China Military Watch - August 9, 2014

[member_28756]

I would not be surprised if its catapult power instead of Ski Jump

[member_28756]

http://in.reuters.com/article/china-def ... GQ20151231

It seems they already started for the second one.

And their ship building industry can build fast launching 10 type 52 AESA destroyers from middle of 2012 to 2015 from a total of at least 18 order.

[NRao]

Airbus Defence and Space imagery shows an overview of Dalian shipyard in China. Source: CNES 2015, Distribution Airbus DS / 2015 IHS

Key Points
An unidentified hull in an advanced state of construction at Dalian shipyard could be China's first indigenous aircraft carrier
While a conclusive identification of the hull as an aircraft carrier cannot be made until work is observed on the upper decks and potential flight deck, the slow pace of assembly and outline suggests a military hull under construction
Satellite imagery suggests that China may be building its first aircraft carrier at Dalian shipyard in northern China.

Airbus Defence and Space imagery captured on 22 September suggests that the possible carrier is under construction in the dry dock associated with the refit and repair of Liaoning (CV16), the Soviet-era Kuznetsov-class carrier acquired from Ukraine that is now in People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) service.

The new hull, first noted under construction in imagery captured on 10 March, is in an advanced state of assembly.

IHS Jane's first noted preparations for a new vessel's assembly at the dry dock in Airbus Defence and Space imagery captured on 27 February. After the launch of a large commercial cargo vessel, the empty dry dock contained multiple support blocks used to provide a base for keel assembly. On 10 March, further imagery showed the initial stages of hull construction. At the time, the support layout suggested a hull of 150 to 170 m in length with a beam of about 30 m.

The hull assembly continued through the summer. Imagery from 22 September shows a lengthened aft section and expanded bow. The hull is currently assessed to have a length of about 240 m and a beam of about 35 m. The incomplete bow suggests a length of at least 270 m for the completed hull.

Given the incomplete nature of the upper decks, definitive identification of the Dalian hull as the first so-called '001A' aircraft carrier is not possible.

[NRao]

China Says It Is Building Its Second Aircraft Carrier

China is building a second aircraft carrier, the country’s Ministry of National Defense confirmed on Thursday. But unlike the first, this one will be produced entirely using China’s own designs and technology, the ministry said.

A spokesman for the ministry, Col. Yang Yujun, told a monthly news briefing in Beijing that the second aircraft carrier was being built in Dalian, a port city in northeast China. He did not indicate when the ship would be completed.

China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, went into service in September 2012. It was built from a castoff, uncompleted vessel bought from Ukraine in 1998 and refurbished by the Chinese Navy.

“After taking into account a range of factors, the relevant authorities launched work on developing a second aircraft carrier, and we are now undertaking our own indigenous design and construction,” Colonel Yang said, according to a transcript of the news briefing on the ministry’s website.

“The design and construction of this second aircraft carrier have absorbed valuable experience from scientific experiments and training with the Liaoning,” he said.

The announcement was unlikely to surprise foreign analysts, who for months have circulated and pored over pictures of an unfinished hull, which indicated that a carrier was being built in Dalian. The images also circulated on Chinese websites, suggesting that the government was making no particular effort to hide its plans.


A second carrier would bring the People’s Liberation Army Navy a step closer to its ambition of becoming a powerful force capable of asserting China’s territorial claims and national influence far from Beijing.

“We have a long coastline and a broad maritime jurisdiction,” Colonel Yang said. “Defending national maritime security, and safeguarding sovereignty over territorial seas and over maritime rights and interests, are sacred duties of China’s armed forces.”

In November, the Chinese military revealed plans to build a logistics outpost in the East African nation of Djibouti, breaking with a longstanding reluctance to establish military facilities abroad.

In September, President Xi Jinping announced plans to cut 300,000 personnel from military ranks, China’s biggest troop reduction in nearly two decades, to make more resources available for technological modernization and better-trained forces. The Communist Party leadership has also endorsed plans to reorganize the People’s Liberation Army so that traditional ground forces have less influence.

But the few details disclosed by Colonel Yang at the news briefing also suggest that China is moving incrementally toward developing an array of aircraft carriers.

He said that the second carrier would have a displacement, a measure of a ship’s weight, of 50,000 metric tons and use a “ski jump” takeoff technique for aircraft. The Liaoning has a displacement of 58,500 tons and also uses a ski jump for takeoffs.

By contrast, the United States Navy’s Nimitz-class carriers have a displacement of about 88,000 tons when fully loaded. The ski ramp takeoff limits the loads of fuel and ammunition that planes can carry, relative to the more difficult catapult takeoff system that the United States Navy has developed.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy has used the Liaoning carrier to hone the skills of fighter pilots and other personnel, but the carrier has not yet been absorbed into the growing Chinese naval forces regularly ready for missions.

[Liu]

http://in.reuters.com/article/china-def ... GQ20151231

It seems they already started for the second one.

And their ship building industry can build fast launching 10 type 52 AESA destroyers from middle of 2012 to 2015 from a total of at least 18 order.

Industry might is the root of nation might.
And might is still right now.

[John]

http://in.reuters.com/article/china-def ... GQ20151231

It seems they already started for the second one.

And their ship building industry can build fast launching 10 type 52 AESA destroyers from middle of 2012 to 2015 from a total of at least 18 order.

At least on paper MF-STAR is superior to so called Chinese Aegis even though we cannot compare the two class 052D vs P-15A with former being primarily AAW DDGs where as Kolkata are Multi Purpose DDG. That said to counter rapid construction hopefully all 4 of Vishak class can be cranked by 2020.

[Picklu]

For people who can read bengali - this is not a good omen

Salient points: Chinese troops are learning hindi to pick up security details in Arunachal border. Since mandarin is more difficult, we are at disadvantage.

[member_28756]

At least on paper MF-STAR is superior to so called Chinese Aegis even though we cannot compare the two class 052D vs P-15A with former being primarily AAW DDGs where as Kolkata are Multi Purpose DDG. That said to counter rapid construction hopefully all 4 of Vishak class can be cranked by 2020.

I am interested on the info you got on so called Chinese Aegis any link you can provide ? Thanks.
The problem is even if all 4 Vishak class construction is cranked its still not does not counter the rapid construction in the long run, Not even close.

[member_28756]

For people who can read bengali - this is not a good omen

Salient points: Chinese troops are learning hindi to pick up security details in Arunachal border. Since mandarin is more difficult, we are at disadvantage.

Why is it more difficult ? there are Westerners who are fluent on the language, if they can learn then anybody can too, No language is insurmountable.

[John]

At least on paper MF-STAR is superior to so called Chinese Aegis even though we cannot compare the two class 052D vs P-15A with former being primarily AAW DDGs where as Kolkata are Multi Purpose DDG. That said to counter rapid construction hopefully all 4 of Vishak class can be cranked by 2020.

I am interested on the info you got on so called Chinese Aegis any link you can provide ? Thanks.
The problem is even if all 4 Vishak class construction is cranked its still not does not counter the rapid construction in the long run, Not even close.

My chinese Aegis comment was just sarcastic comment at media, when on reality both systems are no where similar to each other. Chinese APAR type 346/348 iirc has some limitations based on my observation of how its incorporated in 052c/d. For starters its placed rather low in superstructure which greatly reduces its detection range against low flying targets. On other hand the radar on kolkata is placed higher than even Kunming's search radar.

Also rear facing radar faces seem to have some blindspots due to the exhaust vent of the ship and vhf radar obstruction. Also unlike MF STAR it doesn't seem to be multi function radar and requires other radars to guide weapons like gun systems. MF STAR is capable of guiding all weapon systems including ak 630 gun mounts.

As for procurement figures keep in mind there is also P 17A. While classified as frigates likely to be bigger than Delhi (Shivalik is about the size of delhi) so there are more coming. There is also additional talwar so will see how it turns out.

[member_28756]

I am interested on the info you got on so called Chinese Aegis any link you can provide ? Thanks.
The problem is even if all 4 Vishak class construction is cranked its still not does not counter the rapid construction in the long run, Not even close.

My chinese Aegis comment was just sarcastic comment at media, when on reality both systems are no where similar to each other. Chinese APAR type 346/348 iirc has some limitations based on my observation of how its incorporated in 052c/d. For starters its placed rather low in superstructure which greatly reduces its detection range against low flying targets. On other hand the radar on kolkata is placed higher than even Kunming's search radar.

Also rear facing radar faces seem to have some blindspots due to the exhaust vent of the ship and vhf radar obstruction. Also unlike MF STAR it doesn't seem to be multi function radar and requires other radars to guide weapons like gun systems. MF STAR is capable of guiding all weapon systems including ak 630 gun mounts.

