Collection of Good Posts - Military Forum Only

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Mihir
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Collection of Good Posts - Military Forum Only

Post by Mihir »

This thread is intended for long posts, commentary, and discussions of lasting value. Please limit the posts to those pertaining to military issues, and include a link to the original post. Do not post original content or comments of any kind here, unless it happens to be a short explanation to establish context.
Mihir
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 884
Joined: 14 Nov 2004 21:26

Re: Collection of Good Posts - Military Forum Only

Post by Mihir »

I'll post a few to set the ball rolling...

Vina, the on slow and steady competency building in the military aerospace industry, and how much groundwork has to be done before a massive program like the LCA can commence.

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 5#p1277305
vina wrote:
vikrant wrote: Vina you should actually read through this before indulging in mud slinging.
Cheers....
Kakkaji wrote:wrote:
Vina ji:
TKS saab is no fuddy duddy bara saab. He conceived and led the Jaguar Darin upgrade project. He played a big role in indigenization efforts, often at odds with his seniors, at big risks to his career.
Ok. I did read about his contributions to the Darin upgrade and his achievement is impressive, though the only niggle I have is in his assertion that the the Jaguar Darin is the first platform in the world to have the MilStd 1553 bus. I am not sure of that. The F-16 entered service before the Darin upgrade timeline and that had the 1553 bus. Maybe he meant 1553B , which per wiki got defined (and is a refinement of the the 1553A) around '78 or so, in which case he could well be right about the Darin -Jaguar being the first with 1553B if that is indeed the case .

That still doesn't take away anything at all from what I wrote earlier and I am neither slinging mud, nor playing down in anyway TKS and others accomplishments or contributions.

There is a world of difference between saying, there is a need to do an integration of systems from multiple vendors and using a defined bus standard to do it in response to a specific problem like the deficiency in the Jaguar and the systematic building of such competencies methodically as part of an overall strategy!

Ok, let me flesh out what I am saying. The emerging technologies in the 70s and early 80s were crystal clear. FBW controls,digital avionics , glass cockpit, composite structures, new gen engines (F100) and finally new maintenance concepts (LRU,on condition etc).

The problem is that there was no vision or even interest at a fundamental strategic level at the IAF & HAL in terms of competency building! They couldn't care less. The focus was on importing designs and doing screw driver assembly and passing it off as "indigenous".

It could have been pretty easy to have an R&D project with say the Ajeet (which the HAL knew inside out) to have FBW controls, a composite wing and experimental avionics and you could have built that capability in the period 1975 to 1985! The Brits built their FBW competency by having a hold your breath, a JAGUAR (yes, the very same aircraft we are talking about) tweaked for relaxed stability with FBW. The French did the same with a Mirage III.. Yup the same kind used in the Arab-Isreali conflicts in the 60s!

Okay, the IAF had the Mig-21 since 69 or so. What have the done with it? The Chinese played with it intensely and have multiple versions including different wingforms and even one of their latest AJT is a Mig21 derivative. Why didn't India have a FBW version of the Mig-21 with side intakes and a good radar in the nose and a MIL-1533B bus flying in the 80s? After all, the likes of Prof Prodyut Das (he posted in response in his blog) claim the best substitute for a Mig-21 is another Mig-21 or something to that effect if I remember correctly. It would have been silly to do that in the late 80s, but eminently sensible in the 70s! So what stopped the IAF from doing it rather than continue producing some tired old incremental upgrades of Mig-21s until mid 80s .. Where is the Indian version of an FBW Jaguar ? You did help fix a big flaw in it at the HAL during the production run, you did the Darin upgrade which the others adopted.Why not the FBW ? That is because there was no "operational need" and as an organization you couldn't think ahead strategically.

IF that had been done , you could have entered the LCA project with a solid industrial and technical base to do it and you wouldn't have seen the kind of slippages we had.

In the absence that and because of the lost decades of the 60s , 70s and early 80s, we had to start from scratch. The LCA is really some 4/5 projects rolled into one ..FBW, Composites, Avionics, Radar, Engine and maybe Electronic Warfare. Each of which in normal circumstances would have been researched, developed, proven and tested separately! Each of those is a separate 5 to 10 year project at least. The FBW, composites,mission avionics, and electronic warfare are successes , while the Radar and Engine are partially successful (HAL should never have been given the radar responsibility) and GTRE against all odds for a project as complex as the airframe itself has a working engine! All in all quite good.

I really have little patience with the service folks who sat on their backsides in the period 60s to 80s and for whatever reasons dropped the ball, to come back and dump on the LCA and other projects (like Arjun) for slipping timelines and "bad project management" and this and that and claim these are "R&D" projects and are not "operationally oriented" . Of course, there will be a big R&D phase because YOU dropped the ball there because you couldn't think strategically as an organization, and when it came to even "operational oriented" stuff of making it into a fighter out of a prototype, dropped the ball again by totally neglecting it and going comatose!

And no it is not just the LCA alone . Think of all the whining about the lack of an AJT and the how many decades (was it 25 years ?) and pilots lost before we got the Hawk! Well, we did have the "earlier Hawk" called the "Folland Gnat" in service for donkey's years. That was originally designed and used as a trainer! What stopped the IAF from asking HAL to not close the Ajeet assembly line, enhance whatever was needed to bring it upto scratch as a modern day trainer and maybe if it made sense at all, even put the Adour from the Jaguar into an enhanced version and presto, you would have had an "Indian Hawk" . Nope.. It was all about.. Oh, the Govt /Babus aren't giving us money to buy an AJT and you waited 3 decades for it to finally come through!

The less said about the HPT-32 and the HTT-40 fiascoes the better! There we are in the market again, trying to buy a turbo prop trainer in 2012! The IAF and the Army lost the ability to think beyond importing platforms and screw driver assembly and marginal tinkering.

For all the alphabet soup of acronyms of the folks in Army and Air Force who are supposed to look ahead and do planning and requirements and that sort of thing, the performance has been simply breathtakingly pathetic. The only thing they seem to have done in most part is to be reactive in saying.. Oh. Adversary govt platform X, we need to buy platform Y to counter it .

The Navy was the exception. No wonder the Navy today has a home built Nuke Submarine, while the Airforce is importing an ab-initio trainer and the Army is importing Tatra Trucks (and cant even put the steering column in the correct place for our roads), while ironically we have a very strong domestic truck industry that is pretty competitive with anything anywhere! There is a point in that, I am sure.
Last edited by Mihir on 24 Nov 2014 23:38, edited 1 time in total.
Mihir
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Re: Collection of Good Posts - Military Forum Only

Post by Mihir »

Shiv, on industrial development and the evolution of military aviation.

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... r#p1282337
shiv wrote:The "Industrial revolution" started around 1800 and continued for over a century. During that century, the countries of Europe and the USA underwent fundamental changes as science was applied to create machines that made human labour more efficient. Steam power, mining, chemicals, spinning and weaving and metallurgy. Faster transport and communication, reliable ships, railways, the telegraph etc ensured that Europe and the US were industrial societies by 1900.

