Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

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member_28349
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Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by member_28349 »

I recently wrote a piece for the War is Boring defense blog on whether tanks are obsolete (https://medium.com/war-is-boring/751f5ccd091). As you can see, I argue that tanks still play a very useful role, if not the dominant role that they played 75 years ago.

But much of the debate on the role of tanks has focused on the Western/Middle Eastern experience. I'm curious if the role of armor has changed in Indian (or Pakistani, if anyone can comment on that) strategy and doctrine in light of advances in anti-tank weaponry as well as the prevalence of "small wars" in armor-unfriendly terrain, such as Lebanon 2006 or Kargil.

Michael
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by Karan M »

Michael, armor remains critical to Indian (and Pakistani) war fighting strategy. Please look up Cold Start, for an idea about how India may hypothetically deploy armor. Typically, when it comes to fortified positions, while a combination of Armor and Mech infantry will assault fortified positions, it is armor that will exploit any breakthrough. In the desert, armor formations will be more free to engage in fluid battles; post war territory held is used as a bargaining chip.

In a nutshell, the Indian Army would most likely agree with you that tanks remain crucial to warfare. Proliferation of light AT weapons is a challenge to be sure, but defensive countermeasures (eg hard and soft kill systems) are also proliferating in response. Net, tanks will become more expensive but not obsolete.
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by member_28349 »

Thanks, Karan. My impression is that India has been more focused on big-war mechanized operations (which also tend to be the most expensive), such as Cold Start. The U.S. military is still grappling about whether to prepare for infantry-intensive small wars, or big-war conventional battles that would feature plenty of armor (Israel also has the same debate, for different reasons). Given the expeditionary nature of U.S. overseas commitments, America will probably have to prepare for both.

It would seem logical for Pakistan, given its more limited resources, to concentrate what resources it has on precision anti-tank weapons rather than trying to confront India in what looks like a sort of Air-Land Battle. Pakistan hasn't had much luck in tank warfare over the last 50 years.

Michael
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by Indranil »

Michael,

Thank you for bringing your perspective to the forum. But I would suggest you to move it to the "Armoured Vehicles Discussion" thread. You will have a much wider audience there.

At Bharat-rakshak (BR), we try to limit ourselves to as few threads as possible. This way it is easier for reader to follow and comment.
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by shiv »

Since you want your article discussed , I think that it is fair that it should be visible on here
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/751f5ccd091
Armored vehicles could still rule the battlefield

[Michael Peck] Michael Peck in War is Boring

by MICHAEL PECK

It was 40 years ago this month that the death of the tank was announced. The iron monsters had blitzed through Sedan, Kiev and Tobruk in World War II. In 1967, Israeli armor had swept through the Sinai like lightning. And then in October 1973, hundreds of burning Israeli tanks, draped in anti-tank missile guidance wires, signaled that something had changed.

The Yom Kippur War spurred critics to ask why armies were spending vast sums of money on vehicles that could be destroyed by a single determined infantryman with an inexpensive weapon. Perhaps it was a sort of Schadenfreude, revenge for a decades-long panzer terror.

The king of battle had been bested by puny infantrymen armed with Soviet-made wire-guided anti-tank missiles and rocket launchers. That the vaunted Israeli armor had been decimated by Arabs only made the technology seem more impressive. Also not coincidentally, the 1973 war occurred just as the U.S. had finished a long, unsuccessful jungle war where armor could play only a supporting role.

But it turned out that the initial coroner’s report on the tank was wrong. “It never made any sense,” says military analyst Tony Cordesman, who had been dispatched by the Pentagon to study the conflict.

While the Israelis had suffered heavy tank losses, many of those came at the beginning of the conflict, a result of a lethal mix of desperation and overconfidence. In the opening days of the October War, in a desperate bid to rescue their outposts along the Suez Canal, the Israelis had sent their armor — without infantry, artillery or air support — against fortified anti-tank defenses.

The Israeli Defense Forces could have learned from the British, who had seen their gallant armor decimated in boneheaded charges against Rommel’s 88-millimeter guns some 30 years before. At the same time, the Egyptian assault formations that crossed the canal had been heavily reinforced with anti-tank weapons stripped from other Egyptian units — bad luck for the initial Israeli counterattack, but a boon for the later Israeli counteroffensive that struck weaker Egyptian defenses.

As is their custom, the Israelis adapted in 1973, and scraped together infantry to support their tanks. There were no ‘67-style blitzkriegs in that war, but using infantry and artillery to suppress Arab anti-tank defenses resulted in much fewer losses for IDF armor.

The Yom Kippur War did not prove that tanks were obsolete; it merely restated the lesson of Cambrai in 1917 and Kursk in 1943, which is that armor must operate as part of a combined arms force of tanks, infantry, artillery and other units. Tanks may be the star player, but war is a team game.
Israeli Merkava 4. Wikipedia photo

Ironically, the Yom Kippur War led to a renewal of the tank. U.S. forces in Europe had long been a human tripwire for the use of nuclear weapons, which were thought the only means for outnumbered NATO armies to stop an invading armada of Soviet armor.

