Navy Chief Resigns over Sindhuratna fire

negi · Post by **negi** » 04 Mar 2014 13:02

This is not about any one individual's fault ; the problem is IN and MOD like typical governmund instis refuse to reform and revisit their processes and procedures with changing times and technology . Incompetent and bumbling folks like AKA and ancillary support orgs which are again governmund types make things even more worse.

What needs to be done is to remove Government from as many places as possible for that would encourage the perform or perish culture because that is the only way to ensure that people do their jobs in right manner . Good or bad apples exist in every place what differentiates a good system from a bad one is good processes which unfortunately do not exist anywhere where the GOI is involved .

vasu raya · Post by **vasu raya** » 04 Mar 2014 14:15

They got to give more say for the sub safety officer, without the parts/consumables that are past expiry dates not replaced there can be no certification

On the cable burn, when Navy insisted a whole lot of wiring be replaced on Vikramaditya inspite of cost overruns, really doubt if they didn't have such a safety check procedure on the subs.

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 04 Mar 2014 15:20

negi wrote:This is not about any one individual's fault ; the problem is IN and MOD like typical governmund instis refuse to reform and revisit their processes and procedures with changing times and technology.

I have a different view. A lot of processes have been upgraded, especially we have seen it in MMRCA process. FMS route is another. DPP 13 has been perfected in past few years.

In Sindhuratna issue, its QC who had to take charge and quit.

That battery story may not be entirely true, but the assumption that the batteries caused fire..... On the other hand the board of inquiry is headed by Rear Admiral S.V. Bhokare, Flag Officer Submarines, who is of unquestionable character, as generally known in Navy.

negi · Post by **negi** » 04 Mar 2014 15:35

^Can you please enlighten us as to how 'process' has changed even for MRCA ? Just because it is a big ticket item and was in newspapers does not mean anything . Fact is nothing substantial has changed , procurement department structure , logistics , tendering system , selection of preferred vendors all has remained untouched because believe it or not although these are part of the fauj the latter does not have a clear mandate to change these things for unlike the constitution of India there is no such clear provision to make such changes , services as usual are more than happy to just follow orders and not even think about a way to chnage the existing setup. MoD works just like other ministries , it is just that most influential and pahunch walahs get posted there because there is a lot of lard and malai to be had in this department . 2G , Coal etc etc are insignificant when compared to daily goal-maal that happens for even very basic amenities or goods consumed by the services , lot of these files and info is buried behind a door which is exempted from RTI and hence people do not get a detailed breakup of defence expenditure .

Even a bottle of bisleri costs 4 times it's market price when bought by the fauj from one of it's preferred vendors imagine the markup on more sophisticated products .

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 04 Mar 2014 16:19

The fire emanated from mess deck, which is sailors accommodation, states the report.

Negi, Its my view. I haven't said yours is wrong.

wig · Post by **wig** » 04 Mar 2014 21:10

INS Sindhuratna fire started on mess deck

The fire and resultant smoke in the INS Sindhuratna started on the mess deck and not in the battery pits of the submarine, the defence ministry said here Tuesday, a week after the Feb 26 tragedy in which two naval officers were killed.

This was the conclusion of a preliminary investigation into the incident by a board of inquiry headed by a two-star admiral.

After the submarine returned to the Mumbai harbour, another specialist team of Western Naval Command headquarters also carried out an investigation.

Two officers - Lt. Commander Kapish Muwal of Najafgarh, Delhi, and Lt. Commander Manoranjan Kumar of Jharkhand - lost their lives while seven naval personnel were injured in the incident that led to the resignation of Chief of Naval Staff Admiral D.K. Joshi.

"Based on preliminary inspection of the third compartment, the likely seat of the fire has been indicated at the mess deck located one deck above the battery pit. Certain electrical cables were observed to be burnt or damaged in this area," the defence ministry said.

However, the cause of the fire in the location - which was the sailor's accommodation area - would be ascertained in due course by the board of inquiry.

The Sindhughosh-class of submarines carries 240 cells, distributed equally in forward and aft battery pits.
The batteries currently installed on INS Sindhuratna have completed around 113 cycles till date of their 200-cycle life.

"The life of the batteries is valid by date. The batteries which were being used by INS Sindhuratna at the time of the incident were, therefore, operationally in-date," naval officials said.

A preliminary inspection of the battery pit and the batteries in it revealed that there was neither any damage nor any sign to indicate that the fire could have originated there.