Experimentation had led to the invention of the unpowered glider, and in 1903, the Wright brothers, who were IIRC bicycle makers built upon the concepts of a light and strong structure and the internal combustion engine and created the first powered aircraft. 11 years later, WW1 broke out and thousands of aircraft were manufactured to fight and concepts like recce, dogfights, air defence and bombing had all been "invented" before the end of the 1914-1918 war. By 1900, Europe and the US had already had 100 years of industrial development.

Remember the date 1800 (or 1799) by which time the "Industrial revolution" was starting in Europe. What was happening in India? Just 93 years before - in 1707, Aurangzeb had died. Elderly people who had live under Aurangzeb's rule were still alive in India at that time. India was in a flux and the east India company was expanding. 100 years later, by 1800 the East India company itself was a rich multinational ruling India. So by the time the British crown took over India in 1847, There had been virtually no socio economic progress for Indians.

I need to clarify that statement a bit. India had plenty of rich kings, some of whom benefited from trade with Britons. India also had a business class, typically family run businesses but learning had come to an end. One needs to recall that the entire business of the east India company was trade. Import of things from India and export to india. Export to India was manufactured goods from the new industries of Britain. It made no sense to have industries in India. Indians were the consumers. The only Indians who benefited were the traditional royals who collected tax and some Indian businessmen. The Kshatriya class ruler and his court were OK as were some (vysya class) businessmen. But the vast Indian countryside left out most people from the new changes. Because of British imports of steel and cloth, traditional Indian workmen, the shudras, the "engineers" and innovators who made things with their hands went out of business. carpenters, weavers, potters, metalworkers etc. Of course the cotton growers did well as did cotton traders. But the trading class were always going to be OK.

India's first engineers were trained in the mid 1850s. They were only civil engineers and only a handful were trained in the early colleges in Kolkata and Chennai (and Rourkee, I think). It was not until the 1930s that the first mechanical engineers were trained in India. So by 1940 India had a modest educated class of people who were from backgrounds like the royalty and armed forced (kshatriya), business (vysya) and some brahmins who served as accountants, clerks and scientific helpers to the British. India had virtually no "manufacturing class" (shudra). Oh we had millworkers, and railway workers. But no factories where goods designed by indians for India were produced. Of course in the middle of all this, about 90% of Indians were illiterate anyway (1930 figures). Compare that with about 80% literate in Europe and 90% literate in the USA at that time! By that time the fathers or grandfathers of BRFites today had been born.

In 1950 or so Britain had 9 million factory workers, 18% of the population. Check the comparison for India:

http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary. ... king+Class
On the eve of World War I there were 951,000 factory workers in India. A quarter of a century later (1939) there were 1,751,000. During the period between the two world wars the total number of industrial workers, including artisans, remained virtually unchanged
.

India's share of industrial production and industrial output in the world is directly related to our shudras, the factory workers and engineers and even after independence we had a miniscule number.

India had 370 million people in 1950. We only had 10-15% literacy and about 2 million factory workers. Britain had 50 million people, about 90% literacy and 9 million factory workers. And they still had to import workers for their factories! Our literate people in 1950 were ruling class, business families, military officers and government employees. We hardly had any engineers. Our colleges had started producing mechanical, chemical and electrical and other engineers barely 15 years before 1950.

The fact that the HT-2 (a basic trainer aircraft) was made in India in 1951 is a flash in the pan. Almost pretence. We had nowhere near the industrial and social development of the west at that time. We had not built a single engine or a machine tool. I am certain the HT 2 was made using lathes, presses, and machines that were imported earlier for the WW 2 war effort. So while we are allowed to feel pride at the achievement of the HT 2 that achievement hides that decrepit state of out industry in that era. By 1950 India had missed out on 150 years of industrial development. Even if we thought that we were "getting there" the bald facts are that you cannot catch up with 150 years of industrialization in 10, or 20 or even 50 years.

It is easy to underestimate the level to which your country needs to be industrialized to produce even one single aircraft in house. An aircraft may have half a million different parts. Each part has to be designed and mass produced. The materials that make that part requires chemistry and metallurgy . Making the machines that will make that part requires engineers - and the humble machine worker.

The aicraft has wings. Those wings are made of aluminium, steel and some composites. Mines have to exist for those materials, The ore must be refined and the metal extracted and purified, and the metal then alloyed if need be and then formed by moulding, casting or shaping to form wing skin, internal wing structure, rivets, nuts, bolts. In the 1930s wings were often made of wood and fabric, so any European or American who learned about wings in the 1920s and 30s would learn about aerodynamics, but would be less skilled in the design of metal wings. But at east he would not be stuck in aerodynamics theory. The Indian engineer knew neither.

The wings would need a separate factory floor, but the nuts bolts and rivets would themselves need a separate factory and separate machines to fashion them. The glass parts of the aircraft like lights, dials would need a separate glass factory. For that a good quality glass manufacturing unit would first be required and machines places in that factory to make the glass. Some engineering skills are required to make those machines that make the glass that then if used in the aircraft. And the design skills and metallurgy for those machines that make the glass. Several separate factory units are needed for the glass alone. By the 1900s Europe and the USA already had factories manufacturing machines to make other machines. India had none in 1950.

Every one of these machines need motors. So you need machines to make motor parts and metallurgy to design the motor. You need copper, ceramics and ruber/plastic industries to support the motor manufacture. And you need skilled workmen to design and make the motors that drive the machines that make the machines that make the rivets, nuts, bolts, wings and glass.

Every aircraft has kilometers of wiring. Wiring needs a copper industry. Copper mines or a source of ore. Extraction and refining. Machines are required to be manufactured by a separate factory for mining, extraction and refining and another machine for creating wire out of coper metal. Once the copper is ready you need a separate plastics industry to make the insulation for the wires. For that you need access to the raw material (Petroleum products) refineries to extract the raw material and a further factory to make the insulation for the wires. And of course you need factories that manufacture the machines that make the insulation. And workers.

Then every aircraft has some parts that undergo great stresses. You need light extra strength materials for this. This may be titanium or tungsten - so you need a separate metallurgical line to handle those materials. Some like titanium cannot be welded like steel and do not agree to change shape as you want like copper. Handling them is a matter of research, experience and skill. Once developed the skills are passed from workman to workman (shudra to shudra) on the factory floor. They cannot be read from a book and chanted like a mantra. This is why production lines (such as submarines and aircraft- should not be closed down - but I will come to that later.

The aircraft has some fabric parts. Some places may have specialised fabric that needs special spinning and manufacturing processes to withstand stresses. So you need a separate factory unit for the fabrics and a separate line of industries that make the machines that weave and stitch the fabric.