As for procurement figures keep in mind there is also P 17A. While classified as frigates likely to be bigger than Delhi (Shivalik is about the size of delhi) so there are more coming. There is also additional talwar so will see how it turns out.

Oh OK thanks for your opinion and insight into the matter too bad there isn't a link we can check to provide some credible data but I know its not easy when it comes to Chinese weapons.

As fir procurement, one have to remember they are also churning out other ships like its nobodys business for example type 54 frigate with 22 plus five more buildings and 23 type 56 corvettes all built in less then 3 years with at least 25 more building. Not to mention missile boats and etc. There is already a huge gap today and it will only grow in the future. They are already gearing up for mass production of new classes.

The problem is their ship building industry was the largest in the world with the global slow down happening the order for civilian merchant ships have declined and now they are turning to military ships to keep busy.

[John]

As fir procurement, one have to remember they are also churning out other ships like its nobodys business for example type 54 frigate with 22 plus five more buildings and 23 type 56 corvettes all built in less then 3 years with at least 25 more building. Not to mention missile boats and etc. There is already a huge gap today and it will only grow in the future. They are already gearing up for mass production of new classes.

Type 056 Corvette are more along lines of an OPV with missile armament than the traditional missile corvette role that we are not familiar with. IMO where IN is really falling behind is in submarines but that debate for another day.

[VinodTK]

Chinese Marines' Desert Operations Point to Long-Range Ambitions

Beijing. Days after China passed a new law that for the first time permits its military to venture overseas on counter-terror operations, its marines began exercises in the western deserts of Xinjiang, more than 2,000 kilometers from the nearest ocean.

The continuing drills are an indication, analysts say, that the marines, who have traditionally trained for amphibious assault missions, are being honed into an elite force capable of deploying on land far from mainland China.

China's limited means to respond to threats abroad were highlighted by two incidents in November: when Islamic State executed a Chinese hostage, and the killing of three executives by Islamist militants who attacked a hotel in Mali.

China's new counter-terrorism law, passed in late December, is aimed at protecting its expanding global commercial and diplomatic interests. But China's military commanders are also trying to create a military in the likeness of the world's most dominant power projection force, analysts say.

"They study what the Americans have done very carefully and it's the mirror image effect," said Leszek Buszynski, a visiting fellow at the Australian National University's Strategic and Defense Studies Centre.

The cold weather training will improve the marines' ability to conduct "long-distance mobilization in unfamiliar regions", the deputy chief of staff of the Navy's South Sea fleet Li Xiaoyan said in a Ministry of Defense statement earlier this month.

During the drills, the marines will travel 5,900 kilometers via air, truck and rail beginning in the southern province of Guangdong, the longest range maneuvers ever conducted by the force, state media said.

Expeditionary force

The exercises are the latest in recent years that show the efforts China is making to boost its expeditionary force capabilities.

In 2014, the marines conducted their first training in the grasslands of the northern landlocked Inner Mongolia region. At the time, the exercise was seen as unusual for the south China-based force more proficient in beach landings.

Since those drills, the roughly 15,000-strong marine corps, which operates under the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy's South Sea fleet, appears to be settling into a new niche.

"They never really had a major strategic role, as force projection wasn't something the PLA was willing, or able, to think about even ten years ago," said Gary Li, an independent security analyst in Beijing.

With amphibious divisions in the PLA Army also capable of extending China's reach into the South China Sea and Taiwan, Li said the marines are a good fit for a budding Chinese expeditionary force.

"The main advantage of playing around with the marines is that they have a higher concentration of specialists, act well as light infantry, have good esprit de corps, and are nimble enough to be deployed over long distances if needed," he said.

Rising global profile

Along with President Xi Jinping's vows to build a more modern military, the global profile of China's armed forces is on the rise.

Already, the South Sea fleet, which is based on the mainland coast near the island of Hainan, has been used on operations far from the South China Sea.

The fleet's vessels have ventured to the Middle East and Mediterranean after deployments on international anti-piracy patrols around the Horn of Africa.

Chinese officials announced in November they were in talks with Djibouti to build permanent "support facilities" to further boost Chinese naval operations, in what would be China's first such off-shore military base.

The African port, sitting on the edge of the Red and Arabian seas, is home to several foreign military bases, including US, French and Japanese naval facilities.

China is also expanding its peacekeeping role, with Xi pledging in September to contribute 8,000 troops for a UN stand-by force that could provide logistical and operational experience the PLA would need to operate farther abroad.

While China has been getting more involved diplomatically in trouble spots like the Middle East, it is adamant that it does not interfere in the affairs of other countries, and is the only permanent member of the UN Security Council which has not taken military action in Syria.

The Defense Ministry said in a fax that the drills were part of "annual planned" exercises.

For now, China's marines are advancing only through the snow fields of Xinjiang, as depicted in state media photographs, still wearing their speckled blue fatigues designed for operations at sea. But that could shift in time.

"China's global security posture is becoming more active," said Zhang Baohui, a mainland security expert at Hong Kong's Lingnan University. "And this seems to fit that policy."

[NRao]

China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions

The international media landed itself a gift shortly before ushering in 2016, when it transpired at a recent Chinese Defense Ministry press conference that Beijing’s first indigenous aircraft carrier, and the second one for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) after the Liaoning entered service since September 25, 2012, is currently under construction.

A Surprise?

The announcement is hardly a surprise, given that open-source intelligence, academic and media commentaries have long reported on China’s ongoing aircraft carrier program. Even Chinese reports (see here and here) have hinted at PLAN’s aspirations to operate more than one carrier. The carrier was even dubbed “Project 001A,” and Internet photos of what appears to be the assembly of modules for an aircraft carrier-like platform at a Dalian shipyard have circulated. Chinese officials, including those from the PLA, have also noted the existence of the program.

Compared to the past, Beijing has certainly become more forthright about its defense programs, such as publishing defense white papers since 1998 and holding regular defense ministry press conferences. Of course, one could still claim that these efforts lack real transparency – the white papers, for instance, are rich in policy rhetoric but lack details. Nonetheless, the disparate nuggets of information, whether deliberately intended by Chinese authorities for release into the public domain or otherwise, allow the analyst to formulate a picture, even if an incomplete one.

While imperfect, this picture at a minimum allows a glimpse at what exactly may be in store for China’s new aircraft carrier. In a way, the information helped in desensitizing the academic and intelligence communities to the prospective materialization of China’s carrier ambitions, in the context of external suspicions towards Beijing’s massive military buildup. This was very similar to the earlier case of the unfinished ex-Soviet carrier Varyag, which Beijing purchased from Ukraine in the 1990s and subsequently refurbished and refitted prior to adding it to the PLAN as Liaoning in 2012. Since the 1990s, the international community was aware of the existence of this program thanks to the availability of fragmentary information, even though it took quite some time for Beijing to officially announce plans to put Liaoning into service. As such, the Liaoning did not really come as a surprise, even if one continues to question Beijing’s underlying strategic intent behind this move.

Based on Beijing’s pattern of information disclosure, one may anticipate that in the future, the public will at least have prior snippets of information related to the PLAN’s new, follow-on carriers before official announcements are made. But as Beijing’s recent clampdown (see here and here) on the leakage of militarily sensitive information has shown, there is every attempt to safeguard operational security. At the same time, though, Beijing may also rely on the release of disparate information, through proxy channels perhaps, to help desensitize the international community to its new future carriers. While this certainly falls short of “complete” transparency, it is better than having no information at all.

Defying Speculation

Based on this diverse, if disparate information, there has been considerable speculation about the new aircraft carrier based. Much of it has overestimated the progress China has made with its carrier program. This is similar to the errors Western intelligence made with the performance of the much-acclaimed Soviet MiG-25 Foxbat interceptor, which was found to be grossly overrated following the defection of pilot Viktor Belenko with one of the jets to Japan in 1976.

For example, earlier speculation put the propulsion as possibly nuclear. But the latest official revelations reveal that the new ship will be conventionally powered. Likewise, the new carrier was initially believed to possess steam-powered aircraft launch catapults, dispensing with a ski-jump flight deck that equips the Liaoning. A PLA Daily report in April 2012 claimed that China is developing an electromagnetic catapult analogous to the American electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) installed on board the new Gerald R. Ford class supercarriers, thereby fuelling even more optimistic speculation. But as the new official information reveals, the new carrier will still have a ski-jump, indicating that domestic efforts to develop steam or electromagnetic catapult technologies have yet to reach maturity. Zhang Junshe, a researcher with the PLA Naval Military Studies Research Institute, alluded to this, saying that catapults involve more complex technology.