But if Israeli tanks were vulnerable to anti-tank missiles, then so were Soviet tanks, whose supply lines could also be disrupted by aircraft armed with the precision-guided munitions that were used effectively at the end of the Vietnam War.

And so was born the AirLand Battle concept, which combined maneuver warfare by heavy mechanized forces, plentiful anti-tank missiles and air strikes to interdict Warsaw Pact reserves and supply lines.

The Yom Kippur War “combined with American withdrawal from Vietnam and a decided shift toward the Soviet Union with American military strategy, caused a renaissance, so to speak, within Army circles that helped to produce TRADOC and the DePuy reforms,” says Col. Gian Gentile, who was written about the atrophying of U.S. armor skills since 9/11. “Which of course then led to active defense and Airland Battle doctrines, both premised on heavy tanks and mechanized maneuver warfare.”

So how has the tank fared since 1973? In the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars, American and coalition armor did well, though the opposition was nothing like what the Israelis faced in 1973. In numerous Third World conflicts, such as Angola and the Iran-Iraq war, armor played a useful but not decisive role. Canadian tanks performed well in Afghanistan, as did U.S. armor battling Shia militants in Sadr City in 2008.

Yet a disquieting note was the Israel-Hezbollah war of 2006, where Israeli tanks — including the heavily armored Merkavas — were roughly handled by entrenched Hezbollah forces using advanced Russian anti-tank weapons. But as in 1973, it seems that poor Israeli tactics and overconfidence were more to blame.

And the future? As U.S. military power is increasingly projected by drones and Special Operations Forces, and war becomes manhunts and targeted assassinations instead of open field battles, will tanks have a role? “Folks who have fallen in love with Special Operations Forces, such as RAND analyst Linda Robinson in her recent Washington Post op-ed would certainly agree that the tank has seen its day, partly due to such weapons as the ATGM,” Gentile says.

“But the bigger point here, I think, is that there is still a necessity for heavy armored vehicles for ground combat in American military strategy,” Gentile continues. “This is not to say that the M-1A2 Abrams will live forever in the dreams of armor officers waiting for a Soviet incarnate to attack through the Fulda Gap bringing about World War III.”

Since the first clumsy British Mark I tanks clanked into battle at the Somme in 1916, there has been a race between tanks and anti-tank weapons. For a time after 1973, it seemed that like the tank-killers had the upper hand, though advanced armor plate and active countermeasures such as Israel’s Trophy system have helped restore the balance.

The spread of advanced guided weapons, especially to non-state forces such as Hezbollah, has made the battlefield more dangerous than ever. Which is why RAND analyst David E. Johnson, who has written several papers on the future of armor, believes that tanks are more necessary than ever. “My sense is that ATGMs have made the battlefield — be it irregular, hybrid or high-end war — too deadly for anything but tanks and similarly armored vehicles. As an Israeli told me when I was doing research on Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza, nothing else can survive on the battlefield.”

With their survivability, long-range weapons, sensors and ability to deliver firepower accurately, tanks provide vital muscle for lighter troops such as Stryker brigades and leg infantry fighting irregular forces, Johnson writes. “In the two most recent cases of hybrid warfare — the 2006 Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead in Gaza — heavy armored formations were the only units able to maneuver on a battlefield where an adversary had an effective standoff weapons capability, particularly [anti-tank guided missiles] and [man-portable air-defense systems].”

In the end, tanks are as much concept as technology: the belief that combining firepower, protection and mobility creates a uniquely powerful system on the battlefield. Perhaps someday, powered armor from Starship Troopers, or what Special Operations Command is developing will replace tanks. On the other hand, whatever a man can carry or shoot, a vehicle should be able to carry or shoot more of.

Perhaps more likely is that there will be unmanned tanks, small, light and cheap. But armor will survive. The tank was humbled in 1973, but not vanquished.

Michael Peck is a contributing editor at Foreign Policy Magazine and writes the War Games blog at Forbes.com. His Twitter is @Mipeck1.
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by shiv »

My view on tank warfare is that they are not outmoded.

If an adversary has all the necessary anti-tank assets ready and waiting, yes tanks will be vulnerable. But there is no guarantee that all war situations will have a tank force opposed by a ready and waiting anti-tank warfare system.

Rhetorically speaking, one would not allow one's AWACS to overfly enemy territory without absolute air superiority. One would not allow one's aircraft carrier to simply sail undefended into an area full of mines and enemy subs and within striking range of shore defences and enemy aircraft. Similarly, one needs to use tanks where the best can be squeezed out of them.

War is war, not a joust between knights. A knight might chivalrously fight only another knight who has the same weapons and armour as he does. But in war you fight the enemy with a killer weapon in a situation where he cannot bring effective defences in to fight your killer weapon. So tanks, used judiciously, are relevant.
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by Deans »

I agree with Shiv.