As the batteries appear to be clear of any damage, they would not be put through normal checks and maintenance routines prior to operationalisation, the officials said.

http://in.news.yahoo.com/ins-sindhuratn ... 03292.html

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 04 Mar 2014 21:15

what is the possibility of leaking hydrogen accumulating in the mess deck? sounds relatively high to me

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 04 Mar 2014 21:27

So personnel deaths and injuries were due to inhalation of the fire extinguisher products?

So what triggered the wiring to catch fire? Usually excess current from a short circuit. Where was that electrical short? Also the old wiring could have frayed insulation and that results in a short circuit.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 04 Mar 2014 21:29

Lalmohan, As the battaries were at slightly over half the life cycle(113/200) they might not be the cause this time.

Were they doing a unusual manouver that caused a curretn surge which led to the wiring fires?

It just occured to me the cable insulation might have given the toxic gases and not just the fire extinguisher products.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 04 Mar 2014 21:36

^^^ Why did the officer(s) say that the sub was a bomb waiting to explode ? What was the issue here ? A mess hall fire seems too convenient ?

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 04 Mar 2014 21:51

my hypothesis is that hydrogen accumulated in the wiring bay and was ignited for whatever reason - heat/spark/etc
if a solenoid or something was in the switch gear then a spark could have easily lit the H2 which would light the insulation on the cables

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 05 Mar 2014 00:01

Sanku wrote:^^^ Why did the officer(s) say that the sub was a bomb waiting to explode ? What was the issue here ? A mess hall fire seems too convenient ?

He was right in his own way. H2 buildup form old batteries which overcame the recombiner/burner was waiting for things to go wrong.

LalMohan has a theory of how it contributed to the wiring fire.

I think some new or old manouver taxed the wires and burnt the old cable insulation that caused the toxicity.

PS: Every postulated cause has to explain the signature of cable wiring fire.

negi · Post by **negi** » 05 Mar 2014 08:50

Well the story is a selective leak with very superficial information ; for any fire to start there obviously has to be a spark or heat source hydrogen or no hydrogen so cable part is a given , what is important to know is life of batteries notwithstanding were the hydrogen burners burning the hydrogen at their designed rate ? Just because batteries are now being reported to not have crossed their charge cycles does not mean that they were working fine.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 05 Mar 2014 12:01

True or not?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 05 Mar 2014 23:22

Innocents = IN
Then true.

its important for IN to get to true root cause for now there is cloud over the Kilo fleet.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 06 Mar 2014 02:23

Looks like this Pioneer op-ed was missed

Behind the Resignation is a Story

Behind the resignation is a story
Monday, 03 March 2014 | Shivaji Sarkar | in Oped

Demands by the defence forces need scrutiny. But should the process be so long that the forces are rendered defenceless? The recent disasters and the resignation of the Navy chief are symptomatic of a deepening malaise

An emaciated nation cares more for food and daily chores than the security of the nation. It is no wonder that India, bogged by economic mismanagement, has continuously been ignoring investment in defence services. Politically too, investment in defence services is not so much a vote-catcher except in times of widespread war. India has the advantage of not getting engaged in a large war but it is being continuously pestered by proxy wars at its land borders in the north, north-east and the west. The sea frontiers have also seen a series of proxy attacks. Low-intensity wars have caused concern in the forces but the nation largely has ignored it as ‘routine affair’ or failed to appreciate that it was a threat to the national security.

So, a series — 10 in a matter of months — of ‘accidents’ with naval submarines and ships could not wake the country up from its slumber. The resignation of Navy chief Admiral DK Joshi has ruffled the feathers of everybody. It would certainly become an election issue. That will be good for the nation. People would have informed choice for electing a responsible Government that would be able to take care of critical security needs of the country.

The Navy, Air Force and even the Army need large investments. Several times the Standing Committee on Defence has expressed its concern over miniscule — around 10 per cent a year — increase in annual allocations. In reality, the final utilisations or sanctions have been less. Even the slight increases were gobbled up by inflation. In the 2013-14 Budget, capital outlay for the three services was pegged at Rs 86,740 crore, but in the revised estimate presented now, it has come down to Rs 78,872 crore. Total allocation to all defence needs has been increased in 2014-15 to Rs 2,24,000 crore from Rs 2,03,672 crore. But this includes regular expenses, including salaries and other routine stuff. This Budget also includes an increase in pensionary needs owing to the grant of one-rank-one-pension.

