sped up if a Jaguar FBW proposal at HAL was accepted, MOD shot it down. A proposal to upgrade the Vijayantas FCS to a full fire on the move FCS was similarly shot down. Both issues went on to become the biggest challenges for their respective programs. You can for instance buy an engine and modify the aircraft for integration if suitable. Not the same for FBW. The Arjuns delays in the late 1990s were mostly linked to its inability to achieve the high hit Pk demanded of it on fire on the move. The delays allowed the T90 to get its foot in the door and today Mk2 or not, Arjun is widely considered to have ended.

Dassault proposal was dropped because of the attitude shown by the company officials in presentations to ADA where they showed misleading data and also refused to share further technical details of the FBW program. This is recounted by the then program manager of the LCA SR Valluri, no fan of the LCA program manager or ADA(they supplanted him and Raj Mahindra). The Dassault rep even told the ADA guys that irrespective of what they said, it was New Delhi which decided and they were sure to clinch the deal. MBB and the Americans were the other presenters -former were completely transparent but inexperienced whereas US had experience and was finally chosen. So it was not some overreach as IAF folks watching from the sidelines note today but pure and simple program management 101. The US also had excellent facilities like CALSPAN and the cooperation went great guns till the tests. The one critique that can be addressed is why Kalam et al kept the LCA team in the dark about the tests. The only answer is compartmentalisation and the fear that ordering excess units of actuators, engines could have tipped the US to what was going on. Paranoia perhaps but then again the US had stopped the previous tests by putting pressure on PVNR so Kalam et al prioritised the nuke tests over the LCA. But he did repeatedly call the NAL, AdA teams and ask them if they could do it on their own if cooperation was stopped. Which is what happened. Also using the Dassault proposal may not have stood us in good stead as today the FBW at least is current, without having to be upgraded to Dig from Analog channels.

Coming to the rest, the answer is simple. The current system works on getting some requirements and then working against it in mission mode programs. These programs compete against UORs. Limited budgets mean Peter gets the money or Paul does, not both. This is the sort of thing which for instance stalled the T72Upg because IA alleged MOD told them either Arjun gets money or T72s but not both and sets up a cycle of distrust. If x knows a program will not get funded unless it's ultra ambitious and high risk, it's set up for exactly that. The navy understood this and hence does not gripe when such programs overreach, they allow for Mk2s to come in. In turn the R&D folks no longer breathe insecurity and focus on rectifying their shortcomings. Embedding Naval program managers with technical awareness means they contribute to the program and prevent the occasional case of "promotions" at the cost of honesty which might well occur if the dysfunctional system above is exploited. Also, engineers respect those who come in with valid contributions as versus political appointees (choice made to placate the user by putting their rep at the highest post). Another issue why for instance HAL folks will resent if a R&D AM type is directly parachuted as CEO.

The fundamental difference between IN and IA/IAF is that former has a technical stream for its own design/development/program mgmt cadre. They hence embed themselves with programs early on and bridge the user developer gap. IN does not breathe fire on delay in towed array sonars because it's own personnel are working along with NPOL and hence they get frank feedback about progress or challenges. IA approach is to periodically visit and ask for an update. If things change between one update to the other and screw ups occur, it leads to issues.