What has changed however it that the chance of a full blown conventional war have reduced all over the world incl. India-Pak. We are more likely to see small engagements with greater use of Infantry/ Special forces and Missiles/ EW. It would mean a reduced role for not just a tank, but also artillery, APC's etc.
I see tanks themselves evolving to become lighter (air portable) with less focus on main gun armament. The kind of engagements involving tanks we are likely to see in future would be something like IDF vs. Hezbollah, rather than a Soviet tank army charging across the Fulda gap.
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by member_28349 »

Sorry, it looks like I can't move the post to the armor thread. If the mods can delete this one, I'll move it over to the armor thread.

Michael
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by NRao »

xxxxx
Last edited by NRao on 20 Dec 2013 10:57, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by Rahul M »

it's ok, we can continue here. let that thread be for Indian armour issues.

tanks would remain relevant because of one simple reason, they are mobile yet offer protection and firepower. tanks allow commanders to be proactive and decide time and place of engagement. the other options lack 1 or 2 of these 3 properties.

ManPATGM's lack mobility and protection and are thus primarily defensive weapons. APC/ICV's are mobile but lack both firepower and protection compared to tanks. armed choppers have firepower but are vulnerable to MANPADS and also lag in persistence. they are good for an attack but not for holding a place.

this post, with victor suvorov's quote is still relevant IMO
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 55#p849155


the only system I see that can possibly replace tanks are well armoured ATGM carriers, like the NAMICA but with better protection. the tank gun has probably reached the maximum barrel dia possible at 120/125 mm and it would be unlikely to see major improvements in range or lethality. I know the russians fiddled with a 152mm tank gun at one time but that is probably unrealistic. if ground launched ATGM's can provide a range advantage over tank main guns (top attack mode automatically provides an advantage in lethality) while still being small enough to be carried in enough numbers in vehicles not larger than current tanks, we might just see a shift.

p.s. michael, nice blog, been a reader for sometime.
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by Yogi_G »

What the presence of tanks can do to enemy morale in open battlefields is well understood but what does not have a full consensus in terms of effectiveness and relevance is the use of tanks in urban settings. Improving RPG tech is the tank's nemesis in the urban arena and it has been said that tanks accompanied by infantry on foot in such scenarios is the best way out. twin flank attacks and roadblocks are still very much a serious threat in such environs.
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by Rahul M »

yogi saar, tanks are always supposed to be accompanied by infantry in any combat situation involving enemy infantry, which is the majority of cases. that's why tank formations always have running mates of mechanized infantry.
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by negi »

I think in the first place the ones who have claimed death of the MBT or tank have been given too much attention else I have never heard anyone in the military circle say such a thing , it is like saying now that we have ballistic missiles why do we need fighter bombers ? I mean for an argument's sake a latest gen MBT is far more likely to survive against a RPG hit as against a latest gen fighter AC against a modern SAM but we have never heard about death of a fighter AC . If today a destroyer and submarine were to face off in sea the odds will be in favour of the submarine and that holds true even if the destroyer was a Ticonderoga class but no one says that destroyers are outdated . All in all it is too silly a topic to be even debated.
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by member_23455 »

Michael Peck wrote: It would seem logical for Pakistan, given its more limited resources, to concentrate what resources it has on precision anti-tank weapons rather than trying to confront India in what looks like a sort of Air-Land Battle. Pakistan hasn't had much luck in tank warfare over the last 50 years.

Michael
And one assumes you make this statement after a close study of Indian and Pakistani armored battles in 1965 and 1971?
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by Yogi_G »

Rahul M wrote:yogi saar, tanks are always supposed to be accompanied by infantry in any combat situation involving enemy infantry, which is the majority of cases. that's why tank formations always have running mates of mechanized infantry.
I agree Rahul ji, sorry about the ambiguity but I was specifically speaking in context of dismounted infantry as was learnt by Israel in the Lebanon operations. IIRC, their post 1967 and 1973 operational guidelines predominantly swung around using armour to clear an area before calling in the mech infantry due to the infantry shortage they suffered from. Pure armour units in operations being very rare around the world was thrust upon the IDF due to infantry shortage and they quickly learnt its cost leading them to invest more in infantry and training (earlier armoured-infantry co-ordination training was imparted only to a subset of infantry folks).

And then the Ruskies had the sniper problem in Chechenya with dismounted infantry which is sort of antithetical to above.
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by member_27862 »

Gentlemen......it is all in the way we would like to employ our armoured elements!

Tracing the concept back to the days of the Wehrmacht Panzer formations, it would be noted that they excelled in open land warfare, making rapid dashes and 'occupying' a lot of territory. These were supported to an extent by the infantry riding in Half tracks and similar vehicles who were the KEY in retaining that territory. The Germans learnt a bitter lesson in Kursk though, when they deliberately went on offensive against prepared Soviet defences and except for some die hard Waffen SS panzer formations making progress, the German attacks were blunted. The Soviets took over from where the Germans faltered and organized high volume tank formations, to be used in mass, which even the superior training and firepower of the Germans could not blunt. However, the Germans invented the best AT weapon of the war in form of the Panzerfaust and claimed 20000 plus tank kills by this man portable weapon in less than two years of its usage.....the tank killer had arrived!!!