The leeway to the defence forces remains limited for shoring up actual requirement as also upgradation. Each demand has to be vetted by bureaucrats, who often have the least understanding of the professional needs. They, according to defence officials, delay decisions to shirk their responsibilities. This leads to posing of innumerable, sometimes inappropriate, questions.

The red tape is a reality. Even the Mumbai harbour is considered risky for operation of naval ships as it is not dredged to create the necessary draught. Since dredging has a financial cost, the harbour saves on it by creating unsafe conditions. The submarine INS Sindhughosh recently had got stuck because of low depth. Since there are constraints for a Government whose non-plan expenditure goes on increasing every year, it does not mind bureaucratic delays. Quite often it is counted as important savings that help the Government meet its fiscal ‘deficit’ — a necessity to create international ‘trust’ in the Government’s ‘ability’ to manage.

So, the acquisition of new submarines is approved ‘in principle’ but remains stuck for years for a decision. One instance would suffice. In 2007, six new submarines under Project 75, valued at over Rs 50,000 crore, got acceptance of ‘necessity’. Three committees since then have gone into it without giving any recommendation. Now the issue is shuttling between the Finance and Defence Ministries, awaiting clearance. Two of these are to be sourced from foreign suppliers while the other four are to be built in the country.

Most other submarines have lived their lives, the Comptroller and Auditor-General has noted. Many submarines were retro-fitted. But it is considered a risky affair. A submarine has a projected life of 25 to 30 years. As it ages risks of malfunctions go up. Refits do not help much. It is almost a ticking time-bomb underwater. The distrust between the civilian-controlled ministry and the defence leadership has been deepening for the past few years. Civilian officials suspect every move by top defence personnel. They allege that demands are ‘hiked’ and are often ‘unrealistic’. The defence officials grudge that the civilians never realised their needs and looked for pretexts to keep off projects that were vital to the needs of the country.

It is not just the Navy; the Air Force also is in need of adding to its capabilities. For decades, it had been flying the MiGs, nicknamed ‘flying coffins’. The Army also has many of its requirements, including its guns, high powered-armoured vehicles and tanks, and, at times, the dresses of soldiers for critical areas, remaining pending. It is true that the demands projected needed scrutiny. But could the process be so long that the defence forces themselves remain defenceless? The Sindhuratna and Sindhurakshak disasters and the resignation of the Navy chief are symptomatic of a deepening malaise.

This is the UPA legacy in MoD.
And members post articles singing praises of non functioning ministers for parochial reasons!!!

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 06 Mar 2014 03:05

I did not know that Langley had opened a regional office in the Punjab.

Need to keep up ..................

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 06 Mar 2014 04:37

Kapil, I locked the thread last night when this was posted as it is clearly a paen and political ode to AKA. We dont like political matters in the Mil Forum. Kindly edit it out.

Thanks,

ramana

Kapil · Post by **Kapil** » 06 Mar 2014 04:52

Hi Ramana,
Apologies if this is so.
However, I think there is a wealth of information in that post which can be used for analysis.
It is the most comprehensive ,single place record of what has happened in his tenure and offers immense scope as a reference.
One can pick up each line and run it past filters .
It is also unprecedented as being the first instance of a ministry fighting back at its critics and probably will cause other beleagured ministers to come out this way.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 06 Mar 2014 05:06

Link to the GDF Thread

To post it here brings down the sacrifice of the Admiral and dead sailors of two Sindhus.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 06 Mar 2014 05:19

UPA/USA legacy ! remember who calls the shots with regard to Indian defence acquisitions,who has been sabotaging vital decisions on non-US eqpt.,etc.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 06 Mar 2014 06:37

Kapil wrote:Hi Ramana,
Apologies if this is so.
However, I think there is a wealth of information in that post which can be used for analysis.
It is the most comprehensive ,single place record of what has happened in his tenure and offers immense scope as a reference.
One can pick up each line and run it past filters .
It is also unprecedented as being the first instance of a ministry fighting back at its critics and probably will cause other beleagured ministers to come out this way.

Kapil, in an election year the Defence Ministry runs a PR piece on its achievements, as versus releasing an Annual Report in a standard year which is tabled around Feb in parliament and comes online by May. As such that report is not unusual as the standard Annual Report may be delayed. The mix of ARs & Std Committee Reports Def Min releases have more. Unfortunately, what that PR piece does not mention are how little the MOD (and the IA in particular) achieved in terms of real modernisation in critical areas. Our soldiers have antiquated body armor, lack firepower and arty is a disaster.As RM, he is accountable but shows no sign of that.