Some Chinese analysts held that virtually every component and subsystem on board the new carrier would be different from those on board the Liaoning, an assertion that could potentially be misconstrued as meaning the new ship would be “revolutionary.” Instead, one can assume that the new carrier will be equipped with a mix of mature, tried-and-tested components and subsystems based on valuable insights Chinese naval technicians gleaned from the Liaoning. Some of these systems may even be improved or refined domestically to suit specific PLAN needs. But a cautionary note here: It would be prudent not to exaggerate the progress Beijing has made in its carrier quest. Perhaps a more relevant question to ask is: How will the future PLAN carrier battle group (CBG) take shape?

A Possible CBG Approach?

To be sure, while the invariable temptation is to focus on the aircraft carrier itself, it is important to note that such a valuable platform cannot operate independently on its own, but as part of an entire CBG comprising the escorting warships, organic aviation forces and afloat logistics support. The Soviet Kiev class “aircraft-carrying heavy cruiser”, though fitted with a battery of P-500 Bazalt (NATO codenamed SS-N-12 Sandbox) 550km-range cruise missiles as its offensive armament and its own shipboard air defense and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) combat systems, still had to operate in conjunction with other fleet assets.

It is clear that Beijing has adopted a concerted strategy in developing a CBG, paying close attention to how established carrier navies operate such forces. As such, while developing the carrier, efforts are long afoot to develop a slew of other capabilities that can help constitute a full-fledged CBG. Notably, the Chinese are churning out new major surface combatants, such as the Type-052C/D Luyang II/III guided missile destroyers and Type-054A Jiangkai II frigates, which are optimized for fleet air defense and ASW respectively. Even more ominously, but often overlooked, is China’s ambitious program to build more capable ocean-going fleet replenishment vessels. In the past recent years, new units of the Type-903 (plus the improved 903A variant) replenishment vessels have entered service. An even more capable successor, touted the Type-901 which is said to displace some 40-45,000 tons (just slightly smaller than the new carrier itself), is at an advanced stage of construction.

The U.S. Navy carrier strike group (CSG) is plausibly one that the Chinese aspire towards, but in the distant future. If the Liaoning’s air wing is of any indication, the PLAN’s carrier-borne aviation looks set to remain limited in the range of capabilities available compared to those of the American CSGs. First, the Liaoning air wing has limited airborne early warning (AEW) capacity in the form of Ka-31RLD Helix helicopter that mounts a folding air search radar. But compared to fixed-wing aircraft, such rotary-winged AEW platforms lack the range, endurance and sensor capacity to provide fleet air cover. The Chinese are attempting to rectify this by developing an analogue to the E-2C Hawkeye, touted the JZY-01, but little has come about this project. The Chinese are more likely to employ the larger Z-18J AEW helicopter, which is a refined version of the Z-8 that is in turn a reverse-engineered copy of the old French SA321 Super Frelon design.

Second, the new carrier is said to be equipped with the J-15 Flying Shark carrier-borne fighter jets, which currently equip the Liaoning. Plans to develop carrier-borne J-31 multi-role fighters have not materialized, thus leaving the J-15 as the only carrier-borne fighter jet. Suspiciously similar to the Soviet/Russian Su-33 Flanker-D, the J-15 is optimized primarily for fleet air defense while possessing a limited secondary ability for surface strike, mainly anti-ship (especially important since the new carrier will not have shipboard offensive weapons). The Liaoning carries a small J-15 complement (possibly slightly over 20 in all) and the new carrier, of roughly the same size, may carry more or less the same number. Moreover, the new carrier’s ski-jump configuration limits the J-15’s payload, thereby reducing its operational flexibility. In any case, the myriad of envisaged defensive and offensive roles does place an invariably heavy burden on this small fighter component. Although more J-15s being spotted on the Liaoning’s flight deck point to serial production, according to a recent Kanwa Defense Review report some critical steps of the manufacturing process were performed by human labor instead of automated precision machine tools. This not only slows down production rate but also brings airframe and systems reliability into question.

As such, the PLAN’s approach to CBG operations may be aligned more closely with that of the Soviet/Russian Navy, giving primacy to defensive carrier-borne air operations and emphasizing the role of accompanying escorts to share defensive and offensive burden. The Type-052C/D destroyers will have to bear the brunt of the fleet air defense mission by utilizing their “Chinese Aegis” system, which revolves around phased array radars to compensate for AEW shortfalls while employing the S-300FM (Chinese copy HHQ-9) long-range surface-to-air missiles to complement the limited coverage provided by the J-15s. The PLAN’s future warship designs may hint at a possible continuation of this approach; there is an existing program to build a new destroyer bigger and more capable than the Type-052C/D. Popularly known as the Type-055, the new ship is envisaged to displace almost 10,000 tons and equipped with a much bigger payload of vertically launched missiles, including surface-to-air, thus bringing its fleet air defense capabilities closer to those of the American Arleigh Burke class Aegis destroyers.

Limited Operational Utility?

Notwithstanding those aforementioned limitations of the envisaged new carrier, the PLAN’s future CBG is certainly taking shape thanks to immense political will and funding, to not just simultaneously carry out a complex undertaking of parallel platform and systems sub-programs but also to conduct intense training and trials using the existing Liaoning and handful of J-15s. The envisaged CBG will certainly expand strategic options available to the Chinese political leadership. Some Chinese thinkers called on the PLAN to acquire a viable carrier capability, arguing that prior to the induction of Liaoning, China was the sole great power without an aircraft carrier. From this perspective, an aircraft carrier – the symbol of a modern, blue-water naval power – equates to national greatness. This coincides also with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s contemporary “Chinese Dream” vision.

The question remains whether the PLAN carrier fleet will serve more as a prestige asset or one with real operational utility. No matter how advanced the future Chinese carrier will be, and how the CBG is constituted, it remains to be seen how Beijing will choose to employ this newfound naval instrument. Within immediate regional waters in the Western Pacific littorals, the CBG will be a significant addition to the already impressive plethora of weaponry available to the PLA. In a Taiwan Strait conflict scenario, the PLAN CBG may plausibly station itself to the east of Taiwan in an attempt to at least delay or disrupt any American reinforcements coming from Guam or Hawaii, while opening the “eastern front” by coordinating with land-based PLA units operating against the western Taiwanese coast. This prospect is plausibly seen as an alarming one, for the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense war-gamed the scenario of a PLAN carrier involved in a cross-strait conflict.

PLAN carriers are also believed to be useful assets in the context of existing regional maritime disputes. Northwestward into the East China Sea (ECS), it is possible for the CBG to facilitate military operations against Japanese forces within the vicinity of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. However, the CBG will most likely find itself well exposed to land-based SDF defenses, particularly those arrayed around the remote southwestern Japanese islands and US Forces in Japan. The open nature of ECS waters gives greater room for maneuver by the CBG. But this is not the case for the semi-enclosed South China Sea (SCS) waters. Compared to the land-based PLA forces arrayed along the southern Chinese coast, the CBG may have limited utility and much less survivability in the face of the anti-access and area denial capabilities mustered by some of China’s Southeast Asian rivals, especially Vietnam, whose smaller forces may take advantage of local geography for concealment and surprise anti-carrier strikes. Moreover, Hainan Island and the newly constructed artificial islands in the SCS are comparably more survivable as “unsinkable aircraft carriers.” The loss of such valuable strategic asset as a carrier to cheaper sea denial weapons such as anti-ship missiles launched by mobile coastal batteries and land-based fighter jets, submarines, and naval mines will be a costly proposition to Chinese defense planners. Or at least, even if Beijing is bent on deploying the CBG in a SCS conflict, it will have to accept its limited operational utility and in the worst case, accept potential losses inflicted upon the CBG.

Even further westwards, the utility of the PLAN CBG, as a result of its inherent capabilities, declines exponentially. Far from its mainland bases, the CBG can no longer count on the kind of land-based reinforcements it might expect in the Taiwan Strait, ECS and SCS. It will have to operate autonomously for the most part, with little support available even if there is access to friendly bases and ports. PLAN carrier ambitions were often linked closely with growing Chinese strategic and economic interests in the Indian Ocean region. No doubt, the Chinese carrier will be a welcome asset to do “flag-showing” for Beijing in the region. It will prove more than capable in undertaking such low-intensity missions as non-combatant evacuation (similar to those PLAN warships earlier conducted in Yemen) and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. But in a wartime scenario with India as the adversary for example, the CBG will be vulnerable even if it has ample maneuver space in the open waters of the Indian Ocean. Indian air and naval forces are more likely to secure the local advantage and prove capable of saturating the CBG with kinetic and electronic strikes, even if one factors in Pakistani assistance to the PLAN.