Now how do we employ our armoured formations. If we employ them in direct infantry support...they will be shot up in no time by enemy AT teams. But if employed in the Shock effect role with mass formation usage, they will be a big menace for the enemy. That is why it is important for the initial holding formations to punch a hole in the enemy lines, before the armoured formations in an Operational Maneuver Role are called in. But as mentioned before, they require some manner of infantry support to clear the enemy AT nests. The enemy AT heptrs will need to be countered by the escorting SAM carriers/ Local Air superiority.

So my take on armour in Indian context -

Punjab - Limited success because of favourable terrain for enemy AT teams and good AT bundh/ canal complexes.

Rajasthan - Great possibility.... eg had the Pakis bypassed Longewala in 1971, they would have reached Tannot by the morning.......

North east - Only role in the Assam plains if the Chinese overcome our defences in the mountains.......

And by no mean should we engage our tanks in 'any' role in built up areas where they will be easy meat for the defenders .

Basicall, I am saying the tanks are 'very' relavent in the Indo Pak scenario and will remain so until the era of the automated anti tank drone arrives....
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by johneeG »

A noob question: There are already drones i.e. remote controlled flying machines which can be used for scouting and combat. Similarly, is it not possible to create a remote controlled tank/scout machine?
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by member_27862 »

johneeG wrote:A noob question: There are already drones i.e. remote controlled flying machines which can be used for scouting and combat. Similarly, is it not possible to create a remote controlled tank/scout machine?
UGCVs (Unmanned Ground combat vehicle) or UGV is the development genre of the unmanned armoured drones. As of now they seem to be of less than 15 ton class and sporting more weaponry of the urban combat variety........I feel the major impediment is the cost of development (the all aspect sensors will cost a bomb), deployment and operations and an AFV with a set of crew still works out to be cheaper in all aspects.....with an added advantage of having the most powerful supercomputer ever made to take decisions - The human brain circa 2013-14 :)

The AFV is going to be very relevant in the predicted Indian operational scenario for at least the next 20+ years..... what may change is operational strategy with the inclusion of the C4I2 setup.....and beyond!
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by Karan M »

sameerjoshi wrote:Now how do we employ our armoured formations. If we employ them in direct infantry support...they will be shot up in no time by enemy AT teams. But if employed in the Shock effect role with mass formation usage, they will be a big menace for the enemy. That is why it is important for the initial holding formations to punch a hole in the enemy lines, before the armoured formations in an Operational Maneuver Role are called in. But as mentioned before, they require some manner of infantry support to clear the enemy AT nests. The enemy AT heptrs will need to be countered by the escorting SAM carriers/ Local Air superiority..
Great post. But how do you propose the part in bold be done, without tanks? Infantry will need fire support - either arty or airpower. Does the IAF plan for supporting IA breakthroughs - as the IA arty procurement seems to be stuck
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by kit »

You can win an initial war with overwhelming air power but to hold onto your gains you need ground support., and mechanized infantry is the answer to it., or so goes the thinking.But technological innovations like remotely controlled tanks and mechanized vehicles will play an all important role in the future including battle field robots ..terminator style which are no longer sci fi supplanting and eventually replacing humans .Tanks will be there for all see able future but not as we know it now., but unmanned heavily protected and with much superior fire power most possibly with electromagnetic weapons
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by member_27862 »

Karan M wrote:
sameerjoshi wrote:Now how do we employ our armoured formations. If we employ them in direct infantry support...they will be shot up in no time by enemy AT teams. But if employed in the Shock effect role with mass formation usage, they will be a big menace for the enemy. That is why it is important for the initial holding formations to punch a hole in the enemy lines, before the armoured formations in an Operational Maneuver Role are called in. But as mentioned before, they require some manner of infantry support to clear the enemy AT nests. The enemy AT heptrs will need to be countered by the escorting SAM carriers/ Local Air superiority..
Great post. But how do you propose the part in bold be done, without tanks? Infantry will need fire support - either arty or airpower. Does the IAF plan for supporting IA breakthroughs - as the IA arty procurement seems to be stuck


Karan, my apologies for a delayed response, but I was bitten by the new year bug and was taking a lay back.....

I will respond to your specific question somewhere in the following paras wherein I will put forth my two cents on the relevance of Tank in the Indian and international perspective.

Revisiting the original post in regard the relevance of tanks in today's scenario by Michael.....I fully endorse his viewpoint and of others in stating that the tanks are very much part of the grand plan of fighting anywhere on the globe and will remain so for a long time.........

But why?