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 06 Mar 2014 07:38

ramana wrote:Kapil, I locked the thread last night when this was posted as it is clearly a paen and political ode to AKA. We dont like political matters in the Mil Forum. Kindly edit it out.

Thanks,

ramana

Ramana,

Its untrue. Its a release from MoD. I said the unsubstantiated criticism. I said that the views are not mine. Being a mil forum, I have posted the work of defence minister and not other other ministry.

My personal view on this is

"The conflict with Govt and Armed Forces has to be taken in a larger sense where Government is already in conflict with every one. It has to do with Chidambaram and Sibal, than Antony. They are responsible for conflict with people, allies, judiciary etc. Chidambaram was given Finance post and he messed it up while blaming everything else. Then he took up Home Ministry and nearly caused a revolution in the country when he arrested Anna Hazare and desperately tried to put the responsibilities on Delhi Police shoulder. Nothing that VK Singh said pointed to any conflict between AK Antony. It was again the mechanisations of AG and chidambaram aginst Gen's legitimate demand of DoB change. General is on record that Chidambaram and he were at odds when he refused to deploy troops against Naxals after Chidambaram's demand. Antony should be seen via his achievements on pushing Indian projects, DPP etc. Logically, everything was not rosy with Antony."

I wish you had given me one chance to explain that thread or renamed the thread to "Defence Ministers of India" or something like that.

If you wish to keep it locked, There is no issues, I have nothing to loose. Its unfortunate that you have associated me with 'political defence" of the Defence Minister. In that thread, there is nothing political, all listed are achievements. I will edit the words that made you feel that it was political.

KaranM,

Everyone gets a right to defend themselves and showcase their work. Whats political is this AK Antony's performance as Defence Minister - An assesment

wig · Post by **wig** » 06 Mar 2014 09:40

as per this report the Sindhuratna was running on borrowed batteries on loan from another Kilo-class submarine -INS Sindhukesri and sadly, while the batteries are working fine, the Navy does not have new batteries to fit onto the re-fitted Sindhuratna

Indian Navy’s submarine fleet is now emerging as the weak link is its armoury and its aspirations to match the growing status of the country. Within the Navy, the shortage is well known and has been flagged at various levels. A depleting fleet means as on today India has only 13 battle-ready submarines in comparison China has 55 sub-surface or undersea vessels.

The accident on board the submarine INS Sindhurtana on February 26 ighlights the shortage and lack of urgency that plague the ‘silent arm’ of the Navy. Though the Navy in statement said the cause of fire on board the vessel was not due to the faulty or old batteries, the fact is that the Navy does not even have spare set of batteries for the submarines. The ones used to do sea trials of the Sindhuratna were on loan from another Kilo-class submarine the INS Sindhukesri that is undergoing a re-fit and its batteries, not a new set, was fitted onto the Sindhuratna when the accident occurred.

At least 240 batteries, each weighing a few hundred kilos, are distributed equally in forward and rear battery pits in the kilo class submarines. “The batteries presently installed on Sindhuratna have till date completed about 113 cycles as against 200 cycles available for use. Further, the life of the batteries was valid”, the Navy said.

Sources said the batteries were working fine, but the worrisome part was that the Navy did not have new batteries to fit onto the re-fitted Sindhuratna.

A battle ready Navy aspiring for a wider role would have a couple of spare sets in store. The batteries run the submarine when underwater and diesel generator charges them then the vessel surfaces partially. Batteries are produced by leading Indian company in the business of making batteries for automobiles.

The Navy has said based on preliminary inspection of third compartment, the likely seat of fire has been indicated as the mess deck, which is located one deck above the battery bit. Certain electrical cables were observed to be burnt and damaged in this area. The cause for initiation of fire at this location would be ascertained in due course by the high level board of inquiry.

A BoI headed by a Rear Admiral has commenced the investigation to ascertain the cause leading to the incident. New Delhi’s 30-year submarine construction plan is delayed and the fleet is ageing. India’s 30 year submarine construction plan launched in 1999 envisaged having some 30 submarines of various classes. Now 15 years latter not a single vessel has been produced.

The first of the six scorpene class submarines being built in collaboration with French Company DCNS will be ready only by 2016.

http://www.tribuneindia.com/2014/20140306/nation.htm#6

srin · Post by **srin** » 06 Mar 2014 10:39

chackojoseph wrote:
ramana wrote:Kapil, I locked the thread last night when this was posted as it is clearly a paen and political ode to AKA. We dont like political matters in the Mil Forum. Kindly edit it out.