Then you have the electrical and electronic parts - each category needing the same background knowledge and industrial infrastructure as I have detailed above. Finally you have insulation, seals and tyres, so you need an industry that can manufacture high quality rubber and synthetic materials. We all know how the space shuttle Challenger crashed because of a faulty rubber ring. Every time you fly your life depends on hundreds of such rubber rings and washers. And finally the engines. Any average engine is at least as complicated as the aircraft itself and each engine part requires all of the above and more

By 1900, when Europe and the USA were about to start making the first aircraft all the industries that I mention above already existed. They already had the level of industrialization, the engineering training and the workers to do all those things. India had zilch even in 1950, that is 5 decades later. When your daddy was born he was born into an India that was 150 years behind the west in terms of technology, education and industry. Nothing already existed and everything had to be built up from scratch. Why is anyone surprised or upset at the Indian aviation industry? Why does anyone even dare to believe that we can just get there in 10 years or even 50 years? Only ignorance of facts can make one think that way. It is India, not the industry alone that is backward. If you have an ignorant "educated class" of people who do not know their own country in addition to a fundamentally backward country, that is a formula for whining, self hate and imports.

When modern (modern????) India came into being in 1947, India was hardly different from Somalia or Afghanistan today in terms of development. Your grandfather, and maybe even your father was born by then. In Somalia. It was just called India. But we got a "modern" democratic system, a modern liberal constitution because we had free thinking "modern" people at the top leading a decrepit 1700s, pre industrial revolution nation. This was India around 1950. Compare with a USA that had already made the F-86 Sabre (1948) by then, and a UK that had already mad e the De Havilland Vampire (1946) and a USSR that had already made the MiG 15! (1948)

Now if you look at India's top leadership in 1947-1960, we had bureaucrats and leading politician-administrators (kshatriya class, brahmin advisors). We had business magnates (vysya class) but India was short of shudra manufacturing skills. The kshatriya-brahmin leaders and vysya business class who ran the nation had to equip the armed forces with weapons. But the weapons of 1950 were weapons like Sabres and Vamipres that were products of 150 years of shudra-engineering in the West. What choice did the Indian leadership have to maintain a modern armed force?

India just did not have the 150 year old industrial infrastructure and skilled shudra-engineering workforce and factories to make modern weapons. Your grandfather was alive at this time. The brahmin-kshatriya-vysya leadership of India had to use the nation's money to do deals with British, Russian and American Vysyas and give their competent shudra engineering industries a lot of money and work. This was fine as long as the scheming leaders of the west wanted to supply India with what we needed. But they squeezed us as and when it suited them.

What was the alternative? The alternative was to try and set up an indigenous industrial base to get our own engineer-workman-shudra workforce up to speed. We literally had 150 years catching up to do. As always, everyone wants to take credit for success, but failure is blamed on someone else. If you look up the relevant sources, you will find that test pilots in the west were being killed at the rate of 1 a week in th 1950s. These were all failures. But the west never gave up or stopped. The west never cursed their shudra engineers as incompetent bums who cannot deliver. When they delivered, the armed forces accepted less than perfect equipment (I will make a separate cross post of that below)

What do we do? We start with an industrial base that is 150 years behind the top 10 countries. We urgently do deals with western vysyas (business houses/MNCs) and give their experienced shudras (factory workers) business. And we spend some paise on asking our shudra to give us in 10 years or 20 years or 30 years military products that the shudras of the west developed using 150 years of experience. and when our shudra engineers are unable to bridge a 150 year gap in 50 years we have only contempt for them. Our contempt for them is largely because we as a nation consist of brahmins, kshatriyas and vysya-type thinkers leading the nation. We do not understand the practical engineering difficulties of the shudra. Just like a man may pay a prostitute for services, we pay a bunch of shudra engineers/technicians and expect results with no insight into why results are available abroad and not here. In our minds we Indians see ourselves as equal to the people of the west. So the failure of our products is not our failure. It is the stupid incompetents who have failed despite our paying them so much money and despite giving them 30 or 50 years. But we do not understand and do not want to understand that Indian industry and education simply cannot catch up with 150 years of industrialization in 50 years. And unless we spend and accept failures we will never ever get there.
shiv wrote:Before I made the above post, I had some thoughts about when an aircraft is "really really" ready for service. I will cross post that here. I don't mean to be harsh about anyone - but it seems to me that there have been nations in the past who have been forced to equip their armed forces with "less than world class" equipment that was faulty and unreliable. but they went ahead and suffered that, leading to a robust world leading industry some decades down the line.

There is a semi-philosophical question that asks "When is a fighter really ready for operational flying?"

I don't know the real answer to this question but I guess a safe answer would be "A fighter is ready for operational flying when it is capable of performing the roles envisaged for it in an air force which inducts the fighter, is reliable, and is available in adequate numbers and is fully serviceable when required"

Clearly this is a broad general definition where specifics are left vague. But using the above broad definition I am tempted to think that Air Forces of the world induct aircraft only when they reach that stage as per the definition above. But hey presto, when I look back at the history of military aviation, this is what I find, from WiKi and I post that at the bottom. If you read the list you find that the richest and most powerful country on earth has a record of inducting fighters long before they were really ready. Many were plain unsafe. I am sure the US could have turned to Britain or France for imports. But they did not.

I post his in the context of when the LCA will be declared as ready, but I do feel a separate thread on the evolution of military aviation along with industrial development may be a good idea.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_ ... Phantom_II
In air combat, the Phantom's greatest advantage was its thrust, which permitted
a skilled pilot to engage and disengage from the fight at will.[37] The massive
aircraft, designed to fire radar-guided missiles from beyond visual range,
lacked the agility of its Soviet opponents and was subject to adverse yaw during
hard maneuvering. Although thus subject to irrecoverable spins during aileron
rolls, pilots reported the aircraft to be very communicative and easy to fly on
the edge of its performance envelope. In 1972, the F-4E model was upgraded with
leading edge slats on the wing, greatly improving high angle of attack
maneuverability at the expense of top speed.[38]

The J79 engines produced noticeable amounts of black smoke, a severe
disadvantage in that the enemy could spot the aircraft.[39] This was solved on
the F-4S fitted with the −10A engine variant which used a smoke-free
combustor.[40]