Yes, the Israelis got hammered by the Arab wire guided 'suitcase' ATGMs (AT-3 Sagger or Malyutka) in 1973 and the new class of portable guided ATGM worldwide signaled their arrival! But like the German Panzerfaust of WW2, this primarily announced a new phase of Tank vs AT weapon warfare and NOT, the end of the tank as a fighting format. Further the doomsday examples relating to tanks quoted by Michael deal primarily with urban warfare scenarios as experienced by the US army in Iraq and Israeli army in Lebanon (and also include the Russian tank losses in built up zones in Chechnya and of the Indian 65 Armoured regiment in Jaffna). What we have to understand is that all these operators were forced to fight in these built up zones losing out on the greatest advantage the tank has along with protection and firepower - mobility! While the Yanks could hold on to the urban fighting in Iraq by integrating the C4I2 assets to forewarn along with the superior make of their MBTs , which was immune to the Iraqi and Qaida AT firepower (the M1A2 losses were mostly in shape of mechanical breakdowns and not ATGM/ RPGs), the Israelis suffered losses on a regular occasions when confronting the adversaries in Lebanon and parts of Gaza due to overconfidence/ lack of judgment etc. These losses were advocated to Iranian/ Syrian supplied ATGMs, RPGs getting lucky shots and IEDs/ AT mines. .......going back in history, 'Big Willie' one of the first tank produced back in 1916 by the Brits, armed with 57mm cannons, had a 'female' version of the same, fitted with two machine guns, traveling with the 'male' (with the 57mm gun) to counter the close in attacks by the opposition - thus recognizing the vulnerability of armour to close in combat.

Hence there have been thresholds in the Tank vs AT weapon confrontation, which have tipped the debate on effectiveness of the tanks in favour of the AT measures (primarily due to lower costs and training cycles) – But for all those AT weapon apologists, the larger picture of the success of tanks over the ages has escaped a detailed scrutiny. Also the newer generation of active and passive countermeasures against the ATGM along with Tank employment tactics in urban areas, will tilt the debate to a great extent in favour of the tank (the costs will easily be absorbed as reflected earlier by Karan)…..Similarly we need to be prepared for many more thresholds which will include EM weapons, AI fed missiles, better armour, GCV drones and other tit for tats….

However it is here that I would like to disagree with all my armchair warrior friends who concentrate more on the technological aspects of armour! Yes tech strength is essential, but it is important to concentrate on the methodology/ tactics of employment of the armoured forces. And please STOP basing your Tank vs AT weapon debate on the performance of tanks in Urban scenarios (yes, do sympathize with the Israelis since they have a unique urban warfare problem at hand.. but trust them to give the armour some teeth to fight back ). History has proved to a great extent that armour (even inferior armour) when used in concentrated strikes and innovative ways, will give rich tactical and strategic results………

Since inception, the tank was designed as a weapon of shock which has to be used in mass build up and NOT piecemeal. The Germans demonstrated the same through Blitzkreig, which primarily was a combined arm fast paced technique which overwhelmed the dated Brits, French and the Soviet employment of armour. The key frames of Blitzkrieg are ‘Initiative’ and usage of ‘Pressure’ at the right moment through fluid fighting formations. The Germans in many places simply ‘by passed’ the French and British fortifications and engaged only the mobile allied formations. Their German Mark 1 and 2 panzers were at times inferior to the British Matildas and the French Char Bs and SOMUAs, but were better utilized by the Germans. Similarly the German Panzer formations were used in fruitful manner by Manstein in Russia and Rommel in North Africa. And the irony was not lost on the Germans when their fewer numbers (in spite of a 5:1 kill ratio) was taken on and decimated by massive Soviet tank formations in the last two years of the war. At the same time the US and British tank formations were used in unimaginative waves and humbled many times by low strength (but tactically endowed) German panzer columns in Africa and Europe. The Germans also introduced the world to the ‘hollow charge’ mines and man portable weapons which for the first time gave rise to the debate of the veracity of tanks in the coming years.

This better tactical usage methodology was continued by the Israelis who were innovative and adapted the German art of war better than the US and Soviet counterparts. The Israelis decimated the Arabs on multiple fronts by using better tactics in spite of having M48 Pattons against the Arab T 54/ 55s. Then the Israelis were the first to get the blast of the ATGMs in 1973. Yes, they were hit, but they were forced to use better tactics and it also led to the development of ‘reactive armour’ by the Israelis, which negated that generation ATGMs and the HESH rounds. Better armour and ERA add-ons also gave us a generation of FSAPDS rounds which are still unbeatable to a great extent and followed by a newer generation of ATGMs………but technology updates mean a re think of the employment every time and it is only the employment methodology which can make a difference. And just to prove my point, I will recall the example of the US tank corps with the famous US 1st armoured division enveloping the Iraqi Republican Guards divisions in the German inspired modified ‘panzerkiel’ maneuver whilst tackling the dug in T72 and T55s of the Iraqi army. The US army had the tech advantage, but the US tank division was not taking any chance with the cream of the Iraqi army and it is to their credit that NO US tank was lost to Iraqi tank fire (part due to the Iraqi sabot round not penetrating the chobam armour of the M1A1). The corollary to this were the Israeli Merkava losses, primarily due to non-tactical and un imaginative usage by the tank crews who were overconfident of their war assets and believed that the technology itself was enough to win the situation. Methodology with mass usage is the key to ensure that the tank will always reign supreme over the AT efforts as amply demonstrated in the past.