Thanks,

ramana
Ramana,

Its untrue. Its a release from MoD. I said the unsubstantiated criticism. I said that the views are not mine. Being a mil forum, I have posted the work of defence minister and not other other ministry.

My personal view on this is
"The conflict with Govt and Armed Forces has to be taken in a larger sense where Government is already in conflict with every one. It has to do with Chidambaram and Sibal, than Antony. They are responsible for conflict with people, allies, judiciary etc. Chidambaram was given Finance post and he messed it up while blaming everything else. Then he took up Home Ministry and nearly caused a revolution in the country when he arrested Anna Hazare and desperately tried to put the responsibilities on Delhi Police shoulder. Nothing that VK Singh said pointed to any conflict between AK Antony. It was again the mechanisations of AG and chidambaram aginst Gen's legitimate demand of DoB change. General is on record that Chidambaram and he were at odds when he refused to deploy troops against Naxals after Chidambaram's demand. Antony should be seen via his achievements on pushing Indian projects, DPP etc. Logically, everything was not rosy with Antony."
I wish you had given me one chance to explain that thread or renamed the thread to "Defence Ministers of India" or something like that.

If you wish to keep it locked, There is no issues, I have nothing to loose. Its unfortunate that you have associated me with 'political defence" of the Defence Minister. In that thread, there is nothing political, all listed are achievements. I will edit the words that made you feel that it was political.

KaranM,

Everyone gets a right to defend themselves and showcase their work. Whats political is this AK Antony's performance as Defence Minister - An assesment

We comment on many online articles by adding a link and fully or partially quoting the text and interspersed with our analysis and comments. This appeared different - there wasn't any link or attribution to external source and this implied that you wrote the entire article in response to the criticism of the MoD & RM by forum members (including me). It was only later on that I realized that this was an MoD press release and the context made a lot of sense.

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 06 Mar 2014 11:43

The first two sentences clearly stated in the thread.

For the unsubstantiated critics of Defence Minister AK Antony, here is the List of his achievements. Capital Expenditure on Modernisation - 98 - 106% during his tenure. Its a MoD release. Nothing is mine or I have not created this figures.

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 06 Mar 2014 12:19

Veterans lash out at navy's Submarine-in-Chief Rear Admiral Soonil V. Bhokare

As Defence Minister A.K. Antony continues to be the object of simmering anger within the navy over what has been a traumatic week with Admiral DK Joshi's resignation, there's parallel fury freshly raging against the navy's serving 'Submarine-in-Chief', the officer currently investigating the INS Sindhuratna accident.

Flag Officer Submarines (FOS) Rear Admiral Soonil V. Bhokare's personal Rediffmail inbox has been invaded by angry e-mails from retired veterans who believe the officer should follow his chief's example and quit service. While veterans, including former submariner Rear Admiral (Retd.) K. Raja Menon believe Antony to be the worst Defence Minister in independent India, others now believe that anger must be directed at those who call the shots within the navy. With Admiral DK Joshi out, that anger is now focused on Western Naval Command chief Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha, and now, Rear Admiral Bhokare.

A particularly angry e-mail from a retired Commander-rank submariner to Rear Admiral Bhokare, currently being posted on naval veteran forums says, "I write to you in extreme anguish at the very sad and sorry state of affairs of a once proud and most professional arm of the Navy. Today we hang our heads in shame, both serving and retired submariners, thanks to the legacy left behind by illustrious people like you and a few others who have followed you."

The officer, who has preferred not to be identified, writes, "Today in the Navy sporting a 'Dolphin' [insignia of the submarine service] on your chest is a shame. The mood amongst the men in the arm is absolutely militant and young officers, the leaders of tomorrow are absolutely depressed and disgusted at our dilution of standards and safety norms. (Sindhuratna was sailing with 94 people on board. Were there enough IDA sets on board for all 94.)"

That last point is the subject of Rear Admiral Bhokare's investigation now, and is an aspersion on naval standard operating procedures, adherence to safety protocols and basic training. Part of the buck, angry veterans feel, stops with senior officers in the Indian Navy, whose job it is to ensure laxity never for a moment creeps into daily duties. Several e-mails of a similar tenor to the one quoted above are understood to have been shot off by veterans to those currently making sense of the INS Sindhurakshak and INS Sindhuratna incidents.