The Unstoppable Chinese

It is a foregone conclusion that China will continue to forge ahead with its carrier ambitions. The carrier currently being built in Dalian is its first indigenous attempt, but certainly not its last. More than just a symbol of national greatness, the Chinese carrier program is an indispensable part of the overall PLAN drive towards a blue-water force befitting China’s stature and Beijing’s desire to play a more active global security role, just as it has recently demonstrated in the Indian Ocean region, including Africa and the Middle East. This strategic conviction, which will likely outlast the term of Xi Jinping, will sustain this ongoing momentum if one observes the intensity at which the PLAN seeks to snap up every opportunity to master the intricacies of aircraft carrier construction and operations.

In fact, ever since its commissioning, the Liaoning has gone on multiple long-duration training cruises to stage, in particular, flight training in diverse operating environments such as the SCS and the Bohai Gulf. A cadre of pioneer carrier-borne aviators has also been established, which will sow the seeds for an institutionalized PLAN Air Force carrier-borne aviation training program. Chinese naval planners do recognize the “practice makes perfect” mantra. Future Chinese carriers are tipped to be more capable, especially when Beijing’s researchers yield fruits from ongoing high-tech, carrier-related scientific projects such as electromagnetic catapult and fixed-wing AEW platform.

For a latecomer into the carrier game, the PLAN appears determined to shorten the capacity-building process by funneling vast amounts of time, resources and manpower into the program, even if it means having to adapt lessons through trial-and-error, overcoming the steep learning curve while having to endure painful setbacks, including the loss of life. That said, there ought to be little doubt that notwithstanding the challenges it faces, China will persist in pushing its dream of operating multiple aircraft carriers towards reality. But one also should also temper expectations by not exaggerating the progress Beijing has made in this gargantuan quest.

Koh Swee Lean Collin is associate research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He can be reached at iscollinkoh@ntu.edu.sg.

[Khalsa]

For people who can read bengali - this is not a good omen

Salient points: Chinese troops are learning hindi to pick up security details in Arunachal border. Since mandarin is more difficult, we are at disadvantage.

I personally know of Brigade Intelligence Officers who were qualified on Mandarin and they learnt this language well after they were commissioned.
Both were given an opportunity to learn and qualify and this took their career out of the trench and into the Intelligence Pit.
what I am saying is this changed their careers they both went into Intelligence and advisory roles to the Brigade Commander.

Naturally both found themselves deployed facing the Chinese and helping decode messages and understand regular radio chatter.
And please ... Chinese have had Hindi speaking folks since the 60s. They too have been listening to us as well.

I have two cousins who took Japanese and Mandarin respectively in their last year in school and University are fluent in their respective languages.

If there is will, there is a way.

[VinodTK]

China to Get Russia's Lethal Su-35 Fighter This Year

China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) will start receiving its first Sukhoi Su-35 Flanker-E fighters from Russia later this year.

"Supplies of fighter jets will start in the 4th quarter of this year. For now, everything goes according to plan," a Russian military-diplomatic source told the TASS late last week.

Russia signed a contract to deliver twenty-four Su-35 fighters worth more than $2 billion to China late last year. The contract will be filled within three years according to TASS’s source. Production of a modernized S-108 communications system—which was part of Beijing’s requirements—has already started.

While the addition of the Su-35 will boost Chinese capabilities while the PLAAF waits for its fifth-generation J-20 to enter service. The Su-35S is the most potent version of the Flanker built to date. The powerful twin-engine fighter is high flying, fast and carries an enormous payload. Combined with its advanced suite of avionics, that makes the Su-35 an extremely dangerous foe to any Western fighter with the sole exception of the stealthy Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor.

“It’s a great airplane and very dangerous, especially if they make a lot of them,” one senior U.S. military official with extensive experience on fifth-generation fighters told me some time ago. “I think even an AESA [active electronically scanned array-radar equipped F-15C] Eagle and [Boeing F/A-18E/F] Super Hornet would both have their hands full.”

[brar_w]

Pantsir clone??

[Sid]

Pantsir clone??

IMHO it uses similar concept but it's differences.

1. No gun
2. Different tracking/acquisition radars
3. Optical tracker places in front instead of top of platform

Pantir/Tanguskha is SPAAG, not sure what this is. Russia has the habit of passing older platform/ less capable designs to enemy of their enemies, so you never know.

[NRao]

Guess what in our era looks like this NASA F-1 VSTOL from a few decades ago (I think in the 60-70's):



In a transonic wind tunnel at Ames.

[member_28756]

Guess what in our era looks like this NASA F-1 VSTOL from a few decades ago (I think in the 60-70's):



In a transonic wind tunnel at Ames.

Hmmm looks similar

[brar_w]

Stratcom: China Moving Rapidly to Deploy New Hypersonic Glider

China conducted six successful tests of a new high-speed hypersonic glide vehicle, the most recent in November, and also recently tested an anti-satellite missile, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command said Friday.

Adm. Cecil D. Haney, the commander in charge of nuclear forces, said the tests are part of a worrying military buildup by China, which also includes China’s aggressive activities in the South China Sea.

“China continues to make significant military investments in their nuclear and conventional capabilities, with their stated goal being that of defending Chinese sovereignty,” Haney said during a speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“It recently conducted its sixth successful test of a hypersonic glide vehicle, and as we saw in September last year, is parading missiles clearly displaying their modernization and capability advancements,” he added.

The six tests of the hypersonic glide vehicle, regarded by U.S. intelligence agencies as a nuclear delivery system designed to defeat missile defenses, were first reported by the Washington Free Beacon.

Defense officials said the hypersonic glide vehicle tested on Nov. 23, known as DF-ZF, was launched atop a ballistic missile fired from China’s Wuzhai missile test center in central China.

The glider separated from the booster and flew at extremely high speed—between Mach 5 and Mach 10—along the edge of space.


Haney confirmed all six tests were successful, indicating the weapon program is proceeding.

Prior to the November test, the DF-ZF was flight tested Aug. 19.

The earlier tests were carried out on June 7, and on Jan. 9, 2014; Aug. 7, 2014; and Dec. 2, 2014.

Haney described the hypersonic threat as a challenge to U.S. strategic deterrence.

The congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission stated in its latest annual report that the hypersonic glide vehicle program is “progressing rapidly” and the weapon could be deployed by 2020.

China also is building a powered version of the high-speed vehicle that could be fielded by 2025.

“The very high speeds of these weapons, combined with their maneuverability and ability to travel at lower, radar-evading altitudes, would make them far less vulnerable than existing missiles to current missile defenses,” the commission stated.

In a second speech to another think tank on Friday, Haney also confirmed that China recently conducted a test of an anti-satellite missile.

Defense officials said the Dong Neng-3 exoatmospheric strike vehicle was flight-tested Oct. 30 from China’s Korla Missile Test Complex in western China. The test was also first reported by the Free Beacon, and officials said the missile threatens U.S. satellites.

Chinese Internet posts of pictures from the area showed what appeared to be contrails from the missile test.

A Chinese military official later confirmed the anti-satellite test in a state-run press report.

Zhou Derong, a professor at the People’s Liberation Army Logistics Academy, described the development of anti-satellite weapons as part of China’s national defense.

“It is perfectly legitimate for China to carry out normal missile launch tests,” Zhou was quoted as saying. “Besides, even if China were developing anti-satellite weapons, these would be no more than self-defense measures taken to protect its own space resources.”

The official criticized the United States for what he said were efforts to oppose and exaggerate anti-satellite tests.

The DN-3 is the third known anti-satellite missile operational or under development by China. Earlier tests involved anti-satellite missiles known as the DN-1 and DN-2. The DN-1 has also been labeled the SC-19.

Rick Fisher, a China military analyst at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said Adm. Haney has advanced details of China’s nuclear and strategic developments.

“Adm. Haney is the first U.S. official to call attention to China’s pursuit of prompt global strike capabilities, or non nuclear missile strike systems,” Fisher said. “The United States has been talking about Prompt Global Strike for nearly 20 years but has not built any such system.”

Also, China’s lack of transparency on nuclear forces is undermining Beijing’s often-stated policy of not being the first to use nuclear arms in a conflict.

“China’s development of two and possibly up to two more MIRV-equipped intercontinental missiles could indicate China seeks a nuclear first strike capability,” he said.

China also appears to be seeking to “sprint to parity” with the United States in warhead numbers along with growing space warfare capabilities poses “a much greater danger to U.S. strategic forces,” Fisher said, and should prompt a build up of U.S. nuclear forces.

Haney said another concern of Strategic Command is China’s re-engineering of its long-range missile to carry multiple nuclear warheads.

U.S. intelligence agencies detected the test of a new DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile on Dec. 4 with two independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs.