And yes, I will reiterate that the Tank remains the greatest land warfare source of punching a hole in the enemy lair and capturing land, which is the greatest bargaining chip for accepted victory, especially in the Indian subcontinent…

Now a few thoughts on the development of armoured warfare in India and Pakistan in the context of the topic. I will also attempt to give my views on the relevance of tank combat in the Indo Pak scenario.

On the outset as a reader of military history, I am very disappointed on the tactical employment of armour by both India and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan have attempted some major strategic breakthroughs by tactical employment of tank formations in 1965 and 1971. At that time they had a near equal strength in the tank formations. As a neutral observer, I will say that the Pakis have been more bold in the employment of their tank units that their Indian counterparts. However in terms of battlefield control and operational execution by commanders, both sides have been found wanting. A major aspect of the failure on both sides is based on the common roots of battlefield control and employment of assets they have inherited from the British. The British General staff officers have always been found wanting in leading from the front and tactically sound decisions in time. This is in contrast with the German ‘Truppenfuhung’ policy which ensured that German Generals always lead from the front and achieve great successes. This British colonial legacy, which was more tuned to follow orders rather than display initiative, has been the downfall of most tank thrusts undertaken by both India and Pakistan in 1965 & 1971. Had any one of these thrusts achieved even part of its aim, the history of both the countries would have been different. And the most important reason for failure and decision paralysis has been the usage of tanks in piecemeal formations and at times without Infantry support and added indecision during the fog of war. I will enumerate these thrusts as follow

1. Pak failure in employment of tanks on the initial day of Op Grand Slam in Chamb 1965 – Two Pakistani Patton tank Regiments were distributed piecemeal with the two attacking Infantry brigades to take on a weak Indian Infantry brigade having support of just a squadron of AMX 13 tanks. The Indians held on the first day with intelligent use of our small tank force to counter the Pakis, thus getting time to reinforce themselves. Had the Pak armour been concentrated and attacked together in mass, the Pakis would have achieved a penetration on the first day itself when there were no reinforcements for our forces and marched on to Akhnur thus cutting our forces in J&K. – TANKS NOT USED IN MASS by the PA against a weak Indian defence.

2. The Pak failure in the Khem Karan area in 1965 where five Pak Tank regiments were facing a single Indian army Tank regiment (Deccan Horse). However the Pak tank deployment was delayed due to crossing of a nullah on the Pak side (ironic he he :)). This gave time to Harbaksh Singh to send IA 3 Cavalry with Centurians to plug the flanks of 4 Mountain div and take on the Pattons of Pak army 6 Lancers and 24 Cavalry. The Pakis lost the initiative when they split the tanks units on different axis instead of using them in a mass attack. Belatedly, the Pak commander launched 4 Cavalry of Pak army into the arms of the reinforced Indian positions at Asal Uttar defended by IA Poona Horse. The result was total decimation of Pak 4 cavalry and destruction and surrender of 100 plus tanks of PA. – TANKS NOT USED IN MASS by an incompetent commander (PA 5th Armoured brigade – General Naseer)

3. The Indian 1st Armoured Division failure to capture Pasrur and Chawinda in 1965. Four IA tank regiments were opposed by a single Pak tank regt. When the advancing 16 Cav and 17 Horse of IA were opposed by 25 Cav of the Pak army, the other two IA tank regiments were not thrown in to outflank the PA 25 Cav in a fog of war scenario. The IA armoured div commander (Gen Sparrow) sitting way back from the front lost initiative for three days, giving the Pakis time to reinforce and counter this thrust. Had this succeeded, the Pakis would have lost Sialkot area. – DELAY IN USE OF ARMOUR IN MASS.

4. Pak 8 Armoured Brigade failure at Basantar/ Bara Pind in 1971 – Three Patton Tank Regiments of PA attacked on Centurian Tank Regt of the IA (Poona Horse) in the Shakargarh salient. Poona Horse was spread out on the Basantar Nullah and the PA did not attack our forces with all three regiments together. Finally Poona Horse held on in face of superior enemy pressure till the time the reinforcements reached it. - DELAY IN USE OF ARMOUR IN MASS

5. Pak attack at Longewala – PA 38 and 22 Cavalry attacked in the desert sector near Longewala taking the Indian defence by surprise. However the fog of war created by the valiant action of a company of IA troops delayed the PA 18 Div commander in waiting for the morning. The next morning the tank regiments were decimated and forced to retreat by pinpoint IAf attacks. – NOT EMPLOYING ARMOUR IN MASS and BY PASSING small fortifications

6. Pak attack in Chamb 1971 – The only time when a successful re alignment of armoured forces from a different direction by the PA 23 Division under Genral Eftikar Khan forced the IA to abandon the Chamb salient.EMPLOYMENT OF ARMOUR IN MASS in a successful realigned attack

The above examples have been reflected by me to just prove that in 1965 and 1971, both India and Pakistan did not learn from the history of armour usage and displayed below average standards and lack of initiative in high volume armour usage. This was the game changer and the single most important reason why stalemate persisted on the western front on both occasion.