The navy sought to dispel anger against the MoD over reportedly expired batteries on the INS Sindhuratna by stating today that, "There are no signs to indicate any initiation of fire from the battery pit. The batteries appear to be clear of any damage and would now be put through normal checks and maintenance routines prior operationalisation. The preliminary inspection of third compartment indicates that the fire has emanated from the third compartment mess deck (sailor's accommodation). The batteries which were being exploited by Sindhuratna at the time of incident were operationally in-date."

While the MoD gets to duck any damage over batteries, at least for the moment, it continues to evade questions over modernisation of the submarine arm at large. As HEADLINES TODAY reported last week, the MoD has sat motionless on a 2010 classified naval report literally pleading for high-level intervention to save the submarine service from a crisis.

Questions over procedure, protocol and training within the navy are likely to take centrestage, with deeply uncomfortable questions emerging. Perhaps in an effort to deflect the adverse publicity playing out in the media and veterans community, the navy yesterday published a statement saying, "The fast pace of operations, accentuated by increasing complexities often puts men and material under strain, thus requiring stringent adherence to safety procedures. The Indian Navy is sensitive of the fact that all naval evolutions need to be effectively undertaken within a well defined safety operating envelope. Accordingly, 'safety culture' as a way of life, amongst personnel, traditionally forms a part of naval ethos, and several initiatives have additionally been introduced based on emerging requirements."

Read more at: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/vete ... 46821.html

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 06 Mar 2014 12:21

94 people on board Kilo is a big number to have twice as much a kilo carries .....only big conventional subs of LA class carry that kind of people.

What do they mean by were there enough IDA on board for 94 people ?

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 06 Mar 2014 12:40

escape devices or breathing apparatus would be my guess

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 06 Mar 2014 12:44

Lalmohan wrote:escape devices or breathing apparatus would be my guess

and right you would be, sirjee

http://www.inspired-training.com/IDA59_rebreather.htm

chackojoseph · Post by **chackojoseph** » 06 Mar 2014 12:57

Seen them, but did not realise the significance.

Here is more specs IDA-59

Kapil · Post by **Kapil** » 06 Mar 2014 14:28

Hi,
What is sad is that a lot of good officers are going to go down.
The seniormost submariner is V Adm Chatterjee who is DCNS and is known as the Grey Dolphin.
R Adm Bhokare is the current FOSM but he was due to hand over to R Adm Ashokan I think
the overmanning of the sub that day was because COMCOSWEST had embarked with his staff for validation checks. Why did he need so many people for this particular sortie is one interesting question.

This could have been a much worse incident.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 06 Mar 2014 16:15

Managing the nation's defence, somehow
By Vikram Sood|Posted 06-Mar-2014

Vikram SoodNine officers and men dead in the last six months in two submarine accidents with one submarine written off and another grounded.

Who is responsible for the death of these persons and the loss of expensive vital equipment? What did we tell their families? That someone somewhere kept tossing files while the political masters showed little concern?

Presumably we will pay off the families and clear our sarkari conscience. Apart from the human loss and recurring tragedy which is born of an attitude of a government that refuses to take its responsibilities seriously, there are other serious questions and worries.

The Navy, with its aging fleet, was increasingly deployed on coast guard anti-terror duties and not for its primary role, preparing for the defence of the nation in times of war
The Navy, with its aging fleet, was increasingly deployed on coast guard anti-terror duties and not for its primary role, preparing for the defence of the nation in times of war

True Admiral Joshi did the honourable thing by resigning and accepting moral responsibility. But what about the government? It accepted the resignation with an alacrity which makes one suspicious that it did so to avoid taking responsibility for its continued neglect and cavalier indifference in handling vital issues of defence and security of the nation.

Who else is responsible for the state of affairs of our security apparatus? We have shortages of fighter aircraft, artillery guns, naval vessels. We have shortages of manpower in the armed forces, paramilitaries and intelligence services.

Why do these incidents keep happening? What did successive governments do to secure the nation after Mumbai 1993, Kargil 1999, New Delhi 2001 or Mumbai 2008, beyond cannibalising existing establishments?

Did we do anything to improve the calibre of the recruits, their numbers, training and acquisition and maintenance of equipment in consonance with today’s needs and adequate for future threats? In the Sindhuratna case, was there neglect or was there sabotage. And many more questions, perhaps, which experts could divine.

15 years ago the cabinet had drawn up a 30-year submarine modernisation plan to have 24 submarines by 2030. Half-way through this period we now have more than half of the 14 submarines which have completed three-fourths of their operational lives. What is more, the Navy, with its aging fleet, was increasingly deployed on coast guard anti-terror duties and not for its primary role, preparing for the defence of the nation in times of war.