By contrast, the United States has removed all multiple warheads from its land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles

Haney, in the CSIS speech, said the current strategic environment is “more complex, dynamic, and volatile, perhaps more so than any time in our history.”

“The dangers posed by this unpredictable security environment are compounded by the continuing propagation of asymmetric capabilities and methods, the unprecedented proliferation of advanced capacities and technologies, and the increasingly provocative and destabilizing behavior on the part of both current and potential adversaries,” he said.

The threats include terrorists in the Middle East, and activities by nation states including Russia, China, and North Korea.

Russia is continuing to modernize both its conventional and strategic forces and is stressing new strategic approaches and destabilizing activities in Syria and Ukraine, while developing space weapons and conducting cyber attacks, Haney said.

North Korea continues to threaten the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asia region with strategic advancements, including claims of “miniaturized” nuclear warheads and recent claims of a successful hydrogen bomb test, the four-star admiral said.

Pyongyang also is developing road-mobile and submarine-launched ballistic missile technologies, he added.

To meet the challenges, Haney said U.S. nuclear forces need to be modernized with new missiles, submarines, and bombers.

“Without timely investment, we risk degrading the deterring and the stabilizing effect of a strong and credible nuclear deterrent force,” he said.

Haney also warned about the growing threat of space warfare capabilities.

“We need to get our heads around the fact that a future conflict may bleed into space,” Haney said.

“Simply put, the threats are real and are evolving faster than we probably ever imagined. Irresponsible acts in space can have damaging consequences for all space-faring and space-dependent nations.”

Space attacks pose “a multifaceted space challenge, and potentially threatens national sovereignty and survival,” Haney said.

To counter space threats, the Pentagon is working to counter space attacks on satellites with new capabilities, more secure satellites, and smaller, more easily replaceable satellites.

Both Russia and China are working on space weapons, including lasers and other directed energy weapons that can blind satellites.

The debris resulting from China’s destruction of a weather satellite with a missile in 2007 is still posing problems for satellites and manned spacecraft.

North Korea also appears to be building satellites for space weapons.

“We must be able to maintain situational awareness of it all, act where necessary, and as stated in the 2010 Space Policy, preserve the space environment,” Haney said.

The Pentagon is spending more than $5.5 billion to prepare space systems for a future conflict, Haney said.

“We must have assured access to space such that we can function through a multi-layered approach, through all phases of conflict,” he said.

[NRao]

Go China, go.

[Viv S]

Going just by the number of aircraft built, the Chinese J-20 program seems ahead of the Russian PAK FA, with the ninth J-20 prototype taking to the skies last month.

Very clean design. Big focus on the RCS - faceted sensors. Also, note the sawtooth edges on the flap actuators.

Image 1

Image 2

Image 3

[member_28756]

Going just by the number of aircraft built, the Chinese J-20 program seems ahead of the Russian PAK FA, with the ninth J-20 prototype taking to the skies last month.

Very clean design. Big focus on the RCS - faceted sensors. Also, note the sawtooth edges on the flap actuators.

Image 1

Image 2

Image 3

Is it true its very close for serial production already ?


http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channel ... 850117.htm

Expert: China’s J-20 stealth fighter close to batch production

Song Xinzhi, a Chinese military expert on air force equipment, said in a media interview that the J-20 fighter with fuselage number 2101 represents a brand-new production batch, namely the J-20 fighter is close to batch production stage, and its yellow painting also implies that its stealth performance has possibly passed the test.

The Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that the new J-20 fighter looks like the previous prototype models in shape except the fuselage numbering method, indicating that the appearance of the new prototype J-20 fighter is very close to that of the final-version J-20 fighters, and the J-20 fighter with fuselage number 2101 may possibly mean that the J-20 fighter is now in a transition period from test flight stage to batch production stage

[member_28756]

What is Sri Lanka doing ? Are they being two faced here.


http://colombogazette.com/2016/01/17/ch ... -concerns/

Chinese navy war ships arrive in Sri Lanka despite Indian concerns

By admin on January 17, 2016 - 14:29

Three Chinese warships arrived in Sri Lanka today despite concerns raised by the Indian Government in the past over Chinese military ships coming to Colombo.

According to the navy media unit, the three Chinese navy ships were greeted by the Sri Lankan navy at the Colombo port.

http://atimes.com/2016/01/sri-lankan-pm ... a-beating/

Sri Lankan PM beckons Chinese investors as rupee takes a beating

By Munza Mushtaq on January 21, 2016 in Asia Times News & Features, South Asia

Colombo: In an effort to boost the country’s economy, Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe has extended a fresh invitation to Chinese investors to invest in his country.

Addressing a news conference on Wednesday in Davos, Switzerland, at the World Economic Forum, Wickremesinghe appeared to be slowly leaning towards China for the first time since coming to office over a year ago.

He also announced that Sri Lanka will go ahead with the $1.4 billion China-funded Colombo Port City project initiated by former president Mahinda Rajapaksa,

[NRao]

^^^^^

Not a difficult decision. India cannot afford to invest in SL.

However, the Chinese are investigating the head of their stats dept, the one that has been providing glowing reports on the Chinese economy. In fact today one reporter from a fin mag asked a Chinese hot shot if their economy would "fall flat". So, there is a very good chance that their eco could be tanking - worse than any of us thought it could. Saving grace is their trade surpluses - some trillions.

Let us wait and see what happens. My gut says China is no position to spend billions abroad. Their own people need it - too many business collapsing.

[NRao]

Not just SL, it is Britain too.

Pursuing critics, China reaches across borders. And nobody is stopping it.

BEIJING — China’s campaign against dissent is going global.

Amid extraordinary moves to rein in criticism at home, Chinese security personnel are reaching confidently across borders, targeting Chinese and foreign citizens who dare to challenge the Communist Party line, in what one Western diplomat has called the “worst crackdown since Tiananmen Square.”

A string of incidents, including abductions from Thailand and Hong Kong, forced repatriations and the televised “confessions” of two Swedish citizens, has crossed a new red line, according to diplomats in Beijing. Yet many foreign governments seem unwilling or unable to intervene, their public response limited to mild protests.

The European Union is divided and appears uncertain about what to do. Hong Kong is in an uproar, with free speech under attack, activists looking over their shoulders and many people saying they feel betrayed by a lack of support from Britain.

“China seems bent upon broadcasting to the world its disdain for the rule of law,” said Jerome A. Cohen, a China legal scholar and professor at New York University.

[Televised ‘confession’ was absurd and incoherent — and that’s the point]

With Secretary of State John F. Kerry in Beijing, where he landed late Tuesday, the leaders of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, an independent U.S. government agency, have voiced alarm. The body’s chairman, Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-N.J.), said Friday that President Xi Jinping’s push toward “hard authoritarianism” threatens U.S.-China ties, a view echoed by his co-chairman, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.).

“On Xi’s watch, Hong Kong’s autonomy is under threat, and Beijing’s reach is ever-expanding to include foreign soil and foreign nationals living, working and doing business in China,” said Rubio, a presidential candidate. “President Xi is ruling by fear, not by the rule of law.”

Before this became a story about cross-border abductions, televised confessions and China’s long, throttling reach, it was a story about a book — a gossipy work on Xi’s love life. The book, which has not been published, is said to allude to the alleged girlfriends the president had before he took office.

It was to have been issued in the semiautonomous Chinese city of Hong Kong by a small publishing house, Mighty Current Media, whose name seems to foreshadow the rush of abductions by Chinese security forces that has swept up five men associated with the firm, including two foreign nationals.

On Oct. 17, Gui Minhai, a Hong Kong-based publisher and naturalized Swedish citizen, vanished from his 17th-floor vacation condominium in Thailand. Days later, three Mighty Current employees disappeared while visiting the Chinese city of Shenzhen.

In late December, Lee Bo, a British citizen, was apparently abducted from a warehouse in Hong Kong — an action that appeared to violate the “one country, two systems” principle Beijing pledged to uphold after taking control of the city from Britain in 1997. In a series of odd communications with his wife, Lee said he was “assisting with an investigation” in China and that “everything is fine.”

[China confirms missing Hong Kong publisher in mainland]

That proved unlikely. Months after Lee’s colleague Gui went missing, he reappeared on Chinese television last week to deliver a choreographed “confession” — for a car crash that took place in 2003.

Within the week, in an unrelated case, a second confession by a Swede was broadcast on state television. It featured Peter Dahlin, who has worked to support Chinese lawyers. He disappeared on his way to the Beijing airport on Jan. 3 and was held for nearly two weeks before being given access to consular officials. He was finally released Monday evening and deported, colleagues said.