India and Pakistan have many parts of land which can be deemed as 'tank terrain'. Hence in any future war, the tank forces of both nations will play an important part in a decisive victory attempt. The tank is now a part of the Air Land Battle concept in the sub continent and will be accompanied by various elements of SP nature. At the same time the AT weapons on both sides have dramatically increased with the PA making an attempt to compensate the reduction in armoured forces by re alignment of AT weapons in various PA regiments. The Attack Heptr will be the pivot of all AT activities and will be embedded with the strike corps (the IAF needs to hand over the Attack choppers to the IA at the earliest in this regard in a phased manner at the earliest). However mass usage of tanks in an Operational Maneuver Group kind of flexible and fluid deployment as per the strategic/ tactical need will have to be done keeping in line with the attack plan. Also with the improvement in C4I2 sensors and an integrated battlefield concept, it will be difficult to achieve an element of surprise. Thus the key to success will be rapid deployment and usage of concentrated armoured forces supported by a combined arm action. The country which will have the ability to deploy and attack first will have the advantage.. The lessons from the failure to conduct and expand the armoured thrusts in the past wars should always be on the minds of our General staff. While info available from the battlefield may have increased to 10X from the past, the job will still have to be done on the ground. And nothing captures enemy territory better than an armoured thrust. While we may debate on the PA AT crews, a massed tank offensive of 200 plus 125mm barrels spewing balls of fire will only be the harbringer of death and destruction anyplace anytime! Hence the tank will be VERY relevant in the Indian sub continent. This effort as mentioned though will have to be protected from the skies by the IAF. Coldstart covers the finer points of what I am trying to say and is very relevant. A point to be noted though is that in the end, it will be the tank commander on the battlefield and the General Officer in command of the armoured thrust, who need to be focused and look beyond in an integrated battlefield environment. And I sincerely hope that our Command staff is thinking from an Indian perspective and not still influenced by what old Monty was preaching before his fall from grace in the battle for Caen.

Whilst the IA strike corps are based on a combined arm air land battle concept ( deficiencies like SP guns and better C4I2 systems will need to be complemented at the earliest) supported by local air superiority over the battlefield, the key to the breakthrough will be the holding IA formations which will engage the defensive/ offensive PA elements with its complement of troops, artillery and tanks in localized scenarios. At present the IA infantry divisions are embedded with at least one regiment of armour and further complement of artillery firepower. Based on the attack plan formulation, the holding formations will need to be reinforced with assets so as to create a 'bridgehead'/ gap in the Pak defence through which the uncommitted operational strike core with mass armour can go through to deploy the wedge deep inside the belly of the enemy. The enemy AT assets will need to be overwhelmed or will be overwhelmed in a coordinated strike of this nature. The large usage of armour in a single effort will also ensure that the thrust can take some punishment from the enemy AT crews and still be effective.

With the induction of ERA and Shtora on T90 and T72S of the IA and the ERA and Varta system on the PA T80UDs and the Al Khalid MBTs, the countermeasures against the ATGMs have gained an edge again and thus will be relevant for some time to come. This will give an edge to the Tank against the predominant AT weapons in the subcontinent.

Hence the game changer will be as I have been harping all along....the rapid deployment and employment of the armour in a mass attack to achieve a quick run in the enemy territory and hold on to the gains. Long live the tank...:)
rohitvats
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by rohitvats »

Karan M wrote:
sameerjoshi wrote:Now how do we employ our armoured formations. If we employ them in direct infantry support...they will be shot up in no time by enemy AT teams. But if employed in the Shock effect role with mass formation usage, they will be a big menace for the enemy. That is why it is important for the initial holding formations to punch a hole in the enemy lines, before the armoured formations in an Operational Maneuver Role are called in. But as mentioned before, they require some manner of infantry support to clear the enemy AT nests. The enemy AT heptrs will need to be countered by the escorting SAM carriers/ Local Air superiority..
Great post. But how do you propose the part in bold be done, without tanks? Infantry will need fire support - either arty or airpower. Does the IAF plan for supporting IA breakthroughs - as the IA arty procurement seems to be stuck
This is where CSD (or whatever name you ascribe) is very important.

It involves the Pivot Corps initiating the assault on enemy defenses with the aim of opening up enough space for the Strike Corps to come through. Further, it is hoped that the assault by formations form Pivot Corps may force the PA to commit their Reserve formations thereby showing their hand. And India can deploy the Strike Corps accordingly.

