Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

All threads that are locked or marked for deletion will be moved to this forum. The topics will be cleared from this archive on the 1st and 16th of each month.
Post Reply
Philip
BRF Oldie
Posts: 21538
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: India

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by Philip »

The problem with missiles is once fired,they're gone forever,until our "re-usable" missile comes into service.The advantage of manned aircraft and UCAVs are that they can be used again and again with PGMs,dumb bombs with kits,stand-off missiles,etc.They have immense flexibility and can be redeployed to any part of the theatre of ops within hours.An aircraft combines surveillance,targeting and prosecution all in one package.A missile would need intel,targeting by sats or UAVs,ELINT,photo-recce by aircraft,etc.,and if the enemy cleverly disperses his assets ,would require several missiles to successfully take out the targets.This is the problem that long range naval missiles face ,targeting in real time,and why BMos with its speed is superior to the assortment of sub-sonic missiles around.

Once the air-launched version of BMos arrives,even our MIG-29s will be able to carry 2 underwing.Just look at the added range of the missile if launched from an aircraft that has successfully penetrated enemy air space.Ground based missiles would be limited in range as they would have to be safely located out of range of LR arty ,40KM+ which would reduce their effective range.An aircraft on the other hand staying in Indian air space could launch a missile that would utilize the full range of the missile when air-launched.This has to be kept in mind when considering alternatives for the MMRCA/Rafale.Both MKIs and Fulcrums will be able to carry BMos.I wonder whether any western alternatives would be able to do so.The LCA definitely not,which is why I maintain that it cannot be a complete replacement for the MMRCA,even a MK-2 on this score alone.Oto see whether the other range of Russian supersonic stand-off missiles,the KH series,can be carried by the LCA,as they are planned to be integrated with Rafale.
Viv S
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5303
Joined: 03 Jan 2010 00:46

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by Viv S »

^^

The only aircraft that can carry the Brahmos is the Su-30MKI, and that too only one on the centre-line.

There is a proposal for a lighter Brahmos-3 but it is still a long long way from being ready. Also when ready, the idea is that most IAF platforms including the Tejas Mk2 should be able to employ it.


BTW the Chinese have already fielded a missile in the latter class while the British-French have a similar supersonic stealth missile in development.
Philip
BRF Oldie
Posts: 21538
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: India

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by Philip »

Dear Viv,a lighter BMos is in the works and from various reports,will be available from 2015 onwards in service.There is a version for the IN too from this report.Some have said that the MKI's will be able to carry 3,while others say 2,and even IN MIG-29Ks will be able to carry the air-launched version.

wik
A new, smaller variant of the air-launched BrahMos is also under development. This variant would arm the Sukhoi Su-30MKI, Mirage 2000, future inductions such as the 126 Dassault Rafale, and the Indian navy's MiG-29K.[6] A model of the new variant was showcased on 20 February 2013, at the 15th anniversary celebrations of BrahMos Corporations. The miniaturized version would also have a range of 290 km, but it will be shorter by three metres as compared to the present missile. The Sukhoi SU-30MKI would carry three missiles while other combat aircraft would carry one each.[67][68]
pragnya
BRFite
Posts: 728
Joined: 20 Feb 2011 18:41

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by pragnya »

Philip wrote:Dear Viv,a lighter BMos is in the works and from various reports,will be available from 2015 onwards in service.There is a version for the IN too from this report.Some have said that the MKI's will be able to carry 3,while others say 2,and even IN MIG-29Ks will be able to carry the air-launched version.

wik
A new, smaller variant of the air-launched BrahMos is also under development. This variant would arm the Sukhoi Su-30MKI, Mirage 2000, future inductions such as the 126 Dassault Rafale, and the Indian navy's MiG-29K.[6] A model of the new variant was showcased on 20 February 2013, at the 15th anniversary celebrations of BrahMos Corporations. The miniaturized version would also have a range of 290 km, but it will be shorter by three metres as compared to the present missile. The Sukhoi SU-30MKI would carry three missiles while other combat aircraft would carry one each.[67][68]
it is still in initial phase of planning. even Sivathanu Pillai is not sure but expects it to be around 2017. not before 2020 to me.
Viv S
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5303
Joined: 03 Jan 2010 00:46

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by Viv S »

Philip wrote:Dear Viv,a lighter BMos is in the works and from various reports,will be available from 2015 onwards in service.There is a version for the IN too from this report.Some have said that the MKI's will be able to carry 3,while others say 2,and even IN MIG-29Ks will be able to carry the air-launched version.
The Brahmos-3 was just a proposal in 2012.

Assuming initial development has already begun, you'd at best have only a prototype by 2016 (and even that's doubtful). Assuming two years in testing and another year or two to put into large scale production, as Pragnya said, it will be available only close to the decade end.

With regard to the air launched Brahmos, only modified Su-30MKIs will be able to carry it (I believe that will be the 40 aircraft ordered most recently). Also the material from BrahMos APL puts the number of missiles carried at one per aircraft.
NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 19226
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by NRao »

Thales is about to hickup. Looks like Thales may implement to lay off people due to a delay in the Indian contract: http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 5#p1538985
NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 19226
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by NRao »

One of the major concerns WRT the Rafale has been the financial health of Dassault, which promted the GoI to seek "French Sovereign Guarantee To Fulfill MMRCA Deal".

Well, now comes news of the potential of the guarantor needing a guarantor. In Under Strain, France Examines Its Safety Net, it seems that France itself is under considerable financial stress.

And of course, the now famous France to cut back on Rafale order, the decline of Dassault is very pronounced:
The French state has decided to cut back its orders for Rafale fighter jets from the current 11 per year to just 26 over the next six years. This could jeopardise the entire Rafale programme unless Dassault Aviation is able to sign the India contract for the sale of 126 fighters for over €10 billion.

At a press conference here on Friday, France’s Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, who returned from a trip to India last week, was blunt: as of 2016, Dassault Aviation should count only on exports to support the production of the multirole combat aircraft. That can mean only one thing: wrap up the contract with India or you’re sunk.
At least with Sukhoi they had the backing of their native government, here in the case of Dassualt the margins are too narrow. And, now with Thales predicting, via measures to lay off people(?) the Indian negotiations going into a deep freeze, the future does not seem too good for the Rafale.

Time to bury it and move on.
raj-ji
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 67
Joined: 25 Oct 2010 19:31

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by raj-ji »

NRao wrote:One of the major concerns WRT the Rafale has been the financial health of Dassault, which promted the GoI to seek "French Sovereign Guarantee To Fulfill MMRCA Deal".