A Chinese journalist, two dissidents and the son of a jailed civil rights lawyer also have gone missing or been forcibly repatriated from Thailand and Burma in the past three months, heightening the perception that for critics of the Chinese Communist Party and their families, nowhere is safe.

The U.S. State Department expressed “concern” about the confessions and the use of “extra-legal means” to bring foreign nationals to China. And the German Foreign Ministry voiced “really serious” concern that Britain and Sweden had either not been granted access to their citizens or were granted access only after an “unacceptable delay.”

“This is clearly and undoubtedly not in accordance with the international obligations of the People’s Republic of China with regard to the Vienna Conventions,” spokesman Martin Shaefer said Friday, referring to a 1963 international accord on consular relations.

But the response from other European countries has been anemic, say critics who note that many are keen to court Chinese investment.

When the European Union issued a statement calling on Chinese authorities to “review their decision” to expel a French journalist at the end of last year, many European embassies in Beijing declined to even publish the comment on their websites.

[China expels French journalist for terrorism coverage]

The Global Times, a nationalist Chinese newspaper published in Beijing, argued that the “mild response” from France and the European Union proved that the Chinese were right to throw the reporter out.

Many European nations also have not republished E.U. statements on the abductions of the booksellers and the arrest of Dahlin. China, critics say, has realized that Europe is weak and divided.

“The international reaction, from the E.U. in particular, should be a lot stronger than this — otherwise they will get more cases,” said Nicholas Bequelin, East Asia director for Amnesty International. “China has seen through the hypocrisy of Western countries with respect to human rights.”

On a visit to Beijing this month, British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond warned that if Lee had been abducted, it would represent an “egregious breach” of promises made in 1997. But Hammond also played down such reports as “pure speculation.”

“Hong Kong people feel increasingly that Britain is not honoring its moral and legal obligation to Hong Kong,” said Anson Chan, who served as the territory’s top bureaucrat directly after the handover. “Britain is desperate to do business with China almost on any terms.”

China’s apparent disrespect for Hong Kong’s autonomy and Lee’s British passport is a threat to the hundreds of thousands of residents who hold foreign passports, Chan said.

“If tomorrow you say something that someone doesn’t like, will you be spirited away and taken to mainland China?” she said.

That fear may be precisely Beijing’s point.

It also may signal worry at home, experts said, citing concerns intensified by a stock market collapse and economic slowdown.

“As the economy begins to slow down, the leadership anticipates that the popularity of Xi Jinping and the party will take a body blow,” said Willy Wo-lap Lam, an expert in Chinese politics at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

In the middle of last year, China began a campaign against illegal publications that could “poison the hearts and minds” of its youth. Among the targets: “reactionary” publications out of Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Mighty Current’s works appeared to strike a particular nerve, because the publication suggested that Xi’s Communist Party rivals are leaking gossip to undermine him, and because the salacious subject matter might shatter the aura of invincibility he has cultivated.

“The people around Xi Jinping are furiously creating a Mao Zedong-style personality cult around him,” Lam said. “The book published in Hong Kong would have made a dent in that.”

[DavidD]

Going just by the number of aircraft built, the Chinese J-20 program seems ahead of the Russian PAK FA, with the ninth J-20 prototype taking to the skies last month.

Very clean design. Big focus on the RCS - faceted sensors. Also, note the sawtooth edges on the flap actuators.

Image 1

Image 2

Image 3

Is it true its very close for serial production already ?


http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channel ... 850117.htm

Expert: China’s J-20 stealth fighter close to batch production

Song Xinzhi, a Chinese military expert on air force equipment, said in a media interview that the J-20 fighter with fuselage number 2101 represents a brand-new production batch, namely the J-20 fighter is close to batch production stage, and its yellow painting also implies that its stealth performance has possibly passed the test.

The Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that the new J-20 fighter looks like the previous prototype models in shape except the fuselage numbering method, indicating that the appearance of the new prototype J-20 fighter is very close to that of the final-version J-20 fighters, and the J-20 fighter with fuselage number 2101 may possibly mean that the J-20 fighter is now in a transition period from test flight stage to batch production stage

The pictures posted by Viv S, #2101, is the very first serially produced J-20.

[member_28756]

^^^^^

Not a difficult decision. India cannot afford to invest in SL.

However, the Chinese are investigating the head of their stats dept, the one that has been providing glowing reports on the Chinese economy. In fact today one reporter from a fin mag asked a Chinese hot shot if their economy would "fall flat". So, there is a very good chance that their eco could be tanking - worse than any of us thought it could. Saving grace is their trade surpluses - some trillions.

Let us wait and see what happens. My gut says China is no position to spend billions abroad. Their own people need it - too many business collapsing.

I hope you are right but Sri Lanka is just one of many. It seems this is part of their master plan on the new silk route which also includes India.

http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/24/chinas-t ... ation.html

China's trade and infrastructure deals don't look like desperation

Dr. Michael Ivanovitch | @msiglobal9
Sunday, 24 Jan 2016 | 8:29 PM ET



Think of a small European country where China currently manages a $3.5 billion portfolio of direct investment projects.


And while the hapless Europeans were stirring up more trouble for Greece, last week China completed a $368.5 million deal for a 67 percent stake in the Piraeus Port Authority, with another $350 million slated for investments to create China's largest maritime hub in the Mediterranean.

Piraeus will be the seafaring endpoint of China's 21st Century Maritime Silk Road from East Asia to Africa, Middle East and Europe.

The sea route will connect with an overland trading network called the Silk Road Economic Belt from China and Central Asia to Europe's major centers of commerce and finance.

On the North African shores of the Mediterranean, China is building infrastructure facilities in the energy-rich Algeria and a strategically positioned Egypt, which could become one of the key logistics, commercial and industrial centers on the Belt and Road project.

New sea lanes

On January 17, 2016 China and Algeria signed a $3.3 billion agreement to build and manage (by the Shanghai Port Group) Algeria's major seaport of Cherchell.


Two days later, the Chinese signed a total of 12 contracts with Egyptian companies in areas as diverse as agriculture, medical equipment, and metal, chemical and textile industries.

China is also ready to participate in the development of the Suez Canal Corridor (Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone), and in the construction of Egypt's new administrative capital.

Further down into the Red Sea, there is a $10 billion Yasref oil refinery that Sinopec built at Yanbu on Saudi Arabia's west coast. That huge facility, of which Sinopec owns 37.5 percent, was inaugurated (remotely, from Riyadh) last Wednesday by the Saudi King Salman and China's President Xi Jinping, while they upgraded their countries' ties to a "comprehensive strategic partnership."

The next gateway on the Maritime Silk Road is in the Arabian Sea.

China got 2,000 acres of land to develop Pakistani deep-sea port of Gwadar at the cost of $1.6 billion. That project is a starting point of a $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, linking Gwadar to China's Kashgar City, in the province of Xinjiang, with a network of high-speed trains, highways and oil pipelines.

India is also a big part of this maritime trading route. China-sponsored infrastructure and industrial investments in India will probably get a big boost once the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Beijing-based The New Development Bank (chaired by an Indian citizen) begin their operations in the course of this year.
Meanwhile, China's largest real estate developer decided last Saturday to invest $10 billion in a 5 square-mile industrial zone in the North Indian state of Haryana.

A resource-rich Kazakhstan, with a 1,112-mile border with China, is also vying to get a slice of a potential $800 billion market along Asia's ancient trading roads.

To begin with, Kazakhstan wants to establish itself as a major regional hub, offering faster land transportation alternatives to maritime cargo traffic from East Asia to Europe.

Rich Asian bazaars

Astana's plans are much more ambitious, though.

In December, China and Kazakhstan signed a $4 billion agreement covering business operations in energy, petrochemicals, uranium mining and telecommunications. That was a sequel to the $23.6 billion worth of deals in steel, oil refineries, hydroelectric power generation and car manufacturing signed in March.

Iran, China's third-largest oil supplier, is the latest addition to big Belt and Road projects. A total of 17 agreements, with an estimated value of $8.1 billion, were signed during President Xi Jinping's two-day visit to Tehran at the weekend, when the two countries ramped up millennia-old peaceful ties to a "comprehensive strategic partnership."

The business emphasis was apparently on civilian nuclear energy facilities, but contracts also cover oil and gas industries and infrastructure investments in sea ports, roads and railways.


The Export-Import Bank of China has been another active participant in reviving old trade routes. Some estimates have it that the bank financed more than 1,000 infrastructure and industrial park projects in 49 countries along the Belt and Road destinations in 2015, for a total amount of about $80 billion.

These are some of China's major and most recent projects along the Belt and Road ancient trails. It seems that they are only the beginning of infrastructure and production initiatives foreshadowed by China's direct investment outflows currently running at an estimated annual rate of more than $120 billion.