I think the operations are now meant to occur in a continuous merge scenario - the mobilization time has been reduced through various measures.

This is where the IBG concept comes into play - IMO, a RAPID + (I) Armored bde in a Pivot Corps form a pretty powerful IBG.

If you look from south Punjab to Gujarat - we have 10 Corps with 2 x RAPID+1 x Infantry Division + 1 x (I) Armored bde and 12 Corps has 1 x RAPID + 1 x Infantry Division + 1 x (I) Armored Bde + 1 x (I) Mechanized bde. They partner with 1 Corps and 21 Corps respectively.

So, both 12 Corps and 10 Corps can launch powerful IBG each on one main axis with another attack on minor axis. Reading the new about various news reports of exercises done by IA, it is my belief that the (I) Armored Bdes Group of Strike Corps will mobilize first and fastest and will follow the Pivot Corps in near real time. This will add further fire-power to the Pivot Corps.

IA has moved 12 RAPID from Jodhpur to Jaisalmer and IIRC, even the (I) Armored Bde is slated to move to Jaisalmer. The the cantonment in Jaisalmer has been expanded to manage this movement. IA just reduced the mobilization distance by ~300 kms with this move.

Coming to firepower - this is where IAF's role becomes important. And this is not even about artillery. But more about the numbers and how we distribute the same. Unless we give more firepower to the Pivot Corps, they will remain deficient in Tube+Rocket+Missile Artillery. I would ideally want Artillery Divisions to be available during initial phases of war for massive fire-assaults.

IAF's role is important to provide in terms of interdiction missions in FEBA as well as ground support.

Sometime back there was a report which spoke about IAF's reluctance to support IA in CSD as 'flying artillery' as it has bigger things to care about. IMO, that is flawed thinking. Reason being unless India can manage the opening phase of the war properly and in its favor, the war will turn out to be a slug-fest/stalemate. This will require top-cover for advancing IA columns and interdiction of enemy forces as well as targets impacting the immediate fighting. Such targets will require immediate attention of IAF for they will decide who controls the initiative after 3-4 days of war. And future contour of war in a hypothetical 14 day war period.

India has a disparity in its favor in terms of aircraft for such roles and this should be bought to bear on the ground war. The ability of PA to engage in ground war needs to be negated and degraded in the initial stages of the war itself.

Added later: And this is where the importance of Attack Helicopter comes into play. Even the act of each Pivot Corps having a Squadron of WSI-Dhruv will make hell lot of difference. Both in offensive and defensive maneuvers.
rohitvats
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by rohitvats »

BTW, Pakistan Army has created 'reserves' with its Pivot Corps in desert to counter Indian CSD. Actually, this was done earlier because of what India did with move of 1 Corps/33 Armored Bde between 21 Corps and 2 Corps during Operation Parakram. PA realized that there was a huge gap south of Fort Abbas and it had nothing to counter the massive Indian armor arrayed against it. This move on PA's side became still more important from perspective of CSD and India cutting down on mobilization time + more firepower to Pivot Corps.
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Re: Has the Death of the Tank Been Greatly Exaggerated?

Post by KiranM »

rohitvats wrote:
IAF's role is important to provide in terms of interdiction missions in FEBA as well as ground support.

Sometime back there was a report which spoke about IAF's reluctance to support IA in CSD as 'flying artillery' as it has bigger things to care about. IMO, that is flawed thinking. Reason being unless India can manage the opening phase of the war properly and in its favor, the war will turn out to be a slug-fest/stalemate. This will require top-cover for advancing IA columns and interdiction of enemy forces as well as targets impacting the immediate fighting. Such targets will require immediate attention of IAF for they will decide who controls the initiative after 3-4 days of war. And future contour of war in a hypothetical 14 day war period.

India has a disparity in its favor in terms of aircraft for such roles and this should be bought to bear on the ground war. The ability of PA to engage in ground war needs to be negated and degraded in the initial stages of the war itself.

Added later: And this is where the importance of Attack Helicopter comes into play. Even the act of each Pivot Corps having a Squadron of WSI-Dhruv will make hell lot of difference. Both in offensive and defensive maneuvers.
For the bolded part from what I glean online, IAF claims 'flying artillery' role requries the air assets to be tagged to IA formations at Corps to even division levels. This necessarily under utilizes the range and capabilities of a modern multi role fighter which may provide CAS in AOR of say Western IA Command to OCA in AOR of say South Western command.
This is will also necessitate basing fighters close to FEBA to reduce time gap from request to target engagement for CAS. Not to talk of requiring longer loiter time for engaging and destoying variety of targets as required by the ground commander. Thus threat from enemy rocket/ tactical missile artillery has to factored in. So there is some merit in IAF's thought.
Having said that, your reasoning for seizing intiative in opening days of war also holds true. The requirements for CAS can be offset little with more precision munitions for medium artillery and mortars. But mainly with dedicated CAS aircraft like Bronco or Super Tucano with rough field ablities and can be based 100-150km from FEBA in concealed areas.
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