The F-4's biggest weakness, as it was initially designed, was its lack of an
internal cannon. For a brief period, doctrine held that turning combat would be
impossible at supersonic speeds and little effort was made to teach pilots air
combat maneuvering. In reality, engagements quickly became subsonic.
Furthermore, the relatively new heat-seeking and radar-guided missiles at the
time were frequently reported as unreliable and pilots had to use multiple shots
(also known as ripple-firing), just to hit one enemy fighter. To compound the
problem, rules of engagement in Vietnam precluded long-range missile attacks in
most instances, as visual identification was normally required. Many pilots
found themselves on the tail of an enemy aircraft but too close to fire
short-range Falcons or Sidewinders. Although in 1967 USAF F-4Cs began carrying
SUU-16 external gunpods containing a 20 mm (.79 in) M61 Vulcan Gatling cannon,
USAF cockpits were not equipped with lead-computing gunsights,until the
introduction of the SUU-23, virtually assuring a miss in a maneuvering fight.
Some Marine Corps aircraft carried two pods for strafing. In addition to the
loss of performance due to drag, combat showed the externally mounted cannon to
be inaccurate unless frequently boresighted, yet far more cost-effective than
missiles. The lack of a cannon was finally addressed by adding an internally
mounted 20 mm (.79 in) M61 Vulcan on the F-4E.[38]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vought_F-8_Crusader
The Crusader was not an easy aircraft to fly, and was often unforgiving in
carrier landings where it suffered from yaw instability, and the
poorly-designed, castered nose wheel made steering on the deck problematic. It
earned a reputation as an "ensign killer" during its early service
introduction.[9] The nozzle and air intake were so low when the aircraft was on
the ground or the flight deck that the crews called the plane "the Gator." Not
surprisingly, the Crusader's mishap rate was relatively high compared to its
contemporaries, the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk and the F-4 Phantom II.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Amer ... uper_Sabre
The F-100A officially entered USAF service on 27 September 1954 with 479th
Fighter Wing at George AFB, CA. By 10 November 1954, the F-100As suffered six
major accidents due to flight instability, structural failures, and hydraulic
system failures, prompting the Air Force to ground the entire fleet until
February 1955. The 479th finally became operational in September 1955. Due to
ongoing problems, the Air Force began phasing out the F-100A in 1958, with the
last aircraft leaving active duty in 1961. By that time, 47 aircraft were lost
in major accidents.[2] Escalating tension due to construction of the Berlin Wall
in August 1961 forced the USAF to recall the F-100As into active service in
early 1962. The aircraft was finally retired in 1970.

By the time the F-105 mock-up had been completed in October 1953, the aircraft
had grown so large that the Allison J71 turbojet intended for it, was abandoned
in favor of an even more powerful Pratt & Whitney J75. Anticipating a protracted
development of the engine, it was expected that the first aircraft would use the
smaller Pratt & Whitney J57. Near the end of 1953, the entire program was
canceled by the USAF due to a number of delays and uncertainties regarding the
aircraft, however on 28 June 1954, the USAF officially ordered 15 F-105s (two
YF-105As, four YF-105Bs, six F-105Bs and three RF-105Bs) under the Weapon System
designation WS-306A.[5][9][10]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F-105_Thunderchief
By the time the F-105 mock-up had been completed in October 1953, the aircraft
had grown so large that the Allison J71 turbojet intended for it, was abandoned
in favor of an even more powerful Pratt & Whitney J75. Anticipating a protracted
development of the engine, it was expected that the first aircraft would use the
smaller Pratt & Whitney J57. Near the end of 1953, the entire program was
canceled by the USAF due to a number of delays and uncertainties regarding the
aircraft, however on 28 June 1954, the USAF officially ordered 15 F-105s (two
YF-105As, four YF-105Bs, six F-105Bs and three RF-105Bs) under the Weapon System
designation WS-306A.[5][9][10]

The YF-105A prototype first flew on 22 October 1955, with the second YF-105A
following on 28 January 1956.[9] In spite of being powered by a less potent
J57-P-25 engine with 15,000 pounds-force (67 kN) of afterburning thrust (the J75
was expected to generate 24,500 lbf (109 kN) with afterburner), the first
prototype attained the speed of Mach 1.2 on its maiden flight.[11] Both
prototypes featured conventional wing root air intakes and slab-sided fuselages
typical of the early jets; Republic viewed the YB-105As as not being
representative of the true capability of the aircraft due to numerous changes
prior to production.[12] Insufficient power and aerodynamic problems with
transonic drag, as well as Convair's experience with their F-102, had led to a
redesign of the fuselage in order to conform to the Area rule, giving it a
characteristic "wasp waist".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Dy ... 1_Aardvark
Lacking experience with carrier-based fighters, General Dynamics teamed with
Grumman for assembly and test of the F-111B aircraft. In addition, Grumman would
also build the F-111A's aft fuselage and the landing gear.[20] The General
Dynamics and Grumman team faced ambitious requirements for range, weapons load,
and aircraft weight.[21] The F-111 design also included new features on a
production military aircraft, such as variable-geometry wings and afterburning
turbofan engines.[20]

The F-111A mock-up was inspected in September 1963. The first test F-111A was
rolled out of the General Dynamics' Fort Worth, Texas plant on 15 October 1964.
It was powered by YTF30-P-1 turbofans and used a set of ejector seats as the
escape capsule was not yet available.[18] The F-111A first flew on 21 December
1964 from Carswell AFB, Texas.[22] The first F-111B was also equipped with
ejector seats and first flew on 18 May 1965.[23][24]

To address stall issues in certain parts of the flight regime, the engine inlet
design was modified in 1965-66, ending with the "Triple Plow I" and "Triple Plow
II" designs.[25] The F-111A achieved a speed of Mach 1.3 in February 1965 with
an interim intake design.[18][25] Cracks in the F-111's wing attach points were
first discovered in 1968 during ground fatigue testing, and an F-111 was crashed
the following year due to the issue. The attach structure required redesign and
testing to ensure adequate design and workmanship.[26] Flight testing of the
F-111A ran through 1973.[27]

The F-111B was canceled by the Navy in 1968 due to weight and performance
issues, along with the need for additional fighter requirements.
Last edited by Mihir on 24 Nov 2014 23:39, edited 1 time in total.
Mihir
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 884
Joined: 14 Nov 2004 21:26

Re: Collection of Good Posts - Military Forum Only

Post by Mihir »

Karan M contests the notion that civilian scientists and engineers did not make great personal sacrifices while developing military technology for India

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 5#p1691745
Karan M wrote:
rohitvats wrote:Can you please quote example(s) especially with respect to the entire LCA Program where it has been held up because GOI/MOD have not been willing to put money into the program? Which particular aspect of the program has been stuck-up/was stuck-up because MOD/GOI won't part with the money and had the same been made available, LCA would've been flying in squadron strength with IAF.
http://tarmak007.blogspot.in/2011/01/wo ... -take.html
We ran the show with no man power, no experience, poor salaries, hurt feelings and snakes to fear: Dr V. Kala, Sc G, PD (LCA-FCS)
We had 4 designers and 4 testers in 1993. No man power, no experience. No tools and 50 per cent of us were ladies. And, the government rule says that if you are woman, you can’t work beyond 6 pm. But with all issues revolving around the LCA project, we decided to give everything. During those days it was a remote building and we were scared to move around after 6, due to snakes. Permission was denied to get our two-wheelers inside, despite all these issues. Once, Dr Kalam came to the lab and he had to encounter a snake. The rest is history. We were given permission to get the vehicles.
We had to a huge challenge to make the design document within 3 months. We used to go home sometimes at 2 am and family life went for a toss. Some of our colleagues left the job due to the tough conditions. We stuck on and from that batch, there are only 3 scientists left, including me. (The others are: Asha Garg, Sc F and Sreekalakumary, Sc E.)
http://tarmak007.blogspot.in/2012/06/cl ... rcame.html
The bad publicity that Tejas got in early days and low salaries ensured that most of the team members (men) had a tough time in finding suitable brides. “Yes. It's true and many of our team mates faced this problem. Our job profile was such that no father dared to give her daughter. Some of my colleagues even had to undergo counselling. All that is past and we are all happily married now. But can't believe how 20 years flew past,” said a senior NAL scientist.
This is but a fraction of the actual issues with funding programs like Tejas face, as versus the BS in MOD etc reports where a MOD representative turns out and says funds are always available, all iz well. And the committee members wolf down their samosa and chai. :lol:

One way to determine this is to do a value chain analysis, actually look up the costs involved at every stage - in terms of setting up infrastructure & then "greasing" the system with surplus to make it move along.