Well, now comes news of the potential of the guarantor needing a guarantor. In Under Strain, France Examines Its Safety Net, it seems that France itself is under considerable financial stress.

And of course, the now famous France to cut back on Rafale order, the decline of Dassault is very pronounced:
The French state has decided to cut back its orders for Rafale fighter jets from the current 11 per year to just 26 over the next six years. This could jeopardise the entire Rafale programme unless Dassault Aviation is able to sign the India contract for the sale of 126 fighters for over €10 billion.

At a press conference here on Friday, France’s Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, who returned from a trip to India last week, was blunt: as of 2016, Dassault Aviation should count only on exports to support the production of the multirole combat aircraft. That can mean only one thing: wrap up the contract with India or you’re sunk.
At least with Sukhoi they had the backing of their native government, here in the case of Dassualt the margins are too narrow. And, now with Thales predicting, via measures to lay off people(?) the Indian negotiations going into a deep freeze, the future does not seem too good for the Rafale.

Time to bury it and move on.
Scrapping the deal is one possible option. Another would be to get more out of the French. India will be negotiating from a position of considerable strength. Our defense needs have not diminished. We can get very good value for money. Not to mention France will be very grateful to us for this, not a bad position to be in. I equate this to all the support India gave to Russia in terms of investment and orders. End result we get to lease a n sub and get access to 5th gen fighters.

If the Rafale deal is played right and soon, there are opportunities that India can leverage from the likes of Dassault, Thales etc.
Mihir
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 884
Joined: 14 Nov 2004 21:26

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by Mihir »

Viv S wrote:
Mihir wrote:The initial debate was about CAS aircraft, not just subsonic and armoured CAS aircraft.
The initial debate started with: 'CAS performed in the manner of the A-10 or Su-25 is fast becoming obsolete'.
And how exactly is the MiG-27's mission in the IAF not "performed in the manner of the A-10 or Su-25"?
Viv S wrote:
The MiG-27 fills this niche role in the IAF, and not just as an afterthought. This is a platform designed for low-level attack missions including CAS. Before the introduction of the Su-25, it fulfilled this role even with Frontal Aviation. The big gun, cockpit armour, laser ranger and nav/attack suite all point to that.
One hand you say I'm arguing for the sake of it and on the other you go ahead and claim that the MiG-27 was built for CAS. Single engine. Single rudder. No control redundancies. It has big gun indeed and ammunition enough to last for about... 5 seconds.
In and of themselves, why do the single engine, single rudder, lack of control redundancies (which is plain wrong) make it unsuitable for CAS? The Su-25 has single rudder. Its engines are placed very close to each other. The MiG-27 does indeed have control redundancies (look up a MiG-27 manual). It also has armour, although thankfully you have stopped claiming that it does not. And the ammunition lasting "5 seconds"? Have you ever heard of a CAS bird firing that long a burst? In small bursts, that is enough ammunition for its envisaged mission, unless you wish to make the case that the gun wasn't intended for ground attack. Your entire argument is essentially that the MiG-27 wasn't an exact replica of the A-10 and hence unsuitable for CAS. That's BS.
Viv S wrote:
Are you even reading my posts? If low-flying aircraft are vulnerable to short-range SAMS and AAA, then those flying at higher altitudes are more vulnerable to medium range SAMs. The USAF and Israeli AF paid a heavy price in lives to learn that lesson. It is why low-flying tactics were adopted in the first place.
The whole point behind flying at higher altitudes is to attack from stand-off ranges. Mobile army units are usually equipped only with AAA and SR-SAMs, and infantry with MANPADS.
The Buk is a medium-range SAM meant to accompany mobile land units. And such units often operate withing the engagement envelope of long and medium-range air defences.

And yes, I get what the point of flying for higher altitudes is. Now tell me how you are going to provide close air support to ground forces at "stand-off ranges". Attacking from a distance works if you are hitting a fuel dump. Not so if your target is a highly mobile armoured column in the middle of a firefight. It's almost as if you believe that tactics are universal and unaffected by the objectives, the nature of the mission, local conditions, enemy capabilities, and other such bothersome details.
Viv S wrote:USAF and IsAF paid a heavy price? The same Israeli Air Force that lost some 40 fighters in 1973 to ZSU-23s, including six lost in one day?
And why, pray tell, were those fighters lost to AAA? Because they were flying low, ja? Why were they flying low? To avoid medium-range SAMs, which would have made mincemeat of the attacking force before it got anywhere close to completing its mission. And for all the losses suffered to ZSU-23s, how many were lost to SA-6? How many were lost to the ack-ack because they were forced to fly low due to the presence of medium range SAMs?
Viv S wrote:As for the US, of the 25 fighter aircraft lost after Vietnam, 18 were downed by AAA, VSHORADS or MANPADS.
Why "after Vietnam"? Is that some arbitrary starting point you get to pick? Why not consider the heavy losses to SA-2s during Vietnam as well? Because it puts a dent in your pet theory?

Do look up the history of USAF Wild Weasel units in Vietnam and how they suffered heavy losses from medium-range air defences and fighter patrols. It is a good lesson in what happens when you are facing an enemy whose C3, AD system, and fighter assets are in working order in spite of a concerted SEAD campaign. Thud units attained greater successes only after they started flying low to avoid the worst part of enemy fire. Obviously, it subjected them to significant risk from AAA, but that is just the nature of the beast.
Viv S wrote:In Iraq '03, the same Tornados flew mid altitude and engaged almost exclusively with PGMs.
Yes, and we all know that they did so in the face of a fully functioning Iraqi IADS.
Viv S wrote:
Now you're just nitpicking. Please point to an IAF or at least a reputed Indian publication that calls the Longewala operation "battlefield air interdiction". As for the "most casualties" argument, are you denying that low-flying IAF aircraft did indeed turn the tide of the battle? Are you denying that they engaged Pakistani forces while they were fighting the Indian Army? In fact, were it not for Wingco Bawa's Hunters, the Pakistani forces wouldn't have broken contact with Indian defences in teh first place.
The Pakistani formation had been routed by the time the second sortie returned to Jaisalmer. Air operations continued for another two days. Also I did not, at any point, belittle the importance or contribution of the IAF to the battle.
Let's make this a little simpler. What exactly is your point here? That Longewala wasn't a CAS mission at all? Or that CAS is pointless because even if the Hunters did turn the tide of battle very quickly, most Pakistani casualties were after they had disengaged? In that case, I must ask: why exactly did the tanks disengage in the first place? On a whim? You're line of argument is becoming more and more ridiculous.
Viv S wrote:
Yes, as blobs on a screen. Do tell us what modern technology short of IFF transponders is going to help IAF pilots distinguish a T-72 from an Al Zarrar or a T-90 from a T-80UD from 30,000 feet. Let us also know how they are going to id infantry formations with certainty without someone on the ground doing the designating.
Do you think a pilot zipping along in a MiG-27, an aircraft with poor cockpit visibility and designed to deliver its payload in a supersonic dash at low level (not for low speed loiter over the battle area), trying to keep his aircraft from being shot down, can distinguish between a T-72 & Al Zarrar, or T-80UD & T-90?
First of all, props to you for deftly sidestepping my original question :P