Last year also saw a record amount – apparently exceeding $100 billion – of Chinese companies' foreign acquisitions.

This year, too, is off to a good start: In the past few weeks, the Chinese have spent more than $9 billion acquiring foreign firms in entertainment, home appliances and chemical industries.

All this fits into China's short- and medium-term development plans. Indeed, one of the immediate objectives of China's Belt and Road construction projects is to use excess production capacities left by slowing manufacturing industries at home.

The steelmakers are a good example of that strategy: They exported a record 112 million tons last year, marking a 20 percent increase from 2014. A reduction of idle production outlets is also part of China's medium-term market reforms. Large-scale industry consolidations (already under way in the shipbuilding sector) and outbound foreign direct investments are expected to soften the blow of inevitable job losses.

Investment thoughts

China naysayers are legion. There is nothing new about that; they have been around for a long, long time.


But, as always, markets will continue to respond to China's monetary and fiscal policies and to evidence on economic growth, structural reforms and the country's rising share of global demand and output.

China's economic track record and its unique method of economic management show that the Zhongnanhai officials have known how to navigate in what they call "deep waters" of economic reforms ever since they initiated that process in late 1970s.

Still, watching what they are doing now, I have the impression that they are underestimating the serious challenge posed by the opening up of China's financial system and capital account transactions.

As a former international civil servant with long experience in working with industrialized countries on their financial sector reforms, I have witnessed, up-close, how sophisticated European governments struggled – all the way to the creation of the common currency – with free capital flows and large exchange rate swings.

Investors can safely ignore the views about China's hard landing economic scenarios, but they have to expect unsettling volatility of their yuan-denominated assets.

Those who wish to avoid that can place their bets on dollar- or euro-based companies deriving large incomes from their Chinese operations.

[NRao]

I hope you are right but Sri Lanka is just one of many. It seems this is part of their master plan on the new silk route which also includes India.

That has always been their plan and a very good (+ sly) one at that. The one with Iran is my fav far more than even the one with Russia (to whom I assume they are paying at a nose bleed level for their oil?).

However, check this out. How can anyone talk around internal troubling times like is beyond me. But then I am only an armchair data collector, who connects those dots once in a while and goes back to sleep.

I do commend China on her vision, it is perhaps the very best I have come across (and I am a qualified planner). And, her execution. And beyond all that their patience, a very rare quality (but something that seems to be in their culture - I work very, very closely with a number of Chinese (and get along very, very well too)).

But, my concern stands - I have always felt that China has a hollow economy. Only 33% (or so) of it is exposed in their stock exchange. They have huge amounts of debt (internally) (I compare that to the housing bubble in the US). They claim 66% is in "Service" (which is not showing signs of collapse - yeah? Wait). Something has to give. Now, what gives we will need to wait and see. You just cannot fudge for ever.

[DavidD]

400,000 is a drop in a bucket, tens of millions lost their jobs during the last round of SOE reforms just 20 years ago, especially in the industry-heavy northeast. A family friend of ours who's from the northeast told us about how her brother would get into fights and get arrested intentionally, because at least he'll have warm food and a warm place to live. I expect many millions to lose their jobs in the current reform, they'll just have to suck it up and find new jobs, perhaps in the booming service industry.

[NRao]

Not Top Gun Yet: China Struggles With Warplane Engine Technology

Some idea on engine dev for those in India.

The Shanghai-based Galleon group, which provides consulting services to the aerospace industry, estimates Beijing will spend $300 billion over the next 20 years on civil and military aircraft engine programmes.

Some sources said China had hired several foreign engineers and former air force personnel to work on engine development, although this could not be independently confirmed. The Chinese Defence Ministry declined to comment.

"In 20 to 30 years time, given the amount of work they have done and the effort they are putting into it, they should have a viable military engine," said Greg Waldron, Asia Managing Editor at Flightglobal, an industry publication.

[TSJones]

The dragon reorganizes for space

http://spacenews.com/the-dragon-reorganizes-for-space/

On the last day of 2015, Chinese leader Xi Jinping formally inaugurated three new services into the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The commanders of the PLA Ground Forces, PLA Rocket Forces and the PLA Strategic Support Forces were vested with the colors of their respective services by Xi himself. This constitutes the first step in what promises to be one of the most far-reaching and radical reorganizations of the PLA, or indeed of any major power’s military, in the past two decades.

The creation of the PLA Ground Forces, for example, reflects a tectonic bureaucratic shake-up. Until now, the four General Departments (General Staff Department — warfighting, intelligence; General Political Department — political training, personnel; General Logistics Department — beans, bullets, blankets; General Armaments Department — weapons development, space infrastructure) that run the PLA doubled as the top leadership of the ground forces. Thus, the ground forces were bureaucratically first among equals, with substantially more clout since they staffed the top General Department billets administering the entire military. Now, the PLA Ground Forces have been made their own service — in effect a demotion, as they are separated from the General Departments.

By contrast, the creation of the PLA Rocket Forces is a massive bureaucratic gain for the former Second Artillery. Although in control of China’s rocket forces, and managing China’s nuclear warheads, the Second Artillery was only a “super branch,” half a bureaucratic step below the PLA Navy and PLA Air Force. By granting it the status of a service (junzhong), the Second Artillery has not only been elevated, but moves out of the shadow of the ground forces as well.

Most strikingly, however, is the creation of the Strategic Support Forces (zhanlue zhiyuan jun). Reportedly comprised of China’s space, electronic warfare and network warfare forces, this will arguably be the centerpiece of Chinese efforts to prepare for fighting and winning future “local informationized wars.” Chinese military writings on the conduct of “information warfare” (xinxi zhan) emphasize the need to establish “information dominance” (zhi xinxi quan). This, in turn, rests upon the ability to conduct network warfare (wangluo zhan) and electronic warfare (dianzi zhan), as well as psychological warfare. Because of the role of space systems in the collection, transmission and exploitation of information, the ability to establish space dominance (zhi tian quan) is integral to any effort to establish information dominance.

The establishment of the Strategic Support Force is therefore as much a reflection of how the PLA thinks future wars will be fought as the creation of the ground forces command. In both cases, the PLA is changing its organizational structure to improve its ability to prepare for future “informationized” warfare. Information warfare forces, including space forces, are being elevated, while the separation of the ground forces into their own command effectively signals that their role will shrink. This is further reflected in Xi Jinping’s remarks at the investiture, where the ground forces are praised as the earliest expression of the armed might of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), while the Strategic Support Force is described as a vital extension of the PLA’s combat power, and the newest form.

[Singha]

Ibn
In November, China held talks with Russian state-owned aircraft engine manufacturer United Engine Corp on the possible joint development and production of military engines at the same time it signed a deal to buy 24 Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets, one of Moscow's most advanced warplanes.
The Chinese Defence Ministry declined to comment on the status of the discussions.

[Singha]

The country's best warplane engine is the WS-10A Taihang, made by Shenyang Aeroengine Research Institute, a subsidiary of China's biggest state-owned aerospace and defence company, Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), the sources said.
In development since the late 1980s, Chinese state media reports say more than 250 have been fitted to some fourth-generation J-10s and J-11s.
But the engines don't produce enough thrust, or power, and need frequent repairs, added the sources.
"They are trying to improve the Taihang, but reliability is a major problem," said one source.
AVIC did not respond to a request for comment while Shenyang Aeroengine Research Institute could not be reached for comment.
In October, state media said three engine makers owned by AVIC would merge into one firm.

[Singha]

Among the issues, China's J-20 and J-31 stealth fighters cannot super-cruise, or fly at supersonic speeds like their closest rivals, Lockheed Martin's F-22 and F-35 stealth planes, without using after-burners, said two industry sources who follow Beijing's military programmes closely.
After-burners remove a warplane's stealthiness, a capability that allows them to escape radar detection.

[member_28756]

Among the issues, China's J-20 and J-31 stealth fighters cannot super-cruise, or fly at supersonic speeds like their closest rivals, Lockheed Martin's F-22 and F-35 stealth planes, without using after-burners, said two industry sources who follow Beijing's military programmes closely.
After-burners remove a warplane's stealthiness, a capability that allows them to escape radar detection.

I thought the F35 can not super cruise either.

[brar_w]

Among the issues, China's J-20 and J-31 stealth fighters cannot super-cruise, or fly at supersonic speeds like their closest rivals, Lockheed Martin's F-22 and F-35 stealth planes, without using after-burners, said two industry sources who follow Beijing's military programmes closely.
After-burners remove a warplane's stealthiness, a capability that allows them to escape radar detection.

I thought the F35 can not super cruise either.