The LCA is a case in full reverse. Forget getting an IL-76 TestBed for the Kaveri (which BTW the Chinese purchased, we go to Russia with our entourage at their convenience), our facilities for the program have been funded in bits and pieces and are still far away from what other nations deploy as standard. We are using an ancient Avro Hack to "test" the MMR, never mind its meant to go on a fighter which flies/maneuvers at far greater speeds. Other countries have biz jets! HAL itself bound by Govt overregulation so poorly funded the MMR program, it was doomed to fail anyhow.

Every component, every system, every item in a properly funded setup, has its own organization or setup with a line of funding. In India, we managed it in bits and pieces.

Another revealing snippet. Even "well funded programs" (by Indian standards :lol: ) like the LCA struggled with resources to the extent that at time of sanction, there were only a handful of Moog actuators from the US. These were *rotated* between the flying LCAs and the Iron Bird to keep the program going. No GOI funding available BTW to realize alternate actuator programs with France or Russia or anyone else.

LCA is a full SDRE fighter, funded SDRE wise, while the Air Marshals scoffed at the "Waste of funding" that is the LCA. Its a common perception driven by the fact that the service simply don't have a build your own culture & nor are they used to working with Industry (the practise of the IAF to depute people to HAL was stopped by former citing manpower constraints & Matheeshwaran was expected to directly take the top spot in a "return to the practise").

The IAF deputed LCA Program Manager was denied his promotion & finally got it when civvies fought for his case. The IAF was advised by folks at AHQ not to even attend the LCA's first flight. Relevance being these are the same guys who would shoot down any proposal to fund the LCA when MOD/MOF sought their input!

Ultimately, many of these folks simply don't get the level of investment required in technology & let their objectivity go for a toss even as they are willing to import stuff at a heavy markup which subsidizes foreign complexes.

What adds to this is the GOI's piecemeal funding approach. Sometimes unavoidable -after 1991 forex crisis, several reports noted that work on the LCA literally slowed to a crawl - all projected consultancy, COTS stuff, test gear all on hold. Then there is bureaucratic BS.
CAG was angry at VKS because he used his powers and broke up programs into multiple ones so that they could get funded as required without launching one big program that required babu signatures in triplicate. Not the intent they said. Idiots. :lol:

Basically every year the DM used to come and tell us "everything is well". Ships sank. Army without guns. And LCA was also "funded" likewise. Only in recent years (post 2007) does it even appear that some decent funding is available for basics. No coincidence that's when the IAF also deputed a Project Team to ADA.
Actually, it does not. It's the armed forces who suffer at the end of the day. No skin of the back of any DRDO or DPSU employee if a product is delayed or comes with QC issues.
http://tarmak007.blogspot.in/2011/02/ir ... -told.html
. In spite of these alluring offerings to the core people associated with the Tejas program the program had continued without much deceleration and the ‘Tejas Loyals’ came out with flying colours. Most of these crazy people have even never seen their salary slips from past many years. Ask them their basic pay even today and they will start looking at the skies, not for a clue but to tell the world, Tejas is our actual pay that we have earned. The soldiers at the borders have the obsession of dying for the country, we, at Iron Bird live with that and are always ready to die with that furore.
Just a revealing snippet about the "no skin off their nose stuff"..sadly this sort of commentary is all too common from many on the service side who think they have a lock down on patriotism or that "the other side" doesn't give a darn. But its completely mistaken. There are many folks who persevere with these programs despite the taunting commentary they get even from the service folks themselves because they don't give up.

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/drdo ... 93340.html

This guy gave his fathers funeral a miss because there was an Agni test. Far too many such examples.

Yes, there are OFBs and messed up structural issues - they need reform. But then again, those are systems set up to fail and run by the MOD & decisions influenced by a politico-agent nexus which has far too long been seduced by imports. OTOH, nothing stops the military from focusing on their own product development mechanisms - but apart from Navy, other services are giving lip service & have very limited indigenization/BRD structure with a token SDI or two, which is nowhere near what is required to understand the R&D process, let alone own it or manage it or direct it.

That is the big issue, because even where the services can make a huge difference, they are not punching at their weight. Folks who run programs like Pinaka, Arjun etc either are let go (with their decades of development experience) or have to be absorbed into the R&D side & still face criticism if they support the product (famous case in Arjun - Army rep says Army men who support the Arjun "have forgotten the olive green"). This sort of us versus them attitude is disastrous because program successes are not institutionalized. People are deputed on "tactical" basis, and many will simply demur from such postings if they see it will impact their own life

Word is that even F-INSAS's much anticipated software component is a disaster because different IA units are bickering about who owns the programs and what should be there. In the meantime, BEL will pick its teeth and whistle since there is no direction & hence no accountability. Its more of a symptom of not having an ownership culture and a "buy" culture.

OTOH, the French and Israelis who sell to us happily embed their service folks into product leadership and testing groups. Even with private sector, these challenges will remain. :|
Mihir
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Re: Collection of Good Posts - Military Forum Only

Post by Mihir »

Karan M's detailed post on the Trishul program

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 18#p841518
Karan M wrote:The DRDO was in negotiations to handle the IAF developed variant of the Trishul over to them, with a batch of last produced missiles. It is a fact which several here are or should be aware of. But lets get to the point.

First, lets handle the technological challenges that plagued Trishul and should testify to how hard developing such a complex, and still sophisticated system is.

First the need for 3 beam guidance must be understood. The critical requirement was how to gather the missile, ie to capture the missile in a tracking schema so as to guide it accurately. First attempt was by using a TV Camera. These trials were done in 1989. Challenging as the o/p of the camera had to be processed through a tracker. When propellant obscuration was observed, the change was made to a 3-5 Micron IR camera. These were done from 1990-93. Again, there were issues with poor temperature contrast & smoke, hence the decision to proceed to the hardest method, eg 3 beam guidance. Each of these attempts would require a paragraph to detail, but for brevity, lets keep it to a line.

There were other issues observed each of which was analysed carefully by doing root cause analysis and fixed. I will be brief and not get into details. However, what Rahul said was factually correct.

I will address the problems that were observed and solved towards the end of the project.

1. Inadequate communications Link - due to attenuation of signals by the plume. Solved by 2002 and flight tested.
2. Guidance algorithm modification - high oscillations in the trajectory, and solved by a back to the drawing board approach. For details, please refer to DSJ, 2005. Major milestone as 15 test flights thereafter from 2003-2006 showed these capabilities.
3. Range enhancement - IAF noted it wanted range enhanced from 9 km to 12km in 2003. This too was evaluated and demonstrated via test flight in 2005. Changes included changes to the propulsion, new thermal power pack (size reduction to keep overall length unaltered), new digital autopilot replacing the original analog system.
4.Improving the explosive system for the warhead - reliability reengineering demonstrated and flown successfully in 2005.