And I forgot that the only way MiG-27s operate is by flying low at supersonic speeds. My mistake, of course.
Viv S wrote:A pilot of an aircraft operating at range, can survey a far larger swathe of the battlefield, accept a feed from UAVs on scene, have targeting information passed on from an FAC on ground, use SAR imagery with sub-metre resolution and/or employ CCD-TV. And do it all in a calm measure manner, without his feet in the fire, and while keeping an eye out for enemy aircraft.
Very nice :)

Now imagine that the UAV has already been brought down by air defences, the FAC on the ground is being hammered by artillery and MG fire, and every radar site within a 50km radius is painting your flying gizmo and loosing off a volley of SAMs at it, while enemy fighters are bearing down on it with your top cover struggling to keep them away (hopefully, there is top cover, although we have learnt that specialized aircraft are bad and top cover is a waste of resources). And our brave brave pilot is trying to deal with all this commotion while going through frame after frame of sub-metre resolution imagery of the ground and picking out targets in a calm, measured manner. Not so much fun now, is it?
Viv S wrote:
It is an "appalling risk" only if you force a Rafale of F-35 into a role ill suited to its basic design. It isn't an "appalling risk" for dedicated CAS birds.
Aside from the fact that we don't operate dedicated CAS birds, even modern CAS birds are at far greater risk today given the proliferation of SHORADS and MANPADS.
Greater risk, yes. But the mission is still crucial enough to offset that risk. As Karan M said, the role itself is still necessary. If the adversary has equipped himself with the means to inflict heavy casualties on the attacking force, the answer lies in mitigating the risks presented through new tactics and systems, not doing away with the mission altogether. Stand-off attacks and PGMs are one way of dealing with mitigating those risks under certain conditions. They do not totally replace specialised low-level attack aircraft.
Viv S wrote:
You're confusing two very different things again. "designed in an era when precision guidance was in its infancy" is not the same as "was conceived for an era when precision guidance would no longer be a novelty".
The statements have nearly opposite implications. No scope for confusion. To whit - '[they] were conceived for an era when precision guidance was a novelty'.
No shit, Sherlock; of course they have opposite implications! That's why your understanding was wrong in the first place. You claimed that they were designed in an era when precision guidance was in its infancy. I pointed out that it had no bearing on the era it was designed for. Let me know if I can make that any simpler.
Viv S wrote:First, while the requirement for the A-10 was identified in late 60s, it wasn't until the mid-80s, that the Igla and Stinger (more reliable than the Strela-2 and Redeye) were in wide service becoming potent threats to low level aircraft.
Of course, and American designers had no clue of their own developments in MANPADS tech (Redeye 2 and Stinger were conceived at around the same time as the A-10) while designing the A-10. It is only after Stinger entered "widespread service" that they realised what a colossal mistake they had made.
Viv S wrote:Secondly, until the later 90s, low level rocket and missile attacks were the only means of carrying out CAS missions. Its only recently that long range LDPs and PGMs capable of hitting moving targets from altitude, have become common.
At the risk of repeating myself, the problem is not the precision guided munitions. It is the identification, targeting, and tracking of enemy units engaged in battle which is still a big challenge in a war against a determined, well-equipped, well-drilled opponent.
Viv S wrote:
Those aircraft were phased out because (a) the dissolution of the Red Army made them unnecessary in Europe and (b) the downward pressure on budgets at the end of the Cold War necessitated the consolidation of platform types, so specialist fighter aircraft of all kinds were replaced with more types (and fewer numbers) of multi-role fighters. There is some merit in your argument that it wasn't cost effective for NATO to maintain a huge fleet of single-purpose aircraft. But that is only true for Western Europe. For India, it makes very little sense to blindly follow what the world is doing without taking the capabilities of its potential adversaries into account.
While I do agree that there's been an understandable and deliberate shift away from single purpose aircraft, it wasn't cost effectiveness that I was referring to. All those aircraft were designed long before the proliferation of PGMs and long range cruise missiles. And it wasn't until they entered their last leg of service that long range EO sensors were being widely fielded. Coupled with the advent of net-centric warfare, both events vastly reduced the utility of such aircraft.
Net-centric warfare? In the mid to late eighties? :shock:

Long-range cruise missiles? Against moving targets, that too thirty years ago?
Last edited by Mihir on 09 Nov 2013 08:27, edited 6 times in total.
NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 19226
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by NRao »

If the Rafale deal is played right and soon, there are opportunities that India can leverage from the likes of Dassault, Thales etc.
Possibly.

However, the way I see it is that this not one of those products that one buys and places it on a counter in the house happy that they bought a $500 product for $5. It will need for the various companies to be around to provide support to a very expensive and tech advanced product. And, if their financial health is at risk today the question is will they be around in say 2030.

FYI: France's, the national, rating just dropped to AA today.

Dunno. Image
Victor
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2628
Joined: 24 Apr 2001 11:31

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by Victor »

The situation is only slightly better for Eurofighter but the core problems remain. The Euro mess is far from over and the band-aids applied last year simply covered them up temporarily. Bottom line, they are not in great position to make future improvements on Eurofighter and India will most likely end up paying for it.

One out may be to simply buy the Rafales off the shelf but get serious on the offsets. That way we will get the planes faster and cheaper and also get essential technology via the offsets. Maybe use that as a quid pro quo to get a production line in India for civil/military airliners. Both sides should be khush.
KrishnaK
BRFite
Posts: 964
Joined: 29 Mar 2005 23:00

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by KrishnaK »

Mihir,
Yes, as blobs on a screen. Do tell us what modern technology short of IFF transponders is going to help IAF pilots distinguish a T-72 from an Al Zarrar or a T-90 from a T-80UD from 30,000 feet. Let us also know how they are going to id infantry formations with certainty without someone on the ground doing the designating.
DAS
Mihir
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 884
Joined: 14 Nov 2004 21:26

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by Mihir »

DAS is a sweet piece of tech, but it is basically a defensive system that warns pilots of missile attacks approaching aircraft and can cue short range AAMs. It cannot detect, identify, and prioritize ground targets from 30k feet.
GeorgeWelch
BRFite
Posts: 1403
Joined: 12 Jun 2009 09:31

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by GeorgeWelch »

Mihir wrote:DAS is a sweet piece of tech, but it is basically a defensive system that warns pilots of missile attacks approaching aircraft and can cue short range AAMs. It cannot detect, identify, and prioritize ground targets from 30k feet.
http://www.sldinfo.com/distributed-aper ... abilities/
Lieutenant-Colonel Dehner: The helmet in the F-35 will display fused data, and creates a picture so that, literally, when I look down through what would be the skin of the aircraft, I still get that projection of the ground underneath me. So, if I am trying to locate a target, the current helmets will give you a little box or a symbol to highlight that target. But as soon as the wing of the aircraft gets in the way then I would have had to move the airplane physically to clear it out of the way. So, now I can see through the wing with this new system.