No it can't although it should have a significantly better supersonic footprint compared to the F-16 or F/A-18. However, even if we assume that the Chinese jets CANNOT super-cruise, that may not matter all that much. Folks sometimes get lost in the air-combat sphere and assume these frontline Chinese jets are meant to somehow outfox the F-22 and F-35. There isn't likely to be a 'battle of britain' like scenario play out in the ASPAC but the J-20 is more likely to play a role in enforcing other capabilities that China possesses to create an Anti-Access area-denial situation where the US is denied access to the region, and if it gains access, it is denied tactical maneuvering space. Even a subsonic J-20 would be very capable in this capacity when plugged into other A2AD capabilities china is developing or fielding. China is a rising power, with a huge defense budget and rising capability. Ignore them at your peril!!

China doesn't care about defeating the USAF or America in general until 2050. IN the meanwhile, its all about creating capability that denies them access to the Pacific as China enforces its will on regional players. The J-20 even if it doesn't lives up to all of the claims, does that for them.

[VinodTK]

Five Unique Chinese Weapons (and Why They’ve Built Them)

Chinese military hardware has a tendency to be dismissed as second-rate knockoffs of Soviet Cold War models and stolen Western tech, like the Soviet-built “Chinese” aircraft carrier, or the two Chinese fifth-generation jets under development that closely resemble the American F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters.

But with a burgeoning expenditure and a mind to expanding its influence at home and abroad, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been outfitting its forces with some interesting, if not as flashy, equipment and innovations that haven’t quite caught on in Western militaries.
The ZTQ ‘Mountain Tank’

Not much is known about this Chinese light tank that appeared in 2011. From the few photos uploaded to military blogs and Chinese social media since then, it can be seen driving in desert or mountains or sitting on flat rail cars. It sports a Western-style turret and appears to be armed with a 105 millimeter main cannon.

The ZTQ appears to be intended as a fire support weapon to back up airborne troops and other forces without easy access to heavy weapons or the logistics needed to support them. This would make it perfect for Chinese forces stationed along the along the Indian border in the Himalaya mountains, or in the jungles bordering China’s Southeast Asian neighbors such as Vietnam and Myanmar.

Considering that the tanks currently deployed in the remote extremes of China are mostly the 50-year-old Type 59 (a derivative of the venerable Soviet T-55 model) or Type 62 light tank, the ZTQ would represent a significant upgrade.

Nuclear Missiles on Trucks

In the late Cold War, the U.S. military began work on a nuclear missile, the Midgetman, that was sized down to be launched from a large truck, called a Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL), which would have toughened the American arsenal against first strike in a hypothetical nuclear war.

Despite successful testing and development, the project was cancelled in 1992 due to concerns about the weapon’s continued utility after the end of the Cold War and the breakup of America’s main rival state, the Soviet Union.

Chinese military officials see things differently. While China’s reported nuclear arsenal is small, with just several hundred warheads compared to the several thousand deployed by Russia and the United States, it has been hard at work upgrading its missiles and launchers. China has long deployed nuclear missiles that can reach North America on TEL trucks, and the technology has only been improving. Last February, the Chinese military released a photo of a new TEL that may be able to carry the DF-31B, a missile with as many as ten MIRV (multiple independent reentry vehicle) warheads.
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[Austin]

Chengdu’s J-20 Enters Production

http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ ... production

China’s much-debated J-20 stealth fighter has now entered the low-rate initial production (LRIP) phase. Following on from two prototype/technology demonstrators and at least six pre-production development aircraft, the first of a new batch of production examples made an appearance outside Chengdu’s works in late December. It reportedly made its first flight on January 18, by which time a second LRIP aircraft had also been spotted at the airfield.

Whereas the earlier aircraft had all been numbered in the 20xx range, and were revealed in a full painted finish, aircraft 2101 was seen undergoing taxi trials in December in a yellow primer finish typical of aircraft fresh from Chengdu’s production lines. A second LRIP machine, 2102, was recorded in January, also in the primer finish.

Designed by the 611 Institute and built by the Chengdu Aerospace Corporation at the Huangtianba airfield, the J-20 is a large multi-role fighter with stealthy features similar to those found in the American F-22 and F-35. Although very little is known about its intended purpose, the aircraft appears to offer capability in a number of roles, including long-range interception and precision attack.

In terms of weapon carriage the J-20 has a similar arrangement to that of the Lockheed Martin F-22, comprising two lateral bays for small air-to-air missiles such as the agile, imaging-infrared PL-10, and a large under-fuselage bay for accommodating larger missiles and precision-guided surface attack weapons. The 607 Institute’s new PL-15 active-radar missile is thought to be the primary long-range air-to-air weapon, reportedly having been test-fired from a Shenyang J-16 platform last year. The PL-21, a ramjet-powered weapon in the same class as the MBDA Meteor, is another possibility for the J-20.

The sensor suite includes an electro-optical targeting system (EOTS) and a large-array AESA radar, which was developed by the 14th Institute at Nanjing Research Institute of Electronics Technology (NRIET, 14th Institute), and is possibly designated Type 1475/KLJ-5. Diamond-shaped windows around the fuselage suggest that a distributed aperture infrared vision system is installed.

In the cockpit, the J-20 sports three large color displays, plus other small screens, and a holographic wide-angle head-up display. An advanced datalink has been developed, and a retractable refueling probe is located on the starboard side of the forward fuselage. Much of the avionics suite has been tested by the CFTE (China flight test establishment) aboard a modified Tupolev Tu-204C, in much the same way as the systems of the F-22 were tested in a Boeing 757.

One area that has dogged the J-20 is the powerplant, where Chinese indigenous development has lagged behind that of the airframe and systems. The intended powerplant for the J-20 is believed to be the WS-15, an afterburning engine in the 44,000-pound-thrust (197-kN) class being developed by Xian, and which may ultimately feature thrust-vectoring. However, this engine is not expected to be ready until around 2020. In the meantime, the J-20s produced so far have been powered by the NPO Saturn AL-31FN (as used in the single-engine J-10) imported from Russia. The latest J-20s have the improved AL-31FN Series 3 engine offering 30,800 pounds (137 kN) of thrust, but even this engine may not provide the J-20 with “supercruise” capability.

J-20 History

Spurred on by developments in both indigenous technology and U.S. military capability, China initiated a project for a twin-engine stealthy fighter in the early/mid-1990s, subsequently reported by U.S. intelligence as the XXJ program. Chengdu/611 Institute’s Project 718 competed with a larger design from Shenyang/601 Institute, and was eventually selected in 2008.

Chengdu is believed to have built an initial batch of four prototype airframes, of which two took to the air. The first, 2001, made its maiden flight on January 11, 2011. It was followed on May 16, 2012 by aircraft 2002, which was subsequently renumbered as 2004. Two other airframes are understood to have been used for ground static and fatigue testing, and additional airframes may have later been produced for radar cross-section tests.

On March 1, 2014 the first of the development batch aircraft (2011) made its first flight. Whereas 2001 and 2002 appeared to be prototypes for evaluating aerodynamics and aircraft systems, as well as limited weapon carriage tests, aircraft 2011 was clearly outfitted for some mission systems.

Quite apart from the new RAM (radar-absorbent material) paint, there were numerous differences between it and its predecessors: the tailfins featured cropped tips; the inlets and DSI (diverterless supersonic intake) bulges had been redesigned; the leading-edge root extensions between wing and foreplanes were reshaped; the canopy had gained a stiffening bow frame; and the cumbersome main-wheel door design of the initial aircraft had been replaced by a much neater installation.

Perhaps the most obvious differences were the new nose design with a dielectric radome for an AESA radar featuring a sawtooth joint with the main fuselage, and the addition of an electro-optical targeting system in a fairing beneath the forward fuselage.

Three further development aircraft took to the air during 2014;Number 2012 on July 26; Number 2013 on November 29; and Number 2015 less than a month later on December 19. The latter two lacked a nose-mounted air-data probe, suggesting that the AESA radar was installed. Aircraft Number 2016 flew on September 8, 2015 with reshaped DSI bulges and lengthened fairings around the nozzles to improve rear-aspect radar cross-section. Other changes included enlarged fairings to either side of the engine nozzles. Aircraft 2017 followed on November 24, with a slightly more pronounced hump to the canopy.

At least four aircraft of the development batch were transferred to the CFTE (China flight test establishment) at Xian-Yanliang for tests. It is expected that the initial LRIP aircraft will be dispatched to the Chinese air force’s test and training center at Cangzhou once initial manufacturer/acceptance trials have been completed, and during 2017 the first front-line regiment could start to receive aircraft. IOC is slated for 2019, but may occur earlier given the priority afforded to the J-20 program. Chinese officials have stated that final requirements could be between 500 and 700 aircraft.