Finally, from your posts one gets the impression that all three services had essentially the same requirement and if one system does not work, nor would any. That would be incorrect. The Naval requirements were different in several key respects & the purchase of the Barak & communication by the Navy that they would no longer be interested in a Trishul effectively ended the Naval trishul. Arguements can be made both ways for the pros and cons, but as long as the Barak works, the Navy is happy with it, lets leave that be.

Furthermore you note - as its too hard to trawl through the thread to get the exact post, please allow me to paraphrase - that the Trishul contributed nothing essentially to SRSAM or that DRDO needs a foreign partner for SRSAM because it cannot develop a SHORAD. That would not be accurate.

If one were to write what was developed for the Trishul, and what was learnt in the process for the SRSAM, it would run into pages. Suffice to say, that the missile production facility itself at BDL, remains highly relevant from complex assembly, checkout, 3D Measurement, environmental test etc. These can be used for the SRSAM - for the record, some 100 Trishuls were produced at BDL. At the subsystem and technology level, many technologies developed via the Trishul program (hardware and software) remain relevant and can be and are being used for other programs. The experience that was gained by different teams is another case altogether, and arguably (imho) which needs to be used to the highest extent possible.

Let us speak from the viewpoint of the Navy as to what the SRSAM brings to the table which no Trishul or Barak can, and as to why its being developed.

The DRDO has newer technologies today, and it intends to leverage them for the SRSAM as they make what was available for the Trishul (and Barak-1) obsolescent. It is not technology for technology's sake but directly relates to operational performance.

The SRSAM f.e. is intended to use an active seeker developed with MBDA input which relates to future and current threats both, eg the interception of low flying targets. Current gen systems over the sea repeatedly face multipath reflection problems. The SRSAM is also intended to be a VLS drop in system like the Barak-1 but with complete integration into the existing radar systems onboard, including the Revathi. It will not require an additional targeting radar. Furthermore, it is intended to handle surge attacks, which a LOS system has issues with. The range of the Trishul for instance was 9 km, upgraded to 12km at IAF request, but the SRSAMs smokeless solid rocket is intended for a slant range of 15 km.

Most of the above details can be confirmed but however, not by any online links. And they are all verified.

The Trishul system has arguably been one of the most complex attended by any nation in terms of scope creep and what it was meant to achieve and has delivered substantial results.

In any other nation, there would be a balanced approach to both its successes (including breakthroughs in radar technology with the help of BEL, which allowed naval radars to track targets much smaller than 1 Sq Mtr RCS) and failures but here, it has got stuck in a stupid battle to either support imports, or malign a Naval chief, or attack DRDO.

The Trishul developers note that effectively, the Trishul program meant developing three separate systems under the guise of a common name. As the JSF program is now discovering, commonalities in terms of subsystems dont take away from the significant challenges of differing requirements to be met by a standardised system.

The Trishul developers have also documented what they achieved, did (but should not have), did not (but should have) and that too in several public events but as usual, it has not been archived or detailed online as would have been done by any private organization which was keenly concerned about its image.

As a developer from the user side stated - "We asked for what we should do, nobody told us, the biggest challenge was our inexperience but the advantage is you begin with a clean sheet of paper when you go wrong and solve the problems if you can.". This note was taken in 2008

The biggest need for India today is to retain this hard won experience via the Trishul, which has been very poorly understood by lay media - and implement it via the SRSAM and associated programs.

You note that DRDO lied about the Trishul. That they did not - they closed the project when it became clear it had no future in naval service. Unfortunately, due to the CBIs ham handed investigation of the affair, targeting a rtd Naval chief, the entire issue became political. Let us see the issue here - the MODs POV was simple, it would remain silent and the whole thing would blow over, but it was not fair to the CNS rtd. as he felt targeted. Lets get to the last statement made - the DRDO noted that the Trishul had been closed, and moved to the TD stage, ergo the case is over, and there was no prima facie charge of corruption etc from the DRDO end (Kalam himself signed off on the Trishul). If the DRDO had stated that it closed the project as the Navy would not buy it and that it could even attempt to meet naval requirements, then the CBI could rake up yet another can of worms by claiming that the CNS rtd had done the wrong thing. The DRDO did no such thing. For his part, the CNS was absolutely right in stating that he took an operational decision at the time to import the Barak which was available (per data available to him) and the Trishul wasnt. What constitutes a grey area, and what the CBI would use is what next, ie was Trishul development continued to meet all naval requirements? Ergo, the MOD/DRDOs guarded, response to kill the topic and get the CNS his due irrespective of the media hype. Now that its been done, it makes little sense to continue this discussion. A service member is out of a hamfisted investigation that should never have been launched but for politics to get back at a prior Def.Min. and he ended up as the fall guy.

If the DRDO truly were as malicious as you note they were, all they needed to do was make a statement that further developments could have been done and still attempt to push the Trishul development. No, they closed it, and moved on. Its best that it be done by all of us, enough media attacks have occurred already and the only ones who benefit are the arms peddlers and wheeler dealers who would love the attempt to incite a split between two organizations, which more often than not have worked together and delivered leading results in indigenization.

Finally, coming to Dr. Paulraj - again what RahulM said was unfortunately right. At the time Dr Paulraj was in service, the Navy rules & attitudes as prevalent in some sections of the Naval establishment (not personal malice but organizational inertia) meant that that rules were rules and changing them for the sake of one person could not be done. This piece of information comes directly from one of the key founding members of a Naval organization who fought to reverse the state of affairs but could not. The GOI & DRDO for their part did what they could. Dr. Paulraj was given a scientist of the year award (and for the record, this is a key award within the organization as confirmed via innumerable discussions with stakeholders across projects), Director position at CAIR, allowed to work at CDAC and BEL (as Director of its prestigious CRL, no less). The GOI did what it could to retain this talented individual.

Unfortunately, Dr Paulrajs justifiable career and research aspirations took him in a different direction, and if he preferred Stanford can anyone here blame him? Dr VS Arunachalam of the DRDO also ended up at Carnegie Mellon. For the record, it did not stop Dr Paulraj from continuing to contribute to India. He started Spectrum Infotech Ltd with Dr Thomas Kailath, which org was purchased by L&T. Spectrum did several key projects for DRDO, especially around image processing.

Secondly, the entire Paulraj arguement is irrelevant to the discussion at hand. Managing people, especially talented ones in any organization is akin to herding cats. There will always be issues/ squabbles and all management can do is not take sides and try to make sure both key contributors have their say & are given their chance. That was done in this case.

I regret to say that far worse has been done in many others across the board, whether it be the services, DRDO or DPSUs or even at the GOI level itself wherein large organizations have simply been unable to react properly and in a timely manner when faced with personal conflicts. In my immediate family I have people with service experience who loath what was done to them in the name of rules whereas others have had a better time.