An immediate benefit is I don’t have to move my aircraft into a spot that I might not want. For example, when we set up an orbit for intel, surveillance, reconnaissance, that ISR mission which is a lot of what we spend time doing. There are better paths in the sky for us to just stay within a relative distance, and I want to get a really good picture, so I’m just going to set up an orbit. But that instantly can flex with, oh, my wing might be in my own way, so you’re going to end up flying these non-optimal formations. I’m going to move the wing out of the way so I can get a better look. Oh, now, I’ve got to get back on profile. That’s a lot of the work that the pilot is up to. Now, I don’t have to do that with the DAS.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=p ... W5RY#t=286
Mihir
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 884
Joined: 14 Nov 2004 21:26

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by Mihir »

Ah, that super duper helmet again. We are back to square one, aren't we? :lol:

Now, coming to the contents of that interview, all it says that the HMD (whenever they actually get it working) will allow the pilot to "see through" obstructions. It says nothing about detecting, tracking, identifying, and sorting land vehicles from thousands of feet above the battlefield. That is just your imagination.
NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 19226
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by NRao »

Press release:

Northrop Grumman AAQ-37 Sensor System Demonstrates Hostile Fire Detection Capability
AN/AAQ-37 Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System Detects and Locates Hostile Ground Fire
BALTIMORE, Feb. 11, 2013 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Northrop Grumman Corporation's (NYSE:NOC) AN/AAQ-37 Electro-Optical Distributed Aperture System (DAS), developed for the F-35 Lightning II, has added hostile ground fire detection to its capabilities by successfully detecting and locating tanks that were firing live rounds during preparations for a military exercise.

A video accompanying this release is available on YouTube at http://youtu.be/fHZO0T5mDYU.

While being flown on Northrop Grumman's BAC 1-11 test aircraft, the DAS detected and located tank fire from an operationally significant distance. In addition to artillery, the system is able to simultaneously detect and pinpoint the location of rockets and anti-aircraft artillery fired in a wide area.

The AN/AAQ-37 DAS provides passive spherical awareness for the F-35, detecting and tracking aircraft and missiles in every direction simultaneously, providing visual imagery for day or night navigation and targeting purposes.

"The DAS continues to show its ability to gather and analyze data for a wide range of missions not initially contemplated for this sensor system. These flight test results are just the latest example of the situational awareness capability of this revolutionary technology in action," said Mark Rossi, Northrop Grumman's DAS business area director.

Although hostile fire detection is not an F-35 requirement for the DAS, the system design makes it ideal for this mission. This inherent capability enables DAS to harvest, process and deliver key battlespace information to ground forces and other aircraft autonomously, without the need for cueing or increasing pilot workload. The ability to gather this live fire data expands the mission possibilities of the sensor to include close air support and ground fire targeting.

Northrop Grumman is a leading global security company providing innovative systems, products and solutions in unmanned systems, cybersecurity, C4ISR, and logistics and modernization to government and commercial customers worldwide. Please visit http://www.northropgrumman.com for more information.
There are a few others that claim that tanks can be classified, but I have not found that to be the official position of the vendors (yet).

Besides, we need to remember that here on out - especially with the F-35 - that a single plane (such as the F-35) can and will collect data from other sources too. So, in reality such a plane will automatically fuse info from perhaps UAVs, other F-35s, perhaps even other intel planes flying further away.

It is a disadvantage if "data fusion" is interpreted to mean fusion of data only from one source. That really is a extremely limited view of that term.

Also, what these sensors can gather can very easily be enhanced or blown up to obtain more clear picture (for ID and classification).
NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 19226
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by NRao »

Mihir wrote: Now, coming to the contents of that interview, all it says that the HMD (whenever they actually get it working) will allow the pilot to "see through" obstructions. It says nothing about detecting, tracking, identifying, and sorting land vehicles from thousands of feet above the battlefield. That is just your imagination.
Doing that is not an issue.

The issue, if at all, has to be to get it right in real-time. To "fuse" data - from umpteen sources - in real-time - is an issue.
NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 19226
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by NRao »

And, 30,000 feet is less than six/6 miles. What is the big deal there?
NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 19226
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by NRao »

Note read the whole article, but try this .......................

2006 :: Advanced sensor fusion gives F-35 operators full knowledge of their environment.

Also, check this out:

[youtube]fHZO0T5mDYU&feature=youtu.be[/youtube]
Karan M
Forum Moderator
Posts: 20773
Joined: 19 Mar 2010 00:58

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by Karan M »

The basic DAS does not have the resolution for long range tank identification etc. what it is, is an enhanced MAWS. The job of IDing tanks etc is that of EOTS.
Viv S
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5303
Joined: 03 Jan 2010 00:46

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by Viv S »

Mihir wrote:And how exactly is the MiG-27's mission in the IAF not "performed in the manner of the A-10 or Su-25"?
You could use the MiG-27 that way. Heck you could use the Su-30MKI that way. As a matter they did use the MiG-27 for rocket attacks at Kargil... for all of two days before moving operations out of the MANPAD envelope.

In and of themselves, why do the single engine, single rudder, lack of control redundancies (which is plain wrong) make it unsuitable for CAS? The Su-25 has single rudder. Its engines are placed very close to each other.

The trailing-edge rudder was divided into upper and lower sections, with the upper section independently controlled through the SBU-8 oscillation damper and an RM-130 hydraulic actuator. (Ref)

While initial production Su-25s used the R-95 turbojet engine, very late production examples used the improved R-195 turbojet, which provided slightly greater thrust and was specifically designed for combat survivability, with the ability to soak up considerable battle damage and keep on running.