What better testimony to our collective incompetence and disinterest in our enhancing the country’s security systems. Four years ago, the Navy pointed out that the submarine fleet was getting vulnerable as the batteries would be outliving their life but red-tape prevented indigenous replacements. Sindhuratna was an accident waiting to happen.

There has to be a professional political and bureaucratic approach to these vital issues. The philosophy is manage somehow, rather than seriously repair and upgrade systems. The security of the nation and that of the men and women who are willing to give up their tomorrow for our today is a high moral responsibility and cannot be left to improvisation or indecision.

We seem to have enough money to dole out for projects named after our departed leaders because these will fetch votes but very little to secure the nation as security is not relevant for election prospects. We need to address our problems for now and for the future, thus anticipate what systems we want and work to acquire them.

It is true that some of the problems lie within our system including the forces themselves. Inexperience in governance among transient civil servants rapidly rotating between two unrelated jobs is matched by war battle inexperience of the generals whose knowledge is now more and more theoretical while the political leaders are more concerned with their electoral prospects than the defence of the nation.

The consequence of this is an unending battle of egos in the corridors of power. The day of the generalist civil servant was over a few decades ago.

The entire system is now far more complicated, systems are far more technology driven, the linkages are far greater and requires continued in depth expertise built over a number of years. This also leads to superficial assessments and faulty decisions.

There is much to be said for a greater component of armed forces in the MoD and a greater presence of civilians in the armed forces for them to understand what it means to be posted in Siachen or in the deserts of Rajasthan or distant Walong, to be on the high seas for weeks or undersea for days, to experience g-force in a fighter aircraft.

The desk may give theoretical knowledge but it gives no experience and therefore does not inculcate empathy. Unless we reinvent systems, and ourselves rapidly, we wait for the next disaster.

The writer is a former chief of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)
- See more at: http://www.mid-day.com/articles/managin ... aMX4Z.dpuf

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 06 Mar 2014 17:50

Muddy waters, navy blues

Muddy waters, navy blues
Arun Prakash | Mar 6, 2014, 12.08 AM IST
As the initial shock of Admiral D K Joshi's sudden resignation wears off, the armed forces, and the nation, must applaud a rarity: a man who has held loyalty to service before himself and walked away from high office, following the dictates of conscience. Concerns about the putative 'line of succession' exist only in public imagination because there are clear-cut guidelines available to the government for ensuring a smooth and early succession to the navy's top job.

The dramatic changes in the navy's upper ranks are bound to unsettle its junior officers and sailors. The new chief's first major challenge, therefore, will be to restore the confidence of his service and the nation that the Indian Navy remains an efficient and combat-ready regional maritime force. He would be well advised to obtain a swift and authentic evaluation of how operations, maintenance and training are being conducted in the service and to ensure that shortcomings are speedily remedied.

From the freewheeling media speculation underway, we need to pick out three crucial issues for closer scrutiny and separate facts from fiction. The first relates to the succession of accidents that have badly dented the navy's shining image. Secondly, a widespread impression has taken root that our navy is operating 'old ships' and 'leaky submarines' that hazard their crews. Last, and most important, is the media commentary about the strained civil-military relationship that underpins the present crisis.

Of the 10 accidents cited, two, involving loss of life on board submarines, are indeed grave and warrant a thorough probe. The remaining eight were of a trivial nature — collisions, groundings and minor fires — that happen frequently in all active seagoing navies. With no common thread running through them, it was just an unfortunate happenstance that they occurred in rapid succession.

In any other country they may have rated passing mention, but India's intrusive visual media took it upon itself to project each incident as a disaster of Titanic proportions, subjecting it to shrill and ill-informed discussions. There can be little doubt that this sustained media focus panicked the MoD into pressuring the navy, with Sindhuratna's fire becoming the last straw that led to a despondent chief's resignation. The indecent haste with which the resignation was accepted clearly spoke of relief on Raisina Hill that a sacrificial lamb had presented itself.

Navies nurture their warships so they can squeeze the maximum life out of them. The USS Enterprise retired in 2012 after 52 years of service and our own INS Viraat will be 57 years old when she is decommissioned. By international standards, the Indian Navy is young. It has a large proportion of modern and newly constructed ships, with some approaching middle age and others nearing their stipulated retirement age. Aging ships are, however, 'modernised' and given a fresh lease of life. Moreover, 45 newly cons-tructed warships will join the fleet in the coming decade.