Furthermore, nor has it affected Sonar development at NPOL. As of date, over 80% of naval sonars are from NPOL. For instance, a few years back, the project director for the Nagan Sonar was Commodore Kuruvilla who has been at NPOL, since 1974 and worked across the board in terms of sonar systems including the APSOH itself, the HUMVAD VDS, submarine sonars including the Panchendriya and others. He played a key role in its fitment on INS Mumbai for trials. And the Navy is keenly awaiting the final development and certification of Nagan which would make India self reliant in another key aspect.

If Naval perception of NPOL/DRDO is concerned, suffice to say that in both private and official/public events, naval officers working with their peers at NPOL/DRDO have been very gung ho and upbeat about their work & that of their peers. For the record, at one event, without any sort of prompting whatsoever, referred to the people at NPOL as family.

It is this organizational culture both from certain visionary leadership at the Navy, and from the organization at DRDO, which needs to be replicated across both other services. The family comment was especially telling, as it reflected the ownership the Navy had of its programs and that they could face the good and the bad with equanimity, with the end goal - a better Indian mil ind complex, firmly in mind. It is to be praised for sure, but more importantly replicated and even improved.

The issue is beyond Trishuls or a Paulraj who are irrelevant to the actual topic under discussion - the issue of what went wrong in the Arjun program (as versus the tank itself).

The issue is actually is one of organizational support and culture, as the systems that are in place in the Navy - from designing their own ships, deputing personnel to head/assist/consult with programs at defence labs, assist/lead manufacturing programs at defence shipyards and DPSUs - are simply not there in the Army. As such the number of stakeholders, the organizational drive to support indigenization is not there. It becomes limited to programs, to people and consistency suffers.

As one supplier told me - "I have to convince the Army to let me make things for them, with the Navy, they convince me to make things for them".

With that in mind, what happened to the Arjun may yet happen to the FMBT or any other fancy acronym, if corrective measures are not taken.
Mihir
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Re: Collection of Good Posts - Military Forum Only

Post by Mihir »

Another post by Karan M on the Trishul, addressing concerns about the guidance system, procurement, scope creep, etc.

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 79#p841579
Karan M wrote:Re: beam guidance
The Beam guidance issue was finally solved over 2003-05 (15 guided flights during the period), including modifications to gain & other improvements. The details may be found in the paper "Post-flight Analysis and Design Improvement in Command Guidance System for a Short-range Surface-to-air Missile System" released in 2005. You may check the same as it has the relevant details of interest/discussion. This of course, was the final issues with beam guidance (the penultimate) as the others including initial gathering, communications were solved previously.

However the point I was attempting to elucidate was that there are things viz. the original Trishul about what the program has already achieved there are things that are there and things that arent. However, the lay media has come to the erroneous conclusion that no capabilities were achieved at all or could be progressed into the SRSAM, which is where I would respectfully disagree with them. On discussions, I found it surprising that the amount of technology developed via the Trishul compared well with any other similarly large systems program and was production ready, but thanks to the controversy associated with the program was noticeably absent from discussion.

Now about whether DRDO has the tech viz sea skimmers or not, it becomes a chicken or egg scenario akin to the Airavat ASP program. If I may explain further - i.e., if the program is cancelled in toto, the systems and technologies will not get developed further unless the program is kept alive and active funding kept in place - which was disclosed to me via a brief interaction in 2005 with an Army person associated with the program. Now about whether that funding continued: when I last discussed these issues in depth (early 2008), was noted that there was a proposal that the SRSAM effectively take over & no further funding into Trishul would be progressed. There was also the perception that the command guidance system may be simplified and dropped altogether in lieu of a seeker based system. In 2009, it was informed that the seeker would be an active RF one sourced via MBDA involvement and participation and that would address all tri-service requirements.

I would state that DRDO intends to leverage its progress via the Barak-8/LRSAM program viz low flying targets/sea skimmers for the SRSAM itself and hence the choice of a common guidance schema ie RF seeker + surveillance radar guided data uplink across both programs. The LRSAM is also clearly intended to address VL flying targets, so this would assist with the SRSAM as well.

Also based on an analysis of what was developed (and what was not) via the Trishul program, the SRSAM program was identified and mooted and it included service inputs about what it should be.

Re: procurement controversy

Regarding the procurement controversy - DRDO did what it could by speaking up on occasion (and receiving egg on its face via headlines such as "DRDO admits it made dud missile") to keeping quiet (hoping the MOD would resolve the issue vis a vis another central Govt organization, the CBI). This is a problem that has occurred in the past both with CAG and CVC statements as well, wherein it becomes a political battle played out to great opprobrium in the press. Even the IAF & IA have had to bide their piece and let statements fly unchallenged. In this case, the MODs deliberately worded last statement on the matter exonerates the CNS rtd. and lets the issue rest. Given the manner in which these things are played out, that is the best one can hope for. At any rate it has been resolved vis a vis the manner in which a national periodical hounded another CNS rtd. on grounds of having a shady relative. I wonder if he even received an apology.

Re: operational requirements

I understand the issue of operational requirements and the resultant stress. If we note present day requirements, there is a realization that what can be developed within a reasonable timeframe is pursued inhouse and if not, what is required operationally, is procured as required from outside (as it should be imho)

Re: scope creep
You also mention scope creep. I find no scope changes, other than changes in guidance technology, which was driven by the need to achieve operational parameters, rather than any service specific requirement. The only operational change was increase in range from 9 km to 12 km.
I was informed that specific operational requirements specified were more than anticipated and drove stringent choices in terms of system complexity and choice of RF bands and components, each in turn causing more challenges. The operational range increase from 9 to 12 km was also fairly significant as the missile had to be re-engineered to achieve 30% more range within current dimensions, which meant developing new subsystems and redesigning the missile.
While you mention certain technologies have been mastered, I dont have a confirmation that full operational parameters have been met. From what I found when I checked with an IAF coursemate in 2005, it was that Trishul had failed to make the cut. Its presently midnight in India, but I will seek confirmation that IAF is indeed procuring Trishul, as Rahul claims.
What Rahul referred to was this, namely discussions on inducting the IAF version into service, in 2007, by which time critical guidance issues had been resolved.

http://frontierindia.net/trishul-sam-mi ... quirements

The issue of whether the Trishul systems found their way into the IAF or not is of course not dependent on operational parameters alone. The issue would also be whether the IAF finds it worthwhile to induct a handful of systems into its force when series production of missiles & suppport systems has not been launched, and also whether it has alternative systems available, eg like the SpyDer. This is something DRDO would face an uphill battle over and with the launch of the SRSAM program, it might be dropped.

Regarding Dr Paulraj - I really do not know whether I have the right to discuss a private conversation online in further detail, but from what I can state, the issue was not with his choice of field e.g. sonar development, but overall career prospects given existing rules at the time. Even so, his contribution was recognised both at the Naval, GOI and DRDO level and several folks did their best to do right by the situation at hand. However to be fair it was also noted that, times have changed now & we are less likely to face such situations - which I hope would be the case
Holistically, my intent with these examples was to correct the misperception at BR that services deliberately don’t prefer indigenous equipment. This is quite far from the truth.
I would state that the nuance I intended to point out is different if I may.