The major problem was that the twin engines of the Su-25 were too close together, and when one failed after a Stinger hit, its disintegration or burning would cause the other to fail as well. The solution was to put a "firewall" between the two engines in the form of a slab of metal about 5 millimeters (0.2 inches) thick and 1.5 meters (5 feet) long. (Ref)

It also has armour, although thankfully you have stopped claiming that it does not.
What I said was that its not designed to sustain heavy battle damage. That remains unchanged. It has a few panels of armor to protect the pilot against small arms fire and is no way comparable to the titanium buckets and panels on the A-10 and Su-25.

The MiG-27 does indeed have control redundancies (look up a MiG-27 manual).
Share please. Here's what I've found so far -

Flight controls are hydraulically powered and have an automatic flight control system that provides boost, damping, trimming, and stabilization. This flight control system has no redundant components; all components are critical. Loss of one hydraulic system results in complete loss of aircraft control.
.
.
Case in point, in many military aircraft like the MiG-23, the loss of hydraulic power (not uncommon) can lead to a severe if not a total
loss of control.


There is a backup hydraulic system but once the main hydraulics are lost only basic functionality is retained - when only the boost system is operating, the pilot cannot use the rudder or the air brakes, and the use of differential stabilator deflection for roll control is limited.

FAA

And the ammunition lasting "5 seconds"? Have you ever heard of a CAS bird firing that long a burst?
It was cumulative figure, no suggestion of 'one burst'. 260 rounds at 4500 rd/m would give it two bursts of about 2 seconds each.
In small bursts, that is enough ammunition for its envisaged mission, unless you wish to make the case that the gun wasn't intended for ground attack.
The intentions were sound, unfortunately hanging a big gun on an airframe that wasn't designed for it, led to a less than sound result (ref).

- The constant recoil impacts, despite the brief firing bursts, caused structural damage and punished the plane's equipment.
- Acoustic loadings from muzzle gases and the associated high-frequency vibrations literally loosened the fuselage, adding fatigue cracks to the fuel tanks.
- There was the risk of the doors of the forward landing gear being jammed.
- The fuel pump failed because of breakages in the power supply circuit.
- The avionics systems often became turned off because the electrical commutating switches became disconnected.
- It frequently happened that the recoil force of firing broke the reflector sight.
- Landing headlights broke so frequently, that before flights involving gun firing, they were removed and replaced with caps.

- Even given this background, the case which occurred in the 24th Division on 29th March 1989 appears to have been unique. On recovery from a dive after gun shooting, the instrument panel fell onto the pilot's legs: the panel fastenings had been sheared by the recoil force. The pilot reached an airbase holding the panel, which was hanging via electric cables, by one hand.


Your entire argument is essentially that the MiG-27 wasn't an exact replica of the A-10 and hence unsuitable for CAS. That's BS.
The A-10 is past its sell by date, the MiG-27 hardly merits mention.

The Buk is a medium-range SAM meant to accompany mobile land units. And such units often operate withing the engagement envelope of long and medium-range air defences.
And there's no question of performing CAS in close proximity to a Buk system without SEAD support. The only exception is the F-35 which can approach and attack at a closer range than other aircraft.

And yes, I get what the point of flying for higher altitudes is. Now tell me how you are going to provide close air support to ground forces at "stand-off ranges". Attacking from a distance works if you are hitting a fuel dump. Not so if your target is a highly mobile armoured column in the middle of a firefight. It's almost as if you believe that tactics are universal and unaffected by the objectives, the nature of the mission, local conditions, enemy capabilities, and other such bothersome details.
I suggest you look up the range data on the SDB-II. Its very much in the 'stand-off' category and its designed for employment against highly mobile targets. Even the AASM can be used at fairly long ranges - it can destroy a moving target at a range of upto 50km.

And why, pray tell, were those fighters lost to AAA? Because they were flying low, ja? Why were they flying low? To avoid medium-range SAMs, which would have made mincemeat of the attacking force before it got anywhere close to completing its mission. And for all the losses suffered to ZSU-23s, how many were lost to SA-6? How many were lost to the ack-ack because they were forced to fly low due to the presence of medium range SAMs?
In 1973? About the same number of aircraft was lost to SA-6s. The difference is, you can shut down (if not destroy) medium range SAM sites with ARMs, and the Israelis did so quite thoroughly in Lebanon. Its far harder to suppress short range AAA and impossible to do with MANPADS.

Why "after Vietnam"? Is that some arbitrary starting point you get to pick? Why not consider the heavy losses to SA-2s during Vietnam as well? Because it puts a dent in your pet theory?
There's the little matter of there being no MANPADS in Vietnam.

Do look up the history of USAF Wild Weasel units in Vietnam and how they suffered heavy losses from medium-range air defences and fighter patrols. It is a good lesson in what happens when you are facing an enemy whose C3, AD system, and fighter assets are in working order in spite of a concerted SEAD campaign. Thud units attained greater successes only after they started flying low to avoid the worst part of enemy fire. Obviously, it subjected them to significant risk from AAA, but that is just the nature of the beast.
The issue you raised was about 'learning lessons'.

As it happens the NATO forces did learn their lesson. Almost all operations in the Bosnia ('95), Yugoslavia ('99) and Iraq ('03) were flown at over 10,000 feet i.e. out of the MANPAD envelope.

Yes, and we all know that they did so in the face of a fully functioning Iraqi IADS.
They took the heaviest losses flying low level in '91. Most other allied aircraft flew higher altitudes and suffered lower casualties.

Let's make this a little simpler. What exactly is your point here? That Longewala wasn't a CAS mission at all? Or that CAS is pointless because even if the Hunters did turn the tide of battle very quickly, most Pakistani casualties were after they had disengaged? In that case, I must ask: why exactly did the tanks disengage in the first place? On a whim? You're line of argument is becoming more and more ridiculous.
What I said was that the majority of the air operations were BAI. It was casual BTW sort of statement that you decided to take issue with. I did not claim that CAS never took place, and I don't know why we're having a debate on this line.

First of all, props to you for deftly sidestepping my original question :P
Answered in the paragraph that followed.

And I forgot that the only way MiG-27s operate is by flying low at supersonic speeds. My mistake, of course.
The A-10 was designed to be highly maneuverable and loiter over the battlefield. The Su-25 somewhat less so (owing to the VVS wanting a faster aircraft).

The MiG-27 in contrast was designed was designed for supersonic dash and is fundamentally unsuited to the kind of maneuvering traditionally required of a CAS aircraft.

Now imagine that the UAV has already been brought down by air defences, the FAC on the ground is being hammered by artillery and MG fire, and every radar site within a 50km radius is painting your flying gizmo and loosing off a volley of SAMs at it, while enemy fighters are bearing down on it with your top cover struggling to keep them away (hopefully, there is top cover, although we have learnt that specialized aircraft are bad and top cover is a waste of resources). And our brave brave pilot is trying to deal with all this commotion while going through frame after frame of sub-metre resolution imagery of the ground and picking out targets in a calm, measured manner. Not so much fun now, is it?
Simpler to send in an aircraft right into the heart of the air defences, to join the UAV's carcass on the ground?