New or old, no Indian Navy warship sails out unless it meets stringent safety and seaworthiness requirements, but accidents will happen at sea. Navies that have zero accidents are the ones that stay put in harbour. However, our Soviet-era vessels are quite old, and the accidents on two kilo-class submarines call into question, not only Russian workmanship, but also our own operating and maintenance procedures.

Since 2008, the navy's operational tempo has mounted steadily on account of overseas deployments, anti-piracy patrols, tactical exercises and coastal security commitments. If this has brought excessive strain on personnel as well as ships and machinery, something is bound to give. It is the responsi-bility of naval commanders to ensure that commitments remain commensurate with resources and unwarranted pressures are not imposed on men and machines, nor are any safety norms violated.

That brings us to the crucial issue of civil-military relations at the heart of which lies the deeply flawed policy of subordinating the armed forces, not to political control, but to the tyranny of a lethargic and uninformed bureaucracy. Under current rules, the chiefs carry the full burden of responsibility for their service, operational and administrative, but lack standing and authority within MoD.

On the other hand, the defence secretary is vested with authority for 'defence of India and for the three armed forces HQs', but has zero accountability — especially when things go wrong. In practical terms, every single decision regarding weapons, equipment, infrastructure and personnel impinging on the navy's opera-tional efficiency needs the approval of a bureaucrat.

With ministers engrossed in electoral politics and bureaucrats lacking comprehension of complex military issues, critical cases are frequently cast into limbo for 5-10 years. It is the indifference of the politician, bureaucratic inefficiency and the civil-military divide that are stalling armed forces' modernisation and undermining national security, a $40-billion defence budget notwithstanding.

Like every other major democracy, India must integrate its service HQs with the MoD, and create a chief of defence staff for providing military advice to the government. This would require political sagacity as well as determination so that neither bureaucratic obduracy nor irrational suspicion of the military comes in the way of this long-overdue measure. (This is where that joker Antony failed miserably, whilst all the while, keeping his mundu clean. Might as well have become a dhobi instead of the DM) In a truly integrated MoD the civil and military would accept joint responsi-bility for national security instead of engaging in futile blame games.

The writer is a former chief of the Indian Navy.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 06 Mar 2014 21:10

Kapil wrote:Hi,
What is sad is that a lot of good officers are going to go down.
The seniormost submariner is V Adm Chatterjee who is DCNS and is known as the Grey Dolphin.
R Adm Bhokare is the current FOSM but he was due to hand over to R Adm Ashokan I think
the overmanning of the sub that day was because COMCOSWEST had embarked with his staff for validation checks. Why did he need so many people for this particular sortie is one interesting question.

This could have been a much worse incident.

kapil, USS Greenville had an accident with a Japanese trawler when it had too many people on board as it was undergoing non-standard manouvers.

We still dont know what caused the wiring to catch fire.

Klaus · Post by **Klaus** » 06 Mar 2014 21:19

Cabling fires release Carbon Monoxide in a poor-Oxygen environment, however this does not debilitate/kill as quickly as Phosgene or Hydrogen Sulphide.

Electrical cable fires are typically doused using portable Carbon dioxide extinguishers, the Ring Mains (Freon/Halon) is only activated (manually) if portable extinguishers are ineffective. Was there a shortage of these, or non-refilled canisters? Are these the lapses the former chiefs seem to be pointing out in their letters & e-mails?

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 07 Mar 2014 22:51

Human error caused INS Sindhuratna tragedy: Probe

chaanakya · Post by **chaanakya** » 08 Mar 2014 22:58

1 killed, 2 hurt in accident at Eastern Naval Command in Visakhapatnam

1 worker killed, 2 injured in accident at a site of under-construction nuclear submarine at Eastern Naval Command in Visakhapatnam: Navy & police sources.

DRDO orders inquiry into the accident onboard the follow - up submarine of warship INS Arihant, said DRDO chief Avinash Chander.

Further details awaited.

xposted

member_28108 · Post by **member_28108** » 08 Mar 2014 23:02

Some reports say near but not in the submarine

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 10 Apr 2014 02:51

A Sharma wrote:Submarine accident: Top Navy officer may face court martial

The probe report, according to sources, is also understood to have found out that the cable above the submarine's battery compartment which caught fire was not supposed to be checked by the Navy as per the instructions of the Russian vendors.

The ture root cause was the cable caught fire above the battery compartment. And the cable was OEM and not supposed to be checked. It doesnt tell why the cable caugh fire? Was it under rated or was there a surge what?

Looks like Navy will have to check everything all the time.