In one case, i.e. the Navy has the systems, the structure in place to make sure a program is successful, and is taken from cradle to delivery in a feasible manner. However, in the case of the other two services, the systems are not in place to the same extent. The end result of these is the ad hocism that has played havoc with programs like the Arjun. As Rahul's quotes depict - we have had significant support for the Arjun from one section of people.

At the same time, as quotes in Livefist/Broadsword note - once these folks retired, others were equally passionate about scrapping the program.

What it boils down to is ownership. The Navy is systematically invested in the program via discussions, actual involvement and leadership/deputation at the organizational level. The only times the projects end up scrapped are when they dont meet operational needs (eg Trishul or re: Broadsword on the ALH). In other words, its not the requirements that are questioned but whether they will be met! Unfortunately, in the case of the Arjun we have an entirely different set of issues due to the lack of such organizational support and consistency. Many T-Series commanders are simply at odds with the basic requirements for the Arjun itself, and with that problem, the tank has faced a see sawing battle for its future.
Mihir
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Re: Collection of Good Posts - Military Forum Only

Post by Mihir »

Kartik explains how "Swedish" the Gripen is, in a discussion about indigenous content in the LCA

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 7#p1750497
Kartik wrote:
Wickberg wrote: Yeah, you keep telling yourselves that. Still. it does´nt change the facts. How much you want to draw the racist-card or wathever. The LCA is still not in operational service and its 1st squadron won´t be in years. And some of the people here actually fantazazing about exporting the plane?! And some even thinks it´s an indigenous Indian aircraft, jesus. The two main parts of a fighter is its engine and radar, how much Indian brainpower has been put into that?
you really had to go do this, didn't you? Now we have to expose the Gripen for what it really is--a product heavily reliant on international suppliers and designers, with not very significant Swedish content. Remove those international suppliers and Sweden would never have gotten the Gripen into service for another decade and half.


ENGINE

- Gripen C/D's engine- F-404 derivative with some work done by Volvo Flygmotor to increase thrust and for birdstrike requirements. Effectively an American engine since GE retained technical responsibility for the engine and Volvo was primarily entrusted with some testing/development and manufacturing parts upto 35% of the engine's value.
I won't go into the developmental troubles in developing the RM12 variant - like the fan blade cracks, "thrust droop" and resonance issues since those are par for the course for any product development program.
Volvo Flygmotor has now completed l,400hr of bench testing on the RM12 engine, which is a General Electric
F404 modified to meet Swedish requirements. the front end is beefed up to withstand birdstrikes better, and thrust is up by 10 per cent on the F404.

AIRFRAME


- Wing design, wing torsion box, fuel tank installation, electrics, hydraulics- British Aerospace
The wing is a joint Saab/British Aerospace development. BAe is building wings for the first two prototypes, and is responsible for design of the wing torsion box and installing fuel tanks, electrics, and hydraulics.
Saab designs the control surfaces, pylons, and the wing/fuselage joints and fairings. After completion of the prototype articles, production of the wing will pass to Saab's Linkoping plant entirely.
-Carbon Fiber material from Ciba Geigy of Switzerland


AVIONICS


- PS/05A- Radar - 30% work by Ferranti of Italy. Ferranti involved in the design of the signal data processor and the scanner mechanism.
Ferranti is to share in development of the radar for Sweden's JAS 39 Gripen. It will have about 30 per cent of
the radar, under an agreement signed with radar maker LM Ericsson. Ferranti will invest its own
money in development and production of its radar share, aiming to make a profit on subsequent sales.

The multimode pulse- Doppler set being worked on in conjunction with Ferranti uses some of the technology developed by the latter for Blue Vixen, which is to be fitted to the Royal Navy's Sea Harrier.
- Triplex redundant Fly-by-wire system with single analog channel- developed by Lear Siegler of the US
The Gripen's flight control system computers are produced by the US firm Lear Siegler,as is the system in
Israel's Lavi next-generation fighter. Unlike Gripen, the Lavi will have a quadruplex computer.
Hokborg explains that Sweden went for triplex rather than quadruplex because "we wanted to have as simple a system as possible without compromising on safety. We strongly believe it is sufficient," he
says. "It is a good and flexible system."
Of course, right after this, the first prototype crashed thanks to a bug in the FBW software.

- Heads Up Display and 3 MFDs- developed by Hughes Aerospace

-Stick, throttle and HOTAS controls - Page Engineering of UK
The UK firm Page Engineering, an AB Electronic Products subsidiary, will develop the stick and the throttle lever for the first 30 aircraft.
- PCBs for the Gripen avionics system- Ferranti of Italy

As for the original Gripen being over weight, here we go
Any problems with Gripen?
Tommy Ivarsson: "Well, the weight is still slightly over what it should be, but every day we find ways of trimming it back. It will be in spec, because it has to be." Can't Saab use aluminium-lithium alloys for the metal parts of Gripen, which is 30 per cent composite construction? "I wish we could. That would solve the problem overnight and give us plenty in hand. But the fact is that there is no aluminium-lithium available. Not in sufficient flight-proven quantities. It's around, but, as I say, it's not been approved for flying yet".
Of course, we know how Saab execs went around the world with PowerPoint presentations in hand claiming that the Gripen NG would weigh something and then the actual Gripen E ended up being more than 1000 kgs over that weight.

We haven't even started picking the Gripen E apart and see what all comes from where all..radar, engine, EW equipment, canopy, ejection seat, undercarriage, weapons..
Avarachan
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Re: Collection of Good Posts - Military Forum Only

Post by Avarachan »

I will be immodest and nominate one of my own posts for this honor. Normally, I would never do this, but this issue is extremely important and needs to be more widely understood. Mods, feel free to remove this post from this thread if you wish.

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 3#p1780078
Avarachan wrote:
fanne wrote: or was there some rivalry between VKS and AC (as in some fundamental difference, like lets build a 20,000 KM ICBM and both on different pages and AC being different than NAMO govt).
No. What needs to be more widely understood is that in India (as in most large, developed countries), there is a national-security establishment which is very deeply embedded. Politicians come and go, but it is extremely difficult to get rid of the establishment (barring cataclysmic war). India's national-security establishment remembers the events of 1965-66 (Congress), 1971 (Congress), 1998-99 (BJP), and 2008 (Congress). There is unanimity on the need for 360 degree deterrence.

By the way, India already has that to a certain extent. If a missile can travel 3500 km with a 2500 kg payload, perhaps it can travel much further with a 200 kg payload. I'll leave that to your imagination.

UPDATE: I should add that this is not a prescription for complacency. It is certainly true that foolish politicians can do significant damage to a country's national-security establishment. One example of that is PM Morarji Desai (who is rumored to have been a CIA asset; he shut down much of RAW). Another example is PM I.K. Gujral (who shut down CIT-X and CIT-J).
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