Greater risk, yes. But the mission is still crucial enough to offset that risk. As Karan M said, the role itself is still necessary. If the adversary has equipped himself with the means to inflict heavy casualties on the attacking force, the answer lies in mitigating the risks presented through new tactics and systems, not doing away with the mission altogether. Stand-off attacks and PGMs are one way of dealing with mitigating those risks under certain conditions. They do not totally replace specialised low-level attack aircraft.
To repeat again, no one is suggesting that that the role be done away with. And you've mentioned these tactics and systems to handle MANPADS, AAA etc, yet have refrained from elaborating your concept.

No shit, Sherlock; of course they have opposite implications! That's why your understanding was wrong in the first place. You claimed that they were designed in an era when precision guidance was in its infancy. I pointed out that it had no bearing on the era it was designed for. Let me know if I can make that any simpler.
In the late 60s, very few could have predicted the current proliferation of highly accurate PGMs and long range EO sensors. So yes, they were designed for an era preceding wide spread precision guidance.

Of course, and American designers had no clue of their own developments in MANPADS tech (Redeye 2 and Stinger were conceived at around the same time as the A-10) while designing the A-10. It is only after Stinger entered "widespread service" that they realised what a colossal mistake they had made.
Until the proliferation of the Igla and Stinger the risks were acceptable considering that low level attacks were the only means of performing CAS (aside from dive bombing). The same doesn't apply today.

At the risk of repeating myself, the problem is not the precision guided munitions. It is the identification, targeting, and tracking of enemy units engaged in battle which is still a big challenge in a war against a determined, well-equipped, well-drilled opponent.
The range and resolution of modern EO sensors/SAR radars on fighter aircraft has massively improved from the time when low level gun runs in defended air space was still considered viable. During the Kosovo air operations, even A-10 'the flying tank' stayed above 10,000 feet (flying AFAC & supporting CSAR) and usually attacked only in dives. Plus aircraft today have or will soon have data from their own sensors fused with streams from UAVs on scene and JSTAR/Sentinel type ISTAR platforms in the rear. And this is being developed by the IAF as well, not just by the NATO forces.

Net-centric warfare? In the mid to late eighties? :shock:

Long-range cruise missiles? Against moving targets, that too thirty years ago?
Read it again. I said such aircraft (i.e. most ones designed for low level flight) were/are in their last leg of service when long range PGMs/EO sensors proliferated and NCW emerged.
NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 19226
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by NRao »

Some of us, perhaps, need to get a better picture of which subsystem does what, but, the fact that it is possible to identify and classify a hostile "object" should not be an issue. Especially in today's world of "network centric" architecture. It would be travesty if the Army commander on the ground has detailed situational awareness and that is not communicated to the air crafts above or the other way around. The new IP was supposed to solve most of such problems.

Also, quickly, the issue of identifying is an optics issue and that of classifying is a pattern recognition issue. Both should not be a major problem for some thing like the F-35.

As I mentioned most "problems" boil down to computing power. There are issues related to UAVs, but most are related to computing power, with one major one in the realm of hacking.
Viv S
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5303
Joined: 03 Jan 2010 00:46

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by Viv S »

The Eurofighter has crossed a few milestones recently. While on the sidelines, it is still formally in the running for the MMRCA contract.


1. Storm Shadow integration to begin shortly. Full integration clearance by 2015. Also, being integrated is the Taurus missile for the Luftwaffe.

2. Development variant of Captor-E to begin flight tests in 2014. The production variant will probably enter service around 2016, albeit with only limited deployment (similar to the RBE2 AA).





With a major package of air-to-surface strike-related enhancements now being delivered, and flight tests also poised to begin with two cruise missile designs, the Typhoon is fully able to claim multi-role status, Eurofighter says.
Completing a so-called P1E package of enhancements “is a significant step forward,” says Laurie Hilditch, Eurofighter’s head of future capabilities. “It takes us to a position where it is a true swing-role aeroplane, with a fully integrated laser-designator pod and new weapons.”

Another system that will strongly underline the Eurofighter’s longer-term strike potential is MBDA’s Storm Shadow cruise missile, which is poised to get airborne with instrumented production aircraft (IPA) 2 from Decimomannu air base in Sardinia, Italy. Plans to fly the combination this week have been thwarted so far by a cyclone, but the event is described as to occur “imminently”.


http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articl ... on-393331/




Development work on the Selex radar, known as Captor-E, has been continuing, partly funded by industry. Typhoon test aircraft IPA7 is almost ready to start shakeout flights following modifications to make it capable of testing an AESA radar.

The first flight is expected before the end of the year, after which the machine will be fitted out with a development standard radar in the first quarter of next year.


http://www.defensenews.com/article/2013 ... y-Mid-2014
kit
BRF Oldie
Posts: 6278
Joined: 13 Jul 2006 18:16

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by kit »

wont the alternative be mainly based on cost factors this time around..not necessarily the best ?
NRao
BRF Oldie
Posts: 19226
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30
Location: Illini Nation

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by NRao »

Just as a FYI, not sure how it will impact the MMRCA deal, nations are seriously considering if they can "share" upgrades (mid-life).

Specifically look for a tie up between India, US, Singapore, Australia and Japan. The last three are further along and Indo-US is very slowly maturing. BUT, IF at all it comes to pass we should see something in the next 3-5 years. Perhaps earlier from the smaller blocks.
Viv S
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5303
Joined: 03 Jan 2010 00:46

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by Viv S »

kit wrote:wont the alternative be mainly based on cost factors this time around..not necessarily the best ?
That's true. But capability is a matter of interest to the forum at the least. Particularly since the lack of a 'true' multi-role capability was being cited as the failing for the Eurofighter.

In any case, it would be worth getting a revised quote from EF if for no other reason than to squeeze the French during the negotiations with the CNC. The older pricing quotes have already expired, and it'll be much harder for the Rafale to maintain its L1 position given that the its campaigns in UAE and Brazil have fizzled out and domestic orders have received a huge cut. In contrast, the EF has racked up a sale to Oman, a follow on order from Saudi Arabia, is poised to win in Bahrain and appears to be the preferred choice for the UAE.
bharats
BRFite
Posts: 342
Joined: 06 Mar 2007 13:37
Location: India
Contact:

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by bharats »

Brazil chooses Gripen over Rafale
Opens door for Indian navy

by Ajai Shukla
Link: http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 027_1.html

Brazil's decision to buy the Swedish JAS-39E/F Gripen (or Gripen NG) has opened a tantalising possibility for India's defence ministry (MoD), which is frustrated after 33 months of negotiations with French company, Dassault on the proposed purchase of 126 Rafale medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA).

On Monday, Swedish defence giant, Saab, which builds the Gripen, announced Brazil had signed a contract for 36 Gripen NG fighters for $5.475 billion. Brazil chose the Gripen NG over the Rafale (Dassault, France) and the F/A-18 Super Hornet (Boeing, USA). Brazil will now ask Saab to develop the Sea Gripen, says defence analyst, INS Jane's. Twenty-four of these "navalised" fighters will equip Brazil's aircraft carrier, Sao Paulo.

IHS Jane's also highlights the Indian Navy's need for the Sea Gripen for two carriers that Cochin Shipyard is building - the 40,000-tonne INS Vikrant and a larger, yet unnamed, successor referred to as the Future Indigenous Carrier. So far, the Indian Navy had planned to fly a naval version of the indigenous light combat aircraft (LCA) - the Naval Tejas - from these carriers. However, the Naval Tejas, which the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) is developing, may not be ready for service by 2018, when the Vikrant will be commissioned.

The Sea Gripen constitutes a new option as the Vikrant's light fighter. The navy already has a medium fighter, the MiG-29K, on order from Russia. Indian analysts, like Manoj Joshi of Observer Research Foundation, say buying the Sea Gripen would let the DRDO engage Saab as a design partner for the Naval Tejas and Tejas Mark II, both advanced versions of the current Tejas Mark I.

In 2011, then DRDO chief V K Saraswat had approached Saab to collaborate in developing the Tejas Mark II. In 2012, the DRDO and Saab held detailed discussions. In January 2013, Saab was issued a Request for Proposal, which the DRDO examined and discussed. Yet, nothing came of it. The DRDO's interest in Saab stems from the numerous technical parallels between the Tejas and the Gripen. Both are light fighters in the 14-tonne class. Whilst developing the Gripen NG, Saab changed the engine to the more powerful General Electric F-414 turbofan, and added more fuel; which is exactly what the DRDO proposes for the LCA Mark II. Fitting the bulkier, heavier F-414 into the Tejas would require re-engineering of the fuselage; a problem that Saab has promised to solve. "The greatest benefit to the Tejas Mark II could be from the Gripen's superb networking. Aerial combat is no longer about eye-catching aerobatics; it is about data links; networking, and cockpit avionics, which is Saab's strength," says Joshi.

The DRDO was also hoping to learn from Saab's maintenance philosophy, which has made the Gripen the world's most easy-to-maintain fighter. According to independent estimations, the Gripen requires three to five man-hours of maintenance per flight hour. That means, after an hour-long mission, 6-10 technicians require only 30 minutes to put the fighter back in the air. In contrast, the Rafale is estimated to require 15 maintenance man-hours per flight hour; while the F-35 Lightening II requires 30-35 man-hours.

According to a Jane's study, the operating cost of the Gripen is $4,700 per hour. The Rafale is thrice as expensive, at $15,000 per hour. "The Tejas Mark I has not been designed with operational availability in mind. It is a maintenance nightmare, with sub-systems inaccessible. The Tejas Mark II will need Saab's help in radically re-engineered these," says a DRDO engineer. Senior Saab officials say, off the record, they are keen to partner India in developing the Tejas Mark II. They say the Tejas Mark II, built cheaply in large numbers, would eliminate the need for a heavy, costly, highly sophisticated fighter like the Rafale. Saab sees major profit in co-developing the Tejas Mark II.

Brazil's contract for 36 Gripen NGs comes on top of Stockholm's decision to buy 60 of these fighters for the Swedish Air Force. In 2011, Switzerland too had selected the Gripen over the Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon. However, in an astonishing, nationwide referendum on the proposed $3.5-billion purchase, the Swiss people voted to spend the money instead on education, transport and pensions. The current version of the Gripen NG, the Gripen D, is currently in operational service with the Swedish, Czech, Hungarian, South African and Royal Thai Air Forces, and also with the UK Empire Test Pilots' School.
brar_w
BRF Oldie
Posts: 10694
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by brar_w »

Karan M wrote:The basic DAS does not have the resolution for long range tank identification etc. what it is, is an enhanced MAWS. The job of IDing tanks etc is that of EOTS.
Its by design. The IR spectrum is covered by both of them, but in reality its just not 6+1 , but the CNI and the Common picture is formed for all in the loop. Where DAS goes above and beyond an IR MAWS is that it can not only detect fire, but track it constantly with enough precision to geolocate it. The concept here was to detect fire, if there is a conflict as to the nature (such as which tank it is, whether hostile or not) then the ICP goes through its ALGOS, based on information form 1 or more DAS sensors. If there is no positive ID, the ICP uses the EOTS information to ID the nature of threat. Once that has happened the EODAS keeps a track on the threat and provides real-time information for targeting directly to the weapons station. IR MAWS like function is just one use for EODAS but it has been made sensitive enough and "smart" enough to do a lot more. The Baseline capability @ IOC is for your standard MAWS function plus tracking and keeping tabs on fighters in a furballl (dogfight) from a blue v red pov. On the test bird they are already moving ahead and using the capability i.e. EODAS sensors (no upgrades, but the same sensor) , sensor processor and ICP to build software for future blocks where the EODAS's enhanced capability can be leveraged for things such as missile defense, ISR, ground artillery fire detection, tracking and geolocating. Basically what you see in the video posted by NRAO and another one released last year where EODAS is used to detect missile launches and keep a track on early phase BM profiles. The MDA would jump on this especially when they have trade studies that showed that things like ALHTK and NCADE worked in principle but required massive investment in sensors and computing to have the level of battlefield utility being desired. For the F-35 and future fighters that use the system that has the technical capability to do a lot more through software enhancements future versions of such weapons may just be as plug and play as one can hope.

Another thing to take into account is that the positive identification is done by the ICP, autonomously, so it doesn't have to use just the EODAS, or the EOTS it can use either, a combination of the two, or use the Radar (single high resolution zoomed image form a SAR scan) to come up with an ID based on its threat library and confidence level and then use the EODAS sensor to track. Heck the ICP may wish to use neither, but use the CNI system through MADL and use someone else's positive ID. The main emphasis here is that form a hardware stand-point the EODAS sensor setup is much of an overkill for the IR MAWS type mission. The pains that it has taken to integrate into the existing frame, avionics architecture and to come up with the right amount of processing at the various levels have been justified because in essence it is going to be a very important aspect of how the F-35 builds SA and eventually conducts offensive ops. To highlight how important this is, they could have installed a perfectly capable IR maws in the AN/AAR-56 (f-22) and called it a day, justifying the decision based on affordability. They chose a much more capable system that came with its fair share of headache's that will only increase with a rise in the capability demanded (processing power, at both he sensor level and at the ICP level, software requirements to achieve the desired capability and the fact that they wanted seamless handoff and real-time information projection). The objective here was to design a comprehensive way to operate both actively and passively in the RF (Apg-81 from IOC will have Passive modes) and IR domains with the handoffs being seamless and autonomous. So if a deeper study about the "nature of threat or fire" is to be desired, the ICP can refer to one or more DAS sensors, or perhaps use the other tools at its disposal. This may involve using a SAR map, using a FLIR feature from the EOTS or a combination of the three. Once that is determined based on the level of detail required, distances etc, a handoff is made to the DAS that keeps a tab on (tracks) the threat so that if the threat is to be acted upon the fighter need not turn around or use any more sensors. Therefore it is entirely possible that DAS alone cannot at some given range under some considerations be by itself sufficient to positively ID a target/threat, however it by design has been asked to be sufficient to track it and target it at tactical ranges that obviously vary by the threat (is it a BM missile in Phase 1 or 2 or a tank etc).

Giving the EODAS the level of sensitivity of EOTS would be something that would be duplication of duties and essentially require a humongous sensor therefore they have kept the EODAS as a macro IRST and the EOTS as the one that zooms and provides greater qualitative identification. They combine through the ICP along with a host of other forms of identification and tracking depending upon the nature of the emission. At the sensor processor and the ICP level they have given a 10X capability to the EODAS (akin to a digital zoom on a cell phone for example). Why 10X and not 5X or 20X? My best guess would be that the 10X is about the max they can do while still using the software and algos to have the ability to discriminate for an ID or a track (most likely). Had they gone 20X "digital" then they would have most likely lost the qualitative features required to do a distinct track for say a convoy of tanks.

Readings:

http://www.sldinfo.com/shaping-a-strike ... le-of-das/

http://www.sldinfo.com/shaping-the-f-35 ... nterprise/

http://breakingdefense.com/2014/06/a-go ... -the-f-35/

http://www.northropgrumman.com/capabili ... fault.aspx

Silent Watch : http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabili ... fault.aspx



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9fm5vfGW5RY
DAS is a sweet piece of tech, but it is basically a defensive system that warns pilots of missile attacks approaching aircraft and can cue short range AAMs. It cannot detect, identify, and prioritize ground targets from 30k feet.
No its not. Its been designed to do a lot more things over and above being a defensive IR MAWS. Read the post above, and a few of my other posts on the matter in the JSF thread. They develop a capability, and move on. As has been reported over the last year or so, they are already working on adding more software beyond block3 and to truly start using this as an offensive system in the strike role. As has been mentioned in the links provided, these capabilities are all enabled through software. Hardware can handle a lot lot more before it maxes out and requires a change. I would suspect that the growth room will take it well past the MLU and all changes to up the capability will focus on either the software addition portion or the ICP growth that is planned for every other sub-block. Even now, with the software planned (Blk 3) they can USE the EODAS for example, to launch IR missiles at hostile targets.

Regarding your previous comment on the Helmet, go to the JSF thread and scroll the last 20 or so pages where I have provided constant updates on the level of stability in the Gen 2 and the state of development of the Gen 3. I have provided pilot comments, videos from pilots, statements on the stability issues etc regarding these developments. The alternative helmet is gone, they are very stable on the gen 2 and have rolled out generation III to the fleet this year. The helmet issues are well covered to a degree of confidence where even the bean counters do not suggest investment in a "back up" system.

Edit: Watch this ( 48:00 onwards) , more informative then a gazillion David Axe articles ;)...This particular video is 8 or so months old





http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ ... n-3-helmet

It says nothing about detecting, tracking, identifying, and sorting land vehicles from thousands of feet above the battlefield. That is just your imagination.

This capability has been demonstrated as of last year using the same ICP, same sensors and the same hardware. Like I said, the F-35 roadmap calls for a baseline and to build on that baseline. On the Vendor of the business, they are tasked with constantly demonstrating capability that builds on the baseline as Northrop grumman did last year. The partners then get together and pick and choose on the timelines of when the software blocks are to be mated to the capability concerned. UAI is something that will be at the very top of the capability along with things such as Rover. Having said that, the capability to considerably expand the scope of DAS has been shown without any hardware change to the aircraft other then the planned ICP upgrade that would have occurred anyways as per the roadmap. Needless to say, that as partner nations meet (as they did a few months ago) to hammer out what next beyond 3F and 4 and 5 this would be incorporated into the blocks. The hardware already exists to do this, the software will come as per the schedule.

http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/page ... d=10021210
Last edited by brar_w on 30 Oct 2014 22:52, edited 8 times in total.
member_20292
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2059
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: Alternatives to MMRCA - News & Discussion

Post by member_20292 »

bharats wrote:
In 2011, then DRDO chief V K Saraswat had approached Saab to collaborate in developing the Tejas Mark II. In 2012, the DRDO and Saab held detailed discussions. In January 2013, Saab was issued a Request for Proposal, which the DRDO examined and discussed. Yet, nothing came of it. The DRDO's interest in Saab stems from the numerous technical parallels between the Tejas and the Gripen. Both are light fighters in the 14-tonne class. Whilst developing the Gripen NG, Saab changed the engine to the more powerful General Electric F-414 turbofan, and added more fuel; which is exactly what the DRDO proposes for the LCA Mark II. Fitting the bulkier, heavier F-414 into the Tejas would require re-engineering of the fuselage; a problem that Saab has promised to solve. "The greatest benefit to the Tejas Mark II could be from the Gripen's superb networking. Aerial combat is no longer about eye-catching aerobatics; it is about data links; networking, and cockpit avionics, which is Saab's strength," says Joshi.

The DRDO was also hoping to learn from Saab's maintenance philosophy, which has made the Gripen the world's most easy-to-maintain fighter. According to independent estimations, the Gripen requires three to five man-hours of maintenance per flight hour. That means, after an hour-long mission, 6-10 technicians require only 30 minutes to put the fighter back in the air. In contrast, the Rafale is estimated to require 15 maintenance man-hours per flight hour; while the F-35 Lightening II requires 30-35 man-hours.
This should be explored a little more. Buying the Gripen is not an option. Collaborating with Saab for the low maintenance innards, which I am sure the IAF has had a good look at all the insides and the designs, is a good idea.
